


European Society for the History of the Human Sciences

30th ESHHS CONFERENCE

BELGRADE 5-8 July 2011



BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

ed. Gordana JOVANOVIĆ

Faculty of Philosophy
University of Belgrade

Belgrade 2011



30th ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY FOR THE HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES (ESHHS)

**Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade
BELGRADE, SERBIA, 5-8 July 2011**

Organised by

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Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade

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BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

Ed. Gordana Jovanović

Belgrade 2011

EDITORIAL

Dear conference participants,

I would like to cordially welcome you to the 30th Conference of the European Society for the History of the Human Sciences, taking place in Belgrade, Serbia, 5-8 July 2011.

As any other human affair this conference is a result of many previous intentional activities, but also some contingencies. Thanks to both kinds of processes this anniversary ESHHS conference is taking place in a region and a place that has been traditionally perceived as obsessed with history. Such a perception is usually accompanied by suggestions or even demands to turn away from history.

Beyond the specificity of the local place we live in an epoch that has declared the end of history, the end of grand narratives, and the death of the subject. Unity and continuity have been deconstructed and delegitimized as principles of thinking and living.

Human sciences are involved in both continuities and shifts and ruptures in many ways. If we accept Vico's dictum *verum ipsum factum*, the true is the made, meaning "the content of *scienza* is identical with the development of that *scienza* itself", then we as researchers in human sciences have to deal with two intertwined kinds of historical worlds: socio-cultural history in a broad sense, which of course includes interpretations and self-interpretations of actors in history, and histories of interpretation and understanding of that history articulated and acknowledged within the division of labor as human sciences. We cannot but be obsessed with history. What should be recommended is rather to work against amnesia.

This conference symbolically marks thirty years of European Society for the History of the Human Sciences. These thirty years have witnessed radical socio-political changes in Europe but also worldwide - such changes could not be predicted, even if many, including scientists, worked toward them. Have we made a true world? It is not possible to silence this question.

Can we as researchers in human sciences be "objective", i.e. responsive and responsible to subjects whom we made "objects" of our study? Do we still remember them or have we already lost our "phenomena"?

On the programme of this conference are about 60 presentations, including four invited lectures by Kenneth Gergen, James Good, Thomas Laqueur and Henderikus Stam. Psychology is best represented as a discipline, but philosophy, history, pedagogy, sociology, anthropology, ethnology, history of science, literature, cultural studies, gender and women's studies are gladly taking their place too.

I wish for this conference to be an inspiring forum for remembering history and for thinking about the future - of our ESHHS society and of our societies at large.

I wish for this conference to be a meeting place where West and East, North and South - and I am very glad they are represented at this conference by over 70 participants from 18 countries - will encounter each other in the spirit of fruitful learning and of processes of self-understanding.

I welcome you all to Belgrade! Belgrade means “white town”, which stands for openness and hospitality. Dobro došli!

Gordana Jovanović
Local organiser
30th ESHHS Conference, Belgrade, 5-8 July 2011

Address by the ESHHS President

Dear colleague,

It is a pleasure to welcome you to this conference, which heralds the 30th anniversary of the ESHHS and which is hosted so generously by prof. Gordana Jovanovic. This book of abstracts is the endproduct of both your work and that of the programme committee. It reflects the variety of academic work in the history of the human sciences, an endeavour that the ESHHS has been stimulating for thirty years now. I am looking forward to meeting you at the conference!

Dr. Ruud Abma
President of the ESHHS

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INVITED LECTURES

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PSYCHOLOGY AFTER THE RELATIONAL TURN

Psychology as a field of study was born within a Western tradition in which a dualist vision of minds within bodies prevailed. For more than a century the research programs of the science have sustained this conception, both reifying mental process through research, and rendering support to the cultural institutions (e.g. educational, political, judicial) lodged within this tradition. The contemporary neuro-movement has the potential to subvert the dualist tradition, replacing it with a materialist monism. However, its problematic explanatory preferences have only lead to further objectification. At the same time, over the past several decades, a variety of significant intellectual movements have raised critical questions regarding the dualist tradition, and without reverting to monism, point to new forms of understanding human action. These movements include, from philosophy, the Wittgenstienian account of language, Dewey's pragmatism, and Rorty's critique of traditional epistemology. From critical theory – moving across all the social sciences including psychology – conceptions of the psychological agent are allied with individualism, neo-liberalism, and social oppression. From postmodern literary theory the conception of the author “behind the words” has been undermined. And from social constructionist accounts of scientific knowledge, the individual knower as the origin of knowledge, is replaced by an emphasis on the creation of meaning within communities.

Within a number of these critiques, one also finds the potentials for an alternative conception of human action, namely one that traces its origins to relational process. Within psychology this account is further developed within some strands of developmental psychology (e.g. Vygotskian), some aspects of narrative and dialogical psychology, and most prominently, within discursive psychology. In this latter work, for example, an “attitude” is defined not as a mental event that produces a verbal event, but as one's taking a position in a conversation; “memory” is not a cognitive event to be revealed through experimentation or brain scanning. Rather, it is a social activity defined and carried out in a requisite context.

In my book, *Relational Theory, Beyond Self and Community*, I try to bring these various influences together to generate a fully relational account of human action. The pivotal concept is that of *co-action* (or collaborative action), in which the genesis of all human meaning depends not on the action of a single individual, but a socially collaborative process. On this account, the very concept of an individual or of mental activity issues from a prior relational process. Relationships are not then formed by two or more independent actors, but rather, the very conception of independent actors depends on a preceding relational process. Building on the discursive orientation, we find that what we call human emotions are actions that acquire their meaning and their behavioral character through their placement within culturally scripted scenarios. In effect, we find that all those processes once attributed to individual minds can be satisfactorily incorporated within processes of relational action. What we call “psychology” (and its behavioral “manifestations”) is a relational achievement – a child of cultural history.

With the continued flourishing of relational visions of the person, traditional practices in psychology are thrown into question, and new potentials are opened for exploration. Research attempting to illuminate the character of mental processes, in particular, comes into question. Likewise most research on the neural basis of various psychological processes and forms of social behavior is obviated. All psychodiagnostic categories are similarly problematized. At the same time, alternative forms of inquiry and explanation are invited. Although the issues are complex, the goals of the field may usefully shift away from providing an “accurate and objective account” of what is the case, to joining with the culture in generating practices and technologies needed for cultural enhancement. Cause and effect analysis may be replaced by forms of confluential explanation. The goal of prediction and control may be muted in favor of co-creating new futures. Action oriented inquiry may be favored over experimentation. Strong investments may be favored in terms of creating collaborative and dialogic practices. Psychological theory would be less concerned with “integrating findings” in the service of “adequate understanding,” than in generating intelligibilities available for social change. A premium would be placed on “actionable theory,” that is, theory that can enter the cultural vocabulary in such a way that it may be used for valued ends.

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IS THE HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES HISTORY?

The 30th anniversary of ESHHS affords an opportunity not just for celebration but also for a review of accomplishments, challenges, and new priorities. Since the first meeting in Amsterdam in 1981 the landscape of the human sciences has changed dramatically, as has its historiography. Over the past 30 years, historians of the human sciences have assimilated the lessons of post-positivist philosophy of science and of social studies of science. Michel Foucault's monumental corpus has focused attention on the history of the present and Ian Hacking's studies charting the workings of dynamic nominalism have renewed attention to the role of reflexivity and illustrated the looping effects involved in the 'making up' of people.

In the wake of the writings of scholars such Kurt Danziger, Mitchell Ash, Bill Woodward, Roger Smith, Graham Richards, Irmgard Staeuble, and Trudy Dehue among many others, critical history has long eclipsed celebratory histories and there is a growing awareness of the historical contingency of psychological categories, of the historicity of mind, and of the complex processes of disciplinary object formation. Over this period, increasing numbers of professional historians have made distinctive and important contributions to the field.

At an institutional level, there is also much to be optimistic about. A new APA journal, *History of Psychology*, began publication in 1998. Last year, the University of Akron's Center for the History of Psychology opened providing greatly expanded accommodation for the Archives for the History of American Psychology, a Public Gallery, and ample space for a Museum that will allow for the display of significantly more of the collection. In the United Kingdom, the British Psychological Society has also established a History of Psychology Centre sustained through significant partnerships with the Science Museum and the Wellcome Library, and the Wellcome Trust Centre for the History of Medicine at University College London. The BPS archive collection has also just recently become available online. The BPS also publishes *History & Philosophy of Psychology*, the periodical of its History and Philosophy of Psychology Section. The BPS in-house publication *The Psychologist* now has a regular 'Looking Back' Section and a special issue of *The Psychologist* was recently devoted to the History of Experimental Psychology, marking the 150th anniversary of the publication of Gustav Fechner's *Elemente der Psychophysik*.

Despite these achievements, there remains a sense of unease among historians of the human sciences. Increasingly, historians of psychology have found themselves working at the margins of the discipline whose development they are trying to chart and influence. A central question is: For whom, apart from themselves, are they writing? Over the past few decades work in the mainstream of the human sciences has proceeded largely without regard to research in the history of the human sciences. In psychology, an essentialist agenda has sought explanations of human behaviour located initially in cognitive and, more recently, in neuroscientific domains.

No less important is the question as to how historians of the human sciences will respond to new modes of knowledge production and to changing research values and funding priorities.

In this invited talk I assess some of the consequences of these developments and some of the possible futures for the history of the human sciences. At a time of global financial uncertainties, of the contraction of university funding, and (in the UK context, at least) of a questioning of the value of research in the humanities and social sciences, it is not easy to be optimistic about the future prospects for the field. Yet precisely because of these uncertainties a restatement of the case for the value of work in the history of the human science seems more important than ever. The disciplined use of the historical imagination in the reconstruction of the diverse pasts of the human sciences should be seen as constitutive of their possible futures. And as Roger Smith has frequently reminded us, the histories of the human sciences are themselves a form of human science – a way of exploring the nature of human possibility.

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THE DEEP TIME OF THE DEAD

I begin with a famous skeptical argument that dead bodies do not matter:

He ordered himself to be thrown anywhere without being buried. And when his friends replied, "What! to the birds and beasts?" "By no means," saith he; "place my staff near me, that I may drive them away." "How can you do that," they answer, "for you will not perceive them?" "How am I then injured by being torn by those animals, if I have no sensation?"¹ (Diogenes the Cynic, 412-c 320 b.c.e.)

The talk then asks why and how the dead body does matter, across time and almost everywhere; in particular times and particular places; in disparate religious and ideological circumstances; in cases where reason and common sense tell us that it does not and ought not to matter. Why, one might ask, did the comrades from eastern Europe want to be buried in Highgate Cemetery near the body of the founder of historical materialism, a man who, as a student, wrote his dissertation on Epicurus who famously argued that in death nothing is left of a person but atoms indistinguishable from all others in nature. Marx would have found this very peculiar. And so should we. Diogenes has a point.

I make an argument for the power of a deep time of the dead, a kind of anthropological ground base, through which the dead come to define community over time, to be the markers of history and more generally, like the incest taboo, to represent a boundary between nature and culture.

I will then turn briefly to a summary of an argument for why the dead matter at a specific time: in modernity. I make two sorts of arguments: first, they un-do the necro-geography that defined the Christian world as it emerged in late antiquity. Second, I want to claim that sometime in the eighteenth century History, memory, and anthropology became serious alternatives to metaphysics. We came to make meaning with corpses knowing that if pushed very, very hard we would have to admit that the work of the dead was magic. But it was a magic that people believed in. We could and did comfort ourselves in new ways; we could—melancholy as it was—keep the dead present tenuously among the living; we could make and remake communities persisting through time as we had done before with the machinery of History, memory, and anthropology. This I will claim is what is modern about the work of the dead in modernity: a protean magic we believe in despite ourselves.

¹ Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Loeb Classical Library) I, 43

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Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Reason in the Age of Science* (1981)

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HISTORY, MEMORY AND ETHICS: DO THE HUMAN SCIENCES STILL HAVE SOMETHING TO REMEMBER?

As a starting point, I take up Paul Connerton's claim in his recent work, *How modernity forgets*, that we are not only living in a "post-mnemonic age" but we are also "post-history." Connerton argues that this is a feature of late-capitalism which encourages us to construct a past that consists of idealized images shaping the desire for consumption. A consequence is that we are engaged in a kind of collective forgetfulness that is deeply embedded in the logic of late-capitalism. This "cultural amnesia," argues Connerton, is a feature of the spatial frameworks of a culture and the speed with which they are destroyed. At the same time, our production of information and our constant archiving of the immediate past creates a "hypermnesia." I take my task to be one of evaluating this claim in the context of what we have wrought in the histories of the human sciences. On the one hand, the human sciences in general, and psychology in particular, have joined in this aesthetic gloss by reducing history to a series of textbook frames within which celebratory accounts of the past glorify the ever expanding search for neuro-cognitive foundations of a new science that appears to be always just within reach. The effects of this 'cultural amnesia' within the human sciences are to remove the moral accounts of human nature that these sciences have carried and translate these into ever smaller 'stories' or 'images' whose function is to make the amoral features of a human *science* palatable. Within this aesthetic, the history of the conditions making possible a reflexive evaluation of human existence has been reduced to a series of technical proposals. That our language of reflexive categories is not fixed for example (e.g., Danziger, 1997) is suppressed in contemporary scientific accounts, which rely on the reification and naturalization of psychological categories. Critical historians have resisted this push but in doing so have been alienated from the very disciplines they would transform. Like historians of science we could soon be looking for employment in other kinds of disciplinary arrangements.

In this paper I address some of the consequences of these developments, taking the position that as history becomes less relevant to a technical discipline it becomes more relevant to a critical account of what it is to be human. It does so through the process of narrativization, the way in which both moral and historical tales are told. Taking a cue from narrative theories (e.g., Carr, 2008) I argue that the similarity between storytelling and action, between narrative and life, is more than accidental. History as narrative not only tells a tale but also provides an ethical dimension that is lost in the hypermnesia of the historical aesthetic described by Connerton.

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**SYMPOSIUM ON CULTURAL
PSYCHOLOGY**

SYMPOSIUM »CONTEMPORARY CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS HISTORY«

The symposium deals with the contemporary cultural psychology and its history. Two of four lectures look back on the history of cultural psychology and ask for its roots as well as for reasons and reasoning of its occurrence. The other two lectures deal with contemporary cultural psychology and programmatically look forward at its future to generate questions that a prosperous cultural psychology must answer.

In the first lecture Christian Allesch asks for the roots of cultural psychology and finds them in the anthropological tradition of culture and personality studies; a research tradition deeply associated with the names of Franz Boas, Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead. The successful psychoanalytic approach of its very first beginnings came to an end after the Second World War. Robert A. LeVine revives the interest in this tradition in the 1970s and 1980s by giving the traditional ethnological approach a new interdisciplinary basis (LeVine, 1974) and by positioning it in evolutionary discourse (LeVine, 1982). LeVine also created the term cultural psychology (Shweder, 1999, p. 62). Unfortunately this approach got less attention till the 1990s and the research field was dominated by the cross-cultural tradition.

The cultural psychology in the 1990s is the topic of Lars Allolio-Näcke's lecture. He is not asking for its historical roots rather he asks for reasons that made such a strong but very heterogeneous movement within psychology possible (Cole, 1996, Shweder, 1990, Shweder & Sullivan, 1990). He argues that cultural psychology is in this time nopsychological discipline, but it offered points of mutuality to at least four important psychological sub-disciplines. This mutuality was the reason why these sub-disciplines adopted the term cultural psychology and made it into their headline. Behind the surface the reasons for adopting the term have been very heterogeneous and the metaphysical and anthropological assumptions of each sub-discipline are so disparate that it can be asked, whether cultural psychology is a psychology or a bundle of psychologies? Finally, from the standpoint of historical criticism he asks what such disparity means to the future of cultural psychology (Allolio-Näcke, 2005).

Taking up the last perspective Gordana Jovanović and Jürgen Straub look into the future and position contemporary cultural psychology in its own history as well as in the history of psychology in general. First, Jürgen Straub deconstructs two of the main arguments often cited to position cultural psychology as a development within psychology: firstly, the citation of Wundt's *Völkerpsychologie* (Wundt, 1905-09), that is nothing more than a translation error going back to Stephen Toulmin (1980) and its prominent use by Michael Cole (1996); secondly the citation of Dilthey's *Geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie* that Dilthey himself labeled often as cultural psychology. With that traditions however, the contemporary cultural psychology has nothing in common. So the question arises what then characterizes cultural psychology and what questions have to be asked to boost its development. These questions are: What is human action and how it is explained in cultural psychology? What is human knowledge and how is it used to create subjectivity and forms of subjectivity. The last thesis of this lecture will be that these questions can be answered only with use of interdisciplinary and philosophical positions..

Finally, Gordana Jovanović puts the history of cultural psychology into the history of psychology in general and asks for its place and its relevance in this context. She understands

and establishes cultural psychology – almost one century after the emergence of psychology as an empirical discipline – as a new beginning of scientific psychology. Cultural psychology is no more and no less than a new understanding of human experience accompanied with a consequent shift to new methods that are more appropriate and effective to gain access to specific human experience. In that context the reflective tools of human beings are very important. However, these tools cannot be understood in the sense of a second cognitive revolution (Bruner, 1990), nor in the sense of the political program of the Chicago school, that relativistically postulates differences in ethnicity (Shweder & Sullivan, 1993). These tools should not be understood individualistically and not primarily as differing by ethnicity. Only the general ability of people to reflect on the world and themselves guarantees the psychological unity of humankind – that can be reasoned by citing Vygotski (1934) as well as Wittgenstein's thesis of non-private language games or Carl Ratner's macro psychology.

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SYMPOSIUM »KULTURPSYCHOLOGIE UND IHRE GESCHICHTE«

Das Symposium beschäftigt sich mit der zeitgenössischen Kulturpsychologie und ihrer Geschichte. Dabei blicken zwei Vorträge in die Geschichte der Kulturpsychologie zurück und fragen nach ihrer Wurzeln ebenso wie nach den Gründen und Begründungen ihres Auftauchens. Zwei weitere Beiträge beschäftigen sich mit der rezenten Kulturpsychologie und schauen programmatisch in die Zukunft, um Fragen zu generieren, denen sich eine zukünftige und Potenziale habende Kulturpsychologie stellen muss.

Zunächst widmet sich Christian Allesch der Frage nach den Wurzeln der Kulturpsychologie und findet sie in der ethnologischen Tradition der Culture and Personality studies. Das nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg zurückgegangene Interesse an dieser psychoanalytischen Tradition wird in den 1970 und 1980er Jahren durch Robert A. LeVine wiedererweckt, indem er den klassisch ethnologischen Ansatz durch eine interdisziplinäre Basis ergänzt (LeVine, 1974) und in einen evolutionären Zusammenhang setzt (LeVine, 1982). Auf LeVine geht auch der neugeschaffene Begriff Cultural Psychology zurück (Shweder, 1999, p. 62). Allerdings blieb dieser Ansatz bis in die 1990er Jahre wenig beachtet und musste dem Paradigma der kulturvergleichenden Psychologie das Feld überlassen.

Lars Allolio-Näcke knüpft direkt an den Vortrag an und beschäftigt sich mit der Entwicklung der Cultural Psychology ab den 1990er Jahre. Dabei fragt er weniger nach den historischen Wurzeln als vielmehr nach den Begründungsmustern die zu einer so starken aber sehr heterogenen Bewegung innerhalb der Psychologie führten (Cole, 1996, Shweder, 1990; Shweder & Sullivan, 1990). Es wird argumentiert, dass die Kulturpsychologie keine psychologische Disziplin ist, aber Anknüpfungspunkte bot, die für mindestens vier psychologische Strömungen von Bedeutung waren und somit ein Label wie einen Arbeitskontext boten. Allerdings waren die Gründe, warum sich gerade diese Strömungen unter das Label Cultural Psychology stellten, heterogen, ebenso wie die metaphysischen und anthropologischen Grundannahmen so disparat sind, dass man zu Recht die Frage stellen kann, ob es sich bei der Kulturpsychologie um eine –logie oder um –logien handelt. Schließlich wird aus dieser historischen Kritik heraus die Frage aufgeworfen, was dies denn für die Zukunft der Kulturpsychologie bedeutet (Allolio-Näcke, 2005).

Die letzte Frage aufgreifend richten Gordana Jovanovic und Jürgen Straub ihren Blick in die Zukunft und versuchen eine Positionsbestimmung der Kulturpsychologie unter Rückgriff ihrer Geschichte. Zunächst dekonstruiert Jürgen Straub zwei der wichtigsten historisierenden Begründungsmuster der Kulturpsychologie, die immer wieder zur historischen Begründung herangezogen werden: einerseits der Rückgriff auf Wundts Völkerpsychologie (Wundt, 1905-09), was vermutlich auf einen Übersetzungsfehler Michael Cole zurückgeht (1996), und andererseits der Rückgriff auf Dilthey, der seinen Geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie selbst hin und wieder als Kulturpsychologie bezeichnete. Mit diesen Traditionen hat allerdings die rezente Kulturpsychologie nichts gemein und deshalb wird Jürgen Straub fragen, was die rezente Kulturpsychologie auszeichnet und welche relevanten Fragen ihre Entwicklung bestimmen werden. Die Fragen sind: Was ist menschliches Handeln und wie wird es in der Kulturpsychologie verstehend erklärt? Was ist und wozu dient menschliches Wissen in Bezug

auf Subjektivität und Subjektivitätsformen. Dass diese Fragen nur interdisziplinär und mit Rückgriff auf philosophische Positionen beantwortet werden können, wird die Abschlussthese des Vortrag lauten.

Schließlich stellt Gordana Jovanovic die Frage nach der Geschichte der Kulturpsychologie globaler, indem sie ihren Platz in der Geschichte der Psychologie im Allgemeinen bestimmt. Jovanovic versteht und begründet die Kulturpsychologie als Neubeginn der wissenschaftlichen Psychologie, fast ein Jahrhundert nach dem Auftauchen der Psychologie als empirischer Wissenschaft. Die Kulturpsychologie ist nicht mehr und nicht weniger als eine Neubegründung des Erfahrungsbegriffs und einer konsequenten Neubestimmung der Methoden, wie diese neugefasste Erfahrung wissenschaftlich zu untersuchen ist. Dabei kommen den reflective tool des Menschen besondere Bedeutung zu. Allerdings können diese weder im Sinne einer zweiten kognitiven Revolution gefasst werden (Bruner, 1990), noch im Sinne des politischen Programms der Chicagoer Schule, dass auf dem Postulat der relativistischen Differenzierung der Menschheit beruht (Shweder & Sullivan, 1993). Vielmehr muss man diese tools als nicht individuell und nicht verschiedene fassen, denn die Befähigung des Menschen zur Reflexion begründet ihre psychologische Einheit, was sich mit Vygotski (1934) ebenso begründen lässt wie mit Wittgensteins These der nicht-privaten Sprachspiele oder der Makropsychologie, wie sie Carl Ratner vertritt.

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CULTURE AND PERSONALITY: A ONCE AND FUTURE RESEARCH PROGRAM?

The “Culture and Personality” approach formed a remarkable research program within cultural anthropology and cultural psychology of the 20th century. Inspired by the Freudian hypotheses that the development of personality is decisively coined by experiences in early childhood, early field studies like those of Margaret Mead and Abram Kardiner aimed at finding relations between culture-bound child rearing practices and predominant personality characteristics within the respective cultures. Due to some problematic projects in the wake of the 2nd world war, the reputation of the “Culture and Personality” movement diminished, in particular among anthropologists (cf. LeVine, 2001).

In the 1970ies and 1980ies Robert A. LeVine tried to revitalise the traditional culture and personality paradigm by broadening the interdisciplinary base (LeVine, 1974) and by reinterpreting it within an evolutionary context (LeVine, 1982). Recent reviews (for example Church, 2001) show a clear predominance of cross-cultural studies based on the Big Five model and on constructs like Hofstede’s dimensions collectivism vs. individualism, using designs that are very similar to those of mainstream cross-cultural research. Hence it may be questioned whether the “culture and personality” approach still represents a particular research paradigm and in which respect it could form a particular research tradition in the future.

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KULTURPSYCHOLOGIE – EINE ALTE UND ZUKUNFTSTRÄCHTIGE DISZIPLIN?

Als Psychologe sollte man die erste Teilfrage verneinen. Auch wenn Michael Cole (1996) argumentiert, die Kulturpsychologie hätte es schon zu Beginn der wissenschaftlichen Psychologie gegeben, indem er auf Wundts *Völkerpsychologie* (1905-09) verweist, lässt sich dies schnell widerlegen. Wundt arbeitet in seiner *Völkerpsychologie* nicht auf der Höhe der psychologischen Methoden seiner Zeit, sondern bedient sich der ethnografischen Methode, sprich: sammeln fremder Artefakte, diese interpretieren und dann die beschriebene Ethnie auf einer sozio-darwinistischen Entwicklungsskala der Menschheit einordnen (vgl. Kim, 1997; Morss, 1990). Was Ende der 1980er Jahre erscheint, ist eine Subdisziplin der Ethnologie – schon ein kurzer Blick in die Literaturliste des einflussreichen Shwederschen Buchbeitrages *Cultural psychology – what is it?* (1990) genügt (vgl. Shweder & Sullivan, 1990, 1993); es werden lediglich zwei Psychologen zitiert, einer davon ist – kaum verwunderlich – Michael Cole. Dennoch bleibt die Frage, wie und warum Cole die Wiederkehr einer psychologischen Disziplin ausruft, die es bis dato gar nicht gibt? Ebenso kann man sich fragen, wieso Jerome Bruner in seinem Buch *Acts of Meaning* (1990) schreibt, dass es sich bei der Kulturpsychologie um die *second cognitive revolution* handle, die endlich umsetze, was dem Kognitivismus nicht gelungen sei: die behavioristischen Reiz-Reaktions-Schemata durch *Sinn* und *Bedeutung* zu ersetzen. Auch dies ist ein Versuch einer historischen Begründung der Kulturpsychologie in der Geschichte der Psychologie – der durchaus kritisch in Frage gestellt werden kann (vgl. Zielke, 2004, S. 158ff.).

Was sich Anfang der 1990er Jahre finden lässt, sind verschiedene Ansätze, die in der Tat Sinn und Bedeutung in der Mittelpunkt ihrer Betrachtungen stellen. Auch wenn man sie unter den Begriff »semiotische Ansätze« subsumieren kann, handelt es sich um ein hinsichtlich der philosophischen Vorannahmen und des Menschenbildes sehr disparates Feld: (1) Da sind zunächst die psychologischen Ansätze zu nennen, die sich auf den *linguistic turn* nach Wittgenstein beziehen (Kenneth Gergen, Derek Edwards, Jonathan Potter, John Shotter, Jens Brockmeier, Rom Harré). (2) Die zweite Gruppe entspringt der Tradition der kulturhistorischen Schule, zu der Wygotski, Lurija und Leontjew gezählt werden (Carl Ratner, Michael Cole, Jaan Valsiner, James Wertsch, Martin Hildebrand-Nilshon). (3) Ein drittes Cluster lässt sich in der Ethnologie selbst finden, also der Mutterdisziplin der Kulturpsychologie (Richard A. Shweder, Nancy Much, Jerome Bruner). (4) Hinzugesellen sich – und erhalten vor allem erstmals internationale Beachtung – eigenständige deutsche Entwicklungen, wie Boesch's symbolische Handlungstheorie (Ernst E. Boesch, Lutz Eckensberger, Bernd Krewer), Wilhelm Salbers Morphologische Psychologie und ihre Weiterentwicklung (Wilhelm Salbers, Norbert Groeben) sowie Eduard Sprangers Geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie (Eduard Spranger). (5) Schließlich müssen auch noch diverse Ansätze Indigener Psychologie genannt werden, auch wenn diese für sich beanspruchen, nicht in der Kulturpsychologie aufzugehen. Allerdings, so

argumentiert Chakkarath (2007, S. 242), führt sich diese Bewegung eben auf die Auseinandersetzung mit der westlichen Kulturpsychologie zurück.

Die Gründe, warum sich diese verschiedenen Einzelströmungen unter dem Begriff Kulturpsychologie sammeln, sind vielfältig, z. B. im Falle der Tätigkeitspsychologie liegt die Neuerfindung im Kampf gegen die Bedeutungslosigkeit nach dem Zusammenbruch des Ostblocks begründet. Dennoch lässt sich ein gemeinsamer Anker benennen: Der Grund, warum die Bezugnahme auf die Kulturpsychologie erfolgte, war, dass Richard A. Shweder entgegen den Debatten in der Psychologie nicht nur methodische Fragen diskutierte, sondern den psychologischen Gegenstand und die Inhalte psychologischer Forschung thematisierte – und diese historisch kontingent zu den verschiedenen psychologischen Ansätzen passten. Auch wenn die Kulturpsychologie also nicht eine alte und vitale Teildisziplin der Psychologie ist, so lässt sich ein Treppenwitz der Geschichte finden. Aus ethnologischer Perspektive muss man Coles Überschrift nämlich in der Tat mit ›Ja‹ beantworten – denn die Kulturpsychologie war und ist eine recht vitale Subdisziplin der Ethnologie. Coles Hinweis auf Wundt ist dann insofern richtig, als die Urväter der Kulturanthropologie Franz Boas und Bronislaw Malinowski seine Vorlesungen in Leipzig besuchten und damit von Wundt lernten.

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IS CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY A ONCE AND FUTURE DISCIPLINE?

From a psychological standpoint the answer on the first part of the question should be ›no‹. Although Michael Cole (1996) reasons his thesis of reemerging of an old psychological discipline by referring on Wundts *Völkerpsychologie* (1905-09), this link misses plausibility. In no volume of the 10 volumes broad *Völkerpsychologie* Wundt worked in a ›psychological‹ manner. His method was the ethnographic approach of his time, which means to collect alien artifacts, interpret them and describe this ethnic group through the lens of a psycho-developmental-socio-Darwinistic theory. What emerges at the end of the 1980s is original an anthropological discipline, a quick view into the reference list of Richard A. Shwede's influential chapter *Cultural psychology – what is it?* suffices: only two psychologists are cited, one of them is Michael Cole. So the question arises, why Michael Cole stated the reemerging of a once discipline of psychology? The same question can be asked regarding Jerome Bruner's thesis of the *second cognitive revolution* that he formulates in his book *Acts of meaning* (1990). Bruner argues that cultural psychology is just the follower of cognitivism because it accomplishes its goal: to replace the stimulus-response-schemes of behaviorism by *sense* and *meaning*. But this is also nothing other than a trial to reason that cultural psychology was and is part of psychology – this kind of historical story telling should be criticized (see Zielke, 2004, S. 158).

But there was no such discipline once and there is no one in the early 1990s. What exist is a mix of different approaches that refer on sense- and meaning-making as primary psychic functioning of people. Although I call them in sum ›semiotic approaches‹ they differ enormous in their philosophical assumptions and in their *Menschenbild* (idea of man). (1) The first group is formed by psychological approaches that refer on the linguistic turn following Wittgenstein (Kenneth Gergen, Derek Edwards, Jonathan Potter, John Shotter, Jens Brockmeier, Rom Harré). (2) The second group is formed by psychological approaches in tradition of the so-called culture-historic school formed by Vygotski, Luria und Leont'ev (Carl Ratner, Michael Cole, Jaan Valsiner, James Wertsch, Martin Hildebrand-Nilshon). (3) The third group is formed by anthropological approaches itself (Richard A. Shweder, Nancy Much, Jerome Bruner). (4) The fourth group is formed by independent German developments, that gain new national attention as well as a first international attention: The symbolic action theory by Ernst E. Boesch (Ernst E. Boesch, Lutz Eckensberger, Bernd Krewer), the morphologic psychology by Wilhelm Salber (Wilhelm Salbers, Norbert Groeben) and the *geisteswissenschaftliche* psychology by Eduard Spranger. (5) Despite they claim not to be congruent with cultural psychology, the last group is formed by divers approaches of indigenous psychologies. Despite the claim Chakkarath argues (2007, S. 242) that most approaches formed themselves by debating with the western cultural psychological approaches.

The reasons differ, why this disparate approaches meet under the umbrella-term of cultural psychology, e.g. in case of action theory the new invention as cultural psychology results from the struggle against the vacuity after the ruin of the Eastern Bloc. But beside this a shared reason can be found, why they claim themselves as cultural psychology: The reason to refer on Shweder was that psychology does not had an object, no contents – but Shweder has. His paper

was not on methods like the primary discourses in psychology, he wrote about psyche as object and sense- and meaning-making as content – and it was historically contingent that this fits to the different psychological approaches now labeled as cultural psychology. Although cultural psychology was not and is not a vital discipline of psychology, at least a joke is inside the whole development and the statement of Cole. From an anthropological standpoint the answer on his question is ›yes‹, because cultural psychology was and is a vital discipline in anthropology. The argued link to Wundt really exists: The prime fathers of cultural anthropology, Franz Boas as well as Bronislaw Malinowski, have been his students.

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CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY IN THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY

The famous diagnosis by Ebbinghaus “psychology has a long past, but a short history” expressed at the beginning of the 20th century, just a few decades after the establishment of psychology as an independent empirical science, is still valid. Even more, its trustworthiness has increased - for different reasons, some of them being produced by new developments within the historiography of psychology itself (see, for example, Danziger, 1990, 1997).

The short history of psychology has been dominated by selection and construction of its subject-matter in the domain of “natural kinds”, consequently by naturalistic epistemological models, quantitative methodology and epistemic goals defined as prediction and control. Thus, scientific psychology has abandoned not only its pre-scientific “soul”, but to a great extent also consciousness and lived experience as legitimate objects of psychological study. Naturalism has its logical consequence in individualism – another striking feature of the dominant psychological theorizing and practice.

Against such a background, the very idea of cultural psychology can be understood as a new, and even as a proper start of psychology, this time as a science of human experience and activity in a human-made world – instead of natural psychology. In fact, “the needs of psychology as a whole” are in “the study of dynamic, meaning-making human beings” (Valsiner, 2009). In other words, we need a “second psychology” dealing with higher mental phenomena given form by symbols, language, myth (Cole, 1996). Further, it would be possible to understand cultural psychology as “a return of the repressed past”, a kind of reminiscence of the previous life in different domains – first of all, philosophy, but also religion, literature, art.

Although both natural and cultural psychology are, by their very nature, cultural and symbolic forms themselves, (Cassirer, 1929), natural psychology has no conceptual means to reflect on its own socio-cultural embeddedness. In that regard it can be claimed that the project of cultural psychology provides conceptual means for a potentially more self-reflective attitude. That would be, yet another contribution of historical relevance to the psychology in general. The next question would be then to find out how cultural psychology uses these reflective tools.

In Jerome Bruner’s (1990) understanding of cultural psychology as a second cognitive revolution cultural psychology has been clearly situated within the history of psychology, but I would question whether that point of reference is a suitable approach to understand subject-matter of cultural psychology (“culture in minds and societies”, Valsiner, 2007) and its characteristic methodologies (“systemic, qualitative and idiographic”, Valsiner, 2007).

When Richard Shweder and Maria Sullivan (1993) described the context of reemergence of cultural psychology in 1990s as the “decade of ethnicity” and its aims as “development of a credible theory of psychological pluralism”, these prominent proponents of cultural psychology have ascribed it a role within a framework, which has also specific political connotations. These connotations are founded in a normative semiotic privileging of differences at the expense of

what is shared, which in turn enabled political implementations of such ideas that had led to a growing number of ethnic conflicts and even dissolution wars.

New reasons to reflect on the foundations of cultural psychology must be added to the already compelling theoretical and epistemological ones. These new reasons should be derived from the historical vicissitudes of cultural psychology within the historical role of psychology.

I would argue that emancipatory potentials of cultural psychology require reclaiming the necessity and value of the shared universal: universality of culture as a defining feature of human world makes cultural psychology a project with historical significance for psychology, rather than cultural differences. That universalistic claim should be strengthened already at the level of semiotic agenda of cultural psychology - construction of meaning itself involves processes of generalization (Vygotsky, 1934), or, with Wittgenstein's argument - there is no private language.

Consequently, in my view, the primary subject-matter of cultural psychology is the mediated transformation of objectified social, cultural objects into subjective processes and externalization of subjective states into signifying tools of communication and cultural transmission.

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KULTURPSYCHOLOGIE HEUTE EINE POSITIONSBESTIMMUNG IM RÜCKBLICK AUF DIE GESCHICHTE DER PSYCHOLOGIE

Es ist eine Binsenweisheit, dass auch wissenschaftliche Positionen ihren historischen Hintergrund haben. Wenngleich es seit Thomas Kuhns Arbeiten als falsch gelten darf, Erkenntnisfortschritt (wissenschaftssoziologisch naiv) als eine kontinuierliche Entwicklung am Maßstab rationaler Kriterien aufzufassen, ist die Wissenschaftsgeschichte doch mehr als eine kontingente Abfolge diskontinuierlicher Standpunkte, die sich aus Gründen der Macht eben durchgesetzt haben. Traditionen spielen bisweilen auch deswegen eine Rolle, weil sie starke Argumente und bleibende Einsichten bewahren, an die spätere Generationen anknüpfen können.

Was die heutige Kulturpsychologie angeht, berufen sich viele Vertreter und Vertreterinnen auf solche Traditionen. Von besonderer Bedeutung sind dabei – neben anderen Strömungen wie der Kulturhistorischen Schule der Psychologie in Russland – vor allem zwei Ansätze:

- die sog. Völkerpsychologie, wie sie von Lazarus und Steinthal seit Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts programmatisch skizziert, aber auch von Wundt seit den 1880er Jahren, insbesondere dann in den ersten beiden Jahrzehnten des 20. Jahrhunderts ausgearbeitet wurde;
- die sog. Geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie, als deren Gründer und wichtigster Vertreter im 19. Jahrhundert Dilthey galt, dessen Denken im 20. Jahrhundert insbesondere von Spranger fortgesetzt wurde (der die Geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie auch als „Kulturpsychologie“ bezeichnete).

Im Vortrag sollen einige Argumente entfaltet werden, die zeigen, warum wir heute kaum mehr an diese beiden, theoretisch und methodisch überholten Traditionen anknüpfen und weshalb wir kaum noch etwas wirklich Weiterführendes von ihnen lernen können. An die Stelle einer verklärenden Beschwörung dereinst bedeutsamer Positionen muss in der zeitgenössischen Kulturpsychologie nach der hier vertretenen Auffassung noch sehr viel stärker als bislang die Suche nach tragfähigen Antworten auf die Frage treten, was „Kulturpsychologie heute“ sein, wie sie theoretisch konzeptualisiert und methodisch betrieben werden sollte und was sie als avancierte interpretative Disziplin leisten kann. Dabei steht deren dezidiert interdisziplinäre Ausrichtung ganz außer Frage. Die Kulturpsychologie ist auf interdisziplinäre Grenzüberschreitungen und Kooperationen angewiesen. Der Blick in die Philosophie sowie andere Sozial- und Kulturwissenschaften ist für sie unabdingbar und produktiv. Im Vortrag wird das an wenigen, aber grundlegenden und zentralen Fragen erörtert. Dabei geht es exemplarisch um folgende Fragen:

- Was ist menschliches Handeln und wie wird es in der Kulturpsychologie verstehend erklärt?

- Was ist und wozu dient menschliches Wissen – einschließlich des kulturpsychologischen! –, wenn es nicht nur im Zeichen des Erkenntnisfortschritts steht (z.B. bessere „verstehende Handlungserklärungen“ schafft), sondern auch Macht begründet und Machtverhältnisse transformiert (z.B. durch die Etablierung neuer Subjektivierungsformen und neuartiger Formen der Subjektivität)?

Die erste Frage möchte ich mithilfe wichtiger Beiträge aus der Analytischen Philosophie des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts beantworten, die zweite unter Bezugnahme auf Arbeiten des eigenwilligen Historikers Michel Foucault. Die dabei skizzierten Antworten können als *exemplarische* Hinweise darauf gelesen werden, was „Kulturpsychologie heute“ so alles sein und tun kann – und wie sie dabei methodisch vorgehen kann, ohne sich dogmatisch auf eine einzige Methode zu versteifen.

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GROUP PSYCHOLOGY IN THE TRENCHES. SHELL SHOCK REVISITED

In December 1914, the War Office in London reported that 7-10% of all officers and 3-4% of all ranks, returned from the battlefields of World War I suffering from nervous breakdown. In a 1915 article in *The Lancet* the physician and psychologists Charles S. Myers coined the term 'shell shock' for this condition. The hypothesized neurological injury could not be demonstrated, however. Moreover, the symptoms associated with shell shock, also appeared in soldiers who had not been anywhere near to exploding shells.

Various types of explanations and concurring treatments were given. According to traditional military ideology 'war was a test of manhood', and the only honorable way for a soldier to disengage from the battlefield was by being seriously physically wounded. All other instances were signs of weakness, cowardice or – even worse – pacifism. When military discipline failed, army psychiatry was hired to restore manpower. The traditional psychiatric account – dropout is caused by degeneration – was implausible, in view of the thousands of mental casualties. So it was either malingering or 'male hysteria'. Treatments would vary from harsh electrotherapeutic procedures to psychodynamic 'talking cures'.

In this paper, the cause of this epidemic of nervous diseases is sought in the changes in warfare. Traditional military ideology was valid in wars where the battles were between (groups of) human beings. But World War I was an anonymous, industrial war, in which human losses were seen as 'wastage'. Human beings, even in thousands, were no match for the heavy artillery. The destructive effects of this were not only visible in death rates, but also in the practical and moral disintegration of the primary military units. When intact, a battalion had a chance to survive, but its psychological strength would wane quickly when, for instance, its commanding officers were killed.

In his book on *Group psychology and analysis of the ego* (1921), Sigmund Freud wrote: The neglect of the working of group ties is not just a theoretical omission 'but also a practical danger. Prussian militarism (...) may have had to suffer the consequences of this in the [First] World War. We know that the war neuroses which ravaged the German army have been recognized as being a protest of the individual against the part he was expected to play in the army. (...) the hard treatment of the men by their superiors may be considered as the foremost among the motive factors of the disease.' Upon Freud's analysis, *losing* your superior(s) has even worse consequences than harsh treatment, because it weakens the group ties – the soldiers are left on their own, which opens the door to the contagious processes of panic and other hysterical reactions.

The war poetry of British officer Siegfried Sassoon (1886-1967) reflects not only his personal war experiences, but also the confrontation between the 19th century nationalistic glorification of 'defending your country' and the reality of the dehumanized trench warfare in 1914-1918. Dying in battle appeared in Sassoon's poems not as a heroic act, but rather as a

senseless waste. In line with Freud's group psychology, Sassoon's poetry and memoirs also showed the importance of good comradeship between soldiers and of caring and dedicated leadership by their officers.

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COMPATIBILITY OF JOHN DEWEY'S WORK AND HOWARD GARDNER'S MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES THEORY: EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

Since 1983, when Howard Gardner published his theory of multiple intelligences (MI), educators have begun to incorporate this new model into school programs. Soon, it became a philosophy of education that offered opportunity for creative adaptation of MI key principles to a number of educational settings. However, the idea of multimodal teaching is hardly a new concept. Many pioneers of modern education, such as: J.J.Rousseau, J.H. Pestalozzi, M.Montessori, J. Dewey, suggested systems of teaching based upon more than verbal pedagogy. Also, many current alternative educational models essentially are MI systems using different terminologies.

The aim of the research presented in this paper is to identify and compare compatible elements of educational ideas of John Dewey and Howard Gardner. Even though Dewey's influence is not explicitly stressed in Gardner's work, it is possible to identify many elements in common in their understanding of educational environment and teaching. Furthermore, Gardner's MI theory can be described as a meta-model of education in the spirit of Dewey's ideas on progressive education and his vision of classroom and school as embryonic form of society.

The research is focused on analysis of three key elements of the philosophy of education presented in the work of both authors: curriculum, methods of teaching and learning, and teachers' role.

Curriculum. According to Gardner, MI school environment provide a setting for learning that is hand-on, interdisciplinary, based on real-life contexts, and set in an informal atmosphere that promotes free inquiry into novel materials and situations. He points out that an "MI setting" can be undone if the curriculum is too rigid. Delivery of the traditional school subjects should be done in non-traditional ways, through project-centered instruction and extension of students' understanding of the topic by activities in the local community. Thematic and integrative instruction imitates life because it teaches students from an interdisciplinary point of view and provides them with opportunities to use their multiple intelligences in practical ways. This is closely associated with Dewey's endeavors for experiential learning and practical activities ("learning-by-doing") through which student reproduce a certain real-life occupation. Hence, the three R's (Reading, Writing and Arithmetic) should be studied not as formal subjects, but should express the student need to master them as instruments for achieving new goals.

Methods. Noting that the traditional classrooms stimulate dominantly linguistic and logical-mathematical abilities, Gardner emphasizes the need to expand teachers' repertoire of strategies with ones that nurture each of the seven intelligences. Gardner claims that broad range of techniques provide each student, from time to time, to have opportunity to learn in a way that works best for him/her. Dewey also stress that a question of method is essentially question of

students' strengths and interests. That means that teacher should create a classroom in which students' interests, as rudiments of their abilities, will be respected and followed. Implementation of variety of active methods of learning will give opportunity to students to express their specific identity. However, selection of appropriate methods should be based on solid criteria and critical inquiry on the part of the teacher.

Teachers' role. The teacher in the MI classroom continually shifts methods from linguistic to spatial, from musical to bodily-kinesthetic, often combining intelligences in creative way. He/she stimulates students to interact in different ways, to undertake self-paced work and to link their personal experiences and feelings to the material being studied. There is no doubt that in Dewey's theory teacher is indispensable figure in the process of education as the one who guide and nurture student's development. His role is to "psychologize" subject content which means to connect it with the student's developing experience. To be able to guide students in this manner, the teacher must adjust the school life to the intellectual and personal characteristics of each student, and to represent an "intelligent medium of acting".

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THE LIFE OF GIFTEDNESS: DUST TO DUST... A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE FIELD OF GIFTEDNESS AND GIFTED EDUCATION

Introduction. A paradigm shift has by now been identified in many fields of scientific endeavor, and the field of giftedness research is no exception. Rewind back to 1869, when Galton published his study of England's intellectual elite, and you will learn that giftedness (a.k.a. genius) is a general power, an endowment of nature, ensuring outstanding achievements and eminence in any chosen domain, regardless of the amenability of the environment. Reshuffle the digits to travel forward in time and witness the 1986 edition of the field-representative „*Conceptions of giftedness*“ volume, and you will find that none of these assertions hold true for giftedness researchers in the late 20th century.

The paradigm shift in the field of giftedness may be observed both at the conceptual-theoretic level (i.e., in the way we conceive of giftedness), as at the level of educational policy and practice (i.e., in the way we go about the education of gifted children). In this paper, I shall try to pinpoint the ways in which the scientific concept of giftedness and the practice of gifted education have departed from the traditional Galton-Terman paradigm, that had dominated the field since its inception throughout much of the 20th century. In the end, I will briefly summarize and comment on the implications of the already instituted or recently emerging changes in the field.

The conceptual shift. Contemporary efforts to reconceptualize the construct of giftedness will be analyzed here through the framework of Sternberg and Zhang's pentagonal implicit theory, which proposes that conceptions of giftedness basically revolve around five criteria: excellence, rarity, productivity, demonstrability and value. Three of these are essential for understanding the shift from traditional to contemporary conceptions.

(1) *Productivity.* Traditionally, giftedness is only remotely associated with productivity; it is conceived of as a potential – the promise of future high accomplishments contained in one's superior IQ score. Contemporary conceptions, however, place particular emphasis on the criterion of productivity, defining giftedness as extraordinary achievement (not merely potential) which evidences or equals creativity.

(2) *Value.* The value criterion was not prominent in traditional, but receives special attention in contemporary conceptions of giftedness, which insist on the idea that giftedness refer only to high achievements which are valued in a society. A corollary of this focus on value is that giftedness is no longer regarded to dwell solely within the individual, but in the favorable interaction of the person, the domain, and the field; giftedness, it is further argued, is a „label of desirability“ awarded by a certain field, and by inference, a social construction.

(3) *Rarity.* At the inception of Terman's seminal research, giftedness was a label reserved strictly for those who scored above the 99th percentile on intelligence tests. The criterion of rarity has been progressively loosened ever since. Contemporary conceptions do not only raise

the incidence of giftedness from 1% to as far as 20%, they actually allow that under the right circumstances anybody can be gifted (i.e., display gifted behaviors).

The shift in gifted education. The dawn of the 20th century saw two major breakthroughs regarding gifted education: the possibility of standardized assessment of individual differences, and the recognition of the importance of environmental support for the fulfillment of talent. Building on these scientific contributions is the hitherto common educational practice of identifying and fostering students of promise, the undisputed outcome of identification being the *labeling* of some children as gifted, and the standard means of fostering their gifts being ability grouping, acceleration, and enrichment.

But gifted education as we know it is facing two ground-shaking changes. First, it has been suggested that we should have it „without gifted children“, i.e., that there should be no special label for students of high academic ability. Second, it is expected that gifted education fit the higher-order policy of inclusion; thus, instead of special services for those formerly known as gifted, we should simply have „curriculum differentiation“, preferably within the classroom.

Conclusions: the triumph of entropy? Certain accommodations in the field of giftedness were arguably called for since Terman's IQ framework turned out to be too narrow and in some aspects rather hollow. But the scope and nature of changes undergone by the field seem to have moved it beyond the commonly witnessed loss of firm positivist establishment of psychological categories, to the point of a premeditated killing off of its central construct. Since the end of the 19th century to the present day, giftedness has gone from designating a biological reality, to being dismantled as a social construction, to ultimately being written off by some as a social construct of *questionable validity*, because there are no definitive criteria to distinguish the „gifted“ from the rest. The field is now facing calls to give up the construct/label altogether.

Still, I would argue that we should carefully preserve the life of a construct that is better suited than any other to describe the obvious fact that (given the same amount of prior experience and instruction/support) some individuals are able to master a domain with remarkable ease, speed, and focus. This is more than scoring high on IQ tests, but less than creative productivity; this is a disposition of the individual, but to be actualized only in the proper environment. And it is precisely therefore that we should also preserve gifted education (label included) – to ascertain that the potential for smooth progress towards mastery and eventual creativity in a domain is there, and that we don't want to see it resolve into dust.

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FROM FLIRTATION TO ABANDONMENT: BECHTEREV'S CRITIQUE OF WUNDT'S PSYCHOLOGICAL PROJECT

Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) has been recognized as one of the main advocates of modern scientific psychology consolidating in the 19th century. A decisive factor to his high renown was the establishment of the Laboratory for Experimental Psychology at Leipzig University in 1879, which in a short time became an international center for psychological research. A new generation of psychologists from all over the world wanted to acquaint themselves with the new model of scientific psychology, studied in Leipzig and was trained by Wundt. The Russian physiologist and psychiatrist Vladimir Bechterev (1857-1927) was one of Wundt's students in 1885, and after returning to Russia he continued enthusiastically his experimental research on mental phenomena. However, he gradually took distance from Wundt's psychological project and developed a new concept of psychology: the so-called Objective Psychology or Psychoreflexology (later on simply Reflexology).

Although a renewed interest in Bechterev's life and work was recently aroused, most studies have focused primarily on biographical and institutional issues, leaving aside the properly theoretical dimension of his scientific project. However, considering the range and the deeper meaning of Bechterev's intentions, it seems necessary to complement the above mentioned studies with a series of investigations on the theoretical and conceptual foundations of his thought. It is exactly along these lines that this work falls, though the goal here is only a preliminary contribution. More precisely, our aim here is to analyze Bechterev's position in relation to Wundt's psychology, emphasizing the different assumptions which underlie both conceptions. Up to now this subject has not been considered in the secondary literature, so that an important aspect not only of the history of psychology, but also of the history of science and history of ideas in general is still waiting for an explanation.

In what respects the methodological level, we take as primary sources only Bechterev's psychological texts that were published between 1889 and 1913, a period which marks the onset, development and final consolidation of his psychological project, culminating in the German publication of his "Objective Psychology or Reflexology". Our analysis consists of three stages: 1) to situate the historical context of Bechterev's studies with Wundt; 2) to analyze Wundt's influence on his first psychological studies until the end of the Kazan period (1886-1893); and 3) to show how the foundations of the so-called Objective Psychology or Psychoreflexology are closely related to Bechterev's refusal of some fundamental assumptions of Wundtian psychology.

The results show that the relationship between Wundt's and Bechterev's psychological projects should be understood in two distinct levels. At a first look, experimental psychology as practiced by Wundt and his assistants in Leipzig exerted some influence on Bechterev, drawing his attention to the new methodological procedures (psychophysical, psychophysiological and

psychometric) for the investigation of psychic life. However, with the gradual development and expansion of his neurophysiological investigations, Bechterev came to the discovery of motor associative reflexes, which enabled him to develop a new basis for the explanation of mental phenomena – with a more biological and materialistic character – in sharp contrast with Wundt's view. Secondly, the Objective Psychology or Psychoreflexology points to a still deeper sense, in revealing Bechterev's metaphysical interest to establish a new world view or *Weltanschauung*. It is here that we find the real reason behind the divergence between Bechterev and Wundt, which is reflected in his conception of scientific psychology. In refusing Wundtian dualism in favor of a monistic proposal, Bechterev was forced to reject also the conceptual foundations of Wundt's psychology, though he acknowledged the merits of the experimental method used by him. In fact, a psychology of consciousness seems necessarily committed to some form of dualism, which in principle Bechterev could not accept. So, it is in this philosophical confrontation that we must see the primary reason for his rejection of Wundt's psychology.

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SOCIO-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY: WITH OR WITHOUT THE CONCEPT OF INTERNALIZATION?

In this paper I am going to analyze the place of the concept of internalization in the socio-cultural psychology. The concept of internalization has been used by different authors in different theoretical traditions, but in this paper I wish to get focused on the meanings and place this term has in the socio-cultural psychologies. In the first part of the paper, the definition and the role of this term in theory of Vygotsky will be analyzed and discussed. In the second part of the paper, I am going how this term is used by two most influenced traditions emerged out from theory of Vygotsky – theory of activity and theories focused on symbolical mediation and meaning making process. I wish to show that theories from former group distance themselves from the concept of internalization due to their focus on human activity, and that theories from later group develop further the concept introducing differentiation between the concept of “mastery” and the concept of “appropriation”. Finally, I am going to present a theory that integrates these two traditions in the socio-cultural psychology. This theory will be presented through four metaphors (Labyrinth/City, library, gym, and orchestra). In this theory the formative impact of the socio-cultural context can be achieved based on the mechanism of internalization, but also without the internalization.

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**PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT AND THE «OBJECTIVITY» OF SOCIAL SCIENCES:
THE CHALLENGE OF THE NEW «PEOPLE'S HISTORIES» OF THE WORLD**

This paper will deal with the control of knowledge and other strategies of perception management exercised throughout the intellectual history of the West. The trial and execution of Socrates, the murder of Hypatia, the burning of books (Bibles and their translators Wycliffe and Tyndale in the fourteenth and fifteenth century, as well as tones of books by Wilhelm Reich in New York in 1956 and 1960), the criminal silencing of Giordano Bruno, Galileo's forced retraction, the exiles of Voltaire, the excommunications of Spinoza and Tolstoy, assassinations of Gandhi and Martin Luther King and other courageous social thinkers, the hostility to the views of such women as Margaret Mead or Marija Gimbutas, represent an important aspect of the history of the development of knowledge and science in the West. They are often addressed in plays and other works of art but remain insufficiently discussed in academia and other places of power. The tradition of imposing on the world «democracies» modeled on the Greek imperial slave owning societies necessitates perception management and knowledge control. From Aristotle to the present, among other things, «objectivity» of science has been used to legitimize historical and political misrepresentations and other ideological stratagems. This paper will analyze several recent histories which challenge this claim to objectivity of Western (social) science and document horrendous undemocratic events and practices traditionally unreported or obscured and rationalized by the «objective» scientific methods of the West. The authors discussed will be Aime Cesaire and Eduardo Galeano, historians Howard Zinn, Mike Davis, David Stannard, Vijay Prashad, Robin D. G. Kelley and others.

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**WHO'S THE WALRUS? ON THE POSSIBILITIES AND IMPOSSIBILITIES OF
'FACEBOOK BIOGRAPHY'**

Historians who are in the process of writing someone's biography still largely depend on traditional sources (works, letters, personal documents, interviews) and feel lucky that archives have started to digitalize their collections because that speeds up their searches significantly. But otherwise the impact of the digital revolution on the genre of biography is remarkably small, presumably because the people about whom biographies are written died before computers entered our world. However, the time is not far that biographers will have to deal with 'life logging', with blogs, websites, the use of social media, email correspondence etc, in short, with 'Facebook biography'.

This contribution will explore some of the problems related to the question of writing biography in the digital age. The author will start with a cursory exploration of 'facebook identity' and then explores several questions that modern biography may have to deal with. What, if any, new aspects are brought forward by the uses of social media? How to understand these? What is the impact of social media on the construction of identity? Perhaps the genre of biography will have to disappear?

In this paper, the notion of 'distributed cognition' (Hutchins, 1995) is used to demonstrate that a reconceptualization of identity in (auto)biography is needed in order to deal with the issues that future biographers shall face.

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THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY ABOUT 1950 - 1960

About 1950 to 1960 a series of studies was published which explicitly deals with the topic of “Theoretical Psychology” (cf. Koch, 1951; Bergmann, 1953; Royce, 1957; Madsen, 1961, e.g.). One of the main goals of this paper is the reconstruction of these and some similar works in regard to their reasons, subjects, ways and means and ends – before the background of Lindworsky’s “Theoretische Psychologie”. It is Lindworsky who sees in 1926 the “necessity of a theoretical psychology” as “a companion to theoretical physics”. A task which can be accomplished by establishing various types of mainly qualitative laws of high generalization through the recognition of uniformity in different realms of psychology.

Without direct reference to earlier enterprises, Koch (1951) calls for a theoretical psychology as an effective remedy against an extant crisis of psychology whose “core seem to be disaffection from ... theory”. A common bias in the handling of theories contributed the main part to this sad state of affairs so that the improvement of the formal structure of theories, the revealing of sound intertheoretical relations in addition to the analysis of genuine “foundation problems” of psychology were suggested in order to construct the desired new fruitful theory.

While Koch’s work must be estimated too as an important first step to Koch’s influential later paradigmatic guidelines for his monumental “Psychology: a study of a science (1959–1963), Bergmann’s 1953 study bears some outer relevance already because of its publication in mainstream psychology’s “Annual Review”. It can be found at this remarkable place although theoretical psychology is introduced as a branch of philosophy of science, differing in many respects from mainstream psychology. So, we meet rather formal and basic considerations on the terms concept, law and theory beside the famous intervening variable/hypothetical construct distinction as well as the problem of reduction from the psychological to the physiological level of research – which becomes connected with Feigl’s existential hypothesis. Bergmann discusses all this painstakingly in the light of a neo-behavioristic position which does not give much way to concurring approaches like Neo-Gestalt theory and the just arising social-perception approach. As may be noted easily, on this line Bergmann enters the realm of psychology proper and must face substantive rejoinders from there. However, Bergmann does not refer to Koch’s earlier study. Interestingly, Royce in his 1957 paper on the advancement of theoretical psychology takes reference to Koch only. This contribution of one of the best known theoretical psychologist of our days culminates in recommending four “theoretical concepts of broad generality” for the achievement of an universally integrating psychological theory: physiological homeostasis, primary reinforcement, perceptual sensitivity and behavioral phenotypes. It is hoped, that these concepts will be extended and soon used as “unifying of postulates” by others.

The decennium of theoretical psychology covered here can be seen to be drawn to a preliminary close with Madsen’s historical review in 1961. That will be summarized before the final part of this paper which discusses some more general problems already touched in former sections.

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**MARK A. MAY:
CHARACTER, PERSONALITY, AND THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR**

Educational psychologist Mark A. May is best known for his work as the director of the Institute of Human Relations at Yale University from 1935 to 1960. In this capacity, he reorganized the Institute with the aim of focusing its activities on the formulation of a rigorous new science of human behavior oriented toward the prediction and control of behavior. Along the lines promoted by the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and Rockefeller organizations such as the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, the new science of behavior was to be interdisciplinary in scope; it would ultimately be directed toward the advancement of “human welfare” and the amelioration of such pressing social problems as delinquency, mental illness, and unemployment. A team of behavioral and social scientists, including Clark Hull, John Dollard, Neal Miller, Robert Sears, and Leonard Doob set out to formulate and advance the new behavioral science. In doing so, they attempted to incorporate the insights of Freudian psychoanalysis within a behaviorist framework.

Even as May was engaged in furthering a neo-behaviorist human science based on the prediction and control of behavior, he was also promoting character education—a project that seemed to hark back to the nineteenth-century stress on the moral character of the individual.² May had participated in the Character Education Inquiry, sponsored by the Teachers College of Columbia University, during the 1920s. Under the aegis of this project, May, Hugh Hartshorne, and others had studied various modes of behavior pertinent to character, such as honesty and deceit, cooperation and service, and self control. Moreover, in the late 1920s and in the 1930s, May championed character education in various venues, by giving talks on the topic at conferences on child study and parent education and at meetings in community centers as well as by contributing articles to journals such as *School* and *Parents' Magazine*. May thus seemed to possess a special sense of mission with regard to the fostering of moral character in modern American society.

May was concerned with personality as well as with character in his work. He clearly distinguished between the two, though he suggested that they were closely related. Character concerned the moral dimension of human behavior—honesty, cooperative and charitable activities, inhibition and persistence, consistency, and the like. Personality seemed, for May, to embrace the wider domain of human behavior. More specifically, May focused on what he termed the “social stimulus value” of personality—the manner in which an individual’s personality had an impact on and thus functioned as a stimulus for other individuals. May suggested that the administrator concerned with fostering the new interdisciplinary science of behavior would have to take both personality and character into account. The administrator

² For the distinction between the Victorian notion of character and the twentieth-century notion of personality, see Susman (1984).

would have to foster an atmosphere conducive to communication and mutual respect among the scientists involved in crafting the new behavioral science; thus, he would be fostering traits pertinent to the personalities of these scientists. In doing this, the administrator would also be enhancing cooperation among the scientists; he would thus be cultivating a certain sense of moral character among the latter. Indeed, the scientists would have to set aside their selfish strivings and ambitions and adopt common concepts and norms in order to advance the new behavioral science. In a sense, the new scientific community would constitute a moral community—albeit one based on engineered consensus. Thus, young scientists such as Dollard, Miller, Doob, Sears, et al., under the tutelage of the “psychotechnician” Clark Hull, were to dedicate themselves to the progress of behavioral science as if impelled by the force of a moral imperative. The community of behavioral scientists had its negative features, however. Those who did not conform to the standards and norms of the community—most notably the distinguished anthropologist Edward Sapir—were scorned and excluded from the community.

May was also interested in the emerging field of personality and culture. He participated in a number of conferences on this topic sponsored by the SSRC and Rockefeller philanthropy during the period 1930-1934. Most importantly, May chaired the SSRC’s Research Committee on Personality and Culture (1934-1940) as well as the Subcommittee on Competitive-Cooperative Habits, one of the major prongs of the SSRC research committee. May worked with Gordon Allport and Gardner Murphy in supervising the subcommittee; Margaret Mead, Barbara Burks, Dollard, Doob, and others worked as research assistants for the subcommittee. In *Competition and Cooperation*, their 1937 report for the subcommittee, May and Doob stressed the significance of personality and culture as a means for integrating the biological and social sciences in order to focus on “the total individual as living, functioning, socialized being” (p. 1). May and Doob also stressed the need to reorient current cultural practices away from competition and toward “new, as yet only partially discovered, cooperative ways of living” (p. 2-3).

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WHY SOCIOLOGISTS ABANDONED THE SICK ROLE CONCEPT

Sociologist Talcott Parsons introduced the sick role concept in 1951 as part of a paradigm of his functionalist sociological theory. The concept came in just as medical sociology was crystallizing as a subfield of sociology, and medical sociologists used the concept extensively and fundamentally. The appearance was that after about 30 years, the concept ceased being of great interest to sociologists. It was not developed much further, and therefore was assumed but was no longer a cutting-edge concept that attracted research from medical sociologists. That is an explanation for the history of an idea.

There may, however, be another explanation. Medical sociology itself changed. It became the sociology of health behavior in the 1980s and 1990s. That is, because sociologists turned to behavior, and attracted psychologists as well, they implied that their findings could help society get people to change and act in healthy ways. This was a shift from the earlier period of medical sociology, which was descriptive. The sick role is a descriptive concept. It did not lead to reform or social activism except to some extent in mental health areas. For sociologists in the sociology of health and health behavior, the concept of the sick role was not useful because it did not lead to reform.

This paper is based on published primary sources in the sociological literature of the last half of the twentieth century, including journals and textbooks of medical sociology. The work of Parsons has a great deal of secondary literature, most notably books by Uta Gerhardt and recent articles by Howard Brick and B. Robert Owens. The few works on the history of medical sociology are not very insightful.

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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Psychoanalysis has had an important influence on the social sciences during the 20th century. A prerequisite for this development was a certain sociological connectivity, even more, implication of psychoanalysis: It has an implicit interactionistic psychology of drives, development and personality. It makes a contribution to social and group psychology (war, religion, culture) and to the analysis of literature and art. It is the only psychology that draws up a complete, dynamic picture of personality.

Psychoanalysis presents itself with these characteristics to a historically irritated and disappointed critical social science that was searching for motives for the stagnation and absence of emancipatory progress during the twenties of the previous century. The Frankfurt School of Sociology (characterised by Fromm, Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse) tried to explore the typical psychic structures of modern capitalistic society in Germany with the aid of Freud's psychoanalysis. It concluded that an authoritarian character exists. This character transmits, so the assumption, the expectations of weakening, decline and exploitation of the individual to the next generation via the "family as agency of socialization". This approach was developed into a social psychological analysis of national socialist "rupture of civilization". Taking up Freud's group psychology, the submission and "collective narcissism" (Horkheimer/Adorno) of the Germans could be understood and the projective character of anti-semiotic prejudice could be analyzed. In the post-fascist era the members of the Frankfurt School took different directions as far as the meaning of psychoanalysis is concerned. Fromm created some kind of psychoanalytic humanism. He turned away from the psychoanalytic theory of drives and developed a social psychology of human relations in capitalism. Adorno took a more resigned position. With the death of the individual he regarded the task of psychoanalytic social psychology as finished. Marcuse, on the other hand, radicalised psychoanalytic social psychology by changing it into a historic materialistic theory of drives. In this way he discovered new perspectives for the subject in the capitalistic society.

In the first half of the twentieth century another great sociologist, Talcott Parsons, made an attempt in the USA to create an integrated structural-functional theory of action also by employing psychoanalytic ideas. For his theory of the individual actor, of socialization, of deviance and of control especially Freud's emphasis on incest taboo and his concept of superego played an important role. This approach was broadly criticized for giving priority to maintaining the social order and for not considering the radicality of Freud's theory of drives enough. Instead, the criticism continues, he took up the ideas of the American psychoanalytic ego psychology (Heinz Hartmann). According to the critics, the need dispositions of the psychic system correspond exactly to the roles of the social system. Habermas' "theorem of repression" was directed toward this assumption. It emphasizes the difference between these two systems and the hostility of role-demands against drives. From my point of view, however, an important

achievement of the Parsonian theory was the demonstration of the convergence of Mead and Freud.

These two theoretical traditions regained their influence in Germany after the era of national socialism and provided for a new awakening of sociological interest in psychoanalysis. Especially the second generation of the critical theory pursued this discussion. It essentially led to the following results:

1. A critical theory of the subject that brought forth a new mediation of psychoanalysis and social science through the theory of forms of interaction.
2. A methodological assessment of psychoanalysis as depth hermeneutics from which followed a new approach of psychoanalytic social research.

1. The critical theory of the subject (Alfred Lorenzer, Klaus Horn) was built upon former critical theory (Adorno, Marcuse). Psychoanalysis was its fundament and it was considered to be partner with equal rights to critical theory of society, not only an “assistant science” (Horkheimer). “Psychoanalysis as social science” (s. Lorenzer 1971) marked an approach that conceptualized psychoanalysis as a theory of socialization and interaction, without giving up the idea of a resistant subject. In this sense Lorenzer developed the “theory of forms of interaction” which grasped the construction of personality by interaction in the course of socialization. Using this fundament, Horn made contributions to a critical political psychology.

2. For the first time the epistemological relevance of the psychoanalytic method was appreciated. It consists in methodic self-reflection of the subject of cognition, as Habermas (1968) demonstrated. This self-reflection is enabled by psychoanalytic dialogue. The psychoanalyst opens himself for the transferences of the analytic patient and uses them (in cooperation with his own countertransferences) to discover unconscious conflicts. Lorenzer aptly characterizes this process as reconstruction of destroyed sensual and linguistic symbols. This method of obtaining knowledge of the unconscious could be transferred to the area of social and cultural research. If the difference to the clinical situation is taken into consideration (There is no patient in the area of social research, and consequently it does not deal with therapy.) the use of countertransference by social or cultural scientists can serve to survey the unconscious content and the unconscious effect of texts, movies, art and architecture. This method has come to be known as “depth hermeneutic cultural analysis” (Lorenzer 1986).

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DIE BEDEUTUNG DER PSYCHOANALYSE FÜR DIE SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTEN

Die Psychoanalyse hat auf die Sozialwissenschaften im 20. Jahrhundert einen bedeutenden Einfluss ausgeübt. Die Voraussetzung dafür waren die sozialwissenschaftlichen Anschlussmöglichkeiten, ja Implikationen der Psychoanalyse: Sie verfügt über eine implizit interaktionistische Trieb-, Entwicklungs- und Persönlichkeitspsychologie. Sie steuert explizite Beiträge zur Sozial- und Massenpsychologie (Krieg, Religion, Kultur) und zur Literatur- und Kunstanalyse bei. Sie ist die (einzige) Psychologie, die ein umfassendes, dynamisches Bild der Persönlichkeit entwirft.

Mit diesen Eigenschaften bot sich die Psychoanalyse einer historisch irritierten, enttäuschten kritischen Sozialwissenschaft an, die nach Motiven für den stockenden bzw. ausbleibenden emanzipatorischen Fortschritt in den 20er Jahren des vergangenen Jahrhunderts suchte. Die Frankfurter Schule (namentlich die Autoren Fromm, Horkheimer, Adorno und Marcuse) versuchte mithilfe der Psychoanalyse Freuds die typischen psychischen Strukturen der modernen kapitalistischen Gesellschaft (Deutschlands) zu erforschen. Sie kam zu der Annahme eines „autoritären Charakters“, der über die „Sozialisationsagentur Familie“ die Erfahrungen der Schwächung, des Niedergangs und der Ausbeutung des bürgerlichen Individuums prägend an die nächste Generation weitergab. Dieser Ansatz wurde in der Analyse des nationalsozialistischen Zivilisationsbruchs kritisch weiterentwickelt. Die Massenpsychologie Freuds aufgreifend konnte die Gefügigkeit und der „kollektive Narzissmus“ der Deutschen begriffen und der projektive Charakter des antisemitischen Vorurteils analysiert werden. In der postfaschistischen Ära schlugen die Vertreter der Frankfurter hinsichtlich der Bedeutung der Psychoanalyse verschiedene Wege ein. Fromm entwickelte eine Art psychoanalytischen Humanismus, der sich von der psychoanalytischen Triblehre abwandte und eine Sozialpsychologie der menschlichen Beziehungen im Kapitalismus entwickelte. Adorno nahm nun eine eher resignative Haltung und sah mit dem Tod des bürgerlichen Subjekts auch die Aufgabe der psychoanalytischen Sozialpsychologie als beendet an. Marcuse dagegen radikalisierte die psychoanalytische Sozialpsychologie zu einer historisch-materialistischen Triebtheorie und entdeckte damit neue Perspektiven für das Subjekt in der kapitalistischen Gesellschaft.

Ebenfalls in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts unternahm ein anderer großer Sozialwissenschaftler, Talcott Parsons, in den USA den Versuch, auch mittels psychoanalytischer Annahmen eine integrative strukturell-funktionale Theorie des Handelns zu schaffen. Für seine Theorie des individuellen Aktors, von Sozialisation, Abweichung und Kontrolle spielten insbesondere Freuds Betonung des Inzesttabus und sein Begriff des Über-Ichs eine bedeutende Rolle. Diesem Ansatz wurde vorgehalten, dass er die Erhaltung der gesellschaftlichen Ordnung in den Vordergrund stellte und daher nicht so sehr die Radikalität der Freudschen Triebtheorie berücksichtigte. Vielmehr habe er eher die Anregungen der amerikanischen psychoanalytischen Ich-Psychologie (Heinz Hartmann) aufgegriffen. Die Bedürfnisdispositionen des psychischen Systems entsprechen immer genau den Rollen des sozialen Systems. Hiergegen richtete Habermas das „Repressionstheorem“, das die Differenz beider Systeme und die Triebfeindlichkeit der Rollenanforderungen betonte. Eine bedeutende

Leistung der Theorie von Talcott Parsons ist aber in meinen Augen auf jeden Fall der Aufweis der Konvergenz von Mead und Freud.

Diese beiden Theorietraditionen gewannen im nachnationalsozialistischen Deutschland wieder an Einfluss und sorgten für ein neues Erwachen des sozialwissenschaftlichen Interesses an der Psychoanalyse. Insbesondere in der zweiten Generation der Kritischen Theorie wurde die Auseinandersetzung weitergeführt und erbrachte folgende Resultate:

1. Eine Kritische Theorie des Subjekts, die mit dem Konzept der Interaktionsformen eine neue Vermittlung von Psychoanalyse und Gesellschaftstheorie schuf.
2. Eine methodologische Einschätzung der Psychoanalyse als Tiefenhermeneutik, aus der ein neuer Ansatz psychoanalytischer Sozialforschung erwuchs.

1. Die Kritische Theorie des Subjekts (Alfred Lorenzer, Klaus Horn) knüpfte an die ältere Kritische Theorie (Adorno, Marcuse) an. Für sie war Psychoanalyse die Grundlage einer Kritischen Theorie des Subjekts, die gleichberechtigter Partner einer Kritischen Theorie der Gesellschaft – und nicht nur „Hilfswissenschaft“ (Horkheimer) – sein sollte. „Psychoanalyse als Sozialwissenschaft“ (1971) bezeichnete einen Ansatz, der Psychoanalyse als Sozialisations- und Interaktionstheorie konzipierte, ohne die Annahme einer widerständigen Subjektivität aufzugeben. In diesem Sinn schuf Lorenzer die Theorie der Interaktionsformen, die die Strukturbildung der Persönlichkeit durch Interaktion im Verlauf des Sozialisationsprozesses erfasste. Horn verfasste auf dieser Grundlage Beiträge zu einer kritischen politischen Psychologie.

2. Erstmals wurde die wissenschaftstheoretische Bedeutung des psychoanalytischen Verfahrens gewürdigt, die in der systematischen Selbstreflexivität des erkennenden Subjekts bestand, wie Habermas (1968) zeigte. Diese Selbstreflexivität wird ermöglicht durch den psychoanalytischen Dialog, in dem der Psychoanalytiker sich auf die Übertragungen des Analysanden einlässt und sie (zusammen mit den eigenen Gegenübertragungen) zur Erkenntnis der unbewussten Konflikte nutzt. Diesen Prozeß charakterisierte Lorenzer treffend als Rekonstruktion zerstörter sinnlicher Symbolik und Sprachsymbolik. Diese so bestimmte Methode der Erkenntnis von Unbewusstem ließ sich in den Bereich von Sozial- und Kulturforschung transferieren. Wenn dabei die Differenz zur klinischen Situation berücksichtigt wird (Es gibt in diesem Bereich keinen Patienten und dementsprechend geht es auch nicht um Therapie), kann die Verwendung der Gegenübertragung durch den Sozial- und Kulturforscher zur Untersuchung des unbewussten Gehalts und der unbewussten Wirkung von Texten, Kunstwerken, Filmen, Architektur dienen. Dieses von Lorenzer (1986) bestimmte Verfahren ist unter dem Namen „Tiefenhermeneutische Kulturanalyse“ bekannt geworden.

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DEVELOPMENT OF WORK PSYCHOLOGY IN SERBIA ALONG THE SCIENTIST-PRACTITIONER PARADIGM

The beginnings of the work psychology in Serbia along the scientist-practitioner paradigm can broadly be situated at the time when work psychology entered the academic setting at Department of Psychology, Faculty of Philosophy, at the University of Belgrade. Department was established in 1927 (Havelka, 1998). During the 1950s the study program was conceived as a basis for both research-scientific and practical work in diverse settings. The first course in work psychology was introduced in 1958 and in 1962 students were offered to choose between majoring in educational-clinical or work psychology. Later on changes in study programs were constantly fluctuating between treating work psychology as a recognized and marginalized field of applied psychology. The early 1960s, when graduated psychologists started entering the organizational settings, marked the start of a true affirmation of work psychology as a profession. From the academic perspective, it had been expected that psychologists with broad theoretical and rigorous methodological education were well equipped to apply psychological knowledge in their practice (Petrovic, 2009). Since then, work psychology has been constantly trying to meet the theoretical bases of the scientific psychology with the applied demands of the practice (Cizmic, 1997). On the other hand, work psychologists needed to keep the pace with the scientific advancements created at the international, completely different social and economical scene (McCormick & Tiffin, 1977).

Main theoretical and practical areas of work psychology in Serbia have been in the field of personnel psychology, social psychology and human relations at work, engineering psychology and ergonomics (including traffic psychology). Some practical fields such as professional interests and career guidance (Djuric, 2003), army and police psychology, sports psychology, were also developed and up-to-date are in fluctuating connections with work psychology. The intensity and strength of these connections have been oscillating based on changes in the society, developments in psychological science and research methodology, and practical needs. Since the 1980s work psychology diversified to the field of marketing and consumer psychology.

Since its inception as a separate field, work psychology in Serbia addressed a variety of issues related to work setting (from professional education and recruitment, to consumption). The field has been broadening and different areas were emphasized as an answer to the needs of the practice in Serbian industrial, economic, social and cultural context. Problems of the practice were explored both following the theoretical and methodological developments from abroad and based on specific local research experience. What has mostly been achieved are sound academic foundations for the balanced development of professional roles of work psychologists as scientist-practitioners. The field is hampered by the small numbers: small community of work

psychologists dealing with a rich spectrum of problems; small scientific production (research and theory); small number of published research in peer-reviewed journals, lack of published evaluations of interventions. *Financial support: Ministry of Science, project 179018 and WUS Austria - Austrian Development Cooperation project MSDP 012/2011.*

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PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS CONSIDERED AS ARTIFACTS OF THE POST WWII AMERICAN SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

Psychology informs us about being human. It is a truism often overlooked by psychologists, but it is important to note because once theories are expressed, the profession's debate becomes fact in the public imagination. Once hatched, it is practically impossible to control ideas; they are changed by historical forces and enter public policy decisions. 20th century American psychology explained human nature in terms of adjustment, and by that I mean psychology either explicitly or implicitly suggested that at the very core of human nature was a survival mechanism responding to changes in the environment. This was the foundation of Behaviorism. Psychology insisted it was experimentally validated, but truth is not questioned here. For my purposes, it was enough this explanation satisfied its public. Psychology's adjustment was essentially Darwin's adaptation, and by analogy the environment was society. Risking the fallacy of reduction, life was like Thorndike's puzzle box; only, the person was caged by ambiguous social situations. In the beginning this dynamic interpretation promised a technology to help individuals change, to acquire the necessary habits and skills to be successful during an era of opportunity. Using the adjustment hypothesis, this paper focuses on post WWII America, and it treats personality characteristics as artifacts of the society – with a special interest in traits antithetical to Enlightenment ideals. These ideals provide a comparison for evaluation.

Does the adjustment theory of human nature, germinated in the Progressive Era and developed in The Great Depression, transplant into the society of the New Industrial State? As a concept evolving within history, how did adjustment psychology change with regards to the needs of its public? And what are its limits as a useful explanation of human nature?

Briefly, after WWII, American society went through a profound reorganization. Granted, the trend of increasing organizational control can be traced back in history, but the manifestation of a new environment bloomed in the 1940s, 50s, and 60s. Essentially, sciences and human management progressed to a point where everything became more complex, too complex for an individual to oversee. Organization was the theme, and committees of experts increasingly made policy decisions. Now, Americans were coming to terms with a society organized foremost around a technology and science in the service of large corporations. Under these circumstances the adjustment theory of human nature, that was a promise to the individual, became a useful warrant for the management of people. The prediction and control that psychology promised was still desired, but it took on foreboding implications with regard to democracy. In the industrial state there appeared emerging personality characteristics antithetical to traditional Enlightenment ideals. Individual suffering was easy to explain during The Great Depression. When any response was likely hopeless, it predicted anxiety, depression, frustration and aggression. However, what were the conditions of similar psychological problems during the 1950s and 60s under relative affluence? This research uses the adjustment explanation of human nature to

investigate personality problems observed by psychologists, sociologists, and social philosophers. Many of the social scientists cited in this research criticized social organization using adjustment theory while subtext implies that it was an inadequate explanation of human nature. That paradox raises another question this paper will address.

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BEING MAD IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND

Contrary to the views that locate the origin of scientific psychiatry and psychology in the XIX century Germany, there is growing evidence that the birth of these disciplines as we know them took place in England during the early modern period. In this paper I shall briefly review the most important surviving document about the treatment of mental disorders in England between 1533 and 1672 – the years chosen because books important for the topic were published then.

Modern treatment of the mentally ill started when the practice of exorcism used during the Middle Ages was finally rejected. It seems that this was propelled when two officers of the inquisition, Johann Sprenger and Heinrich Kraemer, published the infamous *The Witches Hammer (Malleus Maleficarum)* in 1487. This book was aimed at codifying the view that all we now term mental disorder was indeed witchcraft and should be treated as inspired by devil and severely punished. This approach has later been supported by the English king James I whose *Daemonologie* was published in 1597, and condemned *The Discoverie of witchcraft* by of the judge Reginald Scott, written 13 years earlier, that described many cases of witches as being in fact insane.

But between these two books many practitioners, as courageous as they were insightful, started treating mental disturbances as more medical than theological problem. Robert Burton in his 1621 *Anatomy of Melancholie* differentiated between: 1) diseases emanating from the body; 2) diseases of the head (brain); 3) madness (mania); 4) melancholy. And half a century later Thomas Willis in *De Anima Brutorum* described fourteen categories, together with the purely neurological ones. Both of these authors also discussed the causes of mental disorders. Burton gave detailed descriptions of the following: 1) Solitariness, 2) Inamorato, 3) Hypochondriacus, 4) Superstition, 5) Religious mania, 6) Dissenters, 7) Maniacus, while Willis in his 1664 *Cerebri Anatome* – in which he introduced the terms neurology and psychology – wrote that disorders were caused by problems in nerve transmission, later discussing vital and involuntary systems in the brain “which were mediated not by the higher centers of the brain, but by the cerebellum” (Millon, 2004, p. 73).

Further insights that strike us as uncannily similar to standpoint of contemporary psychiatry include Willis’s description of *dementia praecox*: “young persons who, lively and spirited, and at times brilliant in their childhood, passed into obtuseness and hebetude during adolescence” (Millon, 2004, p. 73; Stone, 1998, pp. 43-44). Willis also rejected the idea of the wandering womb as a cause of hysteria (“suffocation of the mother”), and observed the coexistence of melancholia and mania in the same person, now known as bipolar affective disorder. In the second half of the XVII century, Thomas Sydenham wrote of hysterical convulsions that resembled epileptic seizures and was the first to write about hysterical disorders in men, although he thought men were more prone to hypochondria. Sydenham also believed that

in each case there were many sources of influence, including the family context. And even before that, Christopher Langton wrote in 1550 that sorrow can overthrow the heart and life can be utterly extinct from the patient, whom we would label psychosomatic.

From the standpoint of today, treatment and rights of the mentally ill are more important than the theories of etiology. Therefore, I shall discuss this issue at greater length.

The treatment recommended for witches was strangulation, beheading or burning at stake, and the mentally ill were offered herbal cures, leeching and vomiting, and “a roasted mouse, eaten whole” (Hunter and Macalpine, 1963, p. 12).

Thomas More who lived in Bishopsgate, near Bedlam hospital, from 1516 to 1523, described in *The Apology of Syr T. More, Knyght*, published in 1533, the cruel approach characteristic of his days: “[...] he had therfor ben put uppe in bedelem, and afterward by betynge and correccyon gathered hys remembraunce to hym, and beganne to come agayneto hym selfe beynge theruppon set at liberty and walkynge about abrode, hys olde fansyes beganne to fall agayne in his hed” (after Porter, 1991, p. 98).

The aforementioned Bedlam was founded in 1247, but became a hospital exclusively for the mentally disturbed in 1377. For centuries, it did not offer anything close to caring and humane approach to the afflicted. It more often served for the ‘patients’ “to be held in close confinement and totally *incommunicado*” (after Arnold, 2009, p. 25) or as a constant source of entertainment for the rich.

Other treatment procedures of the time included shaving the head and washing it with rose water and vinegar in order to help evaporate “grosse vapours which hurt the Memory” (after Hunter and Macalpine, 1963, p. 23), while Timothy Bright in his 1586 *Treatise on Melancholie* wrote that it was a physiological disorder caused by bad diet, so that the first step in recovery was to avoid “beets, cabbage, dates, olives, bread of fine unleavened flour, pork, beef, quail, peacocks, fresh-water fish, red wine, beer and ale” (after Arnold, 2009, p. 67).

Robert Burton listed hundreds of herbal remedies and distracting activities (music being one of the most important among them), believing that these were effective in the cases of depression. More importantly, Burton thought that the melancholic should be encouraged to be open and confess their sorrows to an empathetic friend, thus foretelling contemporary psychotherapeutic approaches.

In conclusion, I believe that we can see, that since the Early Modern period, our attitudes toward the mentally ill have changed more than our thinking about mental disorders, which still develops along more or less the same lines, but with abundance of details. The reason for that may well be in the fact that the field of mental health care largely depends on enthusiasm and initiative of individuals – now as well as four centuries ago.

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THEORETICAL AND ACADEMIC LEGITIMACY OF GENDER AND WOMEN'S STUDIES IN SERBIA

The interdisciplinary field of women's and gender studies is within humanities and its history a field which has recently come of age. Therefore its academic legitimacy may for some part of the academia be still in question. Its placement has different history in Europe, in comparison to for example, North America; it is then additionally fragmented within Europe, and especially so when South East Europe is taken into account.

This presentation will unfold the contextual history of introducing, establishing and legitimizing women's and gender studies in Western Balkans, with a view to the process in Serbia. The focus will be on the specific elements of that process. Some of the issues that will be addressed are: which were the disciplinary entry points? What were the politics of translation, building the terminology and defining the foundational concepts? What were the advantages and the disadvantages of building the women's studies from without the official educational system? Since legitimizing gender and women's studies is in the region still in process, some of the issues should - and will - remain open for discussion.

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**“WE HAVE BEEN BURNING AND FREEZING BY TURNS”
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SÁNDOR FERENCZI AND ERNEST JONES IN
THE MIRROR OF THEIR CORRESPONDENCE**

In the paper we present and discuss the correspondence between Sándor Ferenczi and Ernest Jones, discovered by the present authors in the Archives of the British Psychoanalytical Society in 2004. Their correspondence started in 1911 and lasted until Ferenczi's death in 1933. The corpus of the correspondence comprises altogether 37 letters and 6 postcards. Most of the letters are from Ferenczi to Jones; the collection contains only a few letters written by Jones to Ferenczi. Most of Ferenczi's letters are handwritten and are in German, while Jones replied in English, the language he also used in the *Rundbriefe* of the “secret committee”. The letters were first published in their original languages in the Hungarian journal *Thalassa* in 2008; and in Hungarian translation in 2010. The English translation, edited and introduced by the authors of the present paper, will come out at the Karnac publishing house in London in late 2011 or early 2012.

In the paper we explore the controversial relationship between these two relevant figures of the early psychoanalytic movement. Their relationship, which also includes Jones as being analyzed by Ferenczi in 1913, was complicated by serious personal conflicts and rivalry, nevertheless remained collegial up to the very end. The letters cast new light on the formation of group relations within the movement under specific historical circumstances, as well on the roles Ferenczi and Jones have played in the theoretical and technical debates of the early period of the development of European psychoanalysis. Their polarization reached its peak under the so called “Rank debate” in 1923/24. The correspondence enriches and deepens our knowledge of the events and developments we have already gained from the publication of the *Rundbriefe*.

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‘EVOLUTION’ AS A CONCEPT IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL THEORY

Nowadays, the term ‘evolution’ is inseparably tied to the biological study of the development of life on earth. This, however, has not always been the case. Originally the concept of ‘evolution’ meant little more than the development of the individual during its lifetime. According to eighteenth century thought, this ontogenetic unfolding took place in a preset order of several distinct stages, which were aimed at a predetermined goal. Evolution was often literally taken as an unfolding of something that was already there, but needed to stretch itself out, as a bud opening up in the spring (Beer, 1983; Bowler, 1975). Following this original meaning of the term ‘evolution’, several authors in the first half of the nineteenth century formulated social or cultural theories (e.g. Comte, 1853), using the term to describe the predetermined development of society or knowledge as a natural order, progressing towards the civilized western ideal.

This link between the word ‘evolution’ and a predetermined ontogenetic unfolding is what made Darwin very reluctant of using the word ‘evolution’ (Lewontin, 2005). There are some differences between the various editions that have been published, but in the first edition of his *Origin of Species* (Darwin, 1859) the word ‘evolution’ was completely absent, and in the most common edition it only appears four times. This seems odd for someone who is generally presented as the discoverer of the process of evolution itself. Darwin’s reluctance to use the term is clearly understandable. His theory of natural selection, which only later became known as the ‘theory of evolution’, rejected the idea of purposiveness of developmental processes. Darwin’s entire aim was to show how phylogenetic development was not preset, not predetermined, not aimed at perfection.

It has primarily been Herbert Spencer (Spencer, 1862), who identified this type of thinking as ‘evolutionary theory’, taking it to other levels by separating biologic from non-biologic evolutionary processes. In the subsequent decades everything suddenly was subject to evolution in the scientist’s eye: from religions to embryos, from economies to morals and from sexual behavior to photography. By the turn of the century, this sudden interest seemed to dry up. The term ‘evolution’ got tangled up in the eugenics debate and was left behind for biologists to play with.

Summing up, we have two interesting issues here. First of all: ‘evolution’ is a term originating from social and cultural theory, which seems to be hijacked by biologists, making it objectionable for social scientists. This leads to the question: what happened since then? Obviously in the last century, the term ‘evolution’ has not been completely ignored by the social sciences, often leading to heated debates about whether the social sciences should be ‘biologized’, or evolutionary thought should be ‘debiologized’ (Caplan, 1978).

The second issue of interest is that Spencer’s twist of applying the term ‘evolution’ to Darwin’s theory, in the end would turn the basic definition of evolution upside down. Since the

beginning of the twentieth century, evolution is not only taken to be a strictly biological process, it is also no longer a predetermined development, but an undetermined flow of events in which functionalist selection takes place only after the fact. Applying this second issue to the first, an additional question arises: when evolutionary thinking is being reintroduced in cultural theory, should it give in to this post-Darwinian reconceptualization of the term 'evolution'? In biological evolution it is generally accepted that the ultimate function of the process is the spread of genes. Is a similar ultimate but non-biological goal necessary when thinking about cultural evolution?

These two issues will be central to the proposed paper. By scanning the history of social and cultural theory in the twentieth century, we will be looking for social or cultural theories that have been favorable towards evolutionary thinking. In doing so, we will analyze how evolutionary thinking was received in general. More specifically we will try to identify where and when a post-Darwinian notion of evolution is favored and what specific functions have been proposed as the ultimate boosters of cultural evolution.

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THE QUESTION OF CITIZENSHIP AND FREEDOM IN THE PSYCHIATRIC REFORM PROCESS: A MIX OF GOVERNMENTAL PRACTICES

A possible way to study the history of psychology and psychiatry could be found in Foucault's works about governmentality, presented in the Collège de France courses offered in the end of the 1970's: *Security, Territory and Population* (2004a) and *The Birth of Biopolitics* (2004b). Foucault introduces the concept of governmentality, understood as the strategic control exercise under the other's conduct or "the assemblage formed by institutions, procedures, analysis, reflections, calculations and tactics that allow a specific and complex form of power that has by target the population" (FOUCAULT, 2004a). Nikolas Rose (1998, 1999) uses this concept in the history of psychology considering it in its origins as the realization of an administration technique devoted to population, a new object that arises in the 18th century due to new forms of government. As Foucault points out, a crucial moment in the history of the governmental arts happens in the 16th Century when the so called Govern Handbooks appeared, suggesting how to manage the flux of commodities and individuals. Such concernings grew as the urbanization process accelerated, increased by country immigration and the decline of death rates. Gradually the concept of population became more and more well defined, being considered as an entity crucial to economic richness and development. For all those reasons, the Govern Books, based on the Reason of State, were defined by its strong necessity to register and discipline the actions of the individuals through the so called State of Police. In the 18th century some thinkers, defining the economic science as something more than a home management, established that the State would have to work upon markets by means of a freedom regime. This conception was due to the physiocratic belief that the market phenomena would obey a general and natural law. Rose points out that the arrival of these new kinds of liberalism puts the population domain under new concerns of the government that now needs to discover ways of administrating it respecting its natural functioning codes. In this context psychology finds its development conditions: as a legitimate knowledge in the promise of scientificity and in the free conduction of other's conduct. For Rose (1998), the history of psy knowledges is linked to the govern history in a double way: 1) considering the inscription techniques that allowed subjectivities to be caught by govern devices; 2) through the constitution of multiple politics that intend to conduct the individual conduct not only through discipline, but mainly by considering the free activities of the people that are governed. In Foucault and Rose works liberalism is more than a political or an economic theory, but a positive government technique that begins as an economic issue, and little by little transfers to the question of population in general. In this new kind of management, government is defined as a technocracy, present in the scientific knowledge of the people, governing them by their own liberty, stimulating their self-regulation. These new

governmental techniques are very different from the older ones such as the sovereigns (based in legal devices) and disciplinarians (based on the constant register and control of the actions). Psychology has had a special importance in these new government techniques, especially from the very beginning of the 20th century, acting specifically in the craft of democratic societies, trying to stimulate freedom and activity between the citizens. In this frame, our aim here would be to evaluate specifically the Italian and Brazilian movement of psychiatric reform. The Italian Reform Movement is also known as “Democratic Psychiatric” and appeared during the 1960’s and 1970’s due especially to Franco Basaglia’s efforts in Trieste (Italy Northeast). The Brazilian Psychiatric Reform is in a great measure inspired in the Italian Model and arose during the 1980’s together with the democratic political reform of the State. The analysis of governmental techniques present in these process of reform will be conducted through the examination of the citizenship and freedom concepts present in the anti-manicomial laws (as Brasil, 2002), official documents (some resolutions attached to these laws as Ministério da Saúde 2004a, 2004b), some academic texts (of the main authors of the reform process as Basaglia 1979, 1985, 2005), and practices as the social enterprise (as Rotelli, 1994 and Slavich, 1985). This analysis will be done considering the kinds and styles of governmentality supposed in these discourses, and devices. Our hypothesis would be that in all these processes there is a coexistence of both the old disciplinary processes (as the asylum practices) together with the processes of resistance to them, the old sovereign devices, and new liberal forms of management. In conclusion, we will discuss the liberty concept present in all these practices. The aim is to put in question this liberty concept, trying to think about some alternatives to it in other psychological practices.

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**FROM IMPLICIT TO EXPLICIT KNOWLEDGE IN PSYCHOLOGY:
HUSSLERL, JAMES, AND LINSCHOTEN**

Idolen van de psycholoog (Idols of the psychologist) (Linschoten, 1964) surely changed the landscape in Dutch psychology. Flat as the Dutch landscape may be (taken literally) it turned the virtual one of psychology into a landscape with hills and dales – if not upside down. It had a remarkable impact – more than any impact score could ever have indicated. It shifted the interest of younger psychologists from a psychology that used and accepted much of the implicit knowledge of the psychologist to a psychology that avoided any of the implicit knowledge in favour of explicit, and preferably, quantitative knowledge. It became *the* way of thinking for most academic psychologists. It paralleled movements with the same aims in the Anglo-Saxon world that expressed suspicion about the possibilities of founding knowledge on experience in favor of technical, observable form of knowledge. But there it is difficult to point to *one* book that one can say is *the* book that changed it all.

Writing the biography of Johannes Linschoten leads us to ever more and new questions. In this paper we seek answers to questions regarding the history of the way psychologists (and once in a while philosophers) saw psychology as a science (and practice) using the implicit knowledge of its practitioners, and those who considered psychology as a science that used or had to use explicit knowledge. Especially interesting for us is the question that refers to the interaction between those favoring implicit and those favoring explicit knowledge in the period before and during the alleged change of view of Johannes Linschoten in the 1950s and early 1960s of the 20th century.

William James is the most important American forerunner of this position (James, 1890). His *psychologist's fallacy* has been an important contribution, both to psychology (that often ignored it) and to Linschoten's work. Linschoten not only wrote a book on William James as a precursor to phenomenology (Linschoten, 1959, 1961, 1968) and probably his reading of James was a precursor to Linschoten's *Idolen* (Linschoten, 1964).

Husserl cannot be ignored either. In his earlier years Husserl had been an inspiration for Linschoten, probably through the interpretation of Buytendijk who was very much inspired by Scheler who – in turn -- was influenced by Husserl. However, Buytendijk was never interested in Husserl's transcendental philosophy before the late 1950s. If anything, his interest was in his phenomenology as a way of seeing *through* the shallow properties to see the whole person, the essence of a person, his or her ways of existence (Dekkers, 1985). Later, Linschoten must have

discovered the Husserl of the transcendental philosophy himself. Linschoten travelled to Leuven (the Husserl archives) in 1958, where he did research for three days. By that time Linschoten was obviously involved in seeking answers to questions about the foundations (“grondslagen”) of psychology. His weekly lectures for candidandi and pre-candidandi demonstrate the struggle (Linschoten, 1957-1958, 1958-1959a, 1958-1959b), resulting in his book on James (Linschoten, 1959, 1961, 1968). Linschoten was Buytendijk’s successor by then, and he probably influenced Buytendijk to resume his study of Husserl again, now focussing on the transcendental philosophy.

Due to the evolution of his thinking about James and Husserl, we think – contrary to Jaap Bos’ interpretation presented in the ESHHS paper in Utrecht (2009) and in his book to be published on Langeveld (rumours, 2011) – that Linschoten had very good reasons to go as far as *Idolen* goes. Reasons, that is, that go beyond personal resentments against Langeveld and others due to his alleged infringement. Many ideas about the workings of psychology (that is about the working of the mind of psychologists) can be found already in Linschoten’s lectures and his book on James, only more so (and often turned upside down).

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SCIENCE IN SRETEN ADŽIĆ'S PEDAGOGICAL PRACTICE AT THE BEGINNING OF XX CENTURY IN SERBIA

In this paper we present and analyze the way that Sreten Adzic (1856-1933) - primary school teacher, pedagogue, lecturer and head teacher of College for Primary School Teachers - acquired, developed and applied the achievements of various sciences to his practice. Pedagogue in Serbia at the end of 19th and beginning of 20th century developed in two directions. First direction characterized attempts scientifically foundations of pedagogue and representatives of this orientation were full Herbart's pedagogue, which were educated in Germany: Vojislav Bakic (1847-1929) and Stevan Okanovic (1871-1917). Representatives of other direction were less interested in questions of scientific pedagogue and more in teaching practice, and their pedagogical education contemporary analysts called "encyclopedic". The most important members of this course were Jovan Miodragovic (1854-1926) and Sreten Adzic.

Research question that this paper deals with can be traced in Adzic's biography through three periods. First period - Adzic's primary school teaching is characterized by analyticity and reflexivity in solving practical educational and didactic problems. The second period - Adzic's professional training in Vienna and Leipzig, which is characterized by a variety of different disciplines to learn. The third is related to Adzic's work in the Colleges for Primary School Teachers.

In 1880 Adzic begins his practical work in Trstenik which he presented in the book *Primary School Teacher's Notes*. Analysis of 30 situations that he recorded shows us the elements of the scientific approach to the pedagogical problems. When he notices a pedagogically relevant phenomenon, which is recognized as a problem, Adzic monitors and analyzes it from various aspects, then he sets several hypotheses about possible outcomes and in accordance with them he plans how to solve the problem. Then he realizes his plan in a flexible manner. Finally, he evaluates the entire process and performs several pedagogical implications for future work. In the school practice of Serbia at the end of the nineteenth century such way of working was unusual. Adzic was one of the few primary school teachers who gained their education in a vocational school for teachers. The first College for Primary School Teachers was founded in Serbia in the 1871 year, and in that period in 441 primary schools worked 550 teachers. Until the 1880 year the number of primary schools increased to 614, and number of teachers to 817.

Already in 1882 Adzic was given an opportunity for further training which he began in the field of working with blind children in Pedagogue in Vienna (Vienna Lehrer Pädagogium) as a state scholar. He continues his studies in 1886 by attending University in Leipzig. During the

six semesters he attended lectures of Professors Wunt, Mazius and Schrimpl. In addition to philosophical and pedagogical studies Adzic learns natural sciences related to experimental psychology (anatomy, neurology, physiology, hygiene). He also attends classes of the National Economy, led by Professor Brentano. He endeavored to get to know better the school systems of Austria and Germany in order to return to Serbia with good examples of pedagogical practice.

Since 1889, when he returned in Serbia, until 1914. Adzic was engaged in education for primary school teachers. In the Teacher Training College in Nis, then in Aleksinac, Adzic was in charge of teaching psychology, methods and hygiene. In 1898 he was appointed a head teacher of College for Primary School Teachers in Jagodina which represented a realization of his own teacher education project. It was a state school, organized as a boarding school with well equipped cabinets, workshops and experimental farms (orchards, vegetable gardens, vineyards). Special characteristic was the garden with five different types of outdoor classrooms. Thus, this school became one of the most modern in the Balkans, representing the result of Adzic's interdisciplinary approach to educational issues. In the design of this school Adzic applied his knowledge in the field of medical science, botany, agronomy, as well as the experience of Sweden, Norway and Denmark in the field of teacher education and school policy. In this countries, which he considered to have the most practical regulated school system, Adzic spent three months in 1898.

Teacher Training School in Jagodina, as Adzic imagined, met strict hygienic and pedagogical standards which provided quality conditions for living and learning of students. Besides education, the school had another important social function - education and training students for engaging in agriculture. In Serbia in the late nineteenth century about 80% of the population was engaged in agriculture, but it could not be considered a developed business. Teachers were expected to contribute to enlightenment in this area as well. In addition they were supposed to work on health education programs, which also represented a sore point of the Serbian society, where the percentage of illiterate population far exceeded the percentage of literate population. Sreten Adzic prepared his students both theoretically and practically for these roles. In the period from 1898 until 1919 sixteen generations with 381 students, were educated in Jagodina. In 1914. the school was transformed into military hospital. The experimental farms, outdoor classrooms and garden were destroyed in wars' devastated.

Besides the papers in which other authors dealt with Adzic's educational work, for this paper we used the Sreten Adzic's Fund in Educational Museum as well as the Fund of the Ministry of Education in the Archives of Serbia.

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PSYCHOLOGY AND CONSUMERISM: A CRITICAL APPROACH CONSUMERISM AS A FORM OF MIND COLONIZATION

One of the main characteristics of contemporary societies is marked by shift from authority of producer to authority of consumer. Authority of consumer is strengthened by widespread ideology of consumerism, where consumer becomes not only a model of everyday behaviour, but also an object of scientific studies. The aim of this paper is to critically investigate position of psychology in contemporary society, concerning its relation to consumerism. Although psychology can be presented as a monolite system of knowledge, in essence, it contains radically different epistemological and ontological positions. One of those positions that are based upon positivism and scientific realism has as its product the Psychology of Consumer Behaviour and Psychology of Marketing. During this exposure we will try to mark meta-theoretical basis, problematics, and implications of this positivistic psychological paradigme in its relation to consumerism. Also, we will propose alternativ way of understanding this ideology, from the point of view of critical psychology – a model of consumerism as a colonization of mind.

When considering the begginings of consumerism, we cannot surpass impact of Edward Bernays in this field (Bauman, 2002). Still in 20's, he was the first to persuade corporations that is possible to improve selling of products by connecting symbols of consumer industry to Freud's ideas of human understood as primarily irrational being, being that is driven by its unconscious. Until then, marketing industry had been treating humans as rational beings, and its guiding principle was "purposeful consumerism", to fullfil its goal of satisfying biological and social needs. Through time, consumerism has become (at least in Western societies) mainstream ideology, widespread in all aspects of social life. Its concepts are emphasized as universal, natural, normal and desirable, ideals in which we do not doubt. Different social institutions maintain and encourage ideology of consumerism. This is the case with psychology, as part of the scientific milieu of contemporary society: consumerist behavior is viewed as positive, ahistorical and universal phenomenon that can be studied impartially, while politically neutral scientific theory describes the facts of the world. Also, psychological knowledge is applied in all the more popular Psychology of Marketing and Consumer Psychology, with the aim of better selling of products. This approach has the following disadvantages: lack of criticism and lack of self-reflection, an illusion of political and ideological neutrality of psychology as a science, simplified and one-sided understanding of the phenomenon of consumerism, as well as unawareness of its own position in the social order and in the maintenance of that order.

On the other hand, we want to emphasize the critical potential of psychology through an alternative model of understanding the ideology of consumerism: the consumerist behavior is understood as a consequence of colonization of the mind. Namely, an important place in this

ideology takes the idea of creating identity through the practice of buying products. What happens is the colonization of human mind – internalization of the value system of the colonizers. On the surface, the goal of consumerist colonization is the profit for the colonizers. Colonizers - those who sell, offer product; colonized - those who buy the product offered. More specifically, colonizers are the powerful corporate elite, and the colonized are citizens, consumers. However, it is difficult to draw a clear distinction - in the end, those are just social positions or social roles, and all of us who live in "civilization" are in some ways consumers.

Motivational factor of the mechanism of colonization is the desire, which relates to the purchase, possession, consumption of certain products from a huge range of different products that are offered today and that may be subject to consumption. But products are not just meeting basic human needs, but also creating identity. Consumers, ordinary people, want to be like models of possession, they want to want the same thing models do. It should be noted that the models for identification are in the function of profits. That is, they are fluid, flexible, changeable and are intended to meet the deepest narcissistic needs of consumers. Also, it should be emphasized that desire are not always conscious. Consequently, the unconscious desires must become conscious, in order to access them from a critical perspective. Thus, the awareness of our choices and "rationality" of our desire, in the Psychology of Consumers so rarely questioned, is, in fact, essentially irrational. As human beings, we always arrive at the world in a given society, with its ideologies (consumerism as one of them). Therefore, he enters into the existing system of meaning that he internalizes gradually. It is interesting that in the framework of this ideology, at the manifest level, consumers are left with the choice – for example, which product among hundreds of them they will buy. However, it is always the choice that is limited by the same (consumeristic) ideology and, therefore, illusion. It is choosing in the frame of existing structure of the world, but it is not choosing of the structure of the world. People are encouraged to adopt one or more of the offered shares, but not to create their own values. That is why consumerist ideology is dangerous – it promotes the election and somehow guarantees freedom of choice, but fails to mention that it is always the choice limited by framework of its offered values.

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“PSY” CITIZENS: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERAL CITIZENSHIP IN SPAIN (1875-1923)

This paper has been prepared as a part of a broader research project on the analysis of the psychological origins of governmentality in Spain. Following Nikolas Rose (1996, 1999; Rose & Miller, 2008), by governmentality is meant here a specific form of control on the behavior of the individual subject, arising within the context of Western liberal democracies in the mid-nineteenth century. Among other things, governmentality involved the strengthening of the individual's capacity for self-government and interiorization of those values characteristic of modern liberalism –like the search for personal happiness, individual responsibility, liberty of choice, and freedom. Historically, in the development and management of this new form of subjectivity, unprecedented as to its sophistication and spread in the population, both scientific psychology and its process of institutionalization were to play a crucial role. Not accidentally, indeed, the new liberal forms of government, social co-existence and responsibility were contemporary with the foundation and popularization of psychological discourse in its “modern”, disciplinary or scientific/philosophical forms. Hand in hand with liberal thought, psychology was to be used as a tool for overcoming the old, *ancien-régime* totalitarian forms, thus helping to achieve the legal and subjective transformation of the subject/vassal into a subject possessing the condition of a citizen endowed with a national identity (Sluga, 2006).

With its own peculiarities, the case of Spain at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries provides a good example of this process of citizenship construction (Pérez Ledesma, 2007). From the restoration of the Bourbon parliamentary monarchy in 1874 through its end in 1923 with General Primo de Rivera's military dictatorship, a profound transformation was produced in the socio-cultural logic which had prevailed during the previous three centuries –a logic which was associated to both the constitutional monarchy and the deep social penetration of Catholicism in all spheres of Spanish everyday-life (Álvarez Junco, 2001). Due, among other things, to the “psychological colonization” of public and private discourses and practices –at both the disciplinary and lay levels-, a number of crucial socio-cultural transformations took place. The time of eternal deity was replaced by that of evolution and material progress; character, mentality and temperament took the place of the psychological structure of the soul; practical, operational knowledge became a substitute for the rote memorization of norms and dogmas; the productive and cumulative activity of towns came to replace the cyclical, routine activity of the rural world; while the power and relevance of the old social agents –priests, monarchs, aristocrats, subjects, bandits, and so on- were being replaced by

the functions and roles of the new ones –educators, politicians, intellectuals, producers, union workers, etc. (Castro, Lafuente y Jiménez, 2009). It is in these transformation processes, with their foundations being then laid by psychology, that the genealogical bases supporting the notion of citizenship should still be sought today.

The aim of this paper is to analyze social ethics as a subject of academic discussion – social ethics being one of the specific historic/cultural areas most actively involved in the management of the above-mentioned issues. In previous papers we have argued that the programmatic reflection on ethics and, more specifically, its psychological underpinning, is a particularly relevant space for the reshaping of Western culture (Castro, Lafuente & Jiménez, 2009 and in press). What happened at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th was that the close disciplinary relations between psychology and ethics in classical philosophical systems were re-interpreted in the light of the objectivism allegedly provided by the new psychology. This tendency is clearly shown in such works as Gustave Le Bon's *Les lois psychologiques de l'évolution des peuples* (1895) or Wilhelm Wundt's *Völkerpsychologie* (1916). It is thanks to them that psychology could become not only a guarantee of an adequate analysis of actual forms of social co-existence, but also a kind of propedeutics to any other desirable forms.

In our already mentioned papers, an analysis was made of the programmatic balances carried out by Spanish Catholic authors in their reflections on ethics. A considerable effort was indeed made to adjust the imperatives of modern socio-psychological thought to their own social utopia –a utopia, in this case, of a marked nostalgic, reactionary character. We will now present a parallel, specular study on the proposals made by liberal authors in this respect along the time interval comprised between 1875 and 1923. To this end, we will resort to a selection of programmatic works on social ethics from authors of a liberal bent, such as J.M. Rey-Heredia, U. González-Serrano, J. Verdes-Montenegro, F. Santamaría-Esquerdo o E. Luis-André. Special attention will be paid to those arguments used to establish the psychological bases of the identity and activity of the various human groups, as well as the psychological tools suggested for preserving or, in its case, reorienting them.

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**THE LIFEWORLDS OF MASONS AND BUTCHERS IN THE CITY BEAUTIFUL:
A MICROHISTORICAL APPROACH TO URBAN CHANGE IN *FIN-DE-SIÈCLE*
BELGRADE**

This paper explores informal articulations of scientific expertise, their contextual meanings, and the formulation of Foucauldian apparatuses of power in turn-of-the-century Belgrade. Particularly in the case of the Serbian capital, historiography has emphasized nationalization and failed Europeanization as defining characteristics of the post-Ottoman Balkan city.³ I propose a shift in focus – a move away from large processes of social change, and towards interrogating the city's modernity vis-a-vis transnational discourses of progress, cleanliness and emerging practices of the capitalist economy. Through the methodological lens of microhistory,⁴ I discuss two seemingly unrelated processes in order to glimpse at the lifeworlds of Belgraders during the period of intense urban change.⁵ Can the acquisition of mastership in the Masons and Hewers Guild during 1893, and the debates of the Society for the Beautification of Vračar over the hygiene of butcher shops some two years later tell us how discourses of cleanliness and progress operated in the Serbian capital of the *fin-de-siècle*?

The threads which bind both cases push for a two-fold reading of history. Primarily, they allow for an inquiry into the subjective experiences of denizens, one which highlights minute records of dissent in a historical space often marred by the hypothesis of failed modernization and its implied lack of agency. While the breakdown of the Serbian guild system has been carefully examined by Yugoslav social historians, the experiences of its members have largely remained unknown.⁶ How did masons and hewers live in the face of a scientific discourse of progress which gradually rendered their professions obsolete? More importantly, how did they appropriate such discourses as tools of/against power? Parallel to this, I examine the concerns and interests of the up-and-coming urban beautification enthusiasts and emerging *rentier* capitalists which spearheaded this progress. Was there a relationship between their scientific understandings of cleanliness and new notions of propriety rooted in the public sphere? Likewise, how were the changes which their advocacy physically articulated onto the cityscape experienced?

3 See: Dubravka Stojanović, *Kaldrma i asfalt : urbanizacija i evropeizacija Beograda 1890-1914 [Cobblestone and asphalt: the urbanization and Europeanization of Belgrade 1890-1914]* (Beograd: Udruženje za društvenu istoriju, 2008).

4 For a discussion of the differences between microhistory, the history of everyday life and social history, see: Winfried Schulze. (e.d) *Sozialgeschichte, Alltagsgeschichte, Mikro-Historie: eine Diskussion.* (Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1994) For a general view of the microhistorical method, see: Christopher R. N. DeCorse, James F. Brooks, and John Walton, *Small Worlds: Method, Meaning, and Narrative in Microhistory* (School for Advanced Research Press, 2008).

5 For an excellent examination of the discursive constructions of gender in the lifeworld of a 19th century Belgrader, see: Nataša Mišković, *Basare und Boulevards: Belgrad im 19. Jahrhundert* (Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 2008), 326-332

6 Nikola Vučković, *Raspadanje esnafa u Srbiji* (Beograd: Naučna knjiga, 1954).

Finally, in the thread which binds the two cases, I problematize the reading of modernity in the city as merely a reflection of Marx's apophthegm "all that is solid melts into air."⁷ Rather, I argue for a phenomenological reading of history, one which focuses on the formative nexuses of intersubjectivity in the face of rapid social change. Per Walter Benjamin, I seek to "brush history against the grain", pushing the historical sources at our disposal to glimpse at a bridge between personal and shared lifeworlds. Ultimately, I contend that lived experiences of power were in an intimate relationship with the scientific production of knowledge, even when produced in informal settings outside the realm of state authority.

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7 While the phrase comes from the *Communist Manifesto*, its relationship to urban modernity has best been expressed by Marshall Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (Penguin (Non-Classics), 1988).

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**ON MICROEMERGENCE:
LOUIS AGASSIZ, SIGMUND FREUD, FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE**

In Methods of Study in Natural History (1863), Louis Agassiz describes working with the microscope: "A superficial familiarity with the microscope gives no idea of the exhausting kind of labor which the naturalist must undergo who would make an intimate microscopic study of these minute living spheres" (296). The practice of microobservation, Agassiz furthermore states, transcends the researcher's ability to communicate in ordinary ways. Too much time would be required to train "the uninitiated" (297). In this context, Agassiz, a painstaking scientist known for sober observation and a penchant for elaborate classification, evokes initiation in outright religious formulations. Although Agassiz insists on the scientist's ability to arrive at objective results and factual knowledge, a transcendent element enters into his considerations, coupled with a pronounced physiological awareness: "[...] there are subjects of microscopic research so obscure that the student must observe a special diet before undertaking his investigation, in order that even the beating of his arteries may not disturb the steadiness of his gaze, and the condition of his nervous system be so calm that his whole figure will remain for hours in rigid obedience to his fixed and concentrated gaze" (297 f.).

In 1876, Sigmund Freud begins his scientific career with painstaking microscopic work. An advanced student at the University of Vienna Institute of Comparative Zoological Anatomy, he receives a grant to investigate the lobed organs of eels at the Zoological Experimental Station at Trieste. In 1877, Freud presents the results of this research project to the Academy of Sciences at Vienna, as subsequently published in the Academy's Proceedings. More than sixty years later, in the ruling metaphor of the first chapter of his final outline of psychoanalysis (1938), Sigmund Freud describes the life of the soul as the function of an "apparatus, to which we ascribe spatial extension and a composition comprising several pieces, and which we therefore imagine as similar to a telescope, a microscope, and the like" (67). Like Agassiz in *his* description of microscopic work, Freud furthermore highlights the authoritative knowledge of the teacher. But whereas Agassiz in his poetically infused passages suggests a process of initiation, Freud deploys an elaborate metaphorical apparatus that exhibits a considerable amount of its *own* technological power. In Freud's writing, the apparatus takes over, with the author's explicit support. If Agassiz' figure before the microscope is subject to a rigid gaze in sink with the requirements of the microscopic lens, Freud's authorial stance generates a similar figure and gaze: once the psychic apparatus is established, the analytic eye strongly and steadily conveys the function of the apparatus: the life of the soul. In Freud's writing, however, the psychic apparatus in its ascriptive quality leaves considerable room for an authorial imagination under the sway of the optical metaphor. Freud transposes the scientific instrument of his early research into the metaphorical core of his psychoanalytic writing, and in this transposition retains a stance between apparatus

and imagination. The ascriptive indeterminacy of Freud's psychoanalytic writing recalls his early insistence on the indeterminate results of his microscopic work at Trieste.

In Gay Science (1882), written in the period of Freud's scientific beginnings, Friedrich Nietzsche reflects on "unconscious virtues" in ways that combine the scientific sharpness of the microscope with a psychic, even divine dimension: "Our visible moral qualities, and especially those that we *believe* to be visible, take their course; and the invisible ones, which have the same names but are neither ornaments nor weapons with regard to others, *also take their course*: probably a totally different one, with lines and subtleties and sculptures that might amuse a god with a divine microscope" (Book I, 8). With Nietzsche, Agassiz' monastic tone, which finds its limit in the requirements of scientific proof, is energized transcendently while remaining linked simultaneously to the ironies and pleasures of gay science. Where Freud, in the tradition of Agassiz, insists on the indeterminacy of that which cannot be seen definitively, Nietzsche suggests a doubling of moral realities in a microscopic underground. As in Freud, Nietzsche's authorial imagination plays a decisive role in employing microscopic vision. Unlike Freud, Nietzsche dissolves the tension between the scientific instrument and an observer whose imagination remains in the instrument's grip. In this process of dissolution, Nietzsche's microscope morphs from science toward art. Under his "divine microscope," "subtle sculptures" appear on "the scales of reptiles" (Book I, 8), and human virtues emerge individually and idiosyncratically in their singular forms. Alfred Binet's micropsychological statements (1887) come to mind in this microemergent underworld: a subvirtuous realm appears that in its miniscule dimensions and its otherness undercuts virtuousness as we see it.

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**DEFINING MOMENTS IN THE HISTORY OF MEANING:
THE ROMANTIC CRISIS**

During the 20th century the human sciences were obsessed with the problem of meaning, and “the linguistic turn” triumphed in discipline after discipline. In my own field of anthropology the turn was named “the shift to meaning”, and three of its heralds were Clifford Geertz, Marshall Sahlins and James Fernandez. The preoccupation with hermeneutics and interpretation has an unbroken tradition in American anthropology since Franz Boas. In Britain, the work of Evans-Pritchard is seen as a turning point in the transition from functionalism to interpretative anthropology. And in France, it was the Saussurean revolution in linguistics which set off structuralism in anthropology, mainly associated with the work of Claude Levi-Strauss..

The new century, on the other hand, has seen the resurgence of naturalist approaches in the human sciences. Efforts to identify the biological basis of morality, naturalistic approaches to the study of religion, cognitive science and various new schools of linguistics tend to challenge – or at least complement – the existing varieties of “verstehende” human and social sciences.

These developments give cause for a fresh look at the history of efforts to understand humans as sense makers. I have presented two installments of this story at earlier ESHHS meetings (Dublin and Utrecht), and in this third presentation I intend to paint a portrait of “the romantic crisis” (Todorov’s term) and its repercussions on “the science of man”, anthropology.

There is an aesthetic metaphor at the base of cultural anthropology, especially its American variety: cultures are seen as works of art which reveal a human way of being in the world. The elements of culture, like the elements of art, are integrated by a common cognitive style, an affective disposition, overarching schemata which cast patterns of behavior and artefacts in the same mold.

Analytically, we can distinguish between three postulates which define the concept of culture: a) meaningfulness, b) stylistic integration, and c) creative expressivity. The notion of a linguistically constituted reality was partly derived from Wilhelm von Humboldt and his work on the Kawi language (1836):

Man lives with his objects chiefly – in fact since his feeling and acting depend on his apperception, one may say exclusively – as language presents them to him. By the same process whereby he spins language out of his own being, a circle from which there is no escape save by stepping out of it into another.

Almost 100 years later, Edward Sapir echoes Humboldt:

The “real world” is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group...The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds. Not merely the same worlds with different labels attached.

The postulate of stylistic integration can similarly be traced back to German romanticism. It is heir to the concept of “Geist” which unify the products of spirit in an epoch or a people (Zeitgeist, Volksgeist). There were traces of “Geist”-talk in Dilthey’s *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* of 1883, which Franz Boas brought with him to the USA a few years later. Dilthey elaborated the romantic idea that the schemata which structure the manifold of experience for us are not universal, but thoroughly historical. He is one of several thinkers who anticipate notions like “historical aprioris” (Foucault), “the quasi-transcendental” (Habermas), “absolute presuppositions” (Collingwood) and the like.

Creative expressivity is usually attributed to the work of Herder and his notion of authentic expression of individual and group life. When Boas and his students proceeded to identify stylistic patterns in the artefacts and institutions of various cultures, they represented a stage between the romantic notion of Geist and contemporary secularized terms for cognitively integrated wholes: discourses, paradigms, epistemes, language games, practices, truth games and the like.

In Romantic theories of aesthetics (which by and by becomes a model for cognition) the notion of imitation and representation of a pre-existing world yields to the notion of expressivity and creative production.

I will examine several aspects of the romantic notion of meaning, seeing the concept of culture as a solution to the problem of meaning in a post-theological world disenchanted by the scientific revolution. I will also point out the venues by which German romanticism entered cultural anthropology and helped bring about “the shift to meaning” in the mid-20th century.

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STIMULATING IMAGES: AS PSYCHOLOGICAL INSTRUMENTS AND AS PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH OBJECTS

When entering a psychological laboratory where experiments on perception are performed, one often finds a room with desks and pc terminals. Most of the visual stimuli presented to subjects are shown on a computer screen. It has not always been this way. Before the computer became so generally present, a fascinating richness and variety of techniques, materials, and apparatuses was used to show visual stimuli to subjects. Even in the recent upsurge of interest in scientific images, these ‘instrumental’ images, i.e. images serving as a central part of the instrument, have only been sparsely studied (with an exception of those images used for the study of illusions, e.g. Wade 2005). Studying the history of these stimuli images used in psychological experiments on visual perception not only helps to better understand currently used stimuli images. It is especially significant that our understanding of what perception is has been formed by means of these images. Studying these images can offer an alternative way to understanding the perception theories that were conceived while working with them.

This paper presents a single case study contributing to such a history of stimuli images. I look at the images used by the Belgian experimental psychologist Albert Michotte (1881-1965) in his studies on perception. Looking at the development of Michotte’s work allows an especially clear view on how, throughout his career, he used many images in very different functions, and how it was through this constant working with images that he gradually came to recognize *image* perception as an important psychological topic in its own. His work provides a case of images in action and of a psychological problem in the making. Looking at how this shift happened – how images were no longer only serving as instrument-parts in the experiments but how the perception of images became a research object in itself – helps us to understand how image perception was considered to relate to visual perception in general.

In this paper, I focus on the images Michotte used in his experiments on the perception of causality, which he started in Leuven in the late 1930s. The disc method [Fig. 1] was one of the methods used to present subjects with moving displays showing coloured figures in dynamic interactions. The instrument made use of large rotating paper discs with coloured lines on them in many hundreds of combinations. When looked at through a narrow horizontal slit in a covering screen, moving and interacting patches of colour were seen. I discuss how the materiality of these images contributed to turn Michotte’s interest to the study of image perception as a topic in itself.

Michotte chose this method of rotating discs above others because it was relatively cheap and easy (e.g. as opposed to film) to cut and draw ever new discs in which parameters could be varied and precisely controlled. Another reason for choosing the paper discs was that it was very clear that there was no actual causal interaction taking place, it were just patches of colour shown

in different movement combinations. This was important to Michotte, as he wanted to study the *impression* of causality, and separate it as much as possible from the *belief* that a causal action was taking place. Yet, surprisingly, even though subjects knew very well that they were just looking at lines on paper discs, some described how they had the impression that the causal impact was real nonetheless, in a physical sense. One observer even asked if he could inspect the displays from more up close, in order to double-check whether it were indeed just figures drawn on paper, no actual colliding objects. It were these observations, Michotte relates, that made him set up an investigation of the perception of (moving) images.

Michotte investigation into the specific phenomenal impression of images can at different points be seen to reflect back on his use of (moving) images as visual stimuli in his previous the experiments. He explores, for example, how the impression of reality, the impression of depth, and the belief in both can occur in many different combinations. He concludes how the entire perceptual structure of the image is distinguished by a special phenomenal character of 'unreality'. It was especially this image characteristic which he had put to use in his causality experiments, where he wanted to present the impression of causality without there seeming to be a real causal interaction. Looking at how Michotte gradually comes to recognize that image perception is an important psychological problem, i.e. looking at how images for him grew from being psychological instruments into being a worthy psychological research object, thus can shed more light on their previous role as instruments. It allows, moreover, to gain a better apprehension of how the relation of perception and images was understood.

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


Fig. 1: The 'Banc Michotte', instrument used in the disc method in Michotte's experiments on perceived causality. Photograph from the Collection of the Library of Psychology and Educational Sciences, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.

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WHEN THEMES CONVERGE: THE PERSONAL, THE SOCIAL AND THE AGENTIC ASPECTS OF HISTORY

Trade unionism has been a contextual thread running through earlier "social history" work on "turn of the century" origins of social psychology in France: I examined Augustin Hamon's anarchism, communism and solidarism (Apfelbaum & Lubek, 1983), as the nascent social sciences traded off licks with social movements of the day, and social activists applied social theories through networks such as the international professional meetings, the "Internationales", the Masonic orders, and trade union networks. Early social theories of violence were tuned to realities of the street, mines and factory, and George Sorel's "revolutionary syndicalism" and the threat of the General Strike were discussed earlier (Lubek, 1983). Later, in Cambodia, I reported on efforts to "make history action", using a Lewinian "action research" framework to guide a community health promotion project to reduce HIV/AIDS and other health risks, primarily to women and children (Lubek & Wong, 2002). After discovering that women who sell international brands of beer were greatly at risk, and that corporate headquarters were "recalcitrant" to provide a safe and healthy workplace (Green and Lubek, 2010), we began taking our data to international trade unionists and consumer activists. In August, 2010, we helped form a local of the Cambodian Food and Service Workers Confederation, with 63 women members from Siem Reap, Cambodia. Here, longitudinal data on health and safety (2002-2011) becomes part of an active grievance process at the national and international union levels.

A recent highlighting of "personal history" helps perhaps can put these disjointed social historical analyses and historically-driven actions into a more coherent framework. Mar 25th, 2011 was the centenary of a tragic event in trade-union history, the Triangle Shirtwaist Company fire in New York, in which 146 persons, primarily young immigrant women, died. Families had the grim task of identifying and arranging funerals for the victims, but on April 5th, the last 6 unidentified victims were accompanied by a cortege of 100,000 workers, with an additional 300,000 persons watching the procession. The 6 were buried together in the Evergreen Cemetery. Trade unions took the factory owners to court, and after two trials, won indemnity for the families of victims and survivors. Last year, the last victims were identified by New York genealogist Michael Hirsch and two recent documentaries pieced together the story of the fire, of the changes in New York city working conditions afterwards, the rise of the power of the unions, and began to fill in the missing biographies of the last 6 to be identified (Berger, 2011). Hirsch traced confidential records of benevolent societies that sent money to the families in Europe. Last to be identified was Fannie Rosen, who had migrated from the Ukraine 6 months earlier and was hired at Triangle 2 days before the fire. Triangle's eventual payments to the families permitted her sister Hilde (and later other family members) to migrate to Toronto in 1912, where she met and married Morris Lubek, newly arrived from Poland. These were my grandparents,

and without the tragic death of great-aunt Fanny, perhaps I wouldn't be here today. Our family members had always told the story of Fannie Rosen, without knowing that the official historical account of events 100 years ago lacked information about her and that she did not yet have a marked grave. During 2011, family members and labour historians will fill in the genealogical and biographical accounts of Aunt Fannie, and her name is now carved on the headstone where she was buried. For a historian of the social sciences who explores social and community themes, including trade-unionism, there is some additional thematic glue added to the uncompleted puzzle of my work.

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CONCEPTUAL HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE BELGRADE SCHOOL OF CREATIVITY

The purpose of this paper is to introduce ideas and research on creativity and its significance in education — which were initiated and developed over the past 40+ years in, what we now call, the Belgrade School of Creativity. The concepts, research and programs for children developed in this period represent a unique theoretical and practical approach to human development and education. In that approach creativity and imagination are viewed as the core of development: human beings are understood as unfinished, unpredictable “open systems” who continuously develop through pursuing their interests and dreams and becoming producers of their own culture. Education was conceptualized as an “open system” of guidance, embedded in the life of the child and deeply connected to the child’s immediate social and cultural environment.

The movement to study creativity, play and all forms of arts in human development and education started in Belgrade, Yugoslavia in the late 60s. One of the leading researchers, who spearheaded this area of inquiry, was Aleksandra “Sanda” Marjanovic from the Department of Education at the Belgrade University. Her prior work on literature, drama and art for children in “The Society of the Friends of Children” influenced her initial studies on development of creativity in children as an educational issue. Inspired by social cultural approach to the study of human development (Vygotsky, Marx) and leading dynamic system and cybernetic theories (Wiener, Bateson), Marjanovic formed a belief that human development is a cultural, creative and emergent process and that education, therefore, should be conceptualized and organized as an open system. “Humans do not adapt to the environment in a direct way, but rather indirectly, by transforming their habitat. Furthermore, who they are is not given to them, but rather, it is their task to discover and to forge their own nature. By transforming the natural environment, humans realize their physical and psychological potentials, that is, they establish themselves as people. Simultaneously, they change the main characteristics of their environment, i.e. they create their non-organic body, their culture, their human reality” (Marjanovic, 1977, p 4). Marjanovic saw creativity as the central characteristics of the practices by which people engage in shaping their interactions, relationships, knowledge and a sensibility towards the world around them. Thus, Marjanovic conceptualized development as a process of creative emergence that does not lead to pre-fixed or predefined end points, but rather to new forms and patterns of making sense of the world. Human development is an open system, based on open-endedness and unpredictability of the indefinite number of unique possibilities. Based on this main premise,

Marjanovic developed new conception of early childhood education, which influenced preschool educational practices in Yugoslavia, educational researchers as well as policy makers. Her students and younger colleagues conducted several action research studies, aimed at the transformation of preschool institutions and educational practices into an open system (Pestic, 1989, 1998). Her ideas and educational programs attracted many psychologists and educators in Belgrade and other centers of early childhood education in former Yugoslavia. Departments of Education and Psychology of Belgrade University soon started to produce innovative forms of research that was specifically focused on play and other forms of creativity in education and development (see Duran, Plut, & Mitrovic, 1987; Ognjenovic, 1986/87 and others).

At the same time, Sanda Marjanovic's close colleague, Ivan Ivic, researched issues relevant for symbolic development (Ivic, 1978). Studies of children's play and creativity became the core of Ivic's perspective on the structure of children's cognition, the emergence and formation of symbolic thought, logical (convergent) thinking, the importance of "divergence" in development and educational practices (Ivic, 1981, 1983; Ivic & Davidovic, 1972). Ivic claims that looking at children's play we (adults, and especially teachers) need to learn "...that there exist not one ... correct behavior in any given situation toward a particular object or a person; rather there are many different possible ways to act in any situation. Therefore, the way we, adults, tend to act, is not the only, and often even not the best, way to react in any given situation" (1981, p.15). In several studies, Ivic developed a very detailed analysis of the cognitive, emotional, interpersonal and larger social factors in which play as a human practice develops and begins to transform the lives of children and adults. His studies and work range from focusing on cognitive development and the role of play in the development of symbolic processes to educational practices and policies.

Studies of creativity at Belgrade University developed in a culturally vibrant historical moment of the Yugoslav society in the 60s, 70s and 80s. It was a time characterized by a rich production of literary, theatrical, journalistic, TV and film works for children and youth. A significant number of writers wrote for children (Radovic, Rsumovic, Lukic, Danojlic, Antic and many others). Books of stories and poetry, journals and newspapers for young children were published and illustrated by some of the best graphic artists (Petricic). Television, as a new phenomenon introduced in Yugoslavia in the 60s, became a medium for experimentation and invention of new genres. This cultural production for children was deeply imbued with and inspired by children's play and children's "pearls of wisdom". Particular attention to children at that time developed a sharp sensitivity and a need to better understand children's ways of seeing and experiencing the world in which they lived. At the same time, this, possibly even heightened attention to children's needs resulted in a significant number of creative programs in which children could participate after school and during winter and summer vacations. Numerous "clubs" and "cultural centers" were founded at the time. Children could merely walk in any of these, to engage in literary activities, chess, art, ballet, or film. This ebullient production for children and with children was not merely a background for the increase of the academic interest in play and creativity of children. Marjanovic, Ivic and their colleagues actively collaborated in various forms with artists, writers, actors, musicians, dramatists, and other creative authors whose work was both dedicated to children and inspired by children at all ages and stages of development.

This paper will describe the cultural historical moment in which Belgrade School of Creativity became a new way to approach childhood and education. It will trace the main ideas developed within this movement and present research projects, as well as creative education

programs organized for children in Belgrade and other centers in Serbia and other centers of the former Yugoslavia in the last three decades.

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FORMALIZATIONS OF RATIONAL CHOICE IN THE 20th CENTURY: FROM AXIOMS TO PREFERENCE CONDITIONS

The problem of choice under risk is inherently related to foundational problems of cognitive psychology via the notion of the measurement of belief. The second half of the 20th century witnessed a renewed interest in this problem, following Daniel Bernoulli's early analysis of choice behavior (1738), von Neumann and Morgenstern's (1947) axiomatization of rational choice under risk, and Ramsey (1926), de Finetti (1937) and Savage's (1972) seminal work in the subjectivist foundations of probability theory. While the formal, theoretical foundations of choice under risk were laid in economics and mathematics, where they continue to receive critical reassessment and attention, the empirical phenomena of choice did not receive *systematic* experimental treatment until the cognitive revolution in psychology reaffirmed questions related to the measurement of belief in the second half of the century.

Theories of choice under risk present the most suitable material for exact methodological and theoretical analyses in cognitive psychology, owing this property to their well developed, axiomatic formal structure. Paradigmatically, the construction of a theory of choice under risk is based on a proof of the respective *representation theorem*. A representation theorem provides a basis for the measurement of belief by linking the theory's axiomatic assumptions, which are directly related to observable choice behavior, with the existence of a utility (or value) function that maps the objects of choice to the set of real numbers. The theories of choice are then empirically tested against (a) the empirical violations of their axiomatic assumptions and (b) the capacity to encompass a body of empirical findings established in psychological research.

The most important line of this paradigmatic approach begins with Allais' (1953, Jallais & Pradier, 2005) empirical critique of the normative theory of Expected Utility (EU, von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947), and results in (i) the development of systematic experimental tests of the normative theory (Reed, 2009), and (ii) the development of new formal theories of choice under risk. In the scope of the later development, the theories of Rank-Dependent Utility (RDU, Schmidt, 2004, Abdellaoui, 2009), and specifically a special case of RDU known as Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT, Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, Tversky & Kahneman, 1992, Wakker & Tversky, 1993, Chateauneuf & Wakker, 1999), are recognized as consistently the best, both mathematically sound and empirically valid, answer to the challenges posed by experimental studies.

We follow and discuss three important, interrelated developments that take place in the discourse of this research paradigm. The first is related to the progressive loss of intuitive grounds in the axiomatizations of choice under risk following the development of mathematical alternatives to EU. As axiomatic assumptions on choice behavior in these theories tend to become more complex, a recent textbook (Wakker, 2010) on CPT even drops the term "*axioms*" in favor of "*preference conditions*". The second is the absence of successful convergent

methodological operations in the experimental studies of choice under risk. Some of the “signature” findings, such as the famous Allais' paradox, are not well-behaved under replication, even if only slight methodological variations take place (Reed, 2009). The question of how exactly had such empirical phenomena motivated and influenced the developments in the second half of the 20th century is raised. Finally, the third development we discuss is the perception of obligation on the behalf of professionals in cognitive psychology to conform to the axiomatic approaches characteristic of the tradition in economics and mathematics.

We aim to suggest a conclusion of a theoretical and methodological nature following our historical analysis: as early as in the 18th century, Daniel Bernoulli was able to present a formal analysis of choice that successfully accounted for some of the most important “signature phenomena” of choice relying solely on simple, elementary empirical intuitions. In spite of the great progress in the formal analysis of choice under risk, it is suggested that a different, intuition-driven research paradigm would be more appropriate for psychological studies of choice under risk. It is also suggested that intuition-driven research paradigms need not abandon *a priori* any of the formal results developed thus far.

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PEDOLOGY AS THE NEWLY EMERGED SCIENCE IN RUSSIA (AT THE TURN OF THE 20TH CENTURY)

This article is devoted to the history of developmental psychology in the works of Russian psychologists at the beginning of the 20th century. In Russia its formation as an independent branch of psychological knowledge coincided with the birth of experimental psychology. The main aim of the article is to provide characteristic features of its development in chronological order and at the same time underline general ideas, for as example, the idea of the importance of the environment that could have either positive or negative effects on a person's development. It contains a comparative analysis of psychological works by leading psychologists of the last century using statistical methods.

Key words: history of developmental psychology, Russia, pedology, ideology, methodology.

The main purposes of this paper are to:

- Identify the main prerequisites of developmental psychology as a new branch of psychological knowledge in Russia;
- Identify the main problems of the formation of developmental psychology and describe directions of research;
- Discover the reasons for the elimination of pedology in Russia.

After the social revolution of 1917, the Russian communist party ordered the creation of a new Marxist and Leninist psychology.

A period of tough ideological control over the activities of scientists from the Bolshevik Party began. Responding to the demands of the Party, special attention was paid by psychologists to the influence of the social environment on a child's life. This was evidenced by the growing number of studies which analysed the role of the social situation in a child's development.

It was thought that the character of a young person was determined by the type of work s/he was involved in. The industrial factor prevailed over others, making it the "constant" value, whilst gender and age were considered to be the "variables". Psychologists believed that in order to understand young people's behaviour they had to analyse every aspect of their living conditions.

During that time such famous psychologists as: M. J. Basov, P.P. Blonsky and, of course, L.S. Vygotsky worked and wrote their works. According to Vygotsky's concept, the environment is the source of development. Vygotsky formulated a number of laws of mental development in

children: the law of metamorphosis, the law of telling the differences in tempo and rhythm, the law of the development of higher mental functions and others.

At the turn of the 20th century, Basov, Blonsky and Vygotsky continued working on the newly emerged science – pedology. According to A.V. Petrovsky, pedology was based on four main principles:

- The principle of the holistic approach to the study of the child, using data obtained from various sciences;
- The genetic principle, to include Vygotsky's proposed idea of the zone of proximal development;
- The principle of taking into consideration the social context, that is, the living conditions of the child;
- The principle of making a diagnosis of the level of a child's development with the purpose of providing the child and the child's parents with psychological assistance.

In 1929 The First Pedological Congress took place where a presentation was made by the chief methodologist in pedology, A.B. Zalkind. He encouraged scientists to start building a class pedology, and to fight against dissent in science. Of course that approach forced scientists to observe a rigid political correctness in their works. That led to pedology evolving into a servant of state policy, which meant there was no freedom of speech in science and the search for the truth was prohibited. In our view, 1929 was the turning point for pedology: the remaining 7 years were years of fruitless attempts by the majority of scientists to prove government ideologies in science both theoretically and practically. After 1929 a hounding began of scientists whose ideas did not conform to the political setting of the Bolshevik Party.

Between 1929 and 1931 M. J. Basov's brilliant work "Fundamentals of pedology" was subject to the most severe criticism for its abstract-formal approach to the study of the mind of the child. It should be noted that Basov was the first to underline the importance of the person who played an active part in building the environment. This idea was later developed further by Vygotsky.

Pedology as a science was gradually nearing its crisis, not only because of ideological pressure from the Bolshevik Party, or drifting further away from its leading experts (Basov, Vygotsky, Lazursky, Rossolimo). A major contributor was also the fact that the work of pedologists in schools had significant deficiencies. A lot of pedologists had little or no adequate education, as a result of which their research was of poor quality. At the same time, research findings in general were not utilised or implemented in educational processes.

In 1936, a new regulation was announced by the All-Russian Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks called "Pedological distortions in the system of National Committees of Education". According to the new regulation, pedology was declared to be Marxist reactionary bourgeois science. As a result, work on developmental psychology ceased for many years. Only in 1948, works on child psychology by B.G. Ananjev and A.N. Leontjev started to appear. A lot later, in 1965, N.F. Dobrinin wrote a textbook on developmental psychology.

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TEACHER AS SCIENTIST: POPULARIZING PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING IN CATALONIA

Mental testing in general and specially the measurement of intelligence has become crucial in defining the role of the psychologist in modern society. Some historical work has already dealt with the question about how this device appeared (see Carson, 2006, Ceccarelli, 2002, Fancher, 1985, Gould, 1981, Richardson & Johannismeier, 1998, Rose, 1979, Sokal, 1990, Wolf, 1969, etc.). All these works present a more or less contextualized history of how the ideas about intelligence and psychological measurement were developed in France and how they were transferred afterwards to the United States. But what happened in other places? How was psychological testing introduced in Spain? There is still historical research missing on this topic.

The present paper deals with the intelligence testing applied and promoted by Catalan teacher in the 1920s. One of them was Llorenç Cabós, a teacher of a graded school of Barcelona linked to the rationalist group of pedagogues led by the anarchist Ferrer y Guardia. Cabós published the results 1920 of a seemingly auto-didactical application of the Yerkes, Bridges and Hardwick test to 100 schoolboys (with ages between 7 and 14 years) (Cabós, 1920). The American scale was a modified version of the Binet-Simon edited in 1915 under the title "*A point scale for measuring mental ability*" by Warwick & York (Baltimore). At that time, several psychological testing systems were sold on the Spanish market. Cabós decided to learn by doing, organizing series of paper and pencil testings in the classroom.

In the Catalan newspaper "*La Vanguardia*" as well as in the pedagogical journal in Madrid "*Revista de Pedagogía*" we find notes informing about the visit of teacher-students to Cabós' school to see a trail in infantile intellectual measurement applied to one case. It was a "public demonstration" only for a group of students trained to become teachers. The newspaper commented that the mental testing presentation was made with great exhibit of skills ("*con gran maestría*") by Cabós, using the Binet-Simon test.

The reason why we deal with his work is twofold: first, he became one of the main popularizers of psychological testing in Barcelona and, second, he was the first to adapt intelligence tests to the Catalan linguistic context. Our historical research shows that Cabós was no lonely forerunner but one of the historical actors within a social and institutional network that opened space and even enforced projects of psychological testing in Catalan schools. At a time of renaissance of Catalan industry and culture, the regional government was actively improving primary education. In this regard the policy and political intervention developed around 1920 by the regional government and the Barcelona city hall was clearly supportive for mental testing in school.

From our research we conclude that it was not the need to classify students in Catalan schools but a clear interest to professionalize teacher's career and to promote certain schools what impulse mental testing in Catalonia. Psychological testing meant to Cabós and his colleagues to run an experiment. Tests were easy to get and to be used to obtain numeric results. Whatever these numbers meant, these teachers interpreted them as contribution to science, to the development of a new scientific pedagogy.

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**FROM YELLOW FEVER TO A DOG NAMED PEPPER:
THE INTERSECTION OF HISTORY, STATISTICS, AND RESEARCH METHODS IN
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES**

“The productive paradox is that history can take one deeper into and further outside of one’s field” (p. 286, Woodward, 1982).

The inclusion of history in social science courses deepens students’ understanding of their field and interest in history. Social science history is often taught primarily in a single course (History of Psychology) rather than across courses, and by instructors not formally trained in history (Fuchs & Viney, 2002). We posit that inclusion of history across courses increases interest in history and social science, and leads more students to formally bridge the fields. We describe this approach in statistics and research methods courses.

The history of social science research includes colorful, conflicted, driven personalities. Karl Pearson, of correlation fame, was a youthful novelist and published poet (Porter, 2004). Ronald Fisher rejected a secure academic position to avoid working under Pearson’s thumb – and connected experimental design to statistical reasoning while working at an agricultural station (Box, 1978). The fly fishing W. S. Gossett mediated between Pearson and Fisher, and applied statistics to brewing a better bottle of Guinness (Porter 1986). Stella Cunliffe eventually succeeded Gossett at the Guinness brewery, and became the first female President of the Royal Statistical Society (Salsburg, 2001). The exciting, sometimes-intertwined lives of the people who make up the story of statistics engage students in the methods of social science and history.

In our presentation, we describe historical examples that illuminate concepts in social science research.

1. Data Collection: Florence Nightingale was a passionate statistician who challenged the status quo (Diamond & Stone, 1981; Gill, 2005). After returning from the Crimean War, Nightingale’s data revealed that deaths of British troops resulted from infection more than combat, and led her to champion proper sanitation in hospitals – like changing sheets between patients. Nightingale’s story highlights the limitations of common sense, and the need to rely on

data. Yet, historical reports of Nightingale's impact on mortality have varied, further emphasizing the need for critical questioning.

2. Correlational Research: During the 1854 cholera epidemic in England, John Snow surprised his local board of health with a now-famous map of a correlation that helped pinpoint contaminated well water as the cause of cholera (Johnson, 2006). Yet, an earlier, lesser-known map was created by physician Valentine Seaman in 1798 when he plotted yellow fever victims and "puddles, filth and garbage" on copperplate maps of lower Manhattan (Koch, 2005; Seaman, 1804). Allowing students to "see" correlation provides deeper meaning to the numbers behind a statistic. Further, these examples illuminate the problem of inferring causality from correlation. Seaman, for example, concluded that foul urban air caused yellow fever. Further, some sources credited Snow's revelation and the ensuing removal of the handle from the contaminated well with directly reducing the cholera death rate, whereas others opined that the reduction in deaths occurred because the disease had run its course.

3. Graphing: Charles Minard's exquisite depiction of Napoleon's 1812 March on Moscow has been described as the greatest graph ever created (Tufte, 2006). The 1813 graph includes multiple variables: location of troops in terms of longitude, latitude, and geographic features; number of troops still alive; date; and temperature. Modern graph-making technology allows the creation of visualizations of multi-variate data, and Minard's graph inspires students to think beyond a basic two-variable graph. Minard's graph also demonstrates the importance of exploring stories behind data; the band indicating troops abruptly narrows at each river, a chilling reminder of individual lives lost.

4. Ethics in Research: In the United States, when unethical research on marginalized groups was revealed in the popular media, it resulted in outrage and policy change. The four-decade Tuskegee syphilis study ended in 1972 when the media described experiments on African-American men in Alabama. The same year, the Willowbrook hepatitis experiments on mentally disabled children in New York were publicly revealed, leading to strict laws (Murphy, 2004; Rothman, 1982). Public indignation over the case of a Dalmatian dog named Pepper, stolen from his owners and sold to a hospital for research, led to the passage of the first federal law protecting laboratory animals (Kreger, Jensen, & Allen, 1996). We compare exposés that outed atrocities with peer-reviewed reports that glossed over abuses, an important historical and scientific lesson.

From historical examples, students learn social science more deeply and develop a curiosity about broader contexts. They also learn a skill taught in many history courses – that of "a healthy skepticism that frees one from the pervasive influence of fads" (p. 5, Fuchs & Viney, 2002). Indeed, the use of history in social science courses enhances students' "sociological imagination" (p. 287, Woodward, 1982) and teaches them to question historical "facts" and social science findings alike. Finally, it inspires some students, we hope, to eventually become true historians of the social sciences, trained professionals in both disciplines.

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METAINTENTIONALITY. WITTGENSTEIN, APEL AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE HUMANITIES

A main problem of the "logic" of the humanities is closely related to the notorious ones of "metalanguages" (Russell, Tarski, Wittgenstein). This is so, simply because of the "meta"-character of these disciplines themselves. Whereas natural science operates *intentio recta*, establishing (hopefully true) propositions about nature as an order which is itself devoid of language and intentional relations to objects, the humanities have to cope with objects (thoughts, attitudes, opinions, acts etc.) which have themselves linguistically formed relations to objects, which may be natural phenomena but also entities of the human(istic) (linguistic) kind.

The humanities are, in contradistinction to natural science, "meta"-intentional. Interpretations, concepts, rules and rule-following, freedom, rationality and knowledge (explicit and tacit) ..., such aspects which we normally attribute to the researching *subject* of science and members of the community of investigators, must in the social sciences also be accepted at the level of the *objects* investigated. In the human sciences one has necessarily (at least *prima facie*) to do with sentences which describe the intentional relations-to-world of subjects; sentences of the form "indirect speech", belief-sentences ("A believes that p"), etc.

Historically the philosophy of science debate about the status of the humanities has a kind of beginning with W. Dilthey's distinction between "Erklären" and "Verstehen". With the "movement" of logical positivism/empiricism the counter-position of the proponents of a "unified logic of science" became very influential (and still is). In my view a very important but much neglected input to the discussion was the contribution of the young and the later Wittgenstein. (The main contributors in the Norwegian context, Arne Naess (1936) and Hans Skjervheim (1959), both neglected Wittgenstein in their approaches.) I shall try to sketch what is at stake in Wittgenstein's contribution, following to some extent K.-O. Apel's discussion of it.

Apel (1973/1980) points to how the so-called "belief-sentences" presented Russell and the young Wittgenstein with a problem. One could regard a human subject's assertion of a propositional meaning as a relation between objects. It would then "be possible to incorporate the belief-sentence into the philosophy of 'logical atomism' as an elementary depiction of facts, that is, one not capable of further analysis. But strictly speaking, this implies a naturalistic view of the dimension of intentionality, which can be suggested, for example, by a behaviouristic interpretation of this relationship. Basically, Russell himself and later the logical positivists opted for this solution." (1980, p. 8) Or one could abandon "the conception of a unified scientific language, which reduces all propositions to the depiction of atomistic states of affairs in the external world by means of the logic of truth functions". (ibid, p. 9) This latter course is, to be sure, not the young Wittgenstein's option. On the contrary, "Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* is, in fact, the first radical formulation of a unified 'thing/state of affairs-language'; in Wittgenstein's view, it is valid for all meaningful propositions, that is, for all propositions of 'natural science' (4.11)". (loc. cit.)

However, Wittgenstein finds a kind of paradoxical third way which in a sense “reduces the psychological understanding of intentional meanings to the semantic understanding of the meaning of propositions” (ibid, p.10). This is the way presented in *Tractatus* 5.542: "It is clear ... that 'A believes that p', 'A has a thought p' and 'A says p' are of the same form '“p” says p' " – which is paradoxical, since such sentences are not allowed as meaningful: they try to *say* what can only be *shown*. Wittgenstein’s maneuver none the less has a point, which according to Apel becomes accessible if we connect it with a specific reading of 5.631, where Wittgenstein declares that "there is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas". This should, Apel says, *not* be taken as support for the program of a behaviouristic naturalization of the human subjects and their intentional acts (as the neo-positivists thought) but as an elevation of them to the realm of the "higher" (6.41f., 6.432). "The point behind the reduction of the problem of consciousness to the problem of language does not lie in the denial of consciousness, soul, human subject etc. but rather in a radical transcendentalization which identifies the metaphysical subject as the limit of the world with the logical subject of language as such." (ibid, p.10f.)

The article traces and comments further on K.-O. Apel’s treatment of the early and the later Wittgenstein’s ways of dealing with metaintentionality and hermeneutics. A contention is that the human sciences, in their attempts to reflect on their (ontological and methodological) foundations have regrettably rather neglected the important impulses of Wittgenstein.

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**WILLIAM JAMES' WORKS ON MYSTICISM IN THE LIGHT OF HENRI
DELACROIX'S GENEALOGICAL APPROACH**

Both, William James' work on religious experience (*The Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1902) and Henri Delacroix's works on mysticism (*Le Mysticisme Spéculatif en Allemagne au XIV siècle*, 1900 and *Etudes d'Histoire et de Psychologie du Mysticisme*, 1908), can be seen as attempts to offer a description and a “psychological” explanation on mystical phenomenon avoiding the materialistic reductionism of the medical tradition of their time. Both authors thought that the source of the mystical experience took root in the subject's subconscious life, as it was claimed by the psychology of their time. However, their personal approaches to the phenomenon are quite different.

Although their works were strictly contemporary, James has unquestionably become a “classic” while Delacroix (1873-1937), a well known French psychologist at the beginning of the 20th century, has been nearly forgotten. Nonetheless, the topic of mysticism occupies opposite moments in their careers. Whereas James dealt with the topic quite late in his life, it was a starting point for Delacroix (twenty years younger than James). Indeed, mystical experience supposed James transition from psychology towards philosophy and metaphysics, while in Delacroix rather implied a movement from philosophy to psychology.

In this talk, after exposing the main traits of James' work on mysticism and the place of the Varieties in his whole work very briefly, we will focus on Delacroix's work, which can be considered to some extent an attempt to “adjust” what he considers problematical aspects in James' approach. In fact, it seems to us that his own psychology of mystic is not but a reply to James' thesis. This reply stem from Delacroix's own first work, focused on the theory and the development of the doctrine of mysticism in Germany. In his works, the “psychological” treatment of mysticism, that is, the analysis of the experience itself will come only some years later –analyzed always in relation to the system and to the dogma framing such experiences. As we can read in Delacroix's review on James' Varieties, his first and main concern regards James' separation between the “institutional aspects” and the “personal experience”. Whereas James' definition on religion focuses on the individual feelings, thoughts and acts, excluding any reference to the history of the church, to the dogma or to the collective practices and rituals that surrounded the fact, for Delacroix, such an omission of the environment, drives us to an incomplete vision of the experience itself. The very notions of experience, intuition and unconscious are at stake in this unilateral and somehow hidden dialogue, that we will analyze.

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**THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COLONISATION OF THE HEALTH SECTOR IN BOGOTA,
COLOMBIA DURING THE DECADES OF EMPLOYMENT TRANSFORMATION
1980-2010.**

This paper presents the ways in which psychological knowledge and its practices have been disseminated between the health sector in Bogotá, Colombia, during the decades of employment transformation from 1980 to 2010. This historical and multi-sited ethnography aims to understand the processes of psychologisation in countries where psychological objects are not produced but consumed, adapted, replicated and hybridised. An historical “mapping” conducted in university hospitals of the city is presented to illustrate how a new administrative regime, which follows the prescription of liberal rationalities of government, has been constituted. Relationships were established thanks to, and for the reason of, using psychological discourses and techniques to solve specific problems of the health sector when confronting flexibilisation, standardization and precarisation of work. The “opportunistic movements” connected national and international, public and private institutions and authorities. The results show routes of psychological colonisation of the world of work and changes in the conceptions of health due to the introduction of psychological practices and discourses as well as the emergence of a new healthy worker. The colonial relationships that the liberal rationality of government brings about are discussed.

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FECHNER'S "INNER PSYCHOPHYSICS" AND THE STUDY OF "WAVE PATTERNS"

The year 2010 marked the 150th anniversary of the publication of Gustav Theodor Fechner's *Elements of Psychophysics* (1860). Historian of psychology, E.G. Boring indicated that Fechner was on the level of Wundt as founder of experimental psychology. Fechner's psychophysical methods, important as they have been to sensory studies, were not sufficient to investigate broad problems of psychology, which Wundt interpreted as the broad study of mental activity. In the publication of *Elements*, however, Fechner indicated that "inner psychophysics" might achieve such a broad program.

In the English-speaking world, our understanding of Fechner's program for psychophysics has been limited by two broad circumstances—one "outer" and the other "inner," so to speak. A major externality is that only Vol. 1 of Fechner's classic has been published in English (1966), and that part deals only with "outer psychophysics" (and indeed, only part of that subject). More on "outer psychophysics" and all of Fechner's discussion of "inner psychophysics" lies in Vol. 2, which has not yet appeared in English.

Fechner's "outer psychophysics" deals with how sensory stimuli work, and how those physical and physiological processes can be measured. "Inner psychophysics" goes beyond the physiological, at least as Fechner understood physiology, to what Wundt and his contemporaries called the "purely psychological."

Fechner's classic stimulated much of the new psychology of the late nineteenth century, but his writing is couched not only in the physics and physiology of the 1850s, but also in the ponderous German philosophy of the era; consequently, modern readers face serious challenges understanding exactly what Fechner had in mind with the term "inner psychophysics"—whether, for example, we should interpret it (or indeed all of psychophysics) as a provisional program for scientific psychology, as Wundt apparently did.

This proposed presentation, working with a translation of Vol. 2 in progress, will portray the original purposes of "inner psychophysics," particularly whether the analysis of "wave patterns" proposed such an encompassing theory for psychology.

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THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND ITS IMPORTANCE FOR THE STUDY OF CENTRAL ASIA'S PEOPLES

The presentation includes the following parts:

A brief description of the History of Political Anthropology:

The Political Anthropology appears as a specialty of Social Anthropology in Human Sciences in the 40th years of XX century. This occurs in a time when the evolutionary approaches in thinking of Charls Darwin dominated the evolution of Anthropology. According to its logic, the object of study in Political Anthropology should be the polical forms in use by peoples considered less developed.

Passing of this evolutionary trend comes amid division between American and European schools. In the first dominates Historicism while in the second, were the English Functionalism and French Structuralism, which together make up what is called Structural-Functionalist School.

The rapprochement between Europeans and Americans took place under the Neoevolucionism, which revived some concepts of the nineteenth century and makes conditions for the current stage, dominated by Processual Theory, in which the role previously assigned to the “structure” and “function”, is occupied for more flexible terms as "process", "conflict", "fraction", "struggle" and others. Some people think that the Processual Theory is inconsistent, but it has the advantage that its principles can be applied equally to people with different political forms and social development.

An analysis of the specificities of the situation in former soviet Central Asia:

Defining ingredient in the evolution in countries of former soviet Central Asia during the first decade of XXI century is the struggle between different tribes and clans for leading the final process in conversion of most powerful ethnic groups into the nations, carrying state sovereignty. The existence of blood influential clans in politics is not exclusive to the area, the problem is social and political role of blood ties as the core from which weaves the complex skein of the nation.

The consolidation of nationhood of the ethnic majority claims that its elites established their identities: Turks, Mongols, Aryans?; find ways and means to legitimize the power to themselves, which means the use of mechanisms and means in line with the political culture of these peoples. The political culture of Central Asian peoples is determined by its historical experience as part of the Mongolian and Russian empires, and after that in the Soviet system. With disintegration of this State latter was devalued both their own and Russians values leaving the field open for the recovery of the Mongols values, of course, in to a qualitatively different level.

Local development of researches:

Topics such as identity and lineage have been addressed by Central Asian scientists from the Middle Ages, but was the Kazakh, Choka Valijanov, who in the second half of the nineteenth century gives them a greater degree of scientificism with his investigations about the origin of tribal structure of the Kazakh and Kyrgyz peoples.

In Soviet times, the local anthropology was not highly favoured because of the authority's struggle against what they saw as "Pan-Turkist trends" of many researchers. To adapt to these limitations, some scientists delved into the analysis of other aspects. It is the case of Kazakh V.P. Yudin, who researches about influence of Mogulistan in Central Asian peoples and about the origin of ethnonym "Kazakh."

Access to the independence of these countries raised their societies to new needs. It is, in particular, the study of political culture and the mechanisms of legitimation of power. In this regard, we highlight the work of the Turkmen Shokhrat Kadyrov and his theory of "ethnic society," according to which Central Asian countries are inhabited by tribal societies of the new type.

Under these conditions, blood ties play an important role in determining the political behaviour of social actors.

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THE THEATRE OF BIOMECHANICS

Biomechanics exists both in science and in theatre. In science, the word means a discipline for studying the mechanics of bodily posture and movements, and in theatre it appeared when, in the early 1920s, the Russian stage director, Vsevolod Meyerhold, developed a set of exercises to train expressive movements in actors. However the origins of the term are not quite clear. It is usually believed that, at least in Russia, the term came from the Central Institute of Labour, founded in Moscow by Aleksei Gastev. It is then argued that the first scientists to study biomechanics were the Russian physiologist, Nikolai Bernstein who worked at the Central Institute of Labour.

In the paper, I would like to emphasise that, in fact, the term biomechanics had been around well before Gastev founded his institute and before Bernstein started his work. It appeared in the 1880s, in works by the German-language physicians Moritz Benedikt, Ernst Mehnert and others and it meant “the application of laws of mechanics to the structure and functioning of the living organism”. The idea of such a word was inspired by Auguste Comte’s classification of sciences, where he listed cross-disciplinary areas like biochemistry and bioacoustics. In the first decade of the twentieth century, the term came to Russia, thanks to the anatomist and pioneer of physical education, Piotr Frantsevich Lesgaft. He was a founder of theoretical anatomy in Russia and he worked on what he called the “theory of movements”. In 1910, his former student, G.A. Kogan, suggested introducing chairs of biomechanics to medical schools and establishing practical courses in biomechanics for doctors, sport coaches and teachers of physical education. When, after the Revolution, the Soviet government invested in the rationalisation of labour, Kogan was able to realise his project in Leningrad. He apparently headed a Cabinet of Biomechanics of Working Movements, and he published several volumes on biomechanics. At the same time in Moscow, his colleague, Bernstein, took over the term, biomechanics, for his own research at the Central Institute of Labour. Thus, in the mid-1920s, there were two schools of biomechanics in Russia, in Leningrad and in Moscow. While the former based itself on Lesgaft’s theoretical anatomy, the latter used methods and results of physiology, in particular, the research of Etienne-Jules Marey. The Franco-Russian scientist, Victor Henri, was, it appears, a mediator introducing Marey’s method of chronophotography to the Moscow setting.

After 1921, Meyerhold borrowed the term, biomechanics, for exercises in “expressive movement” which he had practised in his studio from the early 1910s. It seems that the term came from Lesgaft’s school. The two mediators could have been the Petersburg actor, Leonid Sergeevich Vivien, co-founder, with Meyerhold, of a theatre school in Petrograd, and a medical doctor, A.P. Petrov, who in 1918 taught in the school gymnastics and “biomechanics” – probably as a theoretical course on the anatomy and physiology of movement. When, in 1921, Meyerhold moved his school to Moscow, he started teaching biomechanics himself, but as a practical and

not theoretical discipline. As a result, his theatre biomechanics became closer to Gastev's applied research on workers' movements than to Lesgaft's theoretical anatomy.

Thus, the story of biomechanics in Russia is indeed more complex and, besides Bernstein and Meyerhold, it involves other actors. Yet, in an actual fact, the scientific biomechanics and the theatre discipline of this name originate from the same intellectual and social sources.

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**IS HISTORY A SCIENCE? THE LATE NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH
ARGUMENTS ON THE PLACE OF HISTORY IN NATIONAL CULTURE**

Both in the nineteenth century and now, it is evident – sometimes painfully evident – that claims to knowledge of the past directly serve political purposes. Given the authority which describing knowledge as ‘science’ has, it would seem important to differentiate history with scientific standing and history without. Yet, in the English language, it is usual to deny that history is a science, following common usage which understands a science to be a natural science (or knowledge modeled on or aspiring to be like natural science).

This situation has a history, and in this paper I will explore the key decades in the late nineteenth century. It was at this time that usage began to restrict ‘science’ to ‘natural science’, inevitably promoting belief that natural science knowledge has more objective authority than other forms. All the same, Victorian historians often described their practice as ‘science’, and some (E. H. Freeman) even resented and opposed the restriction of meaning to natural science. Describing history as a science, they made a normative claim with positive and negative sides: historical knowledge is factually based, and historical knowledge is distinct from ‘literature’. The claim was central to the professionalisation of history as an academic discipline (though this is not what I shall discuss as it is well covered in existing studies). Strikingly, in Britain almost no historians thought history might reveal laws and thus constitute a science by virtue of being rationally grounded on a few, logically elucidated, principles. Some historians occupying prestigious positions (Lord Acton, J. B. Bury), however, both claimed the field to be science and advanced clearly normative agendas (the progress of God’s providential plan, the progress of reason). Others (G. M. Trevelyan), of course while still holding that history should be factually true, claimed that history is indeed literature and must stay literature in order to have a public audience. The academic debate about history as science was therefore tied up with public debate about the place in national life, and hence in the purposes of politics, of history. Is this purpose to establish a factual record of the past or to give the public an emotionally gripping narrative which will inspire participation in national life?

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A HISTORY OF BEHAVIOR THERAPY IN THE NETHERLANDS: 1950-1970

Cognitive behavioral therapies, which are nowadays the usual and preferred psychotherapeutic intervention strategies in the Netherlands, has always enclosed a broad spectrum of theories (O'Donohue & Krasner, 1995). Theoretical shifts or so called 'generations' of cognitive behavioral therapies follow each other in a considerable speed. Discussions about how to judge these successions of theories are sparse, especially from a meta-theoretical point of view. Some of these theories or therapies seem to be taken for granted easily by the professional community and gain (temporarily) considerable dominance in the mental health system. Other theories remain marginal or quickly fade away from the scene. Psychotherapists have to reconsider the legitimacy of their theoretical knowledge, because various psychotherapeutic theories, including behavioral or cognitive behavioral theories, are under serious criticism (Duncan, Miller, Wampold, & Hubble, 2010).

The aim of this paper is to add to a discussion about the continuous appearance of new theoretical developments or 'schools' of (cognitive) behavioral therapy from a historical angle. Because these developments are supposed to be contextual and in part local, the author addresses the history of behavior therapy of his country, the Netherlands.

The focus will be on the period between 1950 – 1970, in which behavior therapy was mainly conditioning therapy, inspired by Wolpe (1958), Skinner (1953) en Eysenck (1960). Special attention will be given to the influence of psychology as an academic discipline on the development of behavior therapy and to the assimilation of behavior therapy from abroad. Influences of phenomenology and religion are discussed, as well as empirical analytical influences. The latter can be recognized in discussions about psychodiagnostics among Dutch psychologists. In the post-war period moral, epistemological en methodological principles were firmly interconnected in Dutch academic psychology (Dehue, 1990). Especially in what is called 'the Utrecht school' in psychology, but also, although different, within departments for psychology at Dutch universities which were grounded on religious principles (Ter Meulen, 1988). Against this background psychotherapeutical procedures in the Netherlands could not be easily framed in a (neo)behavioristic language, like Wolpe and Eysenck had done. It took to the 60's before some Dutch psychologists took interest in behavior therapy. From then there was a rapid spreading. Ways this process took place are considered. Some of the leading questions will be: What were the opinions of the "first" Dutch psychologists who took interest in behavior therapy, about the behavioral therapies from abroad? What motivated them? Were there discussions in academic psychology that influenced or shaped the development of behavior therapy in the Netherlands? Which theories were easily accepted and on what aspects behavioral therapists were critical? What was the stance of the first Dutch behavior therapists towards cognitive factors? Some preliminary conclusions will be drawn that can guide further research concerning the introduction of cognitive therapy in the Netherlands.

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AN ENCOUNTER THAT NEVER HAPPENED: CLIFFORD GEERTZ AND PIERRE BOURDIEU

Taking up these two outstanding figures of 20th century social thought, Clifford Geertz and Pierre Bourdieu, it is quite easy to see them as very different, perhaps even polar opposites - in their disciplinary affiliations, theoretical inspirations, fundamental premises, styles of thought, methods of research, and political commitments – and thus overlook what they may have had in common. It is more productive however to look behind the contrasting surfaces and seek points of convergence that brought them closer together – mostly without any intent on their part. And what they share is not negligible: 1) They worked in the same region and contributed to the launching of North Africa anthropology. 2) They were both strongly committed to fieldwork, in the broad sense of the empirical engagement with the real world, as opposed to free-floating speculative theorizing. 3) In theoretical terms, they had a similar, ambivalent relationship to Claude Levi-Strauss, who for both played the role of rejected 'father figure' - an authority they owed a lot to but which they struggled to overcome, treating him as a kind of negative ideal (at once model and anti-model, a perpetual inspiring adversary). 4) Geertz and Bourdieu believed that objects of scholarly observation are not given per se but rather are constructed by the observer, which belief further lead them to develop their respective notions of „reflexivity“. 5) In this construction, they never lost sight of the historicity of these objects, that is, of the socially and historically rooted process of their emergence. 6) As field researchers, they both assumed a stance of specific „modesty“ - respect for the members of the observed community, a sense of responsibility, and a sensitivity to political implications and consequences their research for the researched.

Nevertheless, they very seldom, if at all, refer to each other in their writings. True, Geertz is mentioned more often in Bourdieu, than vice-versa, but only to be criticized sharply, as an embodiment of the „scholastic fallacy“ and „textualism“ so passionately denounced by Bourdieu. The title of our paper is thus metaphoric: the two authors, of course, did meet physically on several occasions, but, as we will argue, they failed to meet in the more substantive sense of learning from each other and developing their respective theoretical positions through a critical dialogue. Two main areas may be identified where this fruitful exchange might have taken place: for Geertz, an openness to Bourdieu's messages may have alleviated his often criticized tendency to view culture's „Meaning“ as unitary and indivisible, and his corresponding inability to discern intra-cultural differences based on attributes such as gender, race, age, or social class. On the other hand, Bourdieu could have benefited from incorporating some of Geertz's interpretive subtlety to upgrade his own hermeneutics, which in actual research practice was not so good as it was declaratively important, and in this way avert the objection that in his work notions such as

„domination“ or „symbolic violence“ function as „bulldozer concepts“ (as Latour called them) that raze to the ground any unwieldy diversity.

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THE POSSIBILITY OF PSYCHOLOGY AS A NONMODERN SCIENCE

The aim of this paper is to examine the psychological science using as a frame of reference the work of Bruno Latour, concretely his theory of modernity. Modernity is primarily understood as a strategy of divide and purification that creates two completely distinct and opposite ontological realms – that of human beings on the one hand and that of nonhumans on the other. This modern Constitution, as Latour calls it, doesn't just have the task of separating the domains of natural and social beings, but also defines their properties, abilities and relations: a) on one side there is nature that exists prior and independently of humans and is made up of objects that act according to precise, objective laws; b) on the other side there is the free society of speaking, thinking subjects, their signs and values, which is ruled by arbitrary and immeasurable principles.

All modern sciences epitomize this dichotomy as an exclusive either-or relationship which enables the claim that one element of the dichotomy constitutes the ultimate Reality, while the other can be reduced to it. Psychology has through its history preserved and reproduced this dichotomy in the especially prominent manner. Even though complex topological configuration of psychological knowledge is comprised of diverse schools, methodological-theoretical solutions and dispersed practices, it could be seen as embodying one basic divide between realistic/positivistic and constructivist/hermeneutic positions. Central for both positions is analogous ontological privileging of the body or mind, nature or society, objects or signs that provides the basis for biological or social/linguistic reductionism. The insurmountable difference between these positions actually reflects the separation between the pole of nature and that of subject/society that is central to modernity. Psychology, its research practices and its self-understanding appear to be, due to the specificity of its subject, captured in the middle of this divide, caught in a never-ending dilemma - natural or social, objective or subjective, explanatory or interpretive, empirical or critical. It seems that modernity has left deeper mark on our discipline than on many others.

However, as Latour claims, through the practice of division and purification modernity not just conceals, but also facilitates the proliferation of *hybrids* – complex beings that belong to both ontological orders, that are natural and cultural at the same time. Latour finds all contemporary objects/subjects to be the extreme examples of this kind and refuses to reduce them either to things, social/discursive constructions or political matters. That means that we already live (and have always been living) in a nonmodern world populated by hybrid objects, where nature and society, objects and subjects have never actually been separated.

If we apply this line of reasoning to the analysis of psychology it becomes clear that psychology already operates in nonmodern situation. Objects of psychological research and practice are hybrid objects/subjects – they are at the same time bodies and nerve impulses, bearers of cognitive/affective styles and personality traits, subjects of narration, holders of political

attitudes etc. Psychology through its various performances takes part in creating those objects by using MRI pictures, statistical charts, personal narratives and household incomes to talk about emotional intelligence, perception styles, resilience to stress or voting behavior.

But, if this is the case, if psychology already is nonmodern, then the question from the title has been answered. However, the main problem for Latour is not to show that we all live in a nonmodern world populated by hybrids, but to see if we are capable of recognizing our nonmodern situation and act accordingly by investigating simultaneously the work of purification and the work of mediation that produces hybrids. So, the question is not whether psychology could become nonmodern. It already is. The real question is whether it has the capacity to recognize and to deal with its nonmodern situation. What is needed is new self-understanding that would guide a deliberate research practice that meets the production and spreading of hybrid objects/subjects. And maybe the possibility for this new self-understanding of psychology should be sought at the historical beginnings of the discipline – before psychology became locked into its obsession with subjectivity and objectivity, when empirical method of natural sciences still talked something important about the psyche and laboratories were used for solving philosophical problems, that is – when psychology was still unsuccessful in carrying out the modern Constitution.

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IMRE LAKATOS AND THE IQ DEBATE

It is not a widely known that Imre Lakatos, the famous philosopher of science, was involved into the IQ debate, although the issue did not correspond with his main field. In the early 1970's he exchanged letters with Arthur Jensen, the well known initiator of the debate. Lakatos was disappointed with the critiques made against Jensen, especially with the method. He highly disagreed with the political isolation of Jensen and compared his opponents with Soviet "official" science, which abandoned genetics.

For the first glance we could think that it was Lakatos' turn toward conservatism which played a major role in his surprising views about the origin of mental skills. In fact Lakatos like his compatriot, Arthur Koestler turned completely against his earlier left-wing world view. This is reflected by the fact that Lakatos was clearly hostile with the student's movements in 1968. His famous letter written to the rector of LSE contributed to the harsh rejection of student's demonstrations by the leadership of British universities. There is also little doubt that for many of us it is still a sign of social conservatism, if someone is convinced of the hereditary nature of intelligence, and of the different genetic endowment of people of different ethnicities. (It is another issue that right-wing conservatism acquired important bastions in the so called developed world). On the other hand we must agree with Lakatos that political excommunication is not a good method to defend scientific truths.

But do we know, how Lakatos argued for the hereditary nature of mental skills? He never published anything about the issue, but his student, Peter Urbach, wrote a lengthy article about the IQ debate for the British Journal of Philosophy of Science. We know from Lakatos's correspondence that he was intensely preoccupied with the problem: he gave a number of advice and guidance to his student and he even revised the study directly before his death in February 1974. (Urbach's article has been published later in two parts).

As it is reflected in the title of the study: "Progress and Degeneration in the IQ Debate", Urbach made an attempt to apply the method of his master, Lakatos to decide which one is more "true" from the two scientific programs. It is not surprising that the student, like his tutor, found that the hereditarian research program was progressive while the environmentalist was degenerative.

In this paper beside presentation of the arguments of Urbach's paper I am looking for answers to the question whether Lakatos's method - making a difference between progressive and degenerative research programs - is in fact suitable for evaluation of scientific truth.

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FACTORS OF USSR AND SFRJ COLLAPSE IN MODERN HISTORIOGRAPHY

One of the most significant elements of human science in general and historical science particularly, is historiography. Last 15 years gave us numerous articles and books devoted to the question of the collapse of USSR and SFRJ. It is possible to divide into 2 groups: there are a lot of authors whose position are more or less preconceived. Another group is consisted of researchers who are trying to be maximal objective. The complexity and in time, attractiveness of the analysis of this problem nowadays is that namely now a unique moment appeared when it has become possible to get the information from direct participants of these events – politicians, activists and etc. Sources of oral history are one of the valuable for human sciences and in the same time one of the rarest.

“Yugoslavia is a small model of USSR: the first who leave us will be “Germans” – our Slovenians and yours Balts. Let them leave: they have never been our. The fire will inflame in Kosovo, in your country – on Caucasus. Then it will throw on Bosnia, on your Central Asia...But the country will die when here the war between Croats and Serbs will begin, in USSR – between Russians and Ukrainians, ” – this horror proposition was made by one Yugoslavian researcher in a private conversation with his Russian colleague already in 1983.

This prognosis looked like horror fantasy that time. But on spring and summer 1991 the possibility of such scenario became clear. The negotiations on reform of Yugoslavian federation came to a deadlock and the war began; viscous Novo- Ogarevo process in USSR was aborted by the August putsch. It seemed that crises in USSR and SFRJ were repeating even in details and the catastrophe of morning 19 August 1991 was inevitable. But in 3 crucial august days ways of these 2 countries had parted: Yugoslavia dropped into the long-term wars; USSR could pass through difficult procedure of “civilized” divorce.

The problem of collapse of two multiethnic federations – USSR and SFRJ – has wide historiography tradition: there are scores of books and articles, memoirs on question of Yugoslavian collapse. The estimates of the reasons for collapse of Yugoslavia are marked very often already in the names of the investigations: from neutral one – “Tragedy of Yugoslavia” by S. Woodward and “The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia” by A. Pavkovic - to radical and even polar – “Demolition of Yugoslavia” by V. Dzuretic and “A state that disappeared” by D. Jovic.

A big input into the interpretation of the reasons for the collapse of SFRJ was made by the Russian researchers, especially, from the Institute for Slavic studies of the Russian Academy of Science. V. Volkov, K. Nikiforov, E. Guskova gave deep and well-balanced analysis of causes, particularly, combination of internal and external factors, in the process of disintegration of Yugoslavia. The detailed analysis of ethno political aspects of the collapse is given in the book of M. Martynova. Finally, his own interpretation of Yugoslavia’ collapse has S. Romanenko who suggests that the most significant reason of the disintegration was , first of all, coincidence of the developing process of national self-determination of the Yugoslavian nations

and the crisis of totalitarianism. It means that there was coincidence of crisis of command economy in a form of “self-governing socialism”, one-party political system as a base for ethno territorial federation and total system of military-bureaucratic control which core was the Yugoslavian Public Army.

According to the opinion of the Stirling University professor, Dejan Jovic, there were 8 summarized reasons for the collapse of Yugoslavia: economic crisis; “ethnic hostility” among Yugoslavian nations; nationalism; cultural difference among Yugoslavian nations; external factors that means global changes in international politics; the role of different personalities in establishment and collapse of the state; pre-modern character of Yugoslavian state that was often compared with empire and not with the national state; finally, structural and institutional reasons. At the same time D. Jovic in his ontology of the Yugoslavian crisis of 80th – the beginning of 90th XX century showed that the main cause of the disintegration was the crisis of ideology. He understands ideology very wide: as ideological and political concept, as economic model of self-governing socialism, as model of multiethnic federation and discourse of political elite. This ideology in the forth, “Kardel” Yugoslavia, that propagated idea of inevitable disappearance of the state, logically led to the collapse of this state.

Crisis and the collapse of USSR also have its historiography. At the same time it is necessary to note that the Russian historiography has two extremes: it is or apologetic interpretation of events of the direct participants (M. Gorbachev, N. Ryzhkov, D. Yazov, B. Eltsin) or very negative estimate towards the “first” democrats – “destructors of the great empire”. However, one can see a very representative collection of articles “The tragedy of great power: national question and the collapse of the Soviet Union”. The articles of R. Peehoya, Z. Stankevic, S. Cheshko, V. Tishkov are very interesting as an “explanation models”. A very detailed analysis is given in the book of former prime-minister of the Russian reformatory government of E. Gaydar. But it seems that today the biggest interest represents book of R. Peehoya. He supposes that the main cause for the collapse of USSR was also crisis of ideology: “Soviet state was conceptually oriented on the construction of “bright tomorrow”, expected and tangible communist tomorrow. The deadlines of its coming were several times postponed...” The author states that after long-term waiting “a developed socialism came instead of communism”. From this time a socio-psychological crisis of the soviet society became clear. And, finally, “ideological attractiveness, socialistic romantic changed into the dead rejection of socialistic dogma itself”. In this sense the conclusion s of R. Peehoya are very similar to the idea of D. Jovic.

In the report it is rather interesting to show in 20 years after the collapse of these states the interpretation in modern historiography of 3 mains – as it seems to the author – causes that led to the collapse of 2 states: the role of external factor, the role of economic crisis and specialties of political and ideological transformations including the factor of political elite in both countries and its role in the disintegration. Comparative analysis of these three factors should allow understanding what was common for the disintegration processes in USSR and SFRJ and what is radically different in these processes.

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**INEBRIATED OR INTOXICATED? THE FOUNDATION OF ITALIAN
ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE ROLE OF COCA**

Instead of starting a scientific career directly after finishing his formation as a medical doctor, Paolo Mantegazza (1831-1910), who later founded the first Italian museum of anthropology, travelled to Argentina and Peru, where he discovered his wife and Coca leaves (Gatti 2001). In contrast, his interest for indigenous people was rather limited (Aimi 1986).

Back home in Milan, he belonged to the very few Europeans who disposed of fresh Coca leaves. In 1859, he published the results of his self-experiments with the drug (Mantegazza, 1859) and caused a wave of interest, which was also fostered by the simultaneous isolation of cocaine from another batch of leaves which had arrived on a different itinerary in the laboratory of Friedrich Wöhler in Göttingen (Wahrig 2009). The hype created by these news resulted in more publications and the popularity of Coca wine (Helfand 1980), even if Cocaine as well as fresh leaves remained a rarity on the European market. It was only in 1883 and 1884, that Merck started to scale up its cocaine production and offered it to physician who were willing to test it (Hirschmüller 1995). In 1884 then, several physicians, amongst them Freud and Koller, introduced the substance into therapy, the latter as an anaesthetic, and the first as a cure-all (herein closely following Mantegazza's publications) and as a specific against morphine addiction.

In my paper I would like to follow a different trace, namely the fate of Mantegazza's thinking in the aftermath of his experience with Coca. I would like to show how his attempt to cast his anthropological knowledge into a system was influenced by his earlier works on Coca and other psychoactive substances. His 1871 book „Quadri della natura huma“ (Images of human nature) bears the subtitle „feste ed ebbrezze“ (celebrations and inebriations) and classifies ethnic groups according to the psychoactive substances they use and alongside the techniques by which they cause inebriation within their traditional rites. I would like to ask how the concept of „nerve nutrients“ coincided with and drew on similar concepts like that of „Genusmittel“ („stimulant“) in the publication by Ernst von Bibra (1806-1878), which was published a little earlier (in 1855), but apparently was noticed by Mantegazza only when preparing his anthropological textbook shortly before 1871. Classifications of ethnic groups preceding from their consumption of certain 'nutrients' seems to have been prompted by the exploration of foreign continents. But maybe the search for an unequivocal national identity on the European continent was also a motive.

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**IMAGES OF THE INVISIBLE:
AN ACCOUNT OF ICONIC MEDIA IN THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY**

What epistemic use and function do images and graphs fulfill in scientific practice? Whilst this question is nowadays broadly discussed in the history of science, the history of psychology seems to ignore the images used in textbooks, papers and essays of the discipline's past. Such habit of *logocentrism* in the popular history of psychology seems all the more surprising, as contemporary (cognitive) psychology heavily relies on flow charts, statistic diagrams, tables and other iconic elements. If mentioned at all in the history of psychology, these pictures and diagrams are mostly treated as mere, 'illustrations' or, 'graphical translations' of the written sentence.

Following arguments of the Polish science historian *Ludwik Fleck* (1896-1961), this paper aims to overcome such probably reductionist *text view of science* and intends to sharpen the vision of the specific attributes and performative capacities of iconic media in the history of psychology. In the first section of this paper, general aspects and specifics of graphical objects and their relation to scientific texts are discussed. Then some popular images in the history of psychology are analyzed accordingly. Altogether, this paper argues for an *icon-informed* history of science and proposes further questions worth investigating in this context.

Aspects of iconic objects in science and psychology

As Ludwik Fleck states in his major work *The Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact* (1935/1979), when discussing various figures throughout the history of anatomy, the often acclaimed status of 'objectivity' or 'unambiguousness' of images in scientific textbooks, pretending to be nothing but passive representations of things, 'as they are in nature', cannot be upheld: The 'truth' of scientific images is always product of a *selective* view and *purposive* practice, it is always embedded in what Fleck calls a "thought style", which he defines as "directed perception, with corresponding mental and objective assimilation of what has been so perceived" (Fleck 1935/1979, 99). The acceptance of an image in science is at all times product of a prolonged circularization through various scientific and layman collectives and is made possible "only through organized cooperative research, supported by popular knowledge and continuing over several generations, [whereby] might a uniform picture emerge" (Fleck 1935/1979, 22). Scientific images are always suggestive, as they make things visible in a *specific* way, ignoring, 'negligible' aspects and emphasizing others, and tend to deny competing images of rivaling thought styles. Fleck characterizes the status of these graphic elements and figures as *ideograms*, since a thoughtstyle-specific meaning or idea is always inscribed into scientific

images, which pretend to be just showing the object ‚as it is‘: ‚it involves a kind of comprehending where the meaning is represented as a property of the object illustrated“ (1979, 137). One of the main points in Flecks discussion is the didactic use of scientific images: Going through an academic scholarship means to be instructed into a thought-style specific way of seeing things in certain ways, which for the members of the thought collective seems as the only reasonable way of seeing them (and for rivaling thought collectives as just arbitrary, as they are favoring images corresponding to their tradition).

Brief overview of the historic material





Fig. 1: "Relations between strata of the person under different circumstances": (a) Person in an "easy situation", (b) Person under "high stress", (c) Person under "high tension" (Lewin 1936, 181)

Fig. 2: „Topology of the person“ (Lewin 1936)

One of the most ambitious attempts of *mapping the mind* can be found in the work of Kurt Lewin (1936). His *Topological Psychology* attempts to deduce individual behavior and experience from the configuration and dynamics of different "regions" within the person. Lewin distinguishes between "outer" (motorical, perceptual) and "inner" (thoughts, feelings) regions of the mind. The aligned "barriers" between these areas, their "tension", "fluidity", "elasticity", "plasticity", "structure" and their "material" are conceptualized as the cause for psychological "forces", that determine the "direction" and "strength" of the "locomotion" of a person in his environment. Remarkably, for Lewin these figures "might after all be not merely illustrations but representations of real concepts" (Lewin 1936, pp. VII); consequently, he attempts to *inscribe* metrical and spatial concepts into a new, topological image of the mind. All throughout his work, Lewin heavily relies on the technique of drawing diagrams, constructing the epistemic object as if it was as *inherently* spatial and extended as his figures – thus affirming the fundamental precondition when applying topological mathematics and field theory to psychology. Lewin's drawings also reveal iconic similarities with Freud's energetic concept of the mind (compare Fig. 3).




Fig. 3: Freud's structural model of the mind (1923/1999)

As the movement of cybernetics and information theory made its way into psychology, a new way of visualizing the invisible displaced the old images: Rectangles, lines and arrows became popular from Norbert Wiener's works (and later in cognitive science), such as *Cybernetics* (1948/1961), where the




Fig. 4: Cybernetic Model of the Pavlovian Reflex, in Wiener (1948/1961)

mind was pictured as an information processor. Cybernetic visualizing in many ways resembles the circuit diagrams of electronic devices, envisioning the mind as an interconnected, feedback-looped device that sequentially performs symbol-manipulating operations along the built-in switches. From this view, the mind seems not as something ‚grown‘ or ‚dynamic‘, but rather as a machine, designed and built for specific purposes.

Aims and research questions

The above cases are just few examples out of the rich iconic material that altogether remains mostly unnoticed in the history of psychology. This project aims at filling this gap by asking questions like: What strategies of visualizing do certain thought styles prefer? Which transformations does the introduction of new iconic media induce in psychological theory and practice? Is there some kind of *repercussion* from the image to the thought style?

Footnotes

Prominently Latour (1987 and 2002), Daston & Galison (2010), or Rheinberger (2010), which share an interest in the production, transformation, and reception of images in science. Unlike this paper, however, they focus on images which are in one way or the other a product of visualizing instruments or other measuring devices, as commonly used for instance in brain imaging, particle physics or nanotechnology. In opposition to these images, graphical objects in psychology refer to something not only invisible but also (directly) immeasurable and immaterial, which may call for a specific strategy of making things visible in psychology – and therefore a specific methodology of analyzing these graphical objects in science history.

List of illustrations:

Fig. 1: Lewin (1936), pp. 181.

Fig. 2: Lewin (1936), pp. 177.

Fig. 3: Freud (1929/1999), pp. 252.

Fig. 4: Wiener (1948/1961), pp. 128.

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TWO CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGIES IN THE 19TH CENTURY: LOTZE AND DILTHEY

During 1856 to 1864, Hermann Lotze bridged the "two cultures" of sciences and humanities in unique ways. He embraced a theory of mechanism as scientific explanation. Thus, his treatment of language began with reflex movements and the formation of words and sentences by combining elementary sounds. But he also show how language, culture, and politics draws their model from purposive phenomena. We judge objective values and meanings through common understandings with one another. We act in ways that presuppose moral maxims whereby the individual has to exercise moral judgment.

Put oversimply, he placed the Kantian categorical imperative on a developmental basis in human life and a historical basis in human social evolution (Lotze, 1885 [1858], 1, p. 696). A crucial formal reconstruction underlay Lotze's attempt: he argued that there are no a priori formal laws for the science of society, but that human reciprocal action calls for another kind of account. Uniqueness characterizes social objects: "according to what we are and what others are" (Lotze, Microcosmus, 1885 [1858], 1, 701).

Wilhelm Dilthey at age thirty-one took Lotze's chapter on "Conscience and Morality" as the key to his Habilitationsschrift in 1864, "An Attempt at Analysis of the Moral Consciousness." Dilthey echoed Herbart and Lotze in asserting that moral theories go wrong in trying to reduce right action to one principle. Dilthey also picked up on Lotze's remark that the concept of good will frees us from the narrowness of Kant's conception of moral obligation (Dilthey, GS, 6, 34-35, quoting Lotze, 1885 [1858], 1, 693 [3rd German edition, 2, 619]).

He blamed Lotze for overemphasizing mechanism: "One may not with justice conceive the mere mechanism in which good will is realized, as Lotze seems to want to do" (6, 53). "Kant wanted good will to refer exclusively to the happiness of others. Lotze seems to attach himself to him when he observes...that good will is not a naked relation of the will but assumes in the other person both well-being (Wohl) and suffering (Wehe)." (6, 46).

Yet Dilthey (1864) also learned from Lotze to place values eventually in a "cultural system" (cf. Makreel, 1975, 63-69). Lotze's Mikrokosmos with its chapter on "Conscience and Morality" gave Dilthey three keys to the operation of "cultural systems." The observers in Dilthey's social world become the participants in it. Their theoretical inquiries serve practical ends. Dilthey (1875) replaced Comte's hierarchical system of the sciences with a social organism "which lies in the transition from the facts of reality to the ought, the purpose, the idea" (pp. 64, 67). Psychology became not an inferred natural scientific datum subject to explanation (Erklärung) but a datum immediately present and accessible to understanding (Verstehen).

The plan for a new "foundation of the human studies" emerged from this embryo. Upon Lotze's death in July 1881, Dilthey sought to compete for his chair by completing his Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (1883). He received the call in 1882, and the first two of a

projected five volumes appeared in 1883. In our time, Rudolf Makreel (1983) showed that Wilhelm Dilthey did not reject explanation; his Introduction to the Human Sciences claimed that there could be explanation in the sense of developing general laws. He was still following Lotze.

Even in 1892, at age 59, he maintained a dual methodological foundation (Makreel, 1983). In 1892, he praised Lotze for refuting empiricism on the basis of Kant (5, 76). But how can we be sure that our judgment agrees with that of another person, and how does it recognize the relations of its contents (Inhalte) bound up in the state of affairs (Sache) (5, 97)?

My surprising finding is that in the period of Dilthey's careful reading of Lotze, the 1860's to the 1880s when he took over Lotze's chair in Berlin, Dilthey endorsed a model of description and explanation. From the 1890's on he asserted that the human sciences rest on a separate, hermeneutic foundation and this has guided twentieth-century cultural psychologies.

Dilthey--like Wundt--thus erected a stronger methodological barrier between the natural sciences and the human studies, one that Lotze had always sought to bridge by showing that laws and facts comprise explanations but remain conjoined with values (Woodward, 2010). Thus for Lotze, mechanical or natural science disciplines would never become separated from purposive human science disciplines. Values direct hypotheses in both domains because they are judgments of "states of affairs." This is the direction that Stumpf, Husserl, Bühler, and Wittgenstein took philosophy and psychology (Milkov, 2002).

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BETWEEN REALITY AND REFLEXIVITY: HELMUT SCHELSKY AND TRANSFORMATIONS OF GERMAN SOCIOLOGY

Historians of thought have recognized that the idea of ‘science of reality’ has played a significant role at the early stages of academic institutionalization of human sciences [see, e.g.: Tenbruck 1999; Oexle 2007]. This conception reflected the influence of Neo-Kantian epistemologists, such as Georg Simmel and Heinrich Rickert, and their efforts to justify historical knowledge as a science of its own. This understanding of science was particularly important for sociology, as it played crucial role in methodological writings of the founding fathers of the discipline [Morrison 2006]. Although traces of this conception can be easily seen beyond German sociological tradition, it is Germany where the idea of *Wirklichkeitswissenschaft* had the most systematic and long-standing impact on social thought.

However, the conception of *Wirklichkeitswissenschaft* was not universally understood by German sociologists and turned out to be subject to multiple interpretations. Max Weber’s insistence that social science of reality should abstain from value-judgments was later heavily criticized by Hans Freyer, who maintained that the imperative of ‘value-free’ science in fact alienates scientific knowledge from reality (which amounted to a very different understanding of ‘science of reality’, its mission and method) [Weber 2011: 72ff; Freyer 1964]. Although Freyer’s own radical right-wing programme of sociology had failed [Muller 1987], the idea of *Wirklichkeitswissenschaft* remained attractive for generations of German sociologists. But later developments in sociology associated with this influential idea didn’t get much attention from historians of human sciences.

In this paper I shall trace the evolution of the conception of *Wirklichkeitswissenschaft* in the work of Helmut Schelsky (1912-1984), Freyer’s student and longtime friend. Nowadays Schelsky’s sociology seldom attracts attention of historians of thought, if only with respect to its relation to philosophical anthropology [Heidegren 1997, 1999; Fischer 2006]. However, Schelsky was a very influential figure in German post-war sociology. Being the first in Germany to conduct series of large-scale empirical sociological research in 1950-s, he later became the head of department in Münster and patronized a range of prominent German sociologists, including Niklas Luhmann. Schelsky also promoted the establishment of the University of Bielefeld, where the first department of sociology in Germany had been installed. He is also known in Germany for a series of critical books pointed at intellectuals and social scientists and his eventual disappointment with sociology that pushed him to proclaim himself an ‘anti-sociologist’.

However, Schelsky’s significance for social thought isn’t limited to his pioneer managerial and academic work. The most important fact about Schelsky is that his writings reveal particular sensitivity to the challenges that sociology had faced in twentieth century. That is why Schelsky paid significant attention to the idea of historical mission of sociology and several times revisited his understanding of the proper place of sociology in society and its

modus operandi. In present paper I will present the development of Schelsky's views on sociology as a series of turns, holding that each of them represented an attempt to adapt sociology to changing historical reality:

Schelsky's first books were studies in political philosophy inspired by Freyer's idea of *Wirklichkeitswissenschaft*, according to which sociology succeeds to philosophy of history [Schelsky 1935, 1981].

After WWII Schelsky admitted that the type of sociology inspired by German idealism had eventually led to 'the loss of reality' by sociologists, and it is now time to switch to empirical research in order to return to reality [Schelsky 1979 (1954), 1967: 37]. As a result, he abandoned his philosophical studies and initiated a number of empirical projects.

However, later he realized that the loss of reality that happened somewhere around Nazis come to power, in fact concealed a much more important cultural process. According to Schelsky, there is a trend towards radicalization of doubt in the givenness of reality, and this trend is inherent to modern culture. Schelsky has called this new cultural condition 'permanent reflection', indicating that it creates severe tensions that sociology, among others, needs to resolve [Schelsky 1979 (1957)]. Thus Schelsky became the first sociologist to urge for adaptation of sociology to reflexivity, calling for a new, reflexive attitude towards reality – long before the idea of sociological reflexivity spread across theoretical camps, from Luhmann to Bourdieu to Giddens.

Final shift in Schelsky's understanding of relationship between sociology and reality occurred around 1975, when he realized that 'reflexive elites' contained of intellectuals and social scientists tend to substitute reality for social utopia, thus failing to fulfill their function of society's self-consciousness. As a result, Schelsky urged for a 'sociological critique of sociology', claiming that anti-sociology is the only way for sociology to get back to reality [Schelsky 1975].

Careful analysis of the evolution of Schelsky's thought allows for understanding the fundamental shifts in understanding of its mission that German sociology underwent during twentieth century. Schelsky's attentiveness to cultural change brings to the forth the story of transformations of the idea of *Wirklichkeitswissenschaft* that eventually led to the conception of reflexive social science.

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- ČIZMIĆ, Svetlana**, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Serbia
- CLARK, David**, Independent scholar, USA
- CVIJAN, Nataša**, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Serbia
- DIMITRIJEVIĆ, Aleksandar**, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Serbia
- DUHAČEK, Daša**, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, Serbia
- ERŐS, Ferenc**, Department of Social Psychology, University of Pécs, Hungary

- ESHUIS, Jannes**, Faculty of Psychology, Open University of the Netherlands, The Netherlands
- FEEST, Uljana**, Institute of Philosophy, Berlin University of Technology, Germany
- FERREIRA, Arthur A. L.**, Institute of Psychology, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
- GERGEN, Kenneth J.**, Department of Psychology, Swarthmore College, USA
- GERGEN, Mary**, Penn State University, Brandywine, USA
- GOOD, M. M. James**, Department of Psychology, Durham University, UK
- GORUNOVIĆ, Gordana**, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Serbia
- HEZEWIJK, René van**, Faculty of Psychology, Open University of the Netherlands, The Netherlands
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- JOVIĆ, Vladimir**, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Serbia
- KUDSZUS, Winfried G.**, Department of German, University of California, Berkeley, USA
- LAQUEUR, W. Thomas**, Department of History, University of California, Berkeley, USA
- LARSEN, Tord**, Faculty of the Social Sciences, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway
- LEVINSON, Sharman**, The American University of Paris, France
- LEYSEN, Sigrid**, NCCR Iconic Criticism, University of Basel, Switzerland
- LUBEK, Ian**, Psychology Department, University of Guelph, Canada
- MAKSIMOVIĆ, Aleksandra**, Pre-school Educators College, Šabac, Serbia
- MARJANOVIĆ-SHANE, Ana**, Department of Education, Chestnut Hill College, Philadelphia, USA
- MILOVANOVIĆ, Goran S.**, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Serbia
- MINKOVA, Elena**, Department of Psychology, Volzhsky State Engineering Pedagogical University of Nizhny Novgorod, Russia
- MÜLBERGER, Annette**, History of Science Studies Centre, Autonomous University of Barcelona, Spain

- NOLAN, Susan A.**, Department of Psychology, Seton Hall University, New Jersey, USA
- ØFSTI, Audun**, Department of Philosophy, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway
- OORSCHOT, Juergen van**, Faculty of Humanities, Social Sciences and School of Theology, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany
- PIZARROSO, Noemí**, National University of Distance Education, Spain
- PLAS, Régine**, University Paris Descartes, France
- PULIDO-MARTINEZ, Hernan Camilo**, Pontifical Javeriana University, Colombia
- RADTKE, Lorraine H.**, Department of Psychology, University of Calgary, Canada
- RAJOVIĆ, Vera**, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Serbia
- ROBINSON, David K.**, Department of History, Truman State University, Missouri, USA
- SÁNCHEZ MONROE, Juan**, Higher Institute of International Relations „Raúl Roa García“, University of Havana, Cuba
- SIROTKINA, Irina**, Institute for the History of Science and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia
- SMITH, Roger**, Lancaster University (Emeritus), UK, Residing in Russia
- SMITS, Paul**, Utrecht University, The Netherlands
- SPASIĆ, Ivana**, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Serbia
- STAEUBLE, Irmingard Elisabeth**, Free University Berlin, Germany
- STAM, Henderikus J.**, Department of Psychology, University of Calgary, Canada
- STANKOVIĆ, Biljana**, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Serbia
- STRAUB, Jürgen**, Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany
- VAJDA, Zsuzsanna**, Corvinus University, Budapest, Hungary
- VOLKOVA, Ekaterina**, Faculty of International Relations, Ural State University, Ekaterinburg, Russia
- WAHRIG, Bettina**, Department of History of Pharmacy and Science, Braunschweig University of Technology, Germany
- WIESER, Martin**, Department of History, University of Vienna, Austria
- WOODWARD, William R.**, Department of Psychology, University of New Hampshire, Durham, USA
- YUDIN, Greg**, Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia

30th ESHHS
CONFERENCE
BELGRADE 5-8 July 2011

CONFERENCE PROGRAMME

TUESDAY, 5 July 2011

Faculty of Philosophy
 Ćika Ljubina 18-20, 1st floor

15.00 - 16.30  **REGISTRATION** Festive Hall **108**

University of Belgrade - Rectorate
 Studentski trg 1, 2nd Floor

17.00  **OPENING CEREMONY** Festive Hall

17.30 - 18.30 **SESSION 1 INVITED LECTURE** Festive Hall **108**

Chair: Gordana JOVANOVIĆ



James GOOD, University of Durham, UK:
 IS THE HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES HISTORY?

19.00  **WELCOME RECEPTION** University Garden

WEDNESDAY, 6 July 2011

Faculty of Philosophy
 Ćika Ljubina 18-20, 1st floor

8.00 - 9.00  **REGISTRATION** Festive Hall **108**

Faculty of Philosophy
 Ćika Ljubina 18-20, 2nd floor

Room **208**

Room **211**

9.00 - 10.30	SESSION 2 PHILOSOPHY AND HUMAN SCIENCES	SESSION 3 TOPICS IN THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY
9.00 - 9.30	Chair: Bettina WAHRIG WOODWARD, William Two cultural psychologies in the 19th century: Lotze and Dilthey	Chair: Annette MÜLBERGER ARAUJO, Saulo From flirtation to abandonment: Bechtarev's critique of Wundt's psychological project
9.30 - 10.00	ØFSTI, Audun Metaintentionality, Wittgenstein, Apel and the foundation of the humanities	ROBINSON, David Fechner's "Inner Psychophysics" and the study of "wave patterns"

10.00 - 10.30	YUDIN, Greg Between reality and reflexivity: Helmut Schelsky and transformations of German sociology	MINKOVA, Elena Pedology as the newly emerged science in Russia (at the turn of the 20th century)
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10.30 - 11.00  **Coffee break** Festive Hall **108**

11.00 - 12.00 **SESSION 4 INVITED LECTURE** Festive Hall **108**
 Chair: Gordana JOVANOVIĆ



Henderikus STAM, University of Calgary, Canada
 HISTORY, MEMORY AND ETHICS: DO THE HUMAN SCIENCES STILL HAVE SOMETHING TO REMEMBER?

Room **208**

Room **211**

12.00 - 13.00	SESSION 5 HISTORY AND SCIENCE	SESSION 6 HISTORY OF SCIENCE IN PRAXIS
	Chair: Ruud ABMA	Chair: Jannes ESHUIS
12.00 - 12.30	SMITH, Roger Is history a science? The late 19th-century British arguments on the relations of history and science	LUBEK, Ian When themes converge: The personal, the social and the agentic aspects of History
12.30 - 13.00	LARSEN, Tord Defining moments in the history of meaning: The romantic crisis.	NOLAN, Susan A. HEINZEN, Thomas A. & VIGORITO, Michael From yellow fever to a dog named Pepper: the intersection of history, statistics, and research methods in the social sciences

13.00 - 15.00  **Lunch** Faculty Restaurant PLATO

Room **208**

Room **211**

15.00 - 16.30	SESSION 7 SOCIAL HISTORY OF SUBJECTIVITY	SESSION 8 THERAPIES IN HISTORY
	Chair: Zsuzsanna VAJDA	Chair: Regine PLAS
15.00 - 15.30	JIMÉNEZ, Belén, CASTRO, Jorge & LAFUENTE, Enrique "Psy" citizens : The psychological foundations of liberal citizenship in Spain (1875-1923)	DIMITRIJEVIĆ, Aleksandar Being mad in early modern England

15.30 - 16.00	CLARK, David Personality characteristics considered as artifacts of the post World War II American Social Environment	SMITS, Paul The history of behaviour therapy in the Netherlands
16.00 - 16.30	IVANOVIĆ, Anja & JOVIĆ, Vladimir Consumerism as a form of mind colonisation	FERREIRA, Arthur et al. The question of citizenship and freedom in the psychiatric reform process: a mix of governmental practices

16.30 - 17.00  **Coffee break** Festive Hall **108**

Room **208**

Room **211**

	SESSION 9 CHANGING SUBJECT-MATTERS	SESSION 10 CONCEPTUAL SHIFTS
17.00 - 18.30	Chair: Aleksandar DIMITRIJEVIĆ	Chair: Ivana SPASIĆ
17.00 - 17.30	BURNHAM, John Why sociologists abandoned the sick role concept	HEZEWIJK, René van & STAM, Henderikus From implicit to explicit knowledge in psychology: Husserl, James, and Linschoten
17.30 - 18.00	BRAUNS, Horst-Peter Theoretical psychology about 1950 - 1960	MILOVANOVIĆ, Goran Formalizations of rational choice in the 20th century: from axioms to preference conditions
18.00 - 18.30	STANKOVIĆ, Biljana The possibility of psychology as a nonmodern science	ABMA, Ruud: Group psychology in the trenches. Shell shock revisited

THURSDAY, 7 July 2011

9.00 - 10.30  **ESHHS BUSINESS MEETING** Festive Hall **108**

10.30 - 11.00  **Coffee break** Festive Hall **108**

11.00 - 12.00 **SESSION 11 INVITED LECTURE** Festive Hall **108**

Chair: Gordana JOVANOVIĆ



Thomas LAQUEUR, University of California, Berkeley, USA
THE DEEP TIME OF THE DEAD

Room **208**Room **211**

12.00 - 13.00	SESSION 12 HUMAN SCIENCES IN SOCIAL CONTEXTS	SESSION 13 IMAGES IN PSYCHOLOGY
	Chair: William WOODWARD	Chair: Ana ALTARAS - DIMITRIJEVIĆ
12.00 - 12.30	JOVANOVIĆ, Miloš The lifeworlds of masons and butchers in the City Beautiful: A microhistorical approach to urban change in fin-de-siècle Belgrade	WIESER, Martin & SLUNEČKO, Thomas Images of the invisible. An account of iconic media in the history of psychology
12.30 - 13.00	BOGOEVA-SEDLAR, Ljiljana Holocausts that official histories refuse to see: "scientific objectivity" and the challenge of "people's histories" of the world	LEYSSEN, Sigrid Stimulating images: as psychological instruments and as psychological research objects

13.00 - 15.00

**Lunch**

Faculty Restaurant PLATO

Room **208**Room **211**

15.00 - 16.30	SESSION 14 PSYCHOANALYSIS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES	SESSION 15 TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES TO HUMAN SCIENCES
	Chair: Irmingard STAEUBLE	Chair: Goran MILOVANOVIĆ
15.00 - 15.30	BUSCH, Hans-Joachim The significance of psychoanalysis for the social sciences	SIROTKINA, Irina The theatre of biomechanics
15.30 - 16.00	KUDSZUS, Winfried On Microemergence: Louis Agassiz, Sigmund Freud, Friedrich Nietzsche	BOS, Jaap Who's the walrus? On the possibilities and impossibilities of 'Facebook biography'
16.00 - 16.30	ERŐS, Ferenc & SZÉKÁCS, Judit "We have been burning and freezing by turns". The relationship between Sándor Ferenczi and Ernest Jones in the mirror of their correspondence	WAHRIG, Bettina Inebriated or intoxicated? The foundation of Italian anthropology and the role of Coca

16.30 - 17.00

**Coffee break**Festive Hall **108**

Room **208**Room **211**

17.00 - 18.30	SESSION 16 CULTURE IN THEORY – THEORIES OF CULTURE	SESSION 17 HISTORICAL APPROACH TO EDUCATION
	Chair: Christian ALLESCH	Chair: Ian LUBEK
17.00 - 17.30	ESHUIS, Jannes The concept of evolution in social and cultural theory	MÜLBERGER, Annette et al. Teacher as scientist: popularizing psychological testing in Catalonia
17.30 - 18.00	BAUCAL, Aleksandar Socio-cultural psychology: with or without the concept of internalization	ALTARAS, Ana The life of giftedness: dust to dust. A historical perspective on the field of giftedness and gifted education
18.00 - 18.30	PIZARROSO, Noemí, BALLTONDRE PLA, Mónica & CASTRO, Jorge William James' works on mysticism in the light of Henri Delacroix's genealogical approach	AČKOVSKA-LEŠKOVSKA, Elena & MIOVSKA-SPASEVA, Suzana: Compatibility of John Dewey's work and Howard Gardner's multiple intelligence theory: educational implications

20.00



CONFERENCE DINNER

RESTAURANT AERO KLUB

FRIDAY, 8 July 2011Room **208**Room **211**

9.00 - 10.30	SESSION 18 DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN SCIENCES	SESSION 19 HISTORY AND POLITICS IN HUMAN SCIENCES
	Chair: Biljana STANKOVIĆ	Chair: Svetlana ČIZMIĆ
9.00 - 9.30	SÁNCHEZ MONROE, Juan The evolution of political anthropology and its importance for the study of Central Asia's peoples	ILIĆ-RAJKOVIĆ, Aleksandra & MAKSIMOVIĆ, Aleksandra Science in Sreten Adžić's pedagogical practice at the beginning of XX century in Serbia
9.30 - 10.00	SPASIĆ, Ivana & GORUNOVIĆ, Gordana An encounter that never happened: Clifford Geertz and Pierre Bourdieu	VAJDA, Zsuzsanna Imre Lakatos and the IQ debate
10.00 - 10.30	DUHAČEK, Daša Theoretical and academic legitimacy of gender and women's studies in Serbia	VOLKOVA, Ekaterina Factors of USSR and SFRJ collapse in modern historiography

10.30 - 11.00



Coffee break

Festive Hall **108**

11.00 - 12.00

SESSION 20 INVITED LECTURE

Festive Hall **108**

Chair: Gordana JOVANOVIĆ



Kenneth GERGEN, Swarthmore College, PA, USA
PSYCHOLOGY AFTER THE RELATIONAL TURN

Room **208**

Room **211**

12.00 - 13.00	SESSION 21 PERSONS IN MICROHISTORY AT WORK	SESSION 22 SCIENCE FACING SOCIAL CHANGES
12.00 - 12.30	Chair: Irmgard STAEUBLE BRYSON, Dennis: Mark A. May: Character, personality, and the science of human behavior	Chair: Arthur ARRUDA LEAL FERREIRA PULIDO-MARTINEZ, Hernan Camilo The psychological colonisation of the health sector in Bogota, Colombia during the decades of employment transformation 1980 - 2010.
12.30 - 13.00 MARJANOVIĆ-SHANE, Ana & PEŠIĆ, Mirjana Conceptual history and development of the Belgrade School of Creativity ČIZMIĆ, Svetlana, PETROVIĆ, Ivana Development of work psychology in Serbia along the scientist- practitioner paradigm

13.00 - 15.00



Lunch

Faculty Restaurant PLATO

15.00 - 17.00

SESSION 23 SYMPOSIUM ON CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY

108

Chair: Gordana JOVANOVIĆ

ALLESCH, Christian
 Culture and personality - A once and future research program?

ALLOLIO-NÄCKE, Lars
 Is cultural psychology a once and future discipline?

JOVANOVIĆ, Gordana
 Cultural psychology in the history of psychology

STRAUB, Jürgen
 Kulturpsychologie heute. Eine Positionsbestimmung im Rückblick auf die Geschichte der Psychologie

17.00 - 18.00

SESSION 24 CLOSING SESSION AND REFRESHMENTS

108

Agenda: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

18.30 - 19.00  _____ OLD TOWN HISTORICAL WALKING TOUR

20.00  _____ INFORMAL GATHERING

SATURDAY, 9 July 2011

8.00 - 20.00   _____ SOCIO-CULTURAL PROGRAM - FIELD TRIP

TOUR OF SREM

BELGRADE - SIRMIIUM - NATURE RESERVE ZASAVICA - FRUSKA GORA -
SREMSKI KARLOVCI - BELGRADE

One day trip - by bus and boat

Tour of Srem provides an opportunity to learn about a region that bears the name of Sirmium - today Sremska Mitrovica town, one of the four capitals of the Roman Empire and place of birth or death of seven Roman emperors. The program includes a tour of Zasavica, nature reserve, with panoramic cruise, visit to Fruska Gora mountain and Sremski Karlovci, which represent the place of preservation of Serbian culture in the eighteenth and nineteenth century with obligatory wine tasting and lunch.

Bus departs at 8.30 am. Visit to Sremska Mitrovica town, former Sirmium one of the four capitals of the Roman Empire and place of birth or death of seven Roman emperors. Follows discovery of the history of Balkans and visit to Emperor's palace. Nature reserve Zasavica, with sightseeing from the boat and special lunch. After lunch follows visit to the Krusedol monastery on Fruska Gora mountain. The tour continues with the departure to Sremski Karlovci and sightseeing of the Patriarch's Palace and other institutions of great cultural and historical importance. All this is followed by degustation of wine in selected wine cellar. Return to Belgrade at 8.00 pm.

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