Book of Abstracts

Joint Meeting

ESHHS
(European Society for the History of the Human Sciences)

&

CHEIRON
(International Society for the History of Behavioural and Social Sciences)

Barcelona, June 27 – July 1, 2016

Mariagrazia Proietto & Thiago Constâncio Ribeiro Pereira
(Eds.)
Scientific committee
Annette Mülberger (CEHIC, UAB), Ingrid Farreras (Hood College, EEUU), Sharman Levinsonn (University of Angers, France), Mónica Balltondre (CEHIC, UAB), Jorge Molero (CEHIC, UAB), Carlos Tabernero (CEHIC, UAB), Thomas Sturm (ICREA/CEHIC), Fernando Vidal (ICREA/CEHIC), Agustí Nieto (CEHIC, UAB), Xavi Roqué (CEHIC, UAB), Jon Arrizabalaga (CSIC, IMF), Mariagrazia Proietto (Univ. Sapienza/CEHIC), Andrea Graus (Univ. de Antwerpen, Bèlgica), Saulo de Freitas Araujo (Univ. Juiz de Fora, Brasil), Noemí Pizarroso (UNED, Madrid), Gabrial Ruiz Ortiz (Univ. de Sevilla), Natividad Sánchez González (Univ. de Sevilla), Nadine Weidman (Harvard University), David Robinson (Truman State University).

Organizing Committee

Copyright 2016 by Psychologia Latina
ISSN: 2171-6609

The conference and the publication of the book of abstract has received support by the Catalan Government (AGAUR, 2014 SGR 1414)
Table of Contents

Program

Abstract

TUESDAY

Time table

Session 1: Child psychology and psychiatry
Session 2: Anthropology and social psychology
Session 3: Training the senses: beyond disciplines
Session 4: Normal – Abnormal – Paranormal: shared frontiers in the history of the human sciences
Session 5: Implicit psychologies: the role of psychology in the constitution of other disciplines
Session 6: Johannes Linschoten and the transition from phenomenology in the Netherlands and beyond
Invited Talk (1): Body and soul in early Islamic science and medicine
Poster Session 1
Session 7: After untold lives: analyzing feminism and gender in the history of psychology
(A symposium in honor of Elizabeth Scarborough, 1935-2015)
Session 8: Psychometrics and mental testing
Session 9: Dead and alive: exotic animals in the urban space around 1900

WEDNESDAY

Time table

Session 10: Epistemology, cognition and personality
Session 11: Historiography (1): impact and myths
Session 12: Behavior
Session 13: Juridical psychology
Session 14: Russian psychology in the 20th century and its influence
Session 15: 18th century psychology and its influence
Session 16: Psychology and Catholicism
Session 17: Scientists in modern society
Session 18: Somewhere, beyond the seven seas: Hungarian psychology in Europe in the 20th century
Session 19: Psychology in Argentina
Session 20: Spiritualism, automatism, and hypnosis
Session 21: Science and psychology in Spain in the 20th century
Film: “The ape and the child”

THURSDAY

Time table
Session 22: Psychology in the 19th century: Wundt, James, Stumpf
Session 23: Psychology in ancient times and in the 17th century
Session 24: Medical experts and institutions
Session 25: Relations between psychology and sociology in early 20th century in France: Marcel Mauss, George Dumas and Henri Delacroix
Session 26: Philosophy of psychology and history
Session 27: Psychotherapy and Catholicism
Session 28: Historiography (2)
Session 29: Personality, movement and operation
Session 30: The human sciences in the 19th and 20th centuries
Poster Session (2)

FRIDAY

Time table
Invited Talk (2): From the theory of knowledge to scientific philosophy: the place of psychology in Wundt’s philosophical system
Session 31: Pediatrics and child psychology/psychiatry
Session 32: Sexuality and child abuse 176
Session 33: Eugenics in Spain 181
Session 34: Linguistics in the 19th and 20th century 186
Session 35: Drugs, hormones and professional networks in medicine and psychology 190
Session 36: The child as object in psychology and forensic medicine 194

Index of Authors 199
PROGRAM
JOINT MEETING OF ESHHS-CHEIRON
BARCELONA, 2016

MONDAY 27th June

5.00 pm – 6.00 pm: REGISTRATION

6.00 pm – 6.30 pm: WELCOME RECEPTION

TUESDAY 28th June

8.00 am – 9.00 am: REGISTRATION

8.30 am – 9.00 am: WELCOME ADDRESS

9.00 am – 11.00 am: 3 PARALLEL SESSIONS

SESSION 1
Title: Child psychology and psychiatry
CHAIR: Petteri Pietikäinen
Annemieke van Drenth: Pioneering in autism: the Dutch case of practising child-study in the late 1930s
Lenny van Rosmalen: From secure dependency to attachment: Mary Ainsworth’s integration of Blatz’s security theory into Bowlby’s attachment theory
Frank C.P. van der Horst: John Bowlby meets the world: report of his travels for the WHO in 1950
Anna Kathryn Kendrick: A perfect vitality: José Ortega y Gasset’s new biological critique of pedagogy
Discussant: Kata Lénárd
SESSION 2
Title: Anthropology and social psychology
CHAIR: Dennis Bryson
Dennis Bryson: Acculturation and the culture concept in the 1930s: The SSRC’s Subcommittee on acculturation
Jouni Ahmajärvi: Ragnar Numelin and the origins of diplomacy
Jacy L. Young: Performing psychology for the public: Henri Tajfel, replication, and the minimal group experiment

SESSION 3
Title: Training the senses: beyond disciplines
CHAIR and ORGANIZER: Alexandra Hui
Alexandra Hui & Lino Camprubi: Training the underwater ear
Marcia Holmes: Learning resistance: ‘brainwashing’ and psychological theories of learning during the Cold War
Sarah Marks: Preventing and treating the side-effects of socialism: relaxation training therapies in East Germany
Marta García Quiñones: Measuring musical talent: A critical view of the place of Carl Seashore (1866-1949) in the history of the psychology of music
Discussant: Jessica Wang

11.00 am – 11.30 am: COFFEE BREAK

11.30 am –1.30 pm: 3 PARALLEL SESSIONS

SESSION 4
Title: Normal – Abnormal – Paranormal: shared frontiers in the history of the human sciences
CHAIR and ORGANIZER: Greg Eghigian
Katariina Parhi: Distorted reflections: Psychopaths as disfigured images of ourselves in Finland in the twentieth century
Greg Eghigian: From a science of UFOs to a science of UFO believers
Elizabeth Lunbeck: Producing abnormal personalities: the narcissistic personality inventory, the DSM, and the triumph of traits over state

SESSION 5
Title: Implicit psychologies: the role of psychology in the constitution of other disciplines
CHAIR and ORGANIZER: Sonu Shamdasani
Matei Iagher: The untold tale: psychology and the formation of the science(s) of religion(s)
Alex Woodcock: Psychology in 20th century international relations theory: EH Carr in the inter-war years
Rodrigo Vivas: Differing anthropologies: the debate between diffusion and psychic unity in Max Müller, Edward B. Tylor, and Andrew Lang
SESSION 6
Title: Johannes Linschoten and the transition from phenomenology in the Netherlands and beyond
CHAIR: Andreu Ballús
René van Hezewijk & Henderikus J. Stam: Johannes Linschoten and Juan Luis Vives
Jannes Eshuis: Linschoten’s alleged turn from phenomenology to positivism
Henderikus J. Stam & René van Hezewijk: When ideas cross borders: the shapeshifting nature of phenomenological psychology
Discussant: Andreu Ballús

1.30 pm – 3.00 pm: LUNCH

3.00 pm – 4.00 pm: INVITED TALK
Miquel Forcada: Body and soul in early Islamic science and medicine

4.00 pm – 4.30 pm: REFRESHMENTS & POSTER SESSION (1)
Sarah L. Ballard-Abbott & Richard D. Barnes: Exploring early psychological tests: researching and preserving the Randolph College collection
Christopher Green & Arlie Belliveau: Disciplining of psychology, 1890-1940
Michael R. Dawson: How to convert historical text into a gantt chart

4.30 pm – 7.00 pm: 3 PARALLEL SESSIONS

SESSION 7
Title: After untold lives: analyzing feminism and gender in the history of psychology (A symposium in honor of Elizabeth Scarborough, 1935-2015)
CHAIR and ORGANIZER: Alexandra Rutherford
Elizabeth Johnston & Ann Johnson: Now you see her, now you don’t: Bryan and Boring’s ambivalent feminism
Alexandra Rutherford: ‘The mere fact that a lady picks up a slide rule does not mean she intends to put down powder puff’: psychology, policy, and womanpower in 1950s America
Tal Davidson: Twice a pioneer: The therapeutic methods of Betty Grover Eisner pre-and post-LSD prohibition
Katherine Hubbard: Masks, red lipstick and rabbits: A queer feminist history of the projective test movement in Britain
Nora Ruck, Lisa Maria Wanner & Vera Luckgei: Feminist psychology in the German speaking countries
Discussant: Wade Pickren
SESSION 8
Title: Psychometrics and mental testing
CHAIR and ORGANIZER: Annette Mülberger
Sebastiaan Broere: Engelhard’s ethno-psychology: measuring minds in Central-Java, 1916-1925
Michael M. Sokal: James McKeen Cattell, mental measurement, and positive eugenics, ca. 1890-1920
Elizabeth R. Valentine & Michael M. Sokal: Networks amongst the contributors to Cattell and Bryant’s 1889 study of word association
Kimberly Probolus: The limitations of psychological expertise: legal challenges to intelligence testing in Massachusetts civil service office selection, 1967-1973
Andrea G.v. Hohenthal: anxiety, efficiency and will: psychological testing in WWI
Discussant: Aida Roige

SESSION 9
Title: Dead and alive: exotic animals in the urban space around 1900
CHAIR and ORGANIZER: Oliver Hochadel
Agustí Nieto-Galan: Noah’s ark comes to town: animals in Barcelona during the Universal Exhibition of 1888
Oliver Hochadel: From India to the museum via the zoo: the career of the Elephant Avi in Barcelona
Laura Valls: A whale in Barcelona: from popular entertainment to scientific instruction
Miquel Carandell: Stuffed animals between knowledge making, popularization and business: Barcelona’s Museo Pedagógico de Ciencias Naturales

7.00 pm – 8.00 pm: CHEIRON Society’s meeting
9.00 pm – 10.30 pm: Music (Jam Session)
WEDNESDAY 29th June

8.30 am – 10.30 am: 3 PARALLEL SESSIONS

SESSION 10
Title: Epistemology, cognition and personality
CHAIR: Sharman Levinson
Arlene C. Vadum: Scientific induction: Whewell and Modern Qualitative Methods
Mark A. Affeltranger: S.S. Stevens’s impact on the cognitive revolution
Ian J. Davidson: The sparse life of the ambivert: tracing the history of a nearly forgotten personality type
Aida Roige & Eric Arnau: Measurability and ontologic desiderata: two opposing forces in intelligence research

SESSION 11
Title: Historiography (1): impact and myths
CHAIR: Ana Maria Talak
Caroline da C. Pavan- Cândido, Carmen Beatriz Neufeld & Gabriel Vieira Cândido: Behavior and cognitive therapies: How Brazilian authors recognize the history of their own fields
Christopher D. Green & Shane M. Martin: Crowd-sourcing the question of historical impact on psychology
Luiz Eduardo Prado da Fonseca, Hugo Leonardo Rocha Silva da Rosa & Arthur Arruda Leal Ferreira: Yes, we have Wundt: Waclaw Radecki and historical fabrication of pioneers
Hernán Camilo Pulido Martinez: Practices, appropriation and psychologisation: Colombian psychologists re-create their professional experiences

SESSION 12
Title: Behavior
CHAIR: José Maria Gondra
Evan Arnet: Conwy Lloyd Morgan and the making of a scientific comparative psychology
David O. Clark: Experimental psychology & Thorndike’s puzzle-box: observation and interpretation in practice
Otniel E. Dror: The science of super-pleasure

10.30 am – 11.00 am: COFFEE BREAK

11.00 am – 1.00 pm: 3 PARALLEL SESSIONS
SESSION 13
Title: Juridical psychology
CHAIR: Ingrid Farreras
Maarten Derksen: Out of control: another look at brainwashing
Sheila O’Brien Quinn: The influence of the insanity plea on the abolition of the death penalty in the State of Rhode Island
John Carson: Questioning mental soundness in early nineteenth-century English civil law
Jennifer L. Bazar: Stacking the wards? Ontario’s experiment in treating psychopathy

SESSION 14
Title: Russian psychology in the 20th century and its influence
CHAIR: David Robinson
Natalia Loginova: A human as integral individuality in Russian psychology: theories and empirical research (1960-2010)
Irina A. Mironenko: Revival of christian orthodox psychology in post-soviet Russia
Junona S. Almonaitienė: Same rivers and other waters: discussions on psychology lectures at high school in Lithuania in thirties and nineties of the 20th century
Anton Yasnitsky & René van der Veer: Revisionist revolution in Vygotsky studies: the state of the art and new perspectives

SESSION 15
Title: 18th century psychology and its influence
CHAIR: Saulo de Freitas Araujo
Thiago Constâncio Ribeiro Pereira: Christian Wolff’s psychology as ‘German psychology’
Horst-Peter Brauns & David Miller: On the development of psychology during the 18th century
Lara Scaglia: Bonnet’s and Tetens’s inquiries into human nature and the seeds of the Kantian criticism
Liesbet De Kock: Bridging the gap between post-Kantian idealism and early psychophysiology in 19th century Germany: a study of the concept of apperception in Fichte and Wundt

1.00 pm – 2.00 pm: LUNCH

2.00 pm – 4.30 pm: 3 PARALLEL SESSIONS

SESSION 16
Title: Psychology and Catholicism
CHAIR: Robert Kugelmann
Dario De Santis: Biology and psychology in Fr. Agostino Gemelli’s early studies
Robert Kugelmann: Moral pain
Annette Mülberger: How to measure the soul? Psychology, neo-thomism and the Franco Regime
Sigrid Leyssen: What could a neo-scholastic experimental psychology be? Circulating models for psychology between Louvain and Madrid
Andrea Graus: Stigmata and celebrity at the turn of the 20th century in France and Spain
Discussant: Clara Florensa
SESSION 17
Title: Scientists in modern society
CHAIR: Xavier Roqué
Ruud Abma: Human scientists as public intellectuals. The case of Frederik Buytendijk
Petteri Pietikäinen: ‘Applied’ versus ‘basic’ research: work psychology and its search of identity in Finland between the 1960 and the 1980s
David Ceccarelli: Historical illiteracy? The ‘Lombroso’s trial’ and the whiggish bias in the public understanding of history of science
Annukka Sailo: Human territorial aggression and the 1960s ‘population bomb’
Mikko Myllykangas: Emergence of epidemiological suicide research in Finland

SESSION 18
Title: Somewhere, beyond the seven seas: Hungarian psychology in Europe in the 20th century
CHAIR and ORGANIZER: Zsuzsanna Vajda
Zsuzsanna Vajda: International orientation of Hungarian child psychology in the first half of the 20th century
Anna Borgos: Vilma Kovács, the ‘guardian angel’ of Hungarian psychoanalytic society
Júlia Gyimesi: From spiritism to metapsychical research: contributions to the history of Hungarian psychology in light of 20th century occult revival
Melinda Kovai: ‘Catching up to the West’ – The modernisation and self-colonializing paradigms of Hungarian psychology during state-socialism
Csaba Pléh: Half century of Hungarian psychology: from 1960 to 2010

4.30 pm- 5.00 pm: REFRESHMENTS (presentation of journals and book display)
5.00 pm – 6.30 pm: 3 PARALLEL SESSIONS

SESSION 19
Title: Psychology in Argentina
CHAIR: Fernando Vidal
Ana María Talak: Psychology, society and politics in the work of José Ingenieros (Argentina, 1900-1925): the role of expert knowledge in the intellectual Latin American
Mauro Vallejo: Quacks and lay hypnotists in Buenos Aires (1880-1900)
Laura Berniell: Ingeniero’s psychiatry mirrored in Lugones’ fiction stories

SESSION 20
Title: Spiritualism, automatism, and hypnosis
CHAIR: Mónica Balltondre
Kim Hajek: ‘Toutes les allures d’un roman’: literary style and scientific analysis in 19th century psychological observations
Mónica Balltondre: Counter-hegemonic beliefs in Barcelona: female spiritualists around 1900
David G. Horn: On not paying attention: automatism and the cultivation of distraction in the human sciences
SESSION 21
Title: Science and psychology in Spain in the 20th century
CHAIR: Agustí Nieto-Galan
Mariagrazia Proietto: Does the right job exist for everyone? Spanish and Italian psychotechnicians classifying workers
Carles Sirera Miralles: Juan José Linz: the scientist of the Spanish transition
Ben Harris & Andrew Harris: The Psychologists’ League and American Medical Aid to Spain, 1937-1939

6.30 pm – 7.00 pm: FILM “The ape and the child” (Cathy Faye)

8.00 pm: CONFERENCE DINNER (bus will leave at 7.30 pm at UAB ) + BOOK AUCTION
THURSDAY 30th June

9.30 am – 11.30 am: 3 PARALLEL SESSIONS

SESSION 22
Title: Psychology in the 19th century: Wundt, James, Stumpf
CHAIR: Bill Woodward
Andrea Lailach-Hennrich: Wilhelm Wundt on consciousness and attention
Nancy Didgon: Joseph Haven’s textbook, Mental Philosophy Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will, compared to William James’ Psychology: A Briefer Course
John D. Greenwood: Wilhelm Wundt: The first Gestalt psychologist?
Riccardo Martinelli: Carl Stumpf on the foundations of experimental psychology
Discussant: Saulo Araujo

SESSION 23
Title: Psychology in ancient times and in the 17th century
CHAIR: Silvia De Bianchi
Koen Vermeir: The culture of ingenuity: reforming the mind at the turn of the 17th century
Kees Bertels & Johann Louw: Inwardness: a ‘prehistory’
Marco Solinas: Dreams between (psychoanalytic) science and (ancient) philosophy. Freud on Plato

SESSION 24
Title: Medical experts and institutions
CHAIR: Jon Arrizabalaga
Iván Sánchez-Moreno & Alicia Fernández Martínez: “Isn’t a palace, but it seems so”: the Hospital de la Santa Creu.
Juan Antonio Rodríguez-Sánchez & Raúl Velasco Morgado: The expert patient as a science populariser: the case of post-polio syndrome
Jimena Carrasco Madariaga & Arthur Arruda Leal Ferreira: Brazilian and Chilean psychiatric reforms and management for freedom – a history of the modes of governance in mental health practices
Marco Maureira, Francisco Tirado, Pedro Torrejón & Enrique Baleriola: The epidemiological factor: towards a historic genealogy of the link between medicine and politics in Europe from the 18th to the 21st century
Discussant: Sandra Elena Guevara Flores
11.30 am – 12.00 pm: COFFEE BREAK

12.00 pm – 1.30 pm: 3 PARALLEL SESSIONS

SESSION 25
Title: Relations between psychology and sociology in early 20th century in France: Marcel Mauss, George Dumas and Henri Delacroix
CHAIR: Marcia Consolim
Thomas Hirsch: ‘Where professors eat each other’ [Là où les professeurs se mangent entre eux]. Sociology and psychology following Marcel Mauss
Marcia Consolim: The reception of George Dumas’ Traité de Psychologie by the French School of sociology
Noemi Pizarroso: Relations between psychology and sociology: Emile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss and Henri Delacroix

SESSION 26
Title: Philosophy of psychology and history
CHAIR: James Good
Jill Morawski: Pliant humans? (Prospects for historical ontology)
Arthur W. Still & James M.M. Good: Choc versus troc: mutualism revisited
Gordana Jovanović: From individuum to individualism – A historical reconstruction
Discussant: Éric Arnau

SESSION 27
Title: Psychotherapy and Catholicism
CHAIR: Andrea Graus
Lawrence T. Nichols: Louisa Catherine Pinkham: integrating psychological therapies with sociological practice
Marco Innamorati & Ruggero Taradel: Exorcism and psychotherapy: possession, psychopathology and the Church during the last 100 years
Renato Foschi: Psychotherapy and Catholicism: the end of psychoanalytic ‘non expedit’

1.30 pm – 3.00 pm: LUNCH

3.00 pm – 5.00 pm: 3 PARALLEL SESSIONS

SESSION 28
Title: Historiography (2) (roundtable)
CHAIR: Ian Lubek
Shayna Fox Lee: Historiography and disciplinary values: Carl Murchison, the academy, and profit
Harry Whitaker & Tom Heinzen: Presentism redux
Miki Takasuna: Expanded analysis of textbook citations on the history of psychology using 19th textbooks published after 2001
Michael R.W. Dawson: Structure-process, images, and narratives
Adriana Kaulino: Challenges to training psychologists in Chile: innovations and contributions from teaching critical history of psychology
SESSION 29
Title: Personality, movement and operation
CHAIR: Roger Smith
Irina Sirotkina & Roger Smith: Modernist movement? Kinaesthesia and deepening the senses
Moritz Michels: The ‘Operative psychology’ of the Ministry of State Security of the German Democratic Republic: history, functions, effects and scientific foundation
Martin Wieser: Buried Layers: On the origins, rise and fall of stratification theory, 1900-1950
Leila Zenderland: Culture, personality, and politics: comparing American and German interdisciplinary strategies in the World War II era

SESSION 30
Title: The human sciences in the 19th and 20th centuries
CHAIR: Thomas Sturm
Ivan Flis: A discipline rises from the crises: the protracted null hypothesis testing discussion and replication crisis in psychology (1960-2000s)
Elissa Rodkey: ‘Very much in love’: the letters of Magda Arnold and Father John Gasson
Jaime Valenzuela Matus: The role of fact/value distinction in shaping epistemic ideals: some considerations on 19th century mechanical objectivity emergence

5.00 pm – 5.30 pm: REFRESHMENTS + POSTER SESSION (2)
Justice for women
Maria Giulia Andretta: Science & the city
Kata Lénárd: The birth, fading and rebirth of the psychic trauma - concept

5.30 pm – 7.00 pm: 2 PARALLEL ACTIVITIES
CHEIRON BOOK PRIZE
ESHHS’S MEETING
FRIDAY 1st July

9.00 am – 10.00 am: INVITED TALK (2)
Saulo de Freitas Araujo: From the theory of knowledge to scientific philosophy: the place of psychology in Wundt’s philosophical system

10.00 am – 10.15 am: SHORT COFFEE BREAK

10.15 am – 11.45 am: 3 PARALLEL SESSIONS

SESSION 31
Title: Pediatrics and child psychology/psychiatry
CHAIR: Clara Florensa
Jesper Vaczy Kragh: In the gray area. Psychiatric treatments and the history of disabled children, 1855-1960
Raúl Velasco Morgado & Juan Antonio Rodríguez-Sánchez: The paediatrician as expert in rare diseases and the hatching of the specialty in mid-20th-century Spain: the project of Ernesto Sánchez-Villares on inherited pathology
Discussant: Génesis Nuñez

SESSION 32
Title: Sexuality and child abuse
CHAIR: Sergi Mora
Andrea Josipovic: Conceptualising child sexual abuse: discussions in the 19th and 20th centuries
Elena Demke: William Stern and the emergence of the psychological expert voice on child sexual abuse
Peter Hegarty: Not essential: changing paradigms of sexual identity in American psychology

SESSION 33
Title: Eugenics in Spain
CHAIR and ORGANIZER: Jorge Molero-Mesa
Sara Navarro-Rendón: Eugenics in Francoism through the medical journal Ser (1942-1957)

11.45 am – 12.00 pm: SHORT BREAK (REFRESHMENTS)
12.00 pm – 1.30 pm: 3 PARALLEL SESSIONS

SESSION 34
Title: Linguistics in the 19th and 20th century
CHAIR: Xavier Vall i Solaz
Marjorie Lorch: 19th century ideas regarding the role of learning and memory in second language acquisition
Nadia Kerecuk: Roots growing upwards & bearing deciduous buds: Potebnia’s enduring universal legacy
Ku-ming (Kevin) Chang: Away from anthropology and philology: the training of linguists in the US, Britain, and France, 1900-1945

SESSION 35
Title: Drugs, hormones and professional networks in medicine and psychology
CHAIR: Carlos Tabernero
Gay Cusack: Framing the history of anti-depressants
Mauricio Becerra: Modeling experimental psychoses: first LSD trials in Latin America

SESSION 36
Title: The child as object in psychology and forensic medicine
CHAIR: Óscar Montero Pich
Aina Elias & Vanessa Márquez: The ‘abnormal’ mind as social threat: the psychology of the jurist E. Cuello Calón
Marcelo Valenzuela: The discrete enchantment of children: child abuse in Chile 1870-1930
Sonia Recuerda: Maria De La Rigada’s contribution to child psychology at the beginnings of the 20th century

1.30 pm – 3.00 pm: LUNCH (UAB)

4.00 pm – 7.00 pm: Sightseeing tour (optional)
ABSTRACTS
JOINT MEETING OF ESHHS-CHEIRON
BARCELONA, 2016
### TIME TABLE TUESDAY 28th JUNE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.00 am –</td>
<td><strong>REGISTRATION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.00 am</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.30 am –</td>
<td><strong>WELCOME ADDRESS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.00 am –</td>
<td><strong>SESSION 1</strong> Child psychology and psychiatry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.00 am</td>
<td>CHAIR: Petteri Pietikäinen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Annemieke van Drenth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lenny van Rosmalen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frank C.P. van der Horst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anna Kathryn Kendrick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.00 am -</td>
<td><strong>COFFEE BREAK</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.30 am -</td>
<td>11.30 am – <strong>SESSION 4</strong> Normal–Abnormal–Paranormal: Shared frontiers in the history of the human sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.30 pm –</td>
<td>CHAIR: Greg Eghigian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.00 pm –</td>
<td><strong>LUNCH</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.00 pm –</td>
<td><strong>SESSION 5</strong> Implicit psychologies: the role of psychology in the constitution of other disciplines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.30 pm</td>
<td>CHAIR: Sonu Shamdasani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Matei Iagher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alex Woodcock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rodrigo Vivas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.00 pm –</td>
<td><strong>CHEIRON Society’s meeting</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.00 pm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.30 pm –</td>
<td><strong>Music (JAM SESSION)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.30 pm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Pioneering in autism. The Dutch case of practising child-study in the late 1930s
Annemieke van Drenth
(Leiden University - The Netherlands)
drenth@fsw.leidenuniv.nl

Historiographies on the phenomenon of ‘autism’ display two men as the actual figures pioneering in the medical practises that gave way to ‘the discovery’ of autism in the late 1930’s. The most prominent pioneer is the in Austria-Hungary born psychiatrist Leo Kanner (1894-1981) whose publication on children with ‘autistic disturbances of affective contact’ was included in the American journal *Nervous Child* in 1943. The other pioneer was the Austrian pediatrician Hans Asperger (1906-1980), whose work of ‘Heilpädagogik’ resulted in a publication describing autism in children in 1944. The aim of this paper is not to follow up on the controversies about who was first and who gained eponymous fame for having discovered autism as a new syndrome (most recent contribution by Silberman, 2015). Instead of rewriting a straightforward ‘history of autism’ – for example by adding a new pioneer – I intend to argue that scientific discoveries always have to be examined in the context of processes and practices of academic reflection and research. And in this perspective the Netherlands provide an interesting case, since it was a Dutch nun, Zr. Gaudia, alias Ida Frye, who already in in the late 1930s produced descriptions of the children with autism in the Netherlands. So, Dutch experts pioneering in autism preceded the official ‘discovery’ of ‘infantile autism’ by Kanner and Asperger.

My aim in this paper is to examine the theoretical and research-practical influences which guided the Dutch experts. In their examinations of children with problems, they came to indicate some of these children as ‘autistic’ and reported their diagnosis in their Annual Report of 1938. Ida Frye was crucial in the process of care and observation of the special children under examination. Based on her expertise with ‘feeble-minded’ children, she was a participant in the research team and responsible for the daily routines in the institution. Though she organised the care for these children and gathered the analytical data, she was not the first to publish the scientific results. In order to understand how that came about, I will sketch the scene of this pioneering work in the Netherlands. Subsequently, I will examine the scientific background of both the practices of care-taking of special children and the research into their psychic disturbances. As has been argued by various scholars, the history of interventions concerning ‘special children’ has been intimately related to the creation of knowledge on what became conceptualised a ‘disorder’ or a ‘disability’. My research into the history of one of the first so-called Paedological Institutes in the Netherlands is central in the argument of this paper. I elaborate on my earlier research into the case of the first Dutch boy with autism (Van Drenth 2013; based on the Archive of the Paedological Institute, in Regionaal Archief Nijmegen, 1022). The focus in this paper is on the history of child-studies and the developments in experimental psychology (the ‘laboratory’- tradition, see Owens 2014), in particular at the Catholic University Nijmegen in the Netherlands (Abma 1983).
References
Van Drenth, A. Retrieved from: http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/vrouwenlexicon/lemmata/data/Frye

From Secure Dependency to Attachment: Mary Ainsworth’s integration of Blatz’s Security Theory into Bowlby’s Attachment Theory
Lenny van Rosmalen
(Leiden University – The Netherlands)
lrosmalen@fsw.leidenuniv.nl

The British child psychiatrist and psychoanalyst John Bowlby (1907-1990) is generally regarded as the founder of attachment theory, which he gradually developed and comprehensively formulated in his trilogy (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980). According to attachment theory, human infants need a consistent nurturing relationship with one or more sensitive caregivers in order to develop into healthy individuals. Parental unavailability or unresponsiveness may contribute to aberrant behavior or, depending on other risk factors, to psychopathology.

Mary Ainsworth (1913-1999) has publicly gained credit as co-founder of attachment theory. Through her Uganda and Baltimore studies Ainsworth provided empirical evidence for attachment theory (Ainsworth, 1967, 1969), and she contributed the notion of the secure base and exploratory behavior, the Strange Situation Procedure and its classification system (Ainsworth et al., 1978), and the notion of maternal sensitivity. However, when discussing Ainsworth’s contribution to attachment theory, most authors start around 1950, when Ainsworth moved to London and began working with Bowlby. The fact that many of her theoretical contributions were derived from the ideas of her mentor and colleague William Blatz (1895-1964) is usually only mentioned in passing. Ainsworth started off as one of Blatz’s students at the University of Toronto in the early 1930s and then continued to work with him on the subject of security for many years.

In this contribution, on the basis of an evaluation of written papers and books as well as of understudied correspondence from the personal archives of Mary Ainsworth, John Bowlby and
Harry Harlow, a new perspective is added to the historiography of attachment theory by showing that Ainsworth’s use of Blatzian security theory has been much more important in shaping attachment theory than hitherto realized and that specific parts of attachment theory can be directly traced back to Blatz and his security theory.

While Bowlby studied the effects of mother-child separation in the UK in the 1930s and 1940s, William Blatz in Toronto was studying child development in nursery schools (Blatz & Bott, 1929) and developed his security theory (Blatz, 1944, 1966). Ainsworth absorbed this security theory while studying and working with Blatz for almost two decades. When Ainsworth started working with Bowlby at the Tavistock Clinic in London in 1950, she came well equipped. She brought with her extensive knowledge of Blatzian security theory, experience in designing instruments to measure security, and an awareness of the importance of a sensitive and responsive attitude towards children. On arrival, Ainsworth started to infuse Bowlby’s theory in the making—which up to that point was based only on separation findings—with Blatz’s security theory.

Even though Blatz is hardly mentioned nowadays, many of his ideas live on in attachment theory. Blatz’s security theory has not become as well-known or as much used in contemporary psychology as has attachment theory, but the present analysis shows that it was not lost and points out which parts of attachment theory can be traced back to Blatz and his security theory. Since attachment theory holds much more of Blatzian security theory than hitherto realized, one might argue that attachment theory is not the combined work of two, but of three creative researchers.

References

*John Bowlby meets the world: report of his travels for the WHO in 1950*

Frank C. P. van der Horst
(Erasmus University Rotterdam – The Netherlands)
vanderhorst@fsw.eur.nl

Attachment theory, developed by British child psychiatrist and psychoanalyst John Bowlby (1907-1990) in the 1950s and 1960s, is generally considered a major theory in developmental psychology and developmental psychopathology, and over the years its theoretical framework has inspired researchers across the world to conduct thousands of studies. However, Bowlby did not
create his theory overnight and his WHO report on the consequences of maternal deprivation for child development is regarded as crucial for the development of attachment theory (Van der Horst, 2011). Bowlby’s report (1952) was important for several reasons. First, it was highly influential for his own intellectual development. In an interview Bowlby once testified of the importance of his search for evidence supporting the ill-effects of deprivation: “[T]hose five months I worked for [the] World Health [Organisation] were very crucial ones for me, because first of all, I got to know a lot of people, secondly, I had a chance to read up the literature which I had not been able to do before and thirdly, to put my ideas together on paper” (Senn, 1977a, p. 18). So, his assignment with the WHO gave him the chance to absorb the field and brought him in contact with leading researchers in the field of psychology and psychiatry. Secondly, it was important for the field of psychology as a whole, as the report was generally very well received in medical circles (e.g., Editorial, 1951a, 1951b).

To give an accurate account of the state of the art in the care for homeless children for his report, in the first half of 1950, Bowlby visited the USA, France, Sweden, and The Netherlands. During his time spent away from home, he kept notebooks and wrote dozens of letters to his colleagues at the London Tavistock Clinic and to his wife Ursula, which are currently located at the Wellcome Library in London. In this contribution, on the basis of these primary sources, the author will relate the story of Bowlby’s trip for the WHO and the coming into existence of the WHO report on ‘maternal care and mental health’. Who did Bowlby meet? What were their ideas on maternal deprivation? What was their (subsequent) impact on the field of child development? And does Bowlby mention them in his final report? The answers to these questions will give us a clearer picture of the development of Bowlby’s ideas and of attachment theory as a whole.

References

A Perfect Vitality: José Ortega y Gasset’s New Biological Critique of Pedagogy
Anna Kathryn Kendrick
(New York University Shanghai - China)
anna.kendrick@nyu.edu

Describing the promise of ‘new biology’ in 1921, the Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset declared that ‘A pedagogy which seeks to be worthy of the present, to raise itself to the level of the new biology, must attempt the systematization of vitality’ (136). This was a task he intended to foment in both an intellectual and pedagogical sense. Best known for such far-reaching works as the Rebellion of the Masses and The Dehumanization of Art, Ortega’s sociopolitical interests extended to Spain’s ongoing work of national educational reform. Ortega had, during the 1910s, advocated Natorp’s social pedagogy and an education for citizenship. Yet by the early 1920s – enamoured in large part by Jacob von Uexküll’s theory of the organism, as well as vitalist and holistic currents – he began to promote what he understood as a biological view of pedagogy.
In his essay ‘Pedagogy of Internal Secretions’ (1920), part of a larger collection entitled *Biology and Pedagogy* (1920), Ortega wrote that his ultimate aim was ‘to induce the pedagogical field to submit primary education to an imperative of vitality’ (1920, 116). Using concepts of functional unity drawn, at least superficially, from the Spanish endocrinologist Gregorio Marañon and physiologists Ramon Turró and August Pi i Sunyer, Ortega advocated a primary education reliant on imaginative and physiological stimulation through myth, epic, history, idea and emotion. Ortega claimed such sources to have ‘eternal pedagogical value’, because they crossed the boundary between the physical and the psychical, not just metaphorically but literally inciting physiological changes in the child.

Combining his status as a public intellectual and a popularizer of scientific ideas, his declarations on the state and future of Spanish education resounded with reform-minded pedagogues. While he was by no means the first to urge a ‘vital’ turn in education, the primary school teacher Rafael Verdier claimed it was Ortega who first deduced the pedagogical import of neo-biological concepts (1926, 158). He took Ortega’s work as a starting point to evaluate what exactly a ‘vital’ – not necessarily ‘vitalist’ – education should encompass: ‘Let us imagine that the biological sense of life was completely extinguished […] What would this mean in the terrain of pedagogical values?’ Verdier asked (1934, 2). This is in large part the question this paper seeks to answer. To what extent were such biological ideas popularized and employed as a scaffold for socially-driven claims? How were his sources used or abused, employed and deployed in service of this ‘vital imperative’? In advocating a primary education ‘governed by the ultimate purpose of producing […] vitally perfect men’, Ortega’s masculinized ‘vital’ perfection risked ignoring the universality of the biological research upon which he relied. Concerned with characterizations of the (abstract) child as a ‘vital unity’ in and of itself, between a New Educationalist focus on the ‘whole’ child and proto-fascist ideas of the ‘total’ man, this paper asks what role the evolution of the human sciences had in the sphere of pedagogical theory and what concrete educational values were advanced.

**References**


SESSION 2: ANTHROPOLOGY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Acculturation and the Culture Concept in the 1930s:
The SSRC’s Subcommittee on Acculturation

Dennis Bryson
(Bilkent University – Turkey)
dennis@bilkent.edu.tr

Given the critique of the culture concept conducted by anthropologists and other scholars in recent decades, it may be especially pertinent to examine the culture concept and the closely related concept of “acculturation” as it was elaborated in the United States during the 1930s—a key decade for the formulation of both concepts in the U.S. While the idea of acculturation no longer has wide currency in anthropology or in such fields as cultural studies, during the 1930s and well into the post-World War II era, it had a wide circulation in the social sciences in the U.S., especially among anthropologists. Acculturation, as studied by anthropologists such as Robert Redfield, Melville Herskovits, and Ralph Linton, dealt with such phenomena as “culture change” and was closely affiliated with the field of “culture and personality.” While anthropological students of acculturation such as Redfield and his colleagues tended to reject the “reified” notion of culture promulgated by the Berkeley anthropologist Alfred Kroeber, they emphasized the integration of culture, generally along psychological lines, even as they focused on the encounter of different cultures.

Established as a subcommittee of the Social Science Research Council’s Research Committee on Personality and Culture, the Subcommittee on Acculturation was organized in January 1935. It consisted of three prominent anthropologists: Robert Redfield (chairman), Melville J. Herskovits, and Ralph Linton. The focus of the Subcommittee on Acculturation was on the impact of the acculturation process—viewed as an aspect of cultural change in general—on the groups and individuals involved in this process. With the aid of a research assistant, this subcommittee examined the anthropological literature on acculturation; it also expended significant effort on the clarification of basic concepts, including acculturation, assimilation, diffusion, and disorganization. Two books eventually resulted from the subcommittee’s work: Herskovits’ Acculturation: The Study of Culture Contact (1938) and Linton’s Acculturation in Seven American Indian Tribes (1940). Moreover, the subcommittee formulated a memorandum on acculturation, which was published in the American Anthropologist and several other scholarly journals. All of these publications represented important statements within the field of acculturation studies—and, indeed, made a large contribution towards launching the field as a significant area of specialization within cultural anthropology.

The subcommittee’s 1936 “Memorandum for the Study of Acculturation” defined and clarified basic concepts and indicated the scope of acculturation studies and the basic issues and problems with which the field would be concerned.¹ It thus provided a definition of acculturation as “those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, with subsequent changes in the original cultural patterns of either or both groups.”² It also distinguished acculturation from culture change, which embraced acculturation but went well beyond the latter; from assimilation, potentially the endpoint of acculturation; and from diffusion, which did not necessarily involve direct contact between the

⁠¹<ref>Memorandum for the Study of Acculturation</ref>
⁠²<ref>Definition of acculturation</ref>
groups involved in the exchange of cultural traits. Especially notable, albeit problematic, about the memorandum’s treatment of acculturation was that—though it acknowledged that this process might occur in situations involving political and social inequality (or even domination) in the relation of one group upon another—it de-emphasized the common view of acculturation as entailing the unilateral imposition of the culture of one group (generally Western) upon another (generally non-Western).

In addition to published materials, I will be utilizing for my paper materials from the Social Science Research Council Archive at the Rockefeller Archive Center in Sleepy Hollow, New York.

1 George Stocking, in his Introduction to American Anthropology, 1921-1945, has described the memorandum as “one of the most representative documents in American anthropology in the interwar period. With its movement from [cultural] elements to transmission processes to integration conceived in psychological terms, it is an archetypical manifestation of the transformation of Boasian historical ethnology” (p. 29).


References

Ragnar Numelin and the origins of diplomacy
Jouni Ahmajarvi
(The University of Oulu – Finland)
jouni.ahmajarvi@oulu.fi

One can fairly say that the Finnish diplomat and social scientist Ragnar Numelin (1890–1972) truly committed himself to diplomacy. His career was with the Finnish Diplomatic Services, starting right after Finland got its independence in 1917. He served his country for 35 years in various cities around Europe. Diplomacy was not only his professional career but also one of the main topics of his scientific research. This presentation will focus on this aspect of Numelin’s scholarly avocations: his sociological studies on diplomacy as a part of intertribal and international relations. Numelin formulated his ideas in several studies, most of them published between 1930’s
and 1960’s. The decades of fierce nationalism, the World War II and the Cold War offer an interesting context for a scholar focusing on the foundations of diplomacy and international relations.

Numelin was a member of the so-called “Westermarckian School” in Finnish sociology and social anthropology. He used the comparative method and evolutionary theories of human society. Like his teacher Edward Westermarck, who has been called the first sociobiologist or evolutionary psychologist, Numelin took biological theory seriously. His theories were based on ideas on human nature and its reflection on social arrangements. For Numelin, society is a manifestation of human nature that greatly influences our everyday wants and preferences. More specifically, I will focus on the certain “pre-sociobiological” aspects of Numelin’s work. He studied human sociality and saw man as an essentially social being. I will examine Numelin's use of Westermarck's Darwin-influenced notion of the expansion of sympathy and altruistic sentiments as the origin of human sociality, how these phenomena influence diplomacy and intertribal and international relations and as well Numelin's use of the idea of “consciousness of kind” introduced by American sociologist F.H. Giddings.

Numelin has been mentioned only in passing in the history of Finnish sociology, but there are no previous studies on Numelin's scholarly work. For this reason, I will also briefly outline Numelin's place in the history of social sciences. As Numelin published his main studies decades after his well-known predecessors and years before the rise of sociobiology, he can be considered as one of the links in this tradition still lacking a comprehensive historiography. Numelin may not be a scientific master - after all, sociology was only one of his many scholarly avocations - but he certainly is an interesting curiosity.

References
"Apocalyptic Pessimism": Stanley Milgram, laboratory theatre, and the 1970s culture of malaise
Ian Nicholson
(St. Thomas University – USA)
nicholson@stu.ca

Stanley Milgram’s ‘obedience’ research is the most famous study in the history of American psychology and arguably its most consequential of all time. It is one of the few that has attained the status of a ‘classic’ – something allegedly ‘timeless’ that remains an ongoing part of the disciplinary conversation on ‘destructive’ authority and an inspiration for contemporary researchers. For many scholars, the popularity and significance of the Obedience study is considered something that is self-evident and largely independent of cultural and historical context. As former Milgram student Harold Takooshian (2011) noted, the study is “frozen in time.” Even work that has endeavoured to explain the study’s special charisma has tended to limit consideration to issues that Milgram himself: the study’s ‘dramatic appeal’ and supposed relevance to understanding the Holocaust (Benjamin & Simpson, 2009; Miller, 2009; Russell, 2005).

While there is an undeniable allure to the tabloid sensationalism and headline friendly simplicity of the obedience research, works of social science and culture that achieve such renown are typically sustained by their capacity to symbolize and engage a diverse range of cultural anxieties and tensions. As I have noted in previous work (Nicholson, 2011a, 2011b, 2015), the remarkable appeal of this study in the early 1960s was fuelled in no small part by its capacity to visualize and subsequently amplify pervasive Cold War anxieties about an American national character supposedly weakened by feminism, consumerism, and communism. However, one of the more unusual features of the obedience research is the fact that it comes to academic and cultural prominence not once, but twice. It appeared initially in three relatively brief academic articles in the early 1960s (Milgram, 1963a, 1963b, 1964) and was followed some twelve years later by a non-peer reviewed book written for the general public (Milgram, 1974). Widely publicized on its initial debut, the study became a cultural blockbuster when it was ‘rebooted’ for a mass audience in the 1970s.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the ‘reboot’ and reception of the Obedience study in its second, lengthier and better publicized iteration: the 1974 book Obedience to Authority. Cultural concerns were no less a factor in the 1970s iteration of the obedience research, but in this paper I will argue that the study mapped onto and helped propel a new and even deeper spirit of malaise. As historian Thomas Hine (2007) has noted, the 1970s was an era when America was “running on empty” (p.3). Idealism and hope were in short supply, cut down by the traumatic defeat of the US military in Vietnam, the unnerving energy crisis precipitated by the 1973 Arab oil embargo, and the political upheavals of Watergate. Prognosticators of doom flourished in this context of despair; flamboyant, star studded disaster films and books on eco-panic and a ‘population explosion’ found mass audiences.

Milgram’s obedience research – a gloomy relic from a world of crew cuts and black and white television – seemed to many to visualize and seemingly ‘explain’ just what ailed America. In grainy photos and through melodramatic prose one could ‘see’ the source of America’s
problems in the 1970s – it was that naïve clean cut, conformism of the 1950s. The ‘squares’ had unwittingly ruined everything, mindlessly doing what they were told, consequences be damned.

Obedience to Authority may have fit the dystopian temper of the times, but its popularity/notoriety was not entirely a function of its capacity to reveal or explain that which ailed. For many, Milgram’s work was a symptom of the very thing that it purported to critique – malevolent authority. While enthusiasts praised the study as the most important work in all of social sciences, the study became a significant and much discussed part of a larger narrative of despair, an indication of just how unfeeling and inhuman American social science had become (Faye, 2012).

References

Performing Psychology for the Public:
Henri Tajfel, Replication, and the Minimal Group Experiment
Jacy L. Young
(University of Surrey - UK)
jacy.young@surrey.ac.uk

Throughout the 1960s and 70s psychologist Henri Tajfel made a concerted effort to engage with the British public. Regularly writing letters to newspapers, appearing on radio programs, and on television, Tajfel sought to bring both his psychological work and personal concerns about prejudice and discrimination into the public conversation.¹ In this paper I explore the theatricality
of social psychology experiments through the lens of a replication of Tajfel’s Minimal Group Experiment (MGE) filmed expressly for television. Recent work in the history of psychology has explored the idea that participants in psychological experiments provide researchers with “performances” (e.g., Morawski, 2015; Nicholson, 2011). Engaging with ideas about performance and theatricality in the conduct of psychological experiments, I interrogate the unqualified expectation that the MGE was readily replicable as part of a television production, as well as the ultimate success of this effort at replication.

The MGE, originally undertaken in the late 1960s, endeavoured to distil the minimal conditions necessary for ingroup favouritism and outgroup discrimination (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). The study’s replication was filmed in July 1975 and broadcast on BBC 2 in December of that year as part of a special 2-hour BBC programme The Human Conspiracy (“The Human Conspiracy,” 1975). Although discussion of Tajfel’s experiment ultimately comprised only a four-minute segment of the programme, it offered him an opportunity to replicate the original study and communicate his work on prejudice and discrimination to a wide audience. Even before this replication, however, Tajfel was eager to share the study’s results with a broad audience, discussing the work within the pages of the popular science periodical Scientific American (Tajfel, 1970) a year before they were published in the European Journal of Social Psychology (Tajfel et al., 1971).

In advance of filming the Minimal Group Experiment for the The Human Conspiracy, Tajfel wrote to producer Alec Nisbett, regarding challenges associated with the timing of filming. As a solution Tajfel suggested that the experiment might simply be staged for film:

Would it not be possible to “arrange” the situation? The Klee-Kandinsky experiments first involve a group of boys sitting in a room and watching slides on a screen, and then each boy working separately in a small cubicle to fill in the “matrices” which are pages of a booklet. Altogether, nothing very photogenic, and easily simulated.²

While staging the experiment for television was a possibility, this is not what ultimately transpired. Instead the experiment, as filmed, served as a direct replication of the MGE, its success of central importance to both Tajfel and the programme’s producers.³ As a whole, reception to The Human Conspiracy proved divisive (Bruner, 1976; Calder, 1976). The programme itself may not have been a runaway hit, but Tajfel’s replication proved successful, the results “once again at a very high level of significance in the predicted direction.”⁴

This replication imbued the MGE footage with a degree of authenticity that only served to further cement the applicability of the study’s findings to contemporary social conflicts.


References


**SESSION 3: TRAINING THE SENSES: BEYOND DISCIPLINES**

**Panel abstract**
Jessica Wang, Marcia Holmes, Alexandra Hui & Sarah Marks

In the decades that followed Polanyi’s 1958 introduction of the concept of tacit knowing—the skills that cannot be transmitted through written or even verbal language—historians of science have harnessed it to venture from the realm of theories and ideas into that of practice. This concept was useful in developing and answering new questions about scientists' education and the establishment of schools, traditions and paradigms. Unfortunately, when mobilized towards better understanding the processes involved in the creation and transmission of professional and technical skills, the concept was employed as a black box of sorts. Tacit knowledge has fallen short of explaining the bodily, perceptual, and cognitive skills central to the practice of science. Recent literature in the history of science, science studies and anthropology has shown that learning by doing requires disciplining the senses, giving way to new perceptions and the development of new ideas and categories.

This panel explores the question of skills transmission through examinations of specific programs for the training of the senses in four very different realms: underwater acoustics, hypnotherapy, and psychological training for military personnel. Alexandra Hui will discuss her joint paper with Lino Camprubi on the U.S. Navy’s development of underwater listening techniques for sonar operators and marine biologists, and how the skills necessary for each group changed as military and scientific priorities — and the sounds themselves — changed. Sarah Marks will discuss the vinyl records and photographic instructions developed for training both doctors and the general public in preventive relaxation therapies in the GDR. Marcia Holmes examines how American fears of brainwashing influenced scientific discourse on learning within military psychology, with surprising consequences for research in other psychological fields. We bring these disparate fields together for the first time and go beyond the notion of tacit knowledge through attention to specific techniques developed to train sensory perceptual systems. Jessica Wang will provide commentary.

The panel situates this disciplinization of the scientist within the Cold War context. In each case study, the geopolitics of the Cold War informed the values and goals of the training regimens. Indeed, we would argue that Cold War priorities actively and explicitly shaped the very sensory experiences of the practitioners themselves, suggesting that the tacit knowledge was not so tacit after all.
Training the underwater ear
Alexandra Hui
(Mississippi State University – USA)
ahui@history.msstate.edu
Lino Camprubi
(Max Planck Institute for the History of Science - Germany)

WWII fueled technologies for underwater listening such as hydrophones and echo-sounding. Further innovations during Cold War anti-submarine warfare developed comprehensive technological systems capable of rendering the oceans audible, noisy even. As has been acknowledged in recent literature, this ability to hear marine sounds radically transformed the discipline of oceanography and the oceans themselves. These technological developments also transformed those listening to the sounds. An examination of US Navy ear-training manuals and sound recordings reveals interesting continuities between Cold War military oceanography and marine biology. Skills such as previous musical training and additional technologies such as graphic representation and image processing software further informed how the underwater soundscape was understood by navy sonar operators and marine biologists. In the oceanic soundscape, marine life was defined relative to Soviet vessels and was approached through an epistemology of error: plankton stood in the way of sound waves, shrimps distorted hydrophone receptions, and whales emitted enigmatically unclassifiable sounds that questioned existing sound signature catalogues of Soviet vessels. As technologies and data were later disclosed to the marine biologists, this knowledge about error became scientific knowledge. Skills and training thus provide continuity between the secret search for errors and open practice of marine mammals and fishery studies.

References
Learning resistance:
‘Brainwashing’ and psychological theories of learning during the Cold War
Marcia Holmes
(University of London – England)
m.holmes@bbk.ac.uk

As the Cold War’s meaning took shape in Americans’ minds, psychological theories of “learning” – of conditioning, indoctrination, and behavior modification – became charged with geopolitical significance, and with alarming ambiguities. Such theories had formed the bedrock of experimental and applied psychology before the Second World War, and in the early 1950s they seemed equally essential to understanding the emerging threat of Communist ‘brainwashing.’ In this period, the mental mechanisms of learning became linked to fears of Communist mind control – and to the possibility of acquiring ‘resistance’ to Communist indoctrination. Scientific discourse on learning was transformed by Cold War anxiety as new possibilities and pitfalls emerged for researchers in the fields most concerned with learning as it occurs in institutional settings, including the fields of military, educational, clinical and organizational psychology.

Certain aspects of this shift are well known to historians: how ‘brainwashing’ became a concept that, along with ‘containment’, epitomised Americans’ perceptions of what was at stake in winning the Cold War (Lutz 1997; Carruthers 2009); how fears of brainwashing encouraged a line of scientific research on interrogation and techniques of mind control (Marks 1979; Robin 2001); and how some of this research fed military and CIA policy on the use of torture in interrogation and simulated interrogation (McCoy 2006; Lemov 2015). Yet despite recent interest amongst historians of science on the aims and techniques of humanistic pedagy during this period (Isaac 2012; Cohen-Cole 2014), scholars have only recently begun to consider interactions between the Cold War era’s intellectual innovations in education and cultural constructions of brainwashing (Reisch 2012). This paper builds on these developments, as well as recent fine-grained analyses of military psychologists’ studies of resistance, stress and survival (Long 2014; Genter 2015), to discuss how fears of brainwashing influenced scientific discourse on learning not only in military psychology, but in the human sciences more broadly during the 1950s and ‘60s. In particular it draws on the work of organizational psychologist Edgar A. Schein to suggest a framework for analyzing how brainwashing inspired new approaches to, and critiques of, learning within institutional environments.
The argument that techniques drawn from the psychological disciplines have been a commonplace feature of self-governance in modern liberal societies has become a familiar trope in the historiography of the human sciences (Foucault, 1974; Rose, 1998; Illouz, 2008). This paper argues that the coupling of these so-called ‘technologies of the self’ with liberal democracy has ignored the possibility that psychotherapeutic approaches had an equivalent utility for governing societies on the other side of the Iron Curtain. This paper illuminates the value of psychological knowledge and practice in the case of the German Democratic Republic, where the development of therapeutic relaxation training was encouraged by the regime, and subsequently popularized both within the GDR and across the ‘Eastern Bloc’.

Autogenic training techniques developed by J.H Schultz were appropriated by the physicians G. Kleinsorge and G. Klumbies at the Psychiatric Clinic of the University of Jena, as a means to treat and prevent neurosis in the early years of the Communist regime. These were taken up as a shining example of Pavlovian conditioning in the therapeutic context, and presented as such at the GDR Ministry of Health’s Pavlov Seminars of 1951. This paper examines the methods and technologies of training used, examining the popular books, vinyl recordings, photographic instructions and scripts through which hypnotic relaxation techniques could be taught. These training methods were portrayed as particularly modern, as the techniques could be reproduced.
without the need for an inter-personal therapeutic relationship, thus doing away with the ‘bourgeois’ vestiges of traditional psychoanalytic therapies.

The popularization of these techniques was also illustrative of increasing concern about the effects of the ‘Scientific-Technological Revolution’ on the health of socialist nations, particularly with regard to the impact of automatization and new chemical and machine processes. Industrial progress was fundamental to Communism, yet there was increasing evidence to show that it had detrimental effects on mental and physical health. This could, in turn, affect marital and family matters, producing a counterproductive effect that threatened the national economy, and the ability for the socialist nations of the East to compete with Western Capitalism. Therapeutic training for the prevention and treatment of neurosis not only appeared to be a means to remedy the side effects of industrial modernization, but also offered a valuable propaganda narrative in which Communist states presented themselves as both scientifically and morally elevated above their neglectful Western counterparts in the battle of Cold War ideologies.

References

Marta García Quiñones
(Universitat de Barcelona – Spain)
martagq@gmail.com

This paper will offer an overview of the pioneering research of Swedish-born psychologist Carl Seashore (1866–1949), who in 1897, after completing his dissertation, went to direct the Laboratory of Psychology at the State University of Iowa, where he remained for half a century. At the University of Iowa Seashore succeeded in establishing an important research group where many young psychologists started their careers (Miles 1956). As it was normal during the first decades of the institutionalization of experimental psychology in the United States, Seashore’s group was involved in a variety of research subjects, among which the experimental study of aesthetics, and especially the psychology of music (Seashore 1938, 1947). In particular, Seashore was responsible for the development of a series of tests for measuring musical talent, called *Seashore’s Measures of Musical Talent*, which were subsequently adopted by many schools across the country.

Seashore’s tests consisted in a series of phonographs accompanied by written instructions, and aimed at evaluating children’s physiological and psychological ability for learning music by measuring specific auditory and musical skills, e.g. their ability to distinguish pitch, volume, rhythm, etc. (Seashore 1919, Cary 1922). The paper will address practical aspects about the way in
which Seashore’s group conducted research on musical talent at the psychological laboratory (e.g. which sounds and musical materials were used, which research subjects were tested, etc.), and about the way in which the tests were used at schools. While this testing effort must be located within the history of music aptitude testing (Humphreys 1998), it also belongs in history of the early educational and entertaining applications of the phonograph. Thus, the paper will also link to the history of the new audio technologies that were transforming and standardizing listening at the time (Hui 2012). The place of Seashore within the history of music psychology during the first half of the 20th century (Gjerdingen 2002) will be considered, underlining the originality of his ideas, his technological inventiveness, but also his awkward position among different approaches to the discipline. Central to Seashore’s endeavour is the notion of musical talent, which this paper will reassess, taking into account not only past and present criticisms of his understanding of it (Mursell 1934; Gordon 1998), but also the current debates about the place of the notion as such in music education (Hallam, Cross and Thaut 2009). Besides the many challenging questions that Seashore’s work raises about music education, for instance about the acquisition (or inheritance) of musical skills, or the relationship between receptive and expressive musical abilities, this paper intends to present it as a contribution to communication studies (Malin 2011) and as an episode of the relatively obscure history of experimental aesthetics.

References

Panel abstract
Greg Eghigian, Katariina Parhi & Elizabeth Lunbeck

Dating back to the works of George Rosen and Michel Foucault, historians of the human sciences have made the study of social deviance a centerpiece of their discipline. Madness, delinquency, criminality, and sexuality, for instance, have all come under historical scrutiny. In most cases, historians have tended to approach their subjects in one of two ways: either adopting a social historical approach examining how actors fell into their predicaments and with what consequences or considering the ways in which expert knowledge about actors constructed the latter as social deviants and with what social effects. Less studied, though not completely neglected, have been paranormal experiences. These too, as sociologist Erich Goode has argued, consistently have raised questions about social norms and the role of the human sciences in helping to forge and reinforce them.

On the whole, individuals and groups presenting abnormal or claiming paranormal experiences have sparked a range of responses from widespread anxiety to lurid interest, from social disdain to institutional intervention. Our panel wishes to initiate a broader discussion about the ways in which the normal, the abnormal and the paranormal have been historically conceptualized, experienced, personified, and managed by researchers and clinicians. Examining three borderline cases – the application of the diagnosis of psychopathy in Finland, the process by which UFOs and claimants of alien contact became objects for social and clinical scientific research, and the development of a personality inventory for narcissism – we will consider how the social, psychological, and clinical sciences in practice defined normality and deviations from normality. Taken together, the papers will demonstrate that scientific and clinical engagements with abnormality and paranormality have shared common frontiers within the history of the human sciences. In particular, they have

• prompted debates about the legitimacy of forms of knowledge-gathering and authority
• revealed the effects of the growing aspirational prominence of science, technology, and medicine
• exposed how authorities have gone about attempting to change attitudes through a range of techniques (intimidation, discipline, treatment, enhancement, exclusion, derision), while also laying bare the limits of those interventions
• and shown how the pathologization of abnormality has been effectively leveraged to manage troublesome personal behavior and experiences.
Distorted Reflections: 
Psychopaths as Disfigured Images of Ourselves in Finland in the Twentieth Century
Katariina Parhi
(University of Oulu – Finland)
katariina.parhi@oulu.fi

For a long time, the diagnosis of psychopathy was applied to individuals whose condition needed to be medically described, but who were not mentally ill. Ever since Finnish physicians adopted the diagnosis of psychopathy in the early twentieth century, those receiving the diagnosis became the demarcators of normality. Being a psychopath meant not being normal. Normality was a negation: being normal meant lacking, not being something that the psychopaths appeared to be.

This paper delves into the social surroundings of individuals who were sent to mental hospitals in different parts of Finland, and then diagnosed with psychopathy. I will ask, who were the people who could no longer put up with these individuals? What drove them to action – prevailing values, a shared miserable life, or perhaps some dramatic event? Abnormality, which often led to the diagnosis of psychopathy, was mostly defined by others. Without interaction, psychopathy did not exist. The diagnosis was society's way of saying it had had enough. This closer look at the hospitalization processes in different Finnish mental hospitals is an empirical commentary on what normality was not, and why abnormality needed to be medically described. The analysis is based on anamneses and letters that describe the social surroundings, and the data is collected from various Finnish mental hospitals. The focus is on descriptions of interaction that took place before psychopath patients entered the hospital.

Today, the outlines of personality disorders are in many ways sketched by the surroundings of individuals diagnosed with them – just like their conceptual predecessor psychopathy was in the past. Genetics, neuroscience and environmental factors explain many aspects of personality disorders, but they do not comprehensively clarify why we think there is a need for such diagnoses. The ability to diagnose does not alone justify diagnosing. The reasons for naming, labeling and, in practice, often also condemning, need to be critically evaluated. A historical perspective offers important insights into this intricate issue of societal diagnoses such as personality disorders, which are problematic but considered necessary in a well functioning society.

From a Science of UFOs to a Science of UFO Believers 
Greg Eghigian
(Penn State University – USA)
gae2@psu.edu

The so-called “flying saucer era” is generally credited with beginning in 1946/1947 with reports from Sweden and the United States of odd, disk- and rocket-like objects flying overhead. Over the ensuing seven decades, claims of unidentified flying objects (UFOs) from space, encounters with aliens, and “ancient astronauts” inspired amateur research (ufology) and extraterrestrial contact support networks, government investigations, bestselling books, news coverage, television shows, and films. But until the late-1960s, academic scientists largely turned
their backs on the phenomenon, with most categorically dismissing ufology, “pseudoarcheology,” and claims of alien contact as wrong-headed, irrational, and dangerous. Natural scientists in particular appeared to be content leaving discussion about the matter to others, consistently marginalizing talk of visitors from other planets as a subject unworthy of serious professional consideration. After a scientific commission in the U.S. finally was convened in 1966 to study UFOs, its final report concluded that “nothing has come from the study of UFOs in the past 21 years that has added to scientific knowledge.” But it added that “rigorous study of the beliefs – unsupported by valid evidence – held by individuals and even by some groups might prove of scientific value to the social and behavioral sciences.”

And this is just what happened. From this point on, the natural sciences mostly divested themselves of any serious study of unidentified flying objects and claims of alien visitation. At the same time, sociologists, psychologists, clinical psychologists, psychiatrists, psychotherapists, cultural studies scholars, and specialists in communications began taking up the subject for the first time. Flying saucers and extraterrestrials became the province of the human sciences.

This paper examines how the human sciences became interested in the UFO and alien contact phenomenon, and how researchers went about studying them. For the most part, research clustered around six lines of investigation: sociological surveys about the backgrounds and attitudes of believers; psychometric personality assessments of believers and professed contactees; experimental psychological studies of the odd sensations, perceptions, and recollections associated with witnessing UFOs and contact with aliens; ethnographies of UFO and abductee groups, with a focus on UFO religions; studies by social scientists and folklorists concerned with how UFO and alien contact reports get communicated; and narrative analyses conducted by cultural studies scholars of popular stories about UFO and alien encounters, often focusing on folk conspiracy theories. The evidence shows that while researchers largely did not question the sincerity of most UFO and alien contact witnesses and enthusiasts, the former expressed little confidence in the authenticity of the latter’s claims, a skepticism rooted in the basic practices of the human sciences. Ufologists and contactees, thus, often greeted researchers from the human sciences with considerable dubiety and moral outrage.

**Producing Abnormal Personalities: The Narcissistic Personality Inventory, the DSM, and the Triumph of Traits Over States**

Elizabeth Lunbeck  
(Harvard University – USA)  
lizlunbeck@gmail.com

The popular discussion of narcissism in the United States features the self-absorbed, self-centered, selfie-obsessed millennial, a member of what many argue is the “most narcissistic generation in history”—a charge that appears in countless news articles and blogs and on any number of websites. How did this questionable claim attain the status of undisputed truth? This paper examines the process by which it was produced, looking in particular at the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI), a 40-question forced-choice test, developed by psychologists in the late 1970s, that is widely available on the internet.

The NPI features centrally in the “vast theater of persuasion” that undergirds claims about the deficiencies of the young. It is transparent; the questions are easily interpreted, and there is no
“lie” scale. It is ubiquitous and accessible; thousands have taken it, contributing to the smallish industry that manufactures truth and creates certainty. Its results have proven replicable, which is of no small importance in the midst of psychology’s replicability crisis. If “seeing is believing,” then the test and the apparatus that surrounds and sustains it are fulfilling their roles brilliantly: producing abnormality where there is arguably nothing of the sort.

The NPI was from the start premised on the assumption that there is a general construct called “narcissism,” yet the test’s—and psychology’s—narcissism 1) had little in common with psychiatrists’ clinical construals of the same category, and, more problematic, 2) was admittedly a syndrome constituted of diverse components. Once the test was shown to have internal construct validity, however, very few if any researchers investigated its relationship to the clinical entity it purportied to capture. Further, psychologists now largely agree that the test measures seven factors or dimensions of narcissism, with some arguing that several of them capture healthy and desirable, not abnormal and problematic, behaviors and dimensions of personality—hardly what one would want to mobilize in support of the “most narcissistic generation in history” charge. Despite all of these issues, the NPI continues to serve as the gold standard in public discussions of narcissism.

That psychologists think dimensionally, in terms of traits, and psychiatrists think categorically, in terms of entities, further complicates the picture. DSM-III introduced trait-based conceptualizations of the personality disorders into psychiatrists’ classificatory schemes, with the result that some psychologists could claim to have prevailed in establishing standardized, reliable, and research-friendly categories, even if such referred only to “theoretical constructs” not the “tangible entities” with which psychiatrists preferred to deal. Psychologists’ ambition was to capture not mere mental disorder but everyone’s styles and levels of personality functioning. Thus, in a move similar to that signaled by the NPI, they could be confident that even absent a “disorder,” a person’s relevant traits would be captured by the DSM’s new Axis II criteria.

This particular project of making abnormality has been underway for the last 35 years or so. It is in part an unrecognized effect of trait-based thinking. DSM 5 was intended to finally secure the triumph of dimensional, trait-based conceptualizations of the personality disorders, to the extent that venerable categories—narcissism among them—were to be abandoned in favor of psychologists’ measures, but at the last moment a group of prominent psychiatrists successfully argued for the primacy of categorical thinking in the clinical encounter and the proposed scheme was abandoned (to be subjected to further study).

References
SESSION 5: IMPLICIT PSYCHOLOGIES: THE ROLE OF PSYCHOLOGY IN THE CONSTITUTION OF OTHER DISCIPLINES

Panel abstract
Matei Iagher, Rodrigo Vivas, Alex Woodcock & Sonu Shamdasani
s.shamdasani@ucl.ac.uk

There has been little work in the history of psychology regarding the role played by psychological concepts in the formation of other intellectual disciplines. Seeking to redress this lacuna, this panel aims to open up the discussion about the role of psychological ideas in the formation of the human sciences in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. We take as our starting point the observation that psychological perspectives have played a constitutive role in the establishment of disciplines such as Anthropology, Comparative Religion and International Relations.

Applying this contention to the realm of International Relations theory, Alex Woodcock will present a paper exploring how the work of EH Carr pragmatically combined a variety of contextually prevailing, though often contradictory, psychological notions into a treatise of his own: *The Twenty Years’ Crisis: 1919-1939*. Drawing on evolutionary theory, Crowd Psychology, Jamesian Pragmatism, Bergsonian Metaphysics, Freudian Psychoanalysis and Durkheimian Sociology, Carr produced what has become a milestone text within the disciplinary history of academic International Relations theory.

Matei Iagher’s paper will argue that psychological concepts played a constitutive, if usually overlooked role, in the formation of the science(s) of religion(s) in the late 19th century. The historiography of academic study of religion has, up until now, been quiet about the way in which psychological language was used by the main theorists of the science(s) of religion(s). The paper thus examines the uses of psychology in the work of three key 19th theorists of religion: the two founding fathers of Comparative Religion (Max Müller and C.P. Tiele) and the father of Anthropology (E.B. Tylor). It attempts to flesh out what sort of psychology was used by the advocates of the new discipline(s) and tries to establish the consequences that this use of psychology had for the future of Comparative Religion and allied disciplines in the 20th century.

Finally, Rodrigo Vivas-Pinto will explore the flagrant theoretical divergences between three paradigmatic nineteenth-century scholars associated with the comparative method: Max Müller (1823-1900), Edward B. Tylor (1832-1917), and Andrew Lang (1844-1912). Despite the fact that these three authors were self-proclaimed comparativists drawing from similar ethnological and mythological quarries, they reached utterly different anthropological conclusions regarding the psychic unity of humanity. Their debates, which are very well documented in their works and correspondence, established the chief coordinates for the use of the comparative method and its inherent complexities throughout the rest of the nineteenth century and even in the twentieth century.

Taken together, these papers demonstrate the manner in which implicit psychologies came to play critical constitutive roles in the formation of the human and social sciences and reflect on the broader historiographical consequences.
This paper examines the ways in which psychological concepts played a foundational role in the constitution of the science(s) of religion(s). Traditional narratives about the formation of the scientific study of religion (such as Eric Sharpe's classic *Comparative Religion*) usually highlight the role played by comparative linguistics and evolutionism in the formation of the new discipline, and entirely omit the role of psychology.

In contrast to such narratives, this paper argues that a detailed investigation of the works of figures like Friedrich Max Müller (1823-1900), E.B. Tylor (1832-1917), C.P. Tiele (1830-1902), Ernest Renan (1823-1892) or Albert Réville (1826-1906) shows that psychology was just as important as, for example, linguistics in a variety of turn of the century projects for a science of religion(s). In fact, one could even say that if there was a common denominator across the wide spectrum of projects for a science of religion(s), this denominator was psychology and not evolutionism or linguistics.

In order to make this argument, I will turn to an in-depth reading of several works by Max Müller, C.P. Tiele and E.B. Tylor. Widely acknowledged as one of the founders of Comparative Religion (a term which he shunned), Müller's fame today rests almost exclusively on his editorial work on the *Sacred Books of the East*, which is perhaps the largest editorial venture of its kind in the whole 19th century. In the 1870s, Müller coined the term 'Science of Religion' in a series of popular lectures published in 1879 as *Introduction to the Science of Religion*. In that volume he put forward his theory of religion as 'the perception of the Infinite in the finite' and also argued in favor of a psychological faculty of faith, which he had derived from his reading of post-Kantian German Idealists. Müller later refined his theory in his last major work, the four-tome Gifford lectures, given between 1888-1892 in Glasgow. In the first part of this paper I will track Müller's engagement with psychology, drawing out the implication that this engagement had for his conception of the new discipline.

A second part will deal with Edward Burnett Tylor's exposition of an anthropological science of religion, drawing on his widely read *Primitive Culture* (1879) as well as on his manuscript notes for *The Natural History of Religion*, a work which he never finished and which was based on his Gifford lectures, delivered in Aberdeen between 1889-1891. Much like Müller (though from a radically different position), Tylor believed that the interests of contemporary psychology converged with those of his own science. He thus celebrated the arrival of a soulless, scientific psychology, which, in his view, could aid anthropologists in eliminating animistic survivals from contemporary culture.

The third part will focus on the work of Cornelis Petrus Tiele, a scholar whose work was just as important as Müller's during the early formation of Comparative Religion. In particular, I will focus on Tiele's *Elements of the Science of Religion*, a work based on his own Gifford lectures, delivered in Edinburgh in 1896 and 1898. I will try to unpack Tiele's statement that the science of religion was a 'mental science' and to show in what way Tiele's work reframed Müller's comparative project by fusing it with a different (though equally sui-generis) psychology.
I will end by spelling out some of the consequences that this almost universal espousal of psychology among the founders of Comparative Religion has had for the scientific study of religion in the 20th century.

References
Müller, M. (1868). *Chips from a German Workshop* (vol. 2). London: Longmans, Green and Co..
Müller, F. M. (1902). *Theosophy or Psychological Religion: The Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Glasgow in 1892*. London: Longmans, Green, and Co..
Muller, F. M. (1907). *Natural Religion: The Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Glasgow in 1888*. London: Longmans, Green and Co..
Muller, F. M. (1917). *Theosophy or Psychological Religion: The Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Glasgow in 1892*. London: Longmans, Green, and Co..
Psychology in 20th Century International Relations Theory: EH Carr in the inter-war years

Alex Woodcock

(University College London – UK)
Alex.woodcock.14@ucl.ac.uk

This conference paper will present an intellectual case study connecting the parallel intellectual histories of Psychology and International Relations (IR) theory in the 20th century. IR as an academic field was formally institutionalised after World War II with direct linkages to the United States foreign policy establishment. The field’s mainstream focus was on the development of political theory that would be functional, applicable, and effective for policy actors dealing with the post-War international environment. A corollary of this ultimately practical focus, however, was that detailed exploration of the intellectual frameworks applied by many prominent figures was historically neglected. Specifically, psychological notions implicit to central IR models and debates were under-scrutinised. The historical result was that certain ideas and concepts, which were nuanced, developed, or even directly challenged by a variety of different psychological traditions, were uncritically subsumed into the theoretical understandings of IR scholarship. In effect, IR scholars built their intellectual castles on sandy psychological foundations.

This paper will focus specifically on one particular IR theorist who merits examination in this regard: Edward Hallett Carr. Carr’s 1939 treatise The Twenty Years Crisis: 1919 - 1939 is regularly referred to within IR disciplinary history as a cornerstone of the ‘classical realist’ tradition. It is also considered an intellectual forebear to the neo-realist and neo-liberal theories that dominated IR scholarship in the last quarter of the 20th century. Given that concepts and ideas derived from Carr’s work resonate throughout IR intellectual history, a detailed analysis of his treatise offers useful insight into significant psycho-theoretical currents shaping IR scholarship.

Rather than analysing The Twenty Years’ Crisis in isolation, this conference paper places it within the context of Carr’s preceding biographical work in the 1930s. Carr, a Russophile who considered himself to be primarily a historian, wrote four biographies on significant political and intellectual figures from the 19th century in the lead up to 1939. These were: Dostoevsky 1821-1881 (1931); The Romantic Exiles (1933 – focusing on the life of Russian public intellectual and political exile Alexander Herzen); Karl Marx – A Study in Fanaticism (1934); and Michael Bakunin (1937). Assessing The Twenty Years’ Crisis alongside Carr’s back catalogue from the 1930s offers a deeper insight into Carr’s conceptual framework.

The findings of this paper are significant in highlighting that various prevailing currents of late 19th and early 20th century psychological theory are at the core of Carr’s worldview. Carr’s intellectual formation vis-à-vis biographical history and political theory drew on multiple diverse but interconnected threads: evolutionary biology; crowd psychology; psychoanalytic theory and debate; Bergsonian philosophy; Jamesian pragmatism; and sociological theories of Émile Durkheim and Karl Mannheim. Carr applied the work of these theorists in a loose and flexible way to develop his own positions on the individual, international politics, and history itself.

The paper concludes with the suggestion that the work of EH Carr was fundamentally dependent on contemporarily widespread psychological concepts and categories, and thus best understood within its own historical context. IR scholars have largely neglected to discuss Carr in this regard. The paper also supports a wider contention on IR scholarship in general: that the
historical development of International Relations theory can only be properly understood, validated, or critiqued once its psychological foundations are unearthed.

References

Differing Anthropologies: the Debate between Diffusion and Psychic Unity in Max Müller,
Edward B. Tylor, and Andrew Lang
Rodrigo Vivas
(University College London – UK)
rodrigo.vivas.15@ucl.ac.uk

This paper will explore the flagrant theoretical divergences between three nineteenth-century scholars associated with the comparative method: the German-born philologist Max Müller (1823-1900), the English anthropologist Edward B. Tylor (1832-1917), and the Scottish homme de lettres and folklorist Andrew Lang (1844-1912). Although many authors from several disciplines embraced the comparative method, these three polymaths were crucial protagonists in the history of human sciences because they assumed utterly different postures regarding the existence of the so-called “psychic unity” of mankind. In fact, Müller’s, Tylor’s and Lang’s applications of the comparative method and its concomitant anthropological implications became paradigmatic. This paper will elucidate why the disagreements between these three authors
established the chief coordinates for the use of the comparative method and its inherent complexities throughout the rest of the nineteenth century and even in the twentieth century.

Behind the appearance of a unitary procedure, the nineteenth century hides a myriad of comparative methods. The authors of what George Stocking calls “the comparative method of [British] sociocultural evolutionism"¹ and the scholars of what Joan Leopold calls “the German historical school”² reached different and often conflicting theories despite the fact that all of them were self-proclaimed comparativists drawing from similar ethnological and mythological quarries. In fact, the term “comparative method” has been equivocal even for contemporary scholars. In order to clarify this confusion, Leopold has elaborated a most useful classification of its “three uses.” The first use, with a markedly synchronic streak, aims at comparing vast a spectrum of cultural phenomena in order to identify structural and functional correspondences, regardless of ancestral bonds. The second use, clearly diachronic, focuses exclusively on the comparison of inherited cultural traits within a determined culture (or cluster of cultures) in order to establish a historical genealogy. The third use, a combination of the previous two, seeks to inquire into the lives of foregone peoples and thus to reconstruct the stages of human development based on the ethnographical data collected from existing “primitive” societies.³

The first, second, and third use of the comparative method correspond, respectively, to Lang, Müller, and Tylor. My paper seeks to explain why these three different approaches critically determined their anthropological theories. Perhaps the most significant polemic between nineteenth-century comparativists was the debate between those who postulated a psychic unity of humanity and those who adhered to the diffusion hypothesis. On the one hand, Lang argued that the countless parallelisms between myths, legends and fairy tales in so many different cultures and epochs could not be the product of mere chance. Such correspondences, on the contrary, constituted an undeniable proof of underlying patterns working within the human mind. On the other hand, Müller claimed that the well-documented similarities between mythologies, religious beliefs and other narratives were nothing but inherited traditions. Myths, just like words, mutated with the passing of time – it was therefore the philologist’s task to identify such mutations and thus trace the primeval source. In anthropological terminology, Müller was a staunch “diffusionist.” Finally, unlike Lang and Müller, Tylor oscillated between both views. At times he seems to allude to some sort of psychic unity, yet other times he seems to explain cultural parallelisms as the result of both inheritance or transmission. Since Tylor did not regard these theories as mutually exclusive, his views can be placed in the conciliatory centre of the spectrum between Lang’s psychic unity and Müller’s diffusion.

¹ Stocking, George (1986) Victorian Anthropology, especially 167 and 169-70.
² Leopold, Joan (1980), Culture in Comparative and Evolutionary Perspective: E. B. Tylor and the Making of Primitive Culture, 10.
³ Leopold (1980), 58.

References
SESSION 6: JOHANNES LINSCHOTEN AND THE TRANSITION FROM
PHENOMENOLOGY IN THE NETHERLANDS AND BEYOND

Panel abstract
Jannes Eshuis, Henderikus J. Stam & René van Hezewijk

These three papers represent an ongoing research program on the brief but brilliant and controversial life of Johannes Linschoten whose career was cut short by his early death in 1964 at the age of 38. More than a biographical story however this is also an attempt to account for the foundations of, and the trans-Atlantic movement of, an important 20th century school of psychology. Linschoten’s final book, *Idols of the psychologist*, was ranked the most important book in Dutch psychology in a survey published in 1992. Yet his legacy remains ambivalent in part because of the uncertainty about his apparent transition from a phenomenological psychologist to an empirical-analytic psychologist. Despite this, Linschoten remained true to a number of features of his early phenomenological education. In this symposium we pick up three different aspects of the life and work of Linschoten. Van Hezewijk and Stam look at the interest of Linschoten in Juan Luis Vives (1492-1540) that came to light when an unpublished manuscript about the latter was discovered in the former’s papers. This paper will discuss Vives’s place in the history of ideas and indicate some reasons for Linschoten’s interest in what might otherwise be a largely forgotten Spanish philosopher who spent most of his life in the Low Countries. Jannes Eshuis will take up the core issue of Linschoten’s life and work, namely that of his transition from phenomenologist to what appeared to be a kind of positivist in his empirical-analytic psychology. This transition is not what it appeared to be and the important issues concern an expanding sense of what science is and can do in the work of Linschoten. Stam and van Hezewijk will look at the transitions of phenomenology in Linschoten’s latter years to the United States of America. Linschoten himself spent time at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh and subsequently hosted Amedeo Giorgi in the Netherlands. Along with a number of other important philosophers and psychologists, Linschoten was one of the important Dutch connections to American phenomenological psychology. We take up the question in this paper why American
phenomenological psychology has so little resemblance to that of the Utrecht school in the Netherlands. We discuss the end of the program in the Netherlands and the preoccupations with methodology in American psychology that would alter what counted as phenomenology after it crossed the Atlantic.

References

Johannes Linschoten and Juan Luis Vives
René van Hezewijk
(Open University – Netherlands)
renevanhezewijk@gmail.com
Henderikus J. Stam
(University of Calgary- Canada)
stam@ucalgary.ca

Why did Johannes Linschoten (1925-1964) refer to Juan Luis Vives (1492-1540) as an important precursor of dynamic and experimental psychology? The authors of this paper are (still) involved in writing the intellectual biography of Johannes Linschoten, and presented fragments of the biography in earlier ESHHS and ESHHS-CHEIRON (Van Hezewijk & Stam, 2006, 2007, 2008; van Hezewijk & Stam, 2010, 2011; Van Hezewijk, Stam, & Panhuysen, 2001, 2002).

In this paper we discuss Linschoten’s special interest in Juan Luis Vives’ contribution to dynamic and experimental psychology. We inferred his interest in Vives when studying the plans and (hand written and typed) fragments for manuscripts in progress, one of which was a history of psychology volume (Johannes Linschoten, nd). Vives has attracted little attention among historians of psychology although there are clearly indications that, as Linschoten found, he was one of the precursors of a psychology that was both experimental and practical in its orientation.

Vives is best known for his educational and political views. However, his theory of emotions and acts (Casini, 2002) may have seemed worthwhile, according to Linschoten. We are particularly interested in the interpretation of Carlos G. Noreña (Noreña, 1970) who discussed the humanistic and religious aspects of Vives’ work. Also the fact that Vives has been presented as a pedagogue might be interesting with respect to a possible debate between Linschoten and Langeveld, pedagogue in Utrecht. Moreover, Linschoten may have been inspired by the “significant [influence of Vives] to the history of European philosophy … upon the leaders of the Scottish School of Common Sense. In the first half of the nineteenth century Thomas Reid and Dugald-Stewart confessed their deep admiration for the Spanish thinker” (Noreña, 1970, p. 3). In his posthumous work Idolen van de psycholoog Linschoten demonstrated his interest in common sense as one of the sources of the idols that threaten a proper psychology (J. Linschoten, 1964).
References
Casini, L. (2002). Emotions in renaissance humanism: Juan Luis Vives’ De anima et vita Emotions and choice from Boethius to Descartes (pp. 205-228): Springer.

Linschoten’s alleged turn from phenomenology to positivism
Jannes Eshuis
(Open University – Netherlands)
jannes.eshuis@ou.nl

During the 1950’s and 1960’s the Netherlands knew an (in)famous school of phenomenological psychologists, from Utrecht University, sometimes called the Utrecht School, consisting of phenomenological thinkers such as Buytendijk, Rümke, Langeveld and van den Berg (Bos, 2011; Van Hezewijk & Stam, 2008). Among them was a young prodigy, Johannes Linschoten, who studied psychology between 1946 and 1949 at Utrecht University, and worked on his dissertation for Buytendijk until 1956. Shortly after obtaining his degree, he became full professor of general and theoretical psychology in 1957, and two years later he published his first major book after obtaining his professorship. The book was called: Towards a phenomenological psychology, the psychology of William James (Linschoten, 1959). This publication seemed to fit perfectly within the Utrecht school of phenomenology he was raised in, and now had become part of.

Only five years later, he sadly passed away, leaving behind a manuscript that was posthumously published as: The idols of the psychologist (Linschoten, 1964). That book is a
strong plea for an objective psychology, built on empirical-analytical methodology. This plea is often taken as a radical turn, away from his initial phenomenological stance and towards a rigorous positivism. However, our argument is that the fundamental positions in both publications might be less contradictory than they seem. The transformation could also be interpreted as a more gradual ‘scientification’ of his position, in which it is claimed that gathering knowledge always runs from unknowable brute facts, through personal experience to scientific convergence; meaning that the ‘explanation of’ is always anchored in – both facilitated and constrained by – the ‘experience of’. In that sense, his positivist attitude in the idols of the psychologist (Linschoten, 1964) could be interpreted as a necessary systematization, rather than a contradictory rejection of his phenomenology.

This idea of science always being a further ordering of personal experience, rather than an alternative (and supposedly better) road to the truth, can be traced back to authors such as Husserl (1936), James (1890) and Peirce (1877), that directly or indirectly were major sources of inspiration for Linschoten. By analyzing Linschoten’s reading of these authors we will try to determine whether or not this alternative interpretation of his move, from phenomenology towards a more positivist stance, is justified.

References

When Ideas Cross Borders: The Shapeshifting Nature of Phenomenological Psychology
Henderikus J. Stam
(University of Calgary – Canada)
stam@ucalgary.ca
René van Hezewijk
(Open University – Netherlands)
renewanhezewijk@gmail.com

The development of phenomenological psychology in the United States in the decades after WWII was by its very nature heavily dependent on philosophical foundations and European scholarship. Dutch scholars played a unique role in this transition. Joseph Kockelmans was among the first Dutch scholars to bring a phenomenological perspective to the US after completing post-doctoral studies with Herman Van Breda in Leuven. Stephan Strasser also exercised considerable influence over the new psychology and much of his work was translated into English. However, in psychology it was especially Adrian van Kaam (1920-2007) and Amedeo Giorgi who were instrumental in creating a space for a phenomenological psychology at
Duquesne University in Pittsburgh. Van Kaam was instrumental in bringing Giorgi to Duquesne University after the latter had completed his Ph.D. in psychophysics. One of the early influences on Giorgi was Johannes Linschoten who had by the late 1950s ascended to the chair of psychology in Utrecht left vacant by the retirement of Frederik Buytendijk (1887-1974). In this paper we explore the relationship between these Dutch scholars, particularly Linschoten, and the nascent phenomenological psychology emerging at Duquesne University in the 1960s. Although Giorgi would come to create what, in his view, was a unique method of doing phenomenological research in psychology, the foundations of this approach could be found in European work of the immediate post-war period. We explore these connections to demonstrate how the failure of European phenomenological psychology became entwined in newer versions of phenomenological psychology in North America.

References

INVITED TALK (1)

Body and soul in early Islamic science and medicine
Miquel Forcada
(Universitat de Barcelona – Spain)
mforcada@ub.edu

As is well known the acculturation of Greek science in Islamic civilization took a decisive step forward in Abbassid Baghdad during the late 8th century. Although the sciences entered Baghdad through many channels, the legacy of Greek medicine was mostly brought by Nestorian Physicians who came from the hospital of Ghondeshapur. Once established in the court, they became physicians to the caliphs and a lobby group that looked after the interests of the Nestorians. Although the real extent of political influence is yet to be determined, their authority in medical affairs was almost absolute. The Nestorian physicians, who were often prominent members of their church, held their profession in high esteem. They considered, exaggerating the idealized image of the physician created by Galen’s Quod optimus medicus sit quoque philosophus, that the physician was some kind of meta-scientist who could imitate the works of God. They claimed the primacy of the physician over the philosopher and the physician’s monopoly on the health of body and soul. And, at a time in which Islamic philosophy and theology were in their early stages, who could have contradicted them? These physician-
philosophers who were more physicians than philosophers - and their followers of whatever religion - were responsible for the translation of Galen and Aristotle into Arabic, and for the beginning of philosophical reflection in Arabic culture. In 9th century Baghdad, these translations interested not only specialist but also relevant sectors of the learned society. It is of no surprise therefore that the public appreciated what the physician-philosophers could say about the care of both body and soul; that musicotherapy became popular; that a “medicine of the soul” was developed in parallel with the medicine of the body; and that Galen’s ethics and psychology, in spite of the materialist bias of the latter, strongly influenced the thought of Muslim scholars. In this setting, the Muslim physicians were deeply interested in what they considered to be “diseases of soul”, like melancholy and homosexuality, and studied the Greek authors so as to write new monographs on these issues. Galen’s psychology was also synthesized and made available for the learned public. The undeniable interest in psychology that we find in 9th-10th century Baghdad was the result of many factors which remain largely unstudied at present and raise questions which deserve further exploration. One of the most intriguing points is why a religiously structured society looked for answers to the challenges posed by human mind and soul in Galen and the rational sciences. Baghdad’s cosmopolitanism is undoubtedly a good key for understanding the phenomenon, yet not the only one.

POSTER SESSION (1)

Exploring Early Psychological Tests:
Researching and preserving the Randolph College collection
Sarah L. Ballard-Abbott & Richard D. Barnes
(Randolph College – Virginia)
slbballard@randolphcollege.edu

Established in 1893, the Randolph-Macon Woman’s College (now Randolph College) psychology program has a notable position in the early history of psychology. The psychology laboratory at RMWC was one of the first 20 psychology labs in the United States, and the first psychology lab in the southern United States (Murray & Rowe, 1979; Rowe, 1992; Rowe & Murray, 1979). Celestia S. Parrish, one of the original faculty members at the College and founder of the psychology lab, was a student of Edward B. Titchener at Cornell University (Thomas, 2006). Ms. Parrish’s founding of the psychology lab established a tradition of empirical research in psychology at the College. In order to equip a demonstration laboratory, Ms. Parrish and other faculty members acquired a wide range of laboratory instruments for the study of human sensation and perception. Much of this equipment is still on display at the College and has been described in an earlier study (Rowe, Barnes, & LaFleur, 1995). In addition to the psychological instruments, the psychology department also has a large collection of psychological tests dating from the early 20th Century. The tests are examples of early psychological testing and some are controversial, reflecting the cultural and theoretical biases of the time. These tests have been in unprotected storage for decades and never have been fully researched and cataloged. This project investigated
the origin, authors, and use of each of the tests in the collection, preserved the collection by improving the physical storage conditions, and created an online catalog available to scholars of the history of psychology. Researching these tests provides a window into early attempts by psychologists to measure individual differences, including intelligence, personality, developmental abilities, and mental disorders.

The Disciplining of Psychology, 1890-1940
Christopher D. Green & Arlie Belliveau
(York University - Canada)
christo@yorku.ca

We present a triptych of images, each presenting a famous historical psychologist. Each image is composed of a “cloud” of words that appeared most frequently in one of that psychologist’s most significant works: William James (Principles of Psychology), Sigmund Freud (New Lectures on Psychoanalysis), and B. F. Skinner (Behavior of Organisms).

An aspect of each work is reflected in that image. In James’ time, “psychology” was undergoing so profound a revolution that nearly any topic could be called “psychology.” By Freud’s time, specialized disciplinary languages had started to be developed. Phenomena were to be described within the boundaries of a particular theoretical framework: the unconscious, anxiety, repression, id, ego, super-ego, etc. Finally, by Skinner’s era, the permissible vocabulary had become highly constrained: behavior, stimulus, response, reinforcement, etc. These themes of descriptive freedom and constraint are reflected in the three images we have created.

How To Convert Historical Text Into A Gantt Chart
Michael R.W. Dawson
(University of Alberta - Canada)
mdawson@ualberta.ca

History typically is concerned with text: historical narrative. However, such narratives must be founded upon data, and some important narratives only become apparent when their supporting data is rendered as an image. In this talk I demonstrate techniques for converting text into particularly useful historical images called Gantt charts (Gantt, 1961; Wilson, 2003).

Gantt charts make novel narratives evident when used to represent historical data (Dawson 2013). As well, these images easily permit additional spatial operations and analyses for refining historiographies. One can obtain a wealth of information from Gantt charts by using simple descriptive statistics, by examining chart substructure, and by employing image processing operations to transform chart shape.

To take advantage of what Gantt charts offer, historical texts must be converted into an appropriate format. This can be accomplished in a three-stage procedure that involves some widely available software tools: Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel, and the R statistical programming language. I will illustrate these tools, and these three processing stages, with two different large (text) datasets. The first is the Academic Calendar of the University of Alberta...
which lists the course offerings of the Department of Psychology for every year since the Department’s formation in 1909. The second is the typewritten minutes of Department Council meetings from 1969 until present day.

The first stage of converting texts into Gantt charts is to represent them digitally. Modern technology provides some surprisingly easy ways for doing this. For example, I have successfully used an inexpensive desktop scanner to scan hundreds of pages of Departmental minutes as PDF files. Text recognition software then converts these scans into Word documents with a surprising degree of accuracy. Although these documents need to be checked for scanning errors, the quality of the software makes this stage surprisingly straightforward. Other, more basic, techniques may also suffice. I simply typed the Academic Calendar data into a Word document – but over a century of course offerings were entered in a few short hours by taking advantage of year-to-year redundancies.

Once digitized, texts can be searched, transformed and reorganized. For example, the Academic Calendar data was first digitally represented as a set of tables (which included course name and year offered) that were simply pasted into Microsoft Excel. Once in Excel, basic spreadsheet operations permitted the tables to be sorted, evaluated and categorized. Then short programs written in Visual Basic For Applications (VBA) manipulated these tables to identify the years in which a particular course started and later ended (Bissett, 2007). These VBA routines permitted representing the data in a Gantt-like chart within the spreadsheet itself for basic statistical processing and image processing.

The VBA routines in Excel also formatted the original text data for input to the statistical programming language R (Kabacoff, 2015). The format was crafted to meet the specifications of a particular R package called ‘plan’ which renders Gantt charts with a few simple commands. The data provided to R allowed it to categorize entries; as a result R could generate Gantt charts for meaningful subsets of the original data.

The talk will end by illustrating some of the narratives that emerge from such charts, narratives that would be invisible if historiography was employed instead of historiophoty.


Panel abstract
Alexandra Rutherford, Wade Pickren, Tal Davidson, Katherine Hubbard, Ann Johnson, Elizabeth Johnston & Nora Ruck (with Lisa Marie Wanner and Vera Luckgei)

In 1987, Elizabeth Scarborough and her colleague Laurel Furumoto published their now-classic work Untold Lives: The First Generation of American Women Psychologists. This work broke new ground - not only in telling the lives of early women through careful archival investigation - but in richly contextualizing their experiences within the gendered strictures of early 20th century American science and society. This work, along with only a small number of other analyses of U.S. psychology and social science to that time (e.g., Rosenberg, 1982; Morawski, 1985; Shields, 1975; 1982), moved beyond the purely compensatory aims of
highlighting women worthies by introducing readers to the interpersonal familial, professional, scientific, and political difference being a woman made.

Almost 20 years later, in reflecting on the state of the field, Scarborough offered some observations and issued several challenges to historians of psychology (Scarborough, 2005). She pointed out the ongoing absence of full-length biographies of women psychologists. She had actually attempted such a project for Margaret Floy Washburn, but gradually discovered that the archival record was far too sparse to flesh out the life of this first female psychology PhD in the United States. She also highlighted the importance of telling the lives of those whose careers had been less exceptional. As she put it, “Only by learning about the less notable, those who dropped out and those who converted their professional tools to labor in non-psychology settings, will we gain an understanding of the range of experiences encountered by our earliest women” (Scarborough, 2005, p. 6). Finally, she also challenged historians to examine the history of women’s experiences in less descriptive and more analytical terms: “I submit that if we are to construct a fully-fledged women’s history of psychology, we need more than a record of women’s life experiences. We need now to determine women’s effect on the field. When and how did women’s changing status affect the social values and operations of psychology, the science as well as the professional discipline with its organizational and political components? Can we identify a distinct "women’s culture" within psychology, perhaps cutting across its sub-fields? If so, when and how did it emerge?...How is it that later women, unlike their predecessors, came to invest so heavily in women’s issues and changing women’s status? What difference have they made?...So, more than just a "for-the-record" reporting, we now need interpretation and analysis” (Scarborough, 2005, p. 6).

In this symposium, we honor Scarborough’s legacy by taking on some of these interpretive and analytic challenges. From examining the benevolent sexism of early male-female professional relationships in American psychology; to analyzing psychologists’ contributions to the gendered discourses around women and work in the 1950s; to focusing on gender and LSD in the therapeutic encounter; to excavating the queer networks of British female Rorschachers; to exploring Viennese consciousness-raising groups of 1970s and their relationship to psychology, each of these papers takes on some aspect of Scarborough’s challenge to women’s historians of psychology after Untold Lives. In her words, “We’ve come a long way, to be sure, but there are still more questions. There is much yet to explore, much to ponder, and much to understand” (Scarborough, 2005).

References
Now you see her, now you don’t: Bryan and Boring’s ambivalent feminism

Elizabeth Johnston
(Sarah Lawrence College – USA)
ebj@sarahlawrence.edu

Ann Johnson
(University of St. Thomas – USA)
a9johnson@stthomas.edu

During World War II a remarkable collaboration in American psychology arose as a result of some female-focused organizing. Alice Bryan, a Columbia-trained psychologist who had recently secured an assistant professorship in Columbia’s library school after a series of temporary teaching positions, “exploded” in a meeting of the Emergency Committee tasked with applying psychological expertise to the war effort. Bryan was the token woman on the committee who had won her place there as a result of organized protests on the part of excluded women psychologists, and her agitation was about the lack of women serving in executive positions in the APA. The rest of the committee – all male – concurred that the low numbers were simply in proportion to female membership; but, after his female secretary did the research to prove Bryan’s point, Edwin Boring, the influential chair of the psychology department at Harvard, suggested that they team up in order to empirically study the ‘woman problem.’ His hope was to combine her passion with his objectivity to produce a light-hearted commentary on the perplexing issue of women’s lack of eminence in the field. Their collaboration produced three papers, all with Bryan as first author (Bryan & Boring, 1944, 1946, 1947). The third paper summarizes the results of a survey they undertook to gather data on gender and employment patterns. The ambivalence and dissent in their collaboration is made clear in later single author publications (Boring, 1951, 1961; Bryan, 1983, 1986). In this paper we will add to other historians’ accounts (Capshew, 1989; Capshew & Laszlo, 1986; Rutherford, 2005, 2015) by revisiting their uneasy collaboration using archived correspondence and a re-analysis of their original questionnaire data. Our analysis will expand previous work through an increased focus on the question of life-work balance, or rather imbalance in the case of Boring with his impossible standard of the 168-hour work week. In addition, we will detail the workings of benevolent sexism (BS) in the letters between Bryan and Boring that ultimately supported ambivalence about both sexism and feminism in their collaboration (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 1997). Just as Boring’s (1930) famous wife-and-mother-in-law figure spontaneously reverses obliterating the other perspective, Boring and Bryan’s ambivalence about feminist activism gives their work a hide-and-seek quality.

References
“The mere fact that a lady picks up a slide rule does not mean she intends to put down her powder puff”: Psychology, policy, and Womanpower in 1950s America

Alexandra Rutherford
(York University – Canada)
alexr@yorku.ca

In the two decades following WWII, a national-level debate on the nature and role of higher education for women, as well as the place of women in the workforce, erupted in the United States as thoughts were turned to economic recovery and Cold War competition with the Soviet Union. While there was no shortage of gender conservatives who reinforced the need for women’s “return to domesticity” - many of whom were psychological experts (e.g., Lundberg & Farnham, 1947; Strecker, 1946) - careful work by historians has uncovered the significant complexity of this era: Women’s so-called retreat to the home was highly selective and partial, and women were actually entering the workforce in unprecedented numbers. As for feminism, women’s historians have until recently tended to divide their attention between the pre-WWII and post 1960s-era, writing off the trough between the waves as a low point for feminist activism (for exceptions, see Harrison, 1988; Rupp & Taylor, 1987). However, as Meyerowitz (1994) and others have shown, this bifurcation has reinforced a monolithic version of feminism that effaces significant strains of feminist struggle such as the fight for working women’s rights (Cobble, 2004), the making of “red feminism” (Weigand, 2002), and the significant multiracial feminist activism of this period (Hewitt, 2010).

In this context, I uncover and analyze the roles of psychologists in the activities of the American Council on Education’s Commission on the Education of Women (1953-1962), and in the National Manpower Council’s Womanpower conferences held throughout the 1950s to examine issues in women’s education and employment (see Eisenmann, 2006; Hartmann, 1994). The expertise of psychologists was called on repeatedly in both of these venues, and some of these psychologists (e.g., Eleanor Maccoby and Elizabeth Douvan) subsequently played central roles in the emergence of feminist psychology in the 1970s. Others (e.g., Marie Jahoda, Mary Cover
Jones) are better known as exemplars of “second generation” women (Johnston & Johnston, 2008), and did not participate actively in the feminist activism of the 1970s. In presenting their psychological research on sex differences, sex roles, and the impact of working mothers on child development to the commissions, some of these psychologists, I will argue, advanced a proto-feminist agenda despite the era’s stated allegiance to traditional gender ideologies. Uncovering their roles in this period before the official “birth” of feminist psychology creates a more continuous historical narrative than has typically been assumed. It illuminates the largely untold relationships among feminism, psychology, and policy at a time when slide rules emerged alongside powder puffs as symbols of America’s womanpower.

References

Twice a pioneer:
The therapeutic methods of Betty Grover Eisner pre- and post- LSD prohibition
Tal Davidson
(York University – Canada)
tald12@yorku.ca

Betty is a strange name for a founding father. But in 1960, the California State Psychological Association finally conceded that Betty Grover Eisner indeed counted among the “founding fathers” of psycholytic therapy, a form of psychodynamic therapy that relied on substances such as LSD to reduce clients’ defense mechanisms during sessions. Although she
received her clinical psychology PhD for infertility research, Eisner began conducting research and therapy with LSD after her own experience as a participant in Sidney Cohen’s earliest Stanford LSD trials. In 1957, she joined Cohen as a research assistant, and the two examined the therapeutic value of LSD in participants who ranged from mentally healthy to individuals burdened with various psychiatric diagnoses. While in the early 1960s Cohen rose to prominence as a public expert on LSD, Eisner focused on private practice. She continued to administer LSD in therapy and address its uses at conferences until 1966, when the Swiss pharmaceutical company Sandoz ceased distributing LSD to the USA and political resistance to her work became prohibitive. However, despite the prohibition of her primary therapeutic tool, Eisner found new ways to induce psycholytic states in her patients by devising methods that involved substances such as ketamine and carbogen (a mixture of 70% oxygen and 30% carbon dioxide).

In her memoir, Eisner claims to have applied these methods to successful ends, but she did not publish her work via typical scholarly avenues. My project entails researching her therapy session audio recordings, archived at Stanford University, to render the details of her sessions both before and after the prohibition of LSD. Situating Eisner’s life and activities in the historiography of psychedelic science will be useful for illustrating how psychedelic therapists adapted their methods in creative and provocative ways as sociopolitical antagonism mounted against their careers and identities (Dyck, 2012; Langlitz, 2012; Sessa, 2012). In the spirit of “untold lives,” it will also shed light on a female pioneer in a history dominated by near-mythic male figures, such as Timothy Leary, Ram Dass, Aldous Huxley and James Fadiman.

References

Masks, red lipstick and rabbits:
A queer feminist history of the projective test movement in Britain
Katherine Hubbard
(University of Surrey – England)
k.a.hubbard@surrey.ac.uk

It is possible to ‘see’ lots of different things when looking at a Rorschach ink blot, for example: masks, red lipstick, or a rabbit. This is also true for projective test movements, in which the Rorschach was central. These movements might not only ‘look’ different to what was expected but they also ‘look’ different in separate national contexts. In this paper I explore the queer and feminist history of the projective test movement in Britain. By comparing and contrasting the
work of Evelyn Hooker in the US and June Hopkins in Britain I explore the queer affirmative consequences of Rorschach research in the 1960s and 1970s. I then extend this queer perspective to some of the other women involved in the British projective testing movement, namely, Margaret Lowenfeld, Ann Kaldegg and Effie Lillian Hutton. In exploring their lives, research and wider social context I not only place, or ‘re-place’, these women into the history of Psychology, but I illustrate how interactional these components are. In particular I pay close attention to the working of the Minorities Research Group and their related magazine Arena Three and how their activities link to Hopkins and queer projective research. By the end of this paper, it is hoped that when looking at an ink blot it may be possible to not only ‘see’ masks, red lipstick or a rabbit (which are all responses from queer people being tested with the Rorschach), but also be reminded of the queer feminist women involved in the British projective test movement.

References

Feminist psychology in the German speaking countries
Nora Ruck
(Sigmund Freud Private University - Austria)
nora.ruck@sfu.ac.at
Lisa Maria Wanner
(Sigmund Freud Private University – Austria)
lisamaria.wanner@gmail.com
Vera Luckgei
(University of Vienna – Austria)
vera_lu@web.de

Especially during the last decade, historians of psychology have not only studied the history of women in psychology but also the development of the psychology of women and of feminist psychology. However, when taking international developments in the history of psychology into account it becomes clear that the histories and themes as well as the academic institutionalization of feminist psychology varies considerably across regional and national contexts: While the U.S., Canada, and the U.K. provide of a rather strongly anchored institutionalization of Feminist Psychology in the academia, feminist psychologists in many other countries report considerable resistance and have hardly gained foot within the discipline. For this reason, Rutherford, Capdevila, Undurti, and Palmari have asked why in some nations feminism has built alliances with social science knowledge but not necessarily with psychology.

In our paper we aim to contribute to existing research on the international history of feminist psychology by providing an account of feminist psychology in the German speaking countries with a special focus on Austria. Given that the German speaking countries look back on a rather long and pronounced history both of institutionalized psychology and of various waves of the women’s movement, it is perhaps surprising that this context has not given way to Feminist
Psychology as institutionalized presence in the academia; indeed, while women’s studies and gender studies are strongly anchored within most disciplines in German speaking academia, research that may be labelled feminist psychology (e.g., by Frigga Haug, Gudrun Axeli Knapp, and Regina Becker-Schmidt) has mostly been developed within sociology.

It is our assumption, however, that feminist psychological knowledge production has flourished in the German speaking countries especially since the late 1970s but that for various reasons it has not gained foot in the academia. Employing the distinction of “Big P” and “small p” psychology, we will look at some examples of psychological knowledge both used and produced in feminist activism (e.g., AUF Aktion Unabhängiger Frauen), in autonomous feminist and queer-feminist counseling and information centers (e.g., Frauen beraten Frauen, Peregrina, Türkis Rosa Lila Villa), and in so-called “Volkshochschulen” (e.g. consciousness-raising groups established by Dr. Inge Grosse-Wilder) in Vienna from the late 1970s until the late 1990s. We will also examine the rather brief but strong presence of feminist psychology at the Department of Psychology at the University of Vienna in the late 1980s that culminated in a Guest Professorship by feminist therapist Sabine Scheffler from 1991 to 1995 and dwindled remarkably from then on. In our analysis we will focus on the institutional and social context of these feminist psychologies in order to get a sense of the conditions that have facilitated or hindered the institutionalization of feminist psychology in the German speaking countries.

With an analysis that aims at uncovering conditions of (im)possibility for feminist psychology, we aim to contribute to a deepened understanding of the social, institutional, and cultural conditions that may either facilitate or hinder the development of both feminist psychology and Feminist Psychology in different local and national contexts.

References
Archives:
Stichwort – Archiv der Frauen- und Lesbenbewegung, Vienna.
Archives of the University of Vienna.
Between October 1919 and February 1920, Christiaan Frederik Engelhard set out to measure the minds of both rural and urban Javanese. A Dutch psychiatrist, Engelhard received his training at Utrecht University and obtained a position at the university’s neurological and psychiatric clinic upon graduation. This clinic was directed by the famous German psychiatrist Karl Heilbronner, a pioneer in psychological testing. After Engelhard and his family moved to the Netherlands East Indies in 1916, the young psychiatrist used his clinical experience to subject the Javanese to mental tests. According to Engelhard, the necessity of “ethno-psychological” research—i.e., the psychological examination of peoples of different cultural backgrounds—was beyond question. ‘In general,’ he claimed in his dissertation, ‘very little is known about the cultural conditions of primitive people, and the little that is known requires supplementation and improvement’. He was particularly interested in what constituted normality, since his work in the colonial asylum required him to identity and care for the insane. Engelhard revealed his findings in two publications. In his 1923 dissertation, he discussed his research by means of pictures. By documenting the natives’ responses towards series of images, Engelhard aimed to define the line between normal and pathological reactions. Two years later, he presented his findings on the Javanese understanding of time. Again, by mapping how Javanese people located themselves in time, Engelhard endeavored to distinguish between normal and pathological psychology.

Psychometry in a new cultural setting required innovation and appropriation. By copying images from picture books, novels, and magazines, Engelhard endeavored to calibrate his tests to the world of the Javanese. Producing test devices, however, was not the only challenge Engelhard had to face. He required subjects. After all, without human subjects there was not much to test. Engelhard therefore had to leave the Surakarta asylum and move into the surrounding fields and villages. He was quick to learn that research outside the mental hospital was different from diagnostic practices within the asylum’s walls. Engelhard required the assistance of local chiefs to find a quiet place to conduct his tests and, above all, to find enough cooperative Javanese. Yet, despite his attempts to transform Javanese farmers and villagers into human subjects capable of taking psychological tests, the Javanese remained free to make—or fail to make—meaning out of Engelhard’s images. In the end, Engelhard did not succeed in stabilizing diagnostic standards. He was unpleasantly surprised by his initial results and concluded that they reflected, more than anything else, the natives’ inability to reason critically. However, by 1925 Engelhard’s attitude towards the mental capacities of the indigenous population had become more nuanced, urging researchers to think twice before drawing conclusion about someone’s mental abilities from the factual knowledge that he or she presented. By paying close attention to Engelhard’s feelings in the field and the criticism that his dissertation received upon publication, I aim to provide insights into what may have caused this shift between 1923 and 1925.
In July 1884, while returning to Europe on the Cunard steamship Gallia after a brief visit to his home in the U.S., James McKeen Cattell – then a student of Wilhelm Wundt’s at the University of Leipzig – met John Shaw Billings, the distinguished American physician and surgeon then serving as Deputy U.S. Surgeon General. During the voyage, Billings (in Cattell’s words) “offered to do several things which would be of great service to me.” One of these “great services” was, apparently, to introduce Cattell (probably by letter) to Billings’ professional friend, Englishman Francis Galton. Chances are that Cattell first met Galton -- whom he later called “the greatest man I have ever known” – later that summer at the International Health Exhibition at London’s South Kensington Museum. Historians have long known of the overwhelming extent of Galton’s influence on Cattell as he developed over the following decades an impactful program of mental measurement. Less known, perhaps, is just how Cattell adopted (and adapted) Galton’s program of eugenics and – unlike most of his contemporaries in the U.S. -- both implemented and promoted a “positive” version of this program.

Eugenics of course calls for the conscious attempt to “improve” the world’s (or a country’s) population through what is essentially selective breeding. Early in the 20th century many U.S. states thus adopted -- after campaigns led by prominent scientists – laws calling for the eugenic sterilization of those deemed “degenerate,” or “less fit” to reproduce. More broadly, by the mid 1920s, the nation itself began implementing immigration restriction legislation, explicitly designed to reduce the flow of migrants to the U.S. from eastern and southern Europe, who (the eugenicists argued) were less desirable than those from the continent’s north and west. What has been called the “eugenics industry” within history of science has devoted much attention to these programs over at least the past half century.

Cattell, however, resonated much more deeply with the positive aspects of Galton’s program, which sought to promote the reproduction of the more “fit” segments of humanity. Indeed, his commitment to this understanding of eugenics had an immediate and direct impact on the most personal aspects of his life. He and his wife thus never used birth control and together they had seven children between 1890 and 1904. Later, in his well-known campaign against U.S. conscription during World War I, he argued (with his then-unmarried 26- and 20-year-old sons in mind) that the draft, as it was implemented, prevented the most fit young men -- with “the best of life . . . before them – love, children, performance, experience” – from reproducing.

Less personally, Cattell’s positive eugenics views led him to study and bemoan the “Declining Birthrate” in families of college graduates, though he never went so far as to call this phenomenon (as others did) “Race Suicide.” More specifically, he attacked – on at least two eugenics grounds -- state laws that prohibited married women from teaching in public schools. These, he argued, both prevented some of the “fittest” women from reproducing and, moreover, set before impressionistic children as a model to emulate unmarried and thus “barren” teachers.

Cattell also attacked “negative” eugenics programs and the claims on which they rested. Most notably, in 1913, he vehemently denounced the analyses and assumptions that informed Henry H. Goddard's well-known book, The Kallikak Family. At the same time, even as he
explicitly recognized the importance of heredity in determining the “fitness” of individuals, he also vigorously supported – with implications for his eugenical views -- a more “environmental” understanding of their abilities. For example, in analyzing data collected for the 2nd edition of his *American Men of Science* directories, he wrote that "the mulattoes are by their physical heredity midway between the whites and the negroes, with parentage probably superior to the average in both races. But their social position is that of the negroes, and their performance corresponds with their environment rather than their heredity. There is not a single mulatto who has done creditable scientific work." Even more significantly, in response to resulting criticisms from eminent Black sociologist W.E.B. DuBois, Cattell reasserted his emphasis on environmental factors, and concluded that "we may hope in the future the contributions of the colored races to science will be not only creditable, but distinguished."

The proposed presentation will address more deeply these and additional aspects (and provide further illustrations) of Cattell’s commitment to positive eugenics and will trace some of the roots of this commitment to his boyhood experiences. It builds upon the author’s almost-50-year study of all phases of Cattell’s life and career.

*This research was supported by the Spanish Ministry (MINECO; project HAR2014-58699-P)*

**References**


---

**Networks amongst the contributors to Cattell and Bryant’s 1889 study of word association***

Elizabeth R. Valentine  
(University of London and University College London - England)  
e.valentine@rhul.ac.uk  
Michael M. Sokal  
(Worcester Polytechnic Institute - USA)  
msokal@wpi.edu

This paper is an integral part of Sokal’s project to construct a social history of the study of word association conducted by James McKeen Cattell and Sophie Bryant and published in *Mind* 1889. Mülberger (personal communication) has suggested that this was the first large-scale transnational experimental study of a psychological phenomenon.

Although the named authors are Cattell and Bryant, a number of others actively participated. Cattell and Bryant served as both experimenters and subjects, contributing commentaries to the published article. Other notable subjects whose comments are also included are George Frederick Stout, Francis Ysidor Edgeworth, Elizabeth P. Hughes and Clara E. Collet.
Dr Georg Oskar Berger, Miss Dudley and Josephine Conan served essentially as research assistants, though Berger was also a subject.

Three sets of studies are reported in the paper: (1) In 1885 Cattell carried out studies in Leipzig, Germany with the help of Berger. (2) From 1885 to 1888 Cattell and Bryant carried out studies in England, in which Stout, Edgeworth, Hughes and Collet participated. Miss Dudley collected data from undergraduates at Bryn Mawr in the USA and Berger collected data from pupils at a German school. (3) In 1887-88, data was collected mostly by Bryant from pupils at the North London Collegiate School in England, and Josephine Conan collected data from pupils at Alexandra Girls’ School in Dublin and from undergraduates at the Royal University of Ireland.

The aims of this paper are (1) to provide brief biographies of Bryant and the four notable participants: Stout, Edgeworth, Hughes and Collet; and (2) to explore ways in which the two authors recruited these collaborators. One of the ways in which this will be done is to investigate common groups and networks to which subgroups of these people belonged. They range from professional societies such as the Ethical Society, and intellectual clubs such as the Moral Sciences Club in Cambridge, to informal groups such as the Mixed Tramps, and social gatherings of various kinds in private homes.

There were two main arenas of activity. Cattell, Stout and Hughes were based in Cambridge; Bryant, Collet and Edgeworth in London. Cattell was appointed a Fellow-Commoner at St John’s College Cambridge in 1886, where Stout was a graduate and Fellow of the College. Hughes was the first principal of the Cambridge Training College (CTC) established in 1885. Bryant was a teacher at the North London Collegiate School (NLCS). Collet, a former pupil at the school, had just abandoned a career in teaching and was studying political economics for a master’s degree and subsequently mathematics at University College London, but was also a visiting teacher at NLCS. Edgeworth moved from the margins of academic life to a Professorship in Political Economy at King’s College, London in 1888; and shared interests in economics with Collet. However, it is clear that there were close connections between London and Cambridge. For example, a number of NLCS pupils went on to study at Girton College, Cambridge. Moreover, Bryant was closely involved in the setting up of the CTC and once it was established, travelled up weekly from London to Cambridge to give lectures to the students there.

An incidental and serendipitous discovery arising from this research was the revelation of the identity of the person whom James Sully refers to in his biography as “my bachelor chum”. Five pieces of evidence make this conclusion convincing: the proximity of his abode to Sully’s, their relative ages, the chum’s Irish descent, discipleship of Stanley Jevons and love of cold-water swimming.

*This research was supported by the Spanish Ministry (MINECO; project HAR2014-58699-P)

References
VV.AA. Our Magazine. North London Collegiate School Archives.
The Limitations of Psychological Expertise: Legal Challenges to Intelligence Testing in Massachusetts Civil Service Office Selection, 1967-1973
Kimberly Probolus
(The George Washington University – USA)
kprobolus@gmail.com

On December 21, 1970, Tom Mela wrote to psychology professor David McClelland to seek assistance in proving that the Boston Police Department's written hiring examinations discriminated against Blacks and Latinos. Mela, a recent Harvard Law School graduate working at the Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, knew that McClelland was an obvious choice to serve as an expert consultant in his case against the Department. McClelland’s previous work at Harvard University focused on developing tests to measure and predict motivation, one of the most important qualities previous studies of police officer effectiveness measured when evaluating their force. In Mela’s letter to McClelland, he mentioned the problems the police force faced both in terms of recruiting and testing minority applicants: out of the 3,000 men who took the exam, seventy-eight were Black and only ten were Puerto Rican. The number of Blacks and Puerto Ricans who passed the exam was even starker: out of the 3,000 people who sat the exam, only seventeen Blacks and one Puerto Rican passed.

Civil rights advocates attempted to challenge racial discrimination by showing the biases of intelligence testing. However, I argue that the narrow focus on intelligence tests prevented other methods of challenging the larger problem of systemic racism in Boston. In Castro v. Beecher, the 1971 case that Mela and the Massachusetts Law Reform Institute brought against the Massachusetts Police Department, the judge ruled in favor of the plaintiff on the discriminatory nature of these intelligence tests; however, his interpretation of intent effectively protected all of the defendants in the case from being found personally responsible for racial discrimination. Instead, the judge proposed creating a new, unbiased test. His decision conveys his belief that science could produce an unbiased exam that actually measured the skills necessary to be a police officer. Ultimately, creating a new test did not end racial discrimination in Boston, despite the promise by McClelland, Mela, and others that it would. My reading of McClelland’s unpublished papers will reveal how he promoted the use of empirical validity and criterion sampling in the creation of a new exam, and how the police department’s implementation of a new exam failed to bring about the radical social justice reform he had hoped for.

While other historians of science have written about the limitations of intelligence testing, usefully demonstrating the way that measures of intelligences were used to legitimate inequality in American society, I contribute to the existing literature by arguing that this case demonstrates how challenging intelligence testing led to subtler and more insidious forms of racial discrimination. In doing so, I bring together diverse fields such as history of psychology, critical race theory, and legal history. By comparing Castro to the Supreme Court case Washington v. Davis, a 1976 case about police officer recruitment and selection in Washington, D.C., I reveal how limited the Castro decision was in challenging racial discrimination. While the facts of both cases are fairly similar—Washington v. Davis also found a much higher percentage of whites than Blacks passed a written exam—the cases understood the cause of discrimination and intent very differently: Washington v. Davis found that discriminatory impact, not intent, revealed the inadequacies of
intelligence testing. Ultimately I reveal the promise psychological experts like McClelland posed for ending racial discrimination, and the limitations of their tools, tests, and trials for doing so.

References

Anxiety, Efficiency and Will. Psychological Testing in WWI
Andrea G. v. Hohenthal
(Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg – Germany)
andrea.von.hohenthal@gmx.de

WWI was described not only as the first industrial war but also as a war of files and numbers. In an unpredicted scale, human beings, animals, weapons and machineries were involved in the preparation of the war and everyone and everything had to fit in and help to win the war.

Psychologists, being the experts of the mind and also competent statisticians found themselves involved in the work of the war pretty quickly. At the beginning of the war, German psychologists from the Institute of Applied Psychology in Potsdam developed a questionnaire to describe and explain the feelings and the behaviour of soldiers at the front. Paul Plaut, a young Jewish officer took this questionnaire to the front, but due to military censorship, was only able to publish his results after the war. The attempt to measure the feelings and coping strategies of soldiers was soon abandoned and stopped after the disastrous battles Verdun and the Somme in 1916. From then on psychological tests were used to find experts for expensive weapons and effective workers in the war industry. Psychological tests were used in Great Britain and Germany in different areas and in different ways during the war. In psychiatric diagnosis German military Psychiatrists used parts of psychological tests to measure the intellectual capacity of injured soldier but also developed new methods to measure the will to recover of the patient. The main goal was to deliver as much capable workers to the war industry as possible. Beside gathering numeric numbers there was always the tendency to describe the patient’s behaviour and the impression of the whole personality. British psychiatrists did not use standardized psychological questionnaires but questioned the patients following the ideas of psychoanalysis. New important issues had to be addressed in both countries: What was normal in war time and could everybody
be measured equally? British psychologists working in the war industry applied paper and pencil
tests and tried to find the best way to improve the performance of the munition workers. In
Germany in psycho-technical examinations for soldiers or civil workers as tram drivers or
telephonists, big machines were used to simulate the real work situation but also to measure an
underlying capability to work efficiently and attentively.

In the second half of the war new expensive weapons such as aeroplanes, demanded a
careful selection of competent experts to handle and fly the planes. German psychologists
developed standardized procedures to find the best candidates. Just like in the war industry they
tried to simulate the real (here: war-) situation and measured the adequate reaction to a number of
electronic stimuli. The test situation was quite similar to the psychological work in laboratories.
British psychologists tried to find the best pilots by testing e.g. the sense of balance of the
candidates.

I would like to discuss and explain in my paper the different ways in which psychological
constructs such as intelligence, work capacity and personality were developed and psychological
tests and questionnaires were used in Great Britain and Germany during the Great War. The
different way in which psychologists were involved in the war work, the different organization,
demands and tradition of the Armies could explain the further development of psychological
concepts and methods in Great Britain, Germany and their allies.

References
In O. Lipmann & W. Stern, Schriften zur Psychologie der Berufseignung und des Wirtschaftslebens Heft. Leipzig.
and personal reflections (pp. 133-149). Leicester.
Head, H. (1918). The Sense of Stability and Balance in the Air. In, Reports of the Air Medical Investigation
Committee. London.
Methodenauffassung in der Militärpsychologie des Deutschen Reiches, Großbritanniens und der USA 1914 bis
1945. Goningen.
Psychologie Heft (pp. 1-123). Leipzig.

SESSION 9: DEAD AND ALIVE: EXOTIC ANIMALS IN THE URBAN SPACE AROUND 1900

Panel abstract
Oliver Hochadel, Peter Yeandle, Agustí Nieto-Galan, Laura Valls & Miquel Carandell

In the standard account of urban history animals tend to disappear from the city due to the
processes of industrialization and mechanization. Livestock moves to the countryside or is made
“invisible” by concentrating the meat production in off-limits slaughterhouses in the outskirts
(already critical: Kos/Öhlinger 2005; Atkins 2012). A crucial exception or one may even say a countermovement is the emergence of the zoological garden as a major cultural institution in the course of the nineteenth century. The zoo is an urban space that has received increased intention over the past two decades or so, highlighting its importance in negotiating the boundaries between the cultural and the natural, the civilized and the wild (Wessely 2008).

This proposal for a session follows this line of research yet does not focus on the zoo – although it plays a role in most of the five papers in one way or another. Rather this session tries to identify other urban spaces (or ways of performing) in which exotic animals are exhibited in the decades just before and after 1900 (for the eighteenth century Robbins 2002). In doing so it deliberately draws no distinct line between living and dead animals (Nyhart 2009). What was crucial was the “lifelike” appearance of stuffed animals. On occasion a spectacular animal might even enjoy a “second career” post-mortem, mounted in a collection (Alberti 2011).

What unites the papers is the “exhibitionary” context, the display of exotic beasts for a (mostly) paying public in public museums, private collections, zoological cabinets, taxidermy workshops, menageries, circuses, pageants, theatrical re-enactments and vaudeville shows (Aragón 2014, Cowie 2014). Specific attention will be given the different means of visualization. Apart from the various formats of displaying “real” animals these papers will ask how they were represented in the media of the time, the posters and announcements, the booklets and catalogues, the illustrated natural history book and early animal photography.

A central theme running right through all five presentations is the tension between entertainment and instruction. Despite the blatant commercial character of virtually all of these different forms of exhibiting exotic animals hardly any of them renounces on (at least the pretense) of educating its visitors, of teaching them natural history or zoology, the anatomy of animals, their habits and peculiarities. Naturalists were torn between a scathing criticism of the animal shows as mere spectacle devoid of any pedagogic value and the valuable opportunities that exotic animals, both dead and alive, offered for investigation “at home”, i.e. without the need to travel to Africa or India. In. order to benefit from these opportunities naturalists had to negotiate with commercial collectors of natural history, taxidermists, keepers, animal tamers and showmen for access to or acquisition of precious and often very rare specimens.

Inevitably these papers will also address the issue in how far these animals from far away represent the “other”, the untamed, the colonies – and in how far these various modes of display made the conquered territory more familiar (Sivasundaram 2005). This session will try to make the changing approaches to nature and animal life tangible, varying between the urban and the exotic, the curious and the scientific, the commercial and the instructive. Four papers deal with fin-de-siècle Barcelona while one paper looks at the animal spectacles that took place in Manchester at the same time. In their totality they will show that animals did not disappear from the urban space around 1900. Rather to the contrary, lions, giraffes, elephants, gorillas and even whales were a common sight. The display of exotic creatures dead and alive was a daily commodity.

References
This paper describes Barcelona’s rich “animal culture” during the Universal Exhibition of 1888. On the Exhibition ground, the Museo de Ultramar displayed a magnificent zoological collection from the Philippines. The aquarium also became another very popular site in which a collection of animals was exhibited, divided into seven different sections in 14 showcases of reptiles, amphibians, fish, molluscs, crustaceans and insects. Stuffed animals were kept at the Museu Martorell, a building in the Parc de la Ciutadella, the centre of the exhibition area. But beyond the walls of the fair, private collections of wild animals in a cabinet de curiosités-like style made for an appealing urban route for local citizens and foreign visitors. Animals were displayed in the Museu del Comte de Belloch; in the Redenbach collection on Gran Vía, which included an elephant and a rich collection of monkeys; Jean-Baptiste Bidel’s menagerie boasted lions, tigers, panthers, leopards, hyenas, elephants, and camels on Passeig d’Gràcia.

Described as “Noah’s Ark” by a journalist, the Exhibition year of 1888 became a huge display of wild and tame animals that this paper attempts to analyse in detail. They were shown in public and private spaces, and raised great interest but also controversy: from exoticism and wilderness to domestication and control, from canonical examples of struggle for life to paradigms of human control on nature and society. In those sites, scientific research, conservation and colonial values, and the amusement and education of urban citizens coexisted in complex ways.

From India to the Museum via the Zoo: the Career of the Elephant Avi in Barcelona
Oliver Hochadel
(Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas –Spain)
oliver.hochadel@imf.csic.es

The Indian elephant Avi, born around 1875, spent the first part of his life in the private collection of animals of the wealthy Barcelonese banker Luis Martí-Codolar. In 1892, Martí-
Codolar sold his collection to the city of Barcelona. It became the nucleus of the Barcelona zoo. Soon Avi became the most popular animal of the new zoo drawing large crowds. There are numerous photos of the pachyderm, many of them showing him in “interaction” with the visitors. Avi also figured in a number of caricatures in the Barcelonese press often in conjunction with political criticism. Avi died in May 1914 leaving yet his second career was only about to begin. The taxidermist Luis Soler i Pujol was commissioned to mount the skeleton of the elephant as well as his hide. For the remainder of the twentieth century Avi’s remains were exhibited in the Natural History Museum of Catalonia.

This paper will use Avi’s biography, alive and dead, to explore the cultures of natural history of fin-de-siècle Barcelona and beyond. Martí-Codolar’s collection and the early Barcelona zoo were dedicated to the project of acclimatization, or “applied” natural history. Yet soon Avi converted from a useful into a spectacular animal. As skeleton and hide Avi represented the visual (and static) pedagogy of natural history museums, literally fading away in the course of the twentieth century. Due to the numerous traces Avi left in different media and the collective memory of the Barcelonese he also represents a form of popular natural history.

This paper will discuss how this elephant was reconfigured, renamed, relocated, repaired and remembered. Avi was more than just an object of knowledge. He oscillated between zoos and natural history museums, between entertainment and education, between exotic animal, “emblem of Barcelona”, “friend of children” and not least as an “exemplary Catalan”, well behaved and patient.

A whale in Barcelona: from popular entertainment to scientific instruction
Laura Valls
(Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona - Spain)
lvalls@dicat.csic.es

In December 1912 a stuffed whale was being exhibited in the Avenida Paralelo in Barcelona. The impressive creature had been washed ashore some months earlier at the Costa Brava near Sant Feliu de Guíxols. The Paralelo was the main artery of amusement industries in Barcelona, teaming with cafés and cinemas, theatres and nightclubs. The whale was exhibited in the center of popular culture, a place that was frowned upon by many contemporaries as of vice and moral decay. At the very same time, an exhibition on Pisciculture was inaugurated at the other side of town in the Parc de la Ciutadella. The Castell dels Tres Dragons was a much more serious and civilized place and in a sense the antithesis to the Paralelo. The exhibition was organized by the Junta de Ciències Naturals in order to promote pisciculture as an auxiliary industry for agriculture. The simultaneity of two “fish” exhibitions in the city did not go unnoticed. In December 1912 the satiric magazine L’esquella de la Torratxa imagined in a caricature the escape of the whale from Paralelo making its way through the crowds of the city to the exhibition in the Parc. Then the joke became reality. In March 1913 the Junta paid 2,000 pesetas for the stuffed whale to be brought to the Castell dels Tres Dragons.

This paper will follow the “journey” of the whale from being a “monster” washed ashore to becoming a spectacular exhibit and eventually an instructive one. The transformations of the animal, both physical and discursive, illustrate that the border between popular and bourgeois
cultures was porous, despite all the rhetoric (boundary work) of Barcelonese naturalists. In the transfer from the Paralelo to the Parc the object did not lose its crowd-drawing character. The organizers were aware that they had to provide strong incentives in order to attract visitors to their exhibition.

Stuffed Animals between Knowledge Making, Popularization and Business: Barcelona’s Museo Pedagógico de Ciencias Naturales
Miquel Carandell
(Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona – Spain)
m_baruzzi00@hotmail.com

Around 1900 taxidermy was a popular and profitable scientific activity in Barcelona. Several taxidermists had their own business in different parts of the city. The best known taxidermy workshop was the Museo Pedagógico de Ciencias Naturales, opened in 1890 by Lluís Soler i Pujol (1873-1923). Later Soler i Pujol became member of the Institució Catalana d’Història Natural and, in 1909, the official taxidermist of Barcelona’s Natural History Museum. During this time Soler i Pujol moved his business to a more spacious location where exhibited and charged an admission fee to see an astonishing Gorilla diorama. The new location included a conference room where talks were given and natural history collectors could debate. Soler i Pujol died already at the age of fifty. Then his widow Carmen Boix Raspall (1875-1948), his daughter Anna Soler Boix (1903-1986) and her husband, Josep Palaus Seígí (1900-1979) run the business for over 60 years. Despite none of them had any formal education in natural history or taxidermy and despite the hardships of the Spanish Civil War and postwar, the Museo Pedagógico remained a lucrative business until the 1970s and finally closed its doors in 1990. According to today's accounts of the shop's history, several celebrities such as Dalí, Miró or Ava Gardner became clients of the shop. Yet this paper aims to explore rather the relation of the Museo with Barcelona’s ordinary citizens. Who were the clients of the shop in its different periods? What role did the shop play in the popularization of natural history in Barcelona? Did it also play a role in knowledge making itself? We know that the Museo reinforced its pedagogic role and sold scientific collections and stuffed animals to museums, high schools and universities. But how did this kind of shops contribute to science education? In sum: what can this case on stuffed animals tell us about the relations between knowledge making, popularization and business in the city?
### TIME TABLE WEDNESDAY 29th June

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session</th>
<th>Chair</th>
<th>Discussant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.30 am –</td>
<td><strong>SESSION 10</strong> Epistemology, cognition and personality</td>
<td>Arlene C. Vadum, Mark A. Affeltranger,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.30 am</td>
<td><strong>SESSION 11</strong> Historiography (1): impact and myths</td>
<td>Ian J. Davidson, Aida Roje &amp; Eric Arnaud</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>SESSION 12</strong> Behavior</td>
<td>Caroline C. Pavan, C. B. Neufeld,</td>
<td>Evan Arnet, David O. Clark, Otniel E. Dror</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Christopher D. Green, S. M. Martin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Luiz Eduardo Prado da Fonseca, H. L.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rocha S. da Rosa &amp; A. Arruda L. F.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hernán Camilo Pulido Martínez</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.30 am –</td>
<td><strong>SESSION 13</strong> Juridical psychology</td>
<td>Maarten Derksen, Sheila O’Brien Quinn,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.00 am</td>
<td><strong>SESSION 14</strong> Russian psychology in the 20th century and its influence</td>
<td>John Carson, Jennifer L. Bazar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.00 pm –</td>
<td><strong>SESSION 15</strong> 18th century psychology and its influence</td>
<td>Natalia Loginova, Irina A. Mironenko,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.00 pm –</td>
<td><strong>SESSION 16</strong> Psychology and Catholicism</td>
<td>Junona S. Almonaritiené, Anton Vasnitsky</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.30 pm –</td>
<td><strong>SESSION 17</strong> Scientists in modern society</td>
<td>Dario De Santis, Robert Kugelmann,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.00 pm –</td>
<td><strong>SESSION 18</strong> Somewhere, beyond the seven seas: Hungarian psychology in</td>
<td>Annette Mülberger, Sigrid Leyssen,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.30 pm –</td>
<td><strong>SESSION 19</strong> Psychology in Argentina</td>
<td>Andrea Graus, Discussant: Clara Florensa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.00 pm</td>
<td><strong>SESSION 20</strong> Title: Spiritualism, automatism, and hypnosis</td>
<td>Ruud Abma, Petteri Pietikäinen, David</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>SESSION 21</strong> Science and psychology in Spain in the 20th century</td>
<td>Ceciarelli, Annuikka Salo, Mikko Myllykangas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>SESSION 22</strong> Film: “The ape and the child” (Cathy Faye)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LUNCH**

**REFRESHMENTS** (presentation of journals and book display)
Scientific Induction: Whewell and Modern Qualitative Methods
Arlene C. Vadum
(Assumption College - USA)
avadum@gmail.com

William Whewell, the 19th Century historian and philosopher of science, believed that science progresses through induction - by moving “from individual facts to universal laws, -- from particular propositions to general ones, - and from these to others still more general, with reference to which the former generalizations are particular.” (Whewell, 1858a, Vol. 1, p. 46) For Whewell, developing such theoretical propositions is interpretation, and scientists are nature’s interpreters.

Whereas rules of experimental inference provide procedures for reaching unambiguous conclusions about the causes of particular events, Whewell developed rules for formulating interpretations (colligations) to explain entire bodies of facts. The kind of insight that colligation provides goes beyond simply generalizing from the facts, to seeing them from a new point of view. “Before this, the facts are seen as detached, separate, lawless; afterwards, they are seen as connected, simple, regular; as parts of one general fact, and thereby possessing innumerable new relations before unseen.” (Whewell, 1860, p. 254) For Whewell, such reconceptualization is a special “act of the mind, springing from its previous preparation and habits.” (ibid)

In this paper, I present Whewell’s principles for arriving at valid colligations and point to parallels between his analysis and guidelines published by contemporary social scientists for how particular types of qualitative research (e.g., case studies, analytic induction, phenomenological research) should be carried out.

Despite the clear parallels, qualitative researchers in the social sciences today do not cite Whewell’s work. This is unfortunate, because through studying his writings it becomes clear that the specific processes these authors present are instances of the more general inductive process that Whewell describes. As stated previously, this type of movement - from specific propositions to more general ones - is how science progresses, according to Whewell. In addition, reading Whewell suggests repositioning qualitative research with natural science as part of inductive science, possibly helping to create parity between qualitative and quantitative approaches to research in the social sciences today – surely, a desirable outcome.

I believe such positioning is entirely appropriate. In investigating the historical roots of modern qualitative methods, for instance, I began by researching Darwin’s methods and discovered an article by Gould (1986) claiming that Whewell was a major influence on Darwin’s methods. Pursuing this further, I learned that Whewell was Darwin’s professor and friend at Cambridge University, and that they spent many hours together discussing science.

Indeed, there is evidence in Darwin’s writings that the inductive analysis that he used in developing the theory of natural selection was shaped by Whewell’s methodological principles. In describing the passion for theorizing that led him to On the Origin of Species, Darwin seems to echo Whewell’s thoughts on how progress in science happens: “My mind seems to have become a kind of machine for grinding general laws out of a large collection of facts.” (Blinderman, 1987, p. 55).
A possible methodological lineage seems to be emerging, leading from Whewell’s work on induction, to Darwin’s publications, to the many case studies in psychology conducted early in the last century by Freud, Piaget, and others whose ideas and methods were influenced by Darwin. Indeed, Darwin may be an important “missing link” between Whewell and modern qualitative research methods.

References

S.S. Stevens’s Impact on the Cognitive Revolution
Mark A. Affeltranger
(Bethany College – USA)
maffeltranger@bethanywv.edu

Stanley Smith Stevens advanced the field of psychophysics through his ratio-based methods. Both the Sone Scale (Stevens and Davis, 1936) and magnitude estimation (Stevens, 1957) allowed investigators to collect perceptual magnitude data quickly and more easily (Bartoshuk, 1990). However, Stevens is rarely discussed in history of psychology books despite the fact that he also made significant contributions to the Cognitive Revolution of the 1970s.

Skinnerian Behaviorism dominated research labs and educational centers up to the 1960s (Glaser, Schaefer, & Taber, 1965; Hergenhahn & Henley, 2014). However, psychologists during the late 1960s began asking questions that took an internal, cognitive angle rather than the external, antecedent angle advocated by Skinner (1974) starting from answering why reinforcers are effective (Glaser, 1971) to how information is retained (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). With the works of Festinger (1957), Broadbent (1958), and, of course, Miller’s (1956) seminal 7 plus or minus 2, the research was trending toward the internal and cognitive but needed to overcome an obstacle set by the viewpoint that observation and quantification of the subjective was impossible. Stevens contributed to the revolution by overcoming this obstacle.

Stevens’s first contribution came early in his career with his papers on operationisms, to objectively investigate the subjective. Einstein’s introduction of the law of relativity (Bridgman, 1959) dispelled ideas of absolutism in physics and emphasized that concepts should instead be
defined by the operations of the researcher to measure the concept (Stevens, 1935a; 1936). Stevens stated that operationisms need to be discriminated well from the other operationisms of other concepts (to prevent contamination), establish and fulfill exact criteria of the concept or be content valid, be demonstrated socially or publicly, be focused on outside subjects or other people, and have language agreed by the science community (Stevens, 1935a). He demonstrated these criteria of operationisms on concepts such as existence, experience, sensation, and tonal density (Stevens, 1935b) thereby opening the door for the cognitive to be empirically verified.

Stevens attempted two objectives. First, he set rules for objectively measuring the subject by defining the subjective through agreed upon and publicly demonstrated operations. Second, he resurrected Wundt’s distinction of psychology as the immediate science and physics as the mediate (Stevens, 1936). He argued the possibility of putting psychology in front as a science that could lead physics through its current, relative dilemma. As he admitted (Stevens, 1936), he was going against several centuries of physics advancing and psychology lagging due to a cultural trend to go beyond the human species to the cosmos (Burtt, 1932). Therefore, Stevens gave ammunition to future cognitive scientists against skeptics who rejected the notion of a science of the mind.

Stevens’s second contribution came through his search for invariance. Stevens believed that scientists should search for functional relationships instead of analyzing variances (Miller, 1974). His quest for invariance produced his scales of measurement (Stevens, 1946) which may have reinforced the Gestaltist argument (Kohler, 1947) that perceptual constancies or invariances result from the analysis of ratios.

Stevens’s third contribution came from establishing magnitude estimation as a psychophysical method and confirming its validity. Stevens required participants to rate sensations relative to each other, resulting in power function of perception to stimulus intensity. He argued the validity by using cross-modal matching to cross validate the power laws across modalities. He also showed responses in sensory nerves perfectly fit the same power function (with the same exponent) as the magnitude estimates of the same sensory modality (Stevens, 1975). These validity tests confirmed construct, face, content, and criterion validity (McBurney and White, 2010) setting the criteria for evaluating other operational definitions.

References
Several popular books focus on personality, and this interest in the scientific study of the self is also evident on the internet. Consumers are interested in better understanding themselves and others, and when pursuing this self-examination they will often latch onto personality categories, such as introverts or extraverts. Recently, attention has been drawn to an overlooked and nearly forgotten personality type: the ambivert. This is a personality type for persons in between the introvert and extravert extremes, and as one blogger puts it: “I’ve scoured the internet extensively and found very little on the subject. It seems this ambiguous, complicated, mythical creature is nowhere to be found” (Sol, 2013). In this paper, I will locate the origins and trace the trajectory of this little-known personality type, the ambivert, which challenges popular culture understandings of typologies. The aim is to both contribute to our knowledge about the history of personality psychology, and to increase awareness of a concept that many persons could find personally meaningful and liberating.

Through tracing the ambivert’s history, we can see the many gazes and contexts personality psychology has been within: diagnostic clinics; psychometric applications within industry; psychological and neurological laboratories; and competitive marketplaces such as sales. It is not entirely clear why the ambivert failed to gain traction within psychology or psychiatry, but there are many possible reasons for its marginal survival. The connection between types and traits (i.e. dichotomies versus scales) has not entirely left academic psychology, as even today psychologists will often opt for the noun or adjective (e.g. “extravert” or “extraverted”) as an abbreviated form of “high in extraversion.” But it was only within the context of Hans Eysenck’s particular understanding of the relationship between types and traits that the ambivert/ambiversion survived as a psychological construct, finding its way into a recent issue of Psychological Science, self-help styled and popular science books, and online in blogs. As awareness of this failed but not forgotten concept enters the popular consciousness, it is becoming apparent that the ambivert is of considerable importance to the everyday person. This is true whether its importance lies in the
“ambivert advantage” that translates into the promise of increased success as a salesperson, or the more existential liberation that the ambivert can bring individuals.

Tracing the history of the ambivert has unveiled its strange genealogy: a concept that went barely noticed when first proposed by Edmund S. Conklin in 1923, but nevertheless a concept that has persisted in academic psychology and has now entered popular psychology. The ambivert was proposed at a bustling time in American personality psychology—when researchers and theorists from around the country were independently attempting to define and measure the person. It was also a time of transition from theorizing types and using clinical observation, to theorizing traits and using psychometric measures. Our understanding of these psychologists, their methodologies, and their theories is ripe for enrichment and expansion: The story of the ambivert is a contribution to this ongoing historical project. There are many ways the history of psychology and the discipline of psychology can impact and influence each other (Pettit & Davidson, 2014); and the history of the ambivert can impact both our disciplinary understandings of current personality theory and methods, as well as understandings of ourselves we draw from popular culture.

References
Measurability and ontologic desiderata: two opposing forces in intelligence research
Aida Roige
(Universitat de Barcelona – Spain)
aida.rrmm@gmail.com
Eric Arnau
(Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona – Spain)
eric.arnau@gmail.com

Scientific theories are subject to different desiderata. We argue that the history of intelligence research can be reconstructed as a negotiation of methodological and ontological desiderata pulling in different directions. On the one hand, research on intelligence has been driven by the aim of developing measurements of intelligence by way of quantifying individual differences and their distribution in populations. On the other hand, there’s a desiderata for the notion of “intelligence” emanating as a theoretical construct from this methodology to have a causal role, to explain behavior, to have predictive power, to be integrable with other psychological theories, and to have an ontological status that grants test validity.

One problem that intelligence theories have faced is how to handle the tradeoffs between these values, as the logic underlying individual measurability is at odds with its epistemico-ontological requirements in a broader context. On the one hand, the aim for measurability and the subsequent development of factor analysis provides a kind of support to the validity of the construct that at the same time shields it from the kinds of empirical predictions that would warrant causal ascriptions. At the same time, the aspiration to provide accounts of mental capacities that explain individual behavior pull in the direction of considering how intelligence functions in general, not only how is different from one another and how these differences are distributed. We can see this divergence throughout the history of the field: the development of psychometric tests has been independent of other psychological theories of empirical and cognitive background—despite recurrent calls for integration—and is also present in the debate about which realist interpretation grounds the validity of IQ tests.

The role these opposing forces play is sometimes implicit and tends to be obscured in misleading debates about the realism of the construct of intelligence. By fleshing out the commitments implicit in the methodological strategy of intelligence measurement, the ontologic desiderata, and their mutual opposition, we can reframe such debates in more productive terms. This way we can set apart the realist claim that follows from the epistemic justification of measurement practices, from the realist requirement that for a construct such as intelligence to serve as an explanatory notion it should fulfill further ontological desiderata—i.e. it should have causal power, it should constrain explanations in terms of cognitive processes, etc.
Acknowledging such interplay between opposite forces on the history of the field also helps situate the current challenges that it faces. Can the opposing forces within intelligence research be reconciled?

References


Humphreys, L. G. (1979). The construct of general intelligence. *Intelligence, 3*(2), 105–120.


SESSION 11: HISTORIOGRAPHY (1): IMPACT AND MYTHS

Behavior and Cognitive Therapies:
How Brazilian authors recognize the history of their own fields

Caroline da C. Pavan-Cândido
(Universidade de São Paulo – Ribeirão Preto, Brasil)
carolinecpavan@gmail.com/ ccpavancandido@usp.br

Carmen Beatriz Neufeld
(Universidade de São Paulo – Ribeirão Preto, Brasil)

Gabriel Vieira Cândido
(Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo - Brasil)

gabrielvcandido@gmail.com

Behavior Therapy and Cognitive Therapies are different approaches in Clinical Psychology. They are considered in growing in Brazil. These two fields have presented some similarities and their practitioners have demonstrated a close relationship once they share scientific societies and meetings, they publish in the same scientific journals and, sometimes, they share intervention techniques. Beyond these similarities, lots of papers about the beginnings of these therapies point out a common rise, as Wolpe’s and Eysenck’s researches. Because of this history, these proposals are often confused and considered a single one by therapists and researchers. For this reason, this research aims to analyze how Brazilian researchers write about the history of Behavioral and Cognitive Therapies. To reach this aim, all numbers published of the three main Brazilian scientific journals about Behavior and Cognitive Therapies (Brazilian Journal of Behavior and Cognitive Therapy; Brazilian Journal of Cognitive Therapy; Perspectives in Behavior Analysis) were analyzed in order to find papers about the history of both approaches. 13 papers were found: 5 in Brazilian Journal of Behavior and Cognitive Therapy, 7 in Brazilian Journal of Cognitive Therapy and one in Perspectives in Behavior Analysis. Three of them present the history of Behavior Therapy and ten the history of Cognitive Therapy. Among philosophical influences, it were mentioned stoicism, functional contextualism, operationism, logical positivism, constructivism and critical rationalism. Regarding to the history of Behavior Therapies, we can assert that J. B. Watson, Mary Cover Jones, B. F. Skinner, J. Wolpe, O. R. Lindsley and H. J. Eysenck are related in the papers as the main founders. The Russians physiologists, as I. P. Pavlov, are presented as important contributors in explaining the physiology of emotions. The Cognitive Therapies had begun to solve problems ignored by Behavioral Therapies, as those related to verbal behavior, private events and subjectivity. Under influences of Cognitive Therapies’ growth, the Behavior Therapists reviewed some concepts as thinking and feeling, such as the relevance of them to therapy effectiveness. It was observed that four papers used the wave metaphor to describe three different periods in the history of Behavior and Cognitive therapies, and sometimes the waves regarded to changes occurred in the history of therapies in the United States. Just two of 13 papers presented the history of therapies in Brazil separated from history in United States. Also, it was carried out an analysis of the references of these papers. Most of the authors quoted were from United States. In despite of being known that Behavior therapy started in Brazil in the late 1960, the oldest papers published by a Brazilian researcher found in these references were published in 1983, by Kerbauy, and in 1988, by Lettner and Rangé. We can conclude that the variety of terminologies used to refer to the therapeutic practices of both
Behavior and Cognitive Therapy, reveal few differences in interpretations of the same philosophical assumptions. At the end, the wave metaphor is analyzed as a chronological view, sometimes used to validate the last wave and depreciate others. This way, we conclude that it is necessary recognizing particularities existing in the history of different groups or countries.

References
Crowd-Sourcing the Question of Historical Impact on Psychology
Christopher D. Green
(York University – Canada)
christo@yorku.ca
Shane M. Martin
(York University – Canada)

Fourteen years ago, Haggbloom et al. (2002) published a list of the 100 most eminent psychologists of the 20th century. They integrated the results of multiple methods: journal citation counts, citations in textbooks, opinion surveys of psychologists, awards and honorary memberships, and the existence of eponyms.

We wondered, by contrast, what would happen if the process were opened up to anyone willing to participate in the discussion, regardless of their level of expertise. Would a “crowd-sourced” ranking of psychological impact differ from an “expert” list, and how? Would there be distinct sub-groups? (e.g., men vs. women. Older vs. younger? American vs. Europeans?)

To find out, we created a digital game that could be accessed on-line by anyone who wanted to play (http://elo.sha.nemart.in). The game showed the player the names of two significant historical individuals (out of 400 in our pool), and asked the player who had “the greater impact on psychology.” Over seven months, we drew more than 1200 players who made more than 80,000 individual judgments. A score was generated for each historical figure using the popular ELO algorithm (originally developed to rank chess players but is now widely used for contexts in which rankings are needed from multiple paired comparisons).¹

The top 20 were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>B. F. Skinner</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Wilhelm Wundt</td>
<td>(93.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Sigmund Freud</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Ivan Pavlov</td>
<td>(24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Charles Darwin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>*William James</td>
<td>(14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Jean Piaget</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>John B. Watson</td>
<td>(17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Edward L. Thorndike</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Albert Bandura</td>
<td>(58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Robert L. Thorndike</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Harry Harlow</td>
<td>(26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>G. Stanley Hall</td>
<td>(72.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Stanley Milgram</td>
<td>(46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>E. B. Titchener</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Abraham Maslow</td>
<td>(10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Hermann Helmholtz</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Hermann Ebbinghaus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Charles Spearman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Elizabeth Loftus</td>
<td>(58)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In total, 8 of these 20 names appeared in Haggbloom’s top 20 as well: Skinner, Freud, James, Piaget, Watson, E. L. Thorndike, Bandura, Maslow. Two of our top 20 fell just outside of Haggbloom’s: Pavlov and Harlow. Of the remaining 10 of our top 20 who were not in Haggbloom’s top 26, 4 appeared lower in Haggbloom’s list (Wundt, Hall, Milgram, Loftus), 2 were ineligible (Darwin, Helmholtz), Ebbinghaus, Binet, Spearman), and 3 others simply did not “rank” according Haggbloom’s rating scheme (Titchener, Ebbinghaus, Spearman). It appears that Europeans were put at a comparative disadvantage by Haggbloom’s. The final case is Robert L.
Thorndike: few “experts” would rank him the top 20. It seem likely that many raters mistook him for his father, Edward L. Thorndike.

We will report more extensive analyses of our rankings, as well as differences between subgroups, as outlined above. There are, obviously, many historiographic concerns generated by this sort of project. We will raise them, and we expect them to be a prime subject for post-presentation discussion.

1 The game began with a short list of optional demographic questions (gender, age, level of psychological education) and the option to agree to an informed consent form. This research project was approved by the York University Research Ethics Office.

Reference

Yes, we have Wundt: Waclaw Radecki and historical fabrication of pioneers
Luiz Eduardo Prado da Fonseca
(Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro – Brasil)
fonseca.luiiz8@gmail.com
Hugo Leonardo Rocha Silva da Rosa
(Pontificial Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro – Brazil)
darosahugo@gmail.com
Arthur Arruda Leal Ferreira
(Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro – Brasil)
arleal1965@gmail.com

This paper aims to establish a discussion about the production of pioneers in the narratives of the history of psychology as an historical operation (Certeau, 1988). For this historiographical discussion we will use as example a character from the history of psychology in Brazil: the Polish psychologist Waclaw Radecki (1887-1953). The historical narratives related to this author don’t agree in a great number of details. But it is possible to establish that Radecki arrived in Brazil around 1920, after an intense political and academical career in Poland and Switzerland. In Rio de Janeiro he organized a laboratory around 1924 that in seven years was converted into an Institute of Psychology. After the interruption of the activities of this Institute in 1932, Radecki dedicated himself to the two new Institutes of Psychology that he created in Montevideo and Buenos Aires. After a long time briefly being referred to in any Brazilian texts of history of psychology (see Olinto, 1944/2004; Cabral, 1950/2004; and Lourenço Filho, 1955/2004), Radecki was reinvented in the 1980’s as a pioneer of psychological science in Brazil, initially by the article of Centofanti (1982/2004). After this article, Radecki had his historical position and function changed to a more central and crucial one (see Antunes, 2004 and Massimi, 2010) and even the modes of discourse (using a concept from Latour, 1988) changed to a more regular and positive reference towards him. Although most of his concepts and theoretical system (the Affective Discrimination) were misunderstood or ignored in these new articles, he received a lot of titles related to this heroic role: the first psychologist in Latin America (Stubbe, 1988) and the main articulator of the experimental
psychology in Brazil (Shiraev, 2015). We then analyze this historical operation of Radecki’s invention as a pioneer in comparison to the Wilhelm Wundt’s creation as "father” of experimental psychology by classical historiography (as an example, Boring, 1929/1950). Here we propose that Radecki has suffered a similar process (although in a different scale and degree of stabilization), occupying suddenly a prominent place in Brazilian narratives of its national history of psychology. Similar to Wundt, Radecki created a laboratory, an Institute and a journal for publications of his research group. Like Wundt, his heroic role as pioneer didn’t guarantee a good comprehension of his work (see Araujo 2010). Our crucial point of comparison is the historical operation generated by the need of creation of a respectable ancestor, validated by the creation of a laboratory as the shibboleth to belonging to a truly scientific scenario. In both cases this operation had some delays, roundabouts and hesitations. In Radecki’s case we can see a sudden appearance as a crucial pioneer after Centofanti’s (1982/2004) article, contrasting with the previous decades where he was almost completely ignored in historical texts. In Wundt’s case it is possible to say that Boring wasn’t the first to promote Wundt as an heroic experimental father, although he promoted the strongest and lasting historical operation. It is interesting to see, though, how Boring opened other possibilities of pioneerism when mentioning Fechner's psychophysics (see Rosenszweig, 1987). We finish this paper questioning this kind of historical operation that produces and paves the histories of psychology, constructing heroes, fathers and pioneers, presenting a historical path from a glorious past towards a supposedly autonomous and scientific progress of psychology. Shouldn’t other stories and versions that escape from this epical narrative be created? This is the political stand of this work.

References
Practices, appropriation and psychologisation.

Colombian psychologists re-create their professional experiences

Hernán Camilo Pulido Martínez
(Pontificia Universidad Javeriana – Bogotá, Colombia)
cpulido@javeriana.edu.co

This paper aims to explore the processes of psychologisation of the Colombian society. Oral histories of those involved in the dissemination of psychology as a profession in Bogota, Colombia were collected to construct an archive and a mosaic of histories of psychologisation. Specifically, 40 psychologists who graduate from the School of Psychology of Javeriana University from 1967 to 1977 were interviewed about their trajectories in different psychological fields.

The school of psychology at Javeriana University was founded in 1963 and was the second to offer a program in professional psychology in the country. For the first time, these graduated psychologists implemented a series of psychological practices in different institutions such as factories, catholic organizations, health services and educational settings. They brought about different psychological practices and prescriptions about how to live and die, how to get married and divorce and also they formulated remedies to industrial diseases.

The participants of this research were psychologists who are not intellectual stars, but ordinary professionals who were not protagonists of the official history of psychology in Colombia. On the contrary, they are part of the “grey” history of the psychological enterprise in the “periphery”. The archive compose by this oral histories is mainly constituted by interviews videotaped with these “second class disseminators” which have a fundamental importance thanks to the fact that through their practice psychology becomes “really” universal.

The analyses show the particular adaptations, appropriations, and hybridations of psychological knowledge, the vicissitudes of psychology when they arrive to different institutions, and the particularities of the processes of psychologisation in the country.

References
Conwy Lloyd Morgan and the Making of a Scientific Comparative Psychology

Evan Arnet
(Indiana University Bloomington – USA)
earnet@indiana.edu

Conwy Lloyd Morgan, today remembered largely for Morgan’s Canon, was one of the founding figures of comparative psychology. I examine Morgan’s role as a discipline builder in early comparative psychology, paying special attention to his stated attempt to ground it as a science in the English context, and then track his thinking across the Atlantic to explore the impact of the American context, especially regarding the influence of a burgeoning laboratory culture.

Morgan’s attempted reform of comparative psychology in late 1800s England are intertwined with ongoing efforts to secure psychology itself as scientific, the ascendance of both Darwinian and Spencerian evolutionary thinking, and a scientific culture in which it was perfectly acceptable for someone to write into *Nature* about something interesting an aquarium fish did. Philosophically, Morgan was highly attuned to the epistemological difficulties presented by the study of animal minds and I contend that significant light can be shed on his work in comparative psychology by considering it in relation to the broadly verificationist philosophy of science he lays out in some of his earlier works.

After briefly exploring this social and philosophical background, three areas of Morgan’s reforms are given special attention. First is his eponymous canon, which I argue can be best understood as stemming from his verificationism together with a generally Spencerian conception of mental evolution. The demand for certainty alongside a scalar and linear account of animal minds leads naturally to Morgan’s well known conservatism about animal psychology. Second is his emphasis on experimentation over anecdote or even observation. Morgan saw experiment as critical to revealing the development of behaviors, as opposed to the misleading information providing by seeing behaviors separate from their process of formation. I pay particular attention to a months long interchange between Morgan and the comparative psychologist and evolutionary theorist George Romanes (a well known defender of more anecdotal approaches) published in *Nature*, in which both ultimately admit that their disagreement is rooted in fundamental differences in their conceptualization of science. And third is the important role for learning and experience in the shaping of behaviors, as opposed to behaviors being merely seen as instinctual or unproblematically inherited whole cloth. Much of Morgan’s work on the evolution of behavior can be seen as attempting to embrace a Weissmanian conception of inheritance without discarding the importance experience had in Lamarckian evolution.

However, while Morgan’s ambitions for comparative psychology never fully materialized in the Britain, these three aspects of his reforms were to have a formative influence on American comparative psychology. Scientists operating in America’s ascendant laboratory culture, most prominently Edward Thorndike, took up Morgan’s conservatism about animal psychology, theoretical emphasis on experiment, and focus on experience. In Thorndike’s early works he made frequent reference to both Morgan’s experimental work and his theoretical dictums about comparative psychology. Additionally, despite the fact that Morgan was well known as an evolutionary theorist and that he saw evolution as key to the very possibility of comparative
psychology, I argue that in America his work largely served to strip evolutionary considerations from comparative psychology. Morgan’s Canon is also of particular interest in the American context. It retained pride of place as a methodological rule despite the fact that few scientists self-consciously held the framework in which Morgan believed it was justified. Building from this, I conclude with a brief discussion of how the entangled nature of the history of science, where science is deeply materially and conceptually intertwined with the science that came before, can lead to the persistence of scientific practice even after the original justificatory structure for the practice has fallen away.

References

**Experimental Psychology & Thorndike’s Puzzle-Box: Observation and Interpretation in Practice**

David O. Clark
(Independent Scholar)
davidoclark7@gmail.com

An experiment conducted in 1898 at Columbia University in New York City contributed to a paradigm-changing event in the history of experimental psychology. A young graduate student, Edward L. Thorndike observed kittens escaping from trap now known as the puzzle-box. He noted their progress in terms of time in the box prior to escape in relation to the number of attempts. This was novel because the experiment then dominating the psychology laboratory was the classical Wundt inspired stimulus-sensory approach to mental chemistry. Thorndike argued that this new method explored the neurological foundation of learning. It was derived from the definition of mind as adjustment to the environment, and it provided mathematical precision with a graph, a learning curve. The editors of the *Psychology Review* considered this work noteworthy. So much so, they invested in a monograph, “*Animal Intelligence: An Experimental Study of the Associative Process in Animals Minds.*” This experiment was significant because it supported the biological explanation for the conditions of mind expressed by William James in *The Principles of Psychology*. The puzzle-box contributed all-important empirical basis for the emerging evolutionary-adjustment approach that dominated 20th century American psychology.

Last year, I argued that this contribution could be understood in Thomas Kuhn’s requirements for a scientific paradigm. Given it was important, I ask: Where did a 22-year-old graduate student receive the idea? What was the story behind this event?
Edwin Boring emphasized three important pioneers in the founding of experimental psychology: Fechner, Wundt, and Helmholtz. Boring (1957, p. 313), citing Helmholtz wrote, “There is the influence of a ‘laboratory atmosphere’ upon the observational results, which means that investigators are likely to observe what they are trained to observe, and there is also the contrary fact that good observers have to be trained.” This ambiguity has interested historians of science such as Gerald Holton who wrote *The Scientific Imagination*.

I will revisit this seminal event in the history of experimental psychology in terms of the themes of this conference: historiography, the philosophy of science, and the role of experts in modern society. I propose to explore this question as follows: I will provide a brief synopsis of Thorndike’s observations and interpretations in contrast with the “new psychology” of Wundt’s mentalist stimuli-sensation approach. In terms of historiography: Thorndike’s autobiographical statements currently play an important role in his received biography, but primary sources and correspondence contradict his testimony. In terms of the philosophy of science: The history of Thorndike’s influential experiment brings to the forefront the importance of theory in directing observation and influencing interpretation.

**References**


---

**The Science of Super-Pleasure**

Otniel E. Dror

(The Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Israel)

otniel@ekmd.huji.ac.il

“recently discovered is a region within [the hypothalamus]…which on stimulation gives rise to a strongly pleasurable sensation. …Evidently all the desirable things in life are desirable only insofar as they stimulate the pleasure center. To stimulate it directly makes all else unnecessary. Isaac Asimov, 1965

In 1954, James Olds and Peter Milner discovered pleasure in the brain of a laboratory rat. Pleasure, which had been ostracized as a nameable experience by the behaviorist sciences and which had been de-ontologized during the early twentieth-century as merely *aponia*—as only an
absence of pain, returned with a vengeance. The return of pleasure inaugurated a major transformation whose repercussions and off-shoots are very much still with us today, including the development of a neurophysiology of decision making, risk taking, addiction, affective neuroscience, and more.

In this presentation, I will focus on the first decade or decade and a half of the discovery of this new super-pleasure. This early period was characterized by multiple models and hypotheses, incongruent and conflicting terminologies and ideologies, and by an intensive empiricism. I will reconstruct the laboratory enactments and models that constituted this new pleasure as “supramaximal,” instant, and insatiable. I will argue that “pure” “supramaximal” “super-pleasure” was the immediate product of experimental enactments. These enactments of the laboratory made pleasure and made it supramaximal. The laboratory construction of an instantaneously-produced insatiable self-perpetuating super-pleasure captured the imagination of contemporaries and of generations to come. I will briefly discuss the reactions to the new discovery. One of the major preoccupations was where to position the newly discovered super-pleasure in the social and natural orders.

In describing the discovery of pleasure, I will not present a “balanced” history. Rather, I will “side with” “pleasure” in a broader behaviorist context, in which “pleasure”—the very word—was often derided, obfuscated, and maligned. I will reflect in my talk on the historiographical implications of and motivations for “siding with” an emotion.

References

SESSION 13: JURIDICAL PSYCHOLOGY

**Out of control: another look at brainwashing**
Maarten Derksen
(University of Groningen – Netherlands)
m.derksen@rug.nl

In the 1950s the Western world, the United States in particular, was gripped by the fear that 'the Communists' had developed effective techniques of mind control. These techniques, which came to be known as 'brainwashing', were thought to enable totalitarian states to control the beliefs of their own citizens and to manipulate their prisoners into making false confessions. Brainwashing turned the victims of Communism into mindless robots, willing to do the bidding of
their masters. When, during the Korean war, American prisoners of war appeared to collaborate with their Chinese and North Korean captors, and captive American Air Force pilots signed confessions of biological warfare, mind control seemed to offer a plausible explanation, and the brainwashing scare reached fever pitch (Carruthers, 2009; Young, 2014).

Brainwashing has been called a “hoax” (Young, 2014) and a creation of the CIA (Scheflin & Opton, 1978). The journalist who coined the term, Edward Hunter (1951), was a CIA operative, as it later turned out. Moreover, domestic and international propaganda campaigns of the American government were instrumental in fanning the flames of the brainwashing scare. Accusing the Communists of mental torture was a fruitful tactic in the 'Battle for men's minds' that was central to the Cold War. It highlighted the inhumanity and lack of respect for individual freedom that were claimed to be characteristic of Communism.

That the American government and the CIA in particular exploited the concept of brainwashing and to some extent shaped it is clear from historical sources. In my paper, however, I will take issue with the claim that it was created by the U.S. government or one of its agencies or employees. I follow two lines of argument. Firstly, although Hunter may have coined 'brainwashing' for the CIA, a similar concept, 'menticide', was introduced in the same year by the Dutch-American psychiatrist Joost Meerloo (1951; 1954; 1961). Although it never gained the traction of 'brainwashing', 'menticide' became an influential term as well. There are no indications, however, that Meerloo ever worked for the U.S. government, or tried to further its aims.

Secondly, to call it a hoax or creation implies much more control over the meaning of 'brainwashing' than there ever was. On the contrary, the meaning of 'brainwashing' proved to be very hard to pin down. Arguably, this flexibility is one of the causes of its success in the 1950s and its continuing use up to this day. If 'brainwashing' was an intentional creation of an individual or agency, it's fair to say that they did not fully know what they were creating. Moreover, the U.S. government simultaneously financed campaigns that exploited the concept as well as scientific studies that criticized and deflated it (see e.g. (Hinkle & Wolff, 1956)).

I will conclude that 'brainwashing' was never anyone's creation, product, or possession, but that on the contrary it took possession of the people who came in contact with it, and in whom it triggered dreams and fears of control over people that have a long history.

References


Young, C. S. (2014). *Name, rank, and serial number: exploiting Korean War POWs at home and abroad*.
The Influence of the Insanity Plea on the Abolition of the Death Penalty in the State of Rhode Island
Sheila O’Brien Quinn
(Salve Regina University – USA)
sheila.quinn@salve.edu

This paper will be an account of the involvement of Isaac Ray, MD, one of the founders of the American Psychiatric Association, in a murder trial that, I will argue, lead to the first total abolition of the death penalty in the United States and to one of the earliest involuntary commitment laws. This first abolition of the death penalty is usually attributed to the public outcry after the 1844 hanging of a 21-year old immigrant who was generally seen as innocent (Conley, 1998). Historians of the death penalty have pointed out that the 7-year gap between the unjust hanging and the abolition of the death penalty is puzzling (Mackey, 1976). This paper will present arguments that the death penalty was abolished as a result of a successful insanity plea in 1851, that occurred just months before the introduction and passage of the bill abolishing the death penalty. Editorials at the time opined that the jury agreed with the insanity defense in this trial only to avoid hanging a 14-year-old girl. If she had been declared guilty, hanging would have been the only available outcome.

The Trial:
In 1851, Almira Bezely, an approximately 14-year-old orphan and practicing spirit medium, plead not guilty to the charge of poisoning a child under her care. A jury of 12 tax-paying men were appointed after each swore that he had no “conscientious scruples as to finding a person guilt of a crime which the law punishes with death”.

Some newspaper accounts said that Bezely had, during a séance, predicted the death of the child. Not surprisingly, the trial attracted the attention of E. W. Capron, an avowed spiritualist (Eliab Wilkinson Capron, 1855) and the former manager of the Fox Sisters, the young women credited with starting modern spiritualism. Capron had just returned to Rhode Island to become the editor of the Morning Mirror, a Providence newspaper in which he published daily accounts of the trial.

Isaac Ray, MD, the superintendent of Butler Hospital in Providence, a founder of the American Psychiatric Association and the author of the text used by the defense in the M’Naughton trial (Hughes, 1986) was an expert witness for the defense. Capron’s newspaper accounts of the trial (Formal court transcripts were not kept at the time.) were reprinted throughout New England. As a result, the public was exposed to the latest theories on the causes and diagnosis of insanity. The possible causes of insanity in this case were said to be heredity, the beginning of menstruation, lack of moral and/or academic education, and/or the cerebral excitement resulting from the accused involvement in spiritualism. In addressing the issue of diagnosis, Isaac Ray stated that the act itself (the murder of a child) should be evidence enough to declare the accused insane (Capron, 1851; Supreme Court, 1851).

After the verdict of not guilty was announced, the judge instructed Isaac Ray, who was in the courtroom at the time, to commit Almira to Butler Hospital. She had, after all, just been declared insane by the jury. Ray, who had written in favor of involuntary commitment laws (Hughes, 1986), explained that the state law did not allow for that. The state attorney general then announced in the courtroom at the end of the trial that he was proposing a bill to abolish the death
penalty at the next legislative session. Consequently, within months of this trial the State had abolished the death penalty and established an involuntary commitment law.

References


Questioning Mental Soundness in Early Nineteenth-Century English Civil Law

John Carson

(University of Michigan - USA)

jscarson@umich.edu

Who is unsound of mind? (And, really, as we might ask nowadays, who isn’t?) Who should be deemed sufficiently responsible to make a will, enter into a contract, get married, and the like, and who should not? Questions such as these have, for a very long time, been important not only in Anglo-American law, but in branches of medicine as well. In some ways they have been, and are, fundamental in helping to shape the bounds of citizenship and liberty, the ways in which individuals could and can engage in some of the most basic civil activities.

Before the late eighteenth century, the presumption in both law and medicine was that the kinds of mental impairments that really mattered were few in number and generally severe in scope. Terms such as “idiot” and “lunatic,” each rather strictly and narrowly defined, constituted virtually the whole of the accepted vocabulary for mental infirmity in both law and medicine. During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, however, an important transformation took place, visible in Anglo-American civil adjudications concerning the issue of mental competency. Physicians and jurists began to challenge, often quite successfully, strict common law standards minimizing occasions where an actor’s ability to make a will, enter into a contract, get married, be subject to a commission of lunacy, or the like could be placed in question. Through imaginative use of precedents, explicit declarations that the law could no longer ignore relief for less severe conditions, and the production of new nosologies (taxonomies) of idiocy and insanity that delineated a plethora of mental pathologies, practitioners in both fields remade the landscape of mental impairment, if less and less in terms that the other fully understood or sanctioned.

In this talk I want to probe this transformation in the law and to examine the place of mental science, among other factors, in contributing to it. While physicians themselves often were rather disastrous witnesses in the courtroom, the treatises on medical jurisprudence that a number of them produced proved to be important sources of authority for the judges seeking to remake the
law of mental impairment. I will focus in particular on one of the landmark cases that helped to codify, at least for a time, a more capacious view of the kinds of impairments that might render someone “unsound of mind.” With it, I will try to tease out the ways in which medical science, working in conjunction with new cultural conceptions of (paternal) authority and the social transformations wrought by the expansion of market/manufacturing capitalism, helped create the conditions for the changes the law was undergoing. However, by introducing another, rather similar case, at the end of my talk, I will try to illustrate just how many different ways this transformation can be read and to underscore the multi-faceted uses to which mental science could be turned and interpretations it could sustain.

References
Stacking the Wards? Ontario’s Experiment in Treating Psychopathy
Jennifer L. Bazar
(York University – Canada)
jennbazar@gmail.com

In 1963 the first man to be held at Ontario’s only maximum security forensic mental health facility on a Warrant of the Lieutenant Governor was discharged (Bertin, 1963). Found “Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity” 30 years prior, the man had been a part of a system in which mental health administrators had no decision-making powers concerning those patients admitted to them via the courts. His discharge in 1963 represented an end to three decades of indeterminate sentencing for Ontario’s forensic population and ushered in a period of renewed optimism within the institution.

At the same time, the report of the Royal Commission on the Law of Insanity as a Defence in Criminal Cases, published in 1956, was successfully widening the parameters under which mental incompetence or disorder was viewed within the provincial courts. Focusing on the differences in meaning between the word “appreciate” in the Criminal Code of Canada and the word “know” in the British M’Naghten Rules, this broadening of interpretation concerning who could be considered “Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity” or “Unfit to Stand Trial” resulted in a drastic increase in the number of individuals recognized as having a psychopathic personality being redirected from the penitentiary and into the mental health system (Turner, 1973; Weisman, 1995).

Combined together, these two events ushered in a nearly two-decade period of controversial experimentation in the treatment of persons with psychopathic personality disorders. Emerging from the assumption that mental illness was a result of a lack of communication, the program – known as the Social Therapy Unit – applied varying techniques to encourage patients to express their emotions, reflect on their previous criminal behaviours, and reveal their most intimate thoughts. Programming was all-encompassing on the locked wards, with therapy occurring continuously throughout the day. Patients were engaged in back-to-back psychotherapy sessions both in pairs as well as larger groups and were further encouraged to lower their inhibitions through the use of so-called defence-disrupting and psychedelic drugs. The Social Therapy Unit represents a unique period in the history of mental health care, being both one of the...
first treatment programs aimed specifically at psychopathy as well as one of the last treatment programs of this kind.

Drawing on the unique archival material held at the Archives of Ontario and the Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care, as well as oral history interviews with former staff of the hospital, this talk will explore the two-decade period during which psychopathy was considered treatable in the province of Ontario and the resulting aftermath of the demise of the Social Therapy program. Focus will rest particularly on the precursors that led to an increase in the psychopathic population of the institution as well as the expressed intentions of the psychiatrists behind this experiment.

References

SESSION 14: RUSSIAN PSYCHOLOGY IN THE 20th CENTURY AND ITS INFLUENCE

A Human as integral individuality in the Russian Psychology:
The ideas and empirical research (1960-2010)*
Natalia Loginova
(Saint-Petersburg State University – Russia)
a_loginova@mail.ru

The problem of a human’s bio-social unity, psychology of personality and a human being as a whole became the focal point for discussion at a number of scientific conferences held in 1960 – 1980 in The Soviet Union. These scientific events had a social background in some important changes after Stalin’s death (1953), release of social and intellectual activity of the Soviet intelligentsia. Different terms, the most frequent being “personality”, and “individuality”, “subject”, have denoted a human as a psychological issue. In the Soviet Union, the philosophy of Marxism and the system approach used to serve as a foundation for research in this area. Soviet psychologists were mainly inspired by new ideas borrowed from biology, cybernetic, engineering sciences and philosophical works (I.V. Blauberg, V.N. Sadovsky, V.G. Afanasyev and others).

Extensive empirical research on integral individuality was organized and developed by B.G. Ananiev (Saint-Petersburg, 1963-1976), V.S .Merlin (Perm, 1968-1980s), E.A. Golubeva
Ananiev’s work was noted particularly for its holism – considering the wholeness of the individuality. The Ananiev’s theory has been referred to as an “anthropological psychology”. It means that psychological phenomena are regarded as attributes of a complete human structure, or as a “system foundation” of psyche. Ananiev developed and turned to truth the anthropological principle in his so-called comprehensive or systemic-complex research activity (1965-1972) which were targeted to the laws of multilevel human structure integration and individual uniqueness. The research was not completed due to the emergent Ananiev death in 1972. Nevertheless, they had a great impact into nowadays-Russian psychology. I am going to tell more about this research in my report.

The Perm psychological school headed by V.S. Merlin has become widely known of its research in the field of integral individuality and their style (cognitive, communicative, practical end so on). There were conducted many different empirical research in the fields of labour, communication, cognitive activity, sport activity and other. They discovered the multiple correlations between different levels of personality structure. So they prove a psychobiosocial structure of individuality.

In Moscow, Psychological Institute E.A. Golubeva and her cooperators have been the followers of the well-known Russian Soviet psychologists B.M. Teplov and V.D. Nebylitsyn. They studied different correlations between psychological features and properties of nervous system. In 1980s, Golubeva suggested the new personality (individuality) structure scheme.

Another Moscow research group headed by K.A. Abulkhanova and A.V. Brushlinsky followed S.L. Rubinstein defining the problem in terms of the subject (agent of activity). They focused on the social activity and creativity of individual in planning and realizing their life course. On my opinion, they are the most influenced leaders of the Russian psychology in the modern Russian psychology.

In 1980-1990, there occurred an “anthropological shift” in the humanities and psychology in Russia. B.G. Ananiev on one side and S.L. Rubinstein on the other had prepared that shift. In the post-Soviet, period “anthropologism” has actually become a popular trend in psychology (B.S. Bratuse, V.I. Slobodchikov, E.I. Isaev and others). That scientific trend has been influenced by classic Russian philosophy of the early 1900s and Christian orthodox thought.

In the present time, we can see a significant growth of the publications on the psychological anthropology including the life course and existential psychology in the Russian psychological science. There are two distinctive trends. First one is close to the natural science and the other one – to the humanities.

* The paper is sponsored by The Russian Fund of Humanitarian Research, project #14-06-00668.

References
Soviet psychology was kept within the framework of a mono methodological trend based on philosophy of dialectical materialism. Among the trends, which started developing in post-Soviet Russia, Christian Orthodox Psychology (Christian Anthropology) stands out. Unlike the majority of post-Soviet developments, this is an entirely authentic trend, closely related to Russian culture, grounding on Russian authors, and appealing to Russian mentality.

Christian Orthodox psychology is continuing a tradition, rooted in the pre-Soviet period, which was flourishing then, but was entirely abandoned for 70 years of the Soviet power. At the beginning of the 20th century, an important place in Russian psychology was occupied by Christian Orthodox psychology. Professors of Universities’ history, philosophy and philology departments as well as clergymen at the Russian Orthodox Church Academies and seminaries contributed to this trend [e.g., 2; 3; 6]. This trend emerged virtually simultaneously with the one oriented to standards of natural sciences, which later dominated in Soviet psychology, and was developing in constant polemics with the latter [8]. This determined general focus of Russian psychology on the philosophical problem of human nature as a unity of spirit and matter.

The natural science approach was rooted in the philosophy of Nikolai Chernyshevsky (1828-1889) and followed by Sechenov (1829-1905), Pavlov (1849-1936), and Ukhtomsky (1875-1942), etc. The idealistic Christian Orthodox approach was rooted in the works of Vladimir Solov’ov (1853-1900), who was followed by Berdyaev (1874-1948), Sergey Trubetskoy (1862-1905) and Yevgeny Trubetskoy (1863-1920), Semion Frank (1877-1950), Karsavin (1882-1952), Lopatin (1855-1920), Losskiy (1870-1965), etc.

Interestingly, many of these authors chose their way through a denial of the opposing ideological position. Chernyshevsky and Pavlov began their education in a theological seminary; Ukhtomskiy was a student of the Theological Academy. Contrariwise, Solov’ov began his career as a student of the Physics and Mathematics Faculty of the Moscow University, but having attended lectures of the idealist philosopher Pamphyl Yurkevich (1826-1874) he quit and turned to humanities.

The key points of the Orthodox psychology were [8]: a) taking psyche for an independent entity, whose laws are not reducible to the laws of the material world; b) reliance on introspection; c) statement of the continuity of consciousness process (i.e., denying the existence of unconscious mental phenomena); d) specific understanding of the freedom of human will: not as freedom from external compulsion, but as freedom of personality from his/her own passions.

After the victory of the Bolsheviks in 1917, the new government brought under control all spheres of social life including science. The dialectical materialism of Marx, Engels and Lenin was supposed to be the base for the unanimity. Idealism was outlawed. In August 1922 scientists who were sharing idealistic views, were exiled. Thus, Christian Psychology ended in Soviet Russia and connections between psychology and theology seemed to be broken forever.

Now we are witnessing a revival. This trend is growing vigorously in the last decades. Russian Scientific Citation Index (RSCI) shows 202 journal papers on Christian Orthodox
Anthropology since 2001, given only one journal paper from 1991 to 2000. Among the most cited papers, we can name [1; 4; 5; 9; 10, 12]. There are also noteworthy monographies [11; 13].

However, the new Orthodox psychology is substantially different from that of the beginning of the XX c. The “old” Orthodox psychology focused on philosophical and theoretical issues and developed in polemics with other theoretical approaches in contemporary psychology, Russian and international. The XXI c. Orthodox psychology avoids debate, masks theoretical contradictions with other approaches, and addresses mainly the general reader and psychological practices. The paper aims to analyze the causes and consequences of the historical development of the trend.

References

Same rivers and other waters: Discussions on psychology lectures at high school in Lithuania in thirties and nineties of the 20th century
Junona S. Almonaitienė
(Kaunas University of Technology – Lithuania)
junona.almonaitiene@gmail.com

First steps of psychology teaching at high school in Lithuania followed the steps of its teaching in late imperial Russia in the early 20th century. As Tolstych (2010) claims, psychology teaching was included into the general school programmes in Russia in 1906 as a part of philosophy propaedeutics. This was the case at least in some Lithuanian gymnasia in 1906 too (as the country was a part of the Russian Empire then), and it became a common practice later. Russian educational tradition wasn’t broken immediately in Lithuania after gaining Independence in 1918. Popular Russian “Psychology textbook” for high schools written by Georgy Chelpanov
was translated into Lithuanian by two independent translators and published in 1921 and 1922; the first one was slightly adapted, supplied with an original list of additional readings and a vocabulary worked up by translator, Mečislovas Reinys. It was the most popular psychology textbook during the two decades before the Second World War, and the popularity may be explained, at least partially, by its accordance to the traditions of educational system. As outlined by Byford (2008, p. 286-287), the Chelpanov’s textbook contained a number of topics from the classical philosophical repertoire, and introspection was used as effective pedagogical device in it.

In the mid-thirties, the reform educational system was initiated by Lithuanian Ministry of Education, and discussions concerning the content, amount and role of psychology lectures at high school started. However, the reform hadn’t been fully implemented before the Second World War. Radical changes in high school curricula were made during the occupations. Psychology as a science and as a school subject was imperatively regulated in the USSR. As a result of the Pavlovian sessions held in the fifties, most of psychology science started to be treated as unacceptable from an ideological point of view. Psychology was then excluded out of high school curriculum in Lithuania, and its knowledge wasn’t easily accessible in other ways after that, too.

After regaining Lithuanian Independence in 1990, the memories still were alive that “psychology as a subject was once in a high school’s curriculum”. But, several generations grew up having quite sparse encounters with psychology knowledge presented by professionals, either as some kind of popularization, or through applications in such fields as education or health care.

Thus, in such context, two main questions will be examined in my paper. The first objective is to compare expectations concerning the role of psychology as a high school curriculum subject in the thirties and in the nineties, as they may be revealed from public discussions. The second aim is to analyze some important points of the discussions in both cases: who were eager to participate, and in what roles; in what contexts did the discussions take place, etc. The focus lies, on the whole, on the expectations concerning psychology teaching at high school expressed by educators, parents (the “public demand for psychology knowledge”, according to Smith, 2013), and suggestions discoursed by professionals, in two different historical and cultural contexts.

The methods include analysis of the curricula of psychology teaching at high school in Lithuania in the thirties and in the nineties; analysis of the discussions held in professional and popular periodical press, dissection of materials of the conferences devoted to the role and place of teaching psychology at school, and similar sources; interviews with key persons involved in the discussions and curriculum creation process in the nineties.

References
Revisionist Revolution in Vygotsky Studies:  
The State of the Art and New Perspectives  
Anton Yasnitsky  
anthon.yasnitsky@gmail.com  
René van der Veer  
(Leiden University – Netherlands)

The proposed presentation will consist of two parts.
In the first part we overview the state of the art of the major tripartite project that we generally term “The Revisionist Revolution in Vygotsky Studies” and discuss its three constitutive elements (and phases of its development), which resulted in four major publications (partially in press by the end of June, 2016) such as:

First, The Cambridge Handbook of Cultural-Historical Psychology (Cambridge University Press, 2014);

Second, Revisionist Revolution in Vygotsky Studies (Routledge, 2015) and Vygotski revisitado: una historia crítica de su contexto y legado (Miño y Dávila, 2016); and, finally,

Third, Vygotsky: An Intellectual Biography (Routledge, in press; anticipated release 2016-17).

Our current work is focused on the investigation of the life stories, theories, and the social construction of the scientific legacy of the scientific circle of Russian scholars Lev Vygotsky (1896-1934) and Alexander Luria (1902-1977) (the so-called Vygotsky-Luria Circle). The three stages correspond to our effort to, first, present Vygotsky-Luria’s integrative project of integrative bio-social “cultural-historical psychology” in its actual contemporary implementation by the scholars from North America, West Europe, Middle East, Africa and Russia. Then, second, we studied the history of this intellectual movement and its social construction in the “East” and the “West” (where the former denotes the countries of the former Soviet Union, primarily Russia, and the later includes mainly North America and the Spanish/castellano-speaking world across the Ocean). If the first and the second phases can be understood as thesis and antithesis, then the synthesis is provided in the third part of the project that reconstructs the life story and the intellectual legacy of Lev Vygotsky—during his life time and, to some extent, posthumously.

This concludes the first part of our conference talk.

In the second part of this conference presentation we speculate about the possible ways of this project development in the future given the considerable interest in Vygotsky’s legacy worldwide and, on the other hand, contemporary—local and global—challenges to psychology and allied sciences.

References


The current understanding of the role played in the history of psychology by the German philosopher Christian Wolff (1679-1754) is, to say the least, ambiguous. On the one hand, a great deal of traditional history of psychology literature doesn’t even mention him, or simply treats his psychology as nothing but a minor and long gone “philosophical past” of psychology. On the other hand, for the historiography of eighteenth-century psychology and human sciences, as well as for many Wolff scholars, Wolff’s psychology is recognized as a major topic for the understanding of the development of psychology as a new scientific field. This puzzling situation has, of course, several reasons, including an evident difference between those groups on a meta-historiographical level (they differ on what they understand as history, psychology, philosophy, science, and so on). But that’s not all, for, even in the most specialized literature on Wolff’s psychology and its period, there are still some gaps that seem to contribute to this ambiguity. One of them is the poor sense we still have of Wolff’s ‘German psychology’. That is, most studies that are exclusively or partially concerned with Wolff’s psychology tend to emphasize his widely-known Latin works: Psychologia Empirica (1732) and Psychologia Rationalis (1734). Only a minor amount of attention is given to his German works such as Deutsche Metaphysik (1720), Anmerckungen zur Deutschen Metaphysik (1724) and Ausführliche Nachricht (1726), where his psychology is first developed. Associated with this source emphasis, there is another important feature of the literature: most of it consists of almost purely internalist analyses. This implies a superficial understanding of how integrated Wolff’s thought, professional life, and general context were. As we see it, these gaps result in a lack of comprehension not only of Wolff’s psychological thinking, but also of its significance to eighteenth-century’s German intellectual world and, ultimately, of its role in the history of psychology. It is true that some recent studies on Wolff already aim at rectifying this situation. Nonetheless, these studies are far from being integrated, and we still lack an adequate historical and philosophical account of Wolff’s psychology which considers his German psychological works and their context. The present study is intended to contribute to this account. Firstly, along with a conceptual and theoretical exposition of Wolff’s German psychological writings, we undertake an analysis of their relation to his work as a professor in the recently founded University of Halle, and to the tensions he found in early-enlightened Germany. Pari passu, we consider some receptions (consonant and dissonant) of Wolff’s work in early eighteenth-century German psychological debates, and the influence that these debates, in turn, exerted upon him. Finally, we provide a critical analysis of both historiographical and specialized secondary literature. In so doing, we hope not only to clarify our perspective on the significance of Wolff in the history of psychology but also to contribute to further debates in the historiography of psychology, as well as in Wolff scholarship.

* This study was financially supported by the CNPq - Brazil (National Council for Scientific and Technological Development - Brazil)
References


On the development of psychology during the 18th century

Horst- Peter Brauns & David Miller
(Free University of Berlin – Germany)
horst-peter.brauns@fu-berlin.de

Broadly speaking, historical generalizations, particularly in the form of developmental processes, carry certain temporal characteristics like extension, course or differentiation, e.g. However, they are not explicitly mentioned mostly but must be inferred. This state favours various as well as vague interpretations. In order to counteract this undesirable affair, we propose to apply the so called time-criteria-design. Here, development will be operationalized as differences of criteria between points in time, whereby points in time can vary in number and criteria can be of various types. This design promises some flexibility, because it allows to use not only criteria differences at different points in time interindividually but also intraindividually.

In this paper, for various reasons, a limited number of points in time and criteria will be selected. Both are bound to two eminent scholars of one century who lived at different times therein and worked productively and quite influential in the same field besides others, namely psychology. By this, we intend to make visible interscholar development and to draw thereon historic-empirical generalizations respectively.

Implementing our historiographical design on the development of psychology during the 18th century, we selected Wolff (1679-1754) and Jakob (1759-1827). As sources we took: The "New Edition" of "Rational Thoughts on God, the World and the Human Soul" (1751) of the former, and of the latter the second edition of "Outline of Empirical Psychology" (1795) and the third edition of "Outline of General Logics" (1794).

As criteria for structuring the field of inquiry dubbed psychology we introduced besides others: central concepts of content, the scope or range which they cover as well as methodical considerations. In addition, more formal aspects like number, differentiation or degree of specialization were used. They allow to summarize around the fifties of the century a dichotomized science with a theologicalized but nevertheless explicative concept of soul. It comprises a lot of molar units ranging from sensation over representation, fantasy, memory,
desire, attention to intellect, reason and will, mainly conceptualized by qualitative terms. A distinct minority of quantitative terms like degree, strength and contemporaneity as well as the disposition of sensitivity are globally structured. The mind-body relation finds its solution by recurring to a pre-established harmony approach. Both branches - empirical and rational psychology - are governed by a multidisciplinary monomethod (cf. Brauns, 2002). Shortly before the turn of the century we find an unitary psychological science, having dismissed "the whole rational psychology" as a project "originated from a misunderstanding" with the consequence of "there is ... no rational psychology as a science" (Jakob, 1794, p. 411). Belonging to a broader concept of anthropology, now an empirical psychology appears with the aim of "searching for the conditions and causes of the phenomena of the soul and explaining them by laws" - with the method "in physics and chemistry" (Jakob, 1794, p. 2) - two sciences however, which were not yet fully quantitatively and experimentally directed in these times. On the other hand, the extant empirical psychology had abandoned the centrality of the soul concept in favour of the term mind and introduced the majority of concepts, in particular the touch sense, accompanied by differentiated quantitative terms. They in turn provided a vocabulary to state research problems which only could be solved by experimental realizations and quantification procedures like measurement (cf. Jakob, 1795, p. 89).

Finally, some farer reaching historical generalizations will be proposed.

References

Bonnet’s and Tetens’s inquiries into human nature and the seeds of the Kantian criticism
Lara Scaglia
(Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona – Spain)
lara.scaglia@gmail.com

The second half of the XVIIIth century was characterized by the research for an effective method to study human nature. On the one hand, traditional metaphysical arguments were no longer able to provide adequate solutions, on the other mathematics with its stable results started to be regarded more and more as a guide for natural scientists, Newton in primis. But what about the inquiry of human knowledge and its objectivity? Does this topic belong to the field of natural sciences? What is the best method to investigate it?

In our talk we would focus on Bonnet and Tetens’ investigations into human nature in order to identify how a common question might lead to different perspectives. The investigations of Tetens and Bonnet are indeed both motivated by the search for an effective method to study human nature, and they also both aim at developing psychology as an independent and autonomous discipline from metaphysics. Yet, the two approaches aren’t identical: while Bonnet proposes an analytical method, Tetens supports a more complex one, combining introspection, analysis and synthesis through analogy. Moreover, their focus and interests are very different: Bonnet’s view seems to be more concerned with the explanation of the actual empirical process of
representation, while Tetens is more interested in the problem of the objectivity of knowledge, an issue that cannot be solved relying on physiology. The question of knowledge, i.e. of the validity of general principle of the thinking is, indeed, to be regarded separately from an empirical research on the process of knowledge and limits have to be traced among the different fields of disciplines confronted with questions on human nature and the world.

In these considerations the seeds of the Kantian criticism can be foreseen: Kant, indeed, in order to focus on knowledge and the question whether metaphysics can be considered as an objective science, develops an inquiry concerning the human faculties, revealing himself a heir of Bonnet’s and Tetens’s intentions. At the same time he stresses - and that’s one of the novelties of his perspective - that the most important question on philosophical purposes doesn’t deal with the process and concrete activity of the human faculties, but rather the justification of the link between representations and objects, at the base of statements of science aiming at objectivity. What is, indeed, this link provided by? What is the criterium to determine statements of knowledge? Kant, isolating this question from empirical ones concerning the concrete process of knowledge develops the heritage of his predecessors while providing grounds to the further flourishing of psychology and philosophy as distinct disciplines.

References

Bridging the gap between post-Kantian idealism and early psychophysiology in 19th century Germany: a study of the concept of apperception in Fichte and Wundt

Liesbet De Kock
(Free University of Brussels – Belgium)
liesbet.dekock@ugent.be

While it is not until the late 1800s that psychology was established as an autonomous science, the emergence of the historiography of scientific psychology is an even more recent development. Comprehensive textbooks on the history of psychology fell from the press only in the 20th century. Especially Boring’s (1929) and Allport’s (1954) work has long been authoritative in this field. However, these classical historical reconstructions were soon criticized for a number of reasons. For one thing, it has been contended that the exclusive focus on the role of natural scientific methodology and empiricist philosophy in the emergence of a science of mind has prevented a proper understanding of the social and intellectual background of early scientific psychology. As a consequence, revisionist histories of psychology have thrived in the past decades (see for example Brock et al. 2005, Pickren & Rutherford 2010, Araujo 2016). A lot, however, remains to be done.
This paper takes one particular gap in the contemporary historiography of psychology as a point of departure, i.e., the almost complete disregard for the relation between early psychophysiology in Germany and post-Kantian idealism. This neglect is surprising, given the ubiquity of idealist metaphysics in German universities during the 19th century, and idealism’s preoccupation with themes (e.g., self-awareness, agency and volition) that were central in early psychophysiological theories. One of the main challenges in this area of research pertains to the apparent incommensurability between idealism’s abstract theories of subjectivity and early psychology’s preoccupation with the way in which mental functions relate to the physiological body.

A particularly fascinating example in this respect is the way in which the concept of ‘apperception’ – a purely formal principle in Kantian philosophy – was transformed into a hypothesized physiological function in Wilhelm Wundt’s voluntarist psychology. This paper aims at introducing an intermediary stage in this apparent historical leap from the transcendental to the psychophysiological understanding of apperception, by analysing the way in which the apperceptive function was gradually inscribed upon the body in Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s Ego-doctrine. That is to say, based on Fichte’s work, I will examine the hypothesis of the idealist body as a systematic and historical tertium quid between transcendentalism and early (voluntarist) psychophysiology, thus putting into question the apparent incommensurability mentioned above. This exploration entails that I will subsequently go into (i) Fichte’s transformation of the transcendental principle of apperception into a function of the articulated body [der artikulierte Leib], and (ii) Wundt’s subsequent adoption of the concept of apperception to indicate one of the main psychophysiological functions of the volitional subject, and a constitutive element of experience. In doing so, the shift in the concept of apperception from a cognitive to a volitional function – one might say from an I think in Kant to an I will in Fichte – and from an abstract representation to an affect emerging from an embodied subject will be highlighted. Not only will this analysis help to attenuate the view of Fichte Ego-doctrine as a disembodied, abstract view of subjectivity, it is also helpful in restoring the intellectual continuity between philosophical idealism and early psychophysiology in Germany.

References
Session 16: Psychology and Catholicism

Biology and Psychology in Fr. Agostino Gemelli’s early studies
Dario De Santis
(University of Milano-Bicocca – Italy)
dario.desantis@unimib.it

After graduating in medicine from Pavia University in 1902 under the guidance of Camillo Golgi – thanks to whom he received a solid grounding in histology and neurophysiology – Gemelli concentrated his energies primarily on biology, although he maintained a certain interest in evolutionary theories and harboured a covert preference for modernist positions. It was only in 1906 that he decided to turn his attentions to psychology, concomitantly with the plan to bring to Italy the initiative already set up in France by Cardinal Mercier, at the time Director of the Institute of Philosophy at the University of Louvain. Thus, with a stringent framework for conducting experiments, Gemelli found in neurophysiological research the most effective epistemological instrument for re-organizing science according to Catholic doctrine. For him, psychic activity constituted the unique feature of man’s existence, and neuroscience – suspended between empirical observation and experimentation – found the way to build a bridge between the individual and the collective dimensions; in other words, it gave form and content to the constellations of anthropological thought which the new Catholic doctrine (in particular the Neo-Scholastic movement) wished to re-define.

Although there is no shortage of studies on Fr. Gemelli’s scientific background, until now the literature has tended to concentrate on the considerable experience he accumulated in the field of psychology before the outbreak of World War I, listing in particular his many trips abroad, especially to Germany – to Bonn to visit Max Verworn (1863-1921) in his physiology laboratory, to Munich to follow the psychiatry lessons given by Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926) and to Wurzburg to visit Oswald Kulpe (1862-1915) and his laboratory – and the events which led to him being offered a lecturing post in experimental psychology at the University of Turin, under the guidance of the physiologist and psychologist Federico Kiesow (1858-1940), a pupil of the father of experimental psychology, Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920).

What has been lacking until now, however, is a specific investigation into the importance of the role that his research in the field of biology, his medical training and his early clinical experiences – for example his work alongside the economist and sociologist Giuseppe Toniolo (1845-1918) at the Occupational Health Clinic in Milan, which introduced him to the sphere of social medicine and the study of workplace health – played in the development of Fr. Gemelli’s work in experimental psychology. In his earliest writings about psychology, he concentrated on the relationships between the emerging empirical psychology and philosophy, physiology and the biological sciences with the aim of legitimizing the scientific study of psychic phenomena by establishing precise and effective experimental procedures, mostly borrowed from the fields of physiology and biology. If the development of a valid, positive method from a physicalist point of view was what accounted for the progress of the natural sciences, then neuroscience, striving to achieve equal scientific and social success, could not but follow in their footsteps.
The present paper will attempt to shed light on the earliest writings published by Fr. Agostino Gemelli between 1906 and 1914, in order to understand to what extent his medical training and, above all, his early research in the field of biology influenced the procedural canons and methods of application which became central both to Gemelli’s own epistemological framework and within the broader and more structured process of the scientific and experimental development of psychology in Italy.

References


---

**Moral Pain**

Robert Kugelmann  
(University of Dallas – USA)  
kugelman@udallas.edu

Moral pain as a topic began to surface in psychology in the 1980s in the context of the sufferings of veterans from the Vietnam War (Marin, 1981). There is now great interest in the “moral injuries” of soldiers. The causes of moral pain are said to be various: betrayal by a leader (Shay, 1994), participation in or witnessing atrocities, the death of friends, enemies, civilians (Litz et al, 2009). Moral pain results from other forms of violence, such as the torture of others (Sengupta, 2002), racist acts, and rape (Thomas, 1998). An implication of this interest in pain caused not necessarily by bodily injury but by unethical behavior is that psychology's conception of pain may need to expand.

With that in mind, I turn to the nineteenth century, when pain was often viewed as a feeling, rather than primarily a sensation associated with tissue damage. There was considerable interest in moral pain, both in scholarly and popular publications. The intention of this presentation is to cast new light on a contemporary problem by recovering historical usages.

Pairing pleasures with pain, John Stuart Mill’s (1863) *Utilitarianism* exemplified earlier usage. Mill argued that pleasures are various and not confined to “those of which swine are capable” (p. 10). Pleasures include those “of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments” (p. 11). As with pleasures, so with pains. Pains result from “the positive evils of life, the great sources of physical and mental suffering—such as indigence, disease, and the unkindness, worthlessness, or premature loss of objects of affection” (p. 21). Pleasure and pain for Mill originated in elementary sensory experience and were transformed by experience. Also describing kinds of pains was the neurologist, Jules Luys (1882), who held that “moral pain
is only the expression of the moral sensibility carried to its maximum of intensity, as physical pain is but the most exquisite form of the physical sensibility thrown into agitation’’ (p. 121).

Early in the twentieth century, sensory pain came to be seen as the only real pain, all others being unpleasant feelings. Typical was this pronouncement by Adolph Wohlgemuth, a psychologist at the University College London (Valentine, 2008):

Pain, in the proper psychological sense of the term, must not be confounded with what is called pain in the ordinary parlance and which is distinguished as “physical or bodily pain” and “mental or moral pain.” … Mental or moral pain … has nothing whatever to do with pain, being merely the unpleasant affective content of a mental experience. (1917, p. 462)

This way of constructing experience prevailed for decades.

A variety of accounts will specify the common meanings of moral pain. The sources for this inquiry will be various: newspaper articles, and psychological, religious, ethical, and medical writings from the mid-nineteenth to the early twentieth century.

Earlier usages include moral pain—in contrast to physical pain—caused by domestic violence (Cecil, 1910). It was the sting of conscience (Brownson, 1884; Remorse, 1906), the shame of having sinned (McLane, 1904). It was felt in response to seeing others degraded (Contagious diseases, 1877), and to the feared meaninglessness of a cosmos without God (Richter, 1890). The Civil War, “the horrid spectacle of war between fellow-men, fellow-citizens, nay, offspring sometimes of the same ancestry” (Bartol, 1861, p. 10) was felt as moral pain. Moral pain was inflicted when one suffered ingratitude and treachery (Candlish, 1897). For Leuba (1919), moral pain was felt with “the dread of sickness and age, the wearisome struggle to keep up with the demands of society and of one’s better self, the wickedness of duplicity, pride, and hatred” (p. 203). Influenced by French usage, “moral” sometimes meant “mental” pain, a cause of melancholia (Masson, M. & Muirheid-Delacroix, 2014). Sensitivity to moral pain was the ability to empathize with others (Perfect nurse, 1889; Thompson, 1904). Some meanings contrasted moral and physical pain, with the clear implication that the two were different forms of the same thing (Ribot, 1896). Hall (1899) advised spanking as a way to associate physical with moral pain in children.

References
How to measure the soul? Psychology, neo-thomism and the Franco Regime*
Annette Mülberger
(Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona – Spain)
annette.mulberger@uab.cat

The paper traces different kinds of psychology which were practiced in Spain after the Civil War. Historians have divided the Franco era in different periods. In this research I will focus mainly on the first period in which the censorship and governmental control was strongest. The period following the Civil War meant years of penury, hardship, economical autarchy, military terror and censorship. The universities degenerated, the former scientific institutions were closed and many of the leading psychologists were dead or in exile. While the Second World War found its end, Spain was slowly recovering. With the gradual loosening of the regime, new possibilities for the re-introduction of a science (such as psychology) into the academic system took place. It was a period in which the Spanish Government sought for an alliance with the Catholic Church and, especially with the Jesuit Company. Officially the regime fostered neo-scholasticism and called back from Rome the Dominican monk Manuel Barbado who would be in charge of regulating the training in philosophy and psychology. He had great plans with regard to the development of both disciplines but did not live long enough to real-ize them. After him, it would be mainly Juan Zaragieta (1883-1974) who would try to pursue Barbado’s plans. In 1946 he and his collaborators managed to launch the first Spanish journal, specialized in psychology.

In this research I will deal mainly with the tensions between, on the one hand, an effort made by Spanish psychologists at that time to keep up with modern foreign trends, while, on the other hand, they had to keep their discourse within the official neo-scholastic conceptual framework. In this analysis, a look at differential psychology turns out to be very helpful. It was a kind of psychology pursued by researchers in Madrid and Barcelona in the 1940s and 1950s with the help of psychotechnics and psychometrics. At that time it already counted with a long tradition, as scholars had tried to identify and study human differences for centuries. During the first half of the 20th century modern techniques such as psychotechnics and psychometrics proved
especially instrumental for such an endeavour. Referring to the political background of democracy and meritocracy, some historians have already pointed out the strong relation between psychological testing (or IQ psychology) and state management, united by the aim of ordering and classifying citizen.

How could such a psychology be made compatible with Catholicism? After the Civil War the Jesuit priest F. M. Palmés (1879-1963) returned from exile, developing his ‘moral psychotechniques’ and becoming one of the most relevant figures in the field in his country. During the same years also the group of psychologists in Madrid, with J. Zaragüeta and J. Germain (1897-1986) as leading figures, were actively promoting such a psychology. In my paper I will show that while these Spanish psychologists lived in a country dominated by Catholicism and a restrictive regime, they developed several strategies to make their psychology compatible with the exigencies of a dogma based on the idea of a unified, substantial human soul.

*This research was supported by the Spanish Ministry (MINECO; project HAR2014-58699-P)

References

What could a Neo-Scholastic Experimental Psychology be?
Circulating Models for Psychology between Louvain and Madrid
Sigrid Leyssen
(Centre Alexandre Koyré – Paris)
sigrid.leyssen@ehess.fr

At the end of the 19th century, when founding the neo-scholastic Institut Supérieur de Philosophie in Louvain, Belgium, Désiré Mercier (1851-1926) set out the contours for an institutional experiment in psychology: it was an experiment on what an experimental psychology done by Catholics could look like. Albert Michotte (1881-1965) was one of Mercier’s students who got the chance to perform this experiment. He managed to put the psychological laboratory located at the Louvain philosophy institute firmly on the international map, its work recognised by colleagues both catholic and non-catholic, thanks to its neo-scholastic framework for some, in spite of it for others. Of his many international students, a good amount came from catholic institutions which would send their students interested in psychology to study with Michotte. In this talk, I will first analyse Michotte's way of doing experimental psychology within the neo-scholastic institute where he had his laboratory. Second, I will look at Michotte's interactions with one of his students, the Spaniard Mariano Yela (1921-1994) and at how the latter represented Michotte in his writings. Looking at these different generations and places, my aim is to study the
exchange of models for doing experimental psychology in a catholic, neo-scholastic context: models for the figure of a catholic experimental psychologist, and for the roads that experimental psychology should take.

References

Stigmata and celebrity at the turn of the 20th century in France and Spain
Andrea Graus
(University of Antwerp – Belgium)
andrea.graus@uantwerpen.be

In recent years, celebrity studies have attracted a great deal of scholarly attention. Much of the research understands celebrity as a product of modernity. Mass media and the emergence of a ‘mass society’ are characterized as key factors in the formation of celebrity. Such assumptions have proven to be effective when analysing celebrity from a top-down perspective. In this vein, we still know little about the ‘audience’ of the celebrity culture – the fans –, about their role in the social construction of famous individuals and the relationship they establish with them.

Celebrity culture has been frequently related to the cult of saints comparing, for instance, the commodification of famous people with the commercialization of relics, devotional cards and other religious memorabilia. However, there is not much research on the reverse side of this relationship: looking into religious personalities as socially constructed celebrities. Hundreds of examples can be traced through history, from Saint Francis of Assisi to Pope Francis.

In this talk, I will focus on a type of religious celebrity that attracted the crowds at the turn of the 20th century: the stigmatized (female) mystics. Popular examples include the Belgian Louise Lateau (1850-1883) and the German Therese Neumann (1898-1962). For this presentation, I have chosen two less known cases that bring the possibility for a transnational approach: the French Marie-Julie Jahenny (1850-1941) and the Spanish Margalida Amengual (1888-1918). These (lay) women, Franciscan tertiaries, carried the stigmata from a young age. Soon, the isolated villages where they lived started to be filled with thousands of visitors wishing to see the ‘sacred wounds’. Many of them would soon become their fervent ‘fans’ and followers.

How did visitors know about Marie-Julie and Margalida’s stigmata? What were they searching for in their trips – perhaps, pilgrimages – to the mystics’ houses? What did they feel being confronted by ‘the divine spectacle of the wounds’? What did they take back with them? Through which means did they spread the message? How did they interact with the mystics after their death, and how did they preserve their memory? Focusing on religious personalities, as well
on their visitors – the audience – fills a gap in the celebrity studies research. Moreover, it shows the importance of the word-of-mouth communication for the construction of celebrity, to the detriment of the widespread assumption that the media is key to the celebrity culture.

References:

SESSION 17: SCIENTISTS IN MODERN SOCIETY

Human scientists as public intellectuals. The case of Frederik Buytendijk
Ruud Abma
(Utrecht University – Netherlands)
 r.abma@uu.nl

Apart from teaching and doing research, academics may spend part of their time in ‘valorizing’ their knowledge for society. Within the human sciences this can take either the form of social technology, e.g. psychological tests in order to select the right man for the right job, or some form of education: helping people to understand the complexities of the society they’re living in. This can be done directly – by writing and speaking for a lay audience – or indirectly – by interacting with professionals who are in touch with the public.

Exerting educational influence like this requires some form of intellectual authority. It also requires a vision, including a sensitivity for actual problems, and a capacity for problem formulations accustomed to addressing the ‘needs of the era’. People who fulfill this role can be called ‘public intellectuals’. The regard for public intellectuals in the domain of the human sciences has varied, depending on the contemporary degree of ‘scientism’: the more the progress of science, strictly speaking, is the aim, the more often public intellectual activities by scientists are discouraged.

An interesting case of intellectual authority is to be found in the history of the catholic community in the Netherlands. In 1948, the physiologist, and self-taught philosopher and psychologist, Frederik Buytendijk, then in his early sixties, became the president of the Catholic Society for the Enhancement of Mental Health (KCV). Two years earlier he had been appointed as professor of psychology at Utrecht University. And in 1938 he had converted from Protestantism to Catholicism.

Under his leadership, the KCV became an important force in modernizing Dutch Catholicism in the 1950s and 1960s. In the paper, I will demonstrate how he used concepts and insights from personalist and existentialist psychology to educate both pastoral workers and
catholic citizens about marital and family relations, adolescent sexuality and the treatment of neuroses in members of the clergy. Buytendijk used a specific mixture of psychology and philosophy as a lever to loosen up the rigid catholic doctrine on sexuality that had been dominant in The Netherlands since the early twentieth century. How did he succeed in traversing the gap between scientific rigor and public intellectual authority?

References

“Applied” versus “Basic” Research:

*Work Psychology and its Search of Identity in Finland between the 1960s and the 1980s*

Petteri Pietikäinen

(University of Oulu – Finland)
petteri.pietikainen@oulu.fi

This presentation approaches the history of work psychology (also called occupational psychology) in Finland from the perspective of socially informed intellectual history. My focus will be on work psychology’s search for a theoretical foundation and disciplinary autonomy as a “basic” science in the golden age of the welfare state, i.e. between the 1960s and the 1980s. Work psychology and its near-equivalents, especially industrial and organizational psychology, have traditionally been described as “applied psychologies” that employ theories and methods developed in “general” or “basic” psychology. At the same time, work psychologists have not necessarily been content with identifying themselves as applied researchers who depend on the intellectual achievements of “basic” or laboratory-based psychology. I will argue that a characteristic feature of the university-based work psychology in Finland was its search for scientific and disciplinary independence and autonomy, which especially in the 1970s found outlet in the somewhat frustrated discussions about the importance of and difficulty in developing a theoretical foundation for work psychology. By contrast, psychologists who readily identified themselves as applied psychologists – especially occupational health psychologists – expressed no such qualms or worries about the lack of independent theory in work psychology: they were experts whose skills and services were considered important by the public sector (state, municipalities) as well as by the private sector. Work psychology was applied psychology, but for Finnish academic work psychologists it was, or should have been, more than that, namely an independent discipline with a firm identity of a science.

References
Historical Illiteracy? The “Lombroso’s Trial” and the Whiggish bias in the Public Understanding of History of Science

David Ceccarelli
(University of Rome “Tor Vergata” – Italy)
dave.ceccarelli@gmail.com

Several scholars in the last decades have highlighted how history and philosophy may be useful in scientific education. Furthermore, it seems increasingly clear that the lack of “scientific citizenship” (Jasanoff 2005) does not depend on a mere informative deficit. A science-informed decision-making needs not only an adequate level of scientific literacy, but also a deeper understanding of the nature of science (NOS) that could be provided by a historical-epistemological informed approach (Abd-El-Khalick, Lederman 2000). The lack of such awareness, we argue, leads to several misunderstandings about NOS aspects that are still widespread in the public sphere.

The present proposal aims at highlighting the backlashes of a historical and epistemological illiteracy in scientific dissemination by looking through a recent case study which has upset the Italian public opinion: the “Lombroso’s trial”. As several committees have tried to collect signatures in order to close down the Museum of Criminal Anthropology “Cesare Lombroso” (Turin) demanding the restitution of the human remains stored in the structure, a broad argument seems to have risen among most of the supporters of such a plea: that Lombroso’s work, beyond its racial biases, was “unscientific” in so far as it has been disproved by successive anthropological researches in the twentieth century. The museum would not have reason to exist because the theories that lie behind its materials have been disowned. Thus Lombroso’s criminological theories should be “officially removed” from scholastic texts not only for their supposed controversial effects on modern social values but, most importantly, because they were just untrue. Reacting to such views, many scholars and institutions have pointed out how nothing of celebrative or even apologetic could be retraced in the museum exhibits. Further, we suggest that behind the plea against the museum two main biases regarding the public understanding of NOS could be detected:

- That counterfeit theories do not deserve to be regarded as scientific, thus history of science is only the history of confirmed theories.
- That “true” science is an activity free from any extra-scientific discourse. According to this general outlook, Lombroso was firstly wrong because he was influenced by his pre-scientific ideas.
Both these conceptions seem to bring up again a “whiggish” view of history of science, which still represents a standard condition in the public understanding of NOS. The relevance of such biases will be examined by analyzing the political initiatives and publications of the committees in the light of the NOS values recognized in the STS and in epistemology: tentativeness, creativity, independence of thought, an empirical base, testability, subjectivity and cultural embeddedness (Duschl 1990; Matthews 1992; Abd-El-Khalick, Lederman 2000). Far from rehabilitating Lombroso’s theories, whose theoretical and methodological frailties need, evidently, to be contextualized in nineteenth-century historical framework (Gould 1981; Gibson 2002; Gatti, Verde 2012), this contribution will thus try to point out how most of this controversy could be reconsidered as the outcome of the underestimation of the above described assumptions.

References

Human territorial aggression and the 1960s ‘population bomb’
Annukka Sailo
(University of Oulu – Finland)
annukka.sailo @oulu.fi

The growing awareness of population explosion in the 1960s led to many doomsday predictions that later proved to be false. Without denying the negative consequences of the rapid population growth, I claim that the hysteria around the ‘population bomb’ had an effect on analyzing human behavior and vice versa. One example of such an effect was territorial aggression and the wider idea of the density-dependency of aggression. Political theory has long used the terms territory and territoriality mainly to refer to sovereign states, and urban sociology in the 1920s also used them for analyzing the social behavior of different groups, gangs, and individuals. In the 1960s, though, the term territoriality was informed by research and theories from the field of ethology, the study of animal behavior in natural environments. The ethologically derived concept of aggressive territoriality quickly spread to psychology and other human and social sciences as well as to the popular discussion of aggression.

In ethology, aggression regulation was one of the most important functions of animal territoriality. On one hand, claiming and defending territory caused aggression: The closer to the center of its territory the animal was, the more aggressively it defended it. On the other hand,
Territoriality, as an essential element of social organization, helped to reduce violence and competition. Ritualized aggression made the boundaries of territories evident and violence unnecessary. Territorial aggression also caused the animals to space out in such a way that survival necessities were guaranteed and population levels stayed stable.

Many of the ethologists were hesitant to draw conclusions about human behavior on the basis of their research on non-human animals, but at the same time popular ethology and the so-called human ethology gained growing attention. Analogies between animal and human behavior were made, but also widely debated. The single most important work popularizing the idea of human territorial instinct was Robert Ardrey’s *The Territorial Imperative*.

Whether understood as an unavoidable instinct or as a part of human behavioral repertoire, human territorial aggression was problematic to the research community. Despite its possibly adaptive origins, it was often seen as harmful and unsuitable to the modern world, even cause of wars. Conservative and militaristic political opinions linked to the idea of the adaptive value of territoriality stirred much controversy. For its proponents, though, one of the biggest problems with human territorial aggression seemed to be its incapacity to fulfill the function of population regulation in the modern world. The assumed stress of overcrowding was feared to cause a catastrophe similar to that described in the famous rodent experiments of John B. Calhoun, in which the population boom was followed by severe psychological disruption and ultimately extinction.

In this paper, I will analyze how and why the problem of aggressive human territoriality raised in importance in social scientific research of the late 1960s.

**References**


**Emergence of epidemiological suicide research in Finland**

Mikko Myllykangas

(University of Oulu – Finland)
mikko.myllykangas@oulu.fi

In this paper I track down the various origins of psychiatric epidemiology and epidemiological suicide research in Finland during the 1960s and 1970s. The history of psychiatric
epidemiology in the Western countries has thus far concentrated on the institutional and conceptual history; meanwhile the social and socio-political contexts of the emerging social psychiatric suicide research have been left for less attention. I argue that the rise to popularity of psychiatric epidemiology in Finland can be attributed to a discursive adaptation inside the field psychiatry as the surrounding social realities rapidly transformed during the decades following World War II. Not only did the structure of the Finnish society change, as the country went through an unprecedentedly fast phase of industrialization, but also the Finnish academia was invaded – sometimes literally – by the so-called “generation of the 60s”. The new generation of university students and psychiatrists welcomed internationally circulating radical concepts of psychiatry and mental illness and sought to challenge traditional understanding of suicide as an individual malady. The traditional, individual oriented models of psychiatry, whether derived from biological psychiatry or from the early 20th century psychological discourse, were deemed outdated in their ability to explain mental disorders and suicide in the modern society.

At the same time, the Finnish health and social policy-making was entering into a phase of “rational planning”, inspired by “social planning” or “social engineering”. As these politically appointed committees were occupied by professionals, the Finnish social policy became a matter of scientific planning during the 1960s and 1970s. Rational, scientific planning called for exact data, and various social phenomena, such as suicide, became an object of inquiry. As the 1970s was the decade during which psychiatric epidemiology emerged in the Finnish psychiatric discourse, I will review social, intellectual and political contexts of the 1960s and 1970s, which can all be seen as giving an incentive to the rise of psychiatric epidemiology and epidemiological suicide research.

References
Kuusi P. (1961). 60-luvun sosiaalipolitiikka [The social policy of the 60s]. WSOY
SESSION 18: SOMEWHERE, BEYOND THE SEVEN SEAS: HUNGARIAN PSYCHOLOGY IN EUROPE IN THE 20TH CENTURY

Panel abstract
Zsuzsanna Vajda, Anna Borgos, Júlia Gyimesi, Melinda Kovai & Csaba Pléh

The 20th century history of Hungary is full of stormy events and enormous political changes. In the same time important processes of modernisation got started at the turn of the 19/20th century. That was an era of intensive development of education and academic life. The burgeoning psychology was one of the most popular fields of science. Interest of the public for psychology survived all political turns and repressions. From the beginning there was a continuity in one of the most important aims of Hungarian professionals: to catch up the "west".

It is doubtful whether the development of psychology, which was not once disrupted by historical events, can be told as a coherent story. In this symposium we only try to flash some episodes which are suitable to show the era and its maybe missed opportunities.

Zsuzsa Vajda's talk is about child psychology, which was among the most popular topics. First books on child development were published about the turn of 19/20th century. Binet's IQ test's Hungarian adaptation had taken place in 1914 and it was a significant event of Hungarian child psychology. The meaning of intelligence and the way of its measuring sparked debates, and remained a popular topic in the next few decades. In spite of the traditionally tight relationships with their German and Austrian colleagues, Hungarian scholars looked with growing interest at the scientific life of North America.

Anna Borgos will talk about a member of Budapest school of psychoanalysis, Vilma Kovács, a "lay analyst", the mother of Alice Bálint. The activities of Vilma Kovács transcended analytic work itself. Her life represents the productive fusion of traditional and modern women’s roles. Apart from her work as a therapist, her roles and influence as an institutional supporter, trainer, organizer, translator, networker, and caregiver were at least as significant in strengthening the status and effectiveness of psychoanalysis and that of intellectual women too.

Julia Gyimesi's paper is about the history of metapsychical research in Hungary. Hungarian Metapsychical Scientific Society was founded in 1932 with the purpose of investigating spiritualistic, magnetic and connected phenomena. Works of metapsychical researchers influenced several representatives of psychology in and beyond Hungary.

The next two presentations are about the development of Hungarian psychology after the World War 2, during the one party system and after its failure. Melinda Kovai's talk outlines how the status and the ideological role of the “West” and Western psychology changed in the different periods of Hungarian state-socialism; how the East-West (or “capitalist”-“socialist”) dichotomy shaped the interpretation of intellectual roles for Hungarian psychologists, their imaginations about the “aims” of psychology, as well as the organization of professional communities.

With the advent of capitalist democracy, psychology has become a central player both in the public mind and political practice – a psychiatrist becoming a foreign minister, and three psychologists state secretaries - and in the higher education publication and research domains as well. Important institutional changed had also taken place as it will be presented in Csaba Pléh's talk. He addresses the changes of recent decades in training, research, the development of publication trends and applied psychology.
International Orientation of Hungarian Child Psychology
in the First Half of the 20th Century
Zsuzsanna Vajda
(Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church in Hungary - Hungary)
vajdazsuzsanna@gmail.com

The half century of existence of the dualistic Austro-Hungarian Empire was the era of cultural and economic prosperity in Hungary. In these decades the country really embarked upon modernization due to a couple of special social circumstances. Up to the beginning of 20th century illiteracy has almost been eliminated, and the school expansion got started. A significant proportion of the population spoke German, human intellectuals wrote and write on both languages but in the same time they were commited to local community. One must also mention here the role of Jewish population which in Hungary before the World War 1 considered itself to be an integral part of national culture. The famous psychologist, Paul Ranschburg was a good exemple for that, being in the same time an experimental psychologist, with an international network and an active participant of establishing special education in Hungary.

First books on child development were published about the turn of the century (Donner, 1898 Pethes, 1901). Hungarian Association of Pedology was founded in 1906. In spite of the traditional tight relationships with German and Austrian colleagues, Hungarian scholars looked at scientific life of North America with growing interest. László Nagy (Nagy, 1907), one of the founding father of Hungarian educational science and child psychology in his paper about the situation of child psychology reported about competing approaches to children's nature and to the appropriate methods of its investigation. He refused the view of the German-American, Hugo Munsterberg, who claimed that children has to be studied only for a better understanding of grown-ups. Nagy emphasized that children's psyche has its own characteristics and education has to be based on psychological knowledge.

Adaptation of Binet's IQ test in 1914 was a significant event of Hungarian child psychology. The meaning of intelligence and the way of its measuring sparked debates, and remained a popular topic in the next few decades. Representatives of various fields of psychology, like Imre Hermann Lipót Szondi (Focher- Lipót, 1919) and the experimental psychologist Pál Harkai Schiller carried out measurements of mental skills of children.

Piaget's work was also followed and reported in Hungarian journals in the thirties by an early died scholar, Elemér Kenyeres. Psychoanalists also had an important contribution to child psychology and they also published for the public.

Although historical circumstances destroyed flourishing Hungarian psychological life, some good traditions of child psychology were preserved even in the time of totalitarian system.

References


---

**Vilma Kovács, the “guardian angel” of Hungarian psychoanalytic society**

Anna Borgos  
(Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience and Psychology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences – Hungary)  
borgosanna@gmail.com

The paper presents and interprets the career of one of the first Hungarian female analysts, Vilma Kovács, in relation to her contemporaries and in the context of her social circumstances. Vilma Kovács went a long way through her life socially and professionally. After being a patient of Ferenczi she became one of his closest colleagues (and the manager of his legacy). Through her second husband she provided significant financial support to the Society; due to that the Hungarian Policlinic could open in 1931 to help patients unable to pay for the treatment and to give space for seminars and meetings (including the technical seminars of Vilma Kovács).

In her therapeutic attitude and case studies she applied the “Ferenczian” active technique with a special attention to the role of the counter-transference. Scientific publication was not her major activity; she published only five articles. Her main field of interest was the process of the analytic training; she organized and described the “Hungarian” training system whose specialty was (and still is) that the first case of the trainee was supervised by his/her own analyst and discussed in an analytic situation. Vilma Kovács is referred the most frequently in this respect, until today.

She also served as an influential model for the younger female analysts of the age (among them her daughter, Alice Bálint, as well as her analysands, Lilly Hajdu, Alice Hermann, and Erzsébet Kardos) creating a personal and professional network around her. The paper shows her contemporary position through her correspondence with her contemporaries too: Ferenczi (and his wife) frequently wrote her from their New York and Baden-Baden trip; the Bálints corresponded along their family connection; Géza Róheim (also her analysand) reported her on his Somalian and Australian fieldworks; and Anna Freud regarding the procession of the Freud–Ferenczi correspondence.

The activities of Vilma Kovács transcended analytic work itself, although her capacities manifested themselves in that too. Her life represents the productive fusion of traditional and modern women’s roles. Apart from her work as a therapist, her roles and influence as an institutional supporter, trainer, organizer, translator, networker, and caregiver were at least as significant in strengthening the status and effectiveness of psychoanalysis and that of intellectual women too.

**References**


From spiritism to metapsychical research: contributions to the history of Hungarian psychology in light of the 20th century occult revival

Júlia Gyimesi
(Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church in Hungary – Hungary)
juliagyimesi@gmail.com

The aim of the paper is to outline the history of the Hungarian Metapsychical Scientific Society in the light of the 19th and 20th century occult revival and the development of modern psychology. The Hungarian Metapsychical Scientific Society was founded in 1932 for the purpose of investigating spiritualistic, magnetic and connected phenomena. The aims of the Society were to understand supernatural experiences and spiritualistic phenomena in a rational, scientific framework, to conduct experiments and publish theoretical studies, to collect data in the field, to publish journals and books on metapsychical research and to establish a library. Although the latter goals were only partially reached, some Hungarian metapsychical researchers (e.g. János Toronyi, Vilmos Tordai, Elemér Chengery Pap, Jenő Hillebrand) won remarkable fame in and beyond Hungary (see Tordai, 1918; Chengery Pap, 1941; Hillebrand, 1940-44; Szirmai, 1941).

A further purpose of the paper is to understand and evaluate the theories of metapsychical researchers taking into account the 20th century political ideologies in Hungary. Growing anti-Semitism and other political tendencies had far-reaching consequences on the evolution of metapsychical research in Hungary, too. As a result, metapsychical research could not continue developing after the WWII (Gyimesi, 2016). However, the works of metapsychical researchers influenced several representatives of psychology in and beyond Hungary.

References
Tordai, V. (1918). Van-e túlvilág? [Does the other world exist?]. Budapest.
Most of the scientific or other types of reflections about the history of Hungarian psychology are founded on the same premises and implicitly endow their object with normative qualities. Such premise is, on the one hand, the conception of “clear science”, the argument that the scientific status of psychology is guaranteed by its independence from its external (economical, political, social) conditions. For this reason, studies focusing on the second half of the 20th century, calling to account this normative quality retrospectively, interpret the status of psychology in the dimensions of “freedom” and “repression”. On the other hand, these interpretations follow a binary narrative of development vs. lagging behind. Even if they reflect on the social context of scientific knowledge, their core premise is that the Western societies and the international (Western) scientific-therapeutic discourse is the actual end point of a universal phylogeny. The Hungarian phenomena are measured as “normal” or “abnormal” (e.g. “underdeveloped”, “distorted”, “handicapped”) against this. Since it makes scientific, historical reflection on the objects of psychological ontology, on the methods of the interventions or on the psychologist community itself impossible, such an essentialist concept of science makes historical analysis indeed impossible.

The fact, that after 1945, most Hungarian psychologist and psychiatrist formed their own professional identity aligned to discourse of lagging behind and catching up with Western colleagues and their achievements, must be handled as the notable object of the analysis and not as its perspective.

The characteristic development-lagging behind discourse of Hungarian psychology in the last century as well as its historical reflection which follows the same narrative belongs to a group of phenomena that the sociological literature on Eastern European post socialist societies (e.g. Bakic-Hayden 1995, Buchowski 2006, Cervinkova 2012, Fehervary 2002, Gille 2010, Gagyi 2014, Hann et al 2002, Kiossev 1999, Melegh 2006) calls self-colonialization. According to the analogy taken from the literature of post colonialism, the “developed West” and the geopolitical dependency on the West (or competition during the cold war) is a fundamental point of reference for Eastern European collective identities. Taking out Western social phenomena from its context, interpreting it as the end point of an “universal” phylogeny and thus internalizing the “inferiority” of their respective culture are the cornerstones of self-colonizing identity.

The presentation shows how the status and the ideological role of the “West” and Western psychology changed in the different periods of Hungarian state-socialism; how the East-West (or “capitalist”-“socialist”) dichotomy shaped the interpretation of intellectual roles for Hungarian psychologists, their imaginations about the “aims” of psychology, as well as the organization of professional communities.

This perspective offers us possibilities to rethink what the examination of the history of Eastern European psychology is good for; what kind of epistemological and methodological viewpoints may emerge when self –colonialization is the object of the analysis and not its perspective.
Half Century of Hungarian psychology: From 1960 to 2010

Csaba Pléh
(Dept of Cognitive Science, CEU - Hungary)
vispleh@ceu.edu

Hungary has certainly undergone several drastic changes during this half century. The dictatorial governing style following the 1956 revolution was gradually softened, followed by radical changes and a move towards a democratic capitalist society far away from the single party system based on a dominance of state ownership. These changes have been accompanied by changes first in the overall possibility of social and human sciences, including psychology, and a move towards a more varied psychology including its applications. Later with the advent of capitalist democracy, psychology has become a central player both in the public mind and political practice – a psychiatrist becoming a foreign minister, and three psychologists state secretaries - and in the higher education publication and research domains as well. Since the works of Kovai (2015), Laine-Fzufgren (2015) and Pléh (1999) have reviewed the relations between the large scale social factors and the proliferation of psychology in Hungary in the given period, the present talk shall concentrate on institutional developments.

Most of the data will be from two types of sources. Public data like publications, university and ministerial documents, and summary of a national workshop to be held about the same topics in 2016 in Budapest.

Several stages can be differentiated in the period surveyed.

1. Reemergence of psychology, 1960-1970
4. Loosening of ideological control.
5. Differentiations with the political democratization, 1990-2010.

Regarding training of psychologists the reemergence was followed by a more theoretically oriented restructurining and the formation of applied postgraduate trainings since 1973 on. In the

References
time between 1960 and 1990 3 schools of Budapest, Debrecen, and Pécs emerged, training roughly about a 100 students every year. Today, 6 schools in a Bologna structured system + 2 system take about 700 undergraduate and 300 graduate students every year. This was accompanied by a PhD system replacing the Soviet style centralized system of candidates of sciences.

Two interesting further aspects of education can be seen in the way centralized ministerial organization and nominals control was replaced by a more self organizing quality assurance system. Another interesting aspect is the survey of curricula. Several key subjects in training shall be analyzed: experimental psychology, personality psychology, and developmental psychology, in the context of the curricula and their reading lists.

In the research domain there were several important developments on the institutional level. First, in the 1960s the exiting Child Psychology Research Institute of the Hungarian Academy was reorganized into an all round research institute. Later, several national research programs on education and social integration were launched (1970s-1980s) which were reaching psychology as well. From the late 1980s on a more Westernized National Science Found type grant system was launched. Psychology had a successful but many times shaky place in these systems, gradually becoming integrated with either education or neuroscience.

One interesting data based aspects of the changes in research is the analysis of publication trends. First, a more Westernized virtual and real reference group can be revealed, later a more Westernized translation trend, with national English publications as well, and finally a move towards international publications.

On the side of applied psychology first the growth of some specific institutional networks shall be analyzed. Child guidance centers and neuropsychiatry consultation posts, and an emerging system of school psychology are such typical networks. Their growth and their difficult financial situation in the new democratic system shall be presented. Alongside with these developments the general growth of psychology as a supporting profession, the reemergence of psychoanalysis, and alternative therapeutic systems will be shown. There are many challenging social issues related to this move towards a psychological society, but there is a central institutional aspect as well. How did the different postgraduate training subsystems develop, what is the rivalry between the psychological and medical professions in their actual workings.

References
SESSION 19: PSYCHOLOGY IN ARGENTINA

Psychology, society and politics in the work of José Ingenieros (Argentina, 1900-1925): the role of expert knowledge in the intellectual Latin American.

Ana María Talak
(Universidad Nacional de La Plata – Argentina)
atalak@hotmail.com / atalak@psico.unlp.edu.ar

Some papers have analyzed the psychological work of José Ingenieros (1877-1925), focusing in different aspects of his broad theoretical and empirical production: from general presentations (Foradori, 1944; Ardila, 1970, 1989, 2000) to studies focused in some topics of his social thought (Rodríguez Kauth, 1996; Castro & Blanco, 1998; Carpintero, 2015), his general biological and genetic approach to psychology (Papini, 1985; Talak, 2001), his criminological psychology (Ríos, 1997; Talak & Ríos, 2001), and his historical studies of psychology (Talak, 2002), among others. Other kinds of works have examined his socio-political and philosophical ideas, establishing no relation with his psychological thought (for example, the known books of Oscar Terán, 1986, 2000, 2008a, 2008b). In this paper, we analyze the relationship between his psychological ideas and his political and social thought, during different periods of his work. From a global point of view, we distinguish the first period from 1900 until he resigned from the university professorship (1911) and his trip to Europe; we focused a second period from his return to Argentina in 1915 to his death in 1925. We sustain that the main psychological ideas that he developed and published during what we have called the first period, and that were apparently abandoned and changed into new political, historical and philosophical interests after his return to Argentina, were present in his socio-political and philosophical views he developed from 1915. We even argue that the core psychological ideas that he maintained during this second period are indispensable for understand his later political ideas and his intellectual interventions in field of Latin American political ideas.

In order to prove those theses, we first present the core psychological ideas of José Ingenieros (Principios de psicología biológica, 1911), and the former relations with the social and political values present in his approaches of clinical (Ingenieros 1904, 1907), social (Ingenieros, 1918) and crime problems (Ingenieros, 1916). We show that those values were not identified for the author because of the naturalistic framework of his psychology. We sustain that he naturalized the values of his social group, and understood the human being and the psychological and social problems from those bias values. We examine some ideas of El hombre mediocre (1913) to show the links between psychological ideas and political values. We also consider that this book acted as a bridge between academic ideas and a broader public of readers, and played a transitional role with his later political and philosophical interests.

Then, we show the main political ideas of what we called the second period in relation with his philosophical framework of science and knowledge, and their role he assigned to them in the history and social progress (for example, but no only, Ingenieros, 1817, 1918b). Here we identified the core psychological ideas present in his political and philosophical theses, and role they played in the new framework. While the latter psychological ideas were now not detected by Ingenieros, the political topics were in the first place and explicitly considered by the author.
Finally, we consider the main psychological explanations of the historical change and the relations between the great men and ordinary people, the ideals and the customs in the way he claimed for a Latin American perspective and was recognized as a Latin American intellectual.

The historiographical approach of this paper adopts the conceptual analyze of the intellectual history, but includes the contributions of the feminist epistemology regarding the claims of situated knowledge and of the values in the production of scientific knowledge.

References


In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, hypnosis became a valuable topic of Buenos Aires culture. It reached its place through different paths. On the one hand, the experiences made by physicians who were eager to replicate in the local context the usefulness of a therapeutic tool that was so popular among their European colleagues, must be considered. On the other hand, from the very beginning, healers and stage illusionists also took advantage of that tool, either with the aim of offering relief for several illnesses or to entertain nosey audiences. However, in this list of practitioners it is necessary to add other characters. Local spiritualists contributed greatly in spreading the news. They did so not only through the publication in their journals of foreign news dealing with hypnotism, but also by applying hypnotic maneuvers during their mediumistic sessions. In such process of local dissemination of hypnosis those followers of spiritualism and theosophy also took part, founding in 1896 the Sociedad Magnetológica, which soon was equipped with a consulting room and had its Review in order to publicize the activities. At the same time, there were others who, without clearly belonging to any of the categories already mentioned, were central figures in the history of Buenos Aires hypnosis. Journalists and literate people also felt attraction for hypnotic facts, and therefore wrote popular literature on the subject.

Among the few papers that have already dealt with this problem, the focus has been mainly placed on what physicians thought, said or made concerning hypnosis, so as on the struggles developed between professionals and their competitors. In this opportunity, however, our attention will be headed towards the specific features of laymen's actions. They devised their own strategies in order to spread their abilities among the public (through advertisements, brochure, etc.), displayed remarkable ways of understanding hypnosis, and were even able to write theoretical works that, from the point of view of their conceptual wealth, could easily surpass the lean essays written by physicians. This paper will focus on the careers of lay hypnotists by emphasizing various dimensions. First, the content of the lay literature related to hypnotism, generally neglected by scholars. Those men lacking medical degree were not content to practice hypnosis in their consulting rooms or in stages. They also published books and articles that taken as a whole, showed an articulated and complex vision on the topic. Second, the good reception that the public and certain sectors of the press gave to lays activities and theories will be particularly studied. We will try to demonstrate that the positive reception responded to the ease with which a close relationship between the lay point of view and certain elements of the fin-de-siècle mentality was built.

Based on such evidence, we hope to show to what extent the tasks of lay hypnotists were actually effective disseminators of hypnotism in the culture of Buenos Aires. In a period when local medicine did not give strong steps in the field of hypnotism, folk healers, spiritualists and illusionists were responsible for the spread of the new tool in literature, science and the press.
References

**Ingeneros’ psychiatry mirrored in Lugones’ fiction stories**

Laura Berniell  
(Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona – Spain)  
lauritita@gmail.com

Recently the relation between scientific contribution and literary production has become a central topic of research. In my paper I will study the relation between two works: the widely known medical publication of the Argentinean psychiatrist José Ingenieros on *Histeria y sugestión* published 1904 and the literary work of his friend Leopoldo Lugones who in 1906 published the book entitled *Las fuerzas extrañas*.

Ingenieros’ *Histeria y sugestión* is considered to be a key work for the emerging Argentinean psychology. In its two first chapters he describes the state of the art and offers a new synthesis of the concepts and related practices of hysteria (following, mainly, Sollier’s works), and hypnosis and suggestion (based on Grasset’s theory of polygonal disaggregations). Similar to other clinical works of this time, he starts with some definitions of the concepts, passing afterwards to the presentation of numerous clinical cases in which he shows how he treated patients using hypnosis or suggestion.

*Las fuerzas extrañas, on the other hand*, with its thirteen stories, is considered a crucial and pioneer work in Argentinean science fiction and fantastic literature. Most of the stories have only two characters: a *savant*, who performs an *experiment*, and a *witness-narrator*. The thematic presence in this work of the spiritualisms with scientific ambitions (spiritism, theosophy) and science (concepts, theories, practices, instruments, ways of constructing the reasoning) has already been studied by Quereilhac (2010), with focus in physics and biology. However, little attention has been paid to its relationships to one of the most active (and young) science of that time in Argentina: psychology. This absence is surprising, considering that both, Ingenieros and Lugones
were close friends and collaborators (for example, they edited together the newspaper "La Montaña" (1897)). Also, he became involved in the psychopedagogical debates, through his friend Victor Mercante (the most prominent psychopedagogist of that time) and his work as Inspector de Enseñanza (1900-1915).

The paper studies Lugones' Las fuerzas extrañas in a wider cultural frame. In my view if we take into account the psychology of that time, and especially Ingenieros’ work, we will be able to offer a new interpretation of its meaning: now the savant is the one who operates the suggestion on the witness-narrator. I want to show the plausibility of this interpretation for at least one kind of reader of that time: a cultured reader, the type of porteño intellectual that Lugones and Ingenieros represented more properly.

In my analysis I take into consideration the following aspects, among others: the personal and intellectual relationships between Lugones and other key figures of the Argentinean psychology; Lugones works and activities in psychopedagogy; Lugones involvement in theosophy (although Ingenieros, by the time of the edition of Histeria y sugestión, was reluctant to any kind of spiritualism); the thematic presence in this short stories of many of the morbid states considered in Histeria y sugestión: aphasias, hyperamusias (Ingenieros considered himself the first one in studying this state scientifically), dysmorphias, paralysis, hysteric laughs, synesthesias; and the presence of theories, concepts, practices, works and authors related to psychology (with predominance of those related to hypnosis and suggestion).

Of course this new interpretation does not supersede other readings but just tries to add a new dimension which is expected to be useful for to achieve a more thorough understanding of Lugones thinking and, on a more general level, on the complex relations between science and literature. The tragic endings of many of the stories of Las fuerzas extrañas teach the reader the necessity of following the conditions established by Ingenieros in order to use hypnosis and suggestion properly: it must be operated by an experimented physician, well trained in the subject, only with therapeutic purposes, and counting with the presence of a relative and the patient's consent. In this way, this new interpretation also shows how a literary work can play a role in the demarcation and control over medical practices.

References
In February 1890, Joseph Grasset, a medical professor in Montpellier, told his students the tale of a young hysteric, Louise. Louise had been a resident in Grasset’s service for some months, and now that Grasset had finished observing her, he proposed to use her story as the subject of a clinical lesson. This all seems standard practice for a nineteenth-century physician with a hospital service and an interest in hysteria and hypnotism. What is more surprising is the way Grasset chose to report his observation. He detailed his discovery that Louise was pregnant, her rape by a pedlar while in an hypnotic-like state, and his subsequent confirmation of the story by questioning Louise under hypnosis. Up to this point, the observation seems destined to add just one more case to the growing literature on sexual attacks on hysterical or hypnotised women. But the plot turned when Louise’s baby was born. To cut a complicated story short, the birth and subsequent events revealed that both Louise’s evidence under hypnosis, and Grasset’s portrayal of it in the lesson, were fictions, pure and simple. Indeed, Grasset played with the fictional qualities of his narrative through frequent references to “novels,” “acts,” and “fiction.” The case, he informed his students, “has all the style of a novel, [but] is in reality a clinical observation, that is, a scrupulously true and scientifically analysed fact.” Novelistic style, if not outright fiction, did not conflict, in Grasset’s medical lesson, with scrupulous truth and scientific analysis.

This paper asks how that could be, as a first step towards exploring the medico-scientific genre of the “observation,” or case history, in the late nineteenth-century. It is well known that Freud compared his case histories to short stories, but work by Juan Rigoli and Jacqueline Carroy suggests that literary forms of representation were already present in medical observations. My analysis centres on observations of hysteria, hypnotism, and suggestion in France during the last two decades of the nineteenth century—a formative context for modern medico-psychological knowledges. It contrasts pedagogical, experimental, and therapeutic case histories from the work of prominent researchers including Hippolyte Bernheim, and Paul Richer (who worked with Charcot at the Salpêtrière hospital). What kind of literary techniques or narrative structures did these physicians use to write about subjects’ nervous/mental states? Did these techniques complement or destabilise more traditional elements of the medical observation, like the day-by-day summaries also present in Grasset’s lesson? At stake, ultimately, is to elucidate the ways psychological observations made knowledge about individual subjects, human mental functioning, and therapeutic methods. What can interactions between literary style and scientific analysis in nineteenth-century observations tell us about the conditions for knowledge in the human sciences?

References
Counter-hegemonic beliefs in Barcelona: female spiritist around 1900
Mònica Balltondre
(Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona - Spain)
monica.balltondre@uab.cat

One of the first female civil associations in Spain was born in the bosom of the spiritist movement. “Spiritism” (in Spanish: espiritismo) refers to a revival in the belief in spirits and the spread of mediumistic activities that took place in Europe and in the United States around 1850. In Spain, spiritism was a very influential movement that actively contributed to the secularization of the country along with other anti-clerical groups, such as the anarchists, the masons and the freethinkers.

Barcelona became one of the focal points of the movement, hosting the first international spiritist meeting in 1888. In Barcelona, spiritist women constituted the first leftwing female association. Not all of them believed in spirits, but they all aimed for a secular society and shared basic demands for women in the fields of education and labour rights. This female civil association competed with conservative Catholic organizations for the cultural hegemony in the city. They contributed to create an alternative knowledge network in Barcelona.

In this paper I would like to pay attention to the specific epistemic values and knowledge that female spiritist constructed inside the Catalan movement. By examining the circulation of knowledge through texts produced by them in the local press and journals I expect to show that these women contributed to the circulation of ‘alternative’ knowledge. Their spiritual knowledge system embraced some popular scientific views of the time concerning evolutionary theories — that the spiritists extended to the soul and the reincarnation— and psychic theories on mind, cosmos and mind-body problems. My aim is also to show that Catalan female spiritist colonized gendered sites of the city and broke some male boundaries —staging rallies and entering some men’s public sites, for instance.

By constructing histories that analyse sites, practices and female knowledge production beyond academic confines, this research problematizes the making of the modern knowledge at the same time that makes visible past women’s roles in knowledge production.
References


On Not Paying Attention:
Automatism and the Cultivation of Distraction in the Human Sciences
David G. Horn
(The Ohio State University – USA)
horn.5@osu.edu

This paper follows a thread in the history of the linked problems of attention and distraction, focusing in particular on sites (the laboratory, the séance, the artist’s studio) at which distraction was practiced and indeed cultivated in the service of the production of automatic writing. The late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries were marked by a scientific interest in attention and its pathologies. In school classrooms, industrial workplaces, and in the laboratories of experimental psychology, researchers explored differences in the ability to attend to one’s lessons, work, and varied kinds of artificial stimuli. Attention could be well or poorly directed, too rigidly fixed, or too mobile in its movements, signaling an underlying “distractibility,” sometimes glossed as inattentiveness or absent-mindedness. Then, as now, attention and distraction were problematized in historical specific ways, linked to particular cultural and social anxieties that were focused on particular kinds of subjects. Studies linked the distractibility of animals, savages, children, and women, particularly those women who bore the signs of hysteria. The hysterical woman was, for many, characterized by a “feebleness of attention” or an organic distractibility. Thus, for Pierre Janet, hysterical anesthesia of limbs and hysterical amnesia were forms of “absent mindedness” [distraction].

However, if attention and distraction might seem to have been opposed terms, in many ways they were more complexly linked, and indeed often functioned as each other’s condition of
possibility: paying attention well was for many psychologists only made possible by withdrawing attention from other possible objects—that is, by being in a state of distraction in relation to them—just as distraction was a form of paying attention, in this case to too many objects, or to one object too intently. The dynamics of attention and distraction were particularly interesting in relation to automatic writing, a phenomenon that fascinated spiritists and artists as well as human scientists; in the words of William James, studies of unconscious writing and other forms of automatism promised “to cast a light into the abysses of Psychology.” Automatic writing required a state of distraction—more specifically, a not-paying-attention to the writing hand—that could be produced in a variety of ways. In the hysterical woman, writing might depend on an anesthesia of the writing hand or arm; in others it was necessary actively to produce a visual or auditory distraction. Outside the laboratory, men and women who made a living as automatic writers had commercial interests in developing practices of distraction, or in cultivating a habitus of distractibility. Their ability to enter somnambulistic states or to “lose” themselves, with or without the aid of others, made it possible to serve as mediums and clairvoyants, or to “take dictation” from the dead. Finally, artists who came to see writing or painting automatically as forms of unmediated creativity developed techniques for not consciously following the work they produced. These examples of the cultivation of distraction, I suggest, complicate our histories of the problem of attention in the human sciences.

References
Does the right job exist for everyone?
Spanish and Italian psychotechnicians classifying workers*
Mariagrazia Proietto
(Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona – Spain)
mariagrazia.proietto@gmail.com

During the 20th century psychology was able to establish itself as a theoretical and practical science. A special role for the application of psychological knowledge was played by psychotechnics, a specific field of intervention in labour and educational contexts. The popularization of this practice was also facilitated by the process of industrialization of society that forced science to reply to new challenges and requests related to the criteria of efficiency and efficacy of the productive process.

What solutions did psychologists suggest to the new requests of society? What concepts did they use in this field of intervention? How did they describe, explain and criticize those concepts? What practices did emerge? What were the consequences of such practices? Those are some of the general questions that this talk will address.

Considering Psychotechnics as a product of the interaction between science and society, I will use some concrete examples took from the first half of 20th century of the Spanish and Italian contexts. Subsequently, I will: 1) describe two examples of practice taking from both Italian and Spanish context; 2) underline the common features with a specific focus on the concepts; 3) highlight the difference between the two examples; 4) propose some conclusions linked to the historiographical literature.

For the Spanish context ‘professiologia’ suggested by Jose Mallart will be analyzed in details; for the Italian context I will introduce the Alberto Marzi’s and Mario Ponzo’s proposals for a new categorization of ‘professional profiles’.

A comparison between those two contexts will argue for similarities and differences in the psychological concepts and practices. Both ‘professiologia’ and ‘professional profiles’ were described as ‘instruments’ of evaluation and selection of workers with better qualification. Such a description created the need for new experts in the application of those instruments, the so-called psychotechnicians. Consequently those instruments encouraged the professionalization of psychology from one hand, and introduced new classifications from the other. Those classifications, that reproduced a hierarchic order in both experts and laypeople community, were based on some common concepts (i.e. aptitudes, instincts, vocation) that were discussed, used and sometimes criticized by psychologist. Differing from the Spanish context where the declared aim was to achieve a general and universal classification of the jobs, and the procedure of describing jobs was centralized in the experts power; in Italian context psychologist focused on the description of individual attitudes, on the validity of those concepts and the procedure of taking data explicitly involved the subjects of the research.

Provisional conclusions will be linked to the historiographical literature that in Italy described Psychotechnics as a decline of the tradition of experimental research and in Spain described applied psychology as the main tradition of research.

*This research was supported by the Spanish Ministry (MINECO; project HAR2014-58699-P)
Juan José Linz: The scientist of the Spanish Transition
Carles Sirera Miralles
(Universitat Jaume I – Spain)
sirera@uji.es

Juan José Linz (1923-2013) was the most notorious and important Spanish scholar in the field of Social Sciences in the last century. Even more, he was the most important scholar raised in the Francoist Spain. Sterling Professor Emeritus of Political and Social Science in Yale, he was one of the fathers of Modernization Theory and expert in transitions to democracy. However, he was not a simple man of ideas or theories but he was an active intellectual during the Spanish Transition and he had a protagonist role in the conformation of Spanish public opinion due to his popular writings published by the mainstream journal El País.

Nevertheless, there is no an intellectual or personal biography about Juan José Linz. We can only find a few academic laudatios that neglects or directly lies about his familiar ties with the Nazi regime. In the same way, his intellectual training as a political leader of the Spanish fascist party, Falange, has been ignored to portrait a young supporter of the democracy who ran away from Spain in order to pursue an academic career in the United States, despite the scholarship and political support received from the Francoist institutions (Sesma 2004).

Similarly, the role of Juan José Linz in the foundation of the Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales de la Juan March (CEACS-Juan March) is a ignored object of research. The CEACS is a private and elite research institute that has been funded by the March Family, one of the richest Spanish families whose patriarch, Juan March, was a key element in the victory of the Francoist during the Spanish Civil War. Juan March was a robber baron prosecuted by the Spanish Second Republic who funded the Franco's coup and led the political relationships between the United Kingdom and the fascist rebels. During the dictatorships, he was involved in corruption cases and increased the size of his business. Although he had notorious criminal conduct in his economic activity even hard to fit with the legal standards of the dictatorship, he always received...
protection from the political authorities and it has never been a public debate about his role in the recent Spanish history (Cabrera 2013, Ferrer 2004).

Therefore, this presentation does a brief biography of Juan José Linz and his intellectual origins under the influence of Carl Schmitt and his Spanish fascists disciples Francisco Javier Conde García and Luis Legaz Lacambra in the elite Francoist school for political leaders _El Instituto de Estudios Políticos_ and how he conformed their authoritarian legacy inside of the Modernization Theory through the mastery of Seymour Martin Lipset in Columbia during the conservative turn produced by the Cold War in America. Secondly, this presentation describes in detail how Juan José Linz founded the CEACS-Juan March in Spain and the role played by the March Family as patrons of the institute. Finally, the presentation analyses the function of the CEACS-Juan March in order to ask if it might have been an invisible college that dominated the academic debate at the beginning of Spanish current democracy due to a scientific consensus that narrowed the research in Social Sciences and the historical interpretations of the recent Spanish past.

**References**


---

**The Psychologists’ League and American Medical Aid to Spain, 1937-1939**

Ben Harris

(University of New Hampshire - USA)

ben.harris@unh.edu

Andrew Harris

(New Jersey Medical School – USA)

In honor of this year’s meeting in Barcelona, we offer the story of a small, North American-Spanish collaboration from 80 years ago that involved psychologists. The context and
organizational structure could not be more different today, but our 2016 meeting provides a chance to review a small chapter in the history of psychology during the Great Depression.

As Larry Finison explained in a 1977 article, liberal and anti-fascist psychologists responded to the Spanish Civil War by creating a Psychologists’ Committee within the Medical Bureau to Aid Spanish Democracy [MBSD]. It raised money to buy an ambulance for the Republican forces in Spain and publicized the threat that Franco posed to scientists and academics. At psychological conventions such as the APA’s annual meeting it held events to publicize the Republican cause and the struggle against fascism, showing the film *Heart of Spain* and sponsoring a talk by MBSD’s Edward Barsky. After the victory of Franco, activists formed The Psychologists’ Committee for Spanish Refugee Relief and lobbied on behalf of psychologists held in France.

While most board members of the two Psychologists’ Committees were liberal academics who belonged to the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues [SPSSI], the more radical Psychologists’ League [PL] also raised support for Spain. Its work tended to be in medical and community settings, where it hoped to recruit new forces to cause of anti-fascism.

In the decades since Finison’s article, historians of medicine have chronicled internationalist efforts by left-leaning medical workers, including the MBSD campaign (Lear, 2013). At the same time, historians of the Spanish Civil War have greatly expanded our view of that conflict and its relation to both national politics and the careers of individual scientists and artists (Mülberger, 2010; Rhodes, 2015).

Another development since Finison’s paper is further research on the history of liberal and radical trends in psychology. Thanks to this research, we have a more complete view of groups like the PL and SPSSI. In the 1970s it was natural for New Left academics to celebrate the forgotten and hidden pasts of psychologists who had been politically active. Since then, however, the political enthusiasms of the 1930s have been put in the context of sectarian conflicts on the left, including the destruction of groups like PL caused by the Communist Party USA’s slavish following of the USSR’s positions on various issues including the Stalin-Hitler pact and the Soviet invasion of Finland.

This paper describes the rise and fall of PL through the career of Daniel Harris, one of its officers who led its work on Spain. By 1940, he had resigned from the PL because of its inaction on the Finnish question and become a staunch critic of the CP. His personal papers show the mundane, day to day work in support of the Republican cause, from the selling of raffle tickets to arranging speakers and the showing of anti-fascist films at local meetings. This story has not been told before because such work was not represented in the correspondence between famous psychologists—mostly university professors-- that Finison mostly relied upon.

A footnote to this account is the Depression-era career of Solomon Diamond, a prominent, early member of Cheiron whose radical past Finison began to discover. What Finison did not reveal was Diamond’s parroting the CP’s line in each of its political campaigns, including the defense of Stalin’s Moscow Trials—which he rationalized in the PL’s *Bulletin*. Thanks to his FBI file we now know his Party name and can attribute to him some of the most prominent writing that tried to bring social scientists into the CP’s orbit.
In June of 1931, psychologists Winthrop and Luella Kellogg brought a new addition into their home: a 7-month-old chimpanzee that they named Gua. Born in Cuba on November 15, 1931, Gua spent the first years of her life on the estate of a wealthy woman who had established a large chimpanzee colony (Montgomery, 2015). From Cuba, Gua relocated to the Anthropoid Experiment Station at Yale, which would later come to be known as the Yerkes Primate Center. She then took up residence in the Kelloggs’ home in Florida. She lived with the Kelloggs for nine months, growing up alongside their son Donald, who was less than 3 months older than Gua (Benjamin & Bruce, 1982; Kellogg & Kellogg, 1933).

Gua’s presence in the Kellogg home was the result of Winthrop Kellogg’s interest in comparative psychology and the impact of environment on human development. Kellogg’s interest may have been piqued in part by the reports of “wolf children” discovered in India (Kellogg, 1931a). Such cases suggested that environment affected physical, cognitive, and social development considerably. Rather than performing the “forbidden experiment” of leaving a child to be raised in the wild, Kellogg surmised that the heredity and environment debate could be tested instead by raising a chimpanzee in a human home (Kellogg, 1931b).

Kellogg was insistent that Gua be raised and treated just like his son Donald. She ate with the family, slept in their home, and was given all the same attention one would give a human infant. The Kelloggs meticulously observed and recorded the development of their two subjects, capturing data on a host of variables such as memory, language, manual dexterity, obedience, attention, and play (Benjamin, 1982; Kellogg & Kellogg, 1933). The study was very unique, given Gua’s constant presence with her human parents and with Donald. As Benjamin and Bruce (1982) note, it was a one of the most rigorous investigations of heredity and environment that had been done up to that point.
The Kelloggs’ meticulous data recording extended beyond paper and pencil to the moving image. Filming the behavior of Gua and Donald allowed the Kelloggs to examine their data closely, share it with others, compare their subjects’ behaviors, and note reaction times to various stimuli. In 1932, three films were created based on these studies, each approximately 18 minutes long.

In this presentation, I will briefly describe the *Ape and Child* studies, followed by a screening of the film footage. I will also describe the scope and content of the Sound and Moving Image Collection at the Cummings Center for the History of Psychology and how it is used for scholarly research.

**References**


### TIME TABLE THURSDAY 30th June

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 9.30 am – 11.30 am | **SESSION 22**  
Psychology in the 19th century: Wundt, James, Stumpf  
CHAIR: Bill Woodward  
Andrea Lailach-Hennrich  
Nancy Didgon  
John D. Greenwood  
Riccardo Martinelli  
Discussant: Saulo Araujo  |
|               | **SESSION 23**  
Psychology in ancient times and in the 17th century  
CHAIR: Silvia de Bianchi  
Koen Vermeir  
Michelle Aroney  
Kees Bertels & Johann Louw  
Marco Solinas  |
|               | **SESSION 24**  
Medical experts and institutions  
CHAIR: Jon Arrizabalaga  
Iván Sánchez-Moreno & Alicia Fernández Martínez  
Juan Antonio Rodríguez-Sánchez & Raúl Velasco Morgado  
Jimena Carrasco Madariaga & Arthur Arruda Leal Ferreira  
Marco Maureira, Francisco Tirado, Pedro Torrejón & Enrique Baleriola  
Discussant: Sandra Elena Guevara Flores  |
| 11.30 am – 12.00 am | **COFFE BREAK**                                                                                     |
| 12.00 am – 1.30 pm | **SESSION 25**  
Relations between psychology and sociology in early 20th century in France: Marcel Mauss, George Dumas and Henri Delacroix  
CHAIR: Marcia Consolim  
Thomas Hirsch  
Marcia Consolim  
Noemi Pizarroso  |
|               | **SESSION 26**  
Philosophy of psychology and history  
CHAIR: James Good  
Jill Morawski  
Arthur W.Still & James M.M. Good  
Gordana Jovanović  |
|               | **SESSION 27**  
Psychotherapy and Catholicism  
CHAIR: Andrea Graus  
Lawrence T. Nichols  
Marco Innamorati & Ruggero Taradel  
Renato Foschi  |
| 1.30 pm – 3.00 pm | **LUNCH**                                                                                     |
| 3.00 pm – 5.00 pm | **SESSION 28**  
Historiography (2) (roundtable)  
CHAIR: Ian Lubek  
Shayna Fox Lee  
Harry Whitaker & Tom Heinzen  
Miki Takasuna  
Michael R.W. Dawson  
Adriana Kaulino  |
|               | **SESSION 29**  
Personality, movement and operation  
CHAIR: Roger Smith  
Irina Sirotkina & Roger Smith  
Moritz Michels  
Martin Wieser  
Leila Zenderland  |
|               | **SESSION 30**  
The human sciences in the 19th and 20th centuries  
CHAIR: Thomas Sturm  
Ivan Flis  
Elissa Rodkey  
Jaime Valenzuela Matus  |
| 5.00 pm – 5.30 pm | **REFRESHMENTS + POSTER SESSION (2)**  
Carla Pozuelo Fúnez, Ángel Pozuelo Reina & Ahmed Dusuky  
Maria Giulia Andretta  
Kata Lénárd  |
| 5.30 pm – 7.00 pm | **CHEIRON BOOK PRIZE**  
ESHHS’S MEETING  |
Considered from a commonsense point of view only few would dispute that (selective) attention and consciousness are closely related psychological concepts. The moment we pay attention to an object we become conscious or aware of its various properties. The moment attention wanes, the object fades from consciousness. In other words, attending to something is just a mode of being conscious of it. This has led some researchers to the conclusion that consciousness and attention are intimately connected, if not identical processes. However, as a recent debate shows, the question as to whether attention is in fact a necessary and sufficient condition of consciousness is still open (Tsuchiya and van Boxtel 2013). While some researchers have argued that certain empirical finding speak in favour of the claim that attention is in fact necessary and sufficient for consciousness (Mack and Rock 1998, Prinz 2011, Cohen et al. 2012) others have rejected that claim (Kentridge et. al. 2008, Koch and Tsuchiya 2007, Tsuchiya and Koch 2008, van Boxtel et. al. 2010).

In that debate Wilhelm Wundt is occasionally mentioned as one of the first empirical psychologists maintaining that visual attention and awareness are closely linked. In his *Outline to Psychology* he states that attention is the state that “accompanies the clear grasp of any psychical content.” (Wundt 1897: 209) He distinguishes between apperception and perception, whereas apperception is defined as the process by which – via attention – any mental content is brought to clear comprehension, perception on the other hand is defined by the absence of attention.

In my talk I will pursue a twofold aim. Firstly, I will elucidate Wundt’s notion of psychology as an empirical science. Wundt develops his key notions such as consciousness as a “synthesis of psychical processes” (Wundt 1897: 203) by discussing philosophical claims – notably metaphysical theories of the soul as bearer of psychological properties. As a result he holds that “the contents of this science [empirical psychology] are exclusively processes, not permanent objects.” (Wundt 1897: 20) Based on that view he can infer that consciousness is a matter of grades (Wundt 1897: 207). I will argue that it is only because he thinks of consciousness in terms of grades that attending as a mode of being conscious comes into view in the first place. Secondly, building on the preliminary elucidation I will discuss Wundt’s theory of attention. I take it that the most interesting part of that theory is the aforementioned distinction between apperception and perception. If, as Wundt claims, a subject is aware of the content of a representation in apperception because it attends to that then attention has a certain functional role: it is meant to store information for later recall. In mere perception on the other hand the contents come and go, they enter, as Wundt puts it, “the field of consciousness and pass out again without reaching the inner fixation-point.” (Wundt 1897: 209) Wundt is therefore, or so I will argue, a proponent of the claim that attention is a necessary and sufficient condition for consciousness.
References

Joseph Haven's textbook, *Mental Philosophy Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will*, Compared to William James’ *Psychology: A Briefer Course*
Nancy Digdon
(MacEwan University – Canada)
digdonn@macewan.ca

Although there were several mental philosophy textbooks in the 1850s, Reverend Joseph Haven (1816-1874), a teacher at Amherst College in Massachusetts, could not find a suitable one that went beyond intellectual faculties to adequately address the sensibilities and the will. So he cobbled together his own lecture notes and used them instead of a textbook. In 1857 he converted these notes into the first of many editions of his textbook, “*Mental Philosophy Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will*”.

To Haven, mental philosophy was the natural science of mind. But to distinguish it from other sciences -- such as ethics, logic or politics -- Haven argued for the use of the more definite term, psychology. Psychology was “a science resting on experience, observation, and induction – a science of facts, phenomena and laws which regulate the same” (p.17). The principal sources for study in psychology, according to Haven, were our own minds and our observations of the minds of others. “Our single business is to ascertain facts, actual phenomena; not to inquire what might be, or what ought to be, according to preconceived notions and theories, but what is.” (p.519).

Haven’s textbook was quickly adopted by numerous leading colleges and schools across the US and its reception was so positive that Paley predicted that it would replace all competitors (Paley, Paxton & Ware, 1864). While a student at Clark University in 1879-80, Thorstein Veblen studied Haven’s textbook and credits it as providing intellectual inspiration for his later writings in institutional economics and social critique (Vaughn, 2006). Haven’s textbook also spread beyond the US through its translation into Japanese in 1875 and into Chinese in 1889 (Blowers, 2000; Kodamo, 1991).

Haven’s textbook, however, has received little attention in the history of American psychology ever since the inception of New Psychology. New Psychologists downplayed ties
with American mental philosophers while tracing their roots to the recent importation of German experimental psychology (Fuchs, 2000) or applauding William James as the first notable American psychologist (Fay, 1939). In 1894, G. Stanley Hall compiled a list of influential American college textbooks of psychology and allied subjects, and failed to include Haven’s *Mental Philosophy* (although Haven’s 1876, *History of Philosophy, Ancient and Modern* was on the list). While an undergraduate at Lafayette, James MacKeen Cattell took a mental philosophy course that used Haven’s textbook, but Cattell was critical of the course and appeared unmoved by the textbook (Sokal, 1981).

The purpose of my talk is to analyze the content and style of Joseph Haven’s *Mental Philosophy.* I will compare it to William James’ 1892 *Psychology: A Briefer Course,* which was the textbook of choice for many New Psychologists and their academic progeny. My talk will highlight several parallels between these books as well as some differences. Importantly, James appears less enamored with New Psychology than New Psychologists were with him. James (1892/1948) cautioned that “it is indeed strange to hear people talk triumphantly of ‘the New Psychology’, and write ‘Histories of Psychology’ when into the real elements and forces which the word covers not the first glimpse of clear insight exists.” (p.468). My talk will argue that on the whole, similarities between Haven’s and James’s textbooks are more extensive than one might surmise from the writings of New Psychologists.

**References**


Paley, W., Paxton, J., & Ware, J. (1864). *Natural theology: Or, evidences of the existence and attributes of the Deity collected from the appearance of nature.* Boston, Mass.: Gould and Lincoln.


**Wilhelm Wundt: The First Gestalt Psychologist?**

John D. Greenwood

(CUNY Graduate Center – USA)

jgreenwood@gc.cuny.edu

There is a familiar story repeated by historians of psychology about the origins of Gestalt psychology. Although there were anticipations in the work of Gottlieb Leibniz and Ernst Mach,
Gestalt psychology was initiated by Christian von Ehrenfels (1859-1932), who introduced the notion of Gestaltqualität or ‘form qualities’ in ‘On Gestalt Qualities’ (1890). Ehrenfels famously illustrated the notion of ‘form-quality’ by reference to a melody. The form-quality of a melody is not equivalent to the aggregate sum of its tonal elements, but is something ‘over and above’ the tonal elements. One may produce a different melody by rearranging of the same tonal elements in a different order, and one may produce the same melody by arranging different tonal elements (in a different key, for example) in the original order. According to Ehrenfels, the ‘form-quality’ is not determined by the sensory elements, but by their structure or configuration.

This notion of Gestalt qualities as form qualities ‘over and above’ the elements from which they are configured was developed and extended by Max Wertheimer (1880–1943) in his analysis of the phi phenomenon, the perception of apparent motion (Wertheimer, 1912). Like Ehrenfels, Wertheimer affirmed that the form qualities of motion perception are wholes that are more than the aggregation of sensational elements, but also maintained that so-called sensational ‘elements’ are determined by their location within the whole (1925, p. 2).

These two theses, that Gestalt configurations have properties that are ‘over and above’ the aggregation of sensory (or perceptual or cognitive) elements, and that the nature and identity of the ‘elements’ of Gestalt configurations is determined by their relational location within a Gestalt configuration (with one configuration being analyzable into one set of elements, and another analyzable into a different set of elements) became the foundational theses of the so-called Berlin or Berlin-Frankfurt school of Gestalt psychology represented by Wertheimer, Wolfgang Köhler (1887–1967) and Franz Koffka (1886–1941). The second thesis distinguished them from the so-called Graz school of Gestalt psychology, represented by Stephan Witasek (1870–1915), Vittorio Benussi (1878–1927) and Alois Höfler (1853–1922) who denied that the nature and identity of configured elements is determined by their relational location within Gestalt configurations.

However, by this criterion, neither Wertheimer nor Ehrenfels was the first Gestalt psychologist. This designation surely belongs to Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), who expounded both of the foundational principles of (the Berlin-Frankfurt school of) Gestalt psychology.

According to Wundt’s principle of psychical resultants, the qualities of psychological configurations are distinct from the mere aggregation of the elements from which they are configured. According to Wundt, psychological configurations, such as the perception of a musical chord or the understanding of a sentence, have emergent properties that cannot be reduced to the mere aggregation of their elements, such as tonal elements or words (1897, p. 321). According to Wundt’s principle of psychical relations, the nature and identity of the elements of psychological configurations are determined by their relational location within psychological configurations (1897, p. 323). For example, Wundt claimed that words do not have meaning in isolation, but only via their role in configured sentences (1900, p. 37).

Wundt thus deserves to be characterized as the first Gestalt psychologist because he expounded these principles before Wertheimer, Köhler and Koffka, and because Ehrenfels did not expound the second foundational principle about the relational identity of the elements of psychological configurations. Ehrenfels did not hold that the nature and identity of the tonal elements of a melody is determined by their relational location in the melody, but rather claimed that the same tonal elements could be recombined to form a different melody.
Carl Stumpf on the foundations of experimental psychology
Riccardo Martinelli
(Univeristy of Trieste – Italy)
martinel@units.it

Carl Stumpf is a puzzling figure for historians of science. His work includes numerous experimental investigations in the field of psychology, with particular attention to acoustic and musical phenomena but he also wrote on many other topics, such as mathematics, physical acoustics, phonetics, ethnomusicology, child psychology, animal psychology, psychology of genius, and so on. Founder of the Berlin Institute for Psychology in 1894, Stumpf had been a pupil of Brentano and Lotze, and later Husserl’s teacher in Halle. Unsurprisingly, Stumpf assigned much importance to philosophy and eventually composed a monumental two-volumed Erkenntnislehre, which appeared posthumous in 1939. His heterogeneous body of writings, encompassing philosophy and science, has lead to different interpretations of his personality. In contrast to one-sided readings of his work, I argue that Stumpf considered his experimental and philosophical investigations as part of one and the same epistemological program. The main element in this program is represented by Stumpf’s ideas concerning the foundations of experimental psychology. Stumpf never wed the idea of a ‘philosophical’ psychology as a remedy against the threatening rise of experimental psychology in the late XIX century – as many others did. Nor did Stumpf think that psychology could ever entail good reasons in favor of a dismissal of philosophy. Psychology, rather, sets the limits of any true philosophical inquiry, since no philosophical assertion can conflict against experimentally established psychological truths. Psychology also accounts for the unity of the many philosophical sub-disciplines. Moreover, psychology lays at the core of the Geisteswissenschaften (like physics has a leading role among the natural sciences).

Stumpf clearly rejects introspection, allows for psychological measurement and quantititative considerations. However, he is rather skeptical towards the Wundtian methodology. He prefers to collect statistic data about the subjects’ judgements concerning definite experimental sets – a methodology he applies to the problems of ‘tonal fusion’ and other psycho-acoustic phenomena.

A self-confessed ‘outsider’ among his colleagues, Stumpf actually defends a unique epistemological position. All the more so, in the light of his plea for a comprehensive scientific training for philosophers. In his view, a plausible worldview can be achieved only by those who are familiar with the methods of science and – what is more – who are well acquainted with the

References
results of the natural sciences. The analysis of Stumpf’s epistemology of psychology is an insightful tool to shed light on the theoretical innovations brought about by the “second generation” of leading German psychologists, whose manyfold innovations are sometimes disregarded.

References

SESSION 23: PSYCHOLOGY IN ANCIENT TIMES AND IN THE 17th CENTURY

The culture of Ingenuity: reforming the mind at the turn of the 17th century
Koen Vermeir
(Centre national de la recherche scientifique – France)
koen.vermeir@paris7.jussieu.fr

In this paper, I look in detail at the concept of "ingenium" in the work of the Spanish physician Juan Huarte y Navarro (1529-1588), in particular in his Examen de ingenios para las ciencias ('Examination of ingenuity for the sciences') (1575). Instead of seeing this work anachronistically as the first treatise in "scientific psychology", I will analyze closely key actor's categories, such as "ingenium" and "culture" in order to better understand this work and its reception. Huarte had developed a physiological theory of man's natural capacities (ingenium), based on Galen’s theory of qualities and humors. Huarte argued that one should learn to recognize one's own abilities in order to choose a science, art or profession that corresponds best to one's talents. At the turn of the 17th century, his ideas were appropriated by Jesuit and protestant authors. They used the notion of "ingenium" as the key concept in their attempt to reform the mind. I will analyze their proposal of a "culture" of ingenuity, which would be created by means of new forms of educational practices.

References
Michelle Aroney
(University of Queensland – Australia)
michelle.aroney@uqconnect.edu.au

From 1644 to 1777, at least fourteen individuals in England wrote in support of materialism, maintaining that human thought was the product not of an immaterial soul, but of the brain or a material substance located within it.¹ What is interesting about all of these writers is that, in stark contradiction to their more conservative contemporaries, they argued that their materialistic views were wholly in line with scripture and were in fact ‘true Christianity’. While many of their prominent contemporaries condemned materialism as being “utterly destructive of Religion”,² claiming it would “overthrow...[the] fundamental truths of Christianity”,³ these writers instead argued the opposite. For the materialists, immaterialism conflicted with scripture and was thus a fundamental danger to the Christian enterprise.

These writers were, accordingly, explicitly motivated by a desire to ‘reform’ a Christianity saturated by false philosophy. Their materialism can be seen as part of a long-standing protestant ethos of reform. The doctrine of the soul’s immateriality had been, they maintained, the “Foundation of abominable Idolatries and Superstitions in the Church of Rome”.⁴ As such, the materialists wrote to prevent future damage that could be caused by the “needless Error of feigning a Spiritual Substance united to the Body of Man”.⁵ Their aim was to take Christianity back to its original materialism, a doctrine they argued was self-evident in the Old and New Testaments under proper exegesis. In this paper I contend that the development of this form of English materialism was inseparable from their theological concern.

I will focus on the writings of the physicians Henry Layton and William Coward, whose work I have found to epitomise their materialist contemporaries. Both wrote between 1694 and 1704, a time I see as a middle stage of English materialism – between the unrefined materialism of Richard Overton and the more systematic materialism of Joseph Priestley.

In the wake of Descartes and writers like Thomas Willis (1621-1675), the body was responsible for growth, digestion and sense, either through its own mechanism or the animal spirits. The soul, within this accepted position, was an immaterial and immortal substance responsible for thought and will. In demonstrating this position, writers typically relied on philosophical and medical proofs that denied matter’s ability to think, alongside a series of religious arguments based on Biblical teachings of eternal rewards and punishments. In this sense the soul defied disciplinary boundaries. In their tracts on the material soul, the materialists similarly declare the importance of adhering to the authority of scripture as well as the rules of nature.

The scriptural arguments that were bought to the fore by Layton and Coward range from questions of divine omnipotence, theologies of the person and the accuracy of Biblical translations. I will first unpack their convictions about the Biblically-based nature of materialism. I will then explore their explicit aims to reform a Christianity that had been infiltrated by ‘pagan’ immaterialism. In light of their presentation of these arguments – both focus predominately on theological proofs, intertwining them occasionally with evidence from nature – it becomes clear that theology was a significant driver in the development of their materialism.
Despite several important exceptions – first and foremost Fernando Vidal’s *Sciences of the Soul* (2011) and Ann Thomson’s *Bodies of Thought* (2008) – many writers in the history of science and psychology tend to overlook the religious aspects of English materialism (or overlook the movement entirely) and focus too closely on the influence of medicine and natural philosophy. This has produced internalist histories that suggest a scientifically-impelled materialism was the inevitable saviour of a society “retard[ed]” by apparently Christian dualistic ideas. I hope to complicate any idea of a simple, science-driven secularisation of the soul during this period by examining writers who are often overlooked by histories of psychology, but caused a major stir in a time often seen as a key moment in the soul’s secularisation.

1 Beginning with the work of the leveller Richard Overton from 1644, Christian materialism as a concept appears in the work of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), John Milton (1608–1674), Henry Layton (1622–1705), William Coward (1657–1725), Anthony Collins (1676–1729), John Toland (1670–1722), two anonymous writers writing in 1719 and 1729 respectively, John Jackson (1686–1763), Joseph Wimpey (fl. 1741), Edmund Law (1703–1787), Peter Peckard (1717–1797), William Kenrick (1729/30–1779) and Joseph Priestley (1733–1804).


3 Joseph Benson, *Remarks on Dr. Priestley’s system of materialism, mechanism, and necessity* (London: Hull, 1788), 1.

4 Anonymous, preface in *The Materiality or Mortality of the Soul of Man, and its sameness with the body, asserted and prov’d from the Holy Scriptures of The Old and New Testament* (London: John Noon, 1729), unpaginated.

5 William Coward, preface in *Second Thoughts Concerning the Human Soul* (London: R. Baffet, 1702), unpaginated.


7 Martin and Barresi, *The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self*, 303.

References


Inwardness: A ‘prehistory’
Kees Bertels
(University of Leiden - the Netherlands)
bertels@fsw.leidenuniv.nl
Johann Louw
(University of Cape Town - South Africa)
johann.louw@uct.ac.za

It is not particularly controversial to state that modern human beings think of themselves as having a private inner space that contains many truths about themselves. It is now generally accepted that this “sense of self” is a relatively modern phenomenon, with the turn of the eighteenth century as a particularly significant time. In this paper we address the question: How did people in much earlier times think about “that which happens inside us”; that which is “inner”? How did they regard their psychic life, giving gods and religion an intimate place in their inner worlds? Or, to put it more generally: What is the ancient lineage of human inwardness?

We therefore explore this modern (Western) notion of inwardness, and how it was configured in Hellenistic Greece and imperial (Latin) Rome. We extend it to the early Christian period (around 400 CE), as Christianity changed the notion of what is inner to human beings. It is in these distant times that a surprisingly large constellation of concepts coalesced to form inwardness - without which it is impossible to understand “the inward turn” of the 18th century. We present these concepts, the ingredients of inwardness in former times, in three aspects: the emotions (affect); awareness of the self; and reflexivity (the mental).

We selected such a specific period in early Western history that is far enough removed from modern times to give a sense of difference in interpreting the inner self, but still close enough for those people to be recognizable to us. We argue that Christianity in the early part of the fifth century CE was forging an altered idea of inwardness, drawing on two cultural supports: Hellenistic Greece, and imperial Rome. It is possible to reconstruct a number of key concepts from Greek-Roman antiquity that could be regarded as foundational to the idea of inwardness/psyche, such as Psuchê, Pathoi, Autos, and Mneme from ancient Greek times, and Anima/animus, Affectus, Ego, Persona, and Memoria from the Roman period. Early Christianity amended this Greco-Roman “infrastructure” by introducing its own elements; it infused the idea of self-reflection with a new ethics that emphasized sin as a largely negative layer to human inwardness. By articulating a moral layer to the structure of the soul, we argue that the Christian authors brought a number of specific elements much closer to the human inner world as we know it today, such as the importance of honest disclosure of one’s own weaknesses/sins, the notion of self-sacrifice, and the disapproval of human sexuality as a component of human existence.

Our final thesis therefore can be stated quite briefly: Inwardness in the modern sense did not exist in ancient Greece and Rome, nor in early Christianity. This being said, it does not imply that these people did not have ways to think and write about that which is within themselves.

References
In general *The Interpretation of Dreams* is considered as the most widely known work of Freud. Certainly, Freud’s theory of dreams represents the first fundamental pillar of the entire psychoanalytic edifice. As such it has been studied from an infinite number of different perspectives, amongst them those reconstructions from the many psychological, psychiatric, philosophical and literary sources used by the young Freud. Little attention has been paid, however, to the correlations between Freud’s concept of dreams and that of Plato. And it is this series of questions that I wish to address in my talk.

In other words my paper is dedicated to analyse the relationship between the conception of dreaming exposed by Plato in *The Republic* and Freud’s dream theory. I will analyze this relationship on two main levels.

1) The first level concerns the Platonic conception of the oneiric emergence of repressed desires. This is a conception that prefigures the main path of Freud’s subconscious, that is: “the *via regia* to the unconscious”.

2) The second level concerns the analysis of bibliographic sources used by Freud first of all in *The Interpretation of Dreams*. This is an analysis that, in my opinion, allows us to make the hypotheses that Freud not only omitted the acknowledgment of Plato’s theoretical genealogy of the *via regia* to the unconscious, but also the possibility that *The Republic* constituted a tacit source of inspiration for the composition of *The Interpretations of Dreams*.

In other words, once the extraordinary analogies between them have been demonstrated, and their divergences addressed, I will finally discuss the possibility that Freud took inspiration from Plato’s *The Republic*, and then the meanings that this possibility plays for the theoretical status of Freud’s theory of dreams: a theoretical status between (psychoanalytic) science and (ancient) philosophy.

References
SESSION 24: MEDICAL EXPERTS AND INSTITUTIONS

“Isn’t a palace, but it seems so”: The Hospital de la Santa Creu
Iván Sánchez-Moreno & Alicia Fernández Martínez
(Grup d’Història de Nou Barris, Barcelona - Spain)
graphistorianb@gmail.com

This paper describes the close relationship between structural and architectural design of a psychiatric institution and the therapeutic role for which is to be used. Our object of study will be the Institute of Mental Hospital de la Santa Cruz de Barcelona, built from the theoretical foundations of Dr. Emili Pi i Molist (1857, 1860, 1885) in collaboration with the architect Josep Oriol i Bernadet. To do this, we’ll make a study of genealogic mediators that conditioned socially & historically the clinical arguments of Pi i Molist and justifying the architectural demands of their asylum project.

Our study has four parts.

The first part will deal with the socio-historical background that led to the draft of Dr. Pi i Molist (1860). Also, we will focus on some of the foundations that formed the basis for the project, using both primary sources (Pi i Molist, 1857, 1860, 1889) and specialized secondary sources in its socio-historical origins and its architectural features (Comellas, 2006; Sánchez-Moreno & Fernández Martínez, 2014).

For the second part we will be guided by the notes made by the Catalan alienist assigned to the project during a lot of trips made by various asylums in France, England, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Holland, etc. (Pi i Molist, 1860). From these impressions, Dr. Pi finally adopt the original draft of the Mental Institute. Dr. Pi rejects in his work the implementation of the panoptical model adopted in the insane institutions that emerged from the prison environment under the reformist arguments of Jeremy Bentham.

One focus of particular interest to our research is directed towards the Cologne Gheel (Belgium), which Molist i Pi devoted an extensive study. Also, part of our interest will be over the model of "city garden" and the self-management system oriented by the occupational therapy and occupational therapy in other similar places, in the clinical setting –for example, the Gaudi gardens of the asylum of Sant Boi, the rural model of Les Corts, etc.–, as other urban projections associated the conceptual renewal of the Catalan movement called Higienisme.

The last part of our research will pose an analysis of the personal characteristics that presents the architecture of Josep Oriol i Bernadet, comparing with previous project of Institut Mental’s work, with the object to search subtle differences that the architect Elies Rogent makes as a continuity in this work after the death of his predecessor.

With this paper, we intend to claim the importance of the relationship between a therapeutic model and the architectural design of the space in which it will be implemented, as evidenced by
the "Proyecto médico-razonado para la construcción del Manicomio de Santa Cruz de Barcelona" published by Pi i Molist in 1860.

References
Pi i Molist, E. (1857). Estadística del Manicomio del Hospital de la Santa Cruz de Barcelona. Barcelona: Tomás Gorchs
Pi i Molist, E. (1885). Memoria histórica de los antecedentes relativos a la construcción del Manicomio de la Santa Cruz. Barcelona: Tipografía de la Casa Provincial de Caridad

The expert patient as a science populariser: the case of post-polio syndrome
Juan Antonio Rodríguez-Sánchez
(University of Salamanca – Spain)
jarshm@usal.es
Raúl Velasco Morgado
(Hospital Clínico Universitario de Valladolid – Spain)
raulvmorgado@hotmail.com

Poliomyelitis was a disease with epidemic proportions that has acquired an emblematic significance. In the decade of 1950s it mainly affected the Global North, specially the child population. This unexpected return of epidemics diseases-era was exacerbated by the paralytic sequelae of the virus. That is the origin of a generation of people with motor disabilities, with the important distinguishing feature of being suffered since the childhood period and to share it with many others. A great alliance established between science and society had as results the development of vaccines, immunization campaigns and a world program of eradication of the disease. This objective arrived firstly in 1994, in the Americas Region but nowadays it has not been achieved globally.

The lacerating experience of polio for the occidental society and its effective eradication in mostly all its territories justify the social oblivion of the disease. Consequently, the training programs of health professionals and the media agenda do not contemplate the disease, that has being relegated in an exclusive object of history and development cooperation programs. The major problem resulting from this oblivion is the invisibility of survivors of poliomyelitis and its paralytic sequelae. These people have progressively disappeared from the social scene and have lost their identity among the heterogeneous group of people with motor disabilities. On the other hand, their struggle for a complete social integration has led, in some countries to a dangerous loss of labour rights.

Those who have been especially suffering from the consequences of this oblivion are people with post-polio syndrome. Funded on a misconception of polio as a static and invariable
entity, medical science has shown reluctances for the recognition of new neurological disturbances in a high percentage of those who were affected by polio and its difference with the well-known problems derived from living with the paralytic sequelae. As a result of that resistance, the post-polio syndrome was not recognized in the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) until 2010.

In a context with a clear decision of forgetting polio and erasing it from the collective memory, people with post-polio syndrome have had to confront social oblivion, get over the incomprehension of the dynamic essence of the disease and, finally, fight to obtain an accurate diagnosis with an appropriate health assistance and its consequent social aids. In countries as Spain and Portugal, the difficulties in this process put post-polio syndrome in the sphere of low prevalence diseases. This fact explains that affected people had developed very similar strategies to rare diseases-collectives in order to defend their rights.

One of the main problems for the diagnosis has been the unfamiliarity –and even ignorance- of the syndrome for the health professionals. From this perspective, affected people and its associations have had as their main objective to make known the syndrome for health professionals, for those who suffered polio and for the society in general. With these aims, they started political activities and direct collaboration programs with health professionals – conferences, meetings, guides…- Finally, the ICT –from the association’s web pages to the social networking services- have allowed a maximum diffusion of these processes and its results between the three communities: the affected people, the health professionals, and the general audience.

References

**Brazilian and Chilean psychiatric reforms and management for freedom – a history of the modes of governance in mental health practices**

Jimena Carrasco Madariaga
(Universidad Austral de Chile – Chile)
jimenacarrasco@uach.cl

Arthur Arruda Leal Ferreira
(Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro – Brazil)
arleal1965@gmail.com

Since the middle of the 20th century, a series of movements contesting traditional psychiatry have come into being in many European and American countries. These movements
usually undertake an essentially political analysis, questioning the asylum as the cornerstone of treatment, as well as the asymmetry of power relations. These movements have proposed watchwords that had, until that moment, been incompatible with psychiatric practices: freedom, citizenship, and human rights. They also opened up spaces that had been inaccessible to patients: streets, assemblies, free labour, consumption, responsibility and self-governance. More than this they have allowed the inclusion of psychologists, sociologists, psychoanalysts, occupational therapists and social workers in the intervention of people and groups, which materialized in laws and government policies that introduce new "open door" methods. In only a few decades psychiatry was radically transformed: the asylum was practically abolished as the essential device and psychiatry lost its omnipotence regarding other professions and their patients. These processes are usually celebrated as true "revolutions" that liberated "madness" from the shackles of old psychiatry. There is an abundance of great historical narratives in an almost epic or hagiographic style. However, we think that a genealogically inspired approach can offer more interesting and precise description of this process, by correlating the reform process with a greater variety of governance practices and opening a space to analyse the new dangers present in the reform processes. We propose to approach the psychiatric reform processes in Brazil and Chile from a historical perspective, as proposed by Foucault (2006, 2007). It is not our objective to question the general guideline of these movements, but to analyse their specific devices in relation to the implied modes of government. In this way we hope to support more precise actions of the movement regarding its political aspects, especially given the similarities between some of their practices and those present in certain liberal modes of government. To achieve this objective, we will first present the concept of governmentality, introduced by Foucault in the end of the 70s, with special emphasis on the techniques of liberal practices. This concept allows us to understand the transformation of the ways of "conduct of conduct" of those considered to be mentally ill, since the times of old psychiatry until the reformist modes, in a more direct way. Then we will use this approach to analyse certain elements of the psychiatric reform processes in Brazil and Chile. The analysis of governance techniques present in these reform processes will be done through the study of (a) official documents, as laws and national mental health plans; (b) texts of the main reformist authors; c) the description of reformist devices in action present in some quotidian files (as medical reports, meetings minutes and medical records). This analysis will be conducted considering the modes and styles of governance that are present in those discourses and devices, in order to follow with a discussion of the present practices of freedom. In the conclusion we will propose that governance techniques also do not exist in a pure and distinct form; they are always mixed with our reformist devices. Also, the presence of liberalizing modes and tutelage, implies as crucial to rethink citizenship and freedom outside the horizon of the practices of self-entrepreneurship, self-constitution and self-governance. This exercise is crucial to what Foucault calls a "critical history of the present", opening our present to other possibilities of what has been naturalized and crystallized. Freedom should not be understood as a natural attribute of human nature, but as an effect of critical practices of resistance and the problematization of our most precious truths.
The epidemiological factor: Towards a historic genealogy of the link between medicine and politics in Europe from the 18th to the 21st century.

Marco Maureira, Francisco Tirado, Pedro Torrejón & Enrique Baleriola
(Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona - Spain)
franciscojavier.tirado@uab.cat

From the beginning of our civilization, infectious and contagious diseases have forced one to think not only of solutions from an individual and medical-health point of view, but also, and urgently, from a political level that involves a territory and population that must be managed. In this sense, epidemiology constitutes a strategic dimension to analyze the complex relationships established between scientific conduct and the political management of a territory. With this aim, we will provide a short historic genealogy of the links established between medicine and politics in European societies since the 18th century. From this, we should be able to see a movement from the concepts of healthiness/unhealthiness common to the “public hygiene” managed by the 19th century nation-state, towards the imperative of public health operating with the “global health” promoted by our current global institutions.

The field of medicine and the promotion of health, since the 18th century, has become a fundamental and priority dimension in our societies (Foucault, 1979; Rose, 2012). Within the wide spectrum of practices, mechanisms, and disciplines that embrace biomedical knowledge, we consider that the epidemiological factor has played a crucial and central role in this process. As supported by different studies (Nishi, 2015; Berkman, Kawachi and Glymour, 2014; Tirado and Cañada, 2011; Vibeke and López, 2004; Krieger, 2000/1994; Watts, 1999; Rosenfield, 1992), epidemiology, like no other medical discipline, crystallizes the tension generated by the simultaneous requirements of the biomedical sciences and the social sciences. Furthermore, to the
extent that infectious and contagious diseases constitute a problem that involves society as a whole—not only attacking the individual body, but also, and most importantly, the social body—it would appear that its management involves procedures that go beyond the strictly medical field. That is to say, epidemiology constitutes a strategic dimension to analyze the complex relationships established between scientific behavior and political management of a determined territory.

It is for this reason that we consider it necessary to perform an historic analysis of this discipline from the 18th century, paying special attention to two analytical axes: a) the mechanisms through which the scientific-political tensions that emerge from epidemiology are operationalized into medical practice itself; and b) the relationships established by these mechanisms in the configuration of determined political organization models. In this regard, we will show how, towards the end of the 18th century, the social-medical tensions that emerge from epidemiology are updated, developed and organized, mainly by an increase and consolidation of the “clinical practice”. Simultaneously, we will maintain that this social-technical network of practices, institutions and know-how, are closely related to the emergence of the political figure of the modern nation-state.

Later on, we will start to analyze the decline that both the clinical and the nation-state concept have suffered since the second half of the 20th century. In this regard, we argue that the new medical dimension that has replaced the updating of the scientific-political tensions that is placed on the epidemiology table is the so-called “biosecurity”. Thus, taking into account the strong influence that this latter field currently holds in the configuration of supranational legal and political systems, we end by concluding that epidemiology is a gray area between biomedical sciences and social sciences (in particular), as well as between science and politics (in general), which makes it possible to construct “geopolitical scales” of progressively increasing width, interconnection and territorial scope.

References
SESSION 25: RELATIONS BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY IN EARLY 20TH CENTURY IN FRANCE: MARCEL MAUSS, GEORGE DUMAS AND HENRI DELACROIX

Panel abstract
Marcia Consolim, Thomas Hirsch & Noemí Pizarroso

The debate between sociology and psychology has been an important chapter in the history of human sciences in the first decades of the 20th century. In 1927, more than six hundred contributions on this topic were collected by Daniel Essertier in an international bibliography. Beyond the well-known tension between Tarde’s interpsychology and Durkheim’s sociology,
there was a much denser network between both disciplines, as not only Essertier but also some authors interested in the recovery of an alternative “social” or “collective” psychology have already held (see for example Heilbron, J.,1985; Vernèes, G. Sellier, F. & Ohayon, A. 1993; Mucchielli, 1994). The discussions between psychologists and sociologists were indeed a source of great academic production at the time. From the *Règles de la méthode sociologique* by Durkheim (1895) until Maurice Halbwachs lessons on *La Psychologie collective* (Sorbonne, 1937-38, Collège de France, 1941-42) – a synthesis of sociology’s contribution to the understanding of human mind-, through other works like Charles Blondel’s own *Introduction à la psychologie collective* or *La Pensée chinoise* by Marcel Granet in 1934, there is a large series of titles appearing as a clear expression of the creativity and innovative character these debates promoted. Within them, Marcel Mauss’s speech on “Real and practical relations between psychology and sociology”, delivered at the French Society of Psychology in 1924, as newly-elected President of the institution, is frequently considered the maximum effort to establish the conditions for a balanced and impartial discussion.

The goal of this presentation is to re-examine some aspects of these debates, whose details are still to be explored. Taking Mauss’s 1924 speech as a starting point, we aim at highlighting how they move between the complicity of shared methods and objects and the strategic – and tense- defence of disciplinary frontiers. We will propose a new reading of some of these texts and discussions, in the light of three axes: their reciprocal reception at the time – in the psychological and sociological fields-, the general context surrounding them, and some rarely known networks and personal friendships.

This round table proposes three contributions with different regards to this re-examination: a re-consideration of the role of Marcel Mauss 1924 text and his positioning towards sociologism; a study of the reflection of this debates in the *Traité de Psychologie* (1923-1924) and *Nouveau Traité de Psychologie* (1930-1949) by George Dumas and its reception; and a study of the debate between Emile Durkheim and Henri Delacroix around religious phenomena and its echoes on Mauss own work.

“Where professors eat each other” [Là où les professeurs se mangent entre eux]. Sociology and psychology following Marcel Mauss

Thomas Hirsch
(École des hautes études en sciences sociales - France)
thomas.hirsch@ehess.fr

Marcel Mauss (1935) defined the overlapping field between psychology and sociology as that place “where professors eat each other”. It has been usually accepted that Mauss, head of the French sociology in the interwar period, would occupy a singular place in this debate, far from the the “sociologism” usually attributed to Durkheim, Halbwachs and Granet. His text, “Real and practical relations between psychology and sociology”, would be a sign of his effort to establish the discussion in equal and peaceful terms. The purpose of this contribution is to temporarily suspend the thick layer of sedimented comments dedicated to Durkheim’s nephew and replace the structural conditions of this discussion in order to globally value the position Mauss defended himself in the years 1920 and 1930.
The reception of George Dumas’ *Traité de Psychologie* by the French School of Sociology
Marcia Consolim
(Universidade Federal de São Paulo - Brazil)
mconsolim@terra.com.br

The *Traité de Psychologie* (1923-1924) and the *Nouveau Traité de Psychologie* (1930-1949) coordinated and edited by George Dumas have been received by some circles as a clear stance on the relations between psychology and sociology held by his editor. Mauss and Dumas have studied in the 1920’s the expression of emotions following a division between both disciplines with which both authors agreed. The goal of this contribution is to analyse to which extent both *Traités* can be considered as a publication representing this “agreement of disciplinary division” between Mauss and Dumas. We will analyse the reciprocal reception (reviews) by sociologists and psychologists in the 1920’s and 1930’s. Finally, we will see which were the other possibilities of exchange between sociologists and psychologists following these same reviews.

Relations between psychology and sociology:
Emile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss and Henri Delacroix
Noemi Pizarroso
(Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia - Spain)
npizarroso@psi.uned.es

Correspondence between Marcel Mauss and Henri Delacroix shows a strong friendship and complicity from the very beginning of their careers (Pizarroso, 2014). This complicity seems to have left a sign of reciprocal influence in their respective works, which nonetheless bifurcated from philosophy into two directions: towards sociology (Mauss) and towards psychology (Delacroix) – both of them as materializations of the empirical horizon of philosophy. This increasing bifurcation made part of a more complex network implying Emile Durkheim himself, Mauss’s famous uncle and master. The goal of this contribution is to throw some light over this triangle, focusing on Delacroix’s discussion with Durkheim –especially regarding his presentation of Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse (1912) at the French Society of Philosophy. The idea is to test to what extent taking into account Delacroix’s role may help to clarify Mauss’s stance regarding Durkheim’s legacy and, ultimately, check the echoes of this triangle in their respective treatment of those phenomena –like religion– where psychology and sociology overlapped.

References
Among the advances in the history of the human sciences over the last three decades are calls to consider how the human sciences can change humans — how such knowledge in taken up by people who, in turn, understand themselves differently. They are changed. Invitations to study the ways human science knowledge effects humans and human nature vary considerably in their theoretical grounds, ranging from Foucault’s history of subjectivity and constructivists’ notions of nominalist lifeworlds, to systematic models of the circuitry connecting human science knowledge, scientists, and human behavior. Alongside such enticing theories of historical ontology have appeared histories describing how the human sciences have in some way or another shaped human kinds, their behaviors, or their self-understandings. This scholarly movement writ large includes meta-histories that posit the dynamic influences of the human sciences on everyday life and *vice versa*, the influences of the social world on the human sciences (Mazlish, 1998; Richards, 2002). Roger Smith’s capacious history of the human sciences is exemplary here: his history stands on the observation that “since ordinary people provided these sciences with their subject matter, the human sciences existed in a circle of interactions between science and ordinary life, a circle in which they influenced and were influenced by popular culture” (22).

Whether called “dynamic nominalism,” “historical ontology,” “historical psychology,” “looping,” or a “circuitry” this advance offers opportunities for historical work. Yet despite the vibrancy of this intellectual movement, it remains (conceptually and empirically) incomplete, and its development awaits refinement of crucial components and the repair of lacuna. For instance, the best empirical studies of ontological dynamics, histories chronicling changes in persons, typically correlate the knowledge produced with some consequent actions, perceptions, beliefs, or cultural changes. Most of these studies either presume or elide the micro-processes that yield such
ontological changes, often leaving the sense that humans are pliant or nearly infinitely conforming. They consequently do not consider whether and under what conditions people are not so effected or resist new knowledge of personhood. Thus, left unexplored are important questions: do people act otherwise? Can they? What gets taken up, so changing humans, and what does not? How are persons so changed or not?

Using the case of psychology, this paper calls attention to lacuna in historical ontology and suggests means for addressing them. The first, necessary task entails close analysis of what now is largely a tacit ‘psychology of influence’ that is applied to historical evidence. We need ask, what kinds of human ‘engines’ are assumed or described in these models (Hacking, 2004)? A second, empirically based inquiry, involves locating evidence of micro processes or experiential accounts that give clues to the influences of scientific knowledge of self and others. Such examination might include individuals’ (first person) accounts of the effects of knowledge on themselves; reparative or critical responses by individuals exposed to expert knowledge about themselves; grass roots movements that critically assess, adopt, or reject human science knowledge related to their socio-political concerns.

The most challenging task ahead is assessing how the psychological sciences themselves might be relevant to these historical projects; after all, to some perhaps considerable extent, the processes of subject making are expressly psychological ones. However, as Michael Pettit and Ian Davidson (2014) have observed, historians of psychology have largely refused “to allow the product of empirical, experimental psychology to generate the interpretive frameworks for understanding the past” (711). The development of historical ontology (or historical psychology) can benefit from lifting this prohibition and proceed to explore the ways that psychological science can contribute to thinking deeply about human pliancy and resilience. Here we can ask, how have psychologists imagined human dynamics, sometimes even when their own formal theories posit otherwise? How have psychologists’ notions of human plasticity changed, and in what contexts and with what effects? Researchers’ conceptions of ontological liveliness are just one possible source for enriching historical studies. Just as we might gain from such theory conjectures, so might we explore the possibilities that lie in psychology’s methods and empirical evidence (Gergen, 1973).

A concluding note considers how a refined historical ontology/historical psychology matters not only for historians, psychologists, and other human scientists, but also for persons who might benefit from better understanding of what might be making them up — and whether they might act otherwise.

References
**Choc versus Troc: Mutualism Revisited**

Arthur W. Still  
(Durham University – UK)  
aswstill@btinternet.com

James M. M. Good  
(Durham University – UK)  
j.m.m.good@durham.ac.uk

In an essay on social constructivism and realism in science Joseph Rouse pointed out that there has been a belief that "nature and society or culture are self-contained components of the world that interact at localizable interfaces of human artefacts, bodies, and scientific language-or-concepts" (Rouse 2002:69). These interactions were grounded on a linear causality referred to by Descartes as *choc* (Reed, 1982), which in its most basic form is the contact at localizable interfaces assumed to govern the physical world, and which was to become, as the Stimulus-Response (S-R) reflex, the basic unit of analysis for Psychology.

Around 1800, emerging ideas of Feedback and Self-Organization made it possible to think holistically of the organism as acting upon the environment, as well as being moulded by it, a view which we have previously referred to as mutualism (Still and Good, 1992). This prepared the ground for American philosophical pragmatism and out of that came the psychology of John Dewey and G.H. Mead. In 1896 Dewey argued that the isolated reflex is a laboratory artifact, and an unwarranted abstraction of stimulus and response from their part in the organized coordination of ongoing activity (Dewey, 1896). In this way he offered an alternative unit of psychology, a circular loop based on feedback rather than linear causality.

But the theorists of Behaviourism during the first half of the 20th century remained committed to the *choc* unit of the linear S-R scheme, amplified into S-O-R to take account of the processes within the organism between S and R. After World War 2 this was replaced by cognitive psychology, using the language of computer science to give grounding to its concepts. In essence this remained the S-O-R schema, now referred to as input-output. Deep down it remained *choc*.

Throughout this flowering of cognitivism, there were critical rumblings harking back to the earlier mutualist views of Dewey and Mead. By the end of the 20th century, with the rise of various forms of "situated cognition" these rumblings had become much louder and Rouse was able to conclude in his essay review that "[s]cientific understanding is not ‘inside’ minds or cultures, but embodied in worldly phenomena, skills, equipment, institutions, and situated discursive exchanges that cut across the traditional bounds of natural objects and social and cultural meanings” (Rouse 2002:69). For mutualism, this implies a psychology that starts, not from thought but from activity in the world and the physical and social kinesthesia that accompanies this. What such a psychology lacks is a clear unit of analysis comparable to the S-R or input-output (*choc*) of cognitivism. We have proposed, as a rhyming contrast, what the art historian Michael Baxandall called *troc*, with which he described the exchange relationship between an artist and her social and economic world (Baxandall, 1985). This can be taken as a generalized version of Dewey's reflex loop, and used to represent the mutualist view that all relationships between organism and environment are more like an exchange process (*troc*) than contact causality (*choc*). In the first part of this presentation we briefly outline these two contrasting traditions. In the second part we review a range of recent developments which suggest
an increasing recognition of the relevance of and necessity for *troc*.

**References**


**From individuum to individualism – A historical reconstruction**

Gordana Jovanović

(University of Belgrade – Serbia)

gorda.jovanovic@gmail.com

By examining semantic and pragmatic changes in concepts derived from Latin *individuum*, I shall argue for historicity and socio-cultural embededness of psychological concepts in general. Given the privileged status ascribed to individualisms in modern societies, my further aim will be to show that, contrary to its idealization as a widespread legitimization strategy, the understanding of that value orientation as socio-historically generated is a condition of possibility of its critique and possible change.

Bearing in mind that the concept of individual is predominantly taken for granted in psychology, it will be reminded that ancient Greece did not develop any equivalent to the concept of individual. However Aristotle’s philosophy offered tools to conceptualize and evaluate the particular and the ancient Greek world was quite committed to technologies of care of oneself. It was political domain that served as a source for conceptualization of the soul and relations between soul parts, which speaks for the practical and discursive generative power of the political in the ancient Greek world.

In its original appearance, individuum is translation by Boethius (6. Century) of the Greek concept atomon. There individuum did not have any specific reference to human individual subject, but referred to anything indivisible and unique.

However, the proper birthplace of individual with reference to human subject and that in a very strong sense was Renaissance. It is considered that Italian Renaissance cities were most productive in generating powerful figures of individuals in different spheres of life. But I would like to draw attention to a neglected aspect, namely a strategy of discursive separation which builds the core of individualism as the still dominant normative framework - that is a turn away from constitutive socio-cultural conditions and a discursive construction of a supposed autonomy and self-reliance of the individual. These constructions operate on a vast social amnesia as they do not understand individualism as a historical product but as a self-understandable norm.

Against this background the critique of individualism put forward by Wundt as the recognized father of psychology deserves a special attention, even more so as that critique,
together with some other views held by Wundt, has been ignored in the mainstream historiography of psychology.

From the historical legacy the uniqueness remained a semantic component of the concept of human individual. However, psychology, since its inception, has been very much engaged in overcoming the once supposed indivisibility and demonstrated its power to divide - and that on two fronts – firstly, with regard to the internal structure of the individual and secondly, with regard to relations of individual to historical, socio-cultural worlds.

Psychology is in many ways a loyal heir of modern individualism and social amnesia on which the individualism is built. Psychology’s prevailing methodological individualism, its privileging of individualistic values, its epistemological individualism requires a continuous historical reflection as they are powerful tools of reproducing and justifying the opposition between individual and society.

References

SESSION 27: PSYCHOTHERAPY AND CATHOLICISM

Louisa Catherine Pinkham: integrating psychological therapies with sociological practice
Lawrence T. Nichols
(West Virginia University – USA)
larry.nichols@mail.wvu.edu

This paper traces the career of Louisa Catherine Pinkham (1915-1998), a sociologist-psychologist who worked in diverse academic, medical and community settings. Throughout, Pinkham sought to bridge psychology and sociology, beginning with her dissertation that combined Freudian ideas with the social psychology of George Herbert Mead. Later she sought to integrate the disciplines primarily in therapeutic environments.

After graduating from Radcliffe College in 1937, she became the first woman to receive a doctoral teaching fellowship at Harvard. There she also met Freudian psychologist Robert R. Holt (a student of Gordon Allport), whom she married in 1944, moving with him to Topeka, Kansas where she joined the research staff of the Menninger Foundation.
In 1951 she served as an expert witness in the landmark desegregation case of Brown v. Topeka Board of Education. Drawing upon both sociology and psychology (especially Mead and Erik Erikson), she testified that legally sanctioned systems of segregation inevitably affect the self-images of black children and also interfere with their motivation to learn. Both the Kansas trial court and the U.S. Supreme Court quoted her, and a televised movie portrayed her testimony as crucial.

Following a divorce, Pinkham (now married to musician Lee Emmons Howe) joined the School of Public Health at Berkeley, and carried out research on pregnancy in Hawaii. She then returned to Boston as a sociologist in the Department of Psychiatry at Massachusetts General Hospital, where she also taught community mental health. She later became an associate professor of sociology in the Department of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School.

Pinkham had long been interested in psychoanalysis, and she herself underwent analysis with a Boston psychiatrist, Dr. Edward Bibring (who also analyzed sociologist Talcott Parsons). Pinkham later became deeply involved with the Pesso Boyden System Psychomotor approach, an expressive therapy based on psychodrama. At age sixty-five, she launched a new career in clinical practice based on Pesso Boyden, and trained others in this method. Her initiative elicited a nomination for a local “elderpreneur” award.

Meanwhile Pinkham remained active in sociology. In the late 1960s she was one of the founders of the Massachusetts Sociological Association, and a decade later she helped create the Section on Sociological Practice of the American Sociological Association. The section honored her with its distinguished career in sociological practice award in 1990.

Over the years, Pinkham held a series of teaching positions, usually part-time. Early in her career she taught at Skidmore College. In Kansas she was on the faculty of both the Menninger Foundation and the Department of Psychology at the University of Kansas. She was later a professor of expressive therapy at Lesley College in Cambridge, and she also taught sociology for a time at Northeastern University in Boston.

Pinkham published relatively few academic articles. In 1950, influenced by Erik Erikson’s work, she wrote of the importance of the identity concept for sociology. She later published book chapters on the concept of community, on community mental health and on community psychiatry. She also obtained a number of research grants on addiction and other public health issues.

In the process of this lengthy, complex and unconventional career, Louisa Catherine Pinkham crisscrossed disciplinary boundaries between sociology and psychology, as well as psychiatry. She transcended older professional roles limited by gender, and thereby helped to create new opportunities for women in social science.

References
Exorcism and Psychotherapy: Possession, Psychopathology and the Church during the last 100 years

Marco Innamorati
(University of Rome “Tor Vergata” - Italy)
innamorati@gmail.com

Ruggero Taradel
(Washington University - USA)

Exorcism is often considered a prototypical form of psychotherapy. In its various forms it was widely practiced in the past, since demonic possessions and interferences in daily life was seen as a fact in many cultures until relatively recent times. Exorcism has been even described as the root, from which modern dynamic psychotherapy evolved (Ellenberger, 1972).

The official doctrine of the Catholic Church still affirms that angels and demons a real and personal entities; isolated attempts by some theologians to interpret them as symbols and metaphors have been rejected. The existence of the Devil can be considered to be paramount for Christian Theology as a whole. Jung (1958), who wrote many essays on the psychology of religion, even suggested that the classic Trinity should have been replaced by a Quaternity to include Satan.

Although the complex and labyrinthine demonologies of the Seventeenth Century have been almost completely forgotten, the Catholic Church still believes and teaches that demons are real and can possess the soul of men and women. There are no longer discussions about incubi or succubi (female or male demons), but according to the Magisterium of the Church a person can be possessed by one or many demons, whose name can be identified during the exorcism (Simeone, 1950). The ritual of exorcism of the Rituale Romano is virtually the same for exorcism since 1652.

According to the current doctrine of the Church an exorcism should not be administered by all priests but preferably only by those who have been specifically trained and officially licensed by the competent Ordinarius. Exorcism is not a sacrament, but a sacramental. Thus it cannot always be effective.

During the Twentieth Century, attitudes towards the belief in demons and exorcism evolved at least at a practical level, and during the pontificates of John XIII and Paul VI some aspects of the doctrine, although never changed, were cautiously downplayed and muffled. The
necessity of exorcists, while never denied, wasn’t certainly stressed, and their number fell. This changed under John Paul II, and Benedict XVI. In 2015, under Pope Francis the first official association of exorcists was officially established within the Church.

On the other hand, during and after the pontificate of Paul VI psychology and psychotherapy progressively gained credibility and importance in the Catholic world. A society of psychiatrists and psychotherapists, who explicitly define themselves Catholics was founded and a specific congress on psychopathology in the light of Christian Religion was held in 2001 (See Cantelmi, 2002). The reality of demonic possession has been strongly reasserted and the idea of interpreting such cases as forms of psychosis rejected. A peculiar and new form of collaboration between priests and therapists was born (see Amorth, 2000). Psychotherapists and psychiatrists have been encouraged to take into consideration the possibility that certain forms of mental illness can be cases of demonic possessions and to assess such cases according to guidelines provided by the Church. People who are churchgoers who are afraid to be possessed by Satan are now often sent to psychotherapists or psychiatrists after being evaluated by a priest. Exorcism has regained his role as a form of therapy, a role which indeed it never entirely lost, at least in the Catholic Church.

References

Psychotherapy and Catholicism: the end of psychoanalytic “non expedit”
Renato Foschi
(‘Sapienza’ University of Rome – Italy)
renato.foschi@uniroma1.it

As highlighted by Mecacci (1998), the Catholic Church has always shown a “duplicity” towards psychotherapy. On the one hand, there was an explicit rejection of the idea that man’s destiny was determined by his psychological drives and, moreover, by his sexual nature (see also Foschi & Innamorati, in press). On the other hand, all psychotherapeutic and psychological theories were disclosed among priests “in Latin” for the “strict use” of confessors; with the aim that, through the knowledge of psychology and sexology, they could bring individuals to a normal mental state that would eventually be the basis for understanding the value of life and lead to the righteousness of the religion. From this point of view, Agostino Gemelli (1878–1959) was a paradigmatic figure in the history of psychology and psychotherapy in its relations with philosophy and theology. He constantly provided expertise to the Catholic Church for everything
to do with the psychological, pedagogical sciences and psychotherapy (Foschi, Giannone, & Giuliani, 2013).

David (1990) has also shown that in Italy the Catholic Church was harsher toward psychoanalysis of what happened in the most secular countries such as France. For the great political and educational influence that the “papacy” traditionally exercised in Italy, the church was called to take ethical positions and attitudes particularly censorious towards the Italian culture. Elsewhere, ideas that challenged the traditional dogmas could be better tolerated in order to collaborate with liberal politics that governed other Western countries where the Catholic Church had no influence or temporal power (see also Desmazières, 2011).

For psychoanalysis it was, therefore, a Catholic attitude characterized both by a sort of detachment—it is not convenient to deal with it (non expedit)—even by an open hostility. Atheism, pansexualism, Judaism, determinism and irresponsibility of unconscious acting were all points of view that Catholicism did not accept in psychoanalysis; while the psychotherapeutic practice as much as possible “cleaned” from “theory” could be tolerated. In this context humanistic and phenomenological-existential psychotherapies were most passable for the Catholic culture; those therapies equally censured determinism and reductionism of psychoanalysis.

Even on July 16 1961, the “Holy Office” published in *L'Osservatore Romano* even included a Monitum against psychoanalysis in which Catholics were forbidden to deal with psychoanalysis, and the psychoanalytic practice was prohibited, both as an analyst and as analyzed. Psychoanalysis was treated like any other superstition and was “put on the Index”. Although until the sixties these were the attitudes towards psychoanalysis, things radically changed in the seventies.

This paper sets out to trace the path, which from the refusal, led to substantial acceptance of psychoanalytic psychotherapy in the Catholic Church. In fact, Paul VI in the general audience of Wednesday, November 3 1973, in preparation for the Holy Year of 1975, appealed to psychoanalysis and cited the work of Leonardo Ancona, a pupil of Gemelli. Paul VI maintained that psychoanalysis was a discipline that goes down to the “center of our personal conscience”; stimulated by “importance that today gives [..] in this vivisection of the unconscious process of our work, that is, our temperament, our customs, our peculiar personality [..]”, the pope recognized the contribution that psychoanalysis could provide in mental health sciences (cf. Ancona, 2003).

References
SESSION 28: HISTORIOGRAPHY (2)

**Historiography and Disciplinary Values:**
**Carl Murchison, the Academy, and Profit**  
Shayna Fox Lee  
(York University – Canada)  
shayna4@yorku.ca

The career of Carl Murchison receives perennial attention within the historiography of early 20th-century American psychology. This paper posits that because this recognition has been garnered due to the contentious and unique aspects of Murchison’s work, it can function as a lens with which to view the shifting disciplinary contexts of his era. What has been emphasized about Murchison is shown to provide insight into the development of the history of psychology as a subfield, as well as the value-ladenness of historical scholarship more broadly (Tucker, 2009; Douglas, 2009).

Murchison’s psychological research was not particularly noteworthy, and eventually came to be derided by some of his peers; yet his association with elite institutions, and the accompanying access to the network of “good committee men” that predominated at the time, ensured professional opportunity for him (Isaac, 2009). His work relationships were fraught with tensions, and he found himself ousted from academia-proper mid-career. Nevertheless, through his role as department chair at Clark University, through his revival of the Clark press and his prolific publishing of reference literature (and upon the loss of his position there, by continuing to edit no less than five disciplinary journals privately), Murchison managed to wield considerable influence over the development of psychology and left a tangible legacy.¹ Thus, it makes sense that Dennis Thompson, in the second volume of *Portraits of Pioneers in Psychology*, portrayed Murchison as “no ordinary legend,” specifically because “he was not a theorist, a researcher, or an interpreter of psychology; he was an organizer—an organizer of the first rank—in the developing field” (1996).

That laudatory account unintentionally points towards the changing social politics and increased capitalist orientation of the international academy (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2009). What made aspects of Murchison’s approach to in his career controversial as such was that they reflected a broader upheaval in how the burgeoning social sciences (and indeed, the entire academic industry) relate to economic imperatives. Murchison’s cohort in psychology took umbrage to what they perceived as gall—that, without having even ‘paid due’ with exemplary scholarship, he fashioned himself as a bastion of authority in the field while also forwarding an explicitly profit-driven model for his publication house. For the old guard of an establishment in which gatekeeping and boundary-work had always been the territory of a class, race, and gender based hierarchy, and that self-perpetuated on premises of theoretical and experimental prowess, his alleged profiteering was viewed as crass (Barzilai-Nahon, 2009; Gieryn, 1989; Rutherford, 2015). Yet, Murchison’s organizational and entrepreneurial skill sets resembled those values that would come to be prioritized foremost in the infrastructural administration of universities,
associations, and their associated publishing industries, culminating in what today is denounced by critical theorists as the neoliberalization of the academy at large (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2000; Olssen & Peters, 2005).

This paper elucidates a chronology of the varying accounts of Murchison’s career, what aspects of it become more and less compelling as over time, to whom and why: from the divergent autobiographical accounts produced by Murchison and the other psychologist-historians who felt antagonistic towards him, through the student testimonies, institutional histories, and biographical sketches written since then (including this one). In doing so, it reiterates how the history of psychology, like the discipline it studies, is infused with, and promotes contextually-informed value systems.

1 See Atwood Papers & Committee on Clark University Press 1927-1941, Clark University Archive, Worcester MA.

References
Presentism Redux
Harry Whitaker
(Northern Michigan University – USA)
whit@nmu.edu
Tom Heinzen
(William Patterson University – USA)

George Stocking’s (1965) editorial discussion of presentism alerted historians of the behavioral sciences to the problem of presentism, a.k.a. “Whig history”, that was publicized in Butterfield’s (1931) much-discussed text. However, it was Thomas Leahey’s (1986) History Without the Past, a trenchant and critical review of Gregory Kimble & Kurt Schlesinger’s (1985) two-volume Topics in the History of Psychology, that set the stage for many historians of psychology to examine historiography and in particular, the nature of presentist analyses. In the last 30 years, presentism remains center-stage in historiography, sometimes invoked as the classic mistake of the naïve and uninformed and sometimes praised as the insight of first-class historical analysis.

Howard Zinn’s (2003) A People’s History of the United States: 1492 – Present is unabashedly presentist, claiming that historical objectivity is neither possible nor desireable. Some of Zinn’s harshest critics have themselves been criticized for the same failures that they attributed to Zinn (Hughes, 2008). It is fair to say that most historians, of any specialty, acknowledge what Butterfield himself pointed out: one cannot escape one’s knowledge of the present. The question becomes, for most historians, how does one achieve a measure of objectivity, can one make use of present knowledge to assist in understanding the past rather than distorting it? Lynn Hunt (2002) then president of the American Historical Association, in any essay titled “Against Presentism” lucidly pointed out both the problems of as well as the difficulties avoiding, a presentist bias.

On the other side of the fence, there have been some equally persuasive, in fact elegant arguments that defend presentism as an historiographic technique to be exploited to the fullest extent. Christopher Orlet’s two essays (2004a, 2004b), “A Defense of Whig History” and “Presentism Defended Part 2” present a fascinating analysis of the philosophical problem of failing to make a presentist critique of such giants of the past as Martin Luther, Thomas Jefferson and John Milton. Frances Dolan’s (2008) book Marriage and Violence: The Early Modern Legacy, revisits...

…the supposed problem of "presentism"--that is, projecting the concerns and preoccupations of the present onto the past--in order to defend some version of presentism as a needed part of securing a future for the humanities. A perceived sense of connection between the present and the past, a conviction that the past matters and that it shapes whatever futures we can build, helps to motivate rigorous inquiry into the past. Without collapsing the difference between past and present, we can still return to the past fully aware of the ways in which present concerns shape the questions we ask. My particular focus will be marriage. I examine how figures for marriage in the seventeenth-century still structure and animate the stories we tell about marriage in Anglo-American culture today [from a conference paper presented before the publication of the 2008 book]
Hugh Grady and Terence Hawkes’s (2006) book Presentist Shakespeares (Accents on Shakespeare) articulates their “…use of the term “presentism” – which we’ve always distinguished from the pejorative usage of the term.” (personal communication from Grady).

In the present paper we will anthologize the various usages of the term “presentism” which we hope will help distinguish that which everyone would agree is bad historical analysis from that which arguably is excellent history. We will also discuss a contemporary historical work (Marco Piccolino and Marco Bresadola (2013) Shocking Frogs. Galvani, Volta and the Electric Origins of Neuroscience.) which employs a presentist analysis to illuminate the remarkable and heretofore unappreciated insights of Luigi Galvani.

References

Expanded analysis of textbook citations on the history of psychology using 19 textbooks published after 2001
Miki Takasuna
(Tokyo International University – Japan)
takasuna@tiu.ac.jp

For anyone interested in writing a book on the history of psychology, important related literature must be considered first. At the 45th Cheiron meeting in 2013, I reported on a preliminary analysis I made of literature citations referenced in textbooks on the subject (Takasuna, 2013). In the last analysis, I used 13 textbooks, all published after 2001: 8 books from North America, 4 from Germany, and 1 from Norway. In the present study, I analyzed six more textbooks (2 from Spain, 2 from Japan, 1 from Italy, and 1 from the U.S.) to include books in other languages. Books were collected by searching “history of psychology” (e.g., for English language books) on Amazon.co.jp site.

Criteria for selecting textbooks were as follows;
1) Each book comprised a history of general psychology, not the history of specific areas of psychology (e.g., experimental psychology, or U.S. psychology).
2) The total number of authors per book was not more than three to assure each author contributed to the book’s whole structure or scheme. If more than one book was written by the same author, the one with more references was selected.
3) If various editions were published after 2001, only the most recent edition (as far as available) was included.

In all, literature collected numbered 9,190 articles (13,212 citations) in 19 textbooks (compared with 6,918 articles and 9,323 citations in 13 textbooks in Takasuna, 2013). Of these, B. F. Skinner’s The behavior of organisms (1938) was the most frequently cited (18 out of 19), followed by William James’s The principles of psychology (1890), Wolfgang Köhler’s Intelligenzprüfungen an Menschenaffen (1921), and John B. Watson’s paper on “Psychology as the behaviorist views it” (Psychological Review, 1913). All of these titles were cited in 17
textbooks. Among the top 30 most frequently cited materials (i.e., 12 to 18 citation in 19 books), 23 books were found in contrast to 7 papers; 19 materials were written in the 20th century, and 11 were written before. As to the number of author citing, Skinner was counted four times, and Watson and Charles Darwin were each counted three times.

While many of the major sources were referenced independent of nationality or language in which the book was written, confirming the overall trend of frequently cited materials reported in Takasuna (2013), a few materials were still referenced with bias. For example, Watson and Rayner’s paper, best known for the Albert experiment (Watson & Rayner, 1920) was referred in 11 books, 10 of the 11 were English or German. Both Wilhelm Preyer’s Die Seele des Kindes [The mind of children] (1882), one of the first observations of development in a baby, and Karl Bühler’s Die Krise der Psychologie [The crisis of psychology] (1927) were cited in five books but never referenced in any English language textbook I collected here. Hermann Helmholtz’s Handbuch der physiologischen Optik (1856-66) was referenced in English, German, Norwegian, Spanish, Italian, and Japanese textbooks but the citation frequency in English books was low (2 of 9 books).

Moreover, Daniel W. Bjork’s B. F. Skinner: A life (1993) and Scarborough and Furumoto’s Untold lives: The first generation of American women psychologists (1987) were referenced in eight of nine English textbooks but never mentioned in non-English textbooks. Studies on hysteria (Breuer & Freud, 1895) were never referred in European textbooks.

Due to inequality in terms of the nationality of the authors, I will need to locate textbooks written in U.K., France, or other European countries to confirm the present results. As well, I want to compare results with textbooks written using the old historiography, which would be interesting.

References

Structure-process, images and narratives
Michael R.W. Dawson,
(University of Alberta – Canada)
mdawson@ualberta.ca

See the author’s abstract in Poster Session (1), page 36.
Challenges to training psychologists in Chile: innovations and contributions from teaching critical history of psychology

Adriana Kaulino
(Universidad Diego Portales – Chile)
adriana.kaulino@udp.cl

Psychology in Chile faces great complexity today both externally and internally. Externally, for the overcrowding of the university system in a more complex socio-cultural context and internally, for the differentiation of discipline and professional fields. This complex scene implies new educational challenges, which require the inclusion of theoretical and methodological perspectives in the curriculum to reinforce critical and reflective competences in undergraduate students. Most of the undergraduate programs in psychology recognize the relevance of developing critical and reflective students regarding the discipline and the contexts of professional intervention.

As many authors have stated, because of its meta-disciplinary nature, courses of history of psychology are key to the development of these skills, especially if they adopt approaches of the critical history of psychology. Critical perspectives in history of psychology allow students to see and to be aware of the relationships between the vicissitudes of the discipline and the particular socio-historical contexts. Moreover, knowing the conflicts of the past from these critical approaches, it promote critical thinking of students about the present-time debates on identity and plurality of psychology. Thus, courses of history of psychology that incorporate the perspectives of critical history, would be able to respond effectively to the demands of current training in psychology.

However, despite the relevance of the history of psychology while training psychologists and the increasing of research about the history of psychology in Chile, there is little evidence of innovation in these courses. As a contribution to teaching history of psychology in Chile, this presentation will discuss the results of my research into the current state of history courses of psychology at Chilean Universities. Until now, we don’t have any systematic nor public information about these courses in Chile. I’ll stress on that most of them don’t include any publication nor reference about the History of Psychology in Chile. My exposition concludes proposing an analytical framework to assess the effectiveness of these courses in developing critical competences in undergraduate students.

References


---

**SESSION 29: PERSONALITY, MOVEMENT AND OPERATION**

**Modernist movement? Kinaesthesia and deepening the senses**

Irina Sirotkina & Roger Smith

(Institute for the History of Science and Technology – Moscow)

rogersmith1945@gmail.com

A number of studies attempt to link the modernist arts to the natural and human sciences at the end of the nineteenth century. Our work in progress turns to the senses, and in particular to the effort to enlarge their scope, sometimes by referring to a sixth sense, which at times, not by chance, denoted both intuition and kinaesthesia (the sense of movement). There was extensive investigation of kinaesthesia in both clinical and experimental psycho-physiology in the decades before 1910. It was also explored in the modernist arts, in new forms of “free dance”, most obviously, but also in the rhythmic patterns of poetry (in declamation and in presentation on the page), the move to abstract painting and music. There were also technological innovations (there is an excellent study of torque and the roller-coaster) and the spread of sports like cycling,
gymnastics and rock-climbing. Our examples come from the extraordinary flowering of the Russian avant-garde. A significant number of modernists looked to ‘expand’ sensory experience and make it more profound, to penetrate deeper into the structures of the world. In the sense of movement they found reasons to think they were grounding sensation in the most basic, primitive of the senses, almost coeval with animate life. This argument had a long history. Attention to touch and movement also called into question the common sensory categories (‘the five senses’), supporting belief that there are ways of knowing, ‘embodied’ ways, of which people may be only secondarily conscious. This relates to a debate about the relation between ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing how’ (in Gilbert Ryle’s terms) or ‘connaissance’ and ‘savoir faire’. For historians, this also calls into question studies of the history of ‘one’ sense or claims that one sense is ‘dominant’ in a particular culture (as has often been said about vision in the modern West). Touch and kinaesthesia invite researchers to reconfigure the boundaries between the senses.

References

The ‘Operative Psychology’ of the Ministry of State Security of the German Democratic Republic: history, functions, effects and scientific foundation
Moritz Michels
(Bergische Universität Wuppertal – Germany)
moritz-michels@gmx.net

The GDR’s Ministry of State Security (‘Stasi’) was a powerful intelligence-police organisation in the 20th century. To control its people the Stasi trained their agents in specific facilities. One of them – the Juristische Hochschule Potsdam (JHS) – was a clandestine college specifically for future Stasi-employees. Since 1965 the JHS had a chair for the so-called ‘Operative Psychology’ – a bizarre subdiscipline that tried to make psychological knowledge applicable for intelligence purposes. The discipline’s chosen topics included the ideological education of its staff, the relationship building between the Stasi-agents and the informal employees (‘IMs’) and the so-called ‘Zersetzung’ (which can be translated as ‘subversion’) against enemies of the republic such as dissidents, activists or members of the church.

Zersetzung can be defined as a complex strategy of covert actions to demoralize a person or a group. The covert actions targeted sensitive social and professional sectors of people’s lives. For example: Defamatory rumours were spread, the professional authority was undermined or specific objects were removed from people’s apartments. A defining characteristic of Zersetzung was that it was difficult to identify it as an intelligence operation – people could not be sure if they just had bad luck, if the Stasi was behind everything or if they were ‘going crazy’.
There were also special guidelines how to treat prisoners and how to interrogate them: A bizarre use of language, deceiving interrogation techniques and sensory and social deprivation were used to cause psychological stress in order to obtain confessions.

To recruit IMs it was important to build a relationship of trust to make ordinary people to informants and ‘everyday-life-spies’. Motifs of IMs could range from conviction to narcissistic reasons. The IMs were meant to be situated in every corner of society so that the Stasi could monitor most activities in the GDR. Since it was always possible that a friend or relative could be reporting to the Stasi, paranoid thought patterns often laid between psychopathology and accurate reality.

The present paper is supposed to give a short impression of the historical peculiarities that led to the formation of the Operative Psychology, which purpose it was meant to fulfil, which techniques and methods were used, how effective they were and which psychological mechanisms might have played a role. It shall also be discussed if the Operative Psychology was a scientifically based discipline. In the end the special relationship between intelligence services and psychologists shall be considered: The cooperation of psychologists and intelligence services has grounds that are worth examining. While psychologists might pursue the intelligence services’ resources and possibilities for ethically questionable research, intelligence services seem to hope to increase the efficiency of their operations. Furthermore, controversial aspects of their actions might gain a special kind of legitimacy since it is ‘scientifically justified’. This can be observed in the development of the Enhanced Interrogation Techniques that were used by in Central Intelligence Agency during the Global War on Terrorism.

Reconstructed files from the Stasi Record Agency in Berlin, Germany were requested and analysed to help answering the mentioned aspects.

References

Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (1976). Richtlinie Nr. 1/76 zur Entwicklung und Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge (OV)
During the first half of the 20th century, a wide variety of disciplines integrated a system of concepts from “stratification theory” [“Schichttheorie”] which reached its heyday during the interwar period in Germany. Largely forgotten after the Second World War, this theoretical and visual scheme was integrated by such diverse areas of knowledge as philosophy and epistemology, philosophical anthropology, neurology, psychoanalysis, psychology, sociology, aesthetics, literature theory, architecture, and many others. All of these approaches aimed to visualize, explore and arrange its investigation object as a system of interdependent “layers” which unfold over time, following their respective natural “laws of stratification”.

Up to the present day, a systematic historical analysis of stratification theory is still missing, both within English literature (no publications about the fate of stratification theory have appeared since the 1950s) as well as within the German-speaking community, where stratification theory have vanished from psychological textbooks since the 1960s. This paper presents (1) a historical outline of the origins of stratification theory, tracing its conceptual roots back to Plato and Aristotle and the famous notion of scala naturae, (2) an analysis of the proliferation of stratification theory between 1900 and 1950, focusing on its eminent role in the human and life sciences, and (3) addresses the question why concepts of stratification theory survived in a few areas but disappeared in the majority of disciplines.

It is argued that both the rise as well as the downfall of stratification theory can only be understood if they are recognized as cultural phenomena. After World War 1, stratification theory answered collective needs within German society for a rational system of knowledge of the universe, society and the individual which opposed mechanicism, intellectualism and technological rationalism. Although psychological representatives of stratification theory put a strong emphasis on the objective existence of layers based on empirical observation and emphasized the practical usability of stratification theory for psychological research, personality theory and “characterology”, their claims rapidly lost support after World War 2. Focusing on the fate of stratification theory within academic psychology, it is shown that its proponents (e.g., Philipp Lersch, Erich Rothacker and Albert Wellek) were not only attacked on methodological grounds by US-American psychologists such as Hans-Jürgen Eysenck in the 1950s, but were also associated with the involvement of German psychology with the National-Socialist regime.

This project not only fills a significant historical gap in our historical knowledge of psychology’s past, but also tries to increase our understanding of the cultural and political influence on the dynamics of psychological theorizing, research and practice.

References
Culture, Personality, and Politics: 
Comparing American and German Interdisciplinary Strategies in the World War II Era

Leila Zenderland
(California State University – USA)
lzenderland@fullerton.edu

This paper compares efforts to develop what mid-twentieth century Americans called “Culture and Personality Studies,” a field that combined insights from anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists, with analogous attempts to blend anthropology, sociology, and psychology being developed in Germany in the same era. It focuses on the decades before and during the Second World War. In some ways, these American and German attempts to create new versions of interdisciplinary social science clearly influenced one another. In other ways, however, they followed very different trajectories, for they emerged and functioned within markedly different political contexts that profoundly shaped their development.

To compare contemporaneous efforts to devise interdisciplinary versions of social science in the United States and Germany, this paper will focus on work produced by American and German participants in the “Seminar on the Impact of Culture on Personality.” Funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and held at Yale University throughout the 1932-33 school year, this Seminar was designed to bring Americans into contact with researchers from other parts of the world, for invited to participate were 13 European and Asian social scientists. Especially prominent among its European participants were two Germans, chosen to represent two segments of German culture as well as two types of social science research. This paper will compare work produced by this Seminar’s American leaders and by its German participants.

Leading this seminar were two Americans with different disciplinary backgrounds, each of whom would become important in the emerging interdisciplinary field of “Culture and Personality Studies.” The Seminar’s main organizer, anthropologist Edward Sapir, was an expert on Native American cultures whose work fused linguistic with psychological theories. His assistant in running this year-long international class was social psychologist John Dollard, who would later gain fame for his efforts to combine Freudian with behaviorist concepts and for his studies of American race relations. Among the Europeans chosen to participate were two Germans with expertise in different disciplines. The first, Walter Beck, was a student of “Völkerpsychologie” from the University of Leipzig. In working with Wilhelm Wundt’s successor, psychologist Felix Krueger, as well as with the head of Leipzig’s ethnological museum, Karl Weule, his research merged psychology with anthropology in examining the development of individualism. The second German participant, Willy Gierlichs, came from the University of Cologne where he worked with sociologist Leopold von Wiese in a program that focused on “fieldwork.” This program was deeply influenced by the social psychological concepts of Georg Simmel. Neither Beck nor Gierlichs later gained much fame, for both died either during or shortly after the Second
World War. Even so, the interdisciplinary research traditions that they represented at Yale proved profoundly influential, both before and during the Second World War.

This paper will explore the ways that American and German theories about connecting “culture and personality” both influenced and clashed with each other. It will look at the debates that emerged between different versions of interdisciplinary social science during the Seminar year itself, including arguments over the meanings attached to “culture” and “personality.” It will also show how these participants tried to use what they learned, especially in the years leading up to as well as during the Second World War. By comparing these distinct and yet intertwined interdisciplinary traditions, this paper will also consider the broader political significance of “Culture and Personality Studies.”

References
SESSION 30: THE HUMAN SCIENCES IN THE 19TH AND 20TH CENTURIES

A discipline rises from the crises: The protracted null hypothesis testing discussion and replication crisis in psychology (1960-2000s)

Ivan Flis
(Utrecht University - The Netherlands)
i.flis@uu.nl

Scientists issue crisis declarations from time to time. Psychologists are no different. Stating that the discipline is in a crisis and then proposing ways to solve it is an age-old practice of psychologists, at least since the end of the 19th century. In my paper, I aim to explore a very protracted discussion of this type - about the proper way psychologists are supposed to statistically test their hypothesis - raging since the 1960s to today. I aim to explore the, at times, very polemical debate involving charged language, cynical witticism, and declarations of a catastrophe. My analysis of this debate will also bleed into today, exploring the possibility that this methodological discussion mutated into a full-blown disciplinary (or even transdisciplinary) replication crisis we are seeing in the 2000s and 2010s. I aim to build and expand on the perspective set by Sturm and Mülberger (2012), with looking at crisis declarations as important actor categories that can tell us something about the development of the field. I aim to expand on their position by trying to look at crisis talk as one of the important ways of discipline-making and boundary-setting which has repercussions not only on our view of the historical development of psychology, but also the way we, as historians, write that history. This results in a historiographical issue which is, in my opinion, in great need of critical discussion about the charge against essentialism that makes us reluctant to engage with actor categories like 'crisis' and 'discipline'. The substantive contribution of my analysis is exploring and extending the work on psychologists’ research discourse that has solidified in the first part of the 20th century, as described by Kurt Danziger. The operational language of variables, and the statistical and methodological discourse that followed, continued to be debated among psychologists in the latter part of the twentieth century, but this is rarely examined by historians of psychology. My aim is to do precisely that, through the prism of the crisis/discipline distinction as actor categories of the psychologists themselves, and a view that might serve as a bridge to some contemporary discussions in psychology.

References
The life of psychologist Magda Arnold (1903-2002)—best known for her pioneering appraisal theory of emotion—spanned the 20th century. Arnold had an unusual perspective on the many schools of psychology that rose and fell in her lifetime, due in large part to an event that occurred in 1948: her conversion to Roman Catholicism. Arnold’s conversion significantly affected her career, as she made professional sacrifices to teach in Catholic institutions and was open about her religious identity at a time when Catholic scholars were suspect. Arnold’s conversion also shaped her psychological thinking—she later credited her conversion and her resulting exposure to scholastic philosophy with inspiring her appraisal theory.

In recent years several scholars (most notably Stephanie Shields) have worked to rescue Arnold from oblivion (Bortfeld, Smith & Tassinary, 2006; Cornelius, 2006; Gasper & Bramesfeld, 2006; Reisenzein, 2006; Shields, 1999; Shields, 2006; Shields & Fields, 2003; Stevens & Gardner, 1982), however they have had to rely for information on Arnold’s personal life on the few primary sources available (namely Arnold’s unpublished autobiography [Arnold, n.d. a], and two Arnold interviews [Arnold, 1976; Shields, 1999]). This presentation relies upon and announces the discovery of a number of previously unknown primary sources on Arnold. Joan Arnold, Magda’s daughter, recently shared another unpublished autobiography and nearly 200 letters exchanged by Arnold and her close friend and collaborator Father John Gasson between 1948 and 1956. These sources help to flesh out the details of a life that would otherwise be lost, and allow Arnold to tell much of the story in her own words.

The letters reveal Arnold and Gasson’s intimate friendship, and record his significant role in important events in her scholarly life such as her conversion to Catholicism, her introduction to scholastic philosophy, and the publication of *The Human Person* (Arnold & Gasson, 1954). This casts a new light on the development of Arnold’s thought—Gasson was previously known as a friend and occasional collaborator, but the letters reveal his deep involvement even in Arnold’s sole-authored projects (such as the landmark *Emotion and Personality* [1960]). Arnold confirms this interpretation of her relationship with Gasson: “Throughout the years I have known him, he was always ready to help me untangle the snags that inevitably turned up in working out my theory and writing my books” (Arnold, n.d. a, p. 29).

The frequent use of romantic endearments in the letters (“Dear heart”, “Honey”, “Darling”) and the use of code for “I love you” suggests that this was no simple friendship. This paper will consider Arnold and Gasson’s relationship in the context of other academic couples in psychology in this period. In contrast to the norm in which the female member of the couple played a subservient role, often sacrificing her interests to bolster her husband’s career, Gasson played the
traditional “wife” role—he voluntarily engaged in supportive personal and professional labor that allowed Arnold to flourish; he was an uncredited collaborator, willing to forgo his own professional advancement for Arnold’s sake.

Based on a close reading of the letters I argue that Gasson’s religious beliefs allowed him to transcend and reject the sexist gender dynamics of his day and that the stable, nurturing relationship with Gasson can be seen as an unexpected benefit of Arnold’s conversion. As a woman, an immigrant, and a divorcee in science, Arnold was vulnerable, and her conversion to Catholicism only made her more marginalized. But Gasson’s supportive friendship acted as a protective factor, allowing her an academic productivity and creativity that would not have been possible alone. Arnold’s claim that meeting Gasson was “the greatest stroke of luck of all” (Arnold, n.d. a, p. 28-29) was no exaggeration.

References
The role of fact/value distinction in shaping epistemic ideals:
Some considerations on 19th century mechanical objectivity emergence
Jaime Valenzuela Matus
(Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona – Spain)
jaime.valenzuela@e-campus.uab.cat

The nineteenth-century project of mechanical objectivity presented by Daston and Galison can be understood as the intention of producing knowledge detached from the influence of the knower. This is a deliberate way of seeing which has ethical implications since objectivity is related to what scientists do when they seek to suppress subjective interventions.

Daston and Galison use eighteenth and nineteenth century scientific atlases to characterize the emergence of new conceptions of subjectivity and objectivity pointing out that the elements of this conceptions can be found in others scientific endeavors. In this case, by addressing mechanical objectivity, it would be possible to think that not only the proliferation of new technical elements, such as photography, contributed to the emergence of a mechanical objectivity project, but also the prior establishment of an ideal that regulates scientific practices derived from the notion that what falls within the scope of subjectivity, must be abandoned. That ideal welcomes these new technical elements and promotes the progressive exclusion of previous forms of representation in image processing.

The distinction between facts and values, seen as a dichotomy, provides elements to think why certain epistemic ideals are accepted within a framework formed of complex moral components underlying nineteenth century epistemic goals. What goes unnoticed to those who seek precisely to get away from valorative intrusions through non-intervention in visual representations and self-restraint is that this normative aspects of a practice are indeed derived from values.

The analysis of the background of the fact / value dichotomy to think about the context and historical derives of the notion of objectivity and subjectivity, is driven by the ideas of Hilary Putnam who outlines a framework where we can find some guidance, certainly succinct, to think this dichotomy in light of the thinkers of the nineteenth century.

Considering the noninterventionist objectivity, from the relations suggested by the analysis of the fact / value dichotomy allows us to discuss Daston and Galison's ideas outside the scope of the production of images, to see how neutrality in science becomes a doctrine that has implications in the differentiation of scientific disciplines providing elements to describe processes in the human sciences.

The contributions of this particular form of historical approach to the notion of objectivity are complemented by the analysis of the dichotomy suggesting that it is possible to show how a certain kind of subjectivity is relegated to a marginal position while certain normative aspects of scientific practice are included.

However, it is important to ask if the same regulative ideal of scientific practice, rooted in the distinction between fact and value, inflated in the form of a dichotomy, is announcing the abandonment of the project of mechanical objectivity, shaping epistemic ideals differing from those originally proposed.
References

POSTER SESSION (2)

Toward Modern Criminology in Egypt 19th Century.
The Sanitary Reform of Clot Bey and Mehemd Ali (1832-1876). Justice for Women
Carla Pozuelo Fúnez
(Universitat Oberta de Catalunya – Spain)
carlapozuelof@gmail.com
Ángel Pozuelo Reina
(Hospital General Universitario de Ciudad Real – Spain)
apozuelo@sescam.jccm.es
Ahmed Dusuky
(Hospital General Universitario de Ciudad Real – Spain)

The new role of women in forensic and criminology analysis it was directly proportional to the new medicine’s concepts and theories, and changes in laws during the reign of Mehmehd Ali (1805-1849). The hakima’s studies in the school for nurses and midwives, created by Clot Bey (1832), motivated women to gain relative social importance in daily life, e.g. at police station:
Dabtiyyat.

The school’s curriculum for hakimas involved knowledge of modern toxicology, such as the book of Mateo Orfila. Legal medicine was an important subject in Clot Bey's medicine theories, e. g. Fodere, and the hand-book of Anatomy of Cruveilhier and Shyabasi.

The sanitary reforms made of woman's job a significant activity in public administration, army, and changed the mentality of the traditional islamic society. It’s necessary to comment on the opposition of religious leadership, controversy of traditional ideas, and changing of domestic roles. But, slowly many women were acquiring importance for the community with the new jobs in the field of health, children care, the new vision for the criminal laws, and punishment for abortion, violation, and female aggression. The forensic reports and examinations were one of many functions of hakimas in Dabtiyyat. The coroner group, named Hukama al-Siyasa (physicians of civil law), was composed by hakim-bashi (deputy physician), hakim-thani (attendant physician), and hakima (female physician), and police investigation were consolidating forensic medicine, and legal reform.

The comprehensive legal reform in Egypt of 19th century included several important steps: First, between 1829 and 1844 an amalgam of Ottoman and European laws; including a public debate and other publications for penal reform (French Penal Code and Beccaria’s book Dei delitti e delle pene, 1764); second, the creation of the Ministry of Justice in 1863; and third, the Law Regulating the Judicial System Mixed, "Mauroni Codes", in 1876.

Science & The City *
Maria Giulia Andretta
(University of Perugia – Italy)
mgandretta@hotmail.com

History of science is a way to understand the important role that science has played in the development of culture. It makes possible to study how ideological movements sustained, but also opposed and conditioned science, how it progressed through historical and social contingencies, understand the impact that its studies have had in the development of culture and the practical effects of its results.

The actualization of science starting from its past, and even out of its field, is the strategy used to reach more audience. In fact, through the study of the socio-cultural context, it is possible to understand the process of discovery and theorization, the similarities and the differences between yesterday and today's science and make clear how the development of technology has helped progress.

Science & the City is a walking and didactical tour among the sites of the city centre of Bologna related to the history of science. Through buildings, squares, old markets, prisons, university classrooms and churches, this scientific route goes deeply into the lives and the results of mathematicians, naturalists, astronomers and physicist who lived, studied and worked in the city.

Through the knowledge of stories and events it is possible to discover and study the phenomena contextualizing science in its time and to investigate the connections that it has with other areas and subjects.
The communicative power of places connected with science could be very important for the diffusion of the scientific culture; science, contextualized in the urban space and territory that have seen it as a protagonist, is more accessible and less far from a public of different ages and backgrounds.

*This work was supervised by Beatrice Borghi, Co-founder DiPaSt, University of Bologna

The Birth, Fading and Rebirth of the Psychic Trauma-concept
Kata Lénárd
(University of Pécs – Hungary)
kakukkata@gmail.com

The word ‘trauma’ originates from surgery, referring to physical injuries, and later on it was taken over by psychiatry and psychanalysis, denoting psychical pain, and mostly in the etiology of different psychiatric diseases. In this poster I intend to discuss the different meanings and possible interpretations of psychic trauma, as well as the changes of the trauma concept in psychoanalysis, clinical psychology, developmental psychology, and social psychology.

There are different steps, phases in the process till we "arrived" till the contemporary scientific meaning of the psychic trauma. The changing in the concept of psychic trauma can be connected to different cultural, social, political contexts. At the beginning it has rather a "moral" meaning, after it was connected to somatic-organic problems. Later on it was taken into the field of psychoanalysis, attachment theory, early self-development, and cognitive psychology. Now it is connected to neuroscience, and psychiatry- as one of the risk factors of different personality disorders.

The word and concept of trauma is filtered from the "filed of science" into the public, nowadays it is part of the every-day speech. Moreover, it has effect on different social movements, like protest against child abuse, domestic violence.

The scientific researches on trauma have a very important practical outcome: They play a significant part in the process that child abuse and intra-familiar abuse may be manifested as a social and psychic problem, and could cease to be a taboo. In my poster I will provide an overview of the most significant developments of these investigations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.00 am –</td>
<td><strong>INVITED TALK</strong> (2) Saulo de Freitas Araujo <em>From the Theory of Knowledge to Scientific Philosophy: The Place of Psychology in Wundt’s Philosophical System</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.00 am –</td>
<td><strong>SHORT COFFEE BREAK</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 10.15 am –   | **SESSION 31** Pediatrics and child psychology/psychiatry  
| 11.45 am     | CHAIR: Clara Florensa  
| 11.45 am     | Jesper Vaczy Kragh  
| 11.45 am     | Raúl Velasco Morgado & Juan Antonio Rodríguez-Sánchez  
| 11.45 am     | Discussant: Génesis Nuñez                                                                   |
| 11.45 am –   | **SHORT BREAK (REFRESHMENTS)**                                                              |
| 12.00 am –   | **SESSION 34** Linguistics in the 19th and 20th century  
| 1.30 pm      | CHAIR: Xavier Vall i Solaz  
| 1.30 pm      | Marjorie Lorch  
| 1.30 pm      | Nadia Kerecuk  
| 1.30 pm      | Ku-ming (Kevin) Chang                                                                       |
| 4.00 pm –    | **LUNCH**                                                                                  |
| 7.00 pm      | **Sightseeing tour (optional)**                                                            |
INVITED TALK (2)
From the Theory of Knowledge to Scientific Philosophy:
The Place of Psychology in Wundt’s Philosophical System
Saulo de Freitas Araujo
(Federal University of Juiz de Fora - Brazil)
saulo.araujo@ufjf.edu.br

In the last decades, after the enthusiastic wave of Wundt studies in the 1970s and 1980s, academic interest in Wundt’s work has not declined. On the contrary, studies focusing on specific aspects of his career are plentiful: his biography, his impact on psychology in different countries, his experimental psychology, his Völkerpsychologie, and his relation to some of his contemporaries. In general, these studies have the merit of exploring or shedding new light on neglected elements of Wundt’s life and work. However, in spite of their positive contributions, many gaps persist in Wundt scholarship. In particular, what is missing is an account that discloses how the parts relate to the whole. Hence the need for a reappraisal of Wundt’s thought. In this talk, I will explore what I consider to be the key to solving this issue, namely, the relationship between philosophy and psychology in Wundt’s work. More specifically, I want to show how the establishment of Wundt’s mature scientific psychology depends on, and is part of, his broader philosophical project. On the one hand, psychology is grounded on his theory of knowledge. On the other, it is an essential step toward his scientific philosophy or metaphysics. Accordingly, the talk will be divided in two parts. First, I will present the outlines of Wundt’s theory of knowledge and show how his psychological project is based on his epistemological assumptions. For example, by claiming that human knowledge evolves according to logical stages, and that the stage corresponding to the particular sciences is an intermediate epistemic stage, Wundt established the epistemic boundaries of psychological science. Also, his definition of psychology as science of immediate experience depends on the concept of experience developed in his theory of knowledge. Second, I will claim that his idea of a scientific philosophy is in harmony with his division of human knowledge in stages, and that psychology is an essential step toward his enterprise. For instance, in the context of the nineteenth-century debates about the reform of German philosophy (e.g., Avenarius, Lotze, etc.), it is important to see Wundt’s conception of scientific philosophy as an attempt to integrate philosophy and empirical science. Finally, I will argue that bringing Wundt’s philosophy and psychology into dialogue not only sheds new light on his psychological thought, but also allows us to see his psychology in a broader perspective, that is, as part of his philosophical project.
In the Gray Area. Psychiatric treatments and the history of disabled children, 1855-1960
Jesper Vaczy Kragh
(University of Copenhagen – Denmark)
jvk@sund.ku.dk

Care and treatment of mentally disabled children has a long history in Denmark. The first large institution for mentally disabled children was founded in Copenhagen in 1855. The medical profession played a leading role in the establishment of such institutions for the so-called feebleminded (“åndssvagefórsorgen”). Disability institutions or asylums were up until the late 1950s run by a chief physician. This paper will examine the rationales behind these institutions and compare these with general plans on child welfare. Special attention will be given to questions about differences between treatment of children in psychiatry and children in institutions of mentally disabled. The practice of treatment has long been a neglected topic among disability scholars. Generally, it has been historians of psychiatry who have dealt with this subject in work on somatic therapies and psychopharmacology.¹ Yet, these studies pay little attention to the fact that psychiatric therapies were also widely used in institutions for people with intellectual disabilities. It appears that a large number of mentally disabled children were lobotomised in Denmark. In one of the institutions, Andersvænge, 19 children - the youngest being 6 years old - were lobotomised in the 1950s.² Similarly, shock treatment and psychotropic drugs were widely used by disability doctors. By analysing patient records, administrative archives of disability institutions and other primary sources, this paper will investigate how treatment decisions were made and carried out by disability doctors. The variety of external factors that influenced treatment decisions, such as pressure from relatives, interests of medical companies and state authorities, will also be taken into account.

The paediatrician as expert in rare diseases and the hatching of the speciality in mid-20th-century Spain: the project of Ernesto Sánchez-Villares on inherited pathology
Raúl Velasco Morgado
(Hospital Clínico Universitario de Valladolid – Spain)
raulvmorgado@hotmail.com
Juan Antonio Rodríguez-Sánchez
(University of Salamanca – Spain)
jarshm@usal.es

In the classical scheme of Rosen for the explanation of the process of medical specialization, Paediatrics is the prototype of discipline born from social changes. That is valid for the origins of the speciality from the illustrated social system, but not for the “hatching” of the discipline on mid 20th-century. Although its autonomy as speciality was a reality before the 1930s, the paediatrician’s figure as expert was almost completely relegated to academia, and their knowledge area was basically the infectious diseases and the “nutritive disorders” of the child. After World War II, the other two mechanisms of Rosen’s theory—the own technical progress and the apparition of new chapters in the basic sciences— influenced the process of specialization of Paediatrics. Immersed in a competition for a status and authority, the world of rare diseases was a specialized niche that paediatricians could not leave to general practitioners. Nevertheless, technical and specific knowledge was in the hands of Internal Medicine and its new subspecialties, and the key’s for the majority of low-prevalence diseases was in two new basic biomedical disciplines: biochemistry and genetics. In the present paper, we analyse the project on inherited pathology of Ernesto Sánchez-Villares (1922-1995) who tried to modernize his discipline assuming the responsibility and expertise of the child rare diseases.

The scientific exchange with the “new” basic disciplines was materialised in an ambitious project sent to the National Education Ministry in 1962. The research group, commanded by Sánchez-Villares, included specialists from the areas of biochemistry, experimental embryology and genetics. The molecularization of child pathology was present in their Paediatrics school from the previous generation, so the presence of an own lab in the chair’s clinic was not a coincidence. The interest of Delfín Pérez Sandoval—their clinical biochemist—in enzymology was instrumental in the study of metabolopathies. The erection of an institute for clinical research in the hospital, with sections of biochemistry and haematology, completed the laboratory resources for the paediatricians.

Furthermore, the relation with the chair of Anatomy allowed the assimilation of the experimental embryology and teratology and made available basic cytogenetic analysis for the group. In this area, the wide network established in order to start the genetic studies of rare diseases in the Paediatrics group demonstrates the relevance of these new techniques in Sánchez-Villares’ plan. He invited one of the pioneers of Spanish genetics, Fernando Galán Gutiérrez (1908-1999) to join the project and in the international circles he established links with Maurice Lamy’s genetics laboratory in Paris, Adolphe Franceschetti’s genetics department in Geneve and the laboratory of Genetics of Widukind Lenz in the Eppendorfer Kinderklinik in Hamburg.

Although the project was never completed, the diagnosis and publication of rare diseases of the group suffered an exponential growth after the building of this network. The foundation of the regional society of Paediatrics (SCALP) and the creation of its official journal facilitated the
local, national and even international dissemination of the results. The analysis of the reprint requests of the most important works of the group demonstrate an international interest on their findings on rare entities beyond the Germanic world where they had make their first contacts. This process is accompanied with a progressive decreasing collaboration with the “adults’ specialists”, a clear signal of independence that shows the paediatricians as expert in rare diseases of the child inside the scientific community.

References

SESSION 32: SEXUALITY AND CHILD ABUSE

Conceptualising Child Sexual Abuse: Discussions in the 19th and 20th Centuries
Andrea Josipovic
(University of Queensland – Australia)
a_josipovic@hotmail.com

“The battered child syndrome is a term used by us to characterize a clinical condition in young children who have received serious physical abuse generally from a parent or foster parent,” wrote C. Henry Kempe and colleagues in 1962.¹ Their study of X-rays which showed undeclared injuries in children under the age of three years confirmed they were the result of physical violence.

In his book chapter ‘Kind-making: the case of child abuse’ (1999) Ian Hacking described how, starting with Kempe et al., public awareness of child abuse and with some delays, child sexual abuse, began to increase from the late 1960s. Since then, feminist activism has done much to bring child sexual abuse to public attention, emphasizing the troublesome impact on those who had been subjected to it as children. This has found a clear place in a political agenda aimed at highlighting patriarchal corporeality and bio-power.²

The aforementioned successions form a powerful narrative, particularly encountered in Anglo-American texts.³ Today, child sexual abuse features heavily in public fora and is considered a contentious social problem. Discussions about sex offenders often accentuate their otherness, using language which offers a curious mixture of moral and medical terms, situating them between ‘the evil’ and ‘the sick’. ‘They’ are seen as bad and possibly mad.⁴

One of Hacking’s major claims is that concepts of physical and sexual abuse of children did not exist, nor were their antecedents medicalised before 1962. This may require some nuancing: writings of 19th century physicians who mention cases of adult-child sexual interactions show otherwise.
The paper will present accounts from the 19th century of adults who engaged sexually with children, including a discussion of the question whether they were to be considered evil, mad, or sick. There are relevant texts in legal medicine, for example accounts written as part of the examination procedure for assault victims.

During the latter half of the 19th century, most work in this area was done by French legal physicians, for example Auguste Ambroise Tardieu and Paul Brouardel. Tardieu acted as forensic expert in 5,238 court cases, was the first who made some statements of widespread prevalence of parental abuse on children, and urged for medical practitioners to intervene. Some of his contemporaries, however, accused him of being too naive, because he believed the children who claimed to have been abused. Brouardel, for example, proposed that many girls who reported having been sexually abused were lying, instructed by their mothers to do so. I will discuss some of their case descriptions, looking to explore how legal physicians examined and evaluated allegations of child maltreatment, including sexual abuse. To trace the emergence of a concept, the paper will negotiate between current representations and past discourses which were intended for a smaller, mostly professional readership.

2 Hacking acknowledges the pivotal role feminism has played for the increase in public discourse about child sexual abuse: “Without feminism, there is little likelihood that the idea of child abuse would so quickly have absorbed the notion of sexual abuse of children. (1991, p. 260)
4 See, for example, Downing 2013, Egan and Hawkes 2010, Landor 2009.
5 Labbé 2005, p. 313

References
William Stern and the emergence of the psychological expert voice on child sexual abuse
Elena Demke
(UKE University hospital – Germany)
elena.demke@posteo.de

In 1903, for the first time in Germany, a psychologist acted as an expert witness in court. William Stern, called in by the defense, (negatively) assessed the reliability of the testimony of a young boy who was an assumed victim of child sexual abuse. Sex crimes against children soon developed into a foremost field of psychological expertise at court. Thus the pioneers of applied psychology, especially William Stern and Karl Marbe, became involved with an issue that was located at the intersection of two especially vivid discourses in Imperial and Weimar Germany: those on the appropriate sexuality and on the dangers and fascination surrounding youth. Seen in the context of the history of the academic discipline, their efforts were part of establishing the
practical usefulness of psychology – a strategy which was strongly contested within the discipline but which was to prove successful in refuting the “Aktion gegen die Psychologie” (‘attack on psychology’, Karl Marbe, 1913) – in fact, Stern’s (and similarly Marbe’s) explicit interest in securing what he called a “Lebensraum für den psychologischen Sachverständigen” (‘living space for the psychological expert’, William Stern, 1926) was given more weight in their relevant publications than a possible concern with the prevalence and consequences of child abuse.

Sex abuse trials constituted a terrain of various claims to scientific expertise: legal, medical, pedagogical – and psychological. Around the turn of the century, legal theorists had begun to strengthen the idea of personal autonomy (and not just morality) as the good to be protected by sexual legislation and the prove of “moral integrity” of a minor victim had ceased to be a precondition for the prosecution of an assault. Pathologists had frequently hinted at the fact the sex abuse was widespread but the physical traces ambiguous and hard to pin down. Against this background, driven by politics of science, applied psychology re-introduced the construct of “moralische Verdorbenheit” (moral badness) as a kind of evidence and reaffirmed the exclusion from the discourse of the voices of children and youths concerned by predominantly denying the trustworthiness of what they had to tell.

William Stern also worked widely both theoretically and empirically on child psychology in general. In consequence, his dealings with child sexual abuse are more complex than that of other authors. Interestingly, his respective statements and their theoretical framing within the psychology of testimony partly differs from his considerations on the effects of exposure to sexual transgressions in the context of general child psychology and the theoretical stance he takes there.

In my paper, I will discuss the agency of the proponents within the historical set up outlined and focus in particular on William Stern’s work and its reception. They ways in which psychological methods (e.g. experiments, statistical enquiry et.al.) and constructs (e.g. theories of perception, memory, social interaction et.al.) are presented will receive attention together with an analysis of Stern’s contradictory stance to psychoanalysis in his appreciation of the sensuality/sexuality of children and adolescents. The mixing of scientific reasoning, science-political interests as well as gender and social strategies in the construction of arguments will be analyzed and the effects on the awareness of child abuse, especially on the victims’ chances of effectively voicing their experience, will be addressed.

References

Psychological research and practice that ‘affirmed’ lesbians and gay men constituted a paradigm shift in psychology over the 1970s (Morin, 1976; Watters, 1986). The current paper suggests a framework for historians of psychology to approach the psychology of sexual minorities since then. This history is urged by recent events such as the achievement of marriage equality in the US Supreme Court with support from the American Psychological Association in 2015, psychologists’ concerns with the potential harms caused by the ‘sexualization of culture,’ the expansion of the affirmative project to bisexual, transgender (and possibly intersex) identities – particularly in regard to defending against ‘conversion therapies’ since 2012.

Following Epstein (1996), I argue that knowledge production about LGBT people in recent decades follows from contests for legitimacy and resources that are shaped by disciplinary epistemologies, and which unfold when science is applied to controversial and political issues. Affirmative lesbian and gay psychology countered heterosexism in the USA through a commitment to a liberal politics that minimized group differences (Kitzinger, 1987), created tensions with psychology’s statistical models that focus on the discovery and publication of differences.

By describing knowledge production as contested practice, I complicates Hammack & Windell (2013) and Maher et al.’s (2009) periodization of lesbian and gay identity narratives as bounded by Supreme Court judgments (2) from Bowers v Hardwick to Lawrence v Texas (1986-2003), and (3) from Lawrence v Texas to Obergefell v Hodges (2003-2015). I highlight tensions within affirmative psychology in these periods as psychologists’ responses to HIV/AIDS shifted affirmative values from margin to centre, as APA Public Engagement in lesbian/gay rights cases from Bowers to Obergefell, and as APA’s consistent argument that sexuality is inherent and resistant to change clashed with the public interest in psychological research asserting the fluidity or flexibility of female sexuality.

From the 1990s onward, psychology lost its singular claim on ‘sexuality’ as diverse disciplines from genetics to social history claimed expertise on this topic. By weighing the successes of lesbian and gay affirmative psychology, this history aims to inform struggles to expand psychology’s science and humanism to transgender, intersex and non-binary identities in the present. Accordingly, I will conclude with considerations of what the recent history of lesbian and gay affirmative psychology might offer gender minorities in the present.

References:


**SESSION 33: EUGENICS IN SPAIN**

*Subverting body regulations: Eugenics and neo-Malthusianism in early 20th century Spanish anarchist press*

Isabel Jiménez-Lucena
(Universidad de Málaga – Spain)
isajimenez@uma.es
Carlos Tabernero-Holgado
(Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona – Spain)
carlos.tabernero@uab.cat
Jorge Molero-Mesa
( Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona – Spain)
jorge.molero@uab.cat

The aim of this paper is to analyze the debates about eugenics and neo-Malthusianism that were taking place in Spanish anarchist media during the first third of the past century. Among these media, the magazines *Salud y Fuerza* (1904-1914), *Generación Consciente* (1923-1928) and *Estudios* (1928-1937) stand out. Far from uniform and monolithic interpretations, scientific ideas concerning eugenics were understood and used in quite different ways by distinct social and ideological groups, whether hegemonic or subaltern. In this dialectics, where each line of thought attempted to appropriate the various scientific meanings of the eugenic concept, these magazines became an ideal space for discussion within anarchism, upon its reliance on eclecticism as the foundation of a socially and ideologically interested knowledge.

On the other hand, the debates in these magazines opposed the socio-political view of the states of health-disease. This was based upon a dynamics of medicalization, which allowed the efficient application of bio-power, leading to alienation, a persistent and whole dependence on an overestimated expert professional medical structure, in charge of laying out, conceptualizing and managing the process health-disease. As a result, surveillance and control was guaranteed through the handling of bodies in order to achieve a ‘normalization’ of people’s everyday lives within a social system of hegemony/subordination. The ultimate aim of such a strategy was not the knowledge of the body, but its domination through political technologies of the body, according to standardization purposes to ascertain the differences among social groups. Those with interests other than the established bourgeois power were of special interest regarding the disciplining and taming of social conflict.

Yet, against medical discourses and practices, instruments of hegemony and rejoinder, these magazines offered other responses linked to efforts to establish a naturalized and unquestionable regime of truth regarding people’s bodies. Our aim is to analyze discourses in the anarchist press of the first third of the 20th century dealing with eugenics and neo-Malthusianism.
while focusing on scientific-medical issues concerning the ‘essences’ and the behavior of these social groups. The significance of anarchist thought on these issues, however sometimes ambiguous and contradictory, as an alternative to the dominant bourgeois ideology in the period, and to the far-from-negligible role of scientific knowledge, underlines our goals: contributing to the history of scientific-medical regulation and normalization of people around gender, race and social class, and of the resistances to these processes that decided to speak out, to re-interpret, re-signify and decide the meaning of words an acts.

*This research was supported by the Spanish Ministry (MINECO; project HAR2014-58699-P)

References


Vázquez García, F. (2009) Biopolitics has played an important role in the authoritarian governments such as the Franco regime. The Spanish government, with the final objective of population regulation, implemented measures to increase, to take care of and to indoctrinate the population.

The objective of this paper is to analyze the measures of selection and promotion of some populations, and of extermination and marginalization of others, based on an ideological and spiritual racial ideal, proposed through the medical journal of Falange Española Ser, Revista Médico-Social (1942-1957), published by the Delegación Nacional de Sanidad de Falange

Eugenics in Francoism through the medical journal Ser (1942-1957)*
Sara Navarro-Rendón
(Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona – Spain)
saranavarro.r@gmail.com

Eugenics in Francoism through the medical journal Ser (1942-1957)*
Sara Navarro-Rendón
(Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona – Spain)
saranavarro.r@gmail.com
Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista (National Delegation of health of Falange Española).

The journal was analyzed with the objective of providing an approximation of its eugenic theory and with the aim to contribute to the study of eugenics in Spain. After analyzing the contents of the journal, it has been revealed that it was one of the instruments used by the dictatorship to configure an eugenics in accordance with the catholic moral and the regime’s politics. The eugenic ideas have been found in a medical discourse addressed to the doctors, which expected their collaboration on the raise of Spain’s glory and on the fight for the national salvation and health.

These eugenic measures pretended, through indoctrination and health promotion, the physical and mental improvement of the race. Therefore, eugenics was used to manage the fitness and the growth of life in Spain, but also to legitimize the Franco regime through the modulation of the political and the religious beliefs, and of the minds in general. The analysis of the journal has shown the existence of two kinds of eugenics according to the two objectives of the regime: biological eugenics on the one hand and mental eugenics on the other hand. The biological eugenics proposed the promotion of the best physical characters through demographic growth combined with population health care. The main targets were hence the mothers and their children, focusing the measures on the racial improvement of the woman and her descendants.

The mental eugenic measures focused on the indoctrination of mothers, children and youth in the Catholicism and the National Syndicalism. As a result, mental eugenics would modulate the psyche of the population controlled and shaped by biological eugenics, resulting in the improvement of the race.

Racial inclusion and exclusion mechanisms using psychical, social, cultural, politic and biological characteristics were also featured. These marginalized some population sectors – criminals and dissidents– and legitimized social hierarchies –of social class and gender.

*This research was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation Project HAR2014-58699-P.

References
The aim of this paper is to throw light on the processes of knowledge building (beyond or aside science) that were developed from the counter-culture and the anarchist movement during the 1970s in Spain.

To reach this goal, the article focuses on the first 55 issues of the major anarchist monthly journal Ajoblanco. In these issues broadly appeared alternative debates about health, sexuality, contraceptive methods and abortion, and gave pride of place to non-normative identities, bodies and sexualities. In this sense, Ajoblanco became a means for the struggle against a deterministic biopower in the Spanish Transition and offered a relevant alternative perspective in this uncertain period.

The Spanish Transition was an era marked by social, cultural and political transformations. Some sectors of society, reacting against the loss of both their discursive hegemony and their authority to name and explain reality, perceived the need to compromise with those who demanded new political configurations, new social relations of class and gender. This gender and class perspective took place in Ajoblanco and was held by groups that hadn’t been defined before as a libertarians, like the counter-cultural movement, the feminism, the homosexual movement and some trans individualities, giving others forms of doing politics, sometimes different to the classical libertarian ways.

Ajoblanco proposed a new epistemological approach to gender and sexuality-related topics which helped to introduce this new demands. Moreover, the circulation of knowledge and the entanglement with feminist, gay, trans and anarchist activisms was a prominent feature. This entanglement shaped the resistance to medical practices and discourses, and tried to undermine the dichotomies in terms of sex, gender and sexuality, but also in terms of health-illness and expert-not-expert.

*This research was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation Project HAR2014-58699-P.

References


19th Century Ideas Regarding the Role of Learning and Memory in Second Language Acquisition

Marjorie Lorch
(Birkbeck, University of London – England)
m.lorch@bbk.ac.uk

In the 19th century, methods for teaching languages typically relied on the grammar-translation method informed by philological principles. The language learning system created by Thomas Prendergast (1807-1886) was unique in being founded on proto-psychological principles. His text *The Mastery of Languages or, the art of speaking foreign tongues idiomatically* first appeared in 1864, followed by a further handbook and individual manuals on French, German, Spanish, Hebrew, and Latin. The source for the development of Prendergast’s method was his observations on language acquisition by children, not only of their mother tongue, but more remarkably that of early second language learning. Even more unusual was the fact that his system was based on psychological notions regarding memory and learning. Prendergast applied these ideas to fashion a system of self-guided study for adults. Prendergast’s “Mastery System” was quickly adapted to classroom application, and had widespread uptake in numerous countries throughout the world. The efficacy of his approach in the early stages of spoken foreign language learning was recognized by major educators in the late 19th and early 20th century. However, there is a historiographic challenge in studying Prendergast and his work, as there is little biographical material and no archival remains or other publications to provide evidence of his intellectual sources.

This paper will examine Prendergast’s work with regard to the psycholinguistic concepts it embodies. Several major psychological notions underpinning his system will be explored: 1) the size of the active lexicon; 2) the distribution of parts of speech relative to frequency effects; 3) repetition effects and 4) the forgetting curve. Evidence is presented to attempt to determine the possible sources of his innovations, and to clarify to what extent his ideas were original insights. The psycholinguistic principles that Prendergast sets out in his “Mastery System” detail properties of memory and learning that were empirically validated decades later. Four such examples will be presented. Prendergast’s notions regarding the effect of repetition on memory were verified by Hermann Ebbinghaus (1885) in his experiments. James McKeen Cattell (1886, 1887) carried out a series of experiments in Wundt’s lab that empirically demonstrated how language proficiency correlated with speech fluency rate in a foreign language. The size of the active lexicon estimated by Prendergast was verified by the corpus research of Edward L. Thorndike (1921). Subsequently, aspects of the lexicon, as detailed by Prendergast regarding frequency by part of speech, were demonstrated by the computational work of George Kingsley Zipf (1932).

References
Roots growing upwards & bearing deciduous buds:  
Potebnia’s enduring universal legacy
Nadia Kerecuk  
(Independent Scholar – Ukraine)  
nadia.kerecuk@gmail.com

‘Our times are an example of the interaction of sciences and of choice of the middle way pathways: linguistics and physiology, linguistics and psychology, linguistics and history, psychology and physiology. Il faut cultiver notre jardin. In this way we will cross-fertilize adjacent fields.’ (Potebnia: 1894, 1905/1970:114)

This paper aims at offering a digest of the oeuvre by Oleksander O. Potebnia (1835-1891), Ukrainian historian of ideas, philosopher of language and notable scholar. His works contain an intellectual history of a broad discipline spectrum, which represents an invaluable asset in terms of primary sources for 21st century historians and linguists.

This paper also includes a succinct comparison with the oeuvres of the grammarians and linguists (philosophers of language too) Henry Sweet (1845-1912) and Júlio Ribeiro (1845-1890) in order to provide a broader context for the circulation and migration of ideas on the science of language in the effervescent second half of 19th century.

If Potebnia’s earliest work O nekotorykh simvolakh v slavianskoi narodnoi poesii (On some symbols in Slavic folk poetry), 1860, examines evidence of evolution of human thought and language in oral literature sets forth an incipient sign theory, his 1862 Thought and Language offers an innovative approach to theoretical thinking on language.

The latter work examines key theoretical tenets identifying flaws and engaging with the positives in order to advance the science(s) of language. Its first three chapters offer a concise but comprehensive critical overview of linguistic thoughts with an added dimension. Potebnia bridges contemporary state of art knowledge regarding prevailing both Western and Eastern European thoughts. In examining theories on the origin of language, the first chapter focuses on theories purporting intentional invention or divine creation of language, chapter two provides an appraisal of key ideas in the works K. F. Becker (1775-1849) and A. Schleicher (1821-1868) and cites various pertinent European scholars. The third chapter is on the antinomies in W. von Humboldt (1767-1835), whom he hails as the threshold between old and new linguistics. Potebnia makes in-depth reference to contemporary writings extracting relevant evidence to support his argument (e.g. Grimm brothers, Tidemann, Hermann, Curtius, Pott, Herbart, Steinthal, Lotze, Lott, Kuno-Fischer, Drobisc, Waitz, Spencer, Lazarus, Heyse, Herder, Buslaiev, Jean Paul, M. Müller, and many more) often translating quotes from the original languages; indeed, inserting the original term(s) in parentheses for clarity. He also provides ample reference to historic sources of specifically Slavonic and Ukrainian, and also Indo-European and other languages.

From his review of mid-19th century ideas in his Thought and Language, he postulates
his theory featuring the interaction of language, thought (consciousness) and cognition and evolving an innovative conceptual framework, applied to his subsequent works comprising the multi-layered and hierarchical architecture of language 1.

Potebnia’s 2, Sweet’s 3 and Ribeiro’s 4 oeuvres have shifted research to a higher level ensuing in new paradigms; their work has been broadcast further than the authors could have ever envisaged, thus, remaining as invaluable sources for the history of European and universal ideas.


2 For example, the following have an intellectual debt to Potebnia: Baudouin de Courtenay, Admoni, Vygotsky, Luria, Leontiev, The Prague Linguistic Circle, Russian formalists, R. Jakobson, Mach, Shpet, Bakhtin, Kristeva, Martinet, Leski-en, CH Albert Sechehaye, Halle, Shevelov, etc. Congruences with Hjelmslev, Cassirer, Croce, Wundt to mention but a few.

3 C. L. Wrem’s presidential address on Henry Sweet delivered to the Philological Society London on 10th May 1946 (in Transactions of the Philological Society 46.177-201(1946) contains details of his main works. The Henry Sweet Society for the History of Linguistic Ideas was founded in the UK in 1984. His main works: A Handbook of Phonetics (1887), Elementarbuch des gesprochenen Engli sch (1885), A Primer of Spoken English (1890), The Practical Study of Languages (1899), The Sounds of English (1908), An Icelandic Primer with Grammar, Notes and Glossary (1886), The History of Language and a various works he edited for the Early English Text Society. Sweet was also closely involved in the early history of Old English and Old Norse and contributed to the Oxford English Dictionary.

4 Brazilian grammarian, linguist and novelist: Traços Geraes de Linguistica (General Features of Linguistics) in 1880, Gramática Portuguesa in 1881 and Procelários e Holmer Brasileiro ou Gramática de Puerícia in 1886 (allegedly a translation/adaptation of Introduction to English Grammar, by a G. F. Holmer?), Questão Grammatical (The Issue of Grammar) in 1887, Nova Grammatica da Língua Latina (New grammar of the Latin Language) in 1895, second revised edition of his Gramática Portuguesa, 1884, has a section on etymology. Traços Geraes de Linguistica is
regarded as the first work in ‘linguistics’ in Brazil, noting that the term linguistics is used in the title of his work considering that the prevailing term used at the time was philology. He carefully outlines the ideas contained in works of linguists and other thinkers, paving the way for his grammar, which becomes a great success in schools – it is promptly adopted as the official grammar. He refutes the tenets of the philosophical or general grammar (Port-Royal) and adopts a historical comparative method, with marked Spencerian and Darwinian evolutionary features. He argues that ‘languages, similarly to other living organisms, are true sociological organisms, which are subjected to law of the survival of the fittest, to the law of selection’ adding that ‘linguistic evolution happens in a much shorter period of life than the evolution of the species’. Member of the Philology Academy of São Paulo (Academia de Filologia de São Paulo), which subsequently became the Brazilian Academy of Philology (Academia Brasileira de Filologia, ABRAFIL), patron of seat 15.

Away from Anthropology and Philology:
The Training of Linguists in the US, Britain, and France, 1900-1945

Ku-ming (Kevin) Chang
(Academia Sinica – Taiwan)
kmkchang@gmail.com

This paper examines the training of linguists in the early twentieth century, a critical period when linguistics emerged as an independent discipline, first conceptually, and then institutionally. As linguistics had a long and deep root in philology, to become an independent discipline it had to break the bond of the other discipline. In the US it developed a close association with anthropology since the late nineteenth century. An independent linguistics also had to loosen that association.

The training of junior scholars often reflects the professional identity of a discipline. Old disciplines strengthened the professionalization by training their junior practitioners with the seminar, the laboratory, fieldwork, and statistics, or other instrument of training that was familiar to them. New disciplines, such as linguistics, broke away from old ones also by instilling their new identities in the way they trained young scholars.

Scholarly research and training took place in different frameworks of university and graduate education. Through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries graduate education was set up across Western countries, all looking up to the German model. Though sharing a common model, the actual structure of university and graduate education, however, varied from one country to another. The conceptual identity of linguistics had to materialize in the institutional settings in different countries.

This paper starts with the examination of the graduate education of a student, Fang-kuei Li (1902-1987), who was a founding figure of modern linguistics in China and who had a coveted opportunity to study with two superstars of American linguistics, Leonard Bloomfield (with an appointment in the Department of Germanic Philology) and Edward Sapir (appointed in the Department of Anthropology), at the University of Chicago in 1926-28. This examination focuses on Li’s coursework and the fieldwork in his doctoral training. It then compares his training with that of his peers in Britain (such as Arthur Lloyd James and John Firth) and France (Paul Verrier and Hubert Pernot, for example). It elucidates the emergence of an independent discipline of linguistics first in concept, and then realized in the different institutional structures of graduate education in those countries. By this examination, this paper hopes to contribute to the early
history of modern linguistics by elucidating its formation as reflected in its pedagogical and scientific practice in the early twentieth century (in the west as well as China), and contribute to the history of graduate education by comparing the ways in which a new discipline like linguistics was accommodated in the academic institutions across western countries.

This study therefore has significance in the history of human science, the history of scientific practice, and the history of higher education.

References

SESSION 35: DRUGS, HORMONES AND PROFESSIONAL NETWORKS IN MEDICINE AND PSYCHOLOGY

Comparing opposite networks. The case of two Barcelonean physicians:

*Lluís Sayé and Ramón Pla*

Marc Estapé Egea
(Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona - Spain)
mestape8@xtc.cat

Celia Miralles Buil
(Université de Lyon - France)
celia.miralles.buil@gmail.com

Do different aetiologies lead to different networks? In order to address this question, we compare two different Catalan physicians, Lluís Sayé and Ramón Pla, who were conducting tuberculosis research at the same time. They both played an important role on Catalan socialism during the Spanish Second Republic and so, after the Spanish Civil War, they had to go to exile. However, while Ramón Pla was excluded from official medicine because of his heterodox aetiology, Lluís Sayé was collaborating with the Catalan government and therefore he worked for
the public administration. Sayé’s medical texts report that European physicians greatly influenced him. To legitimate his theory at both Catalan and European level, he entered the large scientist network and was specially connected with Calmette and the promoters of the BCG. Letters from other Catalan physicians found in the medical reports and clinical records also revealed how his influence was rising up within the free public health system.

Conversely, Ramón Pla has set up a private laboratory, the Ravetllat-Pla Institute, in 1923, in order to promote his theory about tuberculosis. The Ravetllat-Pla network of physicians was built through a team of commercial agents that promoted their drugs and theory. These visitors’ work was registered in reports that were sent back to the Institute. In order to analyse how this network developed, this article focuses on these documents as well as the letters between Ramón Pla and his agents. We also analyse their journal La Clínica, a powerful marketing tool, as a crucial way of making their theory and products known.

With this case study, we state that these two physicians had to build two different practices and commercial networks directly linked to their different approaches regarding the aetiology of tuberculosis. For this purpose, we analyse how these networks were built, paying special attention to their specificities and their audience. Interestingly, the comparison of the networks has shown that they were strongly connected in spite of their differing etiological basis. In fact, some physicians were part of both networks and thus used both etiological theories.

Since both networks shared physicians and patients although they had opposite approaches to tuberculosis, this convergence from below brings us to determine another way to compare “opposite networks”.¹ This new proposal includes a study of all the social protagonists (scientists, public authorities but also users of science) so as to nuance the dual opposition between orthodox and heterodox medicine.

¹ By “opposite networks” we mean “not convergent” networks which included different agents, practices and care institutions. We suppose these networks were not connected with each other because their physicians had theories scientifically opposed. Our work precisely demonstrate that we have to question the term of opposite /parallel networks in that case, and maybe speak about complementary networks.

References
Lemercier, C. Analyse de réseaux et histoire, Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, 52(2):88-112.
Framing the history of anti-depressants.
Gay Cusack
(University of New South Wales – Australia)
glorious@hotmail.com

In distinct, but compatible accounts of the history of anti-depressants, David Healy (1997) and Joanna Moncrieff (1999) revised the standard medical textbook narratives and identified flaws in the promotion of anti-depressants and their explanations, which relied heavily on the Monoamine Hypothesis. Central for both writers is that anti-depressants were presented as a treatment that would specifically target depression, reaching a pinnacle with the release of the Selective Serotonin Re-Uptake Inhibitors in the 1980s. They argue that the concept of specificity of treatment drove the research, promotion, and explanation of pharmacological action of antidepressants, from the 1950s. Moncrieff extends these assertions to claim that even the category of an anti-depressant is unstable and that the idea of a chemical cure for mental disorders is a myth.

However, developments in experimental research on anti-depressants can not necessarily be accommodated in the Healy and Moncrieff models beyond the 1990s. Historically, antidepressants have been classified according to their modes of biochemical action, and differentiation between the effects of different drugs has been important, as it is to Moncrieff’s and Healy’s discussions. The Cognitive Neuropsychological Hypothesis (Harmer, Hill, Taylor, Cowen & Goodwin, 2003) and the Molecular and Cellular Theory of Depression (Duman, Heninger & Nestler, 1997) both used a common pathway model with overlapping mechanisms of action between different types of anti-depressants, proposing they work as a class, irrespective of their chemical makeup. Thus significantly, under these hypotheses, specificity of action is irrelevant. Moncrieff and Healy’s frameworks for anti-depressant history do not readily accommodate these, nor other considerations in experimental anti-depressant research. This paper discusses the nature of, and considers possible consequences, from this lack of fit.

References
Modeling experimental psychoses: 
first LSD trials in Latin America 
Mauricio Becerra 
(Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona – Spain) 
vervigracia@gmail.com

In the 1950s, LSD-25 tests were conducted in several countries in Latin America with the intention of inducing psychotic breaks on psychiatric patients in experimental contexts. In asylums in Chile, Argentina, Peru and Brazil, scientists assessed the capacity of such substances not only as pharmacological therapies, but most importantly, as a tool for exploring brain mechanisms.

In 1943 chemist Albert Hofmann and psychiatrist Werner Stoll reported the synthesis of LSD-25 from ergot. Four years later, Stoll published a paper reporting the results testing the substance for the first time on patients diagnosed with schizophrenia. In the following decades in Europe and North America, various trials were carried out to test the therapeutic uses of the drug, which was then distributed by Sandoz laboratories. Apart from schizophrenia, it was used for psychological treating of alcoholism and terminal cancer. In 1957, psychiatrist Humphry Osmond, a pioneer in the treatment of alcoholism with LSD-25, coined the term 'psychedelic' to label LSD-25 along with other substances that produced similar effects, such as mescaline and psilocybin.

In 1953 the first trials with LSD were conducted in Latin America. Psychiatrist Agustin Tellez tried its effects on patients diagnosed with schizophrenia and mania at the Manicomio Nacional in Santiago, using scales that measured affective and psychomotor functions. In 1958 psychiatrists Manuel Zambrano and Javier Mariategui compared LSD-25 with another psychotropic (LAE-32) on patients from Hospital Victor Larco Herrera in Lima. In Buenos Aires, psychiatrists Toledo, Fontana and Morales used the substance for their group psychotherapies, and in Sao Paulo, psychiatrist Clovis Martins, who tested the drug in psychotic patients, noticed a 'psycodislétic syndrome' along with the possibility of reproducing a clinical profile of depersonalization in such patients. For my research I used some articles published in psychiatric journals in Latin America that report tests with LSD-25 between 1953 and 1964, which corresponds to the III Latin American Congress of Psychiatry.

Although the historiography of LSD and its therapeutic uses in Europe and North America is vast, its scientific history and presence in Latin America has not yet been systematically addressed. Therefore, an initial research question is whether psychiatrists in Latin America only reproduced the trials performed previously in northern countries or if they introduced new designs or offered different conceptualizations or results. This paper aims to be an initial effort to fill that gap by analyzing the interpretations and meanings attributed by Latin American psychiatrists to the behaviors they observed on patients during clinical trials with LSD. Particular attention will be put on the parameters they designed to measure the thresholds of normality and, at large, to define the standards of normal psychic and affective functions.

References


SESSION 36: THE CHILD AS OBJECT IN PSYCHOLOGY AND FORENSIC MEDICINE

The “abnormal” mind as social threat: the psychology of the jurist E. Cuello Calón*

Aina Elias & Vanessa Márquez
(Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona – Spain)
vanessa.marquez@e-campus.uab.cat

The Spanish jurist Eugenio Cuello Calón (1879-1963) is a well-known personality in the field of jurisprudence, although he is not known in psychology. Nevertheless, he had a study interest in psychology. In the present paper, we explore his most relevant psychological contributions. He began his career studying the incidence of child delinquency in Spain. Due to the influence of Lombroso’s school, he, as well as many of his contemporaries, thought that the criminal had previously been an ‘abnormal’ child. Therefore, it was important to determine child abnormality at an early stage to prevent criminality at a later stage. In that period, there was a lack of agreement around the definition of “abnormality”, since physicians and pedagogues approached the topic from different angles.

During the first decade of the twentieth century Cuello Calón decided to study abroad to learn the psychological methods used to diagnose mental problems in children. In this trip he had the opportunity to work in the laboratory of the French psychologist Henri Piéron. He was especially interested in the scientific aspects, consisting in the methods to diagnose, the psychological and physiological measures and corrective pedagogies. The mentioned measures provided an average and standard deviation, which permitted to identify as ‘abnormal’ the child who had obtained lower scores in the tests. His positivist orientation made him use these measures and statistics to obtain an objective and quantitative way to define abnormality for scientific jurisdiction, since he considered it a crucial social and juridical problem. He remarks that the aim of psychometrics was not to only to obtain descriptive data, but mainly to obtain information with regard to the way the abnormal mind functions, so that an effectual strategy for intervention and correction of the deviation could be worked out (in the cases when this seems possible).

Between the last two decades of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, many Spanish physicians, pedagogues, jurists and other intellectuals were more and more aware of the
need to control vagabond children and teenagers who were living in miserable conditions in the streets of the big cities. They were perceived as problematic, because they were usually organized in groups spending their time stealing and smuggling goods or trafficking drugs. While in other countries there was already a new regulation establishing differentiated youth courts, in Spain it still took decades before the first courts for minors were established. Cuello Calón was one of the first in Spain who promoted differential treatment of minors in the legal context. Nevertheless, in the paper we will show that Cuello Calón represents clearly a controversial historical figure. His work links mainly the conservative policy of the Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship, and later with the Franco regime.

*This research was supported by the Spanish Ministry (MINECO; project HAR2014-58699-P)

References


Cuello Calón, E. (1909). Los procedimientos experimentales para el estudio de la psicología de los niños anormales, Anales de la Junta para la Ampliación de Estudios é Investigaciones Científicas, tomo III.


The Discreet Charm of children: child abuse in Chile 1870-1930

Marcelo Valenzuela
(Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona – Spain)
martelovalenzuelac2011@gmail.com

The next paper characterized child abuse in Chile since the first capitalist modernization (about 1870) until the establishment of the developmental state in 1930. Our research proposal is that the Chilean government lacks a legal environment of child care policy body, therefore be popular and bourgeois families who require the power protection to the sexually abused child and punishment for rapists.

In other words, children in the nineteenth century were very legally unprotected in case of abuse and rape in the absence of explicit legislation, the judges interpreted Article 365 referred to sodomy to address these issues. Therefore the causes of sodomy enclose a world of love and uses the incorrect body: adult men in consensual sex, rape of women and child abuse. The documentary
corpus will be analyzed criminal legislation dealing with sexual offenses: The Seven Games, the newest collection, The 1874 Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1906. But will the prosecution of the cities of Coquimbo, Valparaiso, Santiago Copiapo and Curicó, taken from the National Archives the basis of our analysis

References
Vázquez, F. (2001). El discurso médico y la invención del homosexual (España 1840-1915), Asclepios, 80(2), 143-162.
My paper deals with the psychological study of the abnormal child made by Maria de la Rigada, one of the few women whose work had a strong impact in the field of pedagogy and psychology during the first half of the XX century in Spain. She taught at a female teacher’s College (Escuela Normal Central de Maestras) and during her career published many papers to promoting special education, focusing her attention on the social environment (Colmenar, 2009). Her work had not yet attracted the attention of historians and is now-a-days quite unknown.

The relevance of the role of women for the history of psychology has already been pointed out by Elisabeth Scaraborough, Laurel Furumoto and others, but there is still more research needed to embed their contributions in the broader picture. It is of interest to acknowledge the difficulties that women faced in those times to get access to training and to make an academic career (Mülberger, 2014). At the same time it is necessary to study how some of them managed to circumvent such difficulties and nevertheless make a successful career (Schiebinger, 1987).

In my research I will take into account the psychology of the child as it was developed and practiced at the beginnings of the 20th century in Spain. In this context we find the pediatrician F. Pereira, the psychiatrist G. Rodríguez Lafora and the pedologist D. Barnés, among others. Their thinking and work was strongly influenced by the initiatives undertaken in other places by scholars of international standing such as A. Binet or E. Claparède. De Rigada’s contributions belong to this setting, in which the child is seen as a relevant unit of psychological and pedagogical research, a research mainly based on the measurement of intellectual capacities.

Throughout her career De la Rigada was very active scholar. She participated at many conferences and committees such as the Comite Femenino de Higiene Popular or the Comision Permanente de Enseñanza de la Union Iberoamerican. Moreover she worked at the Patronato Nacional de Sordomudos, Ciegos y Anormales were she was able to contribute to the fields of education and psychology of the abnormal child. (Colmenar, 2009). In her work she adopted an innovative stance, developing a kind of psychotechniques which would be useful for pedology and which she called “paidotecnia”.

*This research was supported by the Spanish Ministry (MINECO; project HAR2014-58699-P)

References


Index of abstract’s authors

A
Ruud Abma 96
Mark A. Affeltranger 58
Jouni Ahmajavri 8
Junona S. Almonaitiien 82
Maria Giulia Andretta 170
Ana Macaya Andrés 184
Saulo de Freitas Araujo 173
Eric Arnau 62
Evan Arnet 70
Michelle Aroney 131

B
Sarah L. Ballard-Abbott 35
Enrique Baleriola 139
Mónica Balltondre 115
Richard D. Barnes 35
Jennifer L. Bazar 78
Mauricio Becerra 193
Arlie Belliveau 36
Laura Berniell 112
Kees Bertels 133
Anna Borgos 102, 104
Horst-Peter Brauns 86
Sebastiaan Broere 45
Dennis Bryson 7
Celia Miralles Buil 190

C
Lino Camprubi 14
Gabriel Vieira Cândido 64
Miquel Carandell 51, 55
John Carson 76
David Ceccarelli 98
Ku-ming (Kevin) Chang 189
David O. Clark 71
Marcia Consolim 141, 143
Gay Cusak 192

D
Tal Davidson 37, 41
Ian J. Davidson 60
Michael R. W. Dawson 36, 157
Liesbet De Kock 88
Dario De Santis 90
Elena Demke 178
Maarten Derksen 73
Nancy Didgon 126
Annemieke van Drenth 2
Otniel E. Dror 72
Ahmed Dusuky 169

E
Marc Estapé Egea 190
Greg Eghigian 19, 20
Aina Elias 194
Jannes Eshuis 30, 32

F
Cathy Faye 122
Arthur Arruda Leal Ferreira 67, 137
Ivan Flis 165
Luiz Eduardo Prado da Fonseca 67
Miquel Forcada 34
Renato Foschi 151
Carla Pozuelo Fúnez 169

G
James M. M. Good 146
Andrea Graus 95
Christopher D. Green 36, 66
John D. Greenwood 127
Julia Gyimesi 102, 105

H
Kim Hajek 114
Andrew Harris 120
Ben Harris 120
Peter Hegarty 180
Tom Heinzen 155
René van Hezewijk 30, 31, 33
Thomas Hirsch 141, 142
Oliver Hochadel 51, 53
Andrea G.v. Hohenthal 50
Marcia Holmes 13, 15
David G. Horn 116
Frank C.P. van der Horst 4
Katherine Hubbard 37, 42
Alexandra Hui 13, 14

I
Matei Iagher 24, 25
Marco Innamorati 150

J
Isabel Jiménez-Lucena 181
Ann Johnson 37, 39
Elizabeth Johnston 37, 39
Andrea Josipovic 176
Gordana Jovanović 147
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Adriana Kaulino</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anna Kathryn Kendrick</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nadia Kerecuk</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Melinda Kovai</td>
<td>102, 106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jesper Vaczy Kragh</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Robert Kugelmann</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Andrea Lailach-Hennrich</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shayna Fox Lee</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kata Lénárd</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sigrid Leyssen</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Natalia Logiobova</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marjorie Lorch</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Johann Louth</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vera Luckgei</td>
<td>37, 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elizabeth Lunbeck</td>
<td>19, 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Jimena Carrasco Madariaga</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sarah Marks</td>
<td>13, 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vanessa Márquez</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shane M. Martin</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ricardo Martinelli</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alicia Fernández Martinez</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hernán Camilo Pulido Martínez</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jaime Valenzuela Matus</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marco Maureira</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>David Miller</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Carles Sirera Miralles</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Irina A. Mironenko</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jorge Molero-Mesa</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jill Morawski</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Raúl Velasco Morgado</td>
<td>136, 175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moritz Michels</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Annette Mülberger</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mikko Myllykangas</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Sara Navarro-Rendón</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Carmen Beatrix Neufeld</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lawrence T. Nichols</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ian Nicholson</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agustí Nieto-Galan</td>
<td>51, 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>Katarina Parhi</td>
<td>19, 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Caroline da C. Pavan-Cândido</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thiago Constâncio Ribeiro Pereira</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wade Pickren</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Petteri Pietikäinen</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Noemi Pizarroso</td>
<td>141, 143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Csaba Pléh</td>
<td>102, 107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kimberly Probolus</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mariagrazia Proietto</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>Sheila O’Brien Quinn</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marta García Quiñones</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>Sonia Recuerda</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ángel Pozuelo Reina</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elissa Rodkey</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Juan Antonio Rodríguez-Sánchez</td>
<td>136, 175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aída Roige</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hugo Leonardo Rocha Silva da Rosa</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lenny van Rosmalen</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nora Ruck</td>
<td>37, 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alexandra Rutherford</td>
<td>37, 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Annuka Sailo</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iván Sánchez-Perillo</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lara Scaglia</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sonu Shamdasani</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Irina Sirotkina</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roger Smith</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Michael M. Sokal</td>
<td>46, 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marco Solinas</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Henderikus J. Stam</td>
<td>30, 31, 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arthur W. Still</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>Carlos Tabernero-Holgado</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miki Takasuna</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ana María Talak</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ruggero Taradel</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Francisco Tirado</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pedro Torrejón</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Arlene C. Vadum</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zsuzsanna Vajda</td>
<td>102, 103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elizabeth R. Valentine</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marcelo Valenzuela</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mauro Valenzuela</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Laura Valls</td>
<td>51, 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>René van der Veer</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Koen Vermeir</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rodrigo Vivas</td>
<td>24, 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jessica Wang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisa Maria Wanner</td>
<td>37, 43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry Whitaker</td>
<td>155</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Wieser</td>
<td>162</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alex Woodcock</td>
<td>24, 27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anton Yasnitsky</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Yeandle</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacy L. Young</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td>163</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leila Zenderland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>