M.Rodrigo

A.A. Herzen

21st ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY FOR THE HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES



I. Hermann

H. Eysenck

F.Sander

A.A. Herzen

Plotinus

Kornis

A. Adler

EUROPEAN SOCIETY HISTORY HUMAN SCIENCES

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27 - 31 August,
Barcelona, Spain

C.S. Peirce

M.Foucault

P. Janet

Dienis

ABSTRACTS

O. Brachfeld

S. Freud

Singer

Schütz

MINISTERIO DE CIENCIA Y TECNOLOGIA
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J. Anderson

L. Binswanger

ABSTRACTS

PAPERS AND POSTERS PRESENTED AT THE 21st ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE

EUROPEAN SOCIETY FOR THE HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES

August, 27th to 31st, 2002

SALA DE GRAUS
FACULTAT DE MEDICINA
UNIVERSITAT AUTONOMA DE BARCELONA

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PROGRAMME

TUESDAY 27 AUGUST

9.00 - 10.00 **Registration and Poster Session** [1]

9.45 - 10.15 **Opening Session**

10.15 - 12.15 **Paper Session (1) 'History of psychological concepts and ideas' (I)**
Chair: Enrique Lafuente
- 10.15 - Carpintero, H. *'J.B.Watson's "Behaviorism", textual analysis of its first two editions. A note on the evolution of early behaviorism'*
- 10.45 - Dumont, K. *'The 22nd International Congress of Psychology- a scientific and political milestone of the psychology in the GDR'*
- 11.15 - Ruiz, G.; Sánchez, N. & de la Casa, L.G. *'Pavlov's influence on american psychology: completing the puzzle'*
- 11.45 - van Hoorn, W. *'Goethe's simile of psychical chemistry as a romantic background of Wundt's experimental psychology'*

12.15 - 12.30 **Short Coffee break**

12.30 - 13.30 **Invited Lecture**: M. Siguán *'Half a Century Revisisted'*

13.30 - 15.00 **Lunch**

15.00 - 16.30 **Paper Session (2) 'History of Applied Psychology'**
Chair: Annette Mülberger
- 15.00 - Petri, S. *'Choosing officers and spies. Psychological selection programs in Word War II German and British armies, and the US intelligence'*
- 15.30 - Louw, J. & Green, E. *' The last custom-built mental asylum in the world?'*
- 16.00 - Sáiz, M; Sáiz, D.; & Pastrana, G. *' The beginnings of Applied Psychology at the Aeronautics: the first works'*

16.30 - 17.00 **Coffee break**

17.00 - 19.00 **Paper Session (3) 'History of psychological concepts and ideas' (II)**
Chair: Karl Teigen
- 17.00 - Nicolova, N. *'The impact of the ideas of William James on Bulgarian Psychology, Pedagogy and Philosophy'*
- 17.30 - Stock, A. *'About the history of ideo-motor action'*
- 18.00 - Song, E. *' Plotinus' concept of soul'*
- 18.30 - Herbst, A. *'Feeling, Emotion and Mood by Theodor Ziehen'*

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[1] The poster abstracts can be found on page 77, listed alfabetically by the surname of the first author.

WEDNESDAY 28 AUGUST

9.00 - 11.00 **Paper Session (4) 'Writing Cases, Making Experts: The Negotiation of Psychiatric and Psychanalytic Knowledge'**
(panel organised by Andreas Mayer)
Chair: Bob Rieber

9.00 - Reed, M. *'The Emplotment of identity: historical inversions'*
9.30 - Lafferton, E. *'Contructing cases. Psychiatric knowledge and Practices in the Late-Nineteenth-Century Hungary'*
10.00 - Mayer, A. *'Drifting through the space of speech. Psychanalysis, Association Experiments and speaking in Tongues'*
10.30 - Marinelli, L. *'The reading patient: Freud's case Emma Eckstein'*

11.00 - 11.30 **Coffee break**

11.30 - 13.00 **Paper Session (5) 'History of Psychoanalysis'**
Chair: Andreas Mayer

11.30 - Lee, D. *'Logic & Narrative: An Historiographic perspective on Sigmund Freud and Sherlock Holmes'*
12.00 - Oberst, U. & Ibarz, V. *'From Alfred Adler's individual psychology to Olivér Brachfeld's Psychosynthesis'*
12.30 - Heim, G. *'Pierre Janet. A case for the historiography of behavior therapy?'*

13.00 - 14.00 **Lunch**

14.00 - 15.30 **Business Meeting**

15.30 - 17.00 **Paper Session (6) : 'Subjecting the Psyche: Experimental Design and Case Narratology in France (1870-1910)'**
(panel organised by Anne Rose)
Chair: Daniela Barberis

15.30 - Rose, A. *'Hysteria of Ideas? Childhood Neuroses and Suggestive Therapy in an Era of Neo-Mesmerism'*
16.00 - Reed, M. *'Making the Case: Patients, Stories and Modern Selfhood'*
16.30 - Lachapelle, S. *'Between Psychical Research and Psychology in France: Eusapia and the 1905-1907 Experiments at the Institut Général Psychologique'*

17.00 - 17.30 **Coffee break**

17.30 - 18.30 **Invited Lecture**: M. Kusch *'Testimony Revisited'*

18.30 - 20.00 **Paper Session (7) 'History of Psychological Disorders and Capacities: Memory & Dyslexia'**
Chair: Graham Richards

18.30 - Collins, A. *'Memory disorders in World War II and the emergence of British neuropsychology'*
19.00 - Holzapfel, W. *'The relationship between theoretical psychology on memory and art of memory: a historical analysis'*
19.30 - Stock, C. *'Aspects of the research on dyslexia in Germany since the 19th century'*

THURSDAY 29 AUGUST

9.00 - 11.00 **Paper Session (8) 'Historicizing instincts' (I)**
(panel organised by Stephanie Koerner & Uljana Feest)
Chair: James Good

9.00 - Koerner, S. *'Introductory Comments'*
9.10 - Franco, A. '*Definitions and Mechanizations of 'Instincts' by 17th e century Writers, Theologians, Philosophers, and Physicians in France and England'*
9.30 - Neary, F. '*Automatism and the Meanings of Consciousness in the late 19th century*'
9.50 - Discussion of Franco and Neary
10.05 - Osbeck, L. *'Instinct, 'Primitive' Cognition, and theTransformation of Intuition'*
10.25 - Richards, G. *'Ideological Meanings and Uses of the Instinct Concept'*
10.45 –Discussion of Osbeck and Richards

11.00 - 11.30 **Coffee break**

11.30 - 13.30- **Paper Session (9) 'Historicizing instincts' (II)**
(panel organised by Stephanie Koerner & Uljana Feest)
Chair: James Good

11.30 - Jovanovic, G. *'Instincts as Interactive Structures: Freuds' Psychoanalysis in a Historical and Metatheoretical Perspective'*
11.50 - Vajda, Z. *'The Ancient Instincts of the Man: Instinct Theory of Imre Hermann'*
12.10 –Discussion of Jovanovic and Vajda
12.20 - Hampton, S. *'Darwinian Psychology old and new'*
12.40 - Feest, U. *'Giving up Instincts in Psychology – or not?'*
13.00 –Discussion of Hampton and Feest
13.10 –Good, J. *'General Commentary'*

13.30 - 15.00 **Lunch**

15.00 - 16.30 **Paper Session (10) 'Traditions and Modernism: Psychology and Catholicism in different national contexts'**
(panel organised by Pléh, Lafuente & Kugelmann)
Chair: Helio Carpintero

15.00 - Pléh, C. *'Catholics in Hungarian Psychology: Dienes, Kornis, Schütz'*
15.30 - Lafuente, E.; Loredo, J.C. & Ferrándiz, A. *'Catholicism and Psychology in Post-War Spain. The contribution of Manuel Ubeda Purkiss (1913-1999)'*
16.00 - Kugelmann, R. *'Conflicts and Assimilation: Being a Catholic and a Psychologist in the United States'*

16.30 - 17.00 **Coffee break**

17.00 - 19.00 **Paper Session (11) 'Scientists' Biographies in the History of the Human Sciences'**
Chair: Roger Smith

17.00 - Buchanan, R. *'Approaches to scientific biography. The case of Hans Eysenck'*
17.30 - Sirotkina, I. *'Herzen the father and Herzen the son: a discussion of science and freedom'*
18.00 - Herrero, F. *'Mercedes Rodrigo (1891-1982). A woman for the history of psychology'*
18.30 - Fitzek, H. 'Friedrich Sander – 'black sheep' or 'scapegoat' of German psychology'

FRIDAY 30 AUGUST

9.00 -10.30 **Paper Session (12) 'Intersections of Phenomenology and Psychology'**
(panel organised by Lanzoni, Kugelmann & Stam)
Chair: Irmingard Staeuble

9.00 - Lanzoni, S. *'A Psychology of Empathy in the Clinic: L. Binswanger's early phenomenological psychopathology'*

9.30 - Kugelmann, R. *'Importing Phenomenology into North American Psychology and Psychotherapy'*

10.00 - Stam, H.; van Hezewijk, R. & Panhuysen, G. *'The Post War II Disappearance of Phenomenological Psychology in the Netherlands'*

10.30 - 11.00 **Coffee break**

11.00 - 13.30 **Paper Session (13) 'Philosophy and Methods of Psychology'**
Chair: Hans van Rappard

11.00 - Bell, P. *' Psychology or Simiotics; persons or subjects'*

11.30 - van Hezewijk, R.; Stam, H. & Panhuysen, G. *'Phenomenology and phenomenological methods'*

11.45 - Panhuysen, G.; van Hezewijk, R. & Stam, H. *'The heuristic potential of the phenomenological approach to psychology'*

12.00 - Petocz, A. *'Realism and the meaning in scientific psychology'*

12.30 - Michell, J. *'The Prehistory of Psychology's Quantitative imperative'*

13.00 - Vilardaga, R. *' Constructivist and constructionist psychotherapies'*

13.30 - 15.00 **Lunch**

15.00 - 17.00 - **Paper Session (14) History of the Human Sciences: General Aspects**
Chair: Zsuzsanna Vajda

15.00 - Hibberd, F. *'J. Anderon's theory of generality and particularity: a vital contribution to the development of the human sciences or the rhetoric of a naive realist?'*

15.30 - Lange, L. *'Why are some scientific publications not recognized as important until rather late? comparison of 'classics' and 'sleepers' in psychological journals"*

16.00 - Smith, R. *'Early Modern Psychology and the Historiography of the Human Sciences'*

16.30 - Brauns H.-P. *'On the Question of Method of Psychology in the 18th century'*

17.00 - 17.30 - **Coffee break**

17.30 - 19.30 - **Round Table: Discussion of *Sociological Knowledge***

17.30 – Mülberger, A. *'Introductory Comment'*

17.40 - Invited lecture: M. Kusch *The controversy over thought psychology in Germany (1900-20): A Sociological Study'*

18.30 - Discussion (M. Domènech, F. Gabucio, & A. Mülberger)

21.00 - **Conference Dinner**

SATURDAY 31 AUGUST

9.00 - 11.00 - **Paper Session (15): History of the Human Sciences: the History of Aesthetics, Archeaology, Criminology & Sociology**
Chair: Stephanie Koerner

9.00 - Lubek, I. *'Respecting historical embeddedness, resisting cultural inertia, and empowering gendered movement: current challenges for HIV/AIDS health educators in Cambodia'*

9.30 - Allesch, C. *'Aesthetics: Empirical or normative? – Another case study of boundary work'*

10.00 - Barberis, D. *'The organic metaphor in sociology'*

10.30 - Jimenez, B. & Castro, J. *'Some keys for the psycho-sociological construction of Spanish American Nations: the case of Argentinian Criminology in Spanish Restoration'*

11.00 - Herran, N. *'Radiocarbon dating and the Archaelogists: Building Interdisciplinarity in the History of Human Sciences'*

11.30 - 12.00 **Coffee break**

12.00 - 13.30 **Paper Session (16): Linguistics and Rhetorics in the History of the Human Sciences**
Chair: Fernando Gabucio

12.00 - Costea, O. *'Semiotic Approaches of the Intercultural Learning'*

12.30 - Gómez-Zúñiga, B. *'Writing stories and the construction of history: a study of stories by students.'*

13.00 - Rasskin, I. & Blanco, F. *'Consciousness beyond the psychological realm: socio-historical approach to Singer's The magician of Lublin'*

13.30 - 14.00 - **Closure Speech**: J. Good *'Changing Conceptions of the Relations between Body, Mind and World: Some Implications for the History of the Human Sciences'*

14.00 -15.30 **Lunch**

16.00 - **Guided Tour**

PAPER ABSTRACTS

SESSION 1
"HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPTS AND IDEAS (I)"

J.B.WATSON'S "BEHAVIORISM" TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF ITS FIRST TWO EDITIONS. A NOTE ON THE EVOLUTION OF EARLY BEHAVIORISM

Helio Carpintero
Universidad Complutense de Madrid (Spain)

Textual analysis of significant works has proved to be an essential instrument for the history of ideas. Classical philology has been build largely employing such methodological approach.In the history of modern psychology, this sort of studies are infrequent, and journal articles have received most of the interest of historians when trying to present the development of a theory.

The founder of behaviorism, JB.Watson, published a general presentation of his ideas in a highly cited book, "Behaviorism" , that was translated to many foreign languages. "Behaviorism" has a first edition, dated 1924-1925, and a second one, presented as a "revised edition", in 1930. Although large parts of it were mantained unchanged from the first to the second edition, some modifications were introduced in the revised version. These changes appear as non-insignificant, and they seem to give some clues about the evolution of Watson' s ideas and the circumstances in which he lived by that time.

The paper tries to explain these changes , and offers some hypotheses that might explain them.

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Cohen, D. (1979) *J.B. Watson.The founder of behaviorism*, London, Routledge.
Perez Garrido, A. (1997) *John Broadus Watson ¿El primer psicologo de una nueva era?* , Valencia, Promolibro.
Watson, JB (1930) *Behaviorism*, rev. ed. , New York, Norton.
Watson, JB (1925) *Behaviorism*, New York , Norton.

THE 22ND INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PSYCHOLOGY- A SCIENTIFIC AND POLITICAL MILESTONE OF THE PSYCHOLOGY IN THE GDR

Kitty Dumont
Friedrich Schiller Universität Jena (Germany)

In 1980 the 22nd International Congress of Psychology took place in Leipzig (former GDR). It was the second time in the history of the international union of psychological sciences (IUPSYS) that one of these international meetings was organized by a socialist country. Fourteen years before, in 1966, the congress was hosted by the soviet union.

Founded in 1961, the society of psychology of the GDR indicated early on that it wanted to become a member of the IUPSYS. Getting this membership was motivated by two desires: firstly, to belong to the international scientific community by having access to the exchange process of international scientific information and results; secondly, to support the recognition of the GDR as a sovereign nation. The process from application to membership was characterized by difficulties which

were mainly based on the political conflicts existing between the two german states at this time (hallstein doktrin). Only in 1966, the "society of psychology of the GDR" was accepted to be a member of the IUPSYS.

In 1972, the IUPSYS decided to hold the xxii. Congress in leipzig in order to recognize and celebrate 100 years that wundt founded the first psychological institute. Being chosen to host this international congress was interpreted as an honour by the society of psychology of the GDR. However, the society was immediately confronted by one main problem: at the time when the IUPSYS made its decision, the world-wide-known wundt institute did not exist anymore as an institute of psychology.

In the paper it will be shown that after 1972 almost all decisions regarding the development of psychology in the GDR were effected by this forthcoming event. The paper will also focus on the political conditions under which this international congress took place. After the soviet union occupied afghanistan in 1979, the cold war between the western world and the socialist countries reached one of its culminations. As a result of this critical political situation, the olympic games which took place in moscow in 1980 were boycotted by several western countries. However, the international congress of psychology in leipzig seemed to be untouched by this political crisis, because the congress was neither boycotted nor was it interrupted by any other reaction. Does it mean that science was immune against world political crises at this time? This paper seeks to demonstrate which "negotiations behind the curtains" were necessary in order for this congress to have occurred.

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Dumont. K. (1999). *Die sozialpsychologie der ddr.* Eine wissenschaftshistorische untersuchung. Berlin, frankfurt/ main: peter lang verlag.

Dumont, K. & Louw, J. (2001). Organising psychologists: the international union of psychological science and psychological associations in south africa and the german democratic republic. *History of psychology. 4 (4), 388-404.*

Archive: Universitaetsarchiv der Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin. Source: Documents of the GfP in the GDR.

PAVLOV'S INFLUENCE ON AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY: COMPLETING THE PUZZLE

Gabriel Ruiz, Natividad Sánchez & Luis Gonzalo De la Casa
Universidad de Sevilla (Spain)

Even though Pavlov's impact on American Psychology is widely recognized, it seems to us that the historical interpretation of this influence has been reduced to his reception by behaviorism. This point of view, to which we will refer to as the 'received view', could be characterized by the following arguments. First, conditional reflexes became important for American Psychology because they were an objective method alternative to the non-scientific introspection, as was already noticed from the first paper published in the States popularizing this technique (Yerkes and Morgulis, 1909). Second, this influence became more explicit mainly, although not only, through two works published in different moments: John B. Watson's APA presidential address (Watson, 1916), and the first paper on learning theory written by Clark L. Hull in 1929, shortly after the appearance of the English translation of Pavlov's books.

However, Pavlov had a limited influence on Watson and Hull, at best. Watson took from Pavlov the language of conditioned reflexes, but not his methods or theories. Hull's paper had the important effect of bringing the functional implications of the conditional reflex to the attention of American psychologists, avoiding, at the same time, to embrace the physiological aspects of Pavlov's theorizing: "Adopt the method, avoid the theory" could be the motto of this attitude.

As we have seen, this 'received view' openly relate the influence of Pavlov in American Psychology with the development of behaviorism. Nevertheless, although we assume that this interpretation is correct in essence, we think is far from being complete. Therefore, our contribution to this congress will be to show the existence of new historical lines of influence of Pavlov in American Psychology. Those lines appeared in different times and were relatively independent of behaviorism.

Florence Mateer (1887-1961) could be an example of one of these lines. Mateer was a student of William H. Burnham (1855-1941), one of the founders of the mental hygiene movement in the early 1900s, and Professor of Pedagogy and School Hygiene at Clark University. As soon as in 1917, Burnham wrote an article in which the application of conditional reflexes to the mental hygiene was reviewed. Burnham also supervised Mateer's doctoral dissertation presented at Clark University in 1916. This dissertation was later published as a book entitled *"Child Behavior: A critical and Experimental Study of Young Children by the Method of Conditioned Reflexes"* (Mateer, 1918). Using both normal and feeble-minded children as subjects in her studies, she tried to replicate Nikolay I. Krasnogorski's experiments published in 1907 and 1908. However, Mateer's dissertation was more than a simple replication. She not only improved the experimental technique used in Krasnogorski studies, but also took into account new variables –like age, sex and intelligence- and correlated them with the results of conditioning.

Just as this first line of influence was related with child behavior and mental hygiene, the second was related with animal research. This second line of influence emerged years later when Howard S. Liddell (1859-1962) established the first American conditioned reflexes laboratory in 1924: the *Behavior Farm Laboratory* at Ithaca, N. Y. In 1929, Adolf Meyer asked W. Horsley Gantt (1892-1980), who was working with Pavlov in Leningrad, to join Phipps Psychiatric Clinic at Johns Hopkins University with the purpose of establishing a Pavlovian Laboratory. During the 40s and the 50s, in a moment of deep changes in American Psychology, both Liddell and Gantt made outstanding contributions (Gantt, 1944; Liddell, 1956), and were responsible for the foundation of a society (*The Pavlovian Society*) and a journal (*Conditional Reflex*) that became the greatest exponent of pavlovian theories at that time.

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Hull, C. L. (1929). A Functional Interpretation of the Conditioned Reflex. *Psychological Review, 36,* 498-511.
Liddell, H. S. (1956b). *Emotional Hazards in Animals and Man.* Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas.
Mateer, F. (1918*). Child Behavior: A critical and Experimental Study of Young Children by the Method of Conditioned Reflexes.* Boston: Badger.
Watson, J. B. (1916). The Place of the Conditioned Reflex in Psychology. *Psychological Review, 23,* 89-116.
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GOETHE'S SIMILE OF PSYCHICAL CHEMISTRY AS A ROMANTIC BACKGROUND OF WUNDT'S EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY

Willem van Hoorn
Universiteit van Amsterdam (The Netherlands)

There is a remarkable similarity between Goethe's literary device of elective affinities in human relations and Wundt's use of the psychical *elements* of simple feelings and pure sensations in his experimental psychology.

Eckardt et al. (2001) have written about 'Empirical psychology around 1800'. In my opinion there was no such psychology because at the end of the 18th century there is no *object* of an empirical psychology in existence (Van Hoorn,2003). The subject/object of empirical and experimental psychology only emerges during the period of Romanticism (1800-1830) and will be called: the psychical 'inner life' of the individual; in short: *das Psychische.* By then, the well-known judeo-christian 'soul' partly transforms into 'Psyche' and is experienced as conscious and *unconscious* processes. It is remarkable that the first History of Psychology, Friedrich August Carus' *Geschichte der Psychologie,* is published in 1808. This is precisely at the time when the 'soul' transforms into 'psyche'.

Kant's (1796) notorious rejection of an empirical psychology finely indicates that he does not have the slightest notion of the changing human relationships that will bring with them the potential for the emergence of the *modern* subject of psychology. Kant states that time and space cannot be related to the phenomena of the 'inner sense'. However, it is precisely time and space that will characterize the newly arisen subject/object of psychology after1800. It is the *inner space* of conscious and unconscious psychical phenomena that will become the object for the new psychology: *individual* feelings, emotions and sentiments. Thus, without Romanticism there would have been no Experimental Psychology. And here lies the direct relationship between Goethe's and Wundt's anthropologies.

In 1808 Goethe starts to write his novel *Elective Affinities* (Wahlverwandschaften).The four main characters of this novel are subjected to a social psychological experiment in which *psychical chemistry* plays its fateful role. By means of irresistible attraction and rejection/separation the happily married couple of Eduard and Charlotte splits up. Eduard falls fatally in love with his wife's niece and his wife falls in the arms of his best friend. Only when the existing affinities call forth separations, says Eduard, then these are truly interesting and stimulating. Goethe plays with a simile. In contemporary chemistry we find the polarity of acid and base. Nevertheless these are attracted to each other and together they build new connections. Transposed to the human realm: opposed psychical elements build new psychical Gestalten. Goethe's contemporary Schelling divided the whole of nature into polarities: day and night, force and matter, gravity and light and first of all: masculinity and femininity. Here in German romantic *Naturphilosophie* lies the germ of the concept of gender. Psychical elements build new, higher valued Wholes, says Goethe. This idea we will meet again in its 'scientific' form in Wundt's experimental psychology.

Wundt's methodic idea of creative synthesis forms the kernel of his whole system (Van Hoorn & Verhave, 1980). Psychic Gestaltungen are always the result of a mixture of simple feelings and pure sensations. From a number of psychical elements a higher psychical entity arises, which is 'more than the mere sum of its elements. This is a new product. This fundamental characteristic of psychical processes we would like to call the Principle of creative results' (paraphrased from Wundt, 1911, p. 755).

In overview then we have 3 types of Romantic chemistry. In Goethe there is a social psychological approach to human behavior and experience in which the simile of psychical chemistry plays a prominent role. In natural philosophy we have a form of chemistry that is based on the fusion of antagonistic elements (Ellenberger, 1970). In Wundt we have the 'scientific' form of Romantic psychical chemistry, in his case mixed with an idiosyncratic form of pure Idealism. All higher forms of human psychical processes are always co-determined by *values* that are not contained in the constituting elements.

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Van Hoorn 'Goethe's Gleichnisrede der psychischen Chemie als romantischer Hintergrund von Wundts experimentellen Psychologie'*Geschichte der Psychologie.* Festschrift for G. Eckardt. Forthcoming 2003.
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INVITED LECTURE

HALF A CENTURY REVISITED

Miquel Siguán
Universidad de Barcelona (Spain)

Drawing on the experience gained in more than half a century dedicated to psychology, the author reviews the development of this science, laying special emphasis on the demise of behaviorism and the rise of cognitivism as the predominant theory. He stresses the fact that this substitution has not provided a satisfactory answer to the problem of the intentional character of human behavior or the possibility of accounting for it at the level of the individual and at the level of society. He also describes the transfer of the centers of production of psychological research from Europe to the United States during this period and the unique role that English has played not only in the transmission of information but in research itself, highlighting both the advantages and the drawbacks of this development. Finally, the author discusses the present interest in cultural psychology and the possible impetus that this new interest may give to psychological research conducted in Spanish speaking countries.

SESSION 2
"HISTORY OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY"

CHOOSING OFFICERS AND SPIES. PSYCHOLOGICAL SELECTION PROGRAMS IN WORLD WAR II GERMAN AND BRITISH ARMIES, AND THE US INTELLIGENCE

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What defines a good leader? How can we decide whether a young man (or young woman) has the necessary talent? And how can we choose the best of the various talents an individual might possess? In no other area have these questions been more amply discussed than in the military. However, the idea of implementing scientific experts for selecting the right leaders is a recent phenomenon. It was during the 1920s that psychologists in Germany made some of the first notable attempts to develop assessment instruments for officer selection. Soon it became the centerpiece of German military psychology. Only a few years later this problem was on the agenda of almost every army at war. In 1941, British army officials felt increasingly displeased about the high proportion of officer candidates who failed the training units. General Sir Andrew Thorne, heading the Scottish Command, supported attempts to develop a new selection scheme based on psychiatric interviews, intelligence tests and German style officer selection testing. Thorne had witnessed the elaborate procedures developed by German military psychologists while a military attaché in Berlin from 1932 to 1935. He must have found them remarkable enough to encourage a British adaptation. The German procedure centered on character analysis, with good character deemed as the fundamental feature of a good officer. Most of these tests were considered to be inadequate by the British. However, some basic principles were adopted, including the diagnosis of character via strain conditions testing, leaderless group discussion and a "living-in" assessment. As a kind of a parallel to that story, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) established a psychological-psychiatric assessment team in 1943 to improve their recruiting efforts, after OSS officials observed officer selection of the British War Officer Selection Board (WOSB) in London. The OSS team included officers, psychiatrists and psychologists. Heavily influenced by the charismatic Harvard psychologist Henry A. Murray, they quickly drafted a selection scheme. The analysis of personality qualities based on WOSB procedures and the German model was a major pillar of that scheme.

The connection between these three programs that spans countries and cultures is obvious for the techniques of assessment they used were astonishingly similar. Yet a closer look reveals that very different arguments were used to justify the scientific character of these similar techniques and their practical implications. In this paper I will describe the programs the Germans, British, and Americans constructed to provide a basis for a comparison of their different methodological rationales. By focussing on how each used the notion of 'objectivity' to define their science I suggest some answers to the following questions. How did the psychologists establish their claims of precision and practical effect? What limits, caveats or provisos did they give? What kinds of strategies did they follow to convince their clients? The aim of this study is not to measure the validity of these techniques according to some contemporary standards; rather it is to examine how these standards were defined and applied at the time, along with the techniques that were constructed to meet them.

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THE LAST CUSTOM-BUILT MENTAL ASYLUM IN THE WORLD?

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The first buildings specifically designed to house the mentally ill were built in England in the early nineteenth century. The York Retreat, run by the Quaker, Tuke, in 1806 in England, was the model for the new, reformed attitude toward the mad and their accommodation. This moral management drew on the notion that the physical and social environment could help to alleviate or cure mental illness, and institutions such as the Retreat thus emphasised a family atmosphere, kindness and the benefits of work and exercise, in a country setting believed to be conducive to recovery of the patients' reason. "Moral institutions" employed an architecture that was designed around the principles of classification and separation, which were fundamental to its approach to treatment.

Asylum design went through three main stages, which were echoed across the western world, starting with small, reformist institutions, which aimed for a homely atmosphere. As the numbers of admissions rapidly expanded, asylums were designed to hold up to 1 000 patients, and the buildings became consequently more imposing and less home-like in structure. The corridor type asylum was in some cases designed to house as many as 2 000 patients in huge, cheerless wards. The late nineteenth century saw a proliferation of pavilion style asylums, which consisted of dispersed living blocks connected by a walkway, and separate buildings for administration and other functions.

As late as the 1950s, Stikland Hospital was built in Cape Town, South Africa. This paper examines the architecture of this mental hospital, for it is interesting for a number of reasons.

For one, it was built so late. An asylum built after the middle of the twentieth century is rare, if not unique, because the international trend of de-institutionalisation saw the widespread closure of mental hospitals from the 1940s. What had once been seen as a humanitarian response to the plight of the mad, was in the next century being denounced as the root of institutional neurosis, characterised by a dulling and slowing of the spirit and capacity of the individual.

Clearly, optimistic faith in the curative power of the asylum had been transformed into the belief that the mental hospital itself was disabling, and partly responsible for the condition of its inmates. Why then did South African authorities decide to design and build the hospital at exactly this time?

Secondly, Stikland Hospital was built in the dispersed, pavilion style that was the most common architectural style of asylum in Europe in the late nineteenth century. Exemplified by buildings such as Surrey Asylum, built in the 1860s, the style is characterised by detached blocks, usually arranged around an open space, such as playing fields, or airing courts. This design emerged as a simple and economical response to the need for accommodation for large numbers of pauper patients. Pavilion

asylums such as Caterham, Surrey, and Leavesden, near Watford, housed 1 500 patients and more. Similarly, Stikland had a capacity of about 1 400 permanent inmates.

The fact that the overall design of Stikland Hospital, though a modern, twentieth century hospital, is in many ways similar to that of the pavilion style asylum, suggests two things. Firstly, that the evolution of asylum architecture has lost its momentum in the twentieth century. And secondly, that the basic design elements related to the moral era of treatment, as well as the ideological concept of the building as treatment, have not been discarded.

Finally, if buildings are social and cultural products, with their forms reflecting the social context in which they arise, the similarity of this modern, South African mental hospital to the English asylums of the nineteenth century, raises interesting questions. For example, the fact that Stikland Hospital was a government hospital, built by the Nationalist government in the 1950s, under Apartheid laws, is reflected in the architecture (e.g. the racial segregation of the staff and patients. These contextual issues will be explored further in the paper.

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THE BEGINNINGS OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY AT THE AERONAUTIC: THE FIRST WORKS

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The approximation of Psychology to the aeronautic, with an special interest in selection of goods aviators was promoted for militaries circumstances of the World War I, even though in Germany, according to Gemelli, they were working for it before that date and the studies were interrupted for that event (Baumgartem, 1933).

Since the beginning of the war, United Kingdom, Italy and France congregated their specialists for evaluation of their pilots. In United Kingdom since 1914 an "Air Medical Investigation Committee" had working in this area. Since 1915 the research in France were systematised and Camus y Nepper (1916,1917) were who prepared examinations for pilots, rating motor reaction time and the action of stimulus on the nervous system. In the same way in Italy, Gemelli (1917, 1933) had organised at the beginning of war, psychologicals examinations of ability taking care the qualities necessaries for a war aviator (reaction, attention, observation and emotions). In Germany, since 1916, continuing again the

studies, William Stern was called for evaluated the aptitudes of air observers. Since that time, the German's works were focalised in the study of psychical factors which are necessaries for a good flight (Baumgarten, 1933). In this way one of the most important work would be those from Berany in 1918 and Kronfeld in 1919. The first one analysed each necessary psychological characteristics and the second one prepared an evaluation that consisted in an exam of ten minutes in order to know the global abilities of pilots (Erismann and Moers, 1926). On the other hand, since Americans were in conflict, they did tests in order to evaluate their own Army, and, naturally, theirs military pilots (Strong, 1918; Yerkes, 1918).

Further of this works that tried to found a general model for the selection of pilots, we also find, in this firsts period, some studies that attempted to discover some specifics qualities in the aviators, sometimes as the ones and sufficients. So were analysed their abilities (Miles, 1920), as well as their motor stability (Dockeray e Isaacs, 1921), their capacity of stimate the speed (Stratton, 1918), their orientation in flight (Gemelli, 1933b), their attention, their equilibrium (Brammer, 1925; Burt, 1918), their capacity of body perception and the tendency of giddiness or sickness (Gemelli, Tessier y Galli, 1920), their motor reactions in earth and in flight (Angell, 1919), their capacity of perceptive adjustment and discriminative at differents distances, speeds or intensity o light (Ferree y Rand, 1919, Cobb, 1919 y Feree, Rand y Buckley, 1920) etc. Other tried to discover those abilities analysing the statistics of air accidents (Anderson, 1918; Selz, 1919, referenced in Baumgarten, 1933 and Erismann and Moers, 1926) and some did tests or some instruments or some apparatus useful to measure or evaluated these points (Dunlap, 1926; Henmon, 1919; Stratton, McComas, Coover y Bagby, 1920), or making simulators of flight (Figueras, 1924, 1925).

A lot of authors studies the characteristics that should have the aviators and they also did some scales and tests for the selection, but there were less authors doing a complete profile ("professiography") which joined all the necessaries characteristics to fly. V.A.C. Henmon (1919) of Wisconsin University was one of the first to apply a battery of tests to evaluated differents characteristics of pilots, but we think, the most complete profile was presented by the Spanish A. Azoy (1933, 1934, 1935) who show us an examination of aptitude for aviation with three parts. In the first part he studies the familiar antecedents, personals and pathologic; in the second part, he did a complete anthropometric and medical examination evaluating some aspects as: respiratory, circulatory, digestive, urogenital, visual, nasopharyngeal, neurology systems, and, the third part there was a psychotecnic examination.

The aeronautic applied psychology continued during the first half of the XX century and had their most important moment during the World War II.

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SESSION 3
"HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPTS AND IDEAS (II)"

THE IMPACT FROM THE IDEAS OF WILLIAM JAMES ON BULGARIAN PSYCHOLOGY, PEDAGOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

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On the threshold of the twenty-first century, making an estimate of the achievements in pedagogic thought, we cannot but give full credit to the American thinker-psychologist and philosopher, William James. If we place James along the border of the present reality among the globalization of ideological systems, we can say that he goes above all that with his thought, characterized by the contours of its individuality. Unfortunately, James has been a forgotten topic in the historical analysis of world psychology during the last decades. Poor knowledge of his psychology and works can be explained with the time between two wars, and that he is not consistent with the political and ideological currents in Bulgaria. As an open advocate of religion, William James cannot be accepted well.

The presented paper consists of four subtopics:

- The ideas of William James in Bulgarian pedagogical psychology and educational theories.
- The philosophical discussions in Bulgaria in the 1920s and 1930s on the views of William James of pragmatism and religion.
- The ideas of William James in the critiques of Asen Kiselinchev and Ivan Saruliev.
- Bugarian periodic press in defense and critism of the ideas of William James.

The ideas of pragmatism appear in the Bulgarian press at the beginning of the twentieth century. For the first time in 1902, the book of William James "Talks To Teachers On Psychology: and to Students on some of life's ideals" is published into the Bulgarian language, translated from Russian by Iliya Kraev, where his new ideas about the needs of pedagogy and psychology are mentioned. However, as far as we know, William James' ideas are analyzed in Bulgarian in 1910, in an article written in connection with his death (□□□□□, 1910).

James' ideas obtain fuller and broader acknowledgement after the First World War, mostly with his pedagogical views. In this post-war period, the question of renewing Bulgarian popular education and the introduction of training in working is put forth. In the process of searching for new ideas of renewing the Bulgarian school, the new ideas of pragmatism, and, more specifically, those of James, receive favourable attitude. The pedagogical ideas of pragmatism become an object of a heated discussion in the Bulgarian pedagogical magazines: "School Review", "Free Upbringing," and "Science and Education."

The ideas of pragmatism find a strong reflection in the pedagogical ideas of Prof. Dimitar Katsarov , Prof. Gencho Pirgyov and Tsvyatko Petkov. The psychological views of James have not received publicity today, a testimony for which is the lack of a translation of the monumental psychological work " The Principles of Psychology."

The philosophical views of James are not well presented and examined as well, neither do they have a significant influence on Bulgarian philosophical thought. It must be underlined that we set as a goal to present only those pragmatic ideas, with their more prominent representatives in Bulgaria, that have exerted a more direct and stronger impact on our philosophical thought.

Ivan Saruiliev is among the most prominent representatives of pragmatism in Bulgaria, though he also tries to make some critical notes on James' thoughts. To Bulgarian psychologists and philosophers Asen Kiselinchev and Ivan Saruiliev, James' psychology is completely spiritualistic, idealistic, and this helps pragmatism in bringing us to the necessity of God and religious faith.

The ideas of the pragmatism and psychology of William James are reflected, though concisely, in articles and scientific magazines and notes in Bulgarian periodic press at the beginning of the twentieth century. Among the magazines which turn into a pro-cons tribune, are "Philosophical Review," "School Review," as well as the yearbook of Sofia University, which publishes "Etudes on Pragmatism" and "Pragmatism" by Ivan Saruiliev.

It becomes clear from this exposition that the philosophical, psychological, and pedagogic views of pragmatism have a limited influence on Bulgarian scientific thought. The fact, which prevents this, cannot be omitted – that James is only familiar as a pedagogue and philosopher in Bulgaria. His presence in our literature comes down to several tautological and meaningless qualifications - that he belongs to pragmatism and idealism. It will be justified to say that William James is a scholar – a thinker who persistently directs and develops psychology in the direction of the only reality and its only subject – man.

Historical-psychological explorations in our country in the past are an escape from pragmatism, whose representative is William James, and at disclosing the philosophical problems, they to the superiority of a common ideology. In this context, expressing the political situation at that time, the impossibility of presenting William James' ideas to Bulgarian scientific thought is revealed. They come to be seen as "uncomfortable" for exploration.

ABOUT THE HISTORY OF IDEO-MOTOR ACTION

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In 1890 William James described in his "Principles of Psychology" a simple mechanism for the initiation and control of action. The *ideo-motor principle* states that: "Whenever movement follows *unhesitatingly and immediately* the notion of it in the mind, we have ideo-motor action. We are then aware of nothing between the conception and the execution. All sorts of neuro-muscular processes come between, of course, but we know absolutely nothing of them. We think the act, and it is done; and that is all that introspection tells us of the matter. (James, 1890 p. 522). During that time, the ideo-motor principle was widely acknowledged in scientific circles. But due to the upcoming influence of behaviourism (c.f. Thorndike, 1913) it has not played an important role for many decades of the 20th century. Contemporarily the ideo-motor principle is experiencing a renascence in the Cognitive Psychology of action (e.g. Hoffmann, 1993; Hommel, 1998, 2002; Prinz, 1987, 1990, 1997) and is even used to describe and explain intentional action.

Today's implementation of ideo-motor action in Cognitive Psychology implies a substantial development of said principle, originally as James also remarks ideo-motor action was developed by Carpenter (1852) as a third law of reflex function of the brain. Carpenter applied it as a physiological explanation for many curios phenomena like Mesmerism, Table-turning, Table-talking, Electro-Biology etc. which were en vogue in the middle of the nineteenth century. In Carpenter's conception of ideo-motor action there is no room for a term of intentional actions. These intentional actions occur in a higher level of mental processing.

James' assumption that Carpenter was the initiator of ideo-motor action is not entirely correct. As follows some years before Carpenter's definition of the term, his colleague Thomas Laycock (1840, 1845) generalized the spinal reflex function up to the cerebrum, which was direction giving preparatory work to Carpenter's coining of the term. Using the disease "Hydrophobia" or as it is called today "Rabies" as his object of research Laycock was able to demonstrate the existence of cerebral reflex actions. Furthermore, Laycock identified the possibility that involuntary, reflex muscular movements

can take place not merely in response to sensations, but also in response to ideas. In conclusion Laycock obviously discovered the principle of ideo-motor action before Carpenter. Which resulted in a long standing dispute between them about authorship. But finally it was Carpenter who coined the especially suitable term *Ideo-motor*, which Spitz (1997) annotates: "...combined the driving force of a dominant *idea* with the resulting involuntary *motor* activity".

Beside the British physiological root of the ideo-motor principle there exists an even older German one. As early as 1825 the philosopher Johann Friedrich Herbart had given a precise formulation of the ideo-motor hypothesis in his book "Psychologie als Wissenschaft, neu gegründet auf Erfahrung, Metaphysik und Mathematik". It is interesting to note, that Laycock received his doctoral degree in 1839 at the University of Göttingen. At that time, Herbart was Professor for Philosophy in Göttingen and it could be possible that Laycock was influenced by him, but this possibility is till now a speculation.

Rudolph Hermann Lotze, who followed Herbart as the Chair of Philosophy in Göttingen, continued to build on the German root of the ideo-motor principle. In the same year 1852 as Carpenter introduced the term "ideo-motor" he published the "Medicinische Psychologie und Physiologie der Seele". In the third Chapter of this book Lotze described in even more detail than Laycock and Carpenter the ideo- motor hypothesis without using Carpenter's term. In 1861 the German physiologist Emil Harleß built on the existing work on the ideo-motor theory. Completely independent to Laycock he developed a physiological model which is in some respect similar to Laycock's beliefs.

Both roots of the ideo-motor hypothesis meet in James' 'Principles'. He extended this basic idea to all kinds of human actions and it is to his merit, that ideo-motor action has become so popular in contemporary psychology. In accord with the large interest of modern Cognitive Psychology in the ideo-motor principle, the paper at hand aims at giving an extensive overview about the exciting and controversial history of the development of the ideo-motor principle. The history of ideo-motor action can help to critically evaluate the current application and research involving said principle.

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PLOTINUS' CONCEPT OF SOUL

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This paper focuses on Plotinus' concept of soul. In his treatise *On the immortality of soul* Plotinus (AD 204/5-270) argues against Epicurean and Stoic materialism and Aristotelian hylomorphism to defense the Platonic claim that the soul is neither a body of any kind nor some sort of a form or structure of the body, but something which is not to be defined in terms of a body at all soul. Plotinus' views concerning the unity of the perception constitute perhaps the most important aspect of his theory of soul. Against Stoic corporealism Plotinus points out that the unity of perceiving subject reveals characteristics of the soul, which serve to mark an essential distinction of the soul and the body. The Stoics hold that the principal part (*to hegemonikon*) of the soul, located in the heart, is the central faculty of perception in which affections from all the senses converge. A body, understood as a spatial magnitude, is in Plotinus' view such that none of its parts is identical either with any other part or with the whole. If the perceiving soul is a body, then different sensory affections must reach different parts of it. If so, there is really not one entity in which everything converges. In the Stoic corporealist model the kind of unity Plotinus takes to be evident in perception is not achieved.

Plotinus insists on that the numerically one and the same entity is the subject of seeing and hearing or the perceiving of pain in the various parts of the body. The Aristotelians introduce the 'inner sense' through considerations about the perception of *differences* between objects of the different special senses such as the white and the sweet. The function of the special sense organs is thus restricted to the reception of the sensory impression from the outside and its transmission to the central organ, i.e. the heart. But this 'inner sense' *qua* sense receives not more than the mere simultaneous reports by the different senses. Plotinus ascribes to the brain the function as central organ and supposes the transmission of affections by the nerves. In Plotinus' view, however, perception is not the mere passive reception of such sensory impression, but the "judgement" on what one receives.

Aristotle compares the sense-organ to the wax that receives the imprint of the seal without its matter' (*De an* II 12, 424a17-20). After Aristotle, the Hellenistic philosophers, especially the Stoics, made it standard philosophical practice to discuss sense-perception in terms of impressions. According to Plotinus, sensory affection does not constitute genuine perception. Plotinus distinguishes between the sensory affection, on the one hand, and the activities concerning affections and the judgments with which the perceptions are identified, on the other hand. The unity of the perceiving subject is demonstrated from the unity of the thinker who judges the objects of different senses, for which purpose the thinker must also be a perceiver capable of exercising and coordinating a plurality of senses. It is one and the same thing in us that we do all our perceiving and thinking. When we perceive, we activate latent concepts that we already possess. Plotinus suggests that the central faculty of perception is a power of 'the soul', not the central organ, i.e. the brain. The soul is not merely the center of perceptual experience, but also the seat of representation, memory and of thought. Yet soul is a 'single nature', i.d. a unique subject of experiences despite the multiplicity of its functions.

The Distinction between sensation und perceptions is a part of Plotinus' Platonic heritage. Plotinus resists the temptation to regard sensations *per se* as judgemental. He says that there are sensations, which do not reach 'our soul': we may be visually affected without noticing what we see. The existence of unattended or unnoticed sensations contradicts the empiricist tradition that sensations are by their very nature immediately known by the subject and constitute self-authenticating knowledge of their own content.

For the moral of this paper is that Plotinus' concept of soul as a single immaterial substance is the result of a historical dialogue. The confrontation with materialism and empiricism helps to sharpen Plotinus' dualistic views.

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FEELING, EMOTION, MOOD BY THEODOR ZIEHEN

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Theodor Ziehen (1862-1950) left behind an extensive written work dedicated to the goal of achieving, "a comprehensive philosophical system and, as basis, an entirely "Gegebene" comprehensive theory of cognition". He achieved this not only out of a psychiatric and psychological point of view, but also out of a philosophical point of view. His starting-point is the "Gegebene" under which he understands everything we experience. Ziehen chooses this terminus in order to avoid utilizing the then current differentiation between material and psychical as a fundamental assumption. According to his monistic fundamental conviction, all psychological phenomenon must be viewed in connection with physiological parallel processes within the brain; emotions, feelings and mood also belonging to this category. Emotion theories were discussed extensively and vehemently and were a subject of great controversy in his time. First contours of his theory become visible when some of his arguments are analyzed against those of his competitors. According to Ziehen, the "Gefühlston" is based on feelings of like or dislike which are an accompaniment of perception/sensation. Ziehen uses evolutionary processes to explain its origin and its mode of operation with its accelerating (positive) and inhibiting (negative) effects on the processes of perception. Zieher answers the question of the process which creates feelings, to be categorized as a physiological parallel process of the "Gefühlston", with his hypothesis of the ganglion cells' readiness to discharge. The "Gefühlston" is very easily transferred to perception and other sensations. Thus, Ziehen believes that he is able to retrace all emotions and moods with the concept of "Irradiation" and "Reflexion" within his associative-psychology theory. He sees the value of his theory in its ability to summarize a wide range of observations and findings by means of a single perspective. I support the fact that Ziehen's theory of emotion can only be properly valued within the framework of his complete system. The connection of this theory to his theory of cognition from 1913 makes this clear.

Based on this, the "Gefühlstöne" determine considerably the choice of perception and attention, the choice of perception in the association of ideas and the choice of motor-impulses during interaction. According to Ziehen, the so-called "will" and "ought-to" can be retraced to this peculiarity.

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SESSION 4
"WRITING CASES, MAKING EXPERTS: THE NEGOTIATION OF PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHANALYTIC KNOWLEDGE"

THE EMPLOTMENT OF IDENTITY: HISTORICAL INVERSIONS

Matt Reed
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This paper will examine the paradigmatic case of sexual inversion in France, Valentin Magnan and Jean-Martin Charcot's "Inversion du sens genital." Using the case of Monsieur X... and the discourse of sexual inversion which was articulated through it, I will show how thinking (and writing) in psychiatric cases implied particular kinds of moral and ethical investigation, and how these investigations were connected to social and political anxieties in such a way as to facilitate the emergence of "the homosexual" and other pathological sexual kinds in France at the end of the nineteenth century.

CONSTRUCTING CASES. PSYCHIATRIC KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICE IN LATE-NINETEENTH-CENTURY HUNGARY.

Emese Lafferton
Central European University (Hungary)

The paper investigates how everyday psychiatric practices, negotiation between doctors and patients, and concerns about psychiatric expertise played a crucial role in constructing psychiatric theory and knowledge, and how presenting 'cases' served as a useful method in this process.

DRIFTING THROUGH THE SPACE OF SPEECH. PSYCHOANALYSIS, ASSOCIATION EXPERIMENTS AND SPEAKING IN TONGUES

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This paper looks at the making of psychiatric experts through case writing from a sociological and a linguistic perspective. It focuses on cases that were either never published or that exhibit a disturbed relationship with their objects. These objects were religious manners of speaking such as speaking in tongues which were considered to be dangerous and pathological by Swiss protestant psychiatrists or psychologists (such as Carl Gustav Jung or Oskar Pfister). The specificity of psychiatric case writing will be articulated within the oscillation between a stable place which the scientists tried to assign to their subjects under inquiry and the space of speech through which they drifted.

THE READING PATIENT: FREUD'S CASE EMMA ECKSTEIN

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Freuds's case Emma Eckstein shows how the distribution of psychoanalytic books took on a conflicting role in the development of a psychoanalytic process that conceived itself not as mere hermeneutics, but as science derived from experience. Thus the nonmedical readership (the lay reader) attained a central function. In the figure of the reading patient, the lay reader forced theoretical corrections and successfully disputed several clinical procedures. Emma Eckstein's reading of Freud's "Interpretation of Dreams" is proven to be especially suited for demonstrating the interaction between theory and clinical methods.

SESSION 5
"HISTORY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS"

LOGIC & NARRATIVE: AN HISTORIOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE ON SIGMUND FREUD AND SHERLOCK HOLMES

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The curious convergence of the founder of psychoanalysis and the fictional detective Sherlock Holmes has produced a literature remarkable not only for its quantity, but also its quality and breadth. This paper examines this peculiar historiography focusing on the varied background of its contributors, the cross-disciplinary consensus on the oddly similar methodologies employed by Freudian and Holmesian "detective" work, and the links between logical and narratological persuasion.

That the legacy of a man of science such as Freud should bleed into popular culture is notable to be sure; but that the legacy of a fictional character should bleed into the scientific literature is indeed a remarkable development. How does one account for the numerous sober, (social) scientific examinations of the methods employed by a fictional character? Much attention has been drawn to the similarity in methods employed by Freud and Holmes (i.e., Doyle) and to Freud's admitted knowledge of and admiration for the Holmes stories. Are we to conclude that Freud, perhaps the most influential psychologist of the last century, borrowed his methodology from a popular novel? Surely not! Yet the historiographic consensus on this point is virtually its sole unifying principle. The basis for Freud's interest in Conan Doyle's work and the import of this curious historiographic convergence are explored. Narratological exegesis of several texts demonstrates the ambivalence shown by some authors toward Freud. Concluding remarks observe the effect of this historiographic discourse on Freud studies and indicate new avenues of research and discourse.

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FROM ALFRED ADLER'S INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY TO OLIVÉR BRACHFELD'S PSYCHOSYNTHESIS

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Ferenc Olivér Brachfeld, a follower of Alfred Adler and his Individual Psychology, came to Barcelona in 1931, where he contributed considerably to the acknowledgement of Individual Psychology (Adlerian Psychology) in Spain. Brachfeld thought Individual Psychology to have much more in common with the so-called Psychosynthesis, as understood by Alphonse Maeder and Poul Bjerre, than with Freud's Psychoanalysis. In 1950, Brachfeld started to work as a full-time professor at the University of the Andes (ULA) in the city of Mérida, Venezuela, where he was director of the "Instituto de Psicosíntesis y Relaciones Humanas". In 1955, Brachfeld was elected president of the International Society for Psychology and then, president of the Interamerican Society of Psychology. During this time, he continued to work on his conception of psychosynthesis.

Brachfeld sustains that the first author to use the term Psychosynthesis was the Swedish psychiatrist Poul Bjerre in 1912 (Brachfeld, 1953c). Bjerre was a follower of Freud, when Freud was still using hypnosis as a psychological treatment, but then criticized the Freudian ideas for being too exclusively analytical, whilst they should be more synthetic. Bjerre's ideas were echoed in the Swiss author Alphonse Maeder, a member of the "first generation" of in-depth psychoanalysts who appear in the famous "Jahrbuch für Psychoanalyse" (Yearbook of Psychoanalysis). Maeder recommended to apply a "terminal synthesis", as final endpoint of psychoanalytic treatment after the dissolution of the transferential neurosis, but his efforts to introduce these techniques in psychoanalysis were, like those of Bjerre, in vain. In France, Camille Spiess was the first who used the expression Psychosynthesis, but for Brachfeld, the first pragmatic attempt of a synthesis between different schools was made by C.G. Jung, who considered his "Analytical Psychology" – after his ideas were rejected at the Congress for Psychoanalysis in 1913 in Munich – as a synthesis of Freudian and Adlerian theories and practices.

In Brachfeld's view, Adler's "Individual Psychology" was the first synthetic approach that had a certain success in psychotherapy, being Individual Psychology not a synthesis of divergent schools, as initially proposed by Jung, but a non-analytical (synthetic) therapy, similar to what Bjerre and Maeder had proposed. But Bjerre and Maeder, according to Brachfeld, did imply an analytical stage prior to the synthesis, whilst Adler did not practice a "psychology of drives". Brachfeld did not even consider Adler's psychology to be an analytical or "in-depth" psychotherapy; rather, he believed that Adler's procedure was a short-term and essentially synthetic procedure. Brachfeld also points out that Adler's psychology, instead of a psychotherapy method, is more a "psychagogia", a psychological **guiding** of persons, and he mentions one of Adler's disciples, Arthur Kronfeld, who wrote a book titled (in German) "*Psychagogik*".

In his magna opera, *Inferiority Feelings in the Individual and in the group*, Brachfeld criticizes (as many posterior authors do) Adler's naming his school "Individual Psychology", which is extremely misleading, as the principal Adlerian concepts are based on what he called "*Gemeinschaftsgefühl*", community feeling. Rather, Adler should have called his ideas "Psychosynthesis". Furthermore, Brachfeld suggested that Adler should not have talked about "inferiority feelings" and "striving for superiority", but of a "Gulliver complex".

In this presentation, we will explain Brachfeld's concept of psychosynthesis and its historical development in further detail and how it is related to the Adlerian view of guidance, counseling, and psychotherapy. We will also present its relevance with contemporary psychotherapy.

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PIERRE JANET. A CASE FOR THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF BEHAVIOUR THERAPY?

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The contributions of the French psychologist and "médecin-philosophe" Pierre Janet (1859-1947) to a psychological therapy have a certain affinity to modern cognitive-behavioural therapy. Starting-point as well as central object of Janet's research is human behaviour. With his comprehensive and holistic perspective on psychological disorders he may be viewed as a forerunner of behaviour therapy. Although it is impossible to give a survey of his extensive work, by maintaining a balance between historiography and eclecticism, this paper will argue in favor of a new reception of Janet's works. Three points of interest will be discussed:

1. Janet's psychology of "conduite" (conduct) with its key concepts of "tension", "force", and "tendency" can be understood as a resource-allocation model which implies a functional model of psychological disorders (cf. Janet 1930; Janet 1938; Heim 1999; Bühler & Heim in press). These key concepts point to higher, synthetic mental processes , e.g. metacognition and metamemory, social and verbal behaviour, planning and adaptation of actions with feelings as secondary actions, as well as to the role of more basic functions of vigilance, selective attention, volition, perception, reflexes, or habits. Inspired by the work of Baldwin, Hughlings Jackson, and others, but founded on his extensive clinical studies, he proposed a sociogenetic "hierarchy" of behavioural tendencies, which may represent a stimulating elaboration of the concept of behaviour (cf. Van der Veer 2000).

2. Because of their clinical validity, several constructs of his earlier studies on mental disorders (e.g. "automatism", "dissociation","narrowing of the field of consciousness", "fixed ideas", "psychasthenia", "reality function", "feeling of incompleteness") may play a role in presentday cognitive and behaviour therapies (cf. Brown 1991, Bühler & Heim 2001a,b). For instance, the treatment of posttraumatic stress disorders, dissociative disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorders, anxiety, and depression profit or will profit from some of Janet's ideas (e.g. Hantke 1999; Hoffmann 1998; Hoffmann & Hofmann 2001; Van der Hart et al 1993). Interestingly, his later systematic account of psychotherapeutic interventions is based on a dynamic psychology of conduct (Janet 1924).

3. A continuous reception and propagation of Janet's ideas might have been hindered by various sociological facts of his time as well as later on. Although there was a controversy between Janet and psychoanalysts about priority and methodological issues (e.g. Brown et al 1996), today their common sociocultural context as well as special developments in the sciences and humanities of their epoch may help to demonstrate the significance of Janet for the history of psychotherapy (e.g. Hacking 1995, Rabinbach 1990, Plass 2000).

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SESSION 6
"SUBJECTING THE PSYCHE: EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND CASE NARRATOLOGY IN FRANCE (1870-1910)"

HYSTERIA OF IDEAS? CHILDHOOD NEUROSES AND SUGGESTIVE THERAPY IN AN ERA OF NEO-MESMERISM

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The pages of the 1868 volume of the French journal l'*Union Magnetique* were marked by a debate over the existence of a nervous fluid that, when transmitted from one person to another, was believed by Drs. Louyet and Lemoine-Moreau to be capable of transforming states of consciousness. Challenging these "partisans convaincus de l'irradiation fluidique" was Dr. Ambroise-August Liébeault, author of *Du sommeil et des états analogues considerés surtout au point de l'action du moral sur le physique* " (1866). Liébeault's position held that any transformation of an experimental subject's state of mind during the magnetic rapport was due solely to the powers of suggestion. He called on the magnetizers to provide evidence of the emission of nervous fluid just as "one easily demonstrates...the transmission of electric fluid". Equally important for Liébeault was the need for his adversaries to demonstrate the impotence of thoight in the production of passive conscious states, for he believed thet catalepsy resulted simply from mental concentration and that subjects are predisposed to "artificial sleep" by virtue of the physiological habit of ordinary sleep.

Several years had elapsed since Liébeault thought about the theory of a transmittable nervous fluid when, during the summer of 1880, his interest in the fluidist controversy was reawakened as he observed "Monsieur Longpretz, magnétiseur à Liège" assisting him in hypnotic sessions. Like Liébeault, Longpretz believed that verbal suggestion and mental concentration were potential therapeutic agents. But he also offered Liébeault "undeniable proof of a transmission of force going through one animated body to another". He claimed that touching areas of physical pain, he had returned to health babies still nursing, "incapable at this age of submitting to a mental action by suggestion" and, in some cases, "regarded as incurable by the physicians". Liébeault had never succeded in even hypnotizing a child under the age of three and had for some time believed that such young patients were not capable of submitting to the influence of suggestive rapport. But he found Longpretz's assertions irrestible and he formulated a series of biomagnetic experiments on "petite unconscious beings" to determine the therapeutic validity of Longpretz's methods.

Liébeault's biomagnetic and hydromagnetic experiments distinguish a dramatic moment in the histoy of psychical research with children because they tested hypotheses taht had previously been explained on the basis of observation, as in earlier studies by Herbert Spencer or even Cabanis taht postulated reflex as the first spark of instinctive intelligence. At the same time, Liébeault's experimental strategies indicate how rigorous the working climate became for the careers of therapists and mesmerist practitioners whose research was constantly subject to criticism and revision. The interpretative community Liébeault came to know had expanded over the course of the nineteenth century as educationalists and sociologists argued across national and linguistic borders and exchanged research through the medium of print. These discussions featured polemics for and against the cultivation of juvenile subjectivity, introspection and self-consciousness. The ethical contours of this discourse were defined by questions of social responsibility regarding educational and moral treatments for precocity and infantile neuroses.

My investigation of Liébeault's work responds to a critical literature on *fin-de-siècle* psychiatry taht has expanded considerably over the last decade or so. In the late 1980s historian of science Anne

Harrington challenged the conventional presentation of animal magnetism in ninetheenth-century France. The historiography Harrington criticized understood the career of magnetism as a transition from the "pre-scientific" world of Anton Mesmer's fluids to the Braidian science of hypnosis as it was famously modified by Jean-Martin Charcot int a three-phase pathological state peculiar to the hysterical patient. Harrington published two essays that provocatively revise that tapered picture. Her term "neo-mesmerism" recognizes a broader perspective on French medical research that reveals how and why magnetism was not in fact subsumed by the hysteria/hypnosis paradigm in the latter decades of the century. My paper traces the persistence of neo-mesmerism in late ninteenth-century French psychiatry through the suggestibility experiments performed by A.A. Liébeault and, if the time allotted at the Barcelona conference permits, I will also analyze the suggestibility experiments made by Alfred Binet in the context of the student-teacher relationship.

MAKING THE CASE: PATIENTS, STORIES AND MODERN SELFHOOD

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This paper will examine the modern psychiatric case study as a scientific method and as a genre of writing about the self. During the nineteenth century, the case underwent a subtle, but crucial, transformation: it became less a story about the progression of the disease than it was a history of the patient's life. Or rather, it was at least as much a story about the individual – his life, his habits, his relatives – as it was a story about the progression of the malady itself. By the late 1870's, one can see the case in something close to its modern form, a medico-moral narrative of the patient's life that sought to account for present conduct by connecting elements of the present and the past.

The valorization of the personal past as an explanatory and diagnostic guide resulted in an emphasis on intimate individual histories, often as told by the patients themselves. By the end of the century, patient stories had moved to the center of psychiatric inquiry, creating a new relationship between patient and doctor, observation and diagnosis, subject and discourse. Although a perhaps minor historical genre, the psychiatric case nonetheless played an important role in the story of how modern selves were constructed. Its history helps us understand the roles narratives and institutions played in the processes through which people came to acquire seemingly private identities.

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BETWEEN PSYCHICAL RESEARCH AND PSYCHOLOGY IN FRANCE: EUSAPIA AND THE 1905–1907 EXPERIMENTS AT *INSTITUT GÉNÉRAL PSYCHOLOGIQUE*

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This paper explores the relationship between psychology and the marvelous in France focusing on the history of the Institut Général Psychologique (IGP). In 1901, the IGP was officially founded with the purpose of encouraging the study of the human mind. It was to unite men of science who were dedicated to uncovering the laws governing the psyche. Originally, the activities of the institute were organized into four research sections including a section devoted to the study of psychical phenomena. Members of this section were distinguished scientists belonging to various academies and holding respectable positions in the education system. The psychical research section focused on the region situated outside the confines of psychology, biology, and physics where forces still undefined were suspected to be at works. Members of the section encouraged everyone to report unexplained manifestations, which could then be put to serious scientific testing. The section's most elaborate project, and in fact the IGP's most ambitious project, would be the two-years experiment with the Italian medium Eusapia Palladino. Between 1905 and 1907, Eusapia participated in forty-three séances with members of the IGP. The list of participants included Henri Bergson, Pierre and Marie Curie,

Arsène d'Arsonval, and Charles Richet. In his 1908 report, Jules Courtier declared that the participants had not come to a conclusion about the séances and encouraged further research on mediumistic phenomena. The section dedicated to the study of psychical phenomena remained an important part of the institute until its end in 1929 with reports on the divining rod, clairvoyance, telepathy, and control of mediumistic phenomena, but it failed to organize elaborate experiments such as the 1905-1907 séances with Eusapia. The IGP was a respected institution with distinguished members promoting research on the marvelous. Its story illustrates a way in which psychical phenomena were appropriated by science and contributed to psychology's early disciplinary years.

INVITED LECTURE

TESTIMONY REVISITED

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Perception, reasoning, memory, and testimony: These are for traditional and mainstream epistemology the four sources of all of our knowledge. The first three (perception, reasoning, and memory) are standardly taken to be non-social capacities; or—as it is sometimes revealingly put—they are "onboard" sources of knowledge for the individual. By contrast, testimony is an epistemic source outside the individual, or between individuals.

The history of philosophical theorising about knowledge is full of attempts to establish hierarchies between these four sources, and to reduce their number. In such exercises, reasoning and perception have found much favour; memory did well at least in Plato's dialogue "Meno". Only rarely, however, have epistemologists found good things to say about testimony—albeit that testimony has of course always been popular with theologians, historians, and lawyers. Over the past two decades, mainstream (Anglo-American) epistemology has often been taken to task for its alleged excessive and mistaken "individualism", that is, for its tendency to ignore social aspects of knowledge. The criticism has come from many quarters, perhaps most vocally, from feminist scholars, sociologists of knowledge, and philosophers of science. Usually the critics have justified their critique by pointing to the neglect of testimony in mainstream epistemology. That the accusation of individualism should be justified by pointing to the neglect of testimony should not occasion surprise. After all, as mentioned, according to the epistemological tradition itself, testimony is the one and only social source of knowledge.

Many epistemologists have taken these criticisms to heart. Indeed, of late testimony has even become something of a fashionable topic in epistemology. The last decade has seen the publication of a considerable number of competing proposals concerning almost all aspects of testimony. No surprise then that many epistemologists now smugly reject charges of individualism, and congratulate themselves on their "social turn."

In this paper I wish to take issue with this smugness. I admire much of the recent epistemological work on testimony but I do not think that enough has been done to clear epistemology of the charge of individualism. As I see it, one cannot escape the charge merely by writing about testimony. In other words, theories of testimony can themselves be more or less individualistic, more or less ignorant or appreciative of the fundamental role of learning from others. This is, in any case, what I intend to argue. I shall try to make my case with respect to four main issues: the scope of testimony; the role of inferences in the reception and evaluation of testimony; the possibility of a global justification of testimony; and the question whether testimony is a generative source of knowledge.

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SESSION 7
"HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDERS AND CAPACITIES: MEMORY & DYSLEXIA"

MEMORY DISORDERS IN WORLD WAR II AND THE EMERGENCE OF BRITISH NEUROPSYCHOLOGY

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Histories of psychology and psychiatry have rightly emphasised the importance of experiences with 'shell-shocked' soldiers for the professionalization of those disciplines and for the expansion of psychological accounts of people's difficulties in living. Similarly, histories have emphasised the importance of mental testing in creating a place for psychology as a discipline and as a practice. Less to the fore has been consideration of how psychology has embraced and been embraced by brain-based accounts of human behaviour - what is now frequently called 'neuropsychology'. Given the growing importance of explanations of human behaviour in terms of the brain, this area is worthy of further examination. The present paper considers the work of a small number of British psychologists in head injuries units in Britain during the Second World War, especially in relation to memory disorders. It argues that this work was pivotal in the later establishment of British neuropsychology in the 1950s and 1960s.

Memory was a topic frequently cited as being an issue for both physiology and psychology making it a candidate for promoting an alignment of physiological and psychological investigations. As Danziger has argued, memory is one of the few concepts in psychology that was present at the emergence of the discipline and that has persisted throughout psychology's existence. In this sense, it has had the status of a given entity and although there have been and are disagreements about its scope and the best ways in which to describe it, the notion that there is such a thing as memory has rarely been disputed. Consequently, in British psychology between the wars, research on memory was an area that made the gap between psychology and physiology especially visible while at the same time highlighting the potential for complementary accounts - it was something that deserved explanation and that could mediate between separate disciplines and non-specialists.

At the specialist head injuries units that were set up in Britain at the outbreak of WWII, memory disorders were one of the most frequently encountered problems. From 1940-1945 at the Royal Infirmary Edinburgh, Andrew Paterson and Oliver Zangwill occupied the role of medical psychologist working with neurologists. Zangwill argued that the psychological examinations they conducted played two major roles in assessment of brain-injured patients: establishing the pattern of 'cognitive disability' and assisting in 'differential diagnosis' (Zangwill, 1945). Once it had been established that the patient was suffering from a memory disorder, the key diagnostic decision was whether the disorder was organic or psychogenic. In reaching a decision over the origin of a patient's amnesia, the neurologist brought together physiological and psychological concerns in a very practical manner. Far from being an attempt to create a bridge between mind-based and brain-based explanations of memory loss, the medical doctor's concern was to arbitrate between them in order to decide on the next course of action.

The distinction between psychogenic and organic causes of memory disorders was one that had become particularly important to psychologists, psychiatrists and psychoanalysts during and after the First World War. In emphasising the importance of psychogenic accounts of mental difficulties, the psy scientists had contributed towards creating a sphere of expertise that was theirs rather than belonging to other medical professions. In the brain injuries units in World War II, the psychogenic-organic distinction ensured that psychologists had roles to play in relation to both organic and

psychogenic amnesias. In this respect, memory and its disorders were made more thoroughly psychological than ever before.

Both during the war and after the war, psychologists' investigation of brain-damaged patients was crucially dependent on their relationship with neurologists. Despite this being a matter of establishing a new area of investigation and so requiring a certain amount of boundary work, this paper argues that during this period the relationship between neurologists and psychologists was best characterised as cooperative particularly as neurologists perceived psychologists as offering no threat to them or their domain of expertise. The willingness of the psychologists to adopt the case as a means of investigation and reporting ensured that it was an object that allowed translation between the neurologists and psychologists and between clinical practice and research.

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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY OF MEMORY AND ART OF MEMORY: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

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Theoretical psychology of memory may be defined as the development of theoretical models which describe the structure and processes of memory. The art of memory on the other hand may be defined as the range of techniques used to optimize memory performance; for example, the loci-technique, the story-technique etc. These are called mnemotechniques.

Before the beginning of experimental memory research in 1885, many theoretical approaches already existed to describe the structure and function of human memory by metaphors such as a wax tablet, a net, the priming of brain-channels, the permanence of vibrations or the disposition of brain fibres etc. In such models physiological and psychological functions were more or less arbitrarily attributed to different anatomical structures. Throughout the history of memory-psychology however, there have been numerous changes to the theoretical models, as the legitimacy of a model could not be proven empirically. Consequently the development of memory theory is fragmented. Although the art of memory was supposed to augment the natural functions of memory, it was not oriented towards the theoretical models to describe these functions; rather only the effectiveness of the particular technique was considered. Thus theory was largely ignored by individuals who practiced the art of memory, which had developed continuously and cumulatively through the centuries.

On the other hand, the theoreticians distrusted the art of mnemotechniques and rejected it (see Huber, 1878). They thought that superior memory wasn't compatible with good thinking-processes--philosophers and physicians assumed that the use of mnemotechniques would fill the brain with abundant ballast, worsening the ability to think. Kant named mnemotechnical learning as ingenious

learning, taking place without understanding, thereby losing the ability to distinguish the important from the unimportant. According to Kant, the result of such ingenious learning was polyhistors carrying as many books as a hundred camels caravaning through the desert. J.F. Fries suggested that a crammed memory prevents thinking because of the constant intrusion of foreign thoughts. Bonnet warned of chronic fatigue of the brain-fibres because of a crammed memory. J.G. Fichte proclaimed "sapere aude" as the true principle of the art of memory. To unburden the memory Descartes and Bonnet recommended the use of external storage such as books or notes.

Many theoretically oriented authors denigrated the art of memory as a trifle or as a product of charlatans. Mnemotechniques were usually taught by roving mnemonists to earn income. They demonstrated mnemotechnical tricks and praised the usefulness of their techniques by referring to people with exceptional memory abilities. Propaganda was used to lure customers. To prevent people from learning the mnemotechniques and to prevent exposure of their "magic", the memory artists practised secret-mongering. Some mnemonists even obliged their pupils on oath not to talk about the learned mnemotechniques. One could only learn the mnemotechnique after paid instruction as the books were filled with incomprehensible details. For these reasons the art of memory was often seen as a superstitious technique or as sorcery. In the 19tieth century Scheidler wrote that most psychologists warned against the use of mnemotechniques as a means of achieving superior memory.

The theoretical models of memory psychology proposed today continue to utilize different metaphors. However these models are more polished and are, at least partially, empirically proved. Thereby the theories of practice and art of memory psychology can begin to find common ground.

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ASPECTS OF THE RESEARCH ON DYSLEXIA IN GERMANY SINCE THE 19th CENTURY

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When we take a look at the history of research regarding dyslexia and legasthenia during the last 120 years, it becomes apparent that different points of view and understandings exist about this disease, that influenced the various directions of research that were explored (Kobi, 1976).

Pioneers on legasthenia-research at the turn of the 20th century like Morgan (1896), Hinshelwood (1907) or Kussmaul (1877) in Germany focused on case studies of different patients, who often showed special kinds of neurological disorders like alexia or agraphia. It was during this

aetiological period that scientists tried for the first time to outline the specific term of so called "congenital wordblindnes" (Morgan, 1896). CW. is delineated as an isolated reading and/or writing problem independent from phenomenon or causes like mental disorders, disturbed sensory perceptions and further perception-processing, or insufficient education (e.g. Ranschburg, 1916). For this epoch of research we find the first steps of the so called "difference-diagnosis" of legasthenia and the discussion of the nature-nurture-problem of this disease.

The following generation of researchers in dyslexia set a new, more phenomenological focus to research and concentrated their studies on different kinds of errors in reading and writing (e.g. Wolf, 1932), functional conspicuousness (Wile, 1942; Hildreth, 1945) and different types of reading-and-writing-disability (Müller, 1961).

As early as 1914 Jakob Stoll (who was a colleague of Karl Marbe at the Institute for Psychology at the University of Würzburg), published experimental studies focussing on the differentiation of several writing-errors. He was influenced by Meringer and Mayer (1895), who investigated errors in speaking and reading and the implications of such errors for the evolution of the indogerman languages. At this time, some scientists look upon writing-errors as a special kind of the slip of the tongue (Niedermann, 1901), that means variations to the persons' intention caused by reduced attention (Offner, 1897). In the tradition of this "reduced attention" assumption Stoll's subjects had to copy some texts in a limited time without correcting their mistakes. Stoll was able to distinguish four types of writing-errors (the missing, addition, switch and "forgery" of letters, words or parts of words) and assumed three kinds of mental reasons of their origin.

Some decades later, Stoll's differentiation of writing errors were used, although in modified forms and without citing his studies and can be found in the works of German psychologists like Busemann (1954), who claimed the same writing errors as a special sign of legasthenia. And even in the 90s Klicpera and Gasteiger-Klicpera (1998) mention types of errors, which were already found in the work of Stoll (1914).

Furthermore, conspicuous functional elements like manual and ocular dominance were supposed as a reason for dyslexia (Wile, 1942). Both, the distinction of errors and functional conspicuousness were used to point out different types and dyslexia. E.g. Busemann (1954) only differed between a visual vs. an acoustic-motorical, or dysphasical, kind of disorder and cases of "feeble-mindedness", while Müller (1961) declaimed 8 variants of reading-and-writing-disability, but only one "pure" type which he called the "primary legasthenia". This delimitation of the "real" legasthenia as a difficulty in reading or writing although the ability in other academic subjects resulting from other physical defects or environmental disturbances, is characteristic of many decades of dyslexia research.

But what about the contemporary point of view? It must be taken into account, that both aetiological and phenomenological studies alone are no precise enough to differ a "primary legasthenia" from other difficulties. According the ICD-10: first achievement in reading and writing has to be significantly below the achievement of the class and below the individual intelligence of the child (Schulte-Körne, 2001). For instance children can be classified as dyslexic, whose achievement in a reading or writing test is in the lowest 5%. Additionally there can't be any neurological or physical disorders and environmental influences must also be closely evaluated – a differentiation, that began 100 years ago.

Today, a specific type of error isn't important for the diagnosis of dyslexia, but can give vital information about special therapies. Thus, a detailed historical outlining of the research and definition of dyslexia enables us to diagnose and address this performance problem more efficiency.

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SESSION 8
"HISTORICIZING INSTINCTS (I)"

PANEL ABSTRACT

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The concept of instincts has played a key role in arguments over competing theoretical positions in the human sciences throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. This is not surprising in light of its relation to the long history, for example, of natural law theories, and the various roles the concept of instincts has been given among the various conceptual dichotomies around which disciplinary divisions between the human sciences have been structured. In psychology, for example, disagreements which turn on the concept of instinct are oftentimes underpinned by opposing perspectives on the nature/nurture distinction, i.e. the question of the innateness of mental traits and behavior patterns. For another example, in anthropology, its has played a variety of roles in disputes over the scientific status of the field and the very goals of the discipline. These scientific and methodological debates can be seen as being on a continuum with traditional reflections about human nature in the history of Western philosophy (which have been variously structured around such dichotomies as rational/empirical, reason/passion, and knowledge/intuition.

As is widely known, since around the 1960s such dichotomies as nature-culture, symbol-function, evolution-history, the mental and the embodied (and materialized), rational and rhetorical discourses, and Western-non-Western have come under convergent, if not identical sorts of scrutiny. This trend can be observed both within the scientific and methodological reflections of the disciplines involved (most notably, in anthropology), as well as in the historical, philosophical, and sociological discourses about the sciences (consider, for example, fields as diverse as feminist critiques of science, or recent interest that some philosophers have taken in the notion of 'embodied cognition'). Little by little researchers became aware that the categories that so evidently structured their fields of inquiry that they went unremarked were products of historically contingent circumstances.

One of the remarkable ways in which researchers have responded to the situation has been with a growing interest in the historiography of concepts (see, for example, Bloch 1986, Smith 1992, Danzinger 1997). This panel responds to the comment on the potential usefulness of the directions being taken in the historiography of concepts in Professor Danziger's keynote speech at the 2001 ESHHS meeting. It seeks to focus a variety of historical (and disciplinary) perspectives on the concept of 'instincts' in order to throw some light not only on the diversity of interpretations and roles the concept has been given, but also on some reasons why 'historicizing instincts' may be relevant to the challenges facing attempts to carry forward the constructive directions suggested by the critique of dualist categories.

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DEFINITIONS AND MECHANIZATIONS OF 'INSTINCTS' BY SEVENTEENTH CENTURY WRITERS, THEOLOGIANS, PHILOSOPHERS, AND PHYSICIANS IN FRANCE AND ENGLAND

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This contribution explores the state of the definition, and the philosophical relevance, of the concept of 'instinct' in seventeenth century France and England. I will examine (1) the ways in which notions of 'instinct' and 'natural inclination' were used (among writers, theologians, natural philosophers, and physicians) and (2) theories about the soul (mind), body, and the passions, in relation to (3) contemporary developments in natural philosophy that are oftentimes referred as 'the mechanization of nature.' This may throw some light on both the roots and important turning points in the long-term history of the 'mechanicist – vitalist' debate that continued into the twentieth century.

The paper has three parts. The first attempts to establish the state of definition of the concept (usages and theories) in the seventeenth century. Standardized definitions of the concept of instincts were, indeed, available in contemporary dictionariesm, such as Antoine Furetière's *Dictionnaire universel* (1690) or the first edition of the *Dictionnaire de l'Académie Française* (1694) where the term is defined as a certain "sentiment ou mouvement que la nature a donné aux animaux pour connoistre ce qui leur est bon ou mauvais." However, it is not easy to find usages of the term that can be readily compared with present day employments, especially in France. Historical dictionaries suggest that, in France, the concept acquired the Christian (and Aristotelian) connotations of *inclination* and *natural tendency. For example,* J. Marot's Poème *inédit* (1512) employs the expression, *instinct de nature* ("according to its natural inclination"). The situation in France contrasts with that in England in interesting ways. In English, traces of the evolutionary sense of instinct can be found as early as 1596 when Shakespeare wrote: "Beware Instinct, the lion will not touch the true Prince: Instinct is a great matter. I was a Coward on Instinct" (*Henry IV* , II.iv). This sort of usage continued to be widespread up until its influential appearance in Darwin's *Descent of Man* I.iii.100 (1871): "The very essence of an instinct is that it is followed independently of reason". I will consider the question of whether contrasts between seventeenth century usages in French and in English relate to geographically parallel histories of the concept.

The second part concentrates on tracing the meanings attributed to the notion of 'instinct,' with attention to the confluence of theories about the soul (or mind), body and passions in the writings of such authors as Descartes, Pascal, Malebranche, Spinoza, and Hobbes. This may put us in a position to address questions about the meanings given to instincts (and the philosophical significance of those meanings). I will examine, in light of the aforementioned theories, questions concerning how instincts were conceptualized (as faculties, actions, or passions? - of which type?), why they mattered (their moral significance? roles in God's design?), and their importance to discussions of fundamental differences (for instance, between humans and animals, or men and women).

The third part of this contribution situates the themes around which the first two are structured in relation to the issues posed by the development of what is oftentimes referred to as the mechanization of nature). This may bring new light not only (1) to the extraordinary extent of the commitment to that view in seventeenth century natural philosophy, but also (2) the historical roots of the mechanicist – vitalist debate. To these aims we need to explore further meanings attributed to instincts, for instance: If instincts were interpreted as mechanisms, what sort of mechanisms were they? I will examine critical stages in the 'mechanization of nature' (Descartes, Gassendi, Hobbes,. etc.) in relation to the success of Newton's third law of motion (the law of action and reaction) and consider the question of whether it might have given crucial support to ideas about the mechanization of instincts. It is interestingly that Hobbes (who carried forward Descartes' notion of the mechanization of

the *natural appetites* and *passions*) can also be credited (as I discuss in more detail elsewhere) for having been the first to argue for the same conception of 'reaction' as that which is later on made explicit in Newton's third law of motion.

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AUTOMATISM AND THE MEANINGS OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY

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Automatism was the dreamlike state between asleep and awake, the undead condition between life and death. In the late nineteenth century it simultaneously became a focal point of investigation of the human functions and faculties that could be carried out without consciousness and a window into the human soul. Automatism's manifest phenomena (like trance, automatic writing, somnambulism and brain injuries) were investigated to provide insights into human instinctual drives and primitive consciousness, shared with the animal kingdom.

However, automatism was not confined to the rapidly developing sciences of mind, it cut across fledgling disciplinary boundaries and moved freely through popular and professional and scientific and philosophical spaces. In fact medicine, physiology evolutionary biology, law, psychiatry, psychology, psychical research, mental philosophy, ethics, mental healing were all touched by it. It is for this reason that automatism provides an excellent focus to do 'boundary work' and explore the meanings of human consciousness over a diverse range of sites in this period. This paper will map how automatism was a phenomenon that transgressed political, social and professional boundaries and inhabited the spaces between living and dead, conscious and unconscious, animal and human, human and machine, moral and amoral, and science and pseudo science.

For instance, in the 1870s automatism became a focal point for the mainstream debate about the evolution of human consciousness in the wake of Darwin's *Descent of Man* (1871). T.H. Huxey, G.H.

Lewes, Shadworth Hodgson, Douglas Spaulding and others considered the possibility of humans as conscious automata, with their consciousness serving as an epiphenomenon of the physical workings of the body. This thesis narrowed the gap between humans and the higher primates by playing down the role that human consciousness played in action. It was heavily contested and the metaphor of the automaton became symbolic of the amoral nature of late nineteenth-century materialistic and positivistic science. William James (and later his pupils Morton Prince and Gertrude Stein) in America and James Ward in Britain both used automatism to show the ridiculous and speculative nature of the movement of Scientific Naturalism as a whole. Automatism moved from a metaphor that narrowed the gap between humans and animals to a focus for questions of how to represent the moral nature of Man in the seemingly amoral universe that he was a product.

In the medical domain automatism was studied by New York doctor G.M. Beard, who wrote essays on inebriates and trance, and in France by Dr Mesnet, who explored cases of brain injury in the Franco-Prussian War. Henry Maudsley called for a new psychiatry based not only on the degeneration of higher mental functions but also disorders of the automatic, lower functions of the nerves and internal organs. The study of automatism was championed as revealing new causes of, and treatments for, insanity.

Automatism was not just for a scientific and philosophical elite. It was in the home in countless Victorian parlours. The crazes for automatic writing and trance were said to reveal something about the hidden dimensions of the human mind not available to normal consciousness. Those on the margins of the science such as Henry Sidgwick, F.W.H. Myers and Edmund Gurney investigated these automatic phenomena in their writings for the Society for Psychical Research.

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INSTINCT, 'PRIMITIVE' COGNITION, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTUITION

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This paper explores epistemological and historical relationships between 'instincts' and 'intuition'. First, it discusses epistemological connotations of the instinct concept, specifically the implication of a kind of innate knowledge imbedded in the assumption of unlearned behavior as this emerges in evolutionary theory and 19th century comparative psychology. The implication of innate knowledge in this context is compared to the long tradition within epistemology by which appeal to a

faculty of intuition or something analogous to it is invoked in order to account for the acquisition of knowledge without learning, with similarities and differences here discussed. Second, it is claimed that while the intuition concept foreshadows (in some ways) the appeal to instinct, the instinct concept in turn contributes to changes in the concept of intuition. A focal point of this discussion is an apparent transformation in the concept of intuition from a capacity integral to reasoning (e.g. Descartes) to a contemporary formulation in cognitive psychology as a process contrasting with rational, deliberative processing. It is proposed here that this transformation results at least in part from the association of intuition with instinct in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, evidenced by a depiction of intuition as a "lower" or "primitive" mental function influencing judgement in early experimental studies purporting to investigate intuition (e.g. De Sanctis, Valentine). These characterizations are suggested to result in part from a conflation of epistemologically foundational/prior with cognitively primitive as the concept of instinct develops against the backdrop of evolutionary theory and subsequent functionalist frameworks in psychology. Implications of this transformation are related to the considerable ambiguity currently characterizing the concept of intuition, evidence for which is based on the diverse and frequently unrelated phenomena identified as intuitive processes.

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IDEOLOGICAL MEANINGS AND USES OF THE INSTINCT CONCEPT

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During the latter half of the twentieth century it tended to be taken for granted within Psychology that 'nativist' or 'hereditarian' theoretical positions were intrinsically right-wing in their ideological connotations, while those of 'environmentalist' positions were left-wing. In this paper, written from the perspective of a critical historian of Psychology, it is suggested that this is too simplistic. As popularly understood the term 'instinct' has at least three meanings, which differ considerably in their ethical register. (1) Instinct = the bestial or animal level of human nature; in Psychology this is found particularly in late nineteenth century evolutionist Psychology and subsequently in Psychoanalysis. (2) Instinct = natural or normal as opposed to artifical or perverse; in Psychology this is how much post-1945 ethology was understood, but more pervasively it may also be seen as underpinning much mainstream early twentieth century US functionalist Psychology in fields such as child and social psychology. (3) Instinct = spontaneous, innate wisdom (e.g. as in 'I took an instinctive dislike to him'); Psychologically the most obvious example is in Jungian Psychology, but it also brings the 'instinct' concept in close relation to that of 'intuition' – generally thought of as a positive ability (sometimes with gender connotations as being more typically female). In none of these senses however can ideological implications be unambiguously drawn.

Psychoanalysis for example was never generally read as providing a rationale for the political right (quite the contrary during the late 1940s in the US). Ethology owed much of its initial appeal to its subversion of established authority symbolism and behaviour (e.g. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1971), despite being 'nativist', although its mid-1970s incorporation into Sociobiology (widely viewed as neo-Social Darwinism) brought this to a halt. One might also note that the idea that homosexuality is genetically

determined is highly ambiguous in its implications – on the one hand it may be seen by gays as legitimating their sexual orientation as 'normal', on the other as legitimating the suppression (or worse) of gayness as an ineradicable – because innate – perversity which must be ruthlessly 'selected' against. Finally the view of instinct as equating to innate wisdom can as easily be co-opted by the extreme right as legitimating irrationalist 'blood and soil' biological mysticism as it can by libertarian 'New Age' thinkers or 'spiritually' inclined psychotherapists. Goldberg (1993) argues that most theoretical positions in Psychology can be adapted by racist ideologists to suit their own ends in a parasitic fashion (albeit some more easily than others). The same can, more generally, be said of 'instinct' – it can indeed be used by those on the right seeking to 'naturalise' the existing economic order, current social power arrangements or group prejudices, but it can also be used by those seeking to oppose totalitarian schemes for radical psychological engineering and social control, those who feel oppressed by virtue of their sexual orientation, or those simply seeking to redress what they feel is an undue over-emphasis on the intellectual and cold-bloodedly rational at the expense of the intuitive, irrational and emotional. Psychologists themselves can only maintain control over the ideological implications that are read into their views of 'instinct' by making explicit their own ideological positions. And not to have an ideological position is an ideological position in itself.

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SESSION 9
"HISTORICIZING INSTINCTS (II)"

INSTINCTS AS INTERACTIVE STRUCTURES: FREUDS' PSYCHOANALYSIS IN A HISTORICAL AND METATHEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

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The time when Freud started formulating the basic postulates of psychoanalytic theory was a time of a widespread use of the concept of instinct (Fine, 1962). Yet, he revised the concept in direction of more variability and amenability (Freud, 1915). As a basic concept - "indispensable for us in psychology" (Freud, 1915) instinct itself underwent a dynamic development within Freud's psychoanalysis.

There are very different models of conceptualizing instincts: reflex arc, representation, interaction, subject and finally a regressive structure. These models build a peculiar metatheoretical history of psychoanalysis as they entail Freud's more or less explicit views on scientific knowledge and more generally on life.

The definition of human nature by referring to its determining instinctive essence and commitment to an ideal of natural science led Freud to a naturalistic fallacy. But at the same time the hermeneutics of instinct theory reveals a socio-historical meaning of naturalism.

Following Marcuse's interpretation of psychoanalysis as a depth social theory (Marcuse, 1955) and taking into account that a turn toward nature necessarily means a turn away from society the question has been raised about the implications of the contemporary shift toward genes as universal explanatory tools in light of the proclaimed end of the social (Baudrillard, 1983)

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THE ANCIENT INSTINCTS OF THE MAN: INSTINCT THEORY OF IMRE HERMANN

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In this paper I would like to give an account of an interesting attempt to establish a complete theory of instincts, based upon the "clinging instinct" which was discovered by a Hungarian psychoanalyst, Imre Hermann.

Imre Hermann (1889–1984) started his carrier as an experimental psychologist who had a strong interest in the natural sciences. At first, he was very critical of psychoanalytic ideas, with which he became familiar in a seminar about Sandor Ferenczi. After being graduated as a medical doctor and serving for 4 years in the army during world war I, he joined the *Hungarian Association of*

Psychoanalysis. He was the only student of Ferenczi's who remained in Hungary after World War II. He has to be credited with ensuring the survival of psychoanalysis in Hungary after years of the persecution of Jews and of Communist dictatorship. All in his life he was a practitioner of psychoanalytic therapy and a trainer of therapists.

Hermann's main contribution to psychoanalysis was the recognition of the fact that the grasp reflex and Moro reflex of the new-born babies can be found in young apes too. But for primates these reflexes have a clear physiological function: they make it possible for the whelp to cling to its mother's fur, while the mother can move around freely. Hermann was a pioneer of ethological observations: beginning in the 20's, he regularly observed the behaviour of primates. He first published his theory of the sameness of the grasping reflex- and Moro reflex in apes and human babies in 1933. He concerned himself with the question, "what is the psychological significance of the sort of reflexes, which do not play the same role in human life as they do in apes?" Hermann assumed that even though the human child does not need to cling to its mother, the existence of inherited reflexes means that it does retain a drive for it. He called this drive "clinging instinct", which has a counterpart, "to go to search". He considered the clinging instinct to be the base of a variety of typical activities of babies and small children: thumb sucking, grasping objects without evident reason, etc.

The discovery of the clinging "drive" fitted in well with the ideas of other representatives of Budapest school, according to which mother and the child have a very unique relationship. Michael Balint referred to Hermann's discovery as another confirming piece of evidence for the originally social character of the human child. On the other hand, the notion of "instinct" remained confused in Hermann's theory. He attempted to develop his findings into a comprehensive theory of instincts, which was first published in 1943 under the title "The ancient instincts of the man". In this theory, Hermann tried to attain two objectives, neither of which could be easily reached. First, he developed his notion of the clinging instinct, or rather the impossibility of its satisfaction in the human child, into a whole theory, assuming that this instinct is involved in a whole variety of behaviours, from aggression to anti-Semitism. Second, he tried to establish an instinct theory, which could be fitted with Freud's one, the latter, of course, also not being free from inconsistencies and contradictions.

Beyond giving an outline of Hermann's clinging instinct I would like to show that his work was strongly determined both by the particular theoretical tenets of the psychoanalytic movement in general, and by local historical conditions.

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DARWINIAN PSYCHOLOGY OLD AND NEW

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Claims that evolutionary psychology is a 'new paradigm' (Buss, 1995, 1997), a 'new science of the mind', (Wright, 1994), do not withstand historical scrutiny. Most American and many British psychologists between c.1890 and c.1925 were engaged in an attempt to settle on a unified definition of the term 'instinct' as a psychological construct. Whilst this enterprise failed in so far as it did not result in the fulfilment of Darwin's hope that psychology would be founded on his ideas, most definitions of

'instinct' employed the notions of inheritance, selection, function and species typicality - just the notions that today underpin the term 'psychological adaptation' in evolutionary psychology.

The likeness of what we may call 'instinct psychology' and evolutionary psychology is not just one concerning concepts and terminology: That is, it is not confined to an appeal to inheritance, selection, function and species typicality as characteristic of psychological faculties or modules. A further and deeper likeness between the two movements can be found in the writings of their most influential advocates. Specifically, William McDougall's Social Psychology (1908) John Tooby and Leda Cosmides' The Psychological Foundations of Culture (1992) are remarkably similar in three respects.

First, both works are presaged with an account about what their thesis is not. This takes the form of a short history of psychology prior to the dawn of Darwinism on its horizon. McDougall argued that hedonism was the predominant error that preceded the correct view that minds are comprised of instincts. Tooby and Cosmides argue that behaviourism is the predominant error that has preceded their correct view that minds are comprised of psychological adaptations. In both cases, the role of these historical accounts is to set the scene such that revelations that follow appear to be revolutionary.

Second, a major part of the McDougall's and Tooby and Cosmides' revolution is the decomposition of the general notion of adaptation into two forms. Both works seek to distinguish between adaptations that have a clear and specifiable physical description and those that have a psychological description. McDougall called the latter instincts. Tooby and Cosmides call them psychological adaptations or Darwinian algorithms. Both claims are radical when considered against the careful manner in which zoologists and behavioural ecologists employ the term adaptation a century ago and today.

Thirdly, both works argue that the study and analysis of societies should be founded on an understanding of the naturally selected and inherited make-up of the human mind. McDougall makes this clear by conceptualising social psychology as a working out of the inter-personal, group and inter-group consequences of individually instantiated instinctive proclivities and tendencies. And it is what Tooby and Cosmides mean by their title, The Psychological Foundations of Culture. The freedom from any form of material or physicalist constraint won by the argument that minds are a second sort of adaptation allowed McDougall and allows Tooby and Cosmides to promote Darwinism as a general paradigm for the human and social sciences.

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GIVING UP INSTINCTS IN PSYCHOLOGY – OR NOT?

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The notion of 'instinct', as it was discussed among experimental psychologists in the early decades of the 20th century, is pivotal to an understanding of the broader theoretical, philosophical and

methodological issues that were being negotiated within psychology at that point in time. As such, I think that an analysis of this notion will provide insights into the ways in which psychology constituted itself as a science. In this paper, I present a case study of the transformation undergone by the notion of instinct by Edward Chace Tolman. I hope to provide an analysis of the debate over the status of instincts in order to (a) get a handle on the nature of the underlying philosophical issues, (b) provide some historical context as to how these issues were resolved, and (c) raise the question how resolved they really are.

I take as my point of departure the work of a particularly bold and prominent instinct theorist, William McDougall. While McDougall's conception of instincts had fallen out of favor in the psychological community by the mid 1920s (in part because he failed to provide convincing criteria for the individuation of instincts, as had the phrenologists before him), I think his work is more interesting and complex than retrospective textbook accounts suggest. More importantly, however, his work inspired several young psychologists, who proceeded to become quite influential figures in their own right. A particularly interesting case can be seen in the development of E. C. Tolman's psychological system, two important components of which were "demands" and "cognitions". I claim that Tolman's notion of "demand" was importantly modeled on McDougall's notion of instinct. Tolman's "operational behaviorism" has to be seen as trying to steer a middle ground between McDougall's mentalistic instinct theory, and the radical anti-instinct campaign waged by Y. Z. Kuo. Given the fact that Tolman is commonly seen as a precursor of modern cognitivism, and given further that operationism is still the methodological dogma of the day, it is highly relevant to understand precisely what historical factors contributed to the ways in which this position took shape.

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SESSION 10
"TRADITIONS AND MODERNISM: PSYCHOLOGY AND CATHOLICISM IN DIFFERENT NATIONAL CONTEXTS"

CATHOLICS IN HUNGARIAN PSYCHOLOGY: DIENES, KORNIS, SCHÜTZ

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Catholic intellectuals had a rather important role in early twentieth century Hungarian psychology. Their work and life represents different attitudes of the relationships between science and the Catholic Church. I am taking three typical examples to illustrate the varieties within one generation.

Valéria Dienes (1879-1978) mathematician and philosopher, pupil of Bergson and Raymond Duncan started as a positivist, trying to combine social engagement and school reform with an objectivist attitude to psychology. After a crisis of faith and recatholization she became a psychological interpeter of Bergson and later a founder of a spiritually engaged expressive dance movement.

While she was the eternal outsider with a Catholic inspiration, Gyula Kornis (1885-1958) was the eternal insider and official, being not only a president of the Academy, but also a leading member of the upper chamber of the Hungarian parliament. In the intellectual turmoil period of the turn of century and in the political turmoil after World War I he tried to present experimental psychology as a science neutral towards issues of faith. And this at the very stronghold of academic Catholicism, at Budapest University. This initiation later lead to the establishment of the functionalist school of Paul von Schiller at the same place.

While Dienes was the troubled, modern Catholic, and Kornis the representant of a conservative 'smuggler' of psychology into the Catholic world, Antal Schütz (1880-1953) tried to combine modern psychology with crucial issues of Catholic dogma. He started with a PhD in experimental psychology, to become a professor of dogmatism. From act psychology of thought he moved towards trying to make a synthesis of Aristotelian thought and contemporary psychology of personality, with constant criticism of evolution, and tributes to the irreducibility of the mind. For him, scientific psychology was to be intertwined with issues central to faith dogma.

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CATHOLICISM AND PSYCHOLOGY IN POST-WAR SPAIN. THE CONTRIBUTION OF MANUEL UBEDA-PURKISS (1913-1999)

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The Civil War (1936-1939) represents the culmination of an ideological contention pervading Spanish life throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries. While one of the opposing parties was

characterized by a progressive, open-minded outlook, the other was deeply rooted in tradition and hostile to the reception of modern ideas. As many scientists, intellectuals and artists belonged to the former group, they were forced to go into exile at the end of the war. Within the country, on the other hand, a strongly conservative, totalitarian regime was then enforced. All aspects of Spanish life and culture suffered the consequences, and psychology, of course, was no exception.

From the beginning, General Franco's military upraise received an unconditional support from Spanish Catholic Church. His revolt was viewed, as it was put in the rhetoric of war propaganda, as a "Crusade" against the evil liberal, democratic and unbelieving tendencies of modern civilization. As a result, a rigid control over education and culture was attempted by the new regime. Specifically, the organization of post-war philosophical and pedagogical studies was entrusted to Father Manuel Barbado, a Dominican Friar who did his best to put psychology back into its old philosophical, neoscholastic framework. When compared with the remarkable scientific level that Spanish psychology had reached before the war, the new situation represented a considerable step backwards.

It is against this background that the contribution of Manuel Ubeda Purkiss will be considered here. Manuel Ubeda-Purkiss was a Dominican Father, too. He had studied under Cajal and went afterwards to the United States, where he collaborated with Clement A. Fox in a number of psychophysiological studies. When he returned to Spain, he was able to play a significant role in the promotion of scientific psychology. As a priest, Ubeda was highly esteemed by governmental authorities; on the other hand, as a trained scientist, he was also much respected by other men of science. He was also a conscientious and prestigious teacher who became deeply involved in the process of institutionalization of Spanish post-war scientific psychology. The aim of this paper is to analyze the significance of Father Ubeda-Purkiss as a bridge-builder between the purely Scholastic point of view adopted by psychology in the early post-war years, and the more scientific approach that was to prevail in the years to follow.

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CONFLICTS AND ASSIMILATION: BEING A CATHOLIC AND A PSYCHOLOGIST IN THE UNITED STATES

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Except for a few dissonant voices, conflicts between being a Catholic and being a psychologist do not appear in the United States today. The history of the past century shows, however, a different story (Misiak & Staudt, 1954). Disputes over the meanings of an experimental psychology, over psychoanalysis in particular and psychotherapy in general, and over the autonomy of psychology from philosophy, especially from Neoscholastic philosophy, have recurred (Gillespie, 2001). For much of the twentieth century, those who sought identities simultaneously as psychologists and as Catholics occupied a marginal position in both communities (Kugelmann, 2000), in what was still a largely

Protestant country. Assimilation, a great social category in American society, has proven the primary way out of the margins. The presentation will consider the early years (epitomized by Thomas Verner Moore at the Catholic University of America) of these conflicts, the post-World War II period of assimilation, especially with the establishment of the American Catholic Psychological Association (1947-1970), and the post Vatican II period, when Catholic identity became problematic and identity as a psychologist became normalized as a middle class career path. This history illustrates complexities in the relationships among institutions, social, political, and religious, in the establishment of psychology as a science and as a profession.

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SESSION 11
"SCIENTISTS' BIOGRAPHIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES"

APPROACHES TO SCIENTIFIC BIOGRAPHY
THE CASE OF HANS EYSENCK

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Hans Eysenck was one of the most famous and the most cited psychologists of the post-war era. Émigré son of German film and stage performers, he cut a compelling profile in intelligence and personality research in the second half of the 20th century. He also played a pivotal role in shaping the development of clinical psychology in Britain. His strong stands and renowned pugnacity made him many enemies as well as friends, and divided scientific opinion. His legacy remains no less fractured, with numerous proteges carrying out 'the program' at a variety of sites, while elsewhere the non-colonised engage in work that is far removed or overtly antipathetic.

Eysenck's commitment to precise measurement, quantifiable entities and rigorous testability made him the über-positivist of British psychology. For Eysenck, valid knowledge came from the kind of science he idealised as disinterested, sceptical and communal – a prosecution of the whole truth and nothing but the truth. A kind of "philosophy of physics envy," it was a goal he pursued with a relentlessly cool detachment. He distrusted traditional authority based on elite status or presumed expertise, and denounced all he deemed personal and subjective.

Although he played a key role in the development of behavioral therapies, he was more at home with the machinations of data than with the manifestations of depression. Eysenck always dismissed charges that his work was incomplete, contorted and inhuman. He consistently urged us to trust the numbers not the scientist. Yet as a popularizer of psychological science, he had an elite status and a celebrity power that he did not hesitate to use. And despite his insistence on impersonal science, he was widely distrusted by many of his peers and often attacked in a very personal manner.

Most biographical subjects in the history of science are in their own way interesting and influential. Part of the challenge in the case of Eysenck revolves around his prodigious scholarly output, the diversity of his interests and effects, and the wealth of commentary about him. However, the biggest challenge in dealing with such a controversial figure is to achieve a style and level of analysis that rises above the partisan, one that accounts for this sustained divergence of opinion, its origin and its function. More particularly we may ask: what was it about the 'Eysenck style' that made him so successful and yet so loathed?

Wildly divergent opinions about Eysenck's legacy reflect the peculiar ways in which scientists retrospectively account for truth and error. Contemporary scientific judgements about the knowledge claims contained in any given body of work often make reference to the anticipatory value of this work, making such judgements at least implicitly historical. Moreover, these judgements tend to have a methodological and moral aspect. They represent, in part, a re-drawing of the boundaries between good science and bad science, between bad science and fraudulent science. Changing evaluations of Eysenck's contribution, or doubts about particular aspects of his work, illustrate this process at work and may even signal a retrenchment of particular research programs and the collapse of alliances. However, questions remain as to the biographer's role in documenting and potentially intervening in this process.

This project builds on previous work in the history of personality testing and clinical psychology that explicitly examined the tension between trust in expert judgement and trust in numbers.

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"HERZEN THE FATHER AND HERZEN THE SON: A DISCUSSION OF SCIENCE AND FREEDOM"

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The paper deals with the argument about free will and determinism between A. I. Herzen (1812-1870) and his son, the physiologist A. A. Herzen (1839-1906). The polemics between father and son touched upon such burning questions of the day as materialism in understanding human beings, positivism as scientific methodology, and the relation of the nascent human sciences to the natural sciences.

In the words of a historian of Russia, E. Lampert, the older Herzen was a "materialist enraged by materialism"[1]. This dilemma seems to be characteristic of the entire 1840s' generation of Russian intelligentsia. One of Dostoevsky's biographers, Joseph Frank, believes that "Notes from Underground" (1864) is directly about this problem: "as a well-trained member of the intelligentsia, the underground man intellectually accepts ... determinism, but it is impossible for him really to live with its conclusions"[2]. In the case of the Herzen's discussion, different parts of the drama were played out by the father and the son.

It is well known that during his younger years, A. I. Herzen seriously studied science. When his first child, Sasha, was born, he dreamed of bringing him up in the scientific spirit. The dream came true, and Sasha became a physiologist. By that time, however, Herzen the father had accumulated many objections against the way the natural sciences understood human beings. To make things worse, Sasha began to argue against his father's most cherished ideals. Following his teachers, the physiologists Karl Vogt and Moritz Schiff, he announced free will an illusion. In 1867-68, the argument took written shape: the younger Herzen contributed a book on the "physiology of will", and the older Herzen replied in the famous "Letter on free will" where he argued against the physiologists' monopoly over the "real". He insisted that, together with free will, the "moral independence of man is a truth and reality as undeniable as his dependence on the environment"[3].

In search of a science that would support his standpoint, the older Herzen turned one after the other towards various sciences. Psychology was the first: at first, Herzen called the reality so dear to him, "psychological, or, if you like, anthropological"[4]. But he was quickly disillusioned: following the model of physiology, contemporary psychology sought to be an experimental science and to establish causal links in the material world. Sociology was equally disappointing: in the view of its founder, Auguste Comte, it was to become a "positive" science in pursuit of social laws. The founding father of yet another human science, statistics, Adolphe Quetelet, had completely subjugated individuals to the laws of big numbers. Even history attempted, with the help of Thomas Henry Buckle, to imitate the natural sciences by identifying repeating patterns of events. None of these disciplines considered individuals and their freedom to be its own subject matter, none recognized freedom as its "reality".

In search of rhetorical devices that would persuade his son, Herzen turned towards literature. In 1867, in the course of his discussion with Schiff and Sasha, he recalled his early novella, "Dr Krupov" (1847). To express his philosophical point, Herzen created a new character, Dr Krupov's colleague and a homemade philosopher, Tit Leviaphansky ("Variations psychiatrique sur le thème du docteur Kroupoff', 1868). Arguing with the rationalist, Krupov, Leviaphansky offers a hymn to the "great protective madness, which has been improving and guiding us through the centuries". Without madness, "we would be reduced to logic and mathematics"[5]. Leviaphansky, in fact, argues that what opposes scientific rationality is not unreason, or madness, but a wider notion of rationality[6]. Only in this way, Herzen believed, would science be able to recognize the reality of freedom.

Herzen the son tried to argue with his father till nearly the end of his life-long career in physiology. But his arguments led him, on the one hand, to the impasse of a "physiological metaphysics" which incorporates morality and freedom into the organism. On the other hand, negating consciousness and free will, the younger Herzen ended up with an absurd conception of consciousness as a process of destruction, a "disintegration" of nervous links[7]. Even his colleagues, the physiologists, felt uneasy about this "physiological nihilism" (in the words of a historian).[8]

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1 Lampert, E. (1957) *Studies in Rebellion.* London: Routledge. Pag. 191.

2 Frank, J. (1986) *Dostoevsky: The Stir of Liberation, 1860-1865.* Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. Pag. 319.

3 Herzen, A.I. (1975) 'S togo berega', in: *Sobranie sochinenii v 8 tomakh.* Vol. 1 Moscow: Pravda. Pag. 333.

4 Herzen, A.I. (1948) 'Pis'mo synu – A. A. Herzenu', in: *Izbrannye filosofskie proizvedeniia.* Vol. 2 Moscow: OGIZ. Pag. 298.

5 Herzen, A.I. (1975) 'Aphorismata: po povodu psikhiatricheskoi teorii doktora Krupova', in: *Sobranie sochinenii v 8 tomakh.* Vol. 1 Moscow: Pravda. Pag. 476-474.

6 The 'rationalities of everyday life', as the ethnomethodologist Harold Garfinkel has termed it. See Anthony Giddens, Introduction, in: *Positivism and Sociology*, ed. by Anthony Giddens (Aldershot: Gower, 1987), 11.

7 Herzen, A.(1887) *Le Cerveau et l'activité cérébrale au point de vue psychophysiologique.* Paris: Baillière.Pag. 210.

8 Gauchet, M. (1992) *L'inconscient cérébral.* Paris: Seuil. Pag. 149.

MERCEDES RODRIGO (1891-1982). A WOMAN FOR THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY

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During the last decades many historians have been focusing on the role played by women in the development of Sciences, and Psychology is not an exception here. In the research of the History of Psychology in Spain, a figure appeared, very scarcely referred to, although a widely known name, by the founders of Spanish modern Psychology but with ceremonial purposes. This figure turned out to be the missing piece to fulfil the complex structure of interdisciplinary relationships which is to be found in the early developments of Psychology in Spain, more precisely in the School of Madrid, during the first third of the XXth century. And this piece was to be quite simply the psychological one, and a woman also.

The beginnings of this development show very clearly that application was the main interest. Spain was immersed in a process of deep renovation in all its social structures, especially in what refers to the modernization of public education and industrial production, and was also very keen to the implantation of clinical psychology through hygienic legislation within every aspect of society. That is why in this period we find pedagogues, psychiatrists, engineers, and lawyers as the main factors in its

consecution. But in this roll we were missing the psychologist, that is, the specialist in the technology which was to be on the basis of this process, and this was Mercedes Rodrigo, one of the first persons in our country to have received a specifically psychological training, and the first Spanish woman psychologist in any case.

Mercedes Rodrigo (1891-1982) studied at the Institute J.J. Rousseau in Geneva, and there collaborated in the investigations being carried out by Edouard Claparède and Jean Piaget. Once returned, she stands for the specialist in Educational and Professional Guidance in the Psichotechnic Institute of Madrid (later National Institute of Applied Psychology), directed by G. R. Lafora, and carried out very important studies on intelligence in the context of public school throughout the territory, along with J. Germain. The more conspicuous presence of women in the field of educational psychology has been pointed out, but Mercedes Rodrigo extended her activities also to Especial Education and Scientific Management among other fields of scarce development in Spain, in institutions such as the Institute for the Reeducation of the Disabled Workers (Instituto de Reeducación de Inválidos del Trabajo) and the Psychological Clinic of the Juvenile Court.

We think the explanation of the little attention payed to this figure among Spanish researchers is due to certain aspects of her personal and professional life. She maintained a close relation with the Spanish Republican Government during the Civil War, which forced her into exile in Colombia, where she is considered the absolute pioneer of institutional applied psycholog. And this circumstance, as well as the fact of being a woman, favoured a cautious distance from by her Spanish colleagues who were to stay in Spain, in spite of her being a forerunner in scientific psychotechnics, and a later ample oblivion by the following generations.

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FRIEDRICH SANDER – "BLACK SHEEP" OR "SCAPEGOAT" OF GERMAN PSYCHOLOGY

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In 2004 the German society of psychology will celebrate its 100th anniversary. As the Germans belong to the founders of academic psychology this event will raise international attention. The outstanding characters of German psychology will once again reveal their importance for the development of international psychology: Wilhelm Wundt and Karl Bühler, William Stern and Wolfgang Köhler or (post war) Friedrich Hofstätter and Wolfgang Metzger. Surprisingly these names are not identical with the leading figures of the professional organisation (although all of them except Wundt have been members of the board for some time). Under the persons who have exercised a vital position in the society and thus were elected repeatedly as a chairman we find less prominent psychologists like Georg Elias Müller (Chair from 1904-1927), Felix Krueger (1933-1936), Erich Richard Jaensch (1936-1945) and Friedrich Sander (1955-1960).

From a historical point of view the biographies of second rank representatives of science turn out to be exciting, especially when they reveal the behaviour of academic "mandarins" under the conditions of political change. In an extended study Simone Wittmann and me have focused on the scientific biography of Friedrich Sander (1889-1971), who was member of the board between 1935 and 1945 and later was elected as a chairman in 1955 and 1957 (up to 1960). Sander's academic career had taken a spectacular start as Wilhelm Wundt's last assistant at the famous Leipzig Institute (1913/14). In 1919 he was taken over by Wundt's successor, Felix Krueger. After his second dissertation (Habilitation) in 1922, he first was appointed as an associate professor at Giessen (1929), then as a university professor at Jena (1933). After an unintentional interruption he continued and fulfilled his academic career even beyond formal retirement at the university of Bonn (1954-1960). His work originally focused on experimental inquiries of perception ("Aktualgenese" = "microgenesis") and on diagnostical issues concerning personality and professional ability, later on advanced towards structure theories and the psychology of art.

Nowadays the traces of Sander's person and work in German psychology are almost lost. For sure this is not only caused by his rare publishing nor by his attachment to Krueger's Leipzig School of Holistic and Structural Psychology which was expelled from German tradition after World War II. In fact the reason can be seen in his academic policy under the Nazi regime which reveals more loyalty and adjustment as can be tolerated from the point of view of today. Unfortunately Sander's decent participation in Nazi affairs seems to be more typical for university teachers than the rare examples of active collaboration (e.g. by Jaensch) or open protest (e.g. by Köhler). After World War II this moderate – nevertheless incriminating – behaviour could be pushed away and "forgotten", and that in Sander's own opinion like in the minds of his contemporaries. So the fact (or scandal) is not really surprising that Sander who had been banned from university teaching between 1945 to 1953 was elected chairman of the German psychology as a whole only two years later. German psychology was not worried until the former party member Sander was to direct the International Conference of Psychology at Bonn, an event which should help German psychology to regain the trust of the international scientific world.

It sounds like an irony of fate that the activities pointing to nationalist and anti-Semitic expressions in Sander's work themselves turned out to be more than dubious. After diverse denunciations Sander had to give up all his positions under irritating and humiliating circumstances. With the distance of four decades neither Sander's own position nor that of his open and hidden antagonists can be fully accepted. In my point of view at least in Germany an unbiased and emotionally unconcerned approach to human (and academic) behaviour in National Socialism has not been achieved up to the present. Neither the confused activities after 1945, nor the blind restorations of the Fifties and Sixties, nor the vehement clearing activities of the Seventies and Eighties have been able to establish a sober discussion and an impartial assessment of the complex political conditions of science under National Socialism. To the generation of Sander we owe a new and continuous attempt of working out what has happened and who was concerned. This cannot only provide a fair judgement of the historical persons but also a fair treatment of their scientific work. Far from being attached to faschist ideology Sander's experimental work could still and even nowadays be good for an impetus towards vital dynamic and developmental aspects in the psychology of perception and psychology in general.

SESSION 12
"INTERSECTIONS OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY"

A PSYCHOLOGY OF EMPATHY IN THE CLINIC: LUDWIG BINSWANGER'S EARLY PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

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The early years of the twentieth century in Germany saw numerous efforts to develop a psychology of empathy (Einfühlung) which sought to determine how other individuals and aesthetic objects could be understood[1]. Unlike individual inner perception and introspection, empathy was an intersubjective process overlooked by most mainstream developments in the new psychology. The interpersonal domain, along with the observer's experience of a work of art served as intertwined loci for alternative psychological epistemologies: epistemologies which sought to systematize the murky realm of feeling, expression and phenomenological intuition. These epistemologies conjoined the intuitive eye to the feeling self in an emphasis on ways of seeing or intuition (innere Wahrnehmung, Wesensschau) and forms of feeling (Gefühl, Einfühlung).

This paper will focus on one significant, but undocumented attempt to mine these psychological approaches: the phenomenological psychopathology of the Swiss psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger (1881-1966). As the director of the elite Bellevue asylum on the shores of Lake Constance from 1911-1956, Binswanger is perhaps best known for employing Heidegger's existential analytic of Dasein for his existential analysis of psychotic patients beginning in the 1930s, but prior to this time Binswanger had already made repeated forays into phenomenological psychopathology. In this paper, I explore Binswanger's attempt to utilize the work of Lipps, Scheler and Husserl for the clinical task of revealing his patients' altered psychological realities.

[1] Among those I am including in such a group are: Theodor Lipps, Max Scheler, Mortiz Geiger and Edith Stein, although this list is selective. The philosopher Michael Theunissen, in his extensive work on the social ontology of the other includes Wilhelm Dilthey, Ernst Troeltsch, Eduard Spranger and Max Weber as advocates of an 'empathy psychology'. See *Der Andere: Studien zur Sozialontologie d. Gegenwart* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1977).

IMPORTING PHENOMENOLOGY INTO NORTH AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY

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In the middle decades of the twentieth century, phenomenological thought arrived in North America and asserted influence in psychology and psychotherapy. At the time, Adrian van Kaam (1961) realized that it was not simply a transfer of ideas, but a translation to different cultural milieus, ones not immediately devastated by two world wars[1]. Cultural conceptions about science, especially its ties with economic advancement, the dominance of behaviorism and psychoanalysis, and the divorce of psychology and philosophy served to marginalize phenomenological psychological discourse. Rollo May, Adrian van Kaam, Raymond McCall, Amedeo Giorgi, and others carved out a clearing for phenomenological psychology, employing specific rhetorical strategies, including Kuhnian arguments about paradigm shifts, the theme of the crisis of psychology, and scientism. The institutional settings for the reception of phenomenology—the growth of universities and of clinical psychology—a cultural

shift emphasizing the constraints of conformity, and changes already taking place in psychology in North America nourished the ground for phenomenology.

[1] Van Kaam, A. (1961). The impact of existential phenomenology on the psychological literature of western Europe. *Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry*, 1, 63-92.

THE POST WORLD WAR II DISAPPEARANCE OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY IN THE NETHERLANDS

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Prior to and following WW II a loose movement within Dutch psychology eventually solidified as a nascent phenomenological psychology. Supported by German, Belgian and French colleagues, Dutch phenomenological psychologists and criminologists attempted to generate an understanding of psychology that was based on interpretations of phenomenological philosophy, largely Husserlian in inspiration. Although never widely accepted, this movement came to a sudden halt in the 1960s even though it was exported to North America and elsewhere as 'Phenomenological Psychology.' Frequently referred to as the 'Utrecht School,' most of the activity of the group was centered on Utrecht University although it was less a school than a group of loosely affiliated individuals.

In this paper we examine the role played by Johannes Linschoten in both aspects of the development of a phenomenological psychology: its rise and its institutional demise. Linschoten was Buytendijk's most prominent student and succeeded to the latter's chair upon Buytendijk's retirement in 1957. By the time of his early death in 1964, Linschoten had cast considerable doubt on the possibilities of a pure phenomenological psychology. Nonetheless, his empirical work can be seen to be a form of empirical psychology that was inspired by phenomenology but that clearly distanced itself from the more elitist and esoteric aspects of Dutch phenomenological psychology.

SESSION 13
"PHILOSOPHY AND METHODS OF PSYCHOLOGY"

PSYCHOLOGY OR SEMIOTICS; PERSONS OR SUBJECTS?

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The 1960s explosion of various forms of European "structuralism" (based initially , on Saussurean Linguistics), and its various post-structuralist successors, have undercut the more established Anglophone discipline of Psychology by relativising its epistemological assumptions.

This paper discusses the principal theoretical implications for Psychology as an empirical social science that have been asserted by writers based in contemporary "Cultural Studies" (the new Anglo-American field of study that most directly grows out of the post-structuralist, Continental movements). I consider:

1. The putative displacement of the humanistic concept of a person/personality understood as bio-socially caused, by a more idealist concept of abstracted "subjectivity" as a *place* or *space* in language or in other semiotic systems or processes.
2. The phenomenological description of "affect(s)" and the rejection of causal dynamic concepts like "drives", in pseudo-explanatory contexts.
3. The social (or semiotic) construction of the subject as an attempt to avoid "essentialism" and "determinism" (e.g. of sexual or gendered identity).
4. The epistemological incoherence (as I see it) of such approaches from a realist perspective, taking reified and/or circular notions such as non-relational "difference" as my example.

I conclude that post-structuralism has attempted to challenge the notion of a "science" of behaviour or of "the mind", and sought to re-draw the disciplinary boundaries of the social sciences. That it has been rhetorically persuasive cannot be doubted, despite what might be seen as its merely verbal, rather than substantive, explanatory and hermeneutic achievements.

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PHENOMENOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHODS

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The Utrecht School in the fifties and sixties of the twentieth century has been famous for its contributions to phenomenological psychology, or at least to a phenomenological orientation in psychology (see also the paper by Stam, Van Hezewijk and Panhuysen, this conference). One of its (alleged?) members—Johannes Linschoten—has published work in English that has stimulated phenomenology abroad—especially in the Anglo-Saxon countries. However, other work by Linschoten not published in English has been influential on a less obvious, though still professed use of a phenomenological approach in linguistics. This paper explores possible roots and connections of the

present use in linguistics and the variety of phenomenological psychology that Johannes Linschoten suggested in his less read works.

Especially the relation between Linschotens dissertation in German (Linschoten, 1956) and other work by Linschoten (Linschoten, 1959, 1962) the work of Willem J. Levelt (Levelt, 1982, 1984, 1989, 1996) compared with that of Ray Jackendoff (Ray Jackendoff, 1987; R. Jackendoff, 1987; Jackendoff, 1991, 1996), both in the Chomsky tradition in linguistics.

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THE HEURISTIC POTENTIAL OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO PSYCHOLOGY.

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The Utrecht School, blossoming in the fifties and early sixties of the twentieth century, has been famous for its contributions to phenomenological psychology, or at least to a phenomenological orientation in psychology (see also the paper by Stam, Van Hezewijk and Panhuysen, and by Van Hezewijk, Stam and Panhuysen, this conference). The heuristic potential of the phenomenological approach is in particular present in publications wherein Johannes Linschoten summarised the major tenets of the Utrecht School (e.g. 1953). This paper offers an analysis of the heuristic implications of the phenomenological point of view. It shows too, how these heuristics are at work in Linschoten's more specialised publications in the domain of emotion. After the premature death of Linschoten in 1964 and the consequent sudden death of the Utrecht school, the phenomenological inspiration was kept alive elsewhere by some psychologists writing in this field, e.g.. R.S. Lazarus These authors did not only reinstate the cognitive perspective on emotion, but they did also practise a kind of phenomenological analysis. Perhaps through this sideway, phenomenology, although after some necessary transformations, will become again a steady job for psychologists studying cognition and, especially, consciousness. (See, for instance, the book of R.D. Ellis, 1995).

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REALISM AND THE MEANING OF MEANING IN SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY

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In a recent challenge to the realist critics of social constructionism, Stam (2001), echoing calls for a "psychology of practical significance", complains of "the lack of a large, explicitly realist, body of work in psychology", so that "once one argues for a psychology that is explicitly realist (as opposed to constructionist, phenomenalist, instrumentalist, etc.), we are suddenly left with very little to go on".

The present paper takes as its starting point Stam's challenge. It is true that the characteristics and implications of a realist psychology are rarely, if ever, spelled out systematically by its supporters. But even more serious, though perhaps not unconnected causally, is the fact that one of the major reasons for the dissatisfaction with realist, scientific psychology and for the rise and influence of various hermeneutically-oriented "successor projects" (Gergen 1991) has been mainstream psychology's scientistic neglect of one of its central variables, that is - meaning.

The paper is divided into two sections. The first presents a historical and conceptual critique, examining the reasons for the failure of scientific psychology to develop an acceptable theory of the meaning of meaning, and *a fortiori*, to provide a successful programme for the empirical investigation of meaning. It is argued that scientific psychology's self-imposed isolation from philosophical inquiry has had a number of unfortunate consequences. Firstly, it has prevented psychology from grappling critically with theories of meaning from a variety of related disciplines (philosophy, semiotics, hermeneutics, etc.), with the result that elements of these theories have filtered through into the mainstream (as mental representations, psycholinguistic meanings, attributions in cognitive and social psychology, etc.) where they remain unexamined and theoretically problematic. In addition, psychology seems unaware of much of the more recent work on meaning in these other disciplines (such as the shift from the philosophy of language to the philosophy of mind as the problem of meaning becomes the problem of intentionality, the move to centre stage of naturalism in psychosemantics (Garfield 2000), the "epistemological restructuration" (Bouissac 1998) of the psychology/semiotics interface under the impact of evolutionary biology, and so on). A further consequence of isolation from philosophical inquiry has been psychology's failure to spell out the basic tenets and implications of realism, including the core elements of the scientific approach. This has led, in turn, to confused theorising (e.g., that realism, insofar as it postulates a mind-independent reality, cannot cope with the concept of meaning, which is clearly mind-dependent, or that meaning is inescapably relative and so demands a relativist or constructivist epistemology). In sum, various factors have contributed to the long-sustained nexus of science, realism, objectivity, causal explanation and quantitative methods, and the opposition of this to the nexus of meaning, relativism/constructivism, subjectivity, hermeneutic explanation and qualitative methods.

The second section of the paper offers a positive contribution, by setting out the implications of realism and science for a comprehensive and coherent theory of meaning. This process includes the development of a descriptive taxonomy of different types of meaning (indicative signs, conventional signs and symbols, non-conventional symbolic phenomena, experiential meanings, and "mixed"

semiotic phenomena). It then proceeds with an analysis of the logical constraints on meaning as a (typically three-term) relation, followed by the psychological requirements which flow from the necessary inclusion of a cognising organism in the meaning relation. This then requires an exposition of the role of cognition and motivation in the theory of meaning, which in turn collapses the (pseudo-) distinction between the "logical space of reasons" and the "descriptive space of causes and effects". As a result of these considerations, the existing nexus are dissolved and their elements are rearranged; it becomes clear why the treatment of meaning in scientific psychology has been unfocused, impoverished and confused - and why the few recent attempts which have been made to introduce a science of meaning into psychology (e.g., DeGrandpre 2000) are also seriously hampered.

Finally, it is argued that the groundwork for this approach to meaning was laid by Freud (Petocz 1999), but that his contribution has been overlooked in mainstream psychology because of the alleged unscientific status of his theory. Yet, just as the recent shift in the neurosciences towards investigating consciousness and the emotions within an organismic, holistic, evolutionary perspective, has led to a marriage with psychoanalysis (viz. neuro-psychoanalysis), so, too, a return to Freud's work may prove salutary for a realist psychological theory of meaning.

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THE PREHISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY'S QUANTITATIVE IMPERATIVE

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The quantitative imperative is the view that investigating something scientifically means measuring it. From the second half of the nineteenth century, psychologists endorsed this view and over the past half-century commitment to it has been so strong within the mainstream of psychology that the definition of measurement has been distorted in order to protect it Michell, 1999) and the introduction of non-quantitative (or qualitative) methods has been, and still is, strenuously resisted (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). Its dominance of methodology within psychology is justified within that discipline by characterising it as a natural extension of the accepted canons of scientific method (Kline, 1998). However, to the extent that these canons entail the critical scrutiny and, where possible, observational test of all hypotheses, psychology's commitment to the quantitative imperative is actually contrary to scientific method. Not only is there no evidence that psychological attributes, such as the various cognitive abilities or personality traits, possess quantitative structure (as distinct from merely ordinal structure), but also very little attempt has been made within psychology to test the hypothesis that psychological attributes are quantitative nor to subject this hypothesis to any form of serious,

critical scrutiny. In this sense, psychology's commitment to this imperative is deeply pathological (Michell, 2000).

This means that historians of psychology cannot explain psychology's strong commitment to this imperative as simply due to its strong commitment to scientific method as conventionally understood. An explanation must be found elsewhere. Some have suggested that the explanation lies in psychology's commitment to positivism (Lincoln & Guba, 2000), but this is hardly plausible given, first, that psychology's commitment to the quantitative imperative pre-dated its belated and diluted commitment to positivism and, second, that positivism itself remained ambivalent about the quantitative imperative (Michell, In Press). Others have suggested that psychology's commitment to this imperative derives from the success of quantitative physics (Ebbinghaus, 1908). Certainly, it cannot be denied that this success contributed to the interest psychologists had in attempting to introduce quantitative methods into their discipline in the first place. However, by itself, it does not explain the more pathological features of this interest.

In this paper, it is argued that an adequate understanding of this phenomenon requires a deeper appreciation of the pre-history of the quantitative imperative and, in particular, its close association with the Pythagorean vision of reality. This vision of reality has a number of features that make it attractive not only to scientists, but to bureaucrats, economists, philosophers, theologians and mystics as well. As a result, it has an uninterrupted history across almost three millennia and close associations with both scientific and non-scientific strains of thought. When elements of this history are exposed, a clearer understanding can be gained of its attractions to psychologists and of the reasons for their unwavering adherence to it.

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CONSTRUCTIVIST AND CONSTRUCTIONIST PSYCHOTHERAPIES

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During the last decade, the database PsicInfo has collected 170 abstracts corrresponding to the key words 'epistemology' and 'psychotherapy'. This number is not elevated if we take into account that we would come to 17 articles each year on the average. This feature explains somehow the lack of attention epistemology has on the literature about therapy.

In this paper, we try to reveal the close link between knowledge and psychotherapy. Based on this relation, and with regard to the concepts founded on it, we will discuss some general aspects about constructivist and constructionist psychotherapies. In this respect, we try to show some of the gaps existing in the constructivist and constructionist psychotherapies, both of them belonging to postmodernism. These two movements are at the same time set against each other on the conception which supports them, the mental aspect on the one hand, and the social aspect on the other hand.

There is another type of psychotherapy, the behavior therapy, which due to its atheoricist tradition, probably inherited from Skinner, has not worked much on epistemology. The main production of this approach has much more to do with the developing of techniques, interventions, explanatory models, and efficiency studies than with all the aforementioned. However, between 1996 and 2001, and returning to the articles reported on PsicInfo, we notice an increase in the number of articles relating the behavior therapy and the epistemology.

It has been said/suggested that epistemology should not be an instrument of justification (because it could become a prescription), but rather of analysis. The previous condition to an analysis is to have something to be analysed, in this case, an established/standard therapeutical practice. As a general rule, the therapeutical constructivism and constructionism epistemology tries to justify, "epistemologically", a therapeutical practice which hardly exists, whereas the epistemological reflexions on the behavior teraphy have *something* to say. The reason why this is like this is due to the fact that the behavior therapy is an established therapeutical practice, whereas therapeutical constructivism and constructionism are recent practices with a short evolution, they started developing as such practices in the eighties. However, each one of these situations has its advantages and disadvantages. The disadvantages of the first case, that is to say, the behavior therapy, would be that the fact of beeing a standard practice could have also lead to its own solidification, and therefore, the epistemological reflection would not have much effect on the practice. In the second case, it might happen that the epistemological prescriptions could not be put into practice (were not operational) and therefore meaningless. The advantages of the first case woul be, obviously, the already existing therapeutical practice on which we could make changes, whereas in the second case, the advantages would lie in the fact that such changes do hardly exist as such, and therefore the introduction of this therapy would be from the beginning much more free when it came to establishing it.

On the other hand, it could happen that "so many labels" betray us once a form of therapy has initiated. What would happen if a therapy is called constructivist or constructionist and then it works using behavioural strategies? ¿And if the behavior therapy were more constructivist than the very constructivist or constructionist therapy? In this paper we consider that the epistemological reflexion is the tool which has to take care of all of this "labelling" and far from beeing considered of small relevance, it is a procedure to develop and optimize the current techniques.

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SESSION 14
"HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES: GENERAL ASPECTS"

JOHN ANDERSON'S THEORY OF GENERALITY AND PARTICULARITY: A VITAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES OR THE RHETORIC OF A NAIVE REALIST?

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John Anderson held the chair of Philosophy at the University of Sydney from 1927 until his retirement in 1958. His leaving Scotland for Australia was said to be "... the greatest single piece of intellectual good fortune our country [Australia] has ever experienced" (Passmore, 1977, p. 53) and in the judgement of David Stove (1977), one of the most rigorous critics of modern philosophical orthodoxies, Anderson was "... easily the most intelligent person I have ever known" (p. 45).

Anderson's philosophical position was in place by the late 1930s and aspects of it can be found in the works of some of his students, e.g., Armstrong (1997), Mackie (1974), Maze (1983) and Passmore (1970). It is both a *general* philosophy and a philosophy of the human sciences - it holds views on a range of issues including epistemology, logic, social theory, education, ethics and aesthetics. It is realist and pluralist and, therefore, opposed to idealism and the latter's commitments to monism, relativism and dualism. Its most distinctive thesis is: whatever there is, is an occurrence or situation in space and time; the least we can say of anything whether a stone, an emotion or a social movement is that it exists or occurs, it does so at a certain place and it does so for a certain amount of time. Not surprisingly, given Anderson's realism, the possibility of objective knowledge (of finding out what is the case) is not doubted and neither is the possibility of objective description, though he recognises the many obstacles to achieving either.

These views do, of course, set this realist philosophy apart from the various versions of social constructionist metatheory. Yet it also shares a number of features with social constructionism. Both: (i) reject any epistemology which involves mediated cognition; (ii) reject any theory of language which has statements or propositions as linguistic entities that are either true or false; (iii) reject any theory of meaning which makes meaning a constituent of the mind; (iv) reject the view that there can be no scientific inquiry free from the motives of social interests; (v) develop a relational and interactionist ontology; (vi) accept the Heraclitean doctrine that things are constantly changing and infinitely complex; (vii) recognize the importance of context to social life; (viii) hold the view that there is no such thing as the pure individual apart from society; (ix) reject essentialism, and (x) hold the view that there are no such things as pure universals.

These last two commonalities in particular are not generally recognised as such by social constructionists. They falsely assume that realist philosophy involves only a 'things' ontology, an assumption which appears to lie at the root of their rejection of essentialism and their rejection of universals (e.g., Gergen, 1999; Shotter, 1998). With respect to the *nature* of, for example, memory, attitudes, intentions, motives, emotions, etc., social constructionists '... do not believe that there is any such nature to be discovered' (Danziger, 1997, p. 408), and the view that scientific knowledge is a search for universal, abstract, decontextualized essences which cause psycho-social phenomena is dismissed by them as a modernist illusion. The psycho-social world is taken to be a world of particulars (particular relations) and particulars are, by definition, historical and context specific.

This, of course, has implications for psychology as a science. It is not consistent with the orthodox view that the selection of certain *invariant* relations is necessary in explaining how some psycho-social system works, although it must be noted that on occasion social constructionism appears not to be entirely at odds with this (e.g., Shotter, 1993). Nevertheless, social constructionism's

propensity for the particular is judged to be an essential corrective to positivist philosophy and one which drives the recent interest in qualitative research. Such research is said to provide the necessary contextual information which is ignored in quantitative research methodology (Guba & Lincoln, 1994).

Although Anderson's realism shares with social constructionism the thesis that there are no pure universals, it rejects the particularisation that characterises social constructionist metatheory. This paper examines the solution proposed by Anderson in his theory of generality and particularity.

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WHY ARE SOME SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATIONS NOT RECOGNIZED AS IMPORTANT UNTIL RATHER LATE? COMPARISON OF "CLASSICS" AND "SLEEPERS" IN PSYCHOLOGICAL JOURNALS

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If noticed at all by the scientific community, scientific publications are usually forgotten fast; they tend to age quickly. Biometrically, this aging process is displayed by a decline in citation rates, that is, reference is no longer made to the respective publications. A few works, however, are still cited even one hundred years after publication. Some of them were recognized by the scientific community soon after publication ("classics"); others were not noticed until much later ("sleepers").

Which factors determine whether publications became "classics" or "sleepers"? Answers to this question can give us some indication of how the scientific community relates to the scientific past.

The problem was investigated by reference to two psychological journals, both founded in 1890, *Zeitschrift für Psychologie* and *Psychological Review*. All articles published in either of these journals between 1890 and 1920 and cited more than 25 times in the *Web of Science* up to the year 2000 were considered. We found 29 articles that fulfilled these criteria. Papers cited rarely or not at all or during the eleven years after publication were classified as "sleepers" (18), papers cited more often during this period were categorized as "classics" (11).

Which factors determine whether an article is a "classic" or a "sleeper"? We investigated whether the selected articles corresponded to the psychological zeitgeist of the time they were published, whether they contained hypotheses deduced theoretically, whether the authors were affiliated to psychological schools, and whether innovative methods were used. Furthermore, we investigated the predecessors and successors of the respective articles in terms of scientific development. Two methods of investigation were used: a qualitative approach (analysis of the scientific

content of the articles) and a quantitative, bibliometric approach (co-citation analysis using the *Social Sciences Citation Index* and the *Science Citation Index*).

It emerged that the subject matter of the "classics" corresponded more closely to the psychological zeitgeist of the time of publication (investigation of geometric-optical illusions, for instance) than the content of the "sleepers" did. Moreover, the authors of "classics" were more likely to have belonged to psychological schools (associationism, pragmatism, behaviorism, Gestalt psychology) than the authors of "sleepers." There is no recognizable difference in the use of innovative methods between the two categories, however. In terms of scientific development, "sleepers" had fewer predecessors than "classics." Co-citation analysis was used to identify academics who communicated the old articles to the contemporary scientific community in their publications, thus functioning as junctions in the scientific communication between the past and the present. These were historically interested scholars who published theoretically important works in the fields of psychology and neurophysiology. For the most part, the "sleepers" captured scientific attention gradually. In two cases, however, the scientific response to the "sleepers" was rather sudden.

Conclusions are drawn on the factors affecting the dissemination of scientific results and the advancement of psychology. All told, the citation rates of the past few years do not provide a sufficient indication of scientific relevance. Rather, the scientific importance of publications may not be recognized until decades later.

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EARLY MODERN PSYCHOLOGY AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES

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This paper returns to the question of the existence and form of psychology in the period about 1550 to 1750. What kind of historical narrative about the science of the mind and human nature is possible before the age of modern academic disciplines and psychological practices?

I argue with and build on the work of the United States philosopher of mind, Gary Hatfield, who has made historically significant and informed claims about early modern psychology. He has put forward a coherent thesis about the origins of psychology, to which historians (including myself) have not paid attention. It is his view that psychology existed as a natural science of mind in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when scholars systematically taught about the nature of the soul under the heading of *physica*, within the Aristotelian curriculum. With criticism of Aristotelian learning, scholars gradually transformed this science into a range of empirical approaches to the mind, approaches which were, for the most part, neither materialistic nor Christian apologetics. This work, in the eighteenth century, constituted a flourishing science of psychology. He exemplifies his argument in a detailed study of rationalist and empiricist arguments about visual perception. He sharply criticises twentieth-century psychologists who wrote that their discipline, understood as an empirical natural science, originated in the second half of the nineteenth century. I characterise Hatfield's work and juxtapose it to some other recent accounts of the soul in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Hatfield's argument depends on a notion of a discipline as a cognitive enterprise rather than a social institution or cluster of social practices. This reflects his interest, as a philosopher, in defending a science of mind against modern materialist neuroscientists. Reflecting my interests as a historian, I suggest that the studies Hatfield describes, both in the early modern period and in the eighteenth century, were so varied and widely distributed in academic and social life that it is misplaced to say that they amounted to a discipline of psychology. Many topics which Hatfield does not discuss, e.g., on the control of the passions, appear 'pychological' (to use modern terms). Of course, an increasing number of authors used the word 'psychology', but whereas Hatfield takes this to indicate the existence of a coherent science of mind, I point to the diversity of studies of mind and conduct, some of which some authors sometimes called 'psychology'. I note the reluctance shown by Hatfield and other historians of psychology to consider discussion of the soul in theological context or in relation to the practical management of daily life. I also raise questions about a presumed continuity of meaning between early modern and modern concepts concerning soul or mind, and point to the rationalist, ahistorical underpinnings of both Hatfield's and standard histories of psychology (including my own).

These comments lead me to a defence of 'the history of the human sciences', rather than 'the history of psychology', as a working title for this field of historical narrative. The former term places on the agenda the history of the categories in terms of which we structure modern knowledge.

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ON THE QUESTION OF METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY IN THE 18TH CENTURY

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In contrast to the view that psychology arises as a science for the first time mainly by methodical innovations in the late 19th century the question is put forward whether a scientific psychology was newly founded methodically even earlier. It can be shown that the problem of method of psychology is explicitly and vividly discussed by Wolff (1679-1754) already in the first half of the 18th century (Wolff, 1719). This discussion goes on for decades. Wolff's solution offers a transdisciplinary conception of method for psychology, based on mathematics, transferred to logic and molded for the science of the soul. It is considered to meet the special demands of a psychology, devided into a psychologia empirica (Wolff, 1732) and a psychologia rationalis (Wolff, 1734). However, it would be hardly justified to call this transfer of method simply mathematization in lines with our present understanding of this term. Mathematization must be related to the peculiar stage of development of mathematics. By this, Wolff's psychological methodology rather should be conceived as an interdisciplinary monomethod, which is dominated by a certain kind of mathematical thinking. It can be shown further how the realization of Wolff's methodical claims for his twofold psychology are supported by his philosophical view of experience and his doctrine of concepts (Wolff, 1712). The final part of the paper sketches one of the post-wolffian developments of methodical thinking in scientific psychology by referring to Schütz's "Considerations on the various methods of psychology" (1771).

Here, at least three traditional main methodical conceptions (analytical, synthetical and empirical procedures) are recommanded to unite in favour of a solid, exact and reliable psychological research. That means, closer to the end of the 18th century we find a monodisciplinary multimethod for psychology.

All in all, the question of method of psychology is alive and well during the 18th century and presumably never died up to our times.

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ROUND TABLE: DISCUSSION OF *SOCIOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE*

INTRODUCTORY COMMENT

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The aim of this Round Table is to stimulate a collective and critical reflection on the highly stimulating contribution of Martin Kusch, his book *'Sociological Knowledge'* (published 1999). In order to do that we count with the presence of the author who will start the round table by presenting a summary of the main conclusions to which he arrived in that work (the abstract of his intervention follows). His book is composed of two main parts. The first part contains a historical research on the controversy over thought psychology in Germany (1900-1920). Between the first and the second part there is an Interlude in which Kusch defines his sociological position. And, finally, in the second part of the book he analysis Folkpsychology.

After the summary of *Sociological Knowledge* we will start the discussion of different aspects of his contribution with three short interventions. First the social psychologist Miquel Domènech will comment on the sociological approach of Kusch's work as he defines it in his Interlude, relating it to the research on science and society. His intervention will be followed by a commentary of the historian Fernando Gabucio who will consider the second part of the book where he finds interesting hints for the re-construction of a history of the human mind. Finally I will comment on the first part, dealing with Kusch's conclusions and historiographical implications of his research in relation to the history of the Würzburg School.

INVITED LECTURE

THE CONTROVERSY OVER THOUGHT PSYCHOLOGY IN GERMANY (1900-20): A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY

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This paper will give a summary of some of the central themes of my work on the controversy over thought psychology in Germany (Kusch 1999). The purpose of the summary is to prepare the ground for a critical discussion of my book by commentators.

I shall focus on the dispute between Wundt and the Würzburg school under Oswald Külpe. The most important area of contention was the classification of mental experience. Wundt took it to be well confirmed that mental experiences could be analysed into three basic categories: sensations, presentations, and feelings. Thoughts and volitions were not basic categories. Külpe and his students challenged Wundt's theory by insisting on a fourth category of irreducible mental experience: 'situation of consciousness', 'awareness' or simply 'thought'. (I shall here stick to the last-mentioned term.) As the Würzburgers saw it, thoughts were distinct from, and independent of, presentations, sensations, and feelings. The Külpe school claimed to have introspective evidence for its account. Between 1907 and 1914, Wundt and the Würzburgers engaged in a bitter controversy. Both sides challenged the accuracy of each others' introspections. And Wundt insisted that a serious investigation of thoughts had to go beyond introspection and experiment. Thought psychology had to be collective psychology, *Völkerpsychologie*.

I seek to show that the disagreement over this scientific-esoteric and technical issue was intertwined with four social-political questions. These questions were: [1] Which is the best strategy for

scientific psychology to establish itself in the German university system? [2] What is the appropriate social order of a psychological research school? [3] Does the collective in general, and the state in particular, stand above the individual? And: [4] Which religious confession, Catholicism or Protestantism, does best harmonise with the results of modern science?

Re [1]: As Wundt saw it, psychology could lay claim to an independent representation within the academia only if it appeared to owe little or nothing to philosophy. Külpe thought the future of psychology could best be secured by creating an alliance between philosophers and psychologists. The existence of irreducible thoughts was a key assumption of the central logicians and epistemologists of the time. Accepting irreducible thoughts thus meant accepting that philosophical epistemology and logic were relevant to empirical psychology.

Re [2]: There was a strict two-tier hierarchy in Wundt's research school: Wundt was on the higher level, everyone else on the lower. Wundt's theory of the mind was something of a replica of this social model. The elements and processes of the mind were of two kinds or levels: there were higher, complicated processes of thinking and willing, and lower, simple processes of sensation, feeling, and presentation. Because thinking and willing were such complicated processes, one needed decades of experience in order to be able to tackle their study successfully. As the division of labour in Wundt's research school made clear, only one man had this kind of experience: Wundt himself. The Külpe school attacked this social order indirectly by insisting that thinking was not a complicated sequence of other basic building blocks.

Re [3]: For Wundt, the collective and its products were always qualitatively more, and of higher value, than the sum of the individuals and their achievements. Because Wundt believed so strongly in the superiority of the collective, he was also inclined to locate the highest forms of human mental activity on this völkisch collective level. The collective was higher than the individual; thought was higher than presentations, feelings, and sensations; 'ergo': thought needed to be studied through collective products. Külpe and many of his students had individualistic and internationalistic sympathies. This political individualism also informed the Würzburgers' methodological psychological individualism.

Re [4]: The Konfessionenstreit left its mark on the very content of philosophical and psychological theories. During the late nineteenth century, to be a Protestant philosopher in Germany typically meant being a voluntarist. To be a Catholic philosopher, however, was to reject voluntarism, in favour of so-called 'intellectualism'. Wundt was a militant Protestant, whereas most of Külpe's followers were Catholic. Wundt himself spoke of his psychology as a voluntaristic psychology. The Würzburgers' irreducible thoughts however, fitted nicely with Neothomist intellectualism.

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SESSION 15
"HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES: THE HISTORY OF AESTHETICS, ARCHEAOLOGY, CRIMINOLOGY & SOCIOLOGY"

AESTHETICS: EMPIRICAL OR NORMATIVE? – ANOTHER CASE STUDY OF BOUNDARY WORK

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In the call for papers for the last congress in Amsterdam, one possible aspect of the boundary work approach was characterised by "an interest in the social context, which means that a scientific controversy is seen first of all as an indication of the different social, cultural and professional group interests that are engaged in a struggle for hegemony". In this respect, the controversy about an empirical or normative foundation of aesthetics at the beginning of the 20th century may provide an instructive case study.

From its foundation as a particular discipline in the 18th century until the middle of the 19th century, aesthetics was unanimously regarded as a part of philosophy. This consent ended in 1876, when G. Th. Fechner published his *Vorschule der Aesthetic*, in which he claimed for an empirical "aesthetics from below" as an empirical fundament for any metaphysical construction of aesthetics. The following decades were characterised by vehement controversies between the supporters of an empirical or even experimental approach in aesthetics and those of a normative and metaphysical concept of aesthetics.

Although this controversy was superficially dominated by "scientific" arguments, in the wake of this discussion we can find lots of rather passing remarks demonstrating that the refutation of an empirical foundation of aesthetics was an indication of a deeper conflict between the emancipation of the arts from the boundaries of cultural and moral norms and the conservative tendency of academic science to stabilise and warrant traditional norms and limits of artistic creativity. This can be shown by arguments suggesting the impossibility of deriving reliable knowledge about "real beauty" from the "accidental" judgements of "ordinary people" as frequently proposed by conservative scholars in this controversy.

The cultural and even "political" background of this academic controversy can be demonstrated in particular by pointing to the work of Eduard von Hartmann who already in his historical writings (Hartmann 1886) turned out as a violent critic of Fechner's psychological aesthetics. In his *Philosophie des Schönen* (Philosophy of the Beautiful) we can realise the practical consequences von Hartmann drew from his normative concept of the beautiful when, for example, he criticised the representation of "red-haired, cock-eyed and hunchbacked people" as "pathologically abnormal art" (Hartmann 1924, 229). Furthermore, he pleads for some kind of "moral policy" in order to ensure that artistic performances will happen just under appropriate circumstances with respect to the sensibility of the particular audience.

From such examples we can see that the turn to an empirical foundation of aesthetics was not only a theoretical development, but also a step towards the emancipation of aesthetics and of the science of art from the normative concepts of its past. Many aspects of this process indicate the close connection between the development of aesthetic theory and the normative background of culture and society in Germany at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century.

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THE ORGANIC METAPHOR IN SOCIOLOGY

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In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, one current of the emerging science of society sought to model itself on a science that had had great success in its endeavors in that period: physiology. In France, this current, known as organicism or "biological sociology," made extensive use of biological analogies, and especially of the organic analogy. In the 1890s, René Worms offered this approach to the study of society both a journal and several institutions with international membership, such as the Société Internationale de Sociologie. Yet, shortly after the turn of the century, this mode of doing sociology was abandoned by most of its representatives, including Worms himself. My paper will analyze the reasons for the initial success and the later defeat of this current in sociology by focusing on two crucial debates, one inside Worm's institutions, and one with the Durkheimian group. These debates will allow me to reveal the perceived advantages and problems of this particular model for sociology.

The critiques hinged around two issues: the perceived anti-egalitarian and anti-democratic thrust of "biological" theories of society, and the "scientific" fruitfulness of the organic metaphor for a science of society. Organicism was thus attacked on a methodological and on a political level, but these two kinds of critiques were seen as intimately connected by those delivering them.

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SOME KEYS FOR THE PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTION OF SPANISH AMERICAN NATIONS: THE CASE OF ARGENTINIAN CRIMINOLOGY IN SPANISH RESTORATION

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This article belongs to a general research on the psycho-sociological discourse and its place in national construction processes of Spanish America nations. We are especially interested in the cultural relationship between Spain and Argentina at XIXth endings and XXth century beginnings, and above all, in the disciplinar interchange within different circles of the "Psy" field.

During this historical period, national regeneration and construction are main concerns among intellectuals and Spanish and Spanish American scientists. In Spain, the so-called "Crisis of 1898" stimulated liberals in reclaiming a regeneration and progress project in accordance with modern Europe trends. However, one of the keys that cannot be left out is the relationship between Spain and Latin America. The loss of Cuba closed the independence cycle opened at the very beginning of XIXth century. This episode also forced both sides of the Ocean to reconsider definitively the role of Spain as the "Mother Country" in charge of guiding and mediating in the cultural relations between Europe and Spanish America. Immersed in their own national construction processes, Latin American countries also had to evaluate the narrow historical, cultural and intellectual relation maintained with Spain as the colonies they were. Argentinean perspective, without being the only one, is one of the richest and fluidest when reviewing its historical memory in order to talk to Spain about the construction of a modern national program (Castro and Blanco, 1998).

In both the Spanish and Argentinean cases, psycho-sociological discourse is indispensable when inspecting the own collective identity. The "Psy" field will be an excellent tool to analyse social and cultural questions with guarantees of "scientificity"; in doing so, it can also help to validate the nationalisation of the masses and the demand for radical social and political changes. According to Vezzetti (1988), some are the different fields to put together the psychological discourses from, and with them, the alternatives for the participation of the "Psy" field in Argentinean social reform: social psychology, academic psychology, children psychology, and clinical psychology. As mentioned in other works (Castro 1998), the overview on the Spanish case is very similar. Beyond the academic spheres, the psycho-sociological approaches to labour and educational hygiene, social criminology and morbidity, professional orientation or pedagogy stand out. In all the cases, those are the psycho-sociological domains that channel the dialogue on normalisation and social control between Spain and Argentina.

Some of the aspects derived from that interchange have been studied before: the presence of Spanish psycho-sociological discourse in Argentina (Castro, 2000), and the reception of Latin American pedagogy –especially Argentinean- in the Spanish publishing spheres (Jiménez and Castro, 2000). Too, there are first approaches to José Ingenieros and Rafael Salillas' works as outstanding representatives of the criminological and psychopathological reflection in Argentina and Spain (Jiménez and Castro, forthcoming). As it has been pointed out in this last article, the discourse on social degeneration is indispensable when controlling and eradicating social and cultural problems intrinsic to the process of national construction. Dressed as criminal anthropology, this discourse will appear as a discipline elaborated for the sake of progress and common good. Having positivism and evolutionism behind, this discipline will offer an interpretation to two of the principal concerns of the time: the decadence of Latin nations in general, and social morbidity in particular. Many of these interpretations will give place not only to a reflection on national identity and the relationship between Spain and Latin America, but also to the taking of measures and legal reforms to apply directly to that national construction. The keys of these discussions at both sides of the Ocean find a common space in the

Spanish inheritance, although the analytical focus is very different: while in Spain authors as Salillas or Dorado Montero will emphasise historical, social and cultural aspects, in Argentina authors as Ingenieros or Eusebio Gómez won't be free from racial or geo-climatic features.

In this article, the presence of Argentinean criminological and psycho-pathological discourse in Spain will be approached for the first time For a detailed study, the Argentinean criminologists' articles published in Spain will be followed, and also specialised journals as *Revista General de Legislación y Jurisprudencia, Revista de Antropología y Ciencias Médico-legales* and *La nueva Ciencia Jurídica;* general journals as *La España Moderna* and *La Lectura;* books written by Latin American authors and published in Spain with prologues written by Spanish intellectuals. The aim of this article is to offer a first approach to the psychological categories involved in the interchange and their function as arguments within the discourses implied in the construction of national identity.

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RADIOCARBON DATING AND THE ARCHAEOLOGISTS: BUILDING INTERDISCIPLINARITY IN THE HISTORY OF HUMAN SCIENCES

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From the works of Poggendorf, Hoefer and Sprengel until now, the history of science has usually reproduced the disciplinary divides of its object of study. We usually talk about the history of physics, the history of chemistry or the history of psychology: the many other possible categories are subsidiary of this division. This kind of organization of the historical study of science, which is related to the academic origin and status of the history of science and its practitioners, is being challenged by new historiographical approaches .

In fact, a too rigid attachment to these disciplinary identities may be misleading when studying some of the most important events and episodes in the history of science, medicine and technology. Disciplinary boundaries have significantly changer all along the time, and many scientific and technical developments have been the result of collaborative and interdisciplinary efforts. In this sense, the consideration of a wider picture, that embraces different practices and disciplines, can provide new perspectives and fresher insights.

According to this, I will argue that the history of human sciences should be sensitive to some historiographical tendencies that advocate for an integrated study of the history of science, technology and medicine (Pickstone, 2000). This approach, that brings together the history of science, technology

and medicine, focus on the forms of practice which may extend across many disciplines, stressing the synchronicity and interdependences of many sciences and techniques. In this sense, it has a greater interest for the social and economic history, as well for the political and cultural one.

My last research project has tried to build in this direction, focusing in a case of collaboration between physical chemists and archaeologists: the development of radiocarbon dating method. This technique, developed between 1946 and 1951 by the Nobel Prize Willard Libby, is a very peculiar episode in the history of both physical sciences and archaeology, which provides interesting insights about the relationship between natural and human sciences during the second half of the XXth century.

The first part of my study has been devoted to the history of the scientific and institutional setting that shaped the practice of nuclear physics in the 1930s. This framework yielded the emergence of new instrumentation for the measurement of radioactivity and new techniques for the production and isolation of radioactive isotopes. The second part of this study has been centred in Willard Libby's work on carbon-14 in the late 1940s. Libby's participation in Manhattan project, together with his involvement in the nuclear reactors' production of carbon-14 and his participation on the interdisciplinary Institute of Nuclear Studies, brought him to the development of the new radiocarbon dating method. This achievement was mostly performed by means of radioactivity measurement techniques, but also required the collaboration of archaeologists and geologists.

This history of the radiocarbon dating method is one example of a integrated approach that brings into play elements of many different histories: the history of physics, chemistry, archaeology and technology, in a search of a broader picture that can be interesting for many different audiences, and that could bring out general conclusions about the meanings and functions of science in a general social context.

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SESSION 16
"LINGUISTICS AND RHETORICS IN THE HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES"

SEMIOTIC APPROACHES OF THE INTERCULTURAL LEARNING

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Building a peaceful and democratic Europe depends very much on the skills of people to understand and communicate with each other across national and cultural borders. One of the ways to prepare young people for the future is by participating in educational cultural exchanges, including here the understanding of *its significant, signified and contexts' faces and interfaces*. Our theory on the semiotic approach of the intercultural learning conceives the background of the society's existence as an ideal and ethical approach coming from a holistic perspective following a dialogue's consensus, an *"agora"*, but most of all, also as a political volition and institutional configuration based both on the philosophy of the State and its relations with civic society.

The up to date Romanian society has the features of a society processing an educational reform, by placing at the centre of its evolution the education with its basic democratic features and coherence, grounded romantically in the civil society and schools and its active actors. Its educational interface is the causal and communicative relations within the process of social participation and responsibility: *Eidos* - social context, *Ethos* - responsive solidarity among the individuals and groups, *Topos* - synergy among organisations of the local community.

The educational approaches are grounded in a *comprehensive representation of the intercultural learning of society*, and puts forth a global approach, like the semiotic one, in order to enrich the pedagogical situations. Our option for an ethnographical paradigm, inside which are contained the theoretical holistic (con- figurative and functional), semiotic and behaviour tendencies, it also involves a pedagogical paradigm of the democratic reference. This kind of learning answers to certain projects' requests based on the paradigmatic (ethical and normative) and pragmatic dimensions. In the society's framework, *the intercultural learning develops from the main culture, with which the other contributing cultures communicate*. The intersections and changes among the participating cultures develop, in equal measure, the mutual richness of the exchanges with the main culture. Multiple and interconnected educational perspectives are open: humanistic (focused on the subject), cultural (focused on the socio-cultural exploration), methodological (focused on the social workers and on the cross-disciplinary approaches) symbiotic-synergetic (focused on the interrelations among subjects and backgrounds).

The intercultural learning meets also *the cultures' facts and events, the environmental care, the (development of) local memory, and the empowering the social actors and decision makers to participate in building the democratic areas.*

Our work is illustrated by some study cases made in the various local interethnic communities of Romania and the transnational projects.

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WRITING STORIES AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF HISTORY: A STUDY OF STORIES BY STUDENTS

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What are the crucial aspects in teaching history? Is it better to underscore historical data, or is it more useful to emphasize the logic of historical processes? Even though students insist that they know and understand historical data or a particular historical event, they often fail when trying to explain either or both of them. Why does this happen? It seems plausible that if a student really knows the historical data, she will be able to reason about them or, at least, she will be able to construct a narration consistent with them. When reading the stories by students, instructors try to infer what kind of knowledge is implied, because the written text is usually the fundamental, if not the only, instrument they have in order to elucidate the knowledge students have achieved. Historical reasoning is generally accepted to belong to the wider category of informal reasoning (e.g., D'Andrade, 1989; Kuhn, 1991, 1993; Means and Voss, 1996). In this context, Wineburg (1991) indicates that having the knowledge of specific historical facts may not be as crucial as having a flexible and developed way of knowing and thinking about these facts. On the other hand, for Voss and Wiley (1997), prior conceptions become of crucial importance when producing narratives or historical explanations.

Domain knowledge can be an important factor involved in the production or construction of stories about some particular set of events. In the case of history, it is possible that the cognitive processes involved in the construction of an explanation differ depending on whether the domain is familiar o non familiar to us. More specifically, we could think that having some knowledge or having a certain familiarity with a topic can make any task related to it much easier. Our hypothesis is that, the higher the familiarity with the domain, the more complex and elaborate the resulting story would be. Prior knowledge not only would facilitate the task but also, would lead to a better performance.

This study aims at exploring whether the domain knowledge has any influence on the way a writer produces a text, taking into account that the text relates to a past event. Our purpose is to investigate the relationship between general knowledge on a specific domain and the narration that is constructed on such domain. The sample consists of 61 undergraduate students, who participated in this experiment for credit in a course on history of psychology. Subjects wrote two stories that explained a given conclusion, the only difference between the stories being the degree of familiarity with the domain. Two dimensions of analysis were defined for both conditions, one concentrating on the linguistic structure of the text, and the other providing data about its narrative structure.

Although a parametric test does not reveal any significant difference between the stories, non parametric tests indicate that stories on the non familiar domain are more elaborate and complex. Our results show that the construction of a historical story is affected by the prior knowledge about the topic of the story. Specifically, the narration's quality that a subject constructs is influenced by the

familiarity with the content of the story. Contrary to our hypothesis, the analysis indicates that subjects tend to construct more elaborate narrations when their domain knowledge is low.

In teaching History, promoting the mastery of language and of reasoning in social problems (the construction of arguments) seems to be more relevant than emphasizing historical data themselves. If students can be made aware of the fact that texts can be read and interpreted in different ways, they will consider essential to mark those texts lexically and syntactically, which, in turn, would improve the argumentative structures of their texts. Overall, we believe that instead of promoting the specific and partial knowledge implicit in emphasizing particular data, it would be more useful to promote the reading of different sources and the critique of texts. It is not unlikely that developing linguistic and language resources could directly affect the ability to think critically. As Means and Voss (1996) pointed out, informal reasoning skill should be considered in relation to language. Specifically, constructing a story involves skill in the use of language, and language as a cognitive process can be the most crucial tool to construct historical narrations and, in this way, investigating and knowing the reality.

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CONSCIOUSNESS BEYOND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REALM: A SOCIO-HISTORICAL APPROACH TO SINGER'S *THE MAGICIAN OF LUBLIN*

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Far beyond the scientific academic domain there is a landscape where psychology grows. Most of the cathegories which populate the realm of academic psychology are part of a unceasing and polyphonic cultural debate in which academic psychology is just one of the voices. To define the boundaries of subjectivity is the aim of this debate, a neverending debate which accounts for the critical nature of psychology. Psychology will remain in a chronic state of crisis just because subjectivity will be always an opened subject. Psychology should only escape its crisis in a medieval society. So to speak, the *psychological complex* expands far beyond the boundaries defined by the institutional psychological agents because of its very historical function. In our view history of psychology should be sensitive to this general function of psychological discourses and practices. As Carpintero (1998) pointed out, academic psychology must be concerned with the psychology made beyond the frontiers of academic psychology, filling up an abiss which demands a solution. Bruner (see, for example, 1991) has developed in his last writings a similar point of view, highlighting the absence of a critical attitude towards culture in academic psychology. In other words, history of psychology must be sensitive to the broader historical process of psychologization, as a way to overpass the mere identitary function of official stories of great men and ideas. The world of art represents a challege for a history of psychology involved in the understanding of the dynamics of culture.

This papers attempts to illustrate this general scope by focusing in the way narrative arts get involved in the general debate on subjectivity. The paper focuses in the psychological jew

anthropology implied in Singer's narrative production, specially in his fascinating *The Magician of Lublin.* We assume that the narrative encoding of individual or collective experience reveals us the nuclear elements of a particular way of life.

Yasha, the main character in the story, is a magician which comes to represent the symbolic *locus* in the trama for a secular debate between tradition and modernity, remembering and fantasy, reality and wisdom. Consciousness is yet the space in which the debate or conflict takes place. The dramaturgical approach presented in K. Burke's *A Grammar of Motives* is our methodological framework (Burke, 1969). Our results allow us to consider the prevalence of the *act-scenary* ratio. Using this particular narrative ratio, Singer presents the thick relationships between Yasha and his world. From this general stance we develop both a quantitative and a qualitative analysis which leads to a hypothesis on the cultural organization of Yasha's mind. This organization evolves around the role of consciousness, memory and identity.

Finally, our paper tries to stablish the links between the particular way in which Singer speculates about the role of consciousness and the way some formal psychological theories, specially psychoanalysis, do it.

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CLOSURE SPEECH

CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN BODY, MIND AND WORLD: SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THE HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES

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In a essay review of some recent publications on social constructivism and realism, Joseph Rouse suggested that the more radical thesis that emerges from current science studies is 'the denial that nature and society or culture are self-contained components of the world that interact at localizable interfaces of human artefacts, bodies, and scientific language-or-concepts. Scientific understanding is not "inside" minds or cultures, but embodied in worldly phenomena, skills, equipment, institutions, and situated discursive exchanges that cut across the traditional bounds of natural objects and social and cultural meanings' (Rouse, 2002: 69). Such a mutualist view of 'embodied' knowledge and of mind 'embedded' in the world is also reflected in the writings of a growing number of philosophers (e.g., Karen Barad, 1996; Donna Haraway, 1991; John Haugeland, 1998 and Hilary Putnam, 1999). In this paper, drawing examples from presentations at this year's conference, I reflect on some of the implications of this emerging consensus about the 'intimacy of mind, body, and world' for an understanding of both the nature and history of the human sciences.

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POSTER ABSTRACTS

LAWRENCE K. FRANK AND AMERICAN SOCIAL TECHNOLOGY

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Innovators within the field of social technology have received little recognition as having made significant contributions to American culture and social life during the twentieth century. Indeed, the domain of social technology itself has hardly been recognised as an important endeavour in the construction of "social modernity" (to use Paul Rabinow's term) in the United States[1]. Nevertheless, figures such as Lawrence K. Frank, an officer of the Rockefeller philanthropies and the Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation for two decades, have played major roles in modernising cultural practices and reconstructing "the social" during the first half of the twentieth century, and such figures deserve more attention from scholars of the human sciences in the U.S. than they have received. Indeed, the intellectuals who formulated modernising forms of social technology merit all the more close scholarly scrutiny as the social technology elaborated by foundation-sponsored programs was closely associated with the production of significant new knowledge in various branches of the American social sciences.

Frank's name elicits only slight recognition among scholars of American social science today. Nevertheless, as a foundation executive during the 1920s and 1930s, Frank assisted Beardsley Ruml in formulating the social science program of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, designed and administered the child development and parent education program of this foundation, and sponsored a number of projects, conferences, and seminars in such fields as child development, culture and personality, and the sociology of adolescence. He played an especially significant role in encouraging the formation of culture and personality as a distinct field of study, and the research that he sponsored in child development provided much of the intellectual basis for the emergence of "permissive" child-rearing practices in the post-World War II era. He knew and worked with a number of prominent child developmentalists, psychologists, and social scientists, including Margaret Mead, John Dollard, Robert S. Lynd, Edward Sapir, Gardiner and Lois Murphy, and Jean Macfarlane. Although widely read in diverse disciplines and a contributor to an array of scholarly journals in various fields, Frank was not, however, an original or uniquely brilliant thinker. Rather, he was a social technician who—though not without an intellectual interest in various theoretical approaches—was primarily concerned with the technological applications of these approaches. Thus, Frank appropriated aspects of behaviourism, psychoanalysis, Gestalt psychology, John Dewey's instrumentalist philosophy, institutional economic theory, and the culture and personality approach in order to formulate social technologies geared toward the production of an orderly and conflict-free social life. Frank thus played an important role in elaborating American social technology, though he will not be remembered as one of the great scientific or theoretical minds of the twentieth century.

In my presentation, I will demonstrate how Frank came to elaborate and advance a distinctive vision of the role of knowledge and expertise in modern society. Frank believed that knowledge in fields such as child development and culture and personality, as well as in the social sciences more generally, should be directed not merely at the description and explanation of social life and the

[1] Paul Rabinow, *French Modern* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989). See especially the introduction in which Rabinow discusses the French technical intellectuals who played a role equivalent to that of American innovators in social technology such as Frank: "They were pragmatic technicians seeking to find scientific and practical solutions to public problems in times of crisis: hence they qualify as intellectuals. . . . [T]hese men are the forerunners of the technocratic society which emerged in France after the Second World War." (p. 16)

processes involved in the "socialisation" of the child, but that such knowledge should actively produce, enhance, and manage the social sector by means of the fostering of co-operative, "friendly," and sociable personalities. Hence, according to Frank, experts in various fields should collaborate with each other in various interdisciplinary programs in order to develop a "preventive politics" which would alleviate social conflict and disorder and thereby construct an orderly and pacified social life. Although Frank hoped with an almost utopian enthusiasm that his proposals and projects would enable humanity to assume control of its own destiny, I argue that these proposals and projects involved an eclipse of the political. That is, they removed issues of class conflict and poverty, gender and sexuality, and racial and ethnic oppression from the arena of open political debate and contestation by deflecting them onto the realm of the "personal"—of psychological adjustment, healthy child-rearing practices, satisfying marital and familial relationships—a realm which was to be fostered and developed, guided and managed by the experts.

My presentation will be based on the extensive research that I have conducted on Frank and the foundation programs with which he worked in the archival holdings of the History of Medicine Division of the National Library of Medicine in Bethesda, Maryland, and the Rockefeller Archive Center in Sleepy Hollow, New York. A book on mine, entitled *Socializing the Young: The Role of the Foundations, 1923-1941*, is slated for publication this spring by Bergin and Garvey, an imprint of the Greenwood Publishing Group (USA).

A CINEMATOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS FROM THE DRAMATURGICAL PERSPECTIVE OF K. BURKE: MICHAEL COLLINS

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Historical stories are, as we have discussed in other places (Rosa, Huertas and Blanco, 1996; Blanco, 2001; etc.), the basic material for the construction of collective identities. This poster starts a research program concerned with the relationship between cinematographical techniques (for example, Martin, 1996) and the burkean account of action (Burke, 1969). This is a basic point of view to understand the ways in which stories operate in the construction of those identities. Our interest in cinematographical analysis resides in the idea that the combination of certain purely technical parameters is useful to provide us cues upon the "cinematographical style" of the movie. At the same time, this combination will generate different types of expectations in the spectator. In this way, we may argue that the use of specific cinematographical elements, in most cases, is not coincidental, but it obeys to certain specific motivations. The story intends to guide, in a more or less flexible way, a potential spectator through the dynamics of narrative action.

In this poster we analyse the film *Michael Collins* (Neil Jordan, 1996), which makes a fiction with the story of this fundamental character for the History of Ireland at the beginning of the XXth century. The burkean perspective is articulated upon five key terms: *Agent, Scene, Act, Agency and Purpose*. None of these terms refers univocally to a region of the world. It is, therefore, its local function in the description what defines their functions in a particular narrative account. It is assumed that not all of them have to be present in a description, and that the distinction between different descriptions has to do with the particular play of ratios (of relations, diadics, etc.) among the five key terms. So different combinations of ratios will finally produce different patterns of motives attribution, and, therefore, different conceptions of the human nature. In order to carry out the cinematographical analysis, three technical parameters had been used: *Shot Size, Angle of View* and *Camera Movement*.

In this particular case, most of the takes are distributed in "fixed camera", first planes, and horizontal angles. This means that the movie has pretensions of "reflecting reality", that is to say, intends to be a historical document. We have selected the 14 sequences which, in our point of view, account for the central axis of the plot. We have carried out an analysis in two levels: (1) isolated sequences, analysing both the cinematographical elements and the burkean pentad; (2) grouping previous sequences in 4 sets, depending on different thematic criteria. On the other hand, and also parting from the burkean theory, we present the idea that multiple combinations of the five key terms of the burkean pentad underlie at the moment of structuring the movie. The analyst criterion defines whether the content of each one can change, then modifying the motivational structure of the film.

PERSPECTIVE AND NARRATION IN *THE DOORS OF PARADISE*: THE STORY OF ESAU AND JACOB

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As we have defended in a previous paper (Blanco, 2001), history of psychology shouldn't be just a history of ideas, but mainly an analysis of the process of psychologization of culture. So to study the theories of the action formulated in other fields of culture (such as arts, for example) is a crucial enterprise for a history of psychology so conceived.

This poster analyses one of the contributions of Renaissance art to the development of an alternative theory of action to the Middle Ages prevailing theory of action. One of the basic functions of modelling arts during the Middle Ages and Renaissance consisted on spreading shared narratives in order to build homogeneous social identities and to maintain the social order in force (see, for example, Gombrich, 1990). The systematic segmentation of action in pictorical levels ordered by the relevance of the different events of the story (*effeti*) provoked a qualitative change in the conceptions of pictorial action. The Renaissance spectator had the choice to get a less conventional reading, more realistic, but also more participating and flexible of the represented story (see, for example, Steinberg, 1976; Pignatti, 1978; Kubovy, 1996).

The contemplationist obsession of Western world, articulated in this period upon the possibilities opened by the use of perspective, makes the world begun to be seen as a *sub species visibilitatis* world. In this way, perspective has to be considered as one of the multiple factors, but a decisive one, in the process leading to the constitution of a contemplational anthropology, also operative in the control of science and humanities Blanco, in press; Baxandall, 1972). So the study of the functions of narrative arts in Renaissance is crucial both to understand the form in which the art becames culturally outstanding, and to analyse the process of constitutions of an autonomous subject of knowledge for science, in general, and for psychology in particular.

The specific objectives of this poster are:

(1) to study how the narrative resources of Renaissance bas-relief increased with the introduction of linear perspective. We will take as a pretext for this study a crucial work of art in order to understand this process: the east door of the baptistery of the Florence cathedral. It is a bronze bas-relief realized by Lorenzo Ghiberti and his workshop among 1425 and 1452 (Brunetti, 1971; Finn, 1980; Krautheimer, 1982) and it is an excellent sample of the transition among international Gothic and Renaissance style;

(2) to study the use of other narrative pictorical keys, apart of perspective, such as the processing of textures, corporal gestuality and facial expressiveness of the characters.

This poster focuses on the panel representing the story of Esau and Jacob. This panel constitutes perhaps the better example to appreciate some of the aesthetical and narrative consequences of applying linear perspective in the representation of action. We proceed in this study from a geometrical analysis of perspective and then to a narrative account of the events, in order to illustrate the new idea of human action which Ghiberti promotes.

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KARL MARBE'S COLOUR VARIATOR

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The purpose of a colour variator is to alter the proportions of different colours to achieve a mixed additive colour. Karl Marbe invented the first colour variator in 1894 when he was working with Wilhelm Wundt en his Leipzig psychological laboratory.

SOME HISTORICAL ROOTS OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

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Previous works we are looking to find historical roots of newest theory of emotional intelligence, wide present in the actual Psychology, knowing also a very large diffusion, as we have explained at Mora & Ruiz (1999), Mora (2000), Mora & Ruiz (2001).

As appear clearly present at the Symposium of Spanish Society of Psychology (Santiago de Compostela, September 2000, Barberá, E. et alii; García Ferández-Abascal et alii; etc.), they are some concepts in the History of Psychology that we would take as analogous to emotional intelligence. The most important according that could be:

- Orexis;
- Empathy;
- Confront;
- Self-esteem

According historiographic viewpoint, intellectual debate. Could be clarify why these ideas, present before at different historical periods, acquire actually a very important increasing at the contemporaneous Psychology (Goleman, 1995, 1998, 1999), and why remained as unnoticed at previous decades.

According different debates in analogous contexts, we bring as intellectual answer to this problem the concept of *rigor vs. relevance* as Rappard (1997) and Danzinger (1997) was pointed out to others different contexts.

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C. S. PEIRCE IN PSYCHOLOGY, PAST, PRESENT AND... ¿FUTURE? SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY AND PEIRCE

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The American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce is recognised in the history of the philosophy and the logic, like author of the two initial articles of Pragmatism (Apel, 1981), the American thought school *par excellence.* Nevertheless, the history of the psychology shows us, in its more important reference texts, an outstanding limitation in the study of the role played by Charles Sanders Peirce's (Brent, 1993) thought in the foundation of the modern American psychology.

This work presents some historical details that locate to Charles Sanders Peirce in the first experimental investigation of the American psychology (Cadwallader, 1992 y 1972 ; Peirce, 1884) . Also, his relationships with some of parents of American Psychology (William James (Royce, 1916, 1930; Perry, 1974) , John Dewey (1916) , G. Stanley Hall, J. McCkeen Cattell (Sokal, 1981), James Mark Baldwin (1911 y 1925), Joseph Jastrow (1916 y 1930) , etc) is analysed. These dates indicate an initial disagreement with the scarce paper that is played by Peirce in American psychology, if we attend to the chronicle of main references of the history of psychology (Green, 2001).

In order to analyse the characteristics of this forgetfulness, we have made studies and investigations in several aspects. All over allow us to have a complete picture of the Peirce´s presence in Psychology, as much in the past as in the present. Thus, first, we have made a study about the presence of Charles Sanders Peirce in representative History manuals of Psychology. Our objective was in this case to know which are the facts, data or events of Peirce's life and work that are picked up in the official history of psychology, as well as the importance attributed to that influence. We considered that history manuals of psychology represent the official narration of the events, and of the more important personages of Psychology, in the past and in the present. Next, we have made a study of similar characteristics to the previous one, about the presence of Charles Sanders Peirce in one of the more important data bases in psychology, Psycinfo. With all the obtained data of both studies, we can confirm the small repercussion and presence of Charles Sanders Peirce in the history of Psychology. Also we can corroborate a certain change in that tendency, that is let see in the increase of the publications that in psychology recover the work of Peirce in their works and investigations (Fisch, 1982-2000; Berstein, 1965).

Then, from publications and investigations of Peirce, that at the present time are published, as well as the manuscripts reunited and microfilmed by the university of Harvard, we have made a classification of the type of works, experimental and theoretical, that in psychology was made by Charles Sanders Peirce (MS, Peirce 1931-1958, 1975-1979, 1982-2000, 1883). Finally, we have compared the psychological thematic in which work of Charles Sanders Peirce is being recovered, with

the work in psychology that Peirce made (Fisch y Cope, 1982). From to this last study, we can verify that, in general, the work of Peirce that becomes present in psychology in our time is his semiotic (Rosa, 2001; Valsiner, 2001), and no, his psychological thought in subjects like, for example, perception (Ladd-Franklin, 1914), psychophysics (Corso, 1963), etc. All of them subject to which Peirce dedicated great part of his time and his work.

That the collection of the obtained data, they brings forth our discord with the historical narration on Peirce, this discord shows three axes of dissension. First, about consideration of Peirce only like logical philosopher and, and for that reason the cataloguing of its work in the land of the theoretician. This vision, like theoretical philosopher, requests attention when it as much verifies that his work and publications, as the bases of their system, are those of a complete scientist, in which they conjugate theory and practices (Morgade, in press). The second analyses its work in psychology and the recognition of this work by the founders of psychology. Third, this study on part of the history of psychology reclaim that, the Peirce's figure is solves of another form the historical narration of his repercussion in psychology. This narration would have to have hypothesis, which go beyond his possible lack of bad character, or problems with the writing, so and as it takes shelter frequently.

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WORDS, WORDS, WORDS... SO WHAT?: A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF TURING'S MACHINE ANALOGY IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SPANISH LITERATURE (1982-1995).

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The aim of this poster is to present a rhetorical analysis of the uses of Turing's machine in the realm of Spanish cognitive psychology. Some of the most important Spanish handbooks on cognitive psychology (see, for example, Delclaux, 1982; De Vega, 1984) are considered here in order to analyse the severely rhetoric, but not methodological, uses of Turing's machine concept. We take rhetoric as inherent dimension of scientific writing and communication, and not necessarily as an artefact to mislead or swindle the audience (Locke, 1997). In fact there are structural or unconscious rhetorical strategies, as the one I study in this poster (see Blanco, 2001).

Turing's machine has been used in the culture of psychology as an excuse to introduce the idea of computability in the fuzzy domain of the mind, without taking into account the constraints derived from its logical-mathematical origins. It is worthy to acknowledge the several technological and practical positive outcomes of this use of Turing's machine (simulation, artificial vision, and so on), but any of them has nothing to do with an adequate theoretical use of this notion. Some the old guardians of the revolution, such as Putnam or Bruner, have manifested their unsatisfaction with the achievements of the "new paradigm", and with the way it managed its foundational motives and aims. None of them do agree with the loss of meaning and life during the historical travelling of cognitive psychology.

Anyway, the first theoreticians in cognitive psychology used computer as a metaphor in order to introduce order out of chaos in the mind. But, perhaps because it was a metaphor, they put aside the rules which governs theory of computers, that is, computation theory. Maybe they were forgetting that computers are themselves a consequence of theoretical developments coming from other fields of knowledge (basically logic and mathematics). So psychologists borrowed the Turing's machine idea as a bridge between computation theory and computational enginery. I will try to argue how Turing's machine appears in the field of cognitive psychology with a mere rhetorical value. Its function is to justify a concrete theoretical point of view in psychology. A view which reinstaurates a new mechanicist agenda for the mind in the core of academic cognitive psychology.

Moreover, I will try to show that condition especially in texts written in Spain since first eighties, when international literature about this issue, overcoat Anglo-Saxon literature, was already so extensive. These pioneer pieces of cognitive literature openly express the identitary drive of a new scientific and cultural enterprise. They have the aim of presenting a new theoretical alternative for Spanish psychology, which was by these years under the influence of the behaviourist and psychometric approaches. So the work of these pioneers of Spanish cognitive psychology was in part to promote a new identity hypothesis to their scientific community. That is because their rhetorical strategies were more necessary and apparent.

LEGAL REGULATIONS RELATED TO HUMAN BEINGS' ATTITUDE AND CAPACITY

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We review legal regulations well arranged chronologically directed towards the road preventions related to human beings'attitude and capacity. This selection includes: drivers'psychophysical conditions and their valoration, material and human means to carry out this aim, as well as the organizations in charge of putting them into effect.

In a parallel way, we have reviewed the regulations to educate drivers, pedestrians, and passangers road behaviour throughout the history of transport in Spain.

THE RHETORICS OF CHAOS IN CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY

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Along the second half of the S.XX a good deal of philosophers and social scientists had emphasised the failure of formal epistemologies in order to describe, regulate and support scientific knowledge, and thus to differentiate it from pseudoscientific or merely no scientific practices (Bloor). As a consequence they often assume that there are not objective *a priori* criteria to go beyond the supposed epistemological equivalence between any kind of discourses. So they focus in the study of the limitations and conditions of possibility of scientific activity considered as a socio-historical phenomenon. I consider this enterprise as a new cultural-relativist reductionism. Parting from the well-known essay by Sokal and Bricmont (1999), I reviewed official psychological literature in order to study the rhetorical uses of Chaos Theory. Chaos theory is a physical-mathematical broad approach concerned with the extreme sensibility and unpredictability of certain real or invented systems that may be described in formal terms. Taking social or human phenomena as cases for chaos theory very often constitutes an illegitimate or misguided practice, specially when the metaphorical aim is not recognised as such. Furthermore, psychology has not reached until the days the level of formalisation needed to produce exact predictions, even in the more basic realms of human behaviour. So it does not add theoretical value to consider the existence of particular realm of unstable behaviour. Therefore statistical analyses of cerebral frequencies, neural networks, formal models of learning or perception, or even Game Theory would be some of the domains in which Chaos Theory may be applied with certain guarantees.

In contrast, our study shows that Chaos Theory is applied systematically in areas with a low level of formalisation, such as psychoanalysis, epistemology, systemic therapy, or organisational psychology. If, as said before, the idea of Chaos is not of use in this domain, then, how does it function? My Hypothesis is that this rhetoric improves the apparent validity and the social impact of the ideas presented, by appealing to a fashionable theory with a exotic denomination. This rhetorical movement comes to be picturesque taking into account that postmodernism often disdain scientific ortodoxia, while it paradoxically uses its developments as a charming peacock's tail which invades the symbolic space with singular impertinence and very little effective content.

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EARLY TEXTBOOKS OF PSYCHOLOGY USED IN JAPANESE COLLEGES IN THE 19TH CENTURY

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As we previously reported in the 20th annual meeting of ESHHS in 2001, psychology was imported into Japanese society after 1870s. In 1868, as the Meiji-era began, there was a drastic change of politics and society. The first law of school system was enacted in 1872, and this first one was modelled after French school system. There were many problems with the law, however, and the reformed law, which was modelled after American system, was enacted in 1879. University of Tokyo (formerly named Tokyo Kaisei College), the first national university in Japan, was founded in 1877, and in 1870s, several private colleges were also founded. These university and colleges had their own curricula and almost all early university and colleges had one or more lectures of psychology.

Since the subject "psychology" had not existed in Japan, the lecturers of psychology had to use foreign books for textbooks. Some of the books were translated into Japanese. One of the first translated textbooks was Mental Philosophy Including Intellect, Sensibilities and Will (1869, 2nd ed.) by Joseph Haven and its Japanese translation (1875-1879) was titled Psychology. Since it was printed and published by the Ministry of Education, it was the first textbook of psychology officially recognised by Japanese government. Though it is still unclear why it was chosen for translation, this book of Haven was also translated into Chinese some years later. In the following decade, Alexander Bain's books were most frequently translated into Japanese. His Mental Science (1868) was translated in 1882 and 1886 by different people, and two different translations of Mental and Moral Sciences (1884, 3rd ed., Part I only) were published in 1886. Outlines of Psychology (1884) and Teachers Handbook of Psychology on the Basis of the Outlines of Psychology (1886), both written by James Sully, were translated and published in 1886 and 1887 respectively.

There were other textbooks used in early lectures of private colleges. Besides Haven, Bain and Sully, original English books were also used as textbooks for the lectures of psychology during 1870s and 1880s. Elements of Mental Philosophy (1840) by Thomas Upham, Principles of Psychology (1870, 2nd ed. possibly) by Herbert Spencer, Elements of Intellectual Philosophy (1854 or 1865) by Francis Wayland, and Principles of Mental Physiology (1874) by William B. Carpenter were among them.

According to Tomeri Tanimoto, who presented a paper titled *Notice historique de la psychologie au Japon* at the 4th meeting of International Congress of Psychology in 1900, there were three periods in the 19th century history of Japanese psychology. In the first period, books by American moral philosophers such as Haven and Wayland were used. In the next period, British philosophers such as Bain, Spencer and Sully were referred most frequently. Then after a short period of George T. Ladd and T. Ribot, the period of German psychologists set in. Several well-known works of German

Psychologists were translated into Japanese, but the most noteworthy textbook was *Grundriss der Psychologie* (1896) by Wilhelm Wundt. The translation was published in 1896.

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