

*R. Almon*

TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF

**ESHHS**

EUROPEAN SOCIETY FOR THE HISTORY OF THE HUMAN  
SCIENCES

AMSTERDAM

14 – 18 AUGUST 2001

**PROGRAMME TWENTIETH CONFERENCE OF ESHHS  
14-18 AUGUST 2001**

All sessions will be held in the Tinbergen Room, unless otherwise indicated.

**Tuesday 14 August**

13:00-14:00 Registration

14:00-15:30 **Paper Session 1: *Culture, Anthropology and Psychology*** (Chair: Hans van Rappard)

Berger, Stephen

*Zora Neale Hurston and the Politics of Assertiveness of an African-American Woman in the Interwar Period*

✓

Staeuble, Irmingard

*Rethinking Eurocentric Knowledges: The Challenge by Postcolonial and Indigenous Critics and its Chance*

Bartholomee, Yvette

*An Exploration into the Unknown: Donald T. Campbell and Cultural Anthropology, 1955-1975*

15:30-16:00 Coffee & Tea Break

16:00-17:30 **Paper Session 2: *Psychology and Politics in the USA*** (Chair: Bob Rieber)

Pols, Hans

*How to Build Psychological Defenses against Soviet Infiltration, or What a Group of Dutch Psychologists Learned during a Research Visit to the U.S. in 1956*

Buchanan, Rod

*Public Controversy over Testing in the U.S. during the 1960s: The MMPI goes to Washington*

Harris, Benjamin

*Did the Public Lose Interest in Psychology During the Great Depression?*

17:30-18:30 **Welcome Drinks**

*Durham paper → femina*

*'he's not the sharpest tool in the shed'*

**Wednesday 15 August**

09:00-10:30 **Paper Session 3: Methodological Issues** (Chair: Trudy Dehue)

Stoffers, Manuel  
*Münsterberg's Nightmare*

Lovie, Sandy & Pat  
*Golem psychology: The Stately Dance of Solomon et al. and the Founders of Mathematical Learning Theory*

Michell, Joel  
*Causes of the Post Second World War Methodological Consensus in Psychology?*

10:30-11:00 Coffee & Tea Break

11:00-12:00 **Keynote Speech Kurt Danziger: 'Whither the golden oldies of ESHHS?** (Chair: Piet van Strien)

12:00-13:30 Lunch

13:30-15:30 **Paper Session 4: Philosophy and The Human Sciences** (Chair: Irmingard Staeuble)

Barberis, Daniela S.  
*Durkheim, the Philosophy 'agrégation', and the Role of Sociology: A Debate in the 'Revue de métaphysique et de morale'*

John, Matthias & Temilo van Zantwijk  
*At the Dawn of Science. Empirical Psychology in Germany in the 1790s*

Good, James M.M. & Arthur Still  
*The Scottish Common Sense School and Twentieth Century Psychology: A Reassessment*

Allesch, Christian G.  
*Aesthetics as a Human Science*

15:30-16:00 Coffee & Tea Break

16:00-17:00 **Business Meeting** (Location: *The Old Room*)

**Thursday 16 August**

~~09:00-10:30~~ <sup>30</sup> **Paper Session 5: Paradigms in Psychological Testing** (Chair: Michael Sokal)

Strien, Pieter J. van  
*The Resurrection of the 'Clinical' Approach in Personnel Assessment*

~~Drunen, Peter van~~  
~~*The History of Projective Techniques: The Case of the 'Four Picture Test'*~~

Petri, Stefan J.  
*Testing Abilities / Judging Character. Methodological Changes of Aptitude Assessment in German Military Psychology, 1914-1945*

10:30-11:00 Coffee & Tea Break

11:00-12:30 **Paper Session 6: Psychology as a Social Science** (Chair: Annette Mulberger)

Pietikainen, Petteri  
*From Alienation to Integration: Self and Society in Psychological Utopia*

~~Jovanovic, Gordana~~  
~~*Discourses on/of Aggression*~~

*Irmingard Staeuble*

Lubek, Ian & Mee Lian Wong  
*Some Unexpected Research Consequences of a Re-engagement with the History of Social Psychology: Lewinian (1946) Action Research and the Current Cambodian HIV/AIDS Crisis*

12:30-13:30 Lunch

13:30-17:30 **Symposium on Boundary Work**  
(15:30-16:00 Coffee & Tea Break)

**A. Boundary Work: Conceptual Issues** (Chair: Hans Pols)

Illustrated and discussed by:

Blok, Gemma (*The History of Family Therapy in the Netherlands*)

Hilvoorde, Ivo van (*The Journal as Gatekeeper*)

Weijers, Ido (*The Domain of Child Psychiatry*)

**B. Boundary Work: Case Studies** (Chair: Karl Teigen)

Mülberger, Annette et al.  
*A Spanish Priest Psychologist against Occultism: A Case Study in the History of Boundary Discussion in Science*

Cicchini, Marco  
*The Networks of Communication within the Genesis of Sciences of Education as a Disciplinary Field. Analysis of the Scientific Foundations and the Disiplinary Boundaries of these Networks*

Hofstetter, Rita & Bernard Schneuwly  
*Sciences of Education: A Process of Disciplinarisation Deeply Embedded in Professional Fields and Other Social Sciences. The Genevan Case in the Beginning 20th Century*

**C. Transgressing Disciplinary Boundaries?** (Chair: Jacob van Belzen)

Hezewijk, Rene van, Henderikus J. Stam & G. Panhuysen

*Existential Questions: Were there **Two** Utrecht Schools in the 1950's? The relations, similarities and differences between the phenomenological approaches in psychology and in criminology*

Abma, Ruud & F. van Wel

*Youth and Mental Health: Shifting Paradigms*

18:00-19:00 **Reception of the Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Amsterdam**

**Friday 17 August**

NB From 9:00 through to 15:00 the following *posters* will be displayed:

- Takasuna, Miki & Yasuo Nishikawa: *The Netherlands' Early Influence on the Establishment of Modern Psychology in Japan*
- Medlow, Sharon: *Representationism in Psychology: Origins, Issues and Alternatives*
- Palethorpe, James: *What is Meant by the 'Stimulus'?*

These will be open for questions and discussion during the coffee and tea breaks.

09:30-10:30 **Paper Session 7: History of Psychology in Germany** (Chair: Ben Harris)

Behrens, Peter J.

*Applied psychology at Leipzig University in the Inter-War Period*

~~Dumont, Kitty~~ *Lieber*

~~The XXII. International Congress of Psychology - An Important Event in the History of Psychology of the GDR -~~

10:30-11:00 Coffee & Tea Break

11:00-12.30 **Paper Session 8: Psychoanalysis** (Chair: Sacha Bem)

Lee, David D.:

*History and Historiography in Psychoanalysis: The Case of the Pfarrer-Analytiker Oskar Pfister*

Vajda, Szuzsanna

*Keep Nothing Secret: Dependency and Understanding between Freud and Ferenczi*

Bos, Jaap

*In the Margins of Scientific Dialogue: Evart van Dieren contra Psychoanalysis*

12:30-13:30 Lunch

13:30-14:30 **Presentation by Trudy Dehue** (Chair: John Burnham)

*A Dutch Treat: Randomized Controlled Experimentation and the Case of an Experiment with Heroin Maintenance in The Netherlands*

14:30-15:00 Pre-excursion Coffee and Tea

15:00-22:30 **Excursion and Conference Dinner**

# Saturday 18 August

09:30-10:30 **Paper Session 9: *Emotion*** (Chair: James Good)

Dror, Otniel  
*Disordered Controls: Emotions, Embodiment, and the Human Machine*

Pott, Heleen  
*Emotions and Their Place in Psychological Explanation: Rethinking the Cognitive Turn*

10:30-11:00 Coffee & Tea Break

11:00-12:00 **Paper Session 10: *Subjectivity and Ethnicity*** (Chair: Ruud Abma)

Verderber, Suzanne  
*Between Masochism and Agency: A Lacanian Analysis of Late Medieval Subjectivity*

Koerner, Stephanie  
*Archeology, Nationalism and Ethnicity*

19:00- ***Drinks and Snacks at Van Rappard's***

## PAPER SESSION 1: CULTURE, ANTHROPOLOGY, AND PSYCHOLOGY

**"He can read my writing but he sho' can't read my mind": Zora Neale Hurston and the Politics of Assertiveness of an African-American Woman in the Interwar Period**

*Stephen Berger* (Springfield College)

Zora Neale Hurston opposed the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court which, in 1954, abolished segregated public education. The Court had argued that

To separate [grade and high school children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may effect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone....[1]

This decision, and this argument, Hurston wrote, insults rather than honors her race: How much satisfaction can I get from a court order for somebody to associate with me who does not wish me near them? The American Indian has never been spoken of as a minority and chiefly because there is no whine in the Indian....[1] It is inconceivable of an Indian to seek forcible association with anyone. His well known pride and self-respect would save him from that. I take the Indian position.[1]

Who was Zora Neale Hurston and how did she come to take this position?

Hurston was a recognized figure in the "Harlem Renaissance," that resurgence of black artistic work and white interest in black art which peaked in the period 1923-1929. She was the most published African-American writer in the period from 1935 to 1942. She was also trained by Franz Boas, the most important American anthropologist of the day, and she was the major black folklorist of her day. *→ folk tales in the context of peoples lives*

Hurston delighted in black folk culture, which she sought to display through dramatic presentations. Seeking to display the creativity of black culture, and always in need of money to survive, she turned to the novel as a form, and to a novelistic approach to the presentation of black folklore.

Hurston had always to contend with finding ways of making money from white patrons, institutions or organizations, on the one hand, and with the sexism of the black artistic establishment, on the other. She could ally with black male artists around the theme of honoring black folk culture as a source of black creativity. However, she went her own way in the face of black men who took public positions of protest against the white treatment of blacks. Their need to stand up and show themselves as men, paradigmatically exhibited by W.E.B. DuBois, was not her way.

From relatively early on, Hurston created a public persona towards white audiences which stressed her agreement with white and American values and distanced herself from "the sobbing school of Negrohood." [1] She was often criticized, sometimes viciously so, by black male critics who objected to what they saw as pandering to white audiences.

However, for those who have eyes to see and ears to hear, there are hints in Hurston's writing not to take this persona so seriously, that it was also her version of old slave methods of "putting on ole massa." She described this tactic as: "He can read my writing but he sho' can't read my mind." [1] Hurston needed the persona to get attention, to make money, to gain understanding and appreciation for black folk culture.

And she needed it to create a space within which to raise the issues of the treatment of black women. Hurston's great themes are the violence of black men toward women, black men's need to silence their women, and black women's need to develop their own voice. In her great novel, *Their Eyes Were Watching God*, and in her own performance of her persona, she demonstrated the need and ability of black women to develop their own voice, as well as exhibited the situational limitations which constrained that development.

While Hurston did not choose to write in a theoretical vein, she put her understanding of racial oppression and gender dynamics in the mouth of a former slave, the grandmother of the heroine, in *Their Eyes*:

'Honey, de white man is de ruler of everything as fur as Ah been able tuh find out. Maybe it's some place way off in de ocean where de black man is in power, but we don't know nothin' but what we see. So de white man throw down de load and tell the nigger man tuh pick it up. He pick it up because he have to, but he don't tote it. He hand it to his womenfolks. De nigger woman is de mule uh de world so fur as Ah can see.' [1]

And the African-American woman is kept in her place by the African-American man by the threat and exercise of violence. As the critic Christine Raynaud has written of Hurston: 'Racial oppression is conceptualized through family violence, as if the one necessarily led to the other.' [1]

Hurston's career shows how complex and difficult it was to articulate the oppressive situation African-Americans faced when one includes not only the dynamics of color and class, but also those of gender, when the audience is composed of both races and both genders, and money in the hands of well-to-do white people. We may read Hurston's writing as the attempt to create a performance-based relational self, and thus as a critique of, and alternative to W.E.B. DuBois' notion of an internal self.

- [i] Blaustein and Zangrando, 1968: 435-437
- [i] Hurston, 1954
- [i] Hurston, 1928
- [i] Hurston, 1935: 5
- [i] Hurston, 1937: 29.
- [i] Raynaud, 1992: 55

#### Bibliography

- Blaustein, A.P. and Zangrando, R.L., eds. (1968). *Civil rights and the American Negro*. New York: Washington Square Press.
- DuBois, W.E.B. (1903). *The souls of black folk*. As republished 1965 by Avon Books in *Three Negro Classics*.
- Dorst, J. (1987). "Rereading *Mules and Men*: Toward the death of the ethnographer," *Cultural Anthropology* 2: 305-318.
- \* Gordon, D. (1990). "The politics of ethnographic authority: Race and writing in the ethnography of Margaret Mead and Zora Neale Hurston," in M. Manganaro, ed., *Modernist anthropology: From fieldwork to Text*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 146-162
- Hernandez, G. (1995). "Multiple subjectivities and strategic positionality: Zora Neale Hurston's experimental ethnographies," in R. Behar and D. A. Gordon, eds., *Women's writing culture*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 148-165.
- Hooks, b. (1990). "Saving black folk culture: Zora Neale Hurston as anthropologist and writer," in *Yearning*. Boston: South End Press, 136-143.
- Hurston, Z.N. (1928). "How it feels to be colored me," in Hurston (1995): 826-829.
- Hurston, Z.N. (1935). *Mules and men*. New York: J.B. Lippincott. As republished 1978 by Indiana University Press.
- Hurston, Z.N. (1937). *Their eyes were watching God*. New York: J.B. Lippincott. As republished 1978 by University of Illinois Press.
- Hurston, Z.N. (1942). *Dust tracks on the Road*. New York: J.B. Lippincott. 2nd Ed. 1984, University of Illinois Press.
- Hurston, Z.N. (1954). "Court order can't make races mix," in Hurston (1995), 956-958.
- Hurston, Z.N. (1995). *Folklore, memoirs, and other writings*. New York: Library of America.
- Hurston, Z.N. (1999). *Go gator and muddy the water*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Locke, A. ed., (1925). *The new Negro*. New York: Albert and Charles Boni. As republished by 1968 by Atheneum Publishers.
- Johnson, B. (1984). "Metaphor, metonymy and voice in *Their Eyes Were Watching God*," in Gates, H. L., ed., *Black literature and literary theory*. New York: Methuen, 205-220.

- Johnson, B. (1987). "Thresholds of difference: structures of address in Zora Neale Hurston," in *A world of difference*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 172-183.
- Raynaud, C. (1992). "'Rubbing a Paragraphy with a Soft Cloth'? Muted voices and editorial constraints in *Dust Tracks on a Road*," in S. Smith and J. Watson, eds., *Decolonizing the subject*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 34-64.
- Scott, D. M. (1997). *Contempt and pity: Social policy and the image of the damaged black psyche 1880-1996*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

#### Rethinking Eurocentric Knowledges The Challenge by Postcolonial and Indigenous Critics and its Chance

Irmingard Staeuble (Freie Universitat Berlin)

For half a century, postcolonial intellectuals have, voiced a polyphonous challenge to Eurocentric modes of thinking history, knowledge, and methodology. From the days of Frantz Fanon and Albert Memmi, they have elaborated on the cultural dislocations brought about by colonialism for both the colonized and the colonizers, showing how colonialism and European culture are deeply implicated in each other. (Said 1978, 1993; Ngugi wa Thiong'o 1986; Spivak 1999). The challenge continues since Afroamerican, Maori and Aborigine scholars have begun to probe further into Eurocentric modes of organizing knowledge and maintaining its positional superiority (e.g. Smith 1999; Hamlet 1998). Arguing from the vantage point of the colonized, their concern is with the ways in which the knowledge gained through colonization has been represented back to the colonized and used to structure the colonized peoples' own ways of knowing, particularly through the education of colonial elites and "native" intellectuals. The postcolonial heirs of the "native" intellectuals who have to position themselves within the Third World, their indigeneous communities, and towards the Western world, questions of knowledge production, its producers, and its beneficiaries are no abstract issues. In "talking back" and "writing back" they put the question of power and emancipation center stage.

In response to this challenge, Euroamerican scholars involved in postcolonial critique have also put the decolonizing of Eurocentric thought on the agenda. This task, they argue, is not an issue of erasing from our mind colonial images but rather an issue of reworking, repositioning, and restructuring Eurocentric knowledges in order to develop alternative frameworks for thinking about history and epistemology (Dirks 1992; Breckenridge and Veer 1993; Barker & Iverson 1994; Young 1990).

Despite some mutual interest in decolonizing knowledges and modes of knowledge production, easy alliances are not to be expected. As observed by postcolonial intellectuals like Linda Tuhiwai Smith and Gayatri Spivak before her, the academico-cultural debate in what has been termed 'postcolonial studies' tends again to marginalize indigenous scholars (Smith 1999; Spivak 1999). Not to mention the academy at large, where postcolonial critique has hardly made an impact, where Western experts still define what counts as valid knowledge, proper methodology or sound theory. It is obvious that the challenge to Eurocentric knowledge has not yet been grasped as a chance for rethinking and reworking the received wisdom of colonialism and its aftermath.

In my paper I discuss the chances implied in the challenge to Eurocentric knowledge. I argue (a) that rethinking and reworking the premises and frameworks of 'our' knowledge is essential in the interest of both the updating of knowledge and the improvement of intercultural communication, (b) that although the premises of both authoritative and critical traditions of Western knowledge are rooted in the colonialism-culture complex, postcolonial and indigenous intellectuals have demonstrated a difference in the potential they offer for a reworking, and (c) that the process of reworking is to be mutually dialogical. Given that even postcolonial intellectuals who manage to position themselves within the academy, within the Third World or indigenous world, and within the Western world still face the crucial question 'Who will listen?',

it becomes obvious that an essential prerequisite for Euroamerican scholars to enter a dialogical process is learning to listen to others.

#### Bibliography

- Barker, F., Hulme, P., & Iverson, M. (Eds.) (1994) *Colonial Discourse - Postcolonial Theory*. Manchester: Manchester University Press
- Breckenridge, C. A. & van der Veer, P. (Eds.) (1993) *Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament. Perspectives on South Asia*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Dirks, N. B. (Ed.) (1992) *Colonialism and Culture*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Hamlet, J. D. (Ed.) (1998) *Afrocentric Visions: Studies in Culture and Communication*. London: Sage.
- Ngugi wa Thiong'o (1986) *Decolonizing the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature*. London: James Currey.
- Said, E. (1978) *Orientalism. Western Conceptions of the Orient*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Said, E. (1993) *Culture and Imperialism*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Smith, L. T. (1999) *Decolonizing Methodologies. Research and Indigenous Peoples*. Dunedin: University of Otago Press.
- Spivak, G. (1999) *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason. Toward a History of the Vanishing Present*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Staeuble, I. (1996) *Becoming Modern amidst Global Change: Postcolonial cultural transformations as viewed by Western and non-Western social scientists*. In: R. Stachowski & A. Pankalla (Eds.) *Studies in the History of Psychology and the Social Sciences*, 172-178. Poznan: Impressions.
- Young, R. (1990) *White Mythologies. Writing History and the West*. London: Routledge.

→ *Waroll & Cohen (1970) A Handbook of Method - - - in CA*

#### 'An Exploration into the Unknown': Donald T. Campbell and cultural anthropology, 1955-1975

Yvette Bartholomée (University of Groningen)

*power point*

In this paper, I will raise the issue of why certain research methods are successful - or unsuccessful - at a specific time or within particular disciplines. My central example will be the introduction of a standardized, mainly quantitative research methodology within both psychology and anthropology. This example will show that the success of a certain method cannot be explained by the methodology in itself.

First, I will offer an overview of Donald T. Campbell's efforts to turn anthropology into a more 'scientific' discipline. I will also try to explain why Campbell's method initially was attractive to some anthropologists. However, despite Campbell's efforts to turn the entire field of anthropology into a standardized and quantitative science, most anthropologists kept using interpretative and qualitative research methods. His methodology, while extremely successful within one field - psychology -, did not catch on within another discipline - anthropology.

Donald T. Campbell (1916-1996) is widely known as an eminent psychologist and methodologist. He first gained his reputation with a book written together with Julian Stanley, *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research* (1966), also known as 'Campbell and Stanley'. In this book, Campbell and Stanley discuss numerous quasi-experiments, to be used when the ideal true experiment is not feasible. The quasi-experimental research designs developed by Campbell and his research group at Northwestern University were supposed to facilitate scientific social experimentation and the evaluation of social programs. In this field, Campbell became highly influential.

Campbell also directed his attention to cultural anthropology. He engaged in researching cultural influences on visual perception, and studied ethnocentrism. The research project concerning visual perception for example was conducted by presenting a pre-established questionnaire to 1.878 respondents; more than 1.500 people all over the world were questioned

while researching ethnocentrism. In the latter project relations and attitudes between different ethnic groups were studied. Ethnic groups were for instance asked to classify others according to these traits: peaceful or quarrelsome, hardworking or lazy, filthy or clean, stupid or intelligent. Because of the vastness of these research projects, Campbell cooperated with many anthropological fieldworkers. So-called *Handbooks* developed by Campbell presented strict procedures for data-collection to be followed by these fieldworkers. According to the *Handbooks*, the data-collection procedures had to be as standardized as possible - only then the reliability and comparability of the data could be ensured. The research manuals dealt with matters like the choice of informants, translation of questionnaires (for which the 'double-translation procedure' was developed), the exact phrasing of questions, and the gathering of additional background material. The data thus gathered did not have to be rich and detailed, but first and foremost had to be quantifiable. In short, anthropology should become more 'scientific', meaning that it should use statistics and do research according to rigid procedures. Strict methodology - Campbell's specialty - was deemed indispensable for this new anthropology, at the expense of being 'an exploration into the unknown'.

Notwithstanding a promising start, Campbell's introduction of a standardized and quantitative methodology within anthropology failed, even though the same methodology became highly influential within psychology. This presents an interesting case: a research method that succeeds and fails at the same time.

#### Bibliography

- Brewer, M.B. & D.T. Campbell. (1976). *Ethnocentrism and intergroup attitudes. East African evidence*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Campbell, D.T. & J.C. Stanley. (1963). *Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for research*. Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company.
- Herskovits, M.J., D.T. Campbell & M.H. Segall. (1969). *A cross-cultural study of perception*. Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill
- Kuklick, H. (1998). *Fieldworkers and physiologists*. In: Herle, A. & S. Rouse (eds.). *Cambridge and the Torres Strait. Centenary essays on the 1898 anthropological expedition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (pp. 158-180)
- LeVine, R.A. & D.T. Campbell. (1972). *Ethnocentrism: theories of conflict, ethnic attitudes, and group behavior*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Porter, T.M. (1995). *Trust in numbers. The pursuit of objectivity in science and public life*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Segall, M.H., D.T. Campbell & M.J. Herskovits. (1966). *The influence of culture on visual perception*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

*number of pages pro spent dollar on the project.*

*~ science - policy making -> accountability / numbers*

## PAPER SESSION 2: PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICS IN THE U.S.A.

### How to Build Psychological Defenses Against Soviet Infiltration, or: What A Group of Dutch Psychologists Learned during a Research Visit to the U.S. in 1958

Hans Pols (Rutgers University)

In the United States, the Cold War created a great number of new research opportunities for psychologists, who, motivated by patriotic motives as well as opportunities for advancing research and disciplinary growth, took advantage of them with great enthusiasm (Herman, 1995). After World War II, funding for psychological research had been available on an unprecedented level, and the political tensions of the 1950s added funding from sources such as the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. In particular the CIA used a number of "empty" front organizations to hide the real origin of research funds to channel funds to researchers. One such front organization was the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology, which funded politically relevant research in the human sciences (Marks, 1979). This Society was organized by the neurologist Harold G. Wolff of Cornell Medical College in New York and sponsored research on brainwashing and on the effect of Communist regimes on the adjustment strategies of their respective populations. It initiated, for example, an extensive investigation of refugees from Hungary in 1956 to ascertain techniques of social control employed by the Communist regime there (see Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology, 1958).

In the Netherlands, the Cold War had important ramifications for national policy and public opinion as well. Initially, most Dutch citizens viewed the Soviet Union with suspicion. The fear for Communism was particularly strong among the many Christian denominations, who viewed the official atheism of the communist ideology as evidence of its depraved and dangerous nature. However, it appeared to some intellectuals that, during the 1950s, attitudes towards the Soviet Union relaxed somewhat. Dutch citizens no longer associated the Soviet Union with secret police, purge trials, Siberia, and brutal totalitarianism, but rather with successful scientific investigations, technical achievements and prize winning sports stars. A number of conservative psychologists viewed such developments rather dangerous since it would make Dutch citizens more receptive to Soviet propaganda. Psychological means to counter this trend had to be designed; to this end a study group was organized. Its first activity was to travel to the United States—there, it was believed, Soviet propaganda and means for psychological defense had already been studied for a number of years. After its return, the group recommended that a Russian Research Institute be established on Dutch soil. Professionals in this institute would investigate the nature of Soviet infiltration and provide the representatives of groups in Dutch society with the information and practical means to combat it. The American visit was organized and arranged by the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology, which guaranteed that the Dutch visitors would come into contact with the most advanced research undertaken on the topic and with a number of right-wing citizen's associations (see van den Heuvel *et al.*, 1959).

The psychologists in the group that traveled to the States were representatives of phenomenological psychology. They were, first of all, J.H. van den Berg, probably the most widely read psychologist in the Netherlands. His book *Metaphysics* (translated as: *The Changing Nature of Man*) has been reprinted countless times since it was published in 1956. The book advocated a historical psychology by investigating how the human mind has changed over time. The second psychologist was Frederik Hogewind, head of the State Psychological Service, which could occupy a central position in educating government employees about the dangers of the Soviets. The third group member, the sociologist Jan Hornix, was employed by the air-force, and would later lead the Institute for Society and Defense (Stichting Volk en Verdediging) which can be seen as one of the results of the activities of the study group. The fourth member of the (!) group was a manager from the Dutch national railway system, while the fifth member was a representative from the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

↓ ± fenomenologisch

Harold Wolff  
Robert Jay Lifton

In my paper, I will elaborate on the research projects discussed by the visitors and their hosts, which included research on brainwashing techniques, studies of displaced populations (in particular the contingent of Hungarian immigrants in 1956), and deprivation research on conscientious objectors. I will also discuss their contacts with industry representatives and a number of civic associations. (gewetenbewaarden)

The Dutch group became very impressed with the American efforts to combat Soviet infiltrations. Nevertheless, they did not become converts to the American cause. During their stay, the members of the group increasingly started to make observations on the nature of "the American." Repeatedly, they brought up local conditions in their discussions with the Americans they encountered. The concluding chapter stated that "the comparison of our own situation with a different world made us see the former more clearly." The emphasis on making money and immediate, practical results made the position of the intellectual in American society highly problematic. Communism might represent a form of social organization that needed to be combated, but so was the American emphasis on making money as the highest motive in life. The members of the Dutch study group became increasingly hesitant whether America, with its materialism, its emphasis on business, making money, applications, and quick results could serve as an antidote against Soviet infiltration in the Netherlands. \*

Both the Soviet Union and America illustrated how social conditions influenced human nature, and contributed to a sense of urgency to develop an alternative European or Dutch model which would provide a third way to retain its own identity in the world crisis.

#### Bibliography

- cf. David Lifton → inner-directed man
- Berg, J.H. van den, *The changing nature of man: Introduction to a historical psychology* (New York: Dell, 1975).
  - Herman, Ellen. *The romance of American psychology: Political culture in the age of experts* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).
  - Heuvel, C.C. van den, J.H. van den Berg, F.J.E. Hogewind, J.M.M. Hornix, and K.C. de Pous, *Mogelijkheden van psychologische verdediging tegen sovjet-beïnvloeding, vertrouwelijk rapport [Possibilities for a psychological defense against Soviet infiltration, Confidential report]*, 1959.
  - Marks, John D. *The search for the Manchurian candidate: The CIA and mind control* (New York: Times Books, 1979).
  - Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology, *Annual Report* (Forest Hill, NY: Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology, 1958).

Best defense is an inner-directed personality

#### Public controversy over testing in the U.S. during the 1960s: The MMPI goes to Washington

Rod Buchanan (University of Groningen)  
Australiër?

power phnt  
en leest - heel snel - voor → slecht te verstaan

During the 1960s, American psychologists found themselves caught in wide-ranging critique of professional authority. Some commentators suggested that social scientists inevitably cast themselves as the "servants of power," while more radical critics argued that mental health professionals were as much disciplinarians as healers. From this perspective, the tools of mental health professionals – including standardized testing – embodied a means of social control. In any case, testing was applied psychology's public face. Thus the *tools* became the focus of attention. These critiques had dual, seemingly contradictory, aspects: that the tests did not work in any scientific sense; and, that they worked only too well, at considerable cost. This paper will examine a controversy encompassing both aspects of these critiques. ] met in '60

The earliest and most prominent attacks on testing in the postwar era came from media commentators, journalists and writers in the mid-1950s. They condemned intelligence, achievement and aptitude tests as an affront to individual civil liberties and as unfair to various ethnic groups. In contrast, critics of personality testing tended to concentrate their attention on the issue of privacy. The MMPI bore the brunt of many of these attacks. Outside cloistered institutional

environments, the MMPI took on a very confronting hue. To the more informed respondent, the item content seemed bizarre and distasteful, the behavioral categories inappropriate and prejudicial. In the early 1960s, mobilized public resistance to school and community test programs - which had largely been confined to political lobby groups on the right - became more widespread, reaching all the way to Capitol Hill. With the precedent-setting civil court action known as the "Motorola Case" in 1964, a fair testing clause (the Tower Amendment) was inserted into the resulting Civil Rights Act of that year.

Following this, the use of personality testing in federal government employment selection procedures came under intense scrutiny. An expanding debate on privacy helped unite legislators across the political spectrum. Spurred on by the media, both the Senate and the House held hearings in 1965 on the use of psychological tests and constitutional rights. They covered much same ground, each assessing whether psychological testing in Government amounted to an invasion of privacy. With its controversial item content, the MMPI was effectively put on "trial."

The politicizing of the test controversy had ambiguous and unexpected effects. The Tower amendment applied to the use of tests in personnel work and was designed to protect the right to test. It contributed to a wider awareness of the 'fairness' of testing. Use of any test as a selection, counseling, guidance or diagnostic device was to be made more specifically 'relevant' to the task and client group at hand. In the case of the MMPI, virtually all groups with distinctive social and political claims would eventually have their demands for special attention met with appropriate normative standards. Once testing became the subject of federal law in 1964, censure for malpractice in employment selection (and in some aspects of school testing) carried the full force of the state. Psychology was reaffirmed as the only research-based profession able to responsibly meet the non-discriminatory guidelines laid down for proper test use. Moreover, fairness in testing legislation helped maintain test research and use as a specialized area.

The Congressional hearings also went some way in appeasing the critics, and the repercussions were far more helpful than psychologists had ever envisaged. Although many test specialists involved thought the hearings a "witch-hunt," they were in the end empowering for the discipline. They took the sting out of media and public attacks, both directly and indirectly reinforcing professional control over proper test use. In effect, the government covered for a discipline it had sponsored. Psychologists were able to successfully convert social concerns into technical questions. Attention was shifted from privacy to psychometrics, from the power to effect various social interventions to the task of defining appropriate scientific standards and safeguards. Only the tools needed a form of disciplining, it seemed, not those using them.

#### Bibliography

- Amrine, M., "The 1965 congressional inquiry into testing: A commentary," *American Psychologist*, 20 (1965): 859-870.
- Archives of the American Psychological Association, various documents, N3-N4 (Brayfield Correspondence, 1965-1966), N5 (Amrine Correspondence, 1965-1966), N13 (Testing, 1962-1965), N13 (Testing, Miscellaneous 1966), N13 (Psychological Testing, Washington Report, 1964-1965), Library of Congress.
- Baritz, L., *The servants of power: A history of the use of social science in American industry*, (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1960).
- Black, H., *They shall not pass*, (New York: Random House, 1962); Martin L. Gross, *The brain watchers*, (New York: Random House, 1962).
- Hoffman, H., *The tyranny of testing*, (New York: Crowell-Collier, 1962).
- Packard, V., *The naked society*, (New York: McKay, 1964).
- Whyte, J., *The organization man*, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1957).

W.

prachtige foto's ± 1965

- Don't be brainwashed by some Ph.D.
- See your clergyman or doctor
- Help stop grants from your TAX MONEY given to the A... P... A...

Did the Public Lose Interest in Psychology During the Great Depression? → NO! vs Benjamin & Bryant

Benjamin Harris (University of New Hampshire) → prachtige dia's

In their history of psychology magazines in North America, Benjamin and Bryant (1997) refer to the public's waning interest in psychology during the Great Depression. The public lost interest, they claim, because the popular psychology of the 1920s was incapable of addressing the socio-economic problems of the era. The result, we're told, was a decrease in popular venues (e.g., cheap magazines) offering psychological knowledge in the 1930s.

My paper will show that the opposite state of affairs was true. During the Depression there was a flourishing of popular psychological knowledge unlike anything before or after. By 1937, for example, newsstands offered a minimum of five different, competing popular psychology magazines, plus a half dozen more that mixed psychology with health, medicine, and assorted science. These included *Psychology: Health! Happiness! Success!*, *Psychology Digest*, *Current Psychology & Psychoanalysis*, *Practical Psychology Monthly*, and the *Modern Psychologist*. Simultaneously, psychologists offered advice and education through popular books, home study courses, drop in clinics, advice-by-mail bureaus, syndicated newspaper columns and at least a half-dozen competing radio programs.

My paper will offer a brief history of the myth of the public's waning interest, beginning with Donald Napoli's 1976 dissertation and his book *Architects of Adjustment* (1981). Napoli's source was a tiny editorial in the *New York Times* on January 1934. There, the editors of the *Times* echoed a complaint voiced by Grace Adams, a former student of E.B. Titchener turned journalist in the 1920s. When she wasn't popularizing psychology in the *American Mercury*, *Scribner's* and the *Atlantic*, she was using those journals to settle scores with all types of non-Titchnerian psychologists. She also ridiculed any educator, physician or member of the public who she found showing sympathy for Titchener's competition: Watsonian behaviorism, psychoanalysis, mental hygiene and industrial psychology. Having announced *The Decline of Psychology in America* well before the crash of 1929, she repeated herself in a 1934 article titled "The Rise and Fall of Psychology." This time she added the charge that her non-Titchnerian enemies failed to address the problems of the Depression. The result, she claimed, was the public's disenchantment.

I will describe the many problems with this argument. One is Adams' self-contradiction, making fun of industrial psychology for being too practical in 1928 and then criticizing psychology for being insufficiently practical in 1934. The more significant problem is the contradictory evidence presented by popular magazines in the 1930s. The same issue of *The Atlantic* in which Adams announced psychology's fall, for example, features B. F. Skinner's article, *Has Gertrude Stein a Secret?*

A major source for my paper are the actual issues of popular psychology magazines, whose combined circulation reached hundreds of thousands each month. My talk will briefly survey those magazines and discuss how the economics of publishing and life outside the university shaped the popular psychology that was offered to the public. Biographical sketches of publishers, editors, and popular writers will show the fuzzy boundary between academically-certified, scientifically rigorous knowledge and the often sensationalized, popular psychology of the pulp magazines.

#### References

- Benjamin, Ludy T. and William H. M. Bryant. 1997. A History of Popular Psychology Magazines in America. In *A Pictorial History of Psychology*, ed. Wolfgang G. Bringmann, Helmut E. Lück, Rudolph Miller and Charles E. Early, 585-593. Chicago/Berlin: Quintessence.
- Napoli, Donald. 1981. *Architects of Adjustment: The History of the Psychological Profession in the United States*. Port Washington: Kennikat Press.

(Dagobert) Runes (Russische immigrant)

The modern psychologist

Modern living - Natural way to health  
Lindauer

Successful living  
A magazine devoted to

book: Psychology Digest  
± 1938

Psychograph

1928 Enke brief naar de WTA  
---> nieuw tijdschrift "Psychology's Health-Happiness-Success"

## PAPER SESSION 3: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

Münsterberg's nightmare: y & history fin the rich Germany

vs D'they

Manuel Stoffers (University Maastricht)

1 lamprecht debat  
in french.

One of the trends in psychological research of the last 20 years or so consists of the repeated and diverse attempts at formulating a historical psychology. I think it will be sufficient to mention the names of psychologists like Kenneth Gergen, Gerd Jüttemann in Germany, and Harry Peeters in the Netherlands to illustrate this point (Gergen & Gergen 1984; Jüttemann 1986, 1988; Peeters 1994). I might also refer to the recent attention given to a previous generation of historical psychologists like Vygotskij, Lurija and Ignace Meyerson. (Vygotskij & Lurija 1993; Meyerson 1987) In contrast to the tradition of freudian psychohistory, these attempts aim at historising psychology rather than psychologising history. In the historical disciplin itself the same approach has come to the fore in the 1970s with the history of mentalities.

In my paper I will trace a part of the history of the historical approach in psychology. For, the relations between history and psychology have been subject of discussions long before the last two or three decades (Jahoda 1992; Jüttemann 1988). In fact, when seventy years ago the German sociologist Horkheimer adressed the theme of *Geschichte und Psychologie*, he started his essay with remarking that the relation between the two disciplines had at that time already been discussed extensively for several decades (Horkheimer 1932). And indeed, especially about 1900 it seems to have been a widely and hotly debated topic. One of the most intriguing contributions to this debate is the speech delivered by Harvard professor of psychology and 1898 APA president Hugo Münsterberg, entitled *Psychology and History* - and it is this speech my paper will concentrate on.

Münsterberg's adress has attracted some scholarly attention in recent years. In a volume dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the *Psychological Review* in 1994, the journal not only partly reprinted his speech, but it also published two extensive comments on it, one by William McGuire and the other by Wolfgang Schönplug. In his comment professor McGuire criticized Münsterberg for not doing 'fuller justice to his title by calling the reader's attention to the rich possibilities in using historical data to advance psychological theorizing' - thereby expressing his own concern for a stronger historical orientation of psychology (McGuire 1994, 244). Wolfgang Schönplug for his part analysed the German idealistic, more precisely neokantian tradition that influenced the limited concept of psychology that Münsterberg defended in his speech (Schönplug 1994).

Inspiring and useful as these comments on Münsterberg's adress are, they both fail to convey the sense of emergency that makes out one of the central characteristics of his APA speech:

'[C]an we overlook the symptoms of growing opposition against the indiscriminate treatment of the world of facts in the empirical sciences? [...] Such a general reaction demands its expression in the world of science too and there cannot be any surprise if *psychology has to stand the first attack*. [...] [T]he belief in the unity of personality becomes stronger than the confidence in science, which merely decomposes, and *psychology becomes subordinated to the historical view of man*. That is possible under a hundred forms, but the final result must be always the same, *the ruin of real psychology*. I think *this undermining of psychology with the tools of history* is to-day in eager progress. [...] [I]f history and psychology remain chained up together the symptoms of the future are too clear: *there is no hope for psychology*. [...] *Psychology and history must never come together again*.' (Münsterberg (1899), 3-6; italics mine, MS)

Far from lecturing about the benefits of closer relations between Clio and Psyche, Münsterberg tried to warn the assembled psychologists in 1898 against an imminent takeover by history. Now, one of the peculiarities of Münsterberg's adress is that he doesn't give any names of

dreaded scholars nor titles of pernicious publications that might proof that he was not being hypochondrical in his fear of history. My paper, then, will be devoted to these questions: which scholars or what intellectual trend had Münsterberg in mind when he dreaded the imminent 'ruin of real psychology' by history, and what did he mean when he said that the 'undermining of psychology with the tools of history is to-day in eager progress'? By answering these questions, my paper will present a reconstruction of the contemporary context of Münsterberg's speech. This will lead us to several German attempts in the 1890s to historise psychology and to pleas for a more radically empirical and evolutionary psychology - projects indeed prefiguring those later, twentieth-century attempts at a historically orientated psychology.

## Bibliography

- Gergen, K.J. and M.M. Gergen (1984), *Historical social psychology*. Hillsdale, etc.: Erlbaum.  
Horkheimer, M. (1932), 'Geschichte und Psychologie', in: *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* 1, 125-144.  
Jahoda, Gustav (1992) *Crossroads between culture and mind. Continuities and change in theories of human nature*. New York, etc.: Harvester Wheatsheaf.  
Jüttemann, G., ed. (1986) *Die Geschichtlichkeit des Seelischen*. Weinheim: Beltz/PVU.  
Jüttemann, G., ed. (1988) *Wegbereiter der historischen Psychologie*. München, Weinheim: Beltz/PVU.  
McGuire, William J. (1994), 'Use of historical data in psychology: comments on Münsterberg (1899)', in: *Psychological review* 101, 243-247.  
Meyerson, Ignace (1987), *Écrits 1920-1983: pour une psychologie historique*, Parijs: PUF.  
Münsterberg, Hugo (1899), 'Psychology and history', in: *The psychological review* 6, 1-31.  
Peeters, H.F.M. (1994), *Hoe veranderlijk is de mens? Een inleiding in de historische psychologie*. Nijmegen: SUN.  
Schönplug, Wolfgang (1994), 'The road not taken: a false start for cognitive psychology', in: *Psychological review* 101, 237-242.  
Stoffers, Manuel (1996), 'De geschiedenis van de psychologen en de geschiedenis van de psyche', in: *Theoretische Geschiedenis* 23, 231-236.  
Vygotskij, L.S. and A.R. Lurija (1993), *Studies on the history of behavior: ape, primitive, and child*. Translated by Knox, J.E. and V.I. Golod. Hillsdale, NJ, etc.: Lawrence Erlbaum Ass. [1st ed. 1930].

## Golem psychology: The Stately Dance of Solomon et al. and the Founders of Mathematical Learning Theory (MLT)

Sandy Lovie and Pat Lovie (Liverpool and Keele)

The two *Golem* volumes by Collins and Pinch (1993 and 1998) have provided convincing evidence of the socially constructed nature of main-stream science and technology. In the spirit of the *Golem*, therefore, we propose to extend one of the overarching themes of the two books, that *distance lends enchantment*, to analyse the relationship between a classic treatment from the 1950s of traumatic avoidance learning in dogs by Solomon and his collaborators at Harvard (see Solomon and Wynne, 1953 and 1954; also Kamin, 1954, and Brush *et al*, 1955), and the pioneering efforts by Bush and Mosteller and their colleagues on the mathematical modelling of learning which appropriated selected data from the Solomon *et al* studies (see, for instance, Bush and Mosteller 1953 and 1955; also Estes and Bush 1959). Here the distance lies not so much between the uncertain and problematic primary source material and its unproblematic textbook representation as is often the case in the *Golem*, but between the complex Solomon *et al* studies and the uncritically reproduced portion of that work taken over by Bush and Mosteller. This distance, therefore, reflects the varied conceptual, rhetorical and epistemological requirements of the two groups, their separate views on the nature of scientific psychology, and their divergent scientific beliefs and practices.

Our paper, therefore, contrasts how Solomon *et al* represented their experiments and interpreted their outcomes as *uncertain* empirical phenomena with Bush-Mosteller's largely unproblematic treatment of some of the same material. From this comparison, we conclude that the latter were primarily committed to furthering the newly established field of Mathematical Learning Theory (MLT) rather than contributing to research into learning *per se*, then run as an interdependent empirical and theoretical enterprise. Thus the differing definitions of what constitutes proper or appropriate quantitative inference in the two areas will be explored, as will the actual inferential practices: for instance, conclusions drawn by Bush and Mosteller from the comparison between parameter and data based estimates, as against the methods employed by Solomon *et al* which involved either eyeballing many complex graphs or making inferences from frequency counts of certain affective and emotional indicators. The differing richness of the psychological explanations and phenomena that each approach claimed to test and/or generate will also be discussed: for example, the contrast between the complex "duo-process" conditioning theories of Solomon *et al*, and the simple observation from Bush and Mosteller that avoidance trials appeared to lead to faster learning than shock ones.

The concluding strand of our paper focuses on the extended use that Bush and Mosteller made of the same (selective) data from Solomon *et al* after 1955 (including a double exhumation of the learning theorist Clark L Hull in 1959), and the fate of the same results in other hands, particularly those of Duncan Luce *et al*, also in 1959, Theios in 1963, Atkinson *et al* in 1965 and Weitzman in 1966. In doing so, we also indicate the means whereby Bush and Mosteller disembedded the Solomon and Wynne data from its original setting, that is, from its original *meaning*, so that it could now become a widely available *resource* for MLT. We argue that, from the start, MLT was no less free of uncertainties than the Solomon *et al* studies, although these took the form of more technical/mathematical difficulties: for instance, there were epistemological problems thrown up by a lack of parameter invariance over different parts of the data, queries over how to choose between competing models, the lack of a measure of closeness or agreement between theoretical parameter estimates and their data based equivalents, as well as the more analytical difficulties such as the derivation and testing of parameter estimators. Thus, it was only by ignoring the empirical and methodological uncertainties in the Solomon *et al* studies that Bush and Mosteller were able to concentrate on solving the analytical uncertainties generated by the development of MLT.

#### References

- Atkinson, R C, Bower, G H & Crothers, E J (1965) *An Introduction to Mathematical Learning Theory*. New York: Wiley
- Brush, F R, Brush, E S & Solomon, R L (1955) Traumatic avoidance learning: the effects of CS-US interval with a delayed-conditioning procedure. *Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology*. 48, 285-293.
- Bush, R R & Estes W K (Eds.) (1959) *Studies in Mathematical Learning Theory*. Stanford: Stanford University Press
- Bush, R R & Mosteller, F (1953) A stochastic model with applications to learning. *Annals of Mathematical Statistics*. 24, 559-585
- Bush, R R & Mosteller, F (1955) *Stochastic Models for Learning*. New York: Wiley
- Bush, R R & Mosteller, F (1959) A Comparison of Eight Models. In R R Bush & W K Estes (Eds.) Collins, H & Pinch, T (1993, 1998) *The Golem: What You Should Know About Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Collins, H & Pinch, T (1998) *The Golem at Large: What You Should Know About Technology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Kamin, L J (1954) Traumatic avoidance learning: the effects of the CS-US interval with a trace-conditioning procedure. *Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology*. 47, 65-72
- Luce, R D, Bush, R R & Galanter, E (1959) Tests of the "Beta Model". In R R Bush & W K Estes (Eds.)
- Solomon, R L & Wynne, L C (1953) Traumatic avoidance learning: acquisition in normal dogs. *Psychological Monographs*. 67, No. 4
- Solomon, R L & Wynne, L C (1954) Traumatic avoidance learning: the principles of anxiety conservation and partial irreversibility. *Psychological Review*. 61, 353-385

Theios, J (1963) Simple conditioning as two-stage all-or-none learning. *Psychological Review*. 70, 403-417

Weitzman, R A (1966) Statistical learning models and individual differences. *Psychological Review*. 73, 357-364

#### Causes of the Post-Second World War Methodological Consensus in Psychology?

Joel Michell (University of Sydney)

Following the Second World War, a methodological consensus occurred in American psychology and, subsequently, in psychology in other English speaking countries. The consensus involved the following elements: a hybrid of Neyman-Pearson and Fisherian theories of significance testing (Gigerenzer, 1993); Stevens' definition of measurement (Michell, 1999); his theory of scale types (Stevens, 1951); classical test theory (Gulliksen, 1950); and the analysis of variance model for experimental data (Lovie, 1979). The majority of research done in psychology is still informed by one or more of these components.

Gigerenzer and Michell concluded that non-scientific interests motivated elements of this consensus. Specifically, Gigerenzer (1987) concluded that significance testing was imported into psychology because it "provided the illusion of an objective, mechanised form of inductive inference" (p. 11). Michell (1999) concluded that Stevens' definition was endorsed because of "scientism" and "practicalism". One might well wonder whether other elements of this consensus were included for similar reasons. Given the concern of psychologists of that period to appear scientific, it is more than possible.

This paper takes the next element of the consensus, viz., Stevens' theory of scale types. Unlike Stevens' definition of measurement, his theory of scale types is a significant contribution to the representational theory of measurement, as shown through its development by Suppes and Zinnes (1963) and its refinement by Narens (1981). It provides a framework within which attempts at measurement may be identified as *nominal*, *ordinal*, *interval* and *ratio* scale types. The virtue of the theory is its explicit statement of empirical criteria for scale identification. It therefore constitutes a powerful conceptual resource for discovering the scale types of psychology's large class of numerical assignment practices.

However, it has rarely been used in this way. Indeed, in most attempts at psychological measurement it cannot be so used, for these attempts are not developed in a manner to which the criteria are directly applicable. Generations of psychology students have been taught a classification of scale types that has no function in the development of their attempts at measurement and is highly ambiguous in relation to those attempts. It is this ambiguity that is the key to its actual function.

From the start, it was used, not for the purpose of discovery, but for its opposite, that of obfuscation. Stevens (1951) used it in this way, commencing a tradition that still persists. During the 1950s, a pattern of argument was devised and it has altered little to the present. In outline, it consists of, first, baldly asserting that psychological measurements are ordinal and, second, constructing reasons why, as such, they may be treated as interval. This paper proposes a number of hypotheses about possible motives for this pattern of obfuscation. These are considered in relation to the available historical evidence including comparison with a failed earlier attempt to introduce a similar classification (Johnson, 1936).

It is proposed that other elements of the consensus might be similarly investigated.

#### References

- Gigerenzer, G. (1987). Probabilistic thinking and the fight against subjectivity. In L. Krüger, G. Gigerenzer, & M. S. Morgan (Eds.), *The probabilistic revolution. Vol. 2. Ideas in the sciences* (pp. 11-33). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Gigerenzer, G. (1993). The superego, the ego, and the id in statistical reasoning. In G. Keren & C. Lewis (Eds.), *Handbook for data analysis in the behavioral sciences: methodological issues*

mainstream!

- (pp. 311-339). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Gulliksen, H. (1950). *Theory of mental tests*. New York: Wiley.
- Johnson, H. M. (1936). Pseudo-mathematics in the social sciences. *American Journal of Psychology*, 48, 342-351.
- Lovie, A. D. (1979). The analysis of variance in experimental psychology: 1934-1945. *British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology*, 32, 151-178.
- Michell, J. (1999). *Measurement in psychology: a critical history of a methodological concept*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Narens, L. (1981). On the scales of measurement. *Journal of Mathematical Psychology*, 24, 249-275.
- Stevens, S. S. (1951). Mathematics, measurement and psychophysics. In S. S. Stevens (Ed.), *Handbook of experimental psychology* (pp. 1-49). New York: Wiley.
- Suppes, P. & Zinnes, J. (1963). Basic measurement theory. In R. D. Luce, R. R. Bush & E. Galanter (Eds.), *Handbook of Mathematical Psychology*. Vol. 1 (pp. 1-76). New York: Wiley.
- [Suppes & Zinnes]

## KEYNOTE SPEECH

## WHITHER THE GOLDEN OLDIES OF ESHHS: THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTS

Kurt Danziger (Toronto)

To mark the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of ESHHS and its predecessor, Cheiron Europe, I undertook a rough content analysis of the contributions published in the Proceedings of the first three meetings of the Society. A wide variety of topics was represented, though two kinds of themes accounted for nearly half the contributions. One of these themes was historiography, but the most common theme of all was conceptual analysis applied to a particular theoretical system or concept. The basis for this analysis was invariably textual, and this indicates that a very strong interest in discursive objects already existed at the very first meetings of the Society. That interest contrasts with an older historiographic tradition, especially in psychology, which was more interested in narratives of discovery than in the analysis of theories and concepts as discursive objects. (vs 'natural' objects)

In the second part of the talk some general issues that have been salient for historical studies of the human sciences during the last two decades are identified. In particular, two issues connected with the work of Michel Foucault are critically discussed. The first concerns the misuse of the archaeological metaphor, the second the problematic notion of history without a subject which can easily result in a kind of discourse idealism. An analytic distinction between discursive objects, human interests and social practices must be preserved if historical analysis is to do justice to their interaction.

Turning to future directions in the field, it is suggested that more attention be paid to diachronic studies of investigative practices and to the "epistemic objects" that result from these practices. The recent metaphorical use of "biography" in connection with diachronic studies of scientific objects has already proved fruitful. Human individuals are not the only entities whose biographies are worthy of our attention. This is illustrated with some examples from the history of the concept of memory.

N=65

\*'histories without people'  
'absorb everything into discourse'

back  
biographies  
of scientific objects

#### PAPER SESSION 4: PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES

##### Durkheim, the philosophy agrégation, and the role of sociology: a debate in the *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*

Daniela S. Barberis (Max Planck Institute for the History of Science)

My paper addresses the issues at stake in the relationship between sociology and philosophy in the second half of the nineteenth century by focusing on the debate between Émile Durkheim, who was attempting to found an independent, scientific sociology, and the editors and collaborators of the *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* (RMM), one of the central philosophical journals of the period.

The RMM represented a specific philosophical position in the field of French philosophy. It was founded as part of a reaction against the exultant scientism of the mid-nineteenth century — a general attitude of mind combining confidence in the scientific method with religious and metaphysical skepticism. It was believed that science would eventually conquer all realms of ignorance or mystery. The role of philosophy and its realm of competence were placed in question as more and more topics were deemed outside its domain. While the natural sciences had long before separated themselves from philosophy, it was not until the turn of the century that the *sciences morales* (psychology and sociology) developed pretensions to autonomy, claiming, in the name of objective science, territories that had traditionally belonged to philosophy.

The RMM wanted to re-establish the primacy of philosophy. They rejected all attempts to make philosophy into a science and instead claimed a unique status for it, based on its capacity to take the vantage point of a metaphysical Reason. From this vantage point, philosophy was in a position to examine all sciences and thereby to critique science. The RMM was antagonistic to positivist philosophy and its belief that science was the only valid mode of knowledge. The emphasis on "metaphysics" in the title of the journal was meant to underline this point. The other realm that the journal especially wished to claim for its own, *la morale*, was, in the eyes of the founders of the journal, the practical side of philosophy. The RMM wished to re-establish the study of philosophy conceived as a unity, as the discipline of knowledge and action. The interest in ethical and practical questions, and also in pedagogy, were among its characteristic traits. For the young founders of the journal, all republicans in inclination, the generalization and betterment of the teaching of philosophy constituted a priority. The world of thought had to be democratized. The educational question was the moral question *par excellence* in the French Third Republic, and the RMM wished to educate and guide public opinion. In words of Xavier Léon, one of the founders of the journal: "Philosophy could not turn on itself: it was desirable that philosophers should also be publicists, the guides of a more and more present public opinion. Philosophers should become conscious of the duties the age of crowds imposed upon them." The journal's decision in 1895 to open a new rubric entitled "practical questions" devoted to the discussion of current issues was part of this desire to contribute to action and practical life, to take upon themselves the moral responsibility of enlightening the public.

The first appearance of the rubric "practical questions" in the RMM featured a direct attack on Durkheim's sociology and revealed that the journal saw sociology as a competitor of philosophy in its task of guiding public opinion. The philosophers now claimed that they had as much light, or more, to throw on practical moral questions as their rival did, despite its scientific pretensions. My paper examines this attack and the related attack on Durkheim's views regarding the philosophy *agrégation* and the *classe de philosophie* in terms of the rivalry between philosophy and sociology and their boundary disputes.

In the eyes of many Frenchmen, Catholic orthodoxy had been irremediably undermined by the Revolution. From the beginning of the century onwards many thinkers had been in search of an ideological synthesis, a *morale laïque* capable of replacing a religious ethics based on Catholic religion. The *classe de philosophie*, a class taught in the last year of the *lycée* and considered as the *couronnement* of secondary education had, since Cousin's time, been assigned the special function of creating the moral unity of the country. Philosophy was to provide the fundamental common beliefs necessary to a community of principles among citizens. The debate between

Durkheim and the RMM over this strongly charged subject thus had high stakes. What discipline provided appropriate guidance for the citizens of the Third Republic? A version of spiritualist philosophy, or the sciences (including the new sciences of psychology and sociology)? This paper examines the arguments presented by both poles of this debate.

##### Bibliography

- "Note de la rédaction: Enseignement." *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, 3(1895): 231-233.  
 "Une rectification de M. Durkheim." *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, 3 (1895): 352-353, p. 352.  
 J.I. Brooks III. *The Eclectic Legacy: Academic Philosophy and the Human Sciences in Nineteenth-Century*. Newark and London: University of Delaware Press and Associated University Presses, 1998.  
 A. Darlu. "Reflexions d'un Philosophe sur les Questions du Jour: A Propos de l'Impôt Progressif sur les Successions." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, 3(1895): 115-126.  
 E. Durkheim 26(1888): 446- 463. "L'enseignement philosophique et l'agrégation de philosophie." *Revue philosophique* 39 (1895) : 121-147.  
 E. Durkheim. "Lettres à Célestin Bouglé." In *Textes 2: Religion, Morale, Anomie*. (Paris: Minuit, 1975).  
 Fabiani, Jean-Louis. *Les philosophes de la république*. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1988.  
 R. A. Jones. *The Development of Durkheim's Social Realism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).  
 J.-M. Mayeur and M. Rebérier, *The Third Republic from its Origins to the Great War, 1871-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).  
 P. Stock-Morton. *Moral Education for a Secular Society: The Development of Morale Laïque in Nineteenth Century France* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1988).

##### At the dawn of science. Empirical Psychology in Germany in the 1790s

Matthias John & Temilo van Zantwijk (Jena)

In the 1790s German empirical psychology shows a tendency to make itself independent from the metaphysical system established by the philosopher Wolff which since the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century had kept the investigation of the human soul within the borders of philosophy.

In this session first Temilo van Zantwijk demonstrates that Kant's exclusion of psychology from logic in the long run has contributed not only, at least partially, to the formation of the concept of formal logic, but to the development of psychology to a scientific discipline independent from philosophy as well. An analysis of the concept of psychology as a propaedeutics to logic of no influence on the validity of logical rules, developed by the post-Kantian logicians Schmid, Kiesewetter and Fries, elucidates the process of differentiation of philosophical logic and psychology.

Subsequently Matthias John shows that the role of the 'psychologist' is established within the social structure of the academic world in Germany in the same time. Many psychological and anthropological periodicals become available after 1790 following the example of Moritz' *Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde* (1783-1793). Lectures in psychology appear in German university calendars and methodological problems concerning introspection and observation start to play an important role in the debate about the possibility of psychology as an independent discipline.

##### Bibliography

- Carus, F. A. (1990 [1808]): *Geschichte der Psychologie*. Berlin.  
 Brandt, R. & Stark, W. (1998), eds.: *Immanuel Kant: Logik-Vorlesung*. Unveröffentlichte Nachschriften. Bearbeitet von T. Pinder. Hamburg.

- Brandt, R. & Stark, W. (1998), eds.: Immanuel Kant: Logik-Vorlesung. Unveröffentlichte Nachschriften. Bearbeitet von T. Pinder. Hamburg.
- Eckardt, G., John, M., Zantwijk, T. van & Ziche, P. (2001): Anthropologie und empirische Psychologie um 1800. Ansätze einer Entwicklung zur Wissenschaft. Weimar.
- Kiesewetter, J. G. C. C. (1802): Grundriß einer reinen allgemeinen Logik nach Kantischen Grundsätzen. Berlin.
- Fries, J. F. (1804): System der Philosophie als evidente Wissenschaft aufgestellt. In: Sämtliche Schriften. Ed. König, G. & Geldsetzer, L. Aalen.
- Jakob, L. H. (1791): Grundriß der Erfahrungs-Seelenlehre. Halle.
- Schmid, C. Ch. E. (1791): Empirische Psychologie. Jena.
- Schmid, C. Ch. E. (1796-98) ed.: Psychologisches Magazin. Jena.

### The Scottish Common Sense School and Twentieth Century Psychology: A Reassessment

James M.M. Good and Arthur Still (University of Durham)

The impact of the writings of Scottish Enlightenment philosophers on the development of social and political theory has been frequently acknowledged (Berry, 1997; Bryson, 1945; Schneider, 1967). Less well understood, however, has been their influence on the development of psychological ideas. In this paper we focus on the impact of the writings of the Scottish Common Sense School on the development of ideas about perception, thinking, values and communication. We begin by briefly identifying the key figures of the Scottish School and the contexts – social, political and cultural – of their work (Broadie, 2000; Daiches et al, 1986). We then outline some of the work of four key writers – two from the 18<sup>th</sup> Century (Francis Hutcheson, and Thomas Reid) – and two from the 19<sup>th</sup> Century (William Hamilton and James Ferrier). In the third part of the paper we trace the impact of the Scottish School on the work of two twentieth century psychologists – James Gibson and William Stephenson. Gibson and Stephenson both attempted to move away from the empiricist accounts of knowledge and communication that derived from English associationism. Gibson's first encounter with the Scottish School was as a philosophy student at Princeton, then still under the influence of James McCosh. But it was the ideas of Thomas Reid that were to have a lasting influence on the development of his radical views about a non-representational psychology of perception (Gibson, 1979). Stephenson's initial encounter with the Scottish School was mediated through the influence of the writings of Sir William Hamilton on his mentor, Charles Spearman (Spearman, 1937; Stephenson, 1953). Stephenson was later to explore the relevance of Frances Hutcheson's writings on the 'moral sense' for his theories of communication and subjectivity (Stephenson, 1970/1980, 1990a&b). The impact of these ideas was reinforced by his discovery of the influence of the Scottish School on the thinking of Thomas Jefferson. The paper concludes with a reassessment of the contribution of the Scottish School to the development of twentieth century thought (Broadie, 1990; Davie, 1961, 1981; Walker, 1994).

### Bibliography

- Berry, C.J. (1997). *Social Theory of the Scottish Enlightenment*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Broadie, A. (1990). *The Tradition of Scottish Philosophy*.
- Broadie, A. (2000). *Why Scottish Philosophy Matters*. Edinburgh: Saltire Society.
- Bryson, G. (1945). *Man and Society: The Scottish Inquiry of the Eighteenth Century*. New York: Augustus M. Kelley.
- Daiches, D., Jones, P. & Jones, J. (eds), *A Hotbed of Genius: The Scottish Enlightenment, 1730-1790*.
- Davie, G.E. (1961). *The Democratic Intellect*. Edinburgh: Polygon Books.
- Davie, G.E. (1981). *The Crisis of the Democratic Intellect*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

- Gibson, J.J. (1979). *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Hamilton, W. (1865). *Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic*.
- Hutcheson, F. (1728). *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense* (1728).
- Reed, E.S. (1997). *From Soul to Mind: The Emergence of Psychology from Erasmus Darwin to William James*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Reid, T. (1785/1941). *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*. London: Macmillan.
- Schneider, L. (1967). *The Scottish Moralists on Human Nature and Society*.
- Spearman, C. (1937). *Psychology Down the Ages*. London: Macmillan.
- Stephenson, W. (1953). *The Study of Behaviour*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Stephenson, W. (1970/1980). *Quiddity College*. Unpublished manuscript.
- Stephenson, W. (1990a). My Self in 1980: A Study of Culture. *Operant Subjectivity*, 14(1), 1-19.
- Stephenson, W. (1990b). *Ulysses and Finnegans Wake: A Q-Methodological Look at Profundity* (Part II: *Finnegans Wake*). *Operant Subjectivity*, 14(4), 133-152.
- Turnbull, A. (1986). *Scotland and America, 1730-90*. In D. Daiches, P. Jones & J. Jones (eds), *A Hotbed of Genius: The Scottish Enlightenment, 1730-1790*.
- Walker, A.L. (1994). *The Revival of the Democratic Intellect: Scotland's University Traditions and the Crisis in Modern Thought*. Edinburgh: Polygon.

### Aesthetics as a human science

Christian G. Allesch (University of Salzburg)

Aesthetics traditionally has been defined as the science of beauty and the fine arts but this definition was not unanimously accepted in the past. In the Baumgarten-Kant tradition, aesthetics was considered the science of aesthetic experience (aisthesis) as contrasted to mental experience (noesis) according to the etymological sense of the concept. However, until 1876, when Fechner claimed for an empirical approach to aesthetics in his *Vorschule der Aesthetik*, aesthetics in the German-speaking countries rather followed the way of a normative discipline than that of an empiric human science.

In England and Scotland, however, aesthetics was treated very early as an empirically oriented social science. The philosophy of the British Enlightenment was much more interested in the actual aesthetic experience of man than in abstract norms or laws of beauty.

Tatarkiewicz (1963) characterized the history of aesthetics as a staggering between subjectivity and objectivity. At the end of the 19 century, this discrepancy resulted in a strong opposition between a "critical" conception of aesthetics based on Neo-Kantianism and the school of "psychological aesthetics" based on the concept of Fechner and the methods of empirical psychology as practiced in the laboratory of Wundt, in particular. The controversy between these two paradigms dominated the methodological discussion in aesthetics at the beginning of the 20 century (for details of this historical development, see Allesch 1987).

According to these divergent concepts of the discipline, aesthetics was regarded either as a branch of philosophy or – as Lipps proclaimed in 1904 – as a part of psychology. Although the "psychological" oder empirical paradigm was the dominating approach for some years during the first decade of the 19th century, aesthetics was commonly regarded and defined as philosophy of art during the following decades of the century. This is not least due to the fact that the concept of "psychological aesthetics" was not followed up any more but was replaced by specialised subdisciplines like "psychology of music" or "psychology of art".

Although an empirical tradition still exists in aesthetics, as represented, for example, by the *International Association of Empirical Aesthetics*, in the common understanding of the scientific community, aesthetics represents the classical type of "Geisteswissenschaft" or in some aspects that of "cultural science". However, all these categorisations don't meet but a particular aspect of the scope of aesthetic theorising, in history as well as at present.

There are some reasons to conceive aesthetics as a "human science": If we do not limit aesthetics to "artistics" (cf. Welsch 1995) but try to reconstruct it as a science of sensory perception in the original sense of the term "aisthesis", this "aesthetics beyond aesthetics" (Welsch) points to a central capacity of human existence, which cannot be described in exclusively physiological nor in philosophical terms. "Aisthesis" represents an essential aspect of the "conditio humana" and not just a channel for information processing. Finally, such "antropological" concepts of aesthetics may be traced out from the entire process of its historical development. In my paper, I shall try to point out some historical "landmarks" of this development and to make some suggestions for the future development.

#### References

- Allesch, Christian G. (1987). *Geschichte der psychologischen Ästhetik*. Göttingen: Hogrefe.
- Fechner, Gustav Th. (1978). *Vorschule der Aesthetik* (1876). Reprint of the 3rd. ed. 1925. Hildesheim: Olms.
- Lipps, Theodor (1903). *Ästhetik. Psychologie des Schönen und der Kunst*, Bd. 1. Hamburg: Voss.
- Tatarkiewicz, Wladyslaw (1963). Objectivity and subjectivity in the history of aesthetics. *Philosophy and phenomenological research*, 24, 157-173.
- Welsch, Wolfgang (1995). *Aesthetics beyond aesthetics*. Lecture at the XIVth International Congress of Aesthetics, Lahti/SF. <http://www.uni-jena.de/welsch/papers/Beyond.html>

#### PAPER SESSION 5: PARADIGMS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING

##### The resurrection of the 'clinical' approach in personnel assessment

Pieter J. van Strien (Groningen University)

Usually, the history of personnel assessment is conceived as the gradual replacement of a qualitative, intuitive approach by a quantitative psychometric approach. The qualitative approach is associated with European phenomenology and Verstehende psychology, the quantitative approach with American pragmatism and empirism. The defeat of the intuitive, 'clinical' approach by statistic 'actuarial' prediction is seen as part of the general conquest of the 'empirical-analytical' approach in psychological methodology, a conquest that began in America, and then gradually expanded to the European continent. Modern 'anti-presentistic' historiography has tried to demonstrate the historical sense of the clinical approach in the context of the social conditions under which the diagnosticians who practiced it operated, but at the same time has showed that, first in America, then also in Europe, it had to give way to more 'rational' psychometric methods, as the tide changed.

This is the picture that Trudy Dehue has presented in her book *Changing the Rules*, edited in Dutch in 1990 and in English translation in 1995, and that both Trudy and I have sketched ten years ago in our articles on *Transforming psychology in the Netherlands* in *History of the Human Sciences*. I quote Trudy: 'Historical analysis shows that the contemporary "correct approach" was not the "correct approach" of former years. Each approach has its own aims.' (1991,346). In my own article I have shown that the newer generation 'began to look upon the assertions of phenomenologists and Verstehende diagnosticians as esoteric, authoritarian knowledge that eschews the confrontation with empirical tests. Treating all theories and interpretations, irrespective of provenance, on an equal footing as hypotheses that have to be subjected to empirical proof, was conceived to be the only rational way of doing science in contemporary egalitarian society.' (1991, 360)

In my paper for the ESHHS-Florence conference, two years ago, I have described the reluctance of the Dutch psychodiagnostician David van Lennep, head of the largest bureau for personnel selection in the Netherlands, to give up his typically European encounter paradigm, and to exchange it for the prediction paradigm that by academic psychologists was considered to be the only acceptable method by the 1960's. The 'Utrecht School', to which he belonged, was depicted here as a pocket of resistance to the increasing Americanization of psychology in the Netherlands.

My research into the further history of Van Lennep's bureau, that I have completed in the meantime, has shown that, neither at Utrecht, nor in other quarters, statistical prediction has completely won the contest, and that 'clinical' methods of assessment are not only alive, but even expanding, not solely in the Netherlands but also in America. The resurrection of the 'clinical' approach truly has started in America in the context of the Assessment Center Method, and from there has spread to Europe. The human judgement of the candidates' character has been fully restored here. Why this recourse to 'pre-scientific' appraisal?

The Dutch personality psychologist Willem Hofstee in a paper of 1985 has given the clue to an answer. In this paper he admits that 'the position in favor of clinical judgment is firmly associated with the authoritarian point of view.' But at the same time he acknowledges that the 'objective' statistical methods, which have replaced it, have put us in a 'bureaucratic' or 'Procrustean' deadlock. Truly, they 'embody fundamental values like equality and security before the law.' But they are not able to 'capture the emergent aspects of quality', which - being novel - by definition escape the formula. 'The debunking of the judgmental authority in established fields like law or medicine has been one of the ways in which a young and more purely intellectual profession has tried to earn its place, and there is no doubt that in the process society has profited from the sustained scepticism of the angry young profession.' But when it comes to crucial personnel decisions, judgment becomes, in light of 'the emergent nature of criteria', 'a creative act' (Hofstee, 1985, 5 and 11).

In this situation it is no wonder that already in the seventies American firms started to experiment again with the Assessment Center Method (ACM), that had been popular in the 1940's (Murray et al. 1948), but had been nearly abandoned since. Though their judgment is 'disciplined' here by formal appraisal procedures, human assessors play here a pivotal role. After a cautious start (e.g. Hinrichs, 1978) the ACM has regained central place in the 1980's, and also in Europe is now, as part of modern Human Resource Management, the favoured method in the assessment of higher personnel (Zaal, 1998).

In the full paper the history and present status of the Assessment Method will be further explicated, and the contextual factors that have led to the restoration of human judgment is discussed.

#### References

- Dehue, T. (1991). Transforming psychology in the Netherlands I. Why methodology changes. *History of the Human Sciences*, 4, 335-349.
- Dehue, T. (1995). *Changing the rules: Psychology in the Netherlands, 1900-1985*. New York: University Press.
- Hinrichs, J.R. (1978). An eight-year follow-up of a management assessment center. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 63, 596-601.
- Hofstee, W.K.B. (1985). The indispensability of human judgment. Paper for the 1985 Helsinki Conference on Subjective Probability, Utility and Decision Making.
- Strien, P.J. van (1991). Transforming psychology in the Netherlands II. Audiences, alliances and the dynamics of change. *History of the Human Sciences*, 4, 351-269.
- Strien, P.J. van (1999). The prediction paradigm vs. the encounter paradigm. Paper 18th ESHHS conference. Florence, sept. 1999.
- Zaal, J.N. (1998). The Assessment Center Method. In P.J.D. Drenth et al. (eds.). *Handbook of Work and organizational Psychology*. Hove, UK.: Psychology Press.

#### The History of Projective Techniques: The Case of the Four Picture Test

Peter van Drunen (University of Groningen)

Since their inception in the 1920's and 1930's, projective techniques have played a prominent role in the history of psychological testing. Apart from a few isolated studies, however, their history has so far remained largely unwritten - in marked contrast with other forms of psychological testing (notably, intelligence testing). This paper aims to contribute to filling this gap, by examining the history of one test, the *Four Picture Test*.

The *Four Picture Test* (FPT) was devised in 1930 by the Dutch psychologist David J. van Lennep. It was first published in 1948, with subsequent revisions in 1958 and 1983. It differed in two major respects from other projective techniques, such as the Rorschach-test and the T.A.T.. First, it was primarily designed for purposes of personnel selection, rather than clinical diagnosis. And second, it emanated from the existential-phenomenological tradition in psychology, rather than a psychoanalytical framework.

Despite, or perhaps because of, its somewhat divergent background, the FPT enjoyed considerable popularity, not only in the Netherlands, but also in other European countries and the United States. In the late 1940's and 1950's the test ranked among the most prominent and most widely used projective techniques. Despite attempts to revise the test and adapt it to new psychometric standards, however, this popularity was rather short-lived. In the Netherlands, the test remained in use until the early eighties, but elsewhere it almost disappeared from the scene after the late 1950's.

In this paper, I will explore some decisive and intriguing episodes of the FPT's history, set against the background of the projective movement in general. These include the FPT's peculiar background, the attempts to adapt the test to new methodological standards, and the contrast between its favorable early reception and its subsequent rather quick demise.

#### Testing abilities / Judging character.

#### Methodological Changes of Aptitude Assessment in German Military Psychology 1914-1945.

Stefan J. Petri (University of Groningen)

Methodology plays a crucial role in Psychology. Debates about the 'right' methodological approach go down to the very foundations of the discipline. As is well known in the history of Psychology, methodology changes over time. Despite some differences there has been agreement between historians of science on one quite general tendency of change. As Theodore Porter expresses it, there has been a shift from expert knowledge to standardized knowledge making, that is from reliance on discretion to trust in 'mechanical objectivity'.

In my paper, I will discuss a change in the *opposite* direction. I focus on psychological assessment in the German military. Starting in the First World War German military psychology, just like psychology in other western countries, first developed procedures to select drivers, aviation personnel, sound rangers and radio operators. These procedures were deployed in what was called a psychotechnical style (Psychotechnik) based on reaction time measurement and a simulation of the demanded situation. They were evaluated in a quantitative way. With the beginning of the selection of officer candidates in the late twenties, the methods of assessment shifted also in another direction. Character analysis was the aim of psychological assessment now, and a broad set of interpretative methods were developed, reshaped and applied. Based on research and practice in the military context a broad and detailed concept of 'characterological diagnostics' was established. An interpretative component was even added to the 'psychotechnical' tests still used for the selection of specialists. The evaluation was now to be accomplished in a 'characterological' way, with the expertise of the psychologist allowing him to interpret speech, facial expression, handwriting or written essays as an expression of the testee's character.

The reasons for this transition are from my point of view far from clear. Explanations suggesting that a new subject-matter (i.e. the person's character) required different methods are not totally satisfying. It is not the whole story. Along with the subject-matter, the social status of the subjects of psychological expertise also changed. Officers were an elite circle and becoming part of the circle was traditionally organized by the officers themselves. Even if a new procedure of selection was meant as an attempt to reform the military toward a more democratic structure (in the Weimar Republic), it is still astonishing that a complex procedure like psychological character analysis was put in place. From the very beginning, psychological expertise was seen as a possibility to rationalize selection in the military. In what kind of way was the new procedure of selecting officer candidates a rational one? And why were psychologists accepted as the experts in the evaluation of character? What was the intellectual basis for their authority as experts?

#### Bibliography

- Bald, D. (1981). *Vom Kaiserheer zur Bundeswehr. Sozialstruktur des Militärs: Politik der Rekrutierung von Offizieren und Unteroffizieren*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
- Benary, W., Kronfeld, A., Stern, E. & Selz, O. (1919). *Untersuchungen über die psychische Eignung zum Flugdienst*. Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth (Schriften zur Psychologie der Berufseignung und des Wirtschaftslebens, Heft 8).
- Geuter, U. (1984). *Die Professionalisierung der deutschen Psychologie im Nationalsozialismus*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Geuter, U. (1985). Polemos panton pater - Militär und Psychologie im Deutschen Reich 1914-1945. In Ash, M. G. & Geuter, U. (Hrsg.), *Geschichte der deutschen Psychologie im 20. Jahrhundert* (S. 146-171). Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Gundlach, H. (1996a). Faktor Mensch im Krieg. Der Eintritt der Psychologie und Psychotechnik in den Krieg. *Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte*, 19, 131-143.
- Gundlach, H. (1996b). The Hipp chronoscope as totem pole and the formation of a new tribe - applied psychology, psychotechnics and rationality. *Teorie e Modelli*, 1 (1), 65-85.
- Moede, W. (1919). *Die Experimentalpsychologie im Dienste des Wirtschaftslebens*. Berlin: Julius

Springer.

Porter, T. M. (1995). *Trust in Numbers. The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Simoneit, M. (1932). Zur charakterologischen Auswertung von Reaktionsprüfungen. *Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie*, 83, 357-384.

## PAPER SESSION 6: PSYCHOLOGY AS A SOCIAL SCIENCE

otto jonas

From alienation to integration: self and society in psychological utopia

Romanticism ↔ Rationalism

Petteri Pietikainen (University of Helsinki)

This presentation examines the utopian elements in dynamic psychology, especially in the ideas of C.G. Jung, Wilhelm Reich, and Erich Fromm. The term "psychological utopia" refers to a form of utopian thought in which the attainment of an ideal state of consciousness requires the employment of psychological insights and methods that are effective in transforming human personality and, thereby, the whole society or culture. This means that those who propound psychological utopias have both a definite view of the human psyche and a vision of a world that would offer an ideal matrix for psychological well-being. Psychological utopians do not have to be psychologists themselves, but they must have either adopted - and possibly modified - some particular theoretical conception of the psyche already in existence or developed their own conceptual framework for explaining the mind. ] def.

Psychodynamic utopias, just like all modern utopias, anticipated the better life that could lie ahead in the future. However, this presentation argues that what makes psychoutopianism intrinsically psychological are its fundamental conceptions concerning the interrelationship between self and society. First, psychoutopian authors emphasised the social and cultural significance of "inner transformation". According to this anthropological premise, humans can only liberate themselves socially through the liberation of their inner selves and a transformation of personality is a prerequisite for the transformation of society. By "turning inward", psychological utopians modified the classical point of departure of utopian thought, in which the ideas of change and transformation were conceived in the functional context of social and political activity and in which the institutions of utopians were not the creation but the creator of their good qualities. By contrast, in psychological utopias humans are not united by the forms of their external activities but by the structure of their minds which, as "psyche", "unconscious", "inner nature" or some other form of inner self, operates as an agent of change against the distorted or outright pathogenic structures of society. 1

The second basic assumption shared by psychological utopians is that there is an interconnection between the structure of personality and the structure of society. If there is a reciprocal link between these two distinct structures, then we could in principle change society by changing the structure of personality, provided that we have discovered the social and psychological determinants that constitute this link. Third, psychoutopians argued that individual psychopathologies reflect the pathogenicity of society. This claim was founded on a holistic conception of illness, according to which the whole society could be healed by restoring the health of single individuals who are psychically disturbed or in a state of "inauthenticity". With the help of a psychological theory and therapy, the illness of modernity could be cured and there would no longer be any notable social obstacles on our road to authenticity. Fourth, much of psychodynamic thinking was characterised by an antagonistic if not outright hostile attitude towards history and "profane time". While all utopias are transcendent in the sense that they look far beyond the confines of the given social reality, psychoutopias signified a profoundly antihistorical perspective on the questions regarding the basic constituents of human life and the improvement of the human condition. [Taking as its starting point the German philosopher Hans Blumenberg's view of modernisation as a process in which humans have attempted to find various alternative ways to face the challenge of the "absolutism of reality", this presentation argues that psychoutopians faced this challenge by replacing (historical) reality with (the transhistorical) Second Reality. This transhistorical reality rejects the contingencies and complexities of historical time and instead seeks the timeless psychoutopian sphere beyond that which is merely historical. 2 3 4

Proceeding from these four basic assumptions, psychoutopian authors claimed to be able to both diagnose the "malaise of modernity" and offer a remedy for individuals who are

"fragmented" (Jung), "armoured" (Reich), and "alienated" (Fromm). Psychoutopians saw themselves both as unmaskers of the social determinants of "psychopathologies" (doctors of disorder) and as visionaries of a better, more authentic life. In their psychoutopian visions, humans learn to distinguish between what is good and what is bad and act on that distinction. Hence, an awareness of the "true values" would pave the way for a utopian integration of individual and social needs.

### Bibliography

- Barclay, Michael W. (1993). Utopia and psychological theory. *Theory & Psychology*, 3, 2, 173-9.
- Berman, Emanuel (1993). Psychoanalysis, rescue and utopia. *Utopian Studies*, 4, 2, 44ff.
- Blumenberg, Hans. *The legitimacy of the modern age*. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press (German original 1966).
- Burston, Daniel (1991). *The legacy of Erich Fromm*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Dahmer, Helmut (1973). *Libido und Gesellschaft. Studien über Freud und die Freudsche Linke*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Fallend, Karl und Bernd Nitzschke (Hrsg.) (1997). *Der "Fall" Wilhelm Reich. Beiträge zum Verhältnis von Psychoanalyse und Politik*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Fromm, Erich (1999). *Gesamtausgabe in zwölf Bänden*. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, and München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag.
- *Schriften aus dem Nachlass*. Band 1-8. Weiheim und Basel: Benz 1990-92.
- Funk, Rainer (2000). *Erich Fromm: his life and ideas. An illustrated biography*. New York and London: Continuum.
- Jung, C.G. (1953-81). *The Collected Works in twenty volumes*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Kätzel, Siegfried (1987). *Marxismus und Psychoanalyse. Eine ideologiegeschichtliche Studie zur Diskussion in Deutschland und der USSR*. Berlin: VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften.
- Kumar, Krishan (1987). *Utopia and anti-Utopia in modern times*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Mannheim, Karl (1963). *Ideology and Utopia. An introduction to the sociology of knowledge*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul (Original 1936).
- Manuel, Frank E. (1966). Toward a psychological history of utopias. In Frank E. Manuel (ed.), *Utopias and utopian thought*. London: Souvenir Press.
- Manuel, Frank E. & Manuel, Fritzie (1979). *Utopian thought in the Western world*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of the Harvard UP.
- McLaughlin, Neil (1998). How to become a forgotten intellectual: intellectual movements and the rise and fall of Erich Fromm. *Sociological Forum*, 13, 2, 215-46.
- Noll, Richard (1994). *The Jung Cult. Origins of a charismatic movement*. Princeton: Princeton UP.
- Pietikainen, Petteri. *C.G. Jung and the psychology of symbolic forms*. Helsinki: The Finnish Academy of Science and Letters, 1999.
- Reich, Wilhelm: All major publications, incl. recent publications of his letters.
- Rieff, Philip (1966). *The triumph of the therapeutic*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Sharaf, Myron (1983). *Fury on earth. A biography of Wilhelm Reich*. New York: Da Capo Press.
- Vosskamp, Wilhelm (Hrsg.) (1985). *Utopieforschung. Interdisziplinäre Studien zur neuzeitlichen Utopie*. Band I-III. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

### Discourses on/of aggression

Gordana Jovanovic (University of Belgrade)

Aggression is such a human experience which could jeopardize any possibility of individual or social existence. This semantic status of aggression has its counterpart in abundance of historical evidence of omnipresence of aggression in individual and group activities.

Except its extraordinary socio-practical meaning aggression is also a challenge to theoretical analyses. The ways how that challenge has been met build a peculiar intellectual history as a part of social history.

Psychology responded to that challenge by offering two main explanatory models of aggression: 1) aggression as a biological drive (Mc Dougall, Freud, Lorenz, 2) aggression as externally caused learnt reaction (Dollard et al., Berkowitz). These conflicting stances result from different anthropological views and they reinforce these views which have also normative implications (aggression should be discharged or non-aggression should be learnt).

As it is known, Freud (1920) formulated his concept of 'Todestrieb' (death instinct) after the horrible events of the World War 1. Out of the same experience he repeatedly insisted on the work for life and culture as the only way to oppose war as a massive expression of 'Todestrieb' (Freud, 1933). Thus Freud created a hybrid hermeneutic situation: his biologically based theory of aggression emerged after the frustrations of war.

Konrad Lorenz (1966) advocated purification of instinctual nature of man from its socially produced maladaptations as part of a broader political programme of a return to nature.

However, the prevailing scientific and lay understanding see culture and civilization as patterns which require exclusion or control of aggression. The withdrawal of overt aggressive expression leads to its internalization: individual is the battlefield where the Super-ego directs aggression against the Ego. Freud has warned about the psychic price of that internalized fight.

In historical perspective modern epoch understands itself as a fundamental turn toward internalization of individual's aggression and centralization of use of aggression in form of state force monopoly (Elias, 1978) Both aspects became identified with the 'civilizing process'.

Yet, some critics (Adorno & Horkheimer, Sofsky) see that process of modernization itself as an exercise of aggression which in its final consequences can endanger the existence of mankind, though its externalized, socialized forms are actually repressed and interpretively excluded from the dominant social construct of aggression.

Conceptual axes of aggression - internalization, externalization, repression, expression can enter different configurations and fulfil different social functions (integration, control, disciplining of individuals in society).

Aggression is a social construct, which means that social tools (concepts, beliefs, norms) determine what injuries, under what kind of conditions and inflicted by what kind of agencies on what kind of sufferers could and are interpreted and treated as aggression. As it is known it is possible that even massive intentional destruction, as for example war, is not treated as an aggression, whereby on the other hand just an expression of a different opinion could be prosecuted as an intentional endangering of a whole society.

Discourses on aggression necessarily operate with inclusion/exclusion dichotomy which is itself a form of aggression (as it produces excluded as targets of hostility or ignorance). In the next step the included are understood in individualistic terms, which position the only and whole responsibility in isolated individual agents and in this way prevent insights into social causation of aggression. If human biological development can be accomplished only in a social environment, it is clear that social world matters. If it does matter, it cannot be overseen in reflections on individual's understanding, motivation, emotion and action. Therefore aggression could be constructed as an individual's reply to an absent or inaccessible society.

Discourses on aggression are language games which are interwoven with discourses of aggression.

### Bibliography

- Elias, N. (1969/1988-1990): *Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- Freud, S. (1915): *Zeitgemässes über Krieg und Tod*. Frankfurt: Fischer Studienausgabe, B. 9.
- Freud, S. (1920): *Jenseits des Lustprinzips*. Studienausgabe, B. 3.
- Freud, S. (1933): *Warum Krieg?*. Studienausgabe B. 9.
- Hacker, F. (1971): *Aggression. Die Brutalisierung der modernen Welt*. Wien: Molden.
- Lorenz, K. (1966): *On Aggression*. London: Methuen.
- Miller, M. & H.-G. Soeffner (1996): *Modernität und Barbarei. Soziologische Zeitdiagnose am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Singer, J. (ed.) (1971): *The Control of Aggression and Violence. Cognitive and Physiological Factors*. New York, London: Academic Press.  
 Sofsky, W. (1996): *Traktat über die Gewalt*. Frankfurt: Fischer.

**Some unexpected research consequences of a re-engagement with the history of social psychology: Lewinian (1946) action research and the current Cambodian HIV/AIDS crisis**

Ian Lubek and Mee Lian Wong (University of Guelph and National University of Singapore)

While previous research (Lubek, 2000a;b) critically analyzed the historical, epistemological and experimental underpinnings of social psychology, there is in fact a direct connection with the present project addressing health crises in Siem Reap, Cambodia. The critical review of social psychology and some of its "roads not taken", especially by the students and followers of Kurt Lewin, led to a re-consideration of Lewin's (1946) "action research" paradigm and the relatively infrequent use of this in modern social psychology (although a variant, "Participatory Action Research" has been progressing in adjacent areas (e.g., Chataway, 1997). A project conducted since 1999 in Siem Reap Cambodia draws upon some of Lewin's original methodological insights for community-based social research and interventions. It brings together two researchers from different perspectives to confront a major social and medical problem. With 200,000 tourists this year visiting the Angkor Wat temples, the 140,000 citizens of Siem Reap face an alarming HIV/AIDS epidemic, with 10,000 already sero-positive. Can a social psychological analysis be helpful in this context and can action research provide a model for a systematic research intervention?

Guided by Apfelbaum's (2000) theorizing about consequences of uprooting and surviving, in-depth interviews were first conducted with a sample of 16 citizens and 3 medical practitioners aged 30-59, all survivors of the Pol Pot regime, concerning health issues and risk-taking. The interviews helped identify the vectors for the spread of HIV/AIDS in the community, as sexual tourists arrived, and visited the same sex-workers as the local married and unmarried men. Married women indicated they did not know what to say to their husbands when they came home from a night of "partying". Men also described their drinking and risky sex without condoms, especially with the younger "indirect sex-workers" – discotheque dancers, Karioke singers, and young "beer-serving girls". Collective concerns were then fed back to the community as a small grass-roots organization (local NGO) was formed. Rates of HIV/AIDS infections in Siem Reap were among the highest in Cambodia and in Asia, with between 19% - 55% of sex-workers and over 5% of married women already sero-positive. The "beer-girls" wear the uniforms of Heinekens, Stella Artois, Budweiser, Fosters, Labatts, etc., and must sell a daily quota of beers; because their salaries of \$2 per day are insufficient, many offer sex for money to tourists or local clients, often when both parties are inebriated and condom use is neglected.

Both the "beer girls" and the married women lacked strategies for 100% condom compliance. Consequently, out of these interviews and community discussions emerged a peer-educational intervention project to reduce the risk of HIV transmission, specifically targeting these two groups of women in the community. Materials successfully used in Singapore and Malaysia (Wong, 1999) were translated and pilot-tested by the authors for distribution in Siem Reap, supported by a small grant from the Elton John AIDS Foundation. Various measures of condom compliance are being gathered under challenging field conditions, as peer educators distribute the booklets and cassettes. In addition, a series of community and individual meetings was held concerning creation of an all-in-one "Wellness" clinic for HIV/AIDS prevention, education, acute care, diagnosis, treatment, long-term care and follow-up.

**Bibliography**

- Apfelbaum, E. (2000). "And now what, after such tribulations?" Memory and dislocation in the era of uprooting. *American Psychologist*, 55, (9), 1008-1013.  
 Chataway, C. (1997). An examination of the constraints on mutual inquiry in a Participatory Action Research project. *Journal of Social Issues*, 53, (4), 747-765.  
 Lewin, K. (1946). Action research and minority problems. *Journal of Social Issues*, 2(4), 34-46.  
 Lubek, I. (2000a). (Ed.) Re-engaging the history of Social Psychology. [Special Issue] *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, 36, (4)  
 Lubek, I. (2000b). "Shifting Visions of Individualism: Cause or Consequence of Social Psychology's Identity Crisis?" Paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the European Society for the History of the  
 Human Sciences, Free University of Berlin, 26 August, 2000.  
 Wong, M.L., Chan, R.K.W., Chua, W.L., Wee S. (1999). Sexually transmitted diseases and condom use among free-lance and brothel-based sex workers in Singapore. *Sexually Transmitted Diseases* 26: 593-600.

## BOUNDARY WORK: A SYMPOSIUM

Part I: Conceptual Issues (Blok, Van Hilvoorde & Weijers) 90 minuten!

### Introduction

This year we would like to organize again a workshop on 'boundary work', that is on scientific controversies. In recent post-Kuhnian studies of science at least four different kinds of interest controversies can be discerned.

- 1) There is an interest in the social context, which means that a scientific controversy is seen first of all as an indication of the different social, cultural and professional group interests that are engaged in a struggle for hegemony.
- 2) Another interest in scientific controversies sees them as crucial moments of the expansion of disciplinary power.
- 3) A third approach is interested in scientific controversies as far as they demonstrate how scientists succeed to successfully connect new and more propositions, things and phenomena to build new and ever stronger networks.
- 4) And there is a rapidly emerging interest in the way processes of scientific differentiation are shaped by these controversies.

The content of this workshop has a wide variety, but our common emphasis will be on the last approach. Viewed from this angle, scientific controversies are seen first of all as moments of intellectual boundarywork. Controversies as boundarywork means, far from demonstrating both an ongoing expansion of disciplinary power and an ongoing building of new and ever stronger networks, that they are studied as moments of intellectual reorientation, as processes of regrouping, of looking for a new hegemony, finding new vocabularies, building new networks and publics. We hope to make clear that the idea of boundarywork could have special relevance for the study of the history of the human sciences.

We would like to present our papers as examples of the research strategy which has recently become known under this title, inspired by the studies of Thomas Gieryn, Steven Shapin and others. We want to show how dynamics of competition, expulsion, expansion and striving for autonomy occurred in the fields we have studied, how and how far these developments could be understood in terms of boundarywork, and to what critical theoretical conclusions our analyses may lead.

### The history of family therapy in the Netherlands

Gemma Blok (History, University of Amsterdam)

In the 1960's and 1970's, family therapy was 'hot' in the world of mental health care. Many psychiatrists, social workers and psychologists experimented with this form of psychotherapy, which had come into being during the 1950's. Family therapy was attractive and revolutionary because of the fact that it no longer treated sick individuals, but sick groups of people - sick social 'systems', who supposedly were caught in pathological patterns of communication.

During the 1930's and 1940's, 'neo-Freudians' had laid the ground for family therapy, by focussing on problematic human relationships as an important cause of mental illness. But these neo-Freudians still treated individuals. The 'jump' to the treatment of whole families was triggered by a theory formulated in 1956, by anthropologist Gregory Bateson. He stated that schizophrenia was caused by longterm exposure to 'double binds': confusing and paradoxical forms of communication. This paper wants to offer an overview of the history of family therapy

in the Netherlands, starting with the introduction of this form of therapy in the middle of the 1960's. The following questions will be raised:

From 1965 onward, which groups (mental health professionals, mental health organisations, the government, journalists, etc.) have busied themselves with the practice and propaganda of family therapy; why, and which arguments were used to promote family therapy? How was the relationship between the various groups of mental health professionals practicing family therapy; did they cooperate, tolerate or fight each other? And if they fought for dominance in the field, which arguments were used to demand supremacy in the field? Who opposed family therapy, why, and which arguments did they use? How has the epistemic, or cultural authority of family therapy developed since 1965?

### The journal as gatekeeper

Ivo van Hilvoorde (Utrecht University, Educational Sciences)

Current science studies generally reject the division between the *context of discovery* (the social context in which knowledge is discovered) and the *context of justification* (the cognitive context in which scientific knowledge is justified). Instead of using these terms, an editorial board of a scientific journal can be understood as a *context of persuasion*, in which the demarcation between science and non-science is the result of social, cognitive and political processes.

In this paper the focus will be on the journal *Paedagogische Studiën* (PS, one of the major educational scientific journals in Dutch pedagogical history) and its editorial board. Some other publications on this history have stressed the shift this journal made between around 1920 and 1960 from practice oriented towards more academic and scientific oriented. Its history could illustrate the increasing gap between educational practice and educational science. Some changing characteristics of scientific communication (such as publication-, and citation behaviour) will be presented that underlines these developments.

However, a closer look on publication behaviour in PS of the major Post-war pedagogue, Langeveld, contradicts with some of these presumptions. With special attention for the manner Langeveld discussed important psychologists of his time (starting in 1931 with Stern and Piaget), his publication style in PS shows a contradictory development from 'academic' to a more polemic, political and opinion way of attacking the developmental and empirical psychology. In a way, Langeveld shifted the scientific discourse to foreign journals (mainly German) and to his books. This history illustrates the changing role of an editorial board as gatekeeper between pedagogical science and practice and between pedagogy and psychology.

### The domain of child psychiatry

Ido Weijers (Utrecht University, Educational Sciences)

The last century, the 'century of the child', certainly was a century of child-studies: pedagogy, (special) education, child psychology, child psychiatry and pediatry emerged, competing each other's expertise. In the Netherlands the first initiatives that can be identified as 'child psychiatry' started in the 1920's. After some decades of exploration of the field a second phase can be identified between 1945 and 1965 when the discipline became established: the first dissertations were published and the first chairs were founded.

However, a tension can be observed between a more medical and a more psychodynamic orientation. From the mid sixties we can see on the one hand a consolidation of the discipline but on the other hand a weakening of its social and epistemic position, which can be illustrated by

the fact that child psychiatry 'lost' mental retardation and juvenile justice, which up to then had been two of its most important fields of expertise, to psychology and to special education. In these years psychotherapy had become dominant. The beginning of the eighties were crucial. Then a reorientation can be seen when the child psychiatrist defined himself clearly as a doctor and began to win some lost terrain back..

This paper is based on an analysis of all relevant journals, and of manuals and articles, research of the archives of the section of child psychiatry of the Dutch society of psychiatry, interviews and on some comparative research. It will focus on the vicissitudes of child psychiatry in the fields of mental retardation and early infantile autism. While in the first pre-war decade the domain of the discipline was competed by pediatry, since 1945 there has been a continuing competition in these fields with (special) education ('orthopedagogiek') and psychology.

## Boundary Work, Part II: Case Studies

### A Spanish priest psychologist against occultism: A case study in the history of boundary discussion in science

Annette Mülberger, Sandra Astudillo, Sandra Llorente y Mèrche Martos (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

At the end of the nineteenth century a new form of spiritualism became popular. In Spain and France this occultist science was called "Metapsíquica", whereas in English and German speaking country it was called "Parapsychology". The scientific ambition of that field and its nearness to psychology forced some psychologists like Dumas, James, Marbe, Münsterberg, Piéron, Scripture, Titchener, Wundt and others to take part in the discussion about the limits of their science (Coon, 1992, Mülberger, 1994, Parot, 1993).

Our historical research deals with the discourse on occultism of a Spanish psychologist whose name is Fernando Maria Palmés. He wrote quite a lot of articles about that subject, but without any doubt, his major work in this field is a book entitled "Metapsíquica y espiritismo" (Occultism and Spiritualism) edited for the first time in 1932 and again in 1950. We expect this work to be of special interest as he had to combine his identification as scientist with his work as experimental psychologist (as teacher and researcher) together with his condition as Jesuit (Peralta, 1994).

So the question rises: from which angle will he attack occultism? From a religious, scientific or psychological point of view? Will he adopt only one of these approaches or try to combine them? Will he be able to offer a coherent discourse? Is his discourse very different from other writings of that time on that subject?

All these questions we are going to answer while presenting the results of our research. We start with a brief summary of Palmés's work pointing out the purpose and basic ideas of his book "Occultism and Spiritualism". Following the classification of Richet he distinguishes between three kinds of occultist phenomena: ectoplasm, telequinesia and criptestesia. Palmés examines each of these phenomena taking into account different explanations. Step by step he refutes each of the theories that seems to support the realness of these phenomena.

After the summary we expose some of the rhetoric strategies he uses in order to convince the reader that 'parapsychology' is nothing else but a new version of the old spiritualism which has nothing to do with real science. Some of his strategies are to appeal to the right judgment of the reader, presenting occultism as an illegal activity, to put rhetorical questions, the use of images together with an ironic, even sarcastic, writing style.

In the following part we analyse the internal coherence of his discourse and in the last part of our paper we are going to compare Palmés's approach with that of other psychologists of that time.

## Bibliography

- Boulard, A.L. (1910). *El dogma católico ante la razón y la ciencia*. Barcelona: Subirana.  
 Coon, D. (1992). Testing the limits of sense and science: American experimental psychologists combat spiritualism (1880-1920). *American Psychologist*, 143-151.  
 Heuzé, P. (1926). *Où on est la métapsique?* Paris: Gauthiers-Villars.  
 Moll, A. (1925). *Der Spiritismus*. Stuttgart: Fränkische Verlagshandlung.  
 Mülberger, A. (2000). A historical approach to the problem of the limits of science: occultism and psychology in Germany. Paper presented at the Meeting of the ESHS at Berlin (28.8.2000).  
 Palmés, F.M. (S.J.) (1932). *Metapsíquica y Espiritismo*. Madrid: Razón y Fé.  
 Palmés, F.M. (S.J.) (1950). *Metapsíquica y Espiritismo*. Barcelona: Calve.  
 Parot, F. (1993). Psychology experiments: spiritism at the Sorbonne. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, 29, 22-28.  
 Peralta Serrano, A. (1994). El padre Ferran Maria Palmés y el laboratorio de psicología experimental del Colegio Máximo de San Ignacio de Sarriá de Barcelona. *Revista de Historia de la Psicología*, 15, 3-4, 461-475.  
 Richet, C. (1922). *Traité de métapsique*. Paris: Alcan.

### The networks of communication within the genesis of sciences of education as a disciplinary field. Analysis of the scientific foundations and the disciplinary boundaries of these networks

Marco Cicchini (University of Geneva)

This paper is focused on the emergence of sciences of education as a disciplinary field from one of the constituent elements of any social science: the networks of communication. A double question drives this research: within the communication networks, how much hazy are the disciplinary boundaries of the sciences of education during its early development, and which is the part and the weight of non-scientific preoccupations, mostly moral ones, on the emergence of the field? These questions are approached from the example of Geneva during the first decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century – at that time one of the international poles of sciences of education and *éducation nouvelle* – with its key players and institutions.

Social history of social sciences appears today as an unavoidable domain of research in order to study the process of disciplinisation of any scientific field. Since a couple of years, the sciences of education, involved in a kind of collective auto-analysis of the scientific activities (Bourdieu, 1997), are nurtured by repeated investigations into the disciplinary development since the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> century – beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century in Europe and United-States (Hameline, Helmchen, & Oelkers, 1995; Depaepe, 1998; Tenorth, 1998; Gautherin, 2001; Hofstetter & Schneuwly, 2001). Recent comparative studies based on an analysis of specialised reviews as a place and vehicle of scientific products of sciences of education (Schriewer, 1997; Keiner, 1999) have brought a new contribution to the history of the field.

According to this wide range of studies, our research considers the disciplinary field as possibly defined by its network of communications (Stichweh, 1991): a designated community of discipline's researchers, with an institutional foundation and specialised communication supports, is engaged in the capitalisation of findings and in the definition of norms and rules for the researchers themselves at their institution, as well as outside the discipline (Schriewer, 1998). In such an approach, networks constitute an indication of the critical discussion about the field or the place of the sharing of research products, in order to promote scientific recognition of the discipline. Generally, the communications are organised around two basic elements: the publications and the creation of exchange network. Based on this second element, we have limited the concept of exchange network to the scientific events like congresses,

colloquia, conferences, etc. which physically link researchers and educational practitioners other ones in a same place and in real time.

The analysis of the scientific events as a scene of scientific production and communication will first allow us to grasp the disciplinary relationships within and around sciences of education and will lead to define the disciplinary contours of the field. Indeed, a deep tension which torments the process of disciplinarisation concerns the delicate position of sciences of education with regard to referenced disciplines (psychology, philosophy, sociology). Sciences of education dynamically integrate these social/human sciences contributions, whilst renewing and distancing them (Lussi, Muller & Kiciman). Secondly, this communication will ask the relationship between the reform ideas on education and the scientific foundations of the field within the networks of their actors. Didn't Piaget declare in 1942 that the development of sciences of education finds its origin in the conjunction of two waves designated by terms of scientific tradition and modern tradition? The question reveals the need to identify the ideological and methodological postures adopted by the key players of these networks, which means in particular to try to understand the notion of *propaganda* so often stressed by the originators of the disciplinary field.

On the empirical level, we will display the results of an analysis based on original sources centred on the 1910-1930 period. The networks are explored from Geneva according attention to the scientific events of European dimension – conferences, congresses, seminars, etc. – using the titles of reunions, the titles of communications, the personality of researchers, etc. Our paper takes place in a larger project of collective research supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation concerning the emergence of the disciplinary field "sciences de l'éducation" in Geneva, here concentrated on a particular aspect of the process of disciplinarisation, the constitution of networks of communication.

#### Bibliography

- Blanckaert, C., Blondiaux, L., Loty, L., Renneville, M., & Richard, N. (Ed.) (1999). *L'histoire des sciences de l'homme. Trajectoire, enjeux et questions vives*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Bovet, P. (1932). *Vingt ans de vie: L'Institut J.-J. Rousseau de 1912 à 1932*. Neuchâtel: Delachaux et Niestlé.
- Bourdieu, P. (1997). *Les usages sociaux de la science. Pour une sociologie clinique du champ scientifique*. Paris: INRA, 1997.
- Depaepe, M., (1998). La recherche expérimentale en éducation de 1890 à 1940 : les processus historiques sous-jacents au développement d'une discipline en Europe de l'Ouest et aux États-Unis. In R. Hofstetter & B. Schneuwly (Ed.), *Le pari des sciences de l'éducation* (Raisons éducatives, n° 1/2, pp. 29-56. Bruxelles: De Boeck.
- Gautherin, J. (2001). *Une discipline pour la République. La Science de l'éducation, 1882-1919*. Berne: Lang.
- Hameline, D., Helmchen, J. & Oelkers, J. (Ed.). (1995). *L'éducation nouvelle et les enjeux de son histoire: actes du Colloque International des Archives Institut J.-J. Rousseau*. Bern: Lang.
- Hofstetter, R. & Schneuwly, B. (2001). *Les sciences de l'éducation en Suisse. Analyse de l'évolution d'une discipline et définition de perspectives*. Manuscrit: Université de Genève.
- Keiner, E. (1999). *Erziehungswissenschaft 1947-1990. Eine empirische und vergleichende Untersuchung zur kommunikativen Praxis einer Disziplin*. Weinheim: Deutscher Studien Verlag.
- Le Dinh, D. (Ed.). (1997). *L'avènement des sciences sociales comme disciplines académiques XIXe-XXe siècles* (Les Annuelles N° 8). Lausanne: Antipodes.
- Novoa, A. (1998). *Histoire et comparaison. (Essais sur l'éducation)*. Lisbonne: Educa.
- Oelkers, J. (2000). *Zwischen Profession und Empirie. Epistemologische und praktische Probleme erziehungswissenschaftlicher Forschung. Actes du Congrès 2000 de la Société suisse pour la recherche en éducation*. Genève: Section des sciences de l'éducation, Université de Genève [ROM].
- Piaget, J. (1942). Psychologie et pédagogie genevoise. In *Suisse contemporaine* (n°5, pp. 431).

Schriewer, J. (1997). World-System and Interrelationships-Networks. The Internationalizations of Education and the Role of Comparative Inquiry. In *Research Papers*, n°2, Berlin.

Schriewer, J. (1998). Études pluridisciplinaires et réflexions philosophico-herméneutiques: la structuration du discours pédagogique en France et en Allemagne. In P. Drewek & C. Lüth (Ed.), *Histoire des sciences de l'éducation* (pp. 57-84). Gent: CSHP.

Stichweh, R. (1991). *Études sur la genèse du système scientifique moderne* (F. Blaise, trad.). Lille: Presses Universitaires de Lille.

Tenorth, H.-E. (1998). Les sciences de l'éducation en Allemagne. Un cheminement vers la modernité entre science, profession enseignante et politique. In R. Hofstetter & B. Schneuwly (Ed.), *Le pari des sciences de l'éducation* (Raisons éducatives, n° 1/2, pp. 117-146). Bruxelles: De Boeck.

#### Sciences of education: a process of disciplinarisation deeply embedded in professional fields and other social sciences. The Genevan case in the beginning 20<sup>th</sup> century

Rita Hofstetter and Bernard Schneuwly (University of Geneva)

The paper aims at presenting first results of a collective research on the beginning of sciences of education. Two central questions will be asked which concern also other social sciences. Which are the relationships of sciences of education with professional fields? How the evolution of this disciplinary field is it embedded in the field of other social sciences? Our empirical investigations are based on the Genevan example – the first institute of "sciences de l'éducation" (plural) is founded here; it is famous over the world and lasts longer than any other in Europe – in the beginning 20<sup>th</sup> century. On the basis of this example we will propose theoretical considerations which can be discussed from the point of view of other contexts and social sciences.

Theoretically, our framework is based on the concept of disciplinarisation as it is currently used in a number of studies on the history of social and human sciences (see among others Mucchielli, 1999; Blanckaert, 1993; see also Blanckaert, Blondiaux, Loty, Renneville & Richard, 1999; Wagner, Wittrock et Whitley, 1991). In what concerns sciences of education, we will speak more specifically, following Stichweh (1987) about "predominantly secondary disciplinarisation". This kind of disciplinarisation is characterised by the fact that a huge theoretical field, linked to a strongly structured profession, pre-exists to the constitution of a discipline, favours its emergence and orients its evolution. This characteristic, which is common to many disciplines like for instance medicine, has two consequences we will explore in our paper. Such a process reinforces the dynamic tension between the constraints of social and scientific demands and contributes to maintain a pluridisciplinary dimension to the disciplinary field, in our case sciences of education. This latter has therefore a particular relationship of being sometimes stimulated by and sometimes in concurrence with the professionals of the social field and with other, already constituted or to be constituted disciplines. (Note that these are often at the same time outside and inside of sciences of education, this rises the question of boundaries).

We will illustrate our theses in synthesising the results of two empirical investigations:

A) In the first example, we will briefly describe the principal phases of the process of disciplinarisation of sciences of education as it happened in Geneva, in concentrating on institutional dimensions (chairs, academic education, institutions of research, means of scientific communication). The aim will be to define how profession reference fields and other existing disciplines influence (refrain, transform) the process.

B) In the second example we will present a serial analysis of the more than 2000 courses given by/in the *Institut Jean-Jacques Rousseau/des sciences de l'éducation* between 1912 and 1948. The aim will be to describe how the relationships between several disciplines present at the Institute develop, more particularly between psychology, medicine and (experimental) pedagogy.

These illustrations will be discussed theoretically from three points of view:

- a) the ongoing transformation of the disciplinary field by its integration into the more general disciplinary system as it has grown in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century;
- b) the relationship of interdependence between discipline(s) and profession(s);
- c) the ongoing transformation of the relationship of sciences of education to disciplines of reference and the movement of the internal and external differentiation of the disciplinary field.

The paper will end with some considerations about the question if the mechanisms of the disciplinarisation of sciences of education are specific in comparison with other social sciences.

#### References

- Blanckaert, C. (1993). La Société française pour l'histoire des sciences de l'homme. Bilan, enjeux et 'questions vives'. *Genèses*, 10, 124-135.
- Blanckaert, C., Blondiaux, L., Loty, L., Renneville, M., & Richard, N. (Ed.) (1999). *L'histoire des sciences de l'homme. Trajectoire, enjeux et questions vives*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Depaepe, M. (1993). *Zum Wohl des Kindes? Pädologie, pädagogische Psychologie und experimentelle Pädagogik in Europa und den USA, 1890-1940*. Weinheim: Deutscher Studien Verlag.
- Drewek, P. & Lüth, C. (Ed.). (1998). *Histoire des sciences de l'éducation*. Gent: CSHP.
- Favre, P. (1985). Histoire de la science politique. In M. Grawitz & J. Leca (Ed.), *Traité de science politique* (pp. 3-45). Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
- Hofstetter, R. & Schneuwly, B. (Ed.) (1998). *Le pari des sciences de l'éducation* (Raisons éducatives, N° 1/2). Bruxelles: De Boeck.
- Keiner, E. (1999). *Erziehungswissenschaft 1947-1990. Eine empirische und vergleichende Untersuchung zur kommunikativen Praxis einer Disziplin*. Weinheim: Deutscher Studien Verlag.
- Keiner, E., & Schriewer, J. (2000). Erneuerung aus dem Geist der eigenen Tradition? Über Kontinuität und Wandel nationaler Denkstile in der Erziehungswissenschaft. *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Bildungswissenschaften*, 22, 27-51.
- Lussi, V., Muller, Ch. & Kiciman, V. (sous presse). Pédagogie et psychologie : frontières mouvantes du développement des sciences de l'éducation à Genève. In R. Hofstetter & B. Schneuwly (Ed.) *Ancrages institutionnels et disciplinaires des sciences de l'éducation : ressorts de leur déploiement*. [titre provisoire] Berne: Lang.
- Muller, C., Hofstetter, R., Schneuwly, B., Kiciman, V., Lussi, V. & Späni, M. (2000a). *The disciplinary and academic constitution of sciences of education: the "prototype" of Institute Jean-Jacques Rousseau in Geneva, developments and limits (1911-1933)*. Education-line (electronic texts in education and training). Accès: <http://www.leeds.ac.uk/educol>.
- Stichweh, R. (1987). Profession und Disziplinen. Formen der Differenzierung zweier Systeme beruflichen Handelns in modernen Gesellschaften. In K. Harney, D. Jütting & B. Korn (Ed.), *Professionalisierung der Erwachsenenbildung* (pp. 210-267). Bern: Lang.
- Stichweh, R. (1991). *Etudes sur la genèse du système scientifique moderne* (F. Blaise, trad.). Lille: Presses Universitaires de Lille.
- Tenorth, H.-E. (1998). Les sciences de l'éducation en Allemagne. Un cheminement vers la modernité entre science, profession enseignante et politique. In R. Hofstetter & B. Schneuwly (Ed.), *Le pari des sciences de l'éducation* (Raisons éducatives, N° 1/2, pp. 11-146). Bruxelles: De Boeck.
- Wagner, P., Wittrock, B. & Whitley, R. (Ed.). (1991). *Discourses on society: The shaping of social science disciplines*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

#### III: Transgressing Disciplinary Boundaries?

**Existential questions: were there two Utrecht Schools in the 1950's? The relations, similarities and differences between the phenomenological approaches in psychology and in criminology**

René van Hezewijk, Henderikus J. Stam & Geert Panhuysen (Utrecht University)

Among psychologists, the Utrecht School was famous (at least outside The Netherlands) for its phenomenological psychology (e.g. (Giorgi, 1990). Buytendijk, Linschoten, Van Lennep, Kouwer, Langeveld, and others were considered as the members of a school with a strongly resembling approach to psychological problems. To put it bluntly these were problems about meaning and intentionality (Brentano, Husserl), problems going beyond the biological nature of human existence, problems reserved for the human person.

Less well known in circles of psychologists is a school of criminologists and criminal justice scholars that Jacques Léauté explicitly called the Utrecht School as well (Léauté, 1959). He referred to Pompe, Baan, Kempe, Hudig, Van Ratingen, and others that were active as professors in criminal justice, forensic psychiatry, criminology in Utrecht from the early fifties till the early sixties of the twentieth century. Their activities went beyond teaching. Their approach and critical attitude led to many institutional and practical results that still can be seen in the criminal justice and penal system in the Netherlands. Theirs was a "delinquent-centered way of thinking" (Kempe, 1969).

It is not at all clear whether these scholars themselves, or their interpreters considered themselves as members of one school. Nor is it clear whether they would have had good arguments to do so. And if not, it is not at all clear whether there were two schools at all.

In this paper I will discuss answers to these questions, by discussing studies by historians of psychology (e.g. (Dehue, 1995; Dekkers, 1985; Moedikdo, 1976; Nagel, 1963; Ter Meulen, 1988) and original work by authors from both alleged schools, as well as making use of unpublished, recently uncovered material from the Linschoten archives.

#### References

- Dehue, T. (1995). *Changing the rules; Psychology in the Netherlands 1900-1985*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dekkers, W. J. M. (1985). *Het bezielde lichaam; het ontwerp van een antropologische fysiologie en geneeskunde volgens F.J.J. Buytendijk (Body with a soul)*. Zeist: Kerckebosch.
- Giorgi, A. (1990). A phenomenological vision for psychology. In Wm.J.Baker, M. E. Hyland, R. Van Hezewijk, & S. Terwee (Eds.), *Recent trends in theoretical psychology, vol. II* (pp. 27-36). New York: Springer Verlag.
- Kempe, G. Th. *De Utrechtse School* (unpublished mimeograph). 1969.
- Ref Type: Unpublished Work
- Léauté, J. (1959). *Une nouvelle école de science criminelle / 'École d'Utrecht*. Paris.
- Moedikdo, P. (1976). De Utrechtse School van Pompe, Baan en Kempe. In C.Kelk, M. Moerings, N. Jörg, & P. Moedikdo (Eds.), *Recht, Macht en Manipulatie* (pp. 90-154). Utrecht: Het Spectrum.
- Nagel, W. H. (1963). De Utrechtse School. *Tijdschrift voor Strafrecht*. 322-355.
- Ter Meulen, R. (1988). *Ziel en zaligheid*. Zeist: AMBO.

Ruud Abma & Frits van Wel (Utrecht University)

This paper attempts to show how the introduction of a concept, *mental health*, and corresponding discourse, helped to demolish rather than create or defend boundaries between disciplines. This is illustrated by the shifting discourses and interventions towards 'deviant' adolescents in the Netherlands.

Deviancy usually is divided into two categories: consciously transgressing laws or social norms ('wilful deviancy', e.g. delinquency) on the one hand, and mental illness ('unwilful deviancy' on the other. When the discourse on mental health, during the 1930s, was introduced in the Netherlands, it joined forces with pedagogical efforts to improve family life: A 'healthy' family was supposed to prevent both delinquency and mental illness in children.

While 'healthy' in this period was translated simply as 'sticking to dominant cultural norms and values', during the 1950s influential Dutch authors, both in the pedagogical and in the mental health domain, asserted that families should educate their children to a high degree of 'responsible autonomy'. As we all know, young people in the 1960s and 1970s have taken this more seriously than authorities (including parents) had expected, and emancipation became a household word.

While on the ideological level views became politicized, on the practical level technological interventions into the lives of families became dominant. In this paper, we try to answer the question why mental health did lose its unifying power in the 1970s.

\* answer: professionalization  
in research  
- practical help

Langer II

Thimmes yater

Fortmann 71

Duytendijk physic/biolog/φ

Applied Psychology at Leipzig University in the Inter-War Period

Peter J. Behrens (Pennsylvania State University)

This paper provides information about the work in applied psychology of the Psychological Institute at Leipzig University following the retirement of Wilhelm Wundt through the outbreak of the Second World War. A number of illustrations are available about Wundt's own understanding of the role of applied psychology. These views may be identified in his writings as early as 1862 on the role of statistical procedures for understanding the nature and causes of suicide in society. In addition, Wundt studied language development in his own two children. He recorded his observations in his *Voelkerpsychologie*. In brief, Wundt regarded applied psychology as a "legitimate" branch of modern psychology, but offered reservations about it, nonetheless (Wundt, 1910). In fact, he believed it was more appropriate for American psychology. Even in his own laboratory, his early European students, such as Muensterberg, Wolfe, Kuelpe, and Kirschmann, rivaled his American and English students, such as Cattell, Spearman, and Stratton, in pragmatic, or "functional" interests. Of the more than 180 students who received their degrees under Wundt between 1875 and 1919, 22 were actively involved in teaching, research, and practice in various areas of applied psychology during their careers (Hoffman & Deffenbacher, 1992).

Following the retirement of Wundt from Leipzig in 1917, two individuals emerged as particularly significant for the field of applied psychology at the Institute from 1917 through 1938. These figures were Felix Krueger (1874-1948) and Otto Klemm (1884-1939). Each served as an assistant to Wundt and went on to lead the Institute to profound changes in the content and direction of research as directors of the Institute.

The reasons for the transformation of the Institute away from the traditional emphasis of Wundtian *Elementenpsychologie* will be discussed in some detail. On a purely theoretical level, Krueger, who was appointed successor to Wundt in 1917, led the Institute in the inter-war years to participate in the development of holistic, or *Ganzheitspsychologie*, which stressed the unity of the person. On a practical level, Krueger, Klemm, Sander, Volkeit, and others sought to adapt the work of the Institute to the changed demands on the social and economic fabric of German society produced by the Great War.

Klemm, in turn, stands as one of the most prolific early German applied psychologists (Bringmann & Early, 2000). His introduction to applied psychology had its origin from World War I in the German artillery. He conducted research on targeting and sound localization. In the course of his career, more than one-third of his publications reflect his ambitious program of applied psychology. Between 1923 and 1930 alone, 31 publications on applied psychology appeared under his name. Most of them reflect the major economic and social concerns that faced the German state as a result of the devastation following the Great War. In this regard, the majority of the applied research by Klemm and his students fit 4 main categories of applied research comprising more than 35 publications. These include early research on human work, equipment, and control design; human performance and mental functioning; court psychology; and mental ability testing and vocational guidance (Klemm, 1936). Many of the publications suggest a very contemporary orientation, such as those that relate to sports psychology, criminal investigation, and selection of law enforcement officers (e.g., Klemm, 1938). These and other works will be explored in some depth to reveal the quality of Klemm's professional interests and demonstrate his significance for scientific psychology.

Shortly after Wundt's death in 1922, Klemm was at long last appointed to a tenured professorship of Applied and Educational Psychology at Leipzig. For the remainder of his life, he divided his time among teaching, research, and consultation to government bureaus. Krueger, Klemm's longtime collaborator and friend, was removed from his administrative responsibilities

for racial and political reasons in 1936 by the National Socialist government of Germany. When Klemm was forced to retire from Leipzig in 1938, he died of his own hand in early January 1939.

#### References

- Bringmann, W.G. & Early, C.E. (2000). Klemm, Otto August. In A.E. Kazdin (Vol. Ed.), *Encyclopedia of psychology* (Vol. 4, pp. 447-448). Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association.
- Hoffman, R.R. & Deffenbacher, K.A. (1992). A brief history of applied cognitive psychology. *Applied Cognitive Psychology*, 6, 1-48.
- Klemm, O. (1936). Otto Klemm. In C. Murchison (Ed.), *History of psychology in autobiography* (pp. 153-180). New York: Russell & Russell.
- Klemm, O. (1938). Der Kugelstoss – Bericht ueber eine Untersuchung A. Vogels. *Zeitschrift fuer angewandte Psychologie*, 54, 81-91.
- Wundt, W. (1910). Ueber reine und angewandte Psychologie. *Psychologische Studien*, 5, 1-4

#### The XXII. International Congress of Psychology – an important event in the history of psychology of the GDR

Kitty Dumont (Jena)

In 1980 the XXII. International Congress of Psychology took place in Leipzig (former GDR). It was the second time in the history of the International Union of Psychological Sciences (IUPsyS) that one of its international meetings took place in a socialist country. Fourteen years before, in 1966, the congress was hosted by the Soviet Union.

In the history of psychology of the GDR the International Union of Psychological Sciences played a very important role. In its first constitution the "Society of Psychology of the GDR" (founded in 1961) formulated "to apply for the membership in the IUPsyS" as one main goal. However, the process from application to membership was characterized by difficulties which were mainly based on the political conflicts existing between the two German states at this time (Hallstein Doktrin). Only in 1966, the "Society of Psychology of the GDR" was accepted to become a member of the IUPsyS. Six years later, in 1972, the IUPsyS decided to hold the XXII. Congress in Leipzig, in order to recognize and celebrate the 100 years of Wundt psychology. Being chosen to host this international congress was interpreted as an honour, on the one hand. On the other hand, the "Society of Psychology of the GDR" was immediately confronted with one major problem: At the time when the IUPsyS decided to hold the 1980-Congress in Leipzig, the well-known Wundt Institute did not exist anymore as an Institute of Psychology.

In the paper it will be shown that after 1972 almost all decisions regarding the development of psychology in the GDR were affected by this forthcoming event. The paper will also focus on the political dimension of this International Congress whereby national and international contexts are distinguished. To analyse the national political context several examples will be discussed which demonstrate how officials and "in-officials" of the GDR attempted to influence this international congress. To exemplify the international political context we will focus on the Afghanistan crisis and its effects on this international congress.

#### PAPER SESSION 8: PSYCHOANALYSIS

perfecte presentatie

#### History and Historiography in Psychoanalysis: The Case of the Pfarrer-Analytiker Oskar Pfister

David D. Lee (Amsterdam)

The dissonance and harmony of history and historiography are the central concerns of modern studies in history and all the social sciences. The importance of accounting for this level of analysis cannot be overstated and our fields are littered with the barely read, yellowing pages of sterling examples of the failure to take it into account (e.g. Goldhagen). This paper examines both the history and historiography of the Swiss pastor/analyst Oskar Pfister (1873-1956) to present a summary of his life and work and, more importantly, to contribute to a discussion of how the practice of psychoanalysis is linked to the production of its own history. Psychoanalysis stands virtually alone within the history of science as a field which consciously and successfully wrote its own history in order to control it. An unforeseen consequence has been the closure of possibilities for psychoanalytic thinking which, in today's world, need to be re-examined. Psychoanalysis shaped and established itself not only by advancing theory and continuing practice, but by creating an internal historical narrative. A case history for psychology, the history of psychoanalysis demonstrates both the limiting and beneficial consequences of this.

Pfister's corpus is briefly reviewed with special attention to his pioneering applications of Freudian thought to adolescent psychology, religion, and education. Special attention is paid to how his work was received within these fields (within and outside of psychoanalysis) and to the extent his work influenced others, particularly other psychologists and psychoanalysts. Pfister's long personal relationship with Freud is examined for clues as to why and on what terms Freud was able to sustain this relationship - the only one he built with a priest of any faith. Reasons for how this relationship was possible and how it affected each man's professional work are put forward.

After his death Pfister's name and work virtually vanished from the psychoanalytic canon. Comparison to Pfister's historiographical influence on mainstream pedagogy, theology and the psychology of religion, and child psychology demonstrates that his disappearance from the pages of psychoanalytic history was even more complete than in other related fields. I shall review the secondary literature on Pfister and suggest several reasons for why this occurred. Of further interest is why and with what purposes his legacy has been revived in recent years. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of these events for the history of psychoanalysis and the profession itself. Time permitting, the implications of this level of analysis for other fields of psychology will be explored. ?!

#### Bibliography

- Freud, S. & O. Pfister, Briefe  
Pfister, O.R.,  
Die psychanalytische Methode  
Was bietet die Psychoanalyse dem Erzieher? / Die Psychoanalyse im Dienste der Erziehung  
Die Behandlung schwer erziehbarer und abnormer Kinder  
Die Liebe des Kindes und ihre Fehlentwicklungen  
Die Liebe vor der Ehe und ihre Fehlentwicklungen  
Das Christentum und die Angst  
Micale, M., "Paradigm and Ideology in Psychiatric History Writing: The Case of Psychoanalysis" *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*.

(1915) Engliche Vertaehlung  
(1913) -> zur invokation hr. Lehen/pastoral werken

# Keep nothing secret. Dependency and understanding between Freud and Ferenczi

Zsuzsanna Vajda (Szeged University)

One of the problems of outstanding interest in the philosophy of science is the social - political origins of scientific work and tenets. This question has a special significance in psychoanalytic theory and practice. Psychoanalytic therapy can be learnt only in face to face contact, a very special human relation called psychoanalysis. As it is well-known, personal relationships had a significant role in formation of psychoanalytic theory either.

In the Freud - Ferenczi correspondence we find an exciting source of that question. As Judit Dupont, one of the editors, claimed, the more than twenty years of correspondence between Freud and Ferenczi is a sort of a long psychoanalysis. In my paper, based on the first ten years of that rich material, I refer to an important theoretical question of psychoanalysis - evaluation of morality in human relationships - which have been treated in their exchange of letters strained through the authors' personal issues, therapeutical experiences and the affairs and conflicts of psychoanalytic movement.

While at the beginning of their relationship Ferenczi admired Freud almost unconditionally, it is clear that his desire was a relationship of equals: he fought to be „a companion with equal rights”. In a world of psychoanalytic culture „one could tell everyone the truth, one's father, teacher, neighbour and even the king”. He shared opinion of other intellectuals of the turning of the century, claiming that „All fabricated, imposed authority would go to the devil” (vol. I. p. 130). Respectful authority belongs to those people who are conscious of their own weaknesses. He also agreed with Freud's tenet: „there is no psychoanalytical worldview, no psychoanalytical ethics, no psychoanalytical rules of conducts” (p. 219). All these old, moralistic measures of human behaviour can be replaced with psychoanalytical comprehension. In this way domination and subordination of people can be based only a mutual agreement of the partners and it is not a fixed position. → *hierarchical relationship!*

But despite Ferenczi's repeated efforts to claim his friendship with Freud, he failed to overcome his subordinate position. Freud remained the master, professor, „pedagogue”, as Ferenczi wrote in his last notes. This fact caused a lot of pain and was a big disappointment to him. He was not a simple friend of Freud, he was one of his patients too. One of his symptoms was that he could not be released from his inclination to dependency, and he expected his therapist to heal him from that. The old master who never gave up his right to superiority was at the same time „doctor hating patients”. His own experience with the ineffectiveness of psychoanalytic therapy caused Ferenczi's growing uncertainty with regard to the effectiveness of psychoanalytical therapy.

Anything that happened between these two founders of psychoanalysis manifested itself in their assumptions of human nature, and provided an impact on the ideas and practice of psychoanalysis.

## References

- *The Correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Sándor Ferenczi*, volume 1-2. Ed. by Eva Brabant, Ernst Falzeder and Patrizia Giampieri-Deutsch. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 1993
- Dupont, J: *Előszó* In: Ferenczi S.: *Klinikai napló*, Budapest, Akadémiai, 1996
- Ferenczi S: *Journal Clinique*, Editions Payot, Paris, 1989
- Harvat, P: *Freud, Ferenczi és a budapesti pszichoanalitikus iskola*, Európai Protestáns Szabadegyetem, Bern, 1986
- André Haynal: *Controversies in Psychoanalytic Method: From Freud to Ferenczi and Michael Balint*, New York, 1989
- Vajda Zs.: *A pszichoanalízis budapesti iskolája és a nevelés*, Budapest, Sík, 1995

veel 'eh' --  
improviseren  
lukt niet

# In the margins of scientific dialogue: Evart van Dieren contra psychoanalysis

Jaap Bos (Utrecht University)

Evart van Dieren (1861-1940) was a Dutch physician and writer, known in history as a fanatic quarrelmonger who at the beginning of the twentieth century (unsuccessfully) contested most forms of progress, including Darwinism, socialism, feminism and not least of all psychoanalysis. This paper examines Van Dieren's work against Freud (Van Dieren, 1927, 1932a, 1932b), and its reception in analytic as well as non-analytic circles. Van Dieren has left few traces in the history of psychoanalysis but he is interesting as an object of analysis since he sought and found the margins of what is tolerable as a critic.

In his unreasonable absolutism, Van Dieren reveals (unwillingly) the frontiers of scientific dialogue. Van Dieren attacked everyone (adherers to psychoanalysis as well as its antagonists) who did not unconditionally accept his critique. Failing to find a minimum of common ground, he did not succeed in establishing a serious discussion, let alone convince a single soul. This raises the question of the margins of scientific dialogue: at what point does critique no longer count as critique? And in a broader sense the question rises according to what rules (in terms of face-work, politeness and other conversational analytic concepts) scientific dialogues work. This paper offers some provisional answers to these questions.

## References

- Van Dieren, E. (1927) *'Futuristische' behandeling van zielezieken (Freud'sche psycho-analyse: zoogenaamde "zielontleding") Wetenschap of waanzin? Weldaad of misdaad?* Haarlem: Drukkerij Amicitia.
- Van Dieren, E. (1932a) *Prof Freud en het perverse gevaar*. Baarn: Hollandia drukkerij.
- Van Dieren, E. (1932b) *Verbreiding van Freudiaansche wetenschap (?) door den Radioomroep! : Antwoord op de VARA-voordracht van den zenuwdokter A. Querido over "Dokter van Dieren en professor Freud"*. Utrecht: J. van Druten.

# A Dutch Treat - Randomized controlled experimentation and the case of an experiment with heroin maintenance in The Netherlands

Trudy Dehue (Groningen University)

Since 1995 the Parliament of The Netherlands has vehemently debated a plan to conduct a large-scale randomized controlled trial with heroin maintenance for severe abusers. MP's contested the implementation of the experiment for ethical, financial, and practical reasons. Holding out the prospect of unequivocal answers on the effects of heroin maintenance, the Minister of Health eventually managed to guide the project through.

In my presentation, I examine some presuppositions in the debate. I challenge the assumption that the randomized controlled design is a matter of transcendental logic, and instead situate its historical origin in the neo-liberal version of the 20th century welfare state. Furthermore, using theoretical views on classification as a framework and the heroin experiment as an illustration, I argue that human science experimentation is a way to create reality as much as to describe it. The paper ends with an analysis of the course of events from 1997 to 2001. The heroin users invited to participate put both the experiment's advocates and its adversaries in the wrong. Unforeseen contingencies indicate that with a too restricted conception of research pivotal aspects of heroin addiction are neglected. Moreover, the heroin users' responses demonstrate that this particular experiment too is inspired by the core assumption of social experimentation at its early 20th century inception: the presupposition that a society dominated by economic achievement is everybody's best of all possible worlds.

CCBH 750 participants  
↓  
625

randomized controlled experiment  
vs  
matching

## PAPER SESSION 9: EMOTION

1800-1940

### Disordered Controls: Emotions, Embodiment, and the Human Machine

Otniel E. Dror (Hebrew University, Jerusalem)

by Mark Watkinson  
maar zeer goed ingevoerd

This paper examines moments of loss of control over the object of knowledge in diverse biomedical contexts. It focuses on physiological and psychological laboratories and medical clinics during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and argues that moments of loss of control over the object of knowledge were defined as "emotion."

→ disruption

The paper studies the emergent definition of emotion--as loss of control--on three different levels: at the level of individual subjects/organisms--where the subject's loss of self-control was interpreted as a moment of emotion; at the level of the production of biomedical knowledge--where moments of disorder or loss of control over the object of knowledge were defined by the experimenters in terms of moments of emotions; and at the level of the social relationships of the laboratory--where emotion materialized in the types of interactions that governed the manipulators and manipulated. Emotion signified a breakdown in order/control--at the level of the individual body of the organism/subject, at the level of the laboratory and its control over the object of knowledge, and at the level of (the failure to produce) biomedical knowledge.

The paper interprets this emergent definition of "emotion"--as disorder--in the context of a culture that saw in the machine a model for the production of objective--"mechanical"--knowledge. It concludes that failures to mechanize, control, and know the body-as-machine were labeled as--"emotion." And it suggests that the meaning of emotion in biomedical settings should be interpreted in the context of what social historians have defined as a modern "emotionology."

### Bibliography

- Bernard, Claude. "Sur la physiologie du coeur et ses rapports avec le cerveau." Lecons sur les proprietes des tissus vivants. Ed. M. Emile Alglave. Paris: Germer Bailliere, 1866.
- Binet, A., and J. Courtier. "Influence de la vie emotionnelle sur le coeur, la respiration et la circulation capillaire." L'Annee Psychologique 3 (1896): 65-126.
- Brown, Janet. "Darwin and the Expression of the Emotions." The Darwinian Heritage. Ed. David Kohn. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.
- Burgess, Thomas. The Physiology or Mechanism of Blushing. London: John Churchill, 1839.
- Cannon, Walter Bradford. "The James-Lange Theory of Emotions: A Critical Examination and an Alternative Theory." The American Journal of Psychology 39 (1927): 106-124.
- , Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear, and Rage: An Account of Recent Researches into the Function of Emotional Excitement. New York & London: D. Appleton, 2nd ed., 1929.
- Darrow, Chester W. "Psychophysiology, Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow." Psychophysiology 1 (July 1964): 4-7.
- Darwin, Charles. The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. New York & London: D. Appleton, 1872.
- Hillman, James. Emotion: A Comprehensive Phenomenology of Theories and their Meanings for Therapy. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1992 [1960].
- Jaggar, Alison M. "Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology." Women, Knowledge, and Reality: Explorations in Feminist Philosophy. Ed. Ann Garry and Marilyn Pearsall. New York & London: Routledge, 1992 [1989].
- James, William. "What is an Emotion?" Mind 9 (1884): 188-205.
- , "The Emotions." Principles of Psychology. New York: Henry Holt, 1890.
- Kern, Stephen. The Culture of Love: Victorians to Moderns. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1992.
- Lehmann, Alfr. Die Hauptgesetze des menschlichen Gefuehlslebens. Leipzig: O. R. Reisland, 1892.

Mosso, Angelo. Fear. Trans., E. Lough and F. Kiesow. London, New York, Bombay: Longmans, 1896.

Rabinbach, Anson. The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue, and the Origins of Modernity. New York: Basic Books, 1990.

Stearns, Peter N. American Cool: Constructing a Twentieth-Century Emotional Style. New York and London: New York University Press, 1994.

Stearns, Peter N., and Jan Lewis, Ed. An Emotional History of the United States. New York: New York University Press, 1998.

### Emotions and their place in psychological explanation – Rethinking the cognitive turn ✓

*R. Herdman*  
Heleen Pott (Maastricht University)

At the beginning of the modern era, Descartes described the passions as motions of the animal spirits – the smallest particles in the blood. According to Descartes, they are automatically set in motion at the sight of something that is harmful or beneficial to the body. The moment they bump into the pineal gland, they are perceived by the soul and this perception is what we nowadays call the 'emotional experience'.

A When later scholars tackled the passions and changed their name into 'emotions', the naturalist model resurfaced in the writings of William James. He made the emotions susceptible to empirical, experimental research, by defining them as 'feelings of body changes': physiological changes in our internal organs, that are directly, consciously experienced. In the first half of the century, James' theory served to justify a style of scientific research of the emotions that was orientated entirely towards laboratory situations.

Descartes, James, and many others are considered as early supporters of the so-called 'feeling theory'; Zajonc and Ekman have more recently joined the club.

B The other trend in emotion psychology runs from Aristotle through Spinoza to contemporary psychology, and is known as the Cognitive View. Supporters of this trend see emotion as grounded in processes of cognitive appraisal. Emotions seem to be connected with the way in which we evaluate certain events, and thus imply intelligent information processing. Ever since behaviourism was losing ground, the cognitive approach has more and more come to dominate psychological emotion research. During the last 25 years, there is widespread agreement that any adequate theory of emotion must be a cognitive theory.

There is, however, rather less agreement on the general form such a theory should take. Although the cognitive emotion paradigm is still flourishing and the international society for interdisciplinary research of the emotions (ISRE) is very much alive and kicking, critical voices have been around for some time. The triumph of the cognitivist theory has been somewhat mitigated. There is still a widespread agreement in psychology and philosophy that an adequate theory of emotion has to be a cognitive theory. But attempts to modify the view are numerous. James' theory is now having a considerable revival, partly due to the success of neurobiological researchers in the emotion field as Damasio (1996). Some theorists have noted that the new cognitive approach to the emotions may not be much more than a variation on the traditional one. While the Traditional View is convinced of the non-rationality or irrationality of the emotions and tends to see them as feelings, the Cognitive View sees emotions as something cognitive. It seems to be the antidote to the former vision, but this rehabilitation depends on its being turned into something rational first. Has the cognitive turn not saddled us with a picture of the emotions that is much too rationalised and civilised?

All in all, it seems as though the ambivalence towards the emotions that is so characteristic of our culture is repeating an oscillatory movement again: after a period in which the emotions were seen as primarily cognitive, intelligent and functional faculties, the emphasis is back on the excessive, physical aspects of the emotion again.

→ This paper is an attempt to rethink not only the cognitive turn, but also the concept of 'emotion'. Concepts like this, taken from everyday life, have fuzzy edges (Wittgenstein) and the

are constantly changing. We might wonder whether, in the last resort, the conflicts and confusion in research on the emotions of the last 25 years do not have a simple cause: the unreflexive use of the ordinary language concept 'emotion'.

### References

- Antonio Damasio, *Descartes' Error*, New York 1996 → DE OPLASSING
- Rene Descartes, *Les Passions de l'ame*, Paris 1967
- Nico Frijda, *The Emotions*, New York 1986
- Peter Goldie, *The Emotions*, Oxford 2000
- Paul Griffiths, *What Emotions really are*, Melbourne 1999
- Heleen Pott, *De liefde van Alcibiades. Over de rationaliteit van emoties*. Amsterdam 1992

diving deep into the archives to shed light on the origins of modern conceptions of subjectivity and identity

Two challenging papers <sup>that combine</sup> ~~where~~ historical and conceptual analysis <sup>discussing</sup> ~~questioning~~ the foundations of <sup>the</sup> subject and <sup>ethnic</sup> identity

## PAPER SESSION 10: SUBJECTIVITY AND ETHNICITY

intriguing

### Between Masochism and Agency: A Lacanian Analysis of Late Medieval Subjectivity

Suzanne M. Verderber (Pratt Institute, New York)

The use of psychoanalytic theory to study the medieval and Renaissance periods poses a dilemma, because it has been suggested that these theories are applicable only to a modern, post-Kantian subject. In Jean-Claude Milner's analysis of the connection between modern science and psychoanalysis, he argues that psychoanalytic theory is unthinkable prior to the emergence of modern science, that the two discourses are indeed intertwined, suggesting that any application of psychoanalytic concepts to a period prior to the emergence of modern science would be utterly erroneous. For Lacan, Milner argues, psychoanalysis can only have emerged within the same epistemological field as modern science. This assertion depends upon the two fundamental traits that Milner argues distinguish modern science: first, that it is empirical, and second, that it is mathematized. The notion of lack, central to Lacan's conception of desire, is derived from this condition of empirical statements in modern science: "Psychoanalysis is possible only in a universe where a mathematized science deals with what could fail to be when it is or what could fail to be as it is" (35). The second necessary trait of modern science in this scheme is mathematization; since empirical statements can refer to states or objects that could fail to be, language is put in the service, in science, of representing what could fail to be. This is precisely where Lacanian psychoanalysis is situated, addressing a subject alienated within the symbolic order. Psychoanalysis is bound, it would seem, to modern science, although this is not the same as saying that psychoanalysis is a modern science.

Milner's argument is one to be contended with for the use of psychoanalytic theory in a period considered premodern. An application of psychoanalytic theory to medieval studies begins to seem possible if its relationship to medieval science, the "repressed" of modern science is explored. If Milner is correct that the history of psychoanalysis is bound up with the history of science, then this offers one way of thinking about historicizing psychoanalysis, a possible response to Stephen Greenblatt, who writes that "in the company of literary criticism and history, psychoanalysis can redeem its belatedness only when it historicizes its own procedures."

The exposition of the relationship between the eye and the gaze in Lacan's 11th seminar depends upon aesthetic and scientific events easily locatable in history. Lacan refers specifically to the visual structure associated with the technique of artificial perspective in painting, first codified theoretically by Leon Battista Alberti in 1429-1430 in his treatise *Della Pittura*, as well as to the emergence of the subject of modern science, the cogito, elaborated in Descartes' *Discourse on Method* (1637). What draws Descartes and Alberti together in Lacan's seminar is their shared reliance on the concept of the punctiform subject, the subject imagined as located at a singular point in space whose relationship to the extended domain of the object world is primarily mediated by the visual sense. Descartes' cognitive revolution required an already established fiction of a centered subject. In this paper, I am interested in the rupture heralded by the earliest appearances of the punctiform subject in the later Middle Ages, roughly the 13th-15th centuries. How was the medieval subject imagined in the visual field in the absence of perspective, what I have begun to conceive of as a sort of prosthesis that forced the subject to occupy a centralized position. Where and what is the subject without such a fiction? Referring to Seminar 11, does the concept of the gaze have any theoretical consistency in the absence of the technique and concept of perspective?

#### References

- Jean-Claude Milner, "Lacan and the Ideal of Science"  
Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis* (Seminar Eleven)  
Jacques Lacan, *The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis* (Seminar 2)

Rene Descartes, *Discourse on Method*  
Leon Battista Alberti, *On Painting*  
Fifteenth-century texts: *Les Cent Nouvelles Nouvelles* (anonymous); *Le livre du Cœur d'Amour espris* (Rene d'Anjou); *Journal d'un Bourgeois de Paris* (anonymous)

### Archaeology, Nationalism and Ethnicity

Stephanie Koerner (University of Manchester)

Let us not begin at the beginning or even the archive.... But rather at the word "archive"---and with the archive of so familiar a word. Archae, we recall, names at once a commencement and the commandment. This name apparently co-ordinates two principles in one: the principle according to nature or history, *there* where things commence---physical, historical, or ontological principle---but also the principle according to the law, *there* where men and gods command, *there* where authority, social order are exercised. In this place from which order is given---nomological principle.... *There*, we said, and *in this* place. How are we to think of *there*? And this *taking place* or this *having* a place of the archae?.... We have *there* two orders of order: sequential and jussive. From this point on, a series of cleavages will incessantly divide every atom of our lexicon (Derrida 1995 *Archive Fever*, pp. 1-2).

It is difficult to find in the history of archaeology terms which have been either as problematical or used more frequently than 'ethnicity'. In their introduction to a collection of studies entitled *Nationalism, Politics and the Practice of Archaeology* (Kohl and Fawcett eds., 1995:3) the editors note that it might be argued that "there is an almost unavoidable or natural relationship between archaeology and nationalism....and that this relationship is not necessarily corrupt or intrinsically suspect." But Kohl and Fawcett (1995:3-4) then go on to say that blatant manipulation of archaeological materials has long been particular acute in areas of the world experiencing 'ethnic wars'. Within these contexts, the importance of the roles played by highly problematical notions of 'ethnic identity' in unfortunate relationships between political ideology and predominant paradigms for archaeological research is difficult to overstate. There are all too many examples of research programs which treat specific artifact 'types' as evidence for the origins and histories of particular 'ethnic' groups in service of political ideologies making claims about 'ethnic' superiority and inferiority.

Archaeology has been involved in the creation of new political ideals at least since its beginnings in the late medieval and Renaissance revolution in historical reasoning (Funkenstein 1986; and, for example, Valla [1540] 1962). Especially the ideals associated with emergent city- and nation-states drew upon an extremely long history of traditions for defining a 'nation' as a 'people'. In these traditions, a nation was defined as a population unified by common ancestry, language, laws and/or customs, as by a shared place of origins ('homeland') and historical trajectory. Greeks, Romans, Hebrews, Chaldeans figured very centrally among examples (see, for instance, Vico, *The New Science of the Common Nature of the Nations*, [1733] 1962). Many of the terms employed in these traditions are difficult for present day readers to understand, given the extent to which perspectives on human nature, society, history and knowledge have been influenced by treatments of these matters since the Enlightenment and Romantic movements (cf. Toulmin 1990). But quite a few terms rooted in ancient traditions were opened to new interpretations in the course of these movements (cf. Collingwood 1946). New interpretations of notions of a 'nation', a 'people' and shared 'ethnic' identity figured importantly in the ways in which archaeology became associated with nationalist political movements during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Trigger (1995) and others emphasize that it is a mistake to restrict considerations of historical relations between nationalism and archaeology to research

programs structured around notions of 'ethnic identity' rooted in Romantic political philosophy. There are many examples of relationships between colonialist policy and archaeological projects motivated by ideological interpretations of Darwin, which made claims about the supposed cultural (and, oftentimes also about the racial) superiority of Europeans.

The 1980s saw remarkably increased awareness of the need to critically examine historical relationships between nationalism and archaeology. A variety of factors contributed to this development. Very important is the growing concern with archaeology's ethical responsibilities to challenge manipulation of archaeology materials in service of political ideologies seeking to legitimate claims to authority on the basis of distorted pictures of the past. Thus, attention is being drawn not only to academic implications, but also to the many cases in which misuse of archaeology has accompanied violent acts of inhumanity (cf. Gaitta 1998).

Notably, these developments have not led to a general critique of using the notion of ethnicity as conceptual tool in archaeology (as well as in several other human sciences [cf. Geertz 2000]). To the contrary, the last few decades have seen the notion become increasingly important to the ways in which some researchers characterize the diverse dynamic nature of 'cultural identities'. This, not only in studies of the modern world, but also of even the most ancient human past (for instance, Shennan ed. 1989). Trigger (1995), for example, in his contribution to the volume mentioned above, finds many potentially positive features in the history of relationships between nationalism and archaeology mediated by notions of 'ethnicity' including aspects of late nineteenth and early twentieth century culture-historical paradigms. Trigger (1995:269) says "[n]ationalism had a positive effect on archaeology inasmuch as it encouraged archaeologists to trace spatial variations in the archaeological record more systematically than they had done previously. Such variations had generally been ignored by unilinear evolutionists." He emphasizes the need to take into account the diversity of forms relations between nationalism and archaeology have taken, noting that "nationalism, by promoting groups identity has played many different roles during the last 250 years."

In these lights, it should be no surprise that the term 'ethnicity' has by now acquired an extraordinary multi-valence. The meeting of the European Society for the History of Human Sciences offers an especially appropriate context for a contribution relating to the issues outlined above. Specifically I will critically and constructively examine (a) several key issues raised by historical relationships between nationalism and archaeology; and (b) the main implications of the remarkable variability among interpretations being given to the notions, 'ethnicity' and 'cultural identity' today.

#### Bibliography

Anderson, B. 1983. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*. Verso, London.

Collinwood, R.G. 1949. *The Idea of History*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Funkenstein, A. 1986. *Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century*. Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Gaitta, R. 2000. *A Common Humanity. Thinking about Love and Truth and Justice*. Routledge, London.

Geertz, C., 2000. *Available Light. Anthropological Reflections on Philosophical Topics*. Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Lowenthal, D. 1985. *The Past as a Foreign Country*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Kohl, P.L. and Fawcett, C. 1995. *Archaeology in the Service of the State: Theoretical Considerations*, in eds., P.L. Kohl and C. Fawcett, *Nationalism, Politics and the Practice of Archaeology*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 3-18.

Shennan, S. (ed.) 1989. *Archaeological Approaches to Cultural Identity*. Routledge, London.

Trigger, B. 1995. *Romanticism, Nationalism, and Archaeology*, in eds., P.L. Kohl and C. Fawcett, *Nationalism, Politics and the Practice of Archaeology*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 263-279.

Toulmin, S. *Cosmopolis. The Hidden Agenda of Modernity*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Vico, G. [1744] 1984 *The New Science of the Common Nature of the Nations*, tr. T.G. Bergin and M.H. Fisch, Cornell University Press, London.

Zvelebil, M. 1996. *Farmers are Our Ancestors*, in eds., P. Graves-Brown, S. Jones, and C. Gamble, *Cultural Identity and Archaeology*, Routledge, London.