


EUROPEAN SOCIETY FOR THE HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES

22nd Annual Conference

St Johns College, York. 29 August – 2 September 2003



Programme



This conference has been sponsored by the British Psychological Society and co-organised with the British Psychological Society History & Philosophy of Psychology Section, with assistance from Dr Ian Rivers, Chair of the BPS North East Branch and a member of St Johns College, York.

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ESHHS 2003

Schedule of Sessions

Aug 29-Sept 2 2003

	Friday	Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday
9.00-11.00		Session B	Session D	Session G	Session K
11-11.30		<i>Break</i>	<i>Break</i>	<i>Break</i>	<i>Break</i>
11.30-13.00	Registration	Session B (ctd)	Session E	Session H	
13.00-14.00	<i>Lunch</i>	<i>Lunch</i>	<i>Lunch</i>	<i>Lunch</i>	<i>Lunch</i>
14.00-15.30	Session A	Session C	Session F	Session I	END
15.30-16.00	<i>Break</i>	Time to Explore York	<i>Break</i>	<i>Break</i>	
16.00-17.00	Invited Speaker 1	Time to Explore York	Session F (ctd)	Session J	
17.30-18.00	<i>Break</i>	<i>Break</i>	<i>Blackwells Wine Reception</i>	<i>Break</i>	
18.00-19.00	<i>BPS Wine reception</i>	Invited Speaker 2	<i>Dinner</i>	Invited Speaker 3	
19.00-20.00	<i>Dinner</i>	<i>Dinner</i>	Yorkboat Cruise	<i>Conference Dinner</i>	
20.00-21.00	Pub crawl	Business Meeting	Yorkboat Cruise		

	Friday 29th August
9.00-11.00	
11-11.30	
11.30-13.00	Registration
13.00-14.00	<i>Lunch</i>
14.00-15.30	Session A: Business and Industry HERRERO, Fania & LAFUENTE, Enrique The origins of industrial psychology in Spain: An institutional approach SCHWARZKOPF, Stefan Of Laboratory Mice and Salesmen: the History of early twentieth-century Advertising Psychology from the Business History Perspective
15.30-16.00	<i>Break</i>
16.00-17.30	Guest Lecture 1 PORTER, Theodore M. Karl Pearson: The Scientific Self in a Statistical Age.
17.30-18.00	<i>Break</i>
18.00-19.00	<i>Wine reception</i>
19.00-20.00	<i>Dinner</i>
20.00-21.00	Pub crawl

	Saturday 30th August
9.00-11.00	Session B <i>Chair !</i> Symposium 1: Critiques of Grand Narratives and Changing Methodological Perspectives in the History of the Human Sciences KOERNER, Stephanie, Convenor
9.30-10.00	KOERNER, Stephanie <i>Univ. Manchester</i> <i>school of art history</i> Introduction
9.30-10.00	OSBECK, Lisa Method and the Sub-discipline of Theoretical Psychology <i>univ. Pittsbrough</i>
10.00-10.30	NEARY, Francis <i>(univ. of Manchester)</i> <i>Centre for H&S</i> The Boundaries between Normal and Abnormal Psychology in Late Nineteenth Century Britain and America <i>Dech Rechin</i>
10.30-11.00	VAJDA, Zsuzsanna IQ debates – politics or science? <i>Univ Z</i>
11-11.30	<i>Break</i>

11.30-13.00	Session B (ctd) ZAHLE, Julie <i>Univ of P. Hhs</i> Menger's Impact on Weber's Methodological Individualism
	FEEST, Uljana <i>Max Planck Inst Bonn</i> Topic in the History and Philosophy of Evolutionary Psychology
	KOERNER, Stephanie Art and Relations between Debates over Thresholds of Perception and of Causal Attribution and Skepticism about the Conditions of Shared Human Understanding
13.00-14.00	<i>Lunch</i>
14.00-15.30	Session C: Biographies I RIEBER, Bob <i>univ. of Manchester - professor</i> A Dialogue with Vygotsky <i>JAMODA, first</i> GOOD, James William Stephenson, Melanie Klein, and the Mutual Relevance of Psychoanalysis and Q-Methodology <i>J → meanday</i>
15.30-16.00	<i>Break</i>
16.00-17.30	Time to explore York


17.30-18.00	Time to explore York
18.00-19.00	Guest Lecture 2 <i>Business meeting</i> SOKAL, Michael M. James McKeen Cattell, Columbia University, and the Ironies of Academic Freedom, 1891-1917.
19.00-20.00	<i>Dinner</i>
20.00-21.00	Business Meeting

	Sunday 31st August
9.00-11.00	Session D WORKSHOP: The centre and the periphery: The question of marginality in the human sciences BOS, Jaap, PARK, David & PIETIKAINEN, Petteri, Convenors BOS, Jaap Friend by enemy: the making of marginality in psychoanalysis PARK, David Claiming the Margins: On the Charismatic Appeal of Popular Psychology PIETIKAINEN, Petteri Neurosis and the early reception of psychoanalysis in Swedish medicine
11-11.30	<i>Break</i>
11.30-13.00	Session E: Administration and Archives BRYSON, Dennis The Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial and the Construction of the 'Social' and the 'Anti-social' TAKASUNA, Miki Stumpf Collection in Japan: A report
13.00-14.00	<i>Lunch</i>

14.00-15.30	Session F: Origins and Boundaries BRAUNS, Horst-Peter Some notes on characterology in diachronic view MÜLBERGER, Annette & VILAPLANA, Elisabet Parapsychology at the beginnings of the twentieth century in Catalonia VALENTINE, Elizabeth R. The limits of the experiment as a psychological method: A view from 1901
15.30-16.00	<i>Break</i>
16.00-17.00	ALLESCH, Christian G. Person and Environment: Reflections on the roots of environmental psychology LOVIE, Sandy & LOVIE, Pat <i>Stickiness and Boundary Work: Evaluations of Model Closeness in Early Mathematical Learning Theory</i>
17.30-18.00	<i>Blackwells Wine Reception</i>

18.00-19.00	<i>Dinner</i>
19.00-20.00	Yorkboat Cruise
20.00-21.00	Yorkboat Cruise

	Monday 1st September
9.00-11.00	Session G Symposium 2: Psychology and Religion BELZEN, Jacob, Convenor WULFF, David M. Psychology of Religion: History, Potential, and Problems RICHARDS, Graham Religious Advocacy of Psychology and Psychotherapy in Britain 1918-1939 BELZEN, Jacob A. Opposition and defence: Methodological Debates among German Contemporaries of William James
11-11.30	<i>Break</i>


11.30-13.00	Session H: Categories  JAHODA, Gustav From sympathy to empathy J. G. 9100 ANDERSEN, Lars Ole Discussions in medicine 1800-1875 about the influence of imagination
13.00-14.00	<i>Lunch</i>
14.00-15.30	Session I: Biographies II CLARK, David An American Behaviourist in Paris: the psychodynamic foundation of E. R. Guthrie's theory of psychopathology. PIZARROSO LOPEZ, Noemi The work of Maurice Pradines: A forgotten genetic psychobiology
15.30-16.00	<i>Break</i>
16.00-17.30	Session J: Psychopharmacology and Psychiatry DEHUE, Trudy Experiments with Serotonine: Pharmaceutical Industry, Scientific Experimentation and the History They are Sharing ECONOMOU, Pete N. In Search of Schizophrenia: The Old Bailey Session Papers and The Trial of Roger Bow in 1734 ABMA, Ruud The modernisation of Dutch psychiatry 1960-2000
17.30-18.00	<i>Break</i>
18.00-19.00	Guest Lecture 3 SHAMDASANI, Sonu Belief, Suggestion and Influence in Medicine and Psychology: Towards a Genealogy of the Concept of the Placebo.
19.00-20.00	<i>Conference</i>
20.00-21.00	<i>Dinner</i>

	Tuesday 2nd September
9.00-11.00	Session K: Knowledge and Nationality STAEUBLE, Irmingard Historicising the Disciplinary Order of Western Knowledge Postcolonial Perspectives BATTANER, E., CASTRO, J., JIMENEZ, B. Psychology, language, and national mentality in Spain: An approach to the psycho-linguistic construction of national subjectivity at the end of 19th century LUBEK, Ian et al. "We're in the business of selling beer, not medicine": Ethical discourses on corporate responsibility workplace health, and HIV/AIDS in Cambodia.
11-11.30	<i>Break</i>
11.30-13.00	
13.00-14.00	<i>Lunch</i>
14.00-15.30	END

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Abstracts of Contributions



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Individual speakers are listed in alphabetical order of surname. Symposium and panel participants are listed under the surname of the principle convenor or organiser.

ABMA, Ruud

Department of General Social Sciences, Utrecht University, The Netherlands

The modernisation of Dutch psychiatry 1960-2000

In this paper developments in Dutch psychiatry during the last 40 years are analysed and discussed. The focus will be on the complicated relationship between research and practice in psychiatry. During the 1950s, academic psychiatry was dominated by psychoanalytic and phenomenological perspectives, which corresponded quite well with psychiatric practice. Nowadays neurobiological research is commonly recognised as a major asset of psychiatry, and both diagnosis and therapy are becoming increasingly standardised.

The 'modernisation' of Dutch psychiatry took shape in a series of contradictory developments on several levels:

- (1) the first manifestations of modern biological psychiatry in the early 1970s, that were vehemently criticised by the contemporary counterculture within the mental health domain;
- (2) the introduction of the ICD and DSM as nosologic classification systems during the 1980s, initially met with a rather passive attitude among practitioners, but accepted later as a useful *lingua franca* between psychiatrists of divergent theoretical convictions;
- (3) the growing prescription and use of new psychopharmaca, while at the same time psychotherapy was blooming;
- (4) professional and academic rivalry between various mental health disciplines, which was reflected by new academic specialisations and professional organisations; that
- (5) subsequently had to cooperate in the new institutional arrangements of the 1990s, which were increasingly governed by the rule of 'evidence-based' practice and bureaucratic procedures (protocollization). How did these developments affect psychiatric theory, research and practice?

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Person and environment: Reflections on the roots of environmental psychology

Hermann Ebbinghaus said with respect to psychology that it had a short history but a long past. The same may be said likewise of environmental psychology. Environmental psychology as a distinct research paradigm emerged in the second half of the 20th century, primarily inaugurated by Kurt Lewin and his disciple Roger Barker.

Recent American textbooks of environmental psychology (e.g. Gifford 1997, Bell *et al.*, 2001) refer to a continuous interest in the influence of environmental factors on human behaviour within the realm of psychology but date the emergence of environmental psychology as a particular sub-discipline not before the middle of the 20th century when Lewin and Brunswik published their influential papers on this topic. German textbooks (e.g. Hellbrück & Fischer 1999; Miller, 1998) recently point to the work of Willy Hellpach as an early conception of environmental psychology at the

beginning of the 20th century, and sometimes *also* mention the biologist Jakob von Uexküll as an early precursor of this discipline.

My contribution shall discuss some arguments why these early German conceptions might be regarded as the very historical roots of environmental psychology.

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- Miller, R. (1998). *Umweltpsychologie. Eine Einführung*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.

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Discussions in medicine 1800-1875 about the influence of imagination

The term 'imagination' was most frequently used in the 18th century in discussions about poetry, philosophy and medicine. Its role in the 19th century is much less investigated. It is clear that the medical usage of the term declined during this century, but there were several attempts to revitalise it. In Britain John Haygarth (1740–1827), known for his work with infectious diseases, tried to raise the medical interest for the term around 1800. Daniel Hack Tuke (1827–1895), a leading alienist, tried to do the same in books and articles in the *Journal of Mental Science* in the 1870s, but none of them not succeeded with their projects. They both wanted to increase the knowledge about the phenomenon, and they didn't want 'quacks' to be the only ones who in their work would benefit from the effect of imagination.

In *The Lancet* imagination was referred to as an argument in discussions about animal magnetism, homoeopathy and the mother's influence on her foetus. Imagination here still played a role by explaining things otherwise unexplainable: Why could a worthless treatment have an effect or how could the normal development of a foetus be changed? In times where anatomy and physiology were keywords, terms that had connections to philosophy and metaphysics like imagination had hard times. In the end of the 19th century terms such as 'power of attention', 'suggestion' and 'faith healing' increased in importance, and imagination lost the importance it had had in medicine for several hundreds of years.

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- The Asylum Journal of Mental Science* 1855–58
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- Haygarth J. (1801). *Of the imagination, as a cause and as a cure of disorders of the body*. Bath: Cruttwell.
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BATTANER, E., CASTRO, J. & JIMENEZ, B.

Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, Spain

Psychology, language and national mentality in Spain: An approach to the psycho-linguistic construction of national subjectivity at the end of the 19th century

This work registers in a more general research programme: it is oriented towards the study of the role of the psycho-sociological discourse – its categories and anthropological architectures *plus* its tools and preservation technologies, control, or change of the subjectivity – throughout the construction of the national identity within the Spanish ambit. We are particularly interested in the years ending the 19th century and beginning the 20th, as it frames the Spanish liberal sphere's most important efforts towards the incorporation into European modernity. The awareness of this need grows parallel to the collapse of Spain understood as an empire, yet in its final phase due to the loss of last colonies Cuba and Philippines against the United States in 1898. On this critical context, liberals and reformists assumed the existence of a scientific, theoretical, and technological delay that impeded the national and identity project. Lastly, it also hindered the building and organising the modern state-nation – cohesive culturally and competitive economically, industrially, and militarily – together with the obstruction of ways to prospect and palliate the intrinsic sources of the collective decadence. Just in the intersection of both scarcities there was the analytical and intervening prominence of the psycho-sociological discourse. Hence the aim of this paper is to approach one of the crucial fields of this analysis of the identity: the psycho-linguistic one.

As the episteme of 19th century sciences installed the fundamental concern on man at all the levels of knowledge (Foucault, 1970), many are the disciplines oriented towards the clarification of his individual and collective nature. Historiography, anthropology, psychology, or linguistics fluently change and combine terms as *spirit*, *race*, *mentality*, *psychology*, or *language* in order to apprehend the collective being. Authors such as Vico, Condillac, Herder or Fichte were concerned with these matters early, although they did not acquire scientific legitimacy until the development of the Humboldtian programme, comparative linguistics, dialectology, and *Völkerpsychologie* during the 19th century (Robins, 1970; Jahoda, 1992). Soon these theories turned into the referent or constitutive parts of the theories on nation and nationalism created throughout the nineteenth-century. With different *densities*, they appear in the thesis of Lord Acton (*Nationality*), J. Stuart Mill (*Considerations on the representative government*), Friedrich List (The national system of political economy), Pasquale Mancini (*On nationality*), Gobineau (*Essai sur l'inegalité des races humaines*, 1853-55) and Renan (*What is a nation?*) (Juaristi, 2000).

According to this line, in Spain authors such as Menéndez Pelayo, Antonio Cánovas, or Prat de la Riba were the ones interested in the analysis of the relationship between national character and language. Nevertheless, from the point of view of the discipline, this psycho-linguistic reflection is not rooted in the tradition of a strong research nor in the institutional space found in the cases of Grimm, Bopp, Müller, Lazarus, or Steinthal in Great Britain and Germany. But this fact does not imply that, from the academic point of view, the intersection formed by psychology, language, and national mentality, was not apprehended in its theoretical and political importance.

It is true that throughout the 19th century a good part of social sciences in Spain are still blocked up in Scholasticism or repeating and imitating the scientific labour. However, as Nuñez (1987) has pointed out, it is since 1875 – perhaps before that date – that the introduction of the positivist thinking started: scientific discourse is renewed and its circulation was improved. That is the moment when scientific institutions are revitalized (*Ateneos*, Anthropological Societies, etc.), when main works in

anthropology, psychology, and linguistics are translated (authors such as Pedro Felipe Monlau, Antón, Hoyos, Aranzadi, Olóriz, Sales y Ferré, and so on), and when scientific-oriented journals, with renewing and modernising intentions are instituted (*Boletín de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza*, *Revista de Antropología*, etc.).

This work approaches that literary wealth in order to identify those documents that paid attention to the psychological and linguistic conjunction. Amongst them, handbooks and treatises of anthropology, psychology, and linguistics are taken into account; also the discourses and debates held at the different anthropological societies – as the Spanish or the Seville one; expert articles published in journals; and the theoretical essays on the nation or on the Spanish nationalism that centred in language and the peculiarities of the national identity. Those documents are the starting point to identify main theoretical categories employed and ideological courses that underlie the creating and the shaping of the psycho-linguistic field.

In doing so from this methodological point of view, that search is based on two types of parameters. First parameter condenses the epistemic and theoretical side and, in the line of the structure of the knowledge of that epoch, it attends to the roots of that psychological and linguistic coalescence, to the specific mechanisms involved in both disciplines, the concrete expression employed in the Spanish case, and the probabilities of growth – and even disappearance – when stated together with other alternative psycho-linguistic expressions. The second parameter deals with the ethical and political aspects linked to the identity nucleus, particularly to the adjustment to the idea of authenticity or pureness, peculiarity and originality, potentiality or creativity detected in the psycho-linguistic structure. Finally, this work offers a first approach to the intersections between psychology, language, and mentality, taking into account their importance for the construction of modern subjectivity in Spain during the period between the 19th and the 20th centuries.

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SYMPOSIUM ON PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION

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1. WULFF, David M.

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Psychology of religion: History, potential and problems

Among the subfields of psychology, the psychology of religion was one of the first to emerge. Furthermore, the interval between the first publications, on the one hand, and the articulation of basic principles and the establishment of journals, on the other, was remarkably short. The recurring foundering of the field's journals, however, in contrast to the success of those in other subfields, was symptomatic of problems that have hampered the psychology of religion for over a century. Chief among them is the unique and elusive character of the field's object of study, religion, along with a pervasive tendency toward reductionism or apologetics among its proponents and suspicion or aversion among outsiders. The works of its best-known classic contributors – William James, Sigmund Freud, and C.G. Jung, among others – have helped over the decades to sustain interest in the field, in spite of widespread doubts and criticisms. But recent trends raise hopes for some measure of fulfilment of the field's original promise.

2. RICHARDS, Graham

Staffordshire University and the BPS History of Psychology Centre, London

Religious advocacy of psychology and psychotherapy in Britain 1918-1939

Insofar as there is a popular image of the relationship between psychology and Christian religion it is that they have been either opposed and antagonistic or that they have been mutually indifferent. In this paper I will show that in Britain between the two World Wars various Christian writers played a major role in actually popularising psychological ideas, theories and findings, and that far from seeing psychology as an enemy they strove to cast it as an ally. Important figures in this process included Leslie Weatherhead and Eric Waterhouse, on whom the paper will focus, but attention will also be drawn to the large number of texts, in various media, which were also promoting the same message. This occurred primarily in the context of pastoral concerns with mental distress, but expanded beyond that, and some at any rate were happy to revise certain Christian doctrines in the light of contemporary psychology's findings and claims. This episode needs to be seen as having broader, more general, implications for the historical relationship between the two parties. Some observations on this will also be offered.

3. BELZEN, Jacob A.

Opposition and defence: Methodological debates among German contemporaries of William James

After some orienting remarks on the role of history in psychology, this paper deals with the methodological debates that followed the publication of the translation James' *Varieties of Religious Experience* in German (1907). Special attention is given to the work of Gustav Vorbrodt, the first promotor of the field in Germany, and to his discussions with other founding fathers of the field in that country like Georg Wobbermin, Wilhelm Stählin and Wilhelm Wundt.

WORKSHOP: THE CENTRE AND THE PERIPHERY: THE QUESTION OF MARGINALITY IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES

BOS, Jaap, PARK, David & PIETIKAINEN, Petteri

- How does a theory gain legitimacy in a specific scientific area of expertise and in a larger cultural market? What are the mechanisms of social formation and selection that help establish a particular paradigm in medicine, psychology and psychoanalysis? What are the characteristics of a process by which a theory becomes recognised as a part of – or rejected by – the field of knowledge in which it competes? Some theories adapt to specific environmental requirements and prevailing scientific and intellectual agendas better than others, and this means that the less well-adapted theories either pass into oblivion or survive in the margins of a discipline. Proponents of marginalised theories have to cope with reduced funding sources, biased journal receptivity, curtailed job opportunities, blocked academic promotions, and more. However, marginalisation is not an essential or permanent designation. In the course of time, once-marginalised theories (such as those of kin selection in evolutionary biology and continental drift in the Earth sciences) can become dominant, while once-prevailing theories (such as those of group selection and Lamarckian theory of inherited acquired characteristics) may lose their prestige and legitimacy. When contemporary sociologists and historians of science and medicine discuss marginality, they tend to emphasise social relations, competition for resources and recognition, and professional interests and institutions. Thus the social contexts of scientific and medical activity have been diligently studied in recent decades, and these studies have made possible a more comprehensible understanding of what is involved in marginality. At the same time, one can suggest that this sociologically oriented work gives a somewhat distorted picture of scientific activity by neglecting to analyse, for example, the cognitive and rhetorical factors (strength of the argument, modes of presentation and persuasion, techniques and methods, results, and standards of evaluation) operative in intellectual collaboration and institutional support. The purpose of this workshop is to address questions of marginality by focusing on three specific topics: the early reception of psychoanalysis in Swedish neurology and psychiatry, marginal figures in psychoanalysis, and popular psychology in the United States. The participants in the workshop will discuss the varied faces of marginality in specific cases.

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shut de kluis

in te openen

Friend by enemy: The making of marginality in psychoanalysis

Although the problem of marginality is oftentimes (and with reason) studied at the rather impersonal level of scientific paradigms, the consequences of marginalisation are to found at a much more personal level, when institutions, organisations and finally individuals find themselves excluded from funding, means of publication, credit of acclaim. Being marginalised is (at this personal level) an unpleasant or even painful experience, but, ironically, it generally takes place in full consent with the one who is being marginalised – only in very rare or extreme cases must the marginal physically be removed from the floor. The marginal knows that the ‘the rules’ that are being applied to his disadvantage cannot be objected, nor that the gatekeeper can be blamed, who is after all only doing his job. Moreover, arriving at the point of actually being rejected seldom comes as a surprise because warning signs have been signalled long before.

It is at this point that the study of marginality most often commences, when marginalisation has already become visible. What I want to focus on, however, is the process that takes place *before* the marginal is being denied access to or excluded from whatever is considered non-marginal or ‘essential’, that is: before heuristics become objectified in terms of ‘rules’ or ‘standard procedures’, before arguments become facts, before theories become paradigms, even before ideas become properties.

Marginalisation is thus, in a sense, part of a process of socialisation, which involves at least two parties. Thus the road that leads to marginalisation needs to be studied at a social-discursive level since it implies forms of negotiation, social positioning, adaptation to and retraction from common view points and so on.

In this paper I shall examine the relation between Sigmund Freud and Wilhelm Stekel, one of Freud’s first and most loyal students, which slowly but surely deteriorated into enmity and finally led to Stekel becoming Freud’s most prominent marginal. I shall ~~aim~~ demonstrate how this process of marginalisation *within* psychoanalysis connects to the process of marginalisation *of* psychoanalysis, and specify several discursive functions that are distinctive for this process.

→ function

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Claiming the margins: On the charismatic appeal of popular psychology

When a professional uses the media to communicate with a large, non-professional audience, it raises special considerations regarding the assertion of authority. In this situation, the expert attempts to assert authority largely through the use of strategic self-identification. Marginality is of great importance to this process of staking authority in discourse. It is the margins – between the professional and the non-professional, between different positions within the professions, and between author and audience – that become crucial stakes in the game through which authority is negotiated.

This understanding of authority can be applied to popular psychological expertise in the US. In the early 20th century, psychiatrists parlayed their considerable (if contested) place in the medical establishment into a uniquely powerful authoritative voice. Lay analysts of the mid-20th century lacked the institutional power of psychiatrists, and asserted an authority that played up their own marginal position within the sphere of the professions. The lay analysts claimed they were more legitimate

than their orthodox psychiatric peers precisely because they were outside the institutionalised spheres of psychological knowledge. In this sense, they turned their marginal position into a valuable part of their own authority.

This paper examines the authority asserted by popular psychology, and in particular the authority asserted by Joyce Brothers and Phil McGraw. Brothers and McGraw are two of the most famous individuals associated with psychology in the US. As with popular lay analysts, they voice their authority largely in terms of marginality. They claim to be professionals, and yet also claim to be set apart from the professions. They identify their marginality as something that highlights their ostensible superiority to others' 'mere' professionalism. In so doing, they transform their marginality (from the point of view of the professions) into a claimed homology with the audience's authentic interests; what one might think would be the stigma of marginality is thus transformed into a sign of personal charisma. Concluding discussion suggests comparisons and contrasts with psychiatrists Peter Kramer and Irvin Yalom, and describes some of the tools of visual self-representation found in the new televisual style of popular professionalism.

the
downhole
break?

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Neurosis and the early reception of psychoanalysis in Swedish medicine

Psychoanalysts have had a hard time establishing themselves in Swedish medicine. It was only in the 1960s that dynamic psychology broke through, partly in the guise of 'psychosomatic medicine'. Until then, psychoanalysis lived in the margins of medicine, and its impact on the development of psychiatry and neurology was negligible.

In my presentation, I will discuss the early decades of the 20th century, when a number of influential neurologists and psychiatrists confronted psychoanalysis and debated it in various public forums. I will illustrate the way the originally neurological approach to 'nerve illnesses' (neurosis, neurasthenia, hysteria and psychastenia) gradually gave way to a more distinctly psychiatric approach, in which the more emphatically 'psychogenic' factors were taken into account. During the process in which one professional group (psychiatrists) gradually legitimised their expertise in the field of neuroses, Swedish psychoanalysts faced the inconvenient fact that their own authority in that field remained insignificant. The pioneering neurologists in Sweden had been influenced by the 'French school' of neurology (Charcot, Bernheim), and they did not have much sympathy for Freudian views on neuroses, which they tended to see as unscientific, implausible, and of bad taste.

Influential neurologists and psychiatrists at *Serafimer Hospital* and the *Karolinska Institute* in Stockholm had a predominantly somatic view on 'nerve illnesses' and mental disorders, and they looked with suspicion at the psychoanalytic talk about the unconscious psychic processes. As leading experts in the field of neuroses, their critical remarks about psychoanalysis in medical journals and in the Medical Society's meetings had a strong influence on the general attitude towards psychoanalysis among Swedish physicians. As a result, psychodynamically oriented physicians, most of whom were private practitioners (and some of whom were more 'Jungian' than 'Freudian'), found themselves at the margins of medical profession, and they had to defend their precarious position against influential critics who in some cases went so far as to label psychoanalysis as a form of quackery. In such an unfriendly climate, psychoanalysis was doomed to remain at the medical periphery for decades.

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Some notes on characterology in diachronic view

While some first thoughts on individual differences can be found in pre-Socratic writings (Kallfelz, 1940) the earliest systematic character descriptions are those of Plato (politeia), Aristotle (rhetoric) and Theophrast (Siebeck, 1880; Landmann, 1950). One main problem for this presentistic statement is the multiple different disciplinary status of these characterologies.

Obviously, this fact remains over centuries for Walch's (1726) rather differentiated treatment of character is mainly located in ethics and Kant's (1800) exposition of character is situated in his 'pragmatic anthropology'.

Nevertheless, these latter characterologies seem to be sophisticated and determined methodically as well as more differentiated in themselves than the earlier ones.

Finally, some general considerations on diachronic analysis of modern general psychological terms will be tried to be given.

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The Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial and the Construction of the 'Social' and the 'Anti-social'

During the 1920s, a major Rockefeller philanthropic organisation, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial (LSRM), played a seminal role in sponsoring and giving direction to the emerging American social sciences. Thus, the LSRM sponsored the community studies of such University of Chicago social scientists as Robert Park, Ernest Burgess, and Charles Merriam, initiated and funded the Social Science Research Council, contributed to the funding of Elton Mayo's important experiments in industrial sociology at the Hawthorne plant of Western Electric in Chicago, created the Institute for Research in Social Science at the University of North Carolina, and helped to fund major projects of the National Bureau of Economic Research, an important 'think tank' in applied economics.

The social science programme of the LSRM had a normalising dimension that will be quite instructive to examine. The programme was oriented toward the simultaneous construction of new knowledge of the social and of new forms of the social by means of this knowledge. In elaborating such a vision of the role of social science knowledge *vis-a-vis* the social, social scientists affiliated with the LSRM constructed an image of the "socialised" subject, which would be interconnected with other subjects and thus securely positioned within the social by means of bonds of

interdependence and cooperation. Social science was thereby to help foster and manage, in the very process of coming to know scientifically, a new socialised subjectivity. It was to develop techniques for normalising subjectivity; it was thus to construct the image of the normal subject, which would be adjusted to modern social life. In constructing an image of the normal, socialised subject, however, social science also constructed an image against which this subject could be defined and measured; i.e., it constructed the image of the abnormal and anti-social subject. Thus, various images of abnormality and deviancy, of 'maladjustment' and mental disorder proliferated in social science discourse. I will be especially concerned with exploring the images of maladjusted and anti-social subjectivity in the writings of Ernest R. Groves and Harold D. Lasswell, two social scientists closely connected to the LSRM, as well as in the writings of Lawrence K. Frank, an important LSRM officer.

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An American behaviourist in Paris: The psychodynamic foundation of E.R. Guthrie's theory of psychopathology.

Between 1919 and 1935, Edwin R. Guthrie (1886–1959) established himself as one of America's foremost behaviourists. He was a highly respected learning theorist who had made his contributions in the analysis of associative learning and habit formation. Guthrie's behaviourism looked for its model to biology, and his learning theory focused on adaptation or changing responses to a changing environment. In the 1920s Behaviourism was experimental – often involving comparative psychology and rat running, and seemed far removed from 'psychodynamics'. Thus in 1938 when Guthrie published *The Psychology of Human Conflict: The Clash of Motives Within the Individual*, it came as a surprise to his colleagues. Furthermore, a reading of Guthrie's preface shows his book was for all intents and purposes dedicated to Pierre Janet (1859–1947). In as much as Janet's psychology was based upon hypnosis and the pathology of hysterics, this requires some explanation.

In this paper, I will argue that Janet's ideas played an important part in Guthrie's behaviourism early on, and I propose to draw out the history of Janet's psychodynamic influence in the development of Guthrie's theory of learning. I will proceed by building a bridge between Janet's (1924) *Principles of Psychotherapy* and Guthrie's (1938) *The Psychology of Human Conflict*.

This story begins during the Jazz Age when Guthrie and his wife Helen joined the lost generation of American expatriates in Europe. In 1923 Guthrie was a 37-year-old assistant professor at the University of Washington; although trained as a

philosopher who wrote on formal logic, he had only recently metamorphasised into a psychologist. He had collaborated with Stevenson Smith (1921) on *Chapters in General Psychology*, one of the first behaviourist psychology text books, later published as *General Psychology in Terms of Behavior*. In the University of Washington archives, however, we find a faculty personnel questionnaire on which Guthrie wrote, 'September 1923 to August 1924 on leave from U. of Washington – travelled in France, Italy, England. In Paris translated book for Pierre Janet publ. by Macmillan.'

In fact in 1924 Guthrie and his wife published an English translation of Janet's 1923 *La Médecine Psychologique* which they titled *Principles of Psychotherapy*. But what did Guthrie find in Janet's work that motivated him to translate a book? I will argue that two themes of Janet's attracted Guthrie. Late in his career Guthrie lamented, 'Current psychological theory takes almost no account of man as an energy system ... Man is an energy system...' (p. 169–170). And again, 'Janet, as a result of a lifetime dealing with mental patients, used the notion of *force mentale* as a predictor of behaviour' (p. 170). As one indication of the importance of energy to our intellectual forebears, Shephard (2000) said, 'At the turn of the century, exhaustion became a common theme in scientific research and popular discourse...' (p. 11). Further, William James (1911) said, 'We need a topography of the limits of human power, similar to the chart which oculists use of the field of human vision' (p. 39). Janet responded to James's request by sketching the boundaries of the *force mentale*, and Guthrie used it.

The second theme was habit. We know that Smith introduced Guthrie to associative learning (Guthrie, 1951). We find in Smith and Guthrie (1921) in Chapter 3, Learning, that the job of psychology is to explain habits. We also know that Janet's psychology was founded on *automatisms* (Crabtree, 2003). And in Janet (1924) we find a proposal to address a treatment of psycho-pathology behaviour through *automatisms*, for Guthrie automatisms are habits.

I propose to demonstrate how Guthrie (1938) incorporated Janet's psychological energy and *automatisms* into a text book of personality and psychopathology which was thoroughly behavioural.

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Experiments With Serotonin: Pharmaceutical industry, scientific experimentation and the history they are sharing

This talk discusses the adoption of the Randomised Controlled Trial (RCT) as a means of controlling pharmaceutical industries. In the course of the 20th century, after the adverse effects became visible of medical drugs like morphine, heroin, and the sedative thalidomide, administrative bodies such as the American Food and Drug Administration began to demand proof based on controlled experimentation. In many cases, the RCT is an invaluable research instrument. However, in relation to present-day mood changing drugs (influencing serotonin reuptake processes in the brain), the actual consequences of the RCT-obligation have become the reverse of the intended ones. Rather than to control pharmaceutical industries, the RCT greatly enhances the companies' interests. It does so because it shares with pharmacological treatments of mood-disorders an elementaristic rather than holistic model of disease. And it also does so because of the companies' downright, sometimes even fraudulent, manipulation of RCTs.

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In search of schizophrenia: The Old Bailey Session Papers and the trial of Roger Bow in 1734

Schizophrenia is a devastating mental illness producing enormous personal suffering and disability among affected individuals world-wide (Kane & McGlashan, 1995). Because of its relatively early age of onset, it is frequently characterised as a young-

adult disease. However, this characterisation is misleading, because for many the disease is chronic in nature, having a permanent impact (Goeree *et al.*, 1999, p.464), and wreaking havoc in the lives of family members (Kane & McGlashan, 1995) 'work relations, social interactions and quality of life in general' (Goeree *et al.*, 1999, p.464). In 1996, the World Health Organisation (WHO) conducted a review of the global burden of disease and estimated the prevalence rate of schizophrenia to be 9.2 per 1000 for males and 9.0 per 1000 females (approximately 1% of the population or 1 in 100) in the modern industrialised world.

However, the historical prevalence of schizophrenia as a persisting (e.g., Benedict & Jacks, 1954; Torrey, 1973a) and universal mental disease (e.g., Kraepelin, 1971 [1919], 1987) has been challenged by a 'recency hypothesis', claiming that schizophrenia has never been adequately described prior to the 19th century and the advent of modern industrialised civilization (Hare, 1988; Torrey, 1980; Torrey & Miller, 2001). Although many have attempted to refute the recency hypothesis with pre-industrial descriptions (e.g., Bark, 1985, 1988; Cooper & Sartorius, 1977; Jeste *et al.*, 1985; Turner, 1992; Warner, 1987) schizophrenia 'with its hallmark auditory hallucinations, chronic course and onset in late adolescence or early adulthood was never described' (Torrey, 2001, p. 16).

In fact, in his very controversial book *Schizophrenia and Civilization*, Fuller Torrey (1980) states 'it was as if somebody rang a bell precisely at the turn of the nineteenth-century to herald the official entrance of schizophrenia' (p.27). Descriptions of schizophrenia were suddenly appearing throughout Europe and North America (Hare, 1988; Torrey, 1980; Torrey & Miller, 2001). For example, the first clinical descriptions of schizophrenia occurred simultaneously by John Haslam (1976 [1809]) an apothecary at Bethlem Hospital (bedlam) in London, and Phillipe Pinel (1977 [1809]) a distinguished physician (Palha & Esteves, 1997) at the Salpetriere Hospital in Paris. Although they both divided cases of insanity into mania and melancholia, they each described distinct cases of a disease with a premorbid pathogenesis and recognisable today (Ellard, 1987; Hare, 1988; Torrey, 1980) as schizophrenia, with onset in early adulthood, delusions, hallucinations, and a chronic deteriorating course.

Today, with knowledge gleaned from studying the premorbid pathogenesis of schizophrenia (i.e., prodromal risk factors) in longitudinal high-risk (HR) population projects (e.g., Mednick, Parnas & Schulsinger, 1987; Weintraub, 1987) there is a growing consensus that the highest period of developmental risk for schizophrenia is between 15 to 25 years of age (Parnas, Cannon, Jacobsen, Schulsinger & Mednick, 1993). However, in England the rarity of an early onset-type of insanity (schizophrenia) prior to the nineteenth-century was observed by Harper's (1789) statement: 'it is well known that young people are hardly ever liable to insanity, and the attack of this malady seldom happens until an advanced period of life' (p. 521). This dramatically changes by 1888, when 40% of all new cases at the Royal Edinburgh Asylum were reported as 'insanity of adolescence' (from puberty to early adulthood) with chronic dementia and poor prognosis (Thomas Clouston, 1888), which was the most common form of schizophrenia by the end of the 19th century (Hare, 1988).

Therefore, how can the 'recency hypothesis' be tested? 'Ultimately, it depends on whether schizophrenia as we now identify it existed before the 19th century and, if so, whether its prevalence was in anyway comparable with contemporary estimates' (Shepherd, 1993, p. 302). Any attempt to test this hypothesis confronts the problem of retrospective diagnosis (Hare, 1988) and the paucity of available archival records in the eighteenth-century that allow for a comprehensive investigation.

One possible archival source is cited in Eigen's (1995) book *Witnessing Insanity: Madness and Mad-Doctors in the English Court*. Eigen specifies the existence

of a 'curious' publication (periodical) known as the *Old Bailey Sessions Papers* (OBSP). It is a compilation of extensive pamphlets (from 1674 to 1843) that recorded the trial outcomes of every prosecution at the 'Old Bailey' (the London trial court that adjudicated felonies committed in the city and the county of Middlesex) and demonstrated many cases of insanity. He was concerned with the evolution of the insanity defence plea (which his book attempted to trace) and specified the limitations of the OBSP, which were not intended to serve as legal documents, because law related details in the proceedings were missing.

The records of the OBSP were written for non-lawyers and sold to the general public within days of the trials by 'commercial printers' who had shorthand writers dispatched to the Old Bailey to record the proceedings. In other words, they 'were an early species of periodical journalism, purveying a diet of true life crime stories for the interest and amusement of a non-lawyer readership' (Langbein, 1983, p. 4). However, Langbein (1983) cross-referenced adjudicated cases in the mid 1750s with Sir Dudley Ryder's (Judge) private notes (i.e., private narratives of the cases) and found the reporting of the OBSP to be highly credible.

The court sat eight times per year (eight sessions) and ranged from 400 cases in 1674 to over 2000 cases per year by 1800 (Langbein, 1983). The price of each pamphlet ranged from 4 to 6 pence, and one or more pamphlets recorded each session, which often lasted over three days.

The OBSP 'captures the language of ordinary London citizens through direct quotation of courtroom testimony and offers an array of interactions available in no other source: direct examination and cross examination of defendants, witnesses, occasional instances of instruction to the jury, questions asked of witnesses by the jury, and a record of the prisoners' defence' (Eigen, 1995, p. 8). Therefore, the intended purpose of this paper (presentation) is to directly challenge the recency hypothesis by ascertaining evidence by retrospective diagnoses (ICD-10) of a chronic early onset form of schizophrenia (in the eighteenth-century – OBSP) by highlighting the direct statements and behaviours made by one insane defendant, Roger Bow who was indicted for the murder of Thomas Field by stabbing him with a knife in the stomach (left lower belly) on May 16, 1734 (OBSP, Fifth Session, # 5, 133). His character witnesses (who were often family and friends) provided vital information regarding the onset, history and duration of his illness. Through this case, I propose, that chronic schizophrenia, as we know it today existed prior to the 19th century.

The defining features that I have utilised in the diagnostic assessment of (chronic) schizophrenia within the OBSP, 'loosely' mirrored the general diagnostic criteria in the ICD-10 (F20). In other words, 'loosely' is being utilised as a disclaimer to the applicability of exact evaluative criteria being met within the temporal constraints of an archival source such as the OBSP. For example, because the OBSP are narratives (short-hand) of actual legal cases they are not conducive to providing strict legal documentation of temporal events in relation to evaluating insanity cases. Therefore, satisfying ICD-10 criterion for chronicity (florid symptoms lasting for years) (e.g., F20.x0) might be limited to a reference to the onset of the illness without exact specification of age or specific duration of particular signs, symptoms or behaviours. However, many insanity cases in the OBSP have revealed the general duration of the illness through the 18th century nomenclature of insanity, such as lunacy, madness, distracted, frenzied and metaphorical reference to being 'out of the senses' or 'disordered of the senses'.

As a result, these terms (specifying behaviours) have been utilised (and will be elaborated on in detail) regarding Roger Bow's case to assess the general duration or chronicity of his illness (florid symptoms over one month or persisting for years)

without any specific example of any particular chronic symptom that is beyond the narrative capacity of the OBSP. For example, George Dorton, was indicted for selling stolen goods to Samuel Foster and was brought to trial on April 25th, 1745. At the trial, Foster was asked the following questions regarding the duration of Dorton's bizarre behaviour.

Q: Has not he [Dorton] been thought for some time past to be out of his senses?

Foster: Yes he has been at my house till 12'oclock and night, and I could not get him out, and he would ramble into a parcel of nonsense.

Q: Did you at any time when he came to your house take him to be out of his senses?

Foster: He has gone backward and forward with his words, that there was no notice to be taken of him.

Q: Is not he apt to be disordered in his senses?

Foster: I have known the prisoner for a great many years, and as to his lunacy, he has been so for six or seven years (OBSP 1745, Session 4, # 210).

Therefore, utilising the ICD-10 (F20), Dorton's disorganised speech meets criterion f, (breaks or interpolations in the train of thought, resulting in incoherence or irrelevant speech). However, the duration (six or seven years) of criterion (f) is assessed through the utilization of the term 'lunacy', which, like other 18th century nomenclature of insanity utilised in the OBSP will be elaborated on in detail (especially in regards to Roger Bow's case).

In addition, adherence to the ICD-10 general diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia for Roger Bow, and within the OBSP in general, were limited to the post-mortem assessment of signs, symptoms and behaviour (spoken, written, or displayed) in the putative schizophrenic (e.g., Roger Bow) defence of an indictment. However, the narrative scope of Roger Bow's defence and other defences were often attenuated within the OBSP and assessment of schizophrenic behaviour was complemented by witness accounts (which were often from family, friends and employers).

In regards to my overall research in the OBSP, Eigen (1995) has recorded 331 trials (concerning insanity) between the years 1760 and 1843 (ranging yearly from 4 to 8 per 1000 trials). He didn't survey cases prior to this because in the 1760s medical testimonies (medical witnesses) were introduced to the courtroom and demarcated the nascence of 'insanity trials' (he was especially interested in the 1800s). However, his cases have been catalogued and have I have utilised them for retrospective diagnosis (ICD-10) of schizophrenia. In fact, Eigen's analysis of the OBSP revealed, 'between 1760–1843, medical participation in insanity trials grew from approximately one trial in ten throughout the late 1700s to one in two by the 1840s.'

Therefore, I have conducted a systematic search of over **'3000'** criminal cases **prior to 1760** (i.e., these cases have not been catalogued: 1733–1760) searching for cases of schizophrenia in order to mitigate any chances that 'medical testimony' (after 1760) might limit displays of schizophrenic behavior into all inclusive 18th century 'catch phrases' such as being a lunatic, distracted, mad, delirious and insane or reducing the need for the accused to verbally defend themselves in court.

My investigation of the OBSP (3000 cases) prior to 1760 has revealed 4 to 8 cases of insanity per 1000, which is similar to Eigen's findings between 1760 and 1843. Therefore, it became imperative to compare any cases of schizophrenia before and after 1760, because industrialisation in England began in the mid 18th century (Porter, 1987; Torrey & Miller, 2001) and could help prove or disprove the recency hypothesis' association with industrialisation. For example, 'the second half of the 18th century in England gave birth to both industrialisation and a middle class. Advances in the smelting of iron, the invention of the steam engine, power loom, spinning jenny, the introduction of agricultural techniques such as crop rotation, and increasing trade with

England's colonies combined to bring prosperity to an increasingly broad group of people' (Torrey & Miller, 2001, p. 30). As a result, with the increased prosperity in England, there also came increased crime (Eigen, 1995; Langbein, 1983; Porter, 1987; Walker, 1968). Importantly, the increased crime came without an increase in population (Torrey & Miller, 2001; cf. Porter, 1987), which eliminates any possible confounds associated with determining a prevalence rate, such as an 'immigration influx', that may have added to the general and ultimately the criminal population in London at the time of industrialisation.

Therefore, although this paper (presentation) will focus on the retrospective ICD-10 diagnosis of Roger Bow's behaviour in court (in detail) as a possible case of schizophrenia, it will be embedded within the broader implication of whether there were more diagnosable schizophrenics (ICD-10) among the accused criminals at the Old Bailey in London, prior to industrialisation or concomitant to industrialisation? In other words, questioning the validity of the recency hypothesis' claim that schizophrenia has never been adequately described prior to the 19th century (utilising the trial of Roger Bow as an example) and the advent of modern industrialised civilization. This historical approach has never been attempted in the epidemiology of schizophrenia and will add a new polemic to the 'recency hypothesis'.

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William Stephenson, Melanie Klein, and the mutual relevance of psychoanalysis and Q-methodology

William Stephenson frequently acknowledged the impact of Freudian ideas on the development of Q-methodology (e.g. Stephenson, 1953, 1967, 1993). His early encounter with Kleinian psychoanalysis has also been well documented (Brown, 1991). Less well-known is that one of the three major projects of his first decade in the United States was a monograph on *Psychoanalysis and Q-Methodology* (Stephenson, 1954). This monograph and *Intimations of the Self* (c1950) remain unpublished. The third work in this early trilogy – *The Study of Behavior* – was published in 1953. It is also not widely known that over the last two years of his life, Stephenson worked on an article for the *Journal of the Melanie Klein Society*. In this unpublished article Stephenson not only reflects on the impact of his year-long analysis with Melanie Klein on his subsequent development but also clarifies some of his views about the relationship between psychoanalysis and Q-methodology. Stephenson clearly sees this article as continuing, and to a certain extent completing, the work begun in the 1954 monograph. In this paper I describe some of the ways in which psychoanalytic ideas have informed Q-methodology. I hope to show that Stephenson not only successfully appropriated psychoanalytic concepts in the early develop of Q-methodology but that throughout his life he kept in touch with developments in psychoanalysis. *Psychoanalysis and Q-Methodology* is also important for its attempt to utilise Q-methodology in order to pursue psychoanalytic ideas more rigorously. His later writings on the topic can be seen as making a significant potential contribution to the rehabilitation of psychoanalytic ideas within psychology whose disciplinary culture has since grown increasingly suspicious of and hostile towards psychoanalysis.

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The origins of industrial psychology in Spain: An institutional approach

At the beginning of the 20th century, Spain went through a somewhat late but nonetheless powerful process of industrialisation. By that time, the ideas on industrial organisation expounded by the American engineer F.W. Taylor in his *Principles of Scientific Management* (1911) were spreading all over Europe – and Spain was no exception. At the same time, however, the importance of personal factors in work was also being emphasized from a more European, humanistic psychological tradition. Through the measuring of individual differences and the adjustment of such differences to the requirements of the task – a procedure greatly strengthened by military selection – this European tradition gave birth to the theory and practice of professional guidance and selection. The role played in this process by such psychotechnicians as Lahy, Stern, Moede or Münsterberg, among many others, is well known. A third line of approach to industrial psychology that will concern us here is represented by research on fatigue and ergonomics, a field of study that was taken over by physiologists and engineers. This research was focused in individual and group motivation, as well as in those ‘human relations’ that had been originally studied by Elton Mayo in Chicago (1927).

Such were the main orientations Spanish psychologists had to deal simultaneously with. In order to meet the new social and industrial needs, several institutions were then founded. The National Committee for Scientific Management was a specialised association open to professionals belonging to many different fields (medicine, engineering, industrial management, psychology...). This committee was responsible for the publication of the *Journal of Scientific Management* (1928–1936), which was to play a very important role in the dissemination of the various views on industrial psychology. A number of other research and application institutions were also created. The most important of these were the Institute for the Re-education of Disabled Workers, the National Institute of Psychotechnics in Madrid, and the Institute of Professional Guidance in Barcelona.

In this paper, we will draw a general picture of the activities carried out by the above-mentioned institutions. The views underlying them, as well as the main personalities involved in their development will be also dealt with. Particular reference will be made to members of the so-called psychological “School of Madrid” (C. Madariaga, M. Rodrigo, J. Mallart). Finally, the influence of these ideas in the development of modern Spain, as compared with other European countries, will be assessed.

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From sympathy to empathy

The notion of 'sympathy' has a long history, as usual dating back to Aristotle, but I shall begin with David Hume and Adam Smith. Both regarded sympathy as one of the most powerful features of humans, which makes us respond to the feelings of others and forms the basis of our attachment to society. Hume sought to show how sympathy results in our seeing ourselves through the eyes of others, and this aspect was further elaborated by Smith in a manner strikingly reminiscent of Cooley's 'looking glass self' or George Herbert Mead's 'generalised other'.

There seems to have been little mention of sympathy during the first half of the 19th century, though the Herbartian Theodor Waitz described it as the main source of morality. None of the above had anything to say about the origins of sympathy, an issue that came to the fore in the evolutionary theories of Spencer and Darwin. Spencer had a chapter entitled 'Sociality and sympathy', half of which was devoted to animals and dealt primarily with the contagion of emotions, e.g. when flocks become alarmed. Spencer thought that the range of sympathy is proportional to level of intelligence, so that among the 'lower races' it is narrower. Spencer was a social Darwinist who regarded it as inevitable that the weak went to the wall, and this ideology coloured his whole discussion of sympathy. This was in contrast to Darwin, who in the *Descent of Man* treated it as one of the 'social instincts' that had been part of our animal heritage, but became 'more tender and widely diffused'. Unlike Spencer, Darwin referred to Adam Smith but in some particulars confused Smith's views with those of Alexander Bain, whom he also cited. He pointed out, as had Hume before him, that sympathy is much more readily elicited by someone close to us than by a stranger, but suggested that it should be extended 'to the men of all races and nations'.

Among others concerned with sympathy at that period was Théodule Ribot, who envisaged three levels of it: physiological, psychological, and intellectual. There was also William McDougall who in his *Introduction to Social psychology* distinguished 'primitive' from 'active' sympathy.

Meanwhile there arose in Germany during the latter part of the 19th century a movement whose aim was to gain better understanding of the appreciation of beauty in art. Members of this movement applied the term Einfühlung – literally 'feeling into' – to this relationship between a person and a beautiful object. This concept was widely discussed in Germany. Titchener, prominent as a conveyor of German psychology to the American scene, took it up. Finding no exact equivalent in English, he coined the term 'empathy' by analogy, as he put it, with sympathy, without however attempting to clarify the relationship between empathy and sympathy. Since then writers have tended either to draw distinctions that often seem rather artificial or, more frequently, treat the terms as synonymous. On the whole 'empathy' has come to be more commonly used, though 'sympathy' has by no means disappeared.

Attempting to cover all this would not be possible, and the paper will concentrate on expanding the last paragraph, since these events are usually misinterpreted.

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PANEL: CRITIQUES OF GRAND NARRATIVES AND CHANGING METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES IN THE HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES

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Throughout the 19th and 20th century histories of the human sciences and humanities, some of the most controversial debates have been structured around the very old question of whether different methods are required to study different subjects (for instance, Benjamin, 1939; Collingwood, 1949; White, 1987; Fabian 1983). The 20th century saw remarkable change in the directions taken by these debates, posing interesting issues for students of the history of the human sciences. This session seeks to illuminate something of the range of methodologies being employed in the field, and to highlight the fields wider relevance to current cross-disciplinary discussion of whether it is possible to illuminate significant historical 'thresholds, ruptures, breaks, mutations, transformations'(Foucault, 1973) without resorting to metaphysical assumptions about 'causal necessity and teleological purpose' (Elias, 1939).

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Introduction

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Method and the sub-discipline of theoretical psychology

This paper explores the possibility and parameters for specifying theoretical

psychology's methods in a manner that would not privilege one philosophical position (e.g. positivism) or methodological tradition (e.g. a recognised qualitative procedure). A particular focus of this discussion is the apparent tension between the benefits of promoting a flourishing sub-discipline of theoretical psychology through methodological specificity and the concern that such specification might drain theoretical psychology of its creative force or diminish the dialogical nature of its contributions. *Disputed*

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The boundaries between normal and abnormal psychology in the late 19th Century Britain and America

James The last quarter of the 19th century was a period when psychology was being defined as a professional discipline and its scientific credentials were being rigorously tested. The debates over the scientific status of psychology and what should be its legitimate subject matter were heated and intense. By far the most contested ground was the *1* borderlands between psychology and psychiatry and what constituted the normal and the abnormal mind. The histories of experimental laboratory psychophysics and mental testing have been well documented and shown to be the precursors of modern psychology. Less well known and studied is the reception of French psychopathology in Britain and America and its effect on the development of psychology as a discipline. The work of Charcot and Janet was used by critics of the 'experimental turn' in psychology to create a psychology based on the person rather than scientific methods. *✓ Thence* In these approaches laboratory methods could not account for the data produced by psychopathology and psychical research. A large part of the empirical evidence available was perceived to be glossed over in order to favour the methods of the physical sciences. Studies of dreams, hallucinations, automatism, hysteria, multiple personality, demonical possessions, witchcraft, degeneration and genius were systematically marginalised by an emerging psychological elite that wanted to promote scientific methods in their new journals and societies.

However, unlike leading figures from the natural sciences (like Alfred Russel Wallace, William Crookes and Oliver Lodge) whose work on spiritualism and psychical research was quickly excluded from the Royal Society and the British Association for the Advancement of Science, investigators of psychical phenomena had a much more important role to play in the creation of professional psychology and its institutions. In Britain James Ward, FWH Myers and Henry Sidgwick were central to the early institutions of psychology despite their emphasis on psychology as the study of subjective experience, their receptiveness to inclusion of the study of psychical phenomena in psychology and their critiques of scientific naturalism. Even Alexander Bain, W. B. Carpenter, Henry Maudsley and James Sully, who sought to found psychology on physiological principles and rigorously defended the term 'psychology' against its widespread, imprecise usage in spiritualist journals, refused to expunge the language of purpose, volition and will from their work and considered moral problems as central to their 'new psychology'. Maudsley and Carpenter saw many of the phenomena of associated with spiritualism as manifestations of psychopathological conditions. In America, after William James produced his seminal textbook *The Principles of Psychology* in 1890, he pursued a research programme that included a defence of mental healers, lectures on exceptional mental states and classical Eastern

psychology. James insisted that the phenomena of abnormal psychology and psychical research should be explained rather than ignored by a new science of psychology.

This paper explores these complex and shifting boundaries between what was considered as normal and abnormal psychology and how these were explained and defined. The contexts of the development of the science of psychology in the late nineteenth century were extremely varied and the interconnections between them were far from clearly defined. The focus on this crucial distinction of the normal and the pathological aims to shed further light on the difficult question of how psychology became a science.

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IQ debates – politics or science?

The IQ debate is a typical case of kinds of 'eternal debates' that have tended to periodically re-emerge, with seemingly the same (or systematically related) arguments being repeated over and over again. In this paper, rather than collecting new arguments about the hereditary/environmental origins of intelligence, I try to explore the reasons for this 'endless gramophone record' effect. One of the main points here is the relationship of politics and science. A key focus of conflict among participants in IQ debates is the accusation of counterparts – present on both sides – that their arguments are based upon political and ideological grounds, whereas their own have a purely scientific basis. I shall try to show that such divisions can be, even in the best cases, partial in the best case. For instance, even Herrnstein and Murray, the authors of the famous book *The Bell Curve* (1994) noted that the issues posed concern 'the relationship between human capacities and social policy'. In this view, scientific interpretation of the intellectual capacity and functioning of individuals is only one of several aspects of the problem, with 'social policy' (and its institutions, such as state run school systems) being likewise in need of investigation. It bears stressing that in depth study of such large systems as schooling is impossible without taking into consideration historical, sociological and political aspects and methods. Such an approach may have important implications for psychology and anthropology.

My contribution will offer an overview of the impact of schools on the social structure and intellectual capacity of the populations of the Western countries during the last century. Among other things, I seek to show that, although there are considerable similarities between school systems in Western countries, there are also significant

historically rooted contrasts as well as patterns of change. Understanding these differences requires investigating not only the ways in which these systems are organised, but also the social values and political agendas motivating them. Of particular relevance to the latter may be the approach put forward by Margaret Archer, Thomas F. Green and other educational sociologists. In this approach, the school system has gone 'out of control' during the last several decades and is now operating according to its own rules. Exponents of this conception of the apparent self-governing nature of the school system argue that it will be the members and children of the low SES groups who will be 'the last entrants' in any kind of school expansion, and that their resulting level of education will not have advantages for social mobility. At first glance this argument seems to give strong support to the notion that intelligence is primarily inherited and that efforts to compensation through education will necessarily be unsuccessful. However, the only feature shared by these two arguments is that politics is not responsible for school achievement and their basic assumptions are contradictory.

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Menger's impact on Weber's methodological individualism

In his methodological writings, Max Weber assigns a central role to the promotion of methodological individualism, i.e. the view that social scientific interpretations and explanations should refer to individuals only. In the otherwise massive and steadily growing research on Weber, surprisingly little attention has been directed towards the sources of influence for Weber's individualism. A few theorists have pointed to the Austrian economist Carl Menger, a fervent proponent of methodological individualism, as a likely source of influence. Yet no thorough and comprehensive analysis exists in support of this claim.

In this paper, I want to provide a detailed examination of Weber and Menger's methodological individualism showing the similarities between their positions. I will mainly focus on Weber's 'Basic Sociological Terms', the introductory chapter to *Economy and Society* (1921/1978) and Menger's *Investigations into the method of the social sciences with special reference to economics* (1883/1985). A comparison of these two texts not only confirms that they both subscribe to the thesis of methodological individualism. Also, and more significantly, it shows that there is a remarkable similarity between their specifications of this thesis. Briefly put, it appears that they both maintain: a) that social phenomena should be analyzed as constituted by individuals related through their interactions; b) that such interactions should be

explained by pointing to individuals' motives; c) that the constitution of social phenomena may or may not be part of the individuals' motives for interacting; and d) that the interactions and their associated motives should be stated in the form of laws or generalizations. In light of Weber's deep familiarity with Menger's *Investigations* and his general interest in the *Methodenstreit*, these notable resemblances between Weber and Menger's positions makes it reasonable to hold that Menger's work was an important source of influence for Weber's methodological individualism.

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Taking another look at operationism

The term 'operationism' (or 'operationalism') is commonly associated with the Harvard physicist Percy Bridgman (Bridgman 1927). While the notion of operationism was never very influential within physics, it gained (and has continued to enjoy) a fair amount of popularity within psychology and the social sciences. Ever since varieties of this position were first formulated and elaborated on by Stanley Smith Stevens (1935ab, 1936, 1939), and Edward Chace Tolman (1935, 1936, 1938), there has been a sporadic, but ongoing, debate about the tenability of this position (Boring *et al.*, 1945; Frank, 1956; Kendler, 1981, 1983; Leahey, 1980, 1981, 1983; Green, 1992, 2001; Grace, 2001; Rogers, 1989, 2001; Bickhard 2001).

In my paper I suggest that we carefully distinguish between conceptual, historical and philosophical questions, i.e., (1) the question what operationism actually claims, (2) the question what historical conditions contributed to the emergence and endurance of operationism, and (3) the question of whether operationism is a tenable position. I argue that recent critiques of operationism have been largely motivated by philosophical and methodological concerns, which have to be understood in the context of debates about the subject matter and methods of psychology (e.g., debates about qualitative vs. quantitative methods). While these are important issues in their own right, I believe that this ideological focus has biased historical and conceptual analyses of operationism. For example, a common assumption is that operationism was historically closely tied to the philosophical movement of logical positivism and the doctrine of verificationism, but failed to take into account that philosophy has since abandoned this doctrine (e.g., Green 1992). Contrary to that, I argue that, while there was a historical overlap between the two movements, operationisms had quite different concerns from positivists. I will provide an analysis of these concerns, and illustrate them by means of examples taken from Stevens and Tolman.

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Art and articulations of debates over thresholds of perception and causal attribution with skeptical perspective on the conditions of possibility for shared human understanding

Among the various topics that have come forward since the publication of Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962), the question of the historical contingency of relations between epistemological debates and contemporary sources of social conflict has received increasingly sophisticated attention (for instance, Shapin & Schaffer, 1985). One of the issues posed has been that of the ways in which such relations give rise to skepticism about the conditions of possibility for shared human understandings (for instance, Blumenberg, 1983). This contribution explores the roles played by the arts in objectifying such relations and concerns. Emphasis falls upon examples, which have particular bearing upon what may have been significant turning points in the long-term history of the human sciences. Among other things this may indicate something of the potential relevance of the materials available to students of the history of the arts for extending the range of methodologies available to historians of the human sciences.

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Stickiness and boundary work: Evaluations of model closeness in early mathematical learning theory

The essential endgame in mathematically modelling any phenomenon, including learning, is the comparison between what the model predicts about various aspects of the data, such as numerical summaries and plots, and the observations themselves. Although an increasingly powerful set of formal statistical and scientific techniques for such comparisons were developed from the 19th Century onwards under the generic name of 'tests of goodness of fit', it is somewhat mystifying to discover how rarely were they actually used in the early days of Mathematical Learning Theory (MLT), that is, from about 1950 to the middle of the 1960s. This is doubly surprising since MLT had, from the start, claimed a leadership role in *scientific* psychology.

Whilst briefly speculating on the causes of this apparent lapse in scientific etiquette and rigour, we concentrate on examining the informal methods of comparison and related argumentation employed by key figures such as Frederick Mosteller and Robert Bush (1955), R Duncan Luce (in Bush *et al.*, 1959) and Robert Theios (1963) in modelling the data from experiments on traumatic avoidance learning. We employ such ethnographic and micro-sociological concepts as closeness and stickiness (Douglas, 1966), and boundary work (Shapin, 1992) to explore the rhetorical space between theory and data which was constructed by these mathematicians to make sense of the manifold relationships between the two (see also Lovie and Lovie, 2003).

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Just dying for a Heineken? A Foster's? A Stella Artois? Participatory action research in Cambodia, where 'all things flow', recursively... except perhaps the beer

Lubek *et al.* (2002) described how the recursive methodology of Participatory Action Research (PAR), originally proposed by Kurt Lewin (1946), was guiding an ongoing HIV/AIDS prevention programme in Siem Reap, Cambodia, with a cross-disciplinary team. In 2002 we ran workshops to train 60 women peer-educators to train other women, pyramid-style, how to obtain behaviour change among groups at high risk for HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections (STDs). During the next 12 months, they in turn trained more than 1100 additional women in how to obtain 100% condom use. Continuous questionnaire monitoring of patterns of sexual behaviour and condom use and non-use, and post-training evaluation focus groups, have been recursively used to update the workshops and identify new target groups (e.g., married and single men, tourists, and young souvenir vendors and 'street children'). We have also 'fed back' to beer companies the information about the health and remuneration gaps existing with Cambodian 'beer promotion women', 20% of whom are HIV sero-positive and invited them to reduce the risk of workplace infection by joining in a proactive prevention strategy, including providing anti-retrovirals as needed to keep these women alive. Currently, these 'beer girls' who are literally dying on the job for the Heineken, Foster's or Stella Artois breweries, are all quickly replaced by non-literate young women from the countryside, often with just one hour of training. In June, 2002, one young beer girl's body was dumped by the roadside, since neither her employer nor local relatives provided the ceremonial Buddhist funeral rites. Her colleagues described themselves as 'throwaway' employees; their employers also insist that they are not regular employees (and hence under comprehensive health plans) but appear as budgeted advertising and promotion costs on annual reports, along with throwaway posters and coasters. The recursive feedback loops to these corporations – each making profits in Cambodia for their shareholders but with a female workforce with excessive mortality rates – pass through public relations department 'gatekeepers' (Lewin, 1944). They place a more positive spin on events, help maintain the status quo where possible, and can shelter corporate decision makers and stockholders from adverse feedback that might lead to social change. While students may wish to engage in a grass-roots campaign for 'fairtradebeer.com' or 'ethicalbeer.com' that urges a \$5 per day salary, workplace health education and medical care and anti-retrovirals as needed, the beer companies are seemingly not very eager to improve the situation in Cambodia. Says one European brewery spokesperson: '[W]e are in the business of beer, not in medical care'... 'Poverty related problems we cannot solve out of The Netherlands.' (Bouma, 2003). While most PAR approaches derive from theory and practices within the social and health sciences, this example shows that globalising 'business' discourse and practices, which may bring recursive, but negative, resistance loops and inertia, may also need to be considered in future PAR models attempting social change, such as those involved in HIV/AIDS prevention and workplace safety in developing countries.

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Parapsychology at the beginnings of the 20th century in Catalonia

Although Anglo-Saxon historiography usually neglects the history of parapsychology and spiritualism in Spain, there can be found historic evidence of the arrival of spiritualist ideas in the second half of the nineteenth century. The importance of Spain in the spreading of spiritualist ideas can be shown by citing the first International Congress held in Barcelona in 1888. Due to its close contact to the rest of Europe, Barcelona and Catalonia, on the whole, played a very active part in the importation of spiritualist and parapsychological ideas and practices in Spain.

In this research we review the point of view of Catalan psychologists and parapsychologists on parapsychological issues like criptestesia, telequinesia and ectoplasma, taking into account local journals and books published at the beginnings of the twentieth century. Traced the basic ideas that were discussed in this historical context, we also took a look at the parapsychological associations and the sessions they held.

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Importing psychology to Japan, public, or private academic systems.

Who brought modern scientific psychology to Japan, and who were their mentors? The name of the first founder of scientific psychology in Japan was Yujiro Motora (1858–1912). He gained a PhD under the supervision of Professor & Dr G. Stanley Hall (1844–1924), from Johns Hopkins University in June 1888. The title of his doctoral thesis was ‘Exchange, considered as the principle of social life’, which included a broad discipline from sociology to psychology. In July 1888, Dr Motora returned to Japan after five years in the USA, and in September 1888, he accepted a position as a part time lecturer at the Imperial University, lecturing in ‘psychophysics’. This university was originally established in 1877 as Tokyo University, but was renamed in 1886 as the Imperial University. It was the only national university until the Kyoto Imperial University was established in 1897. In 1890, he became a full professor of the Imperial University and in 1903 opened a laboratory for experimental psychology in collaboration with Matataro Matsumoto (1865–1943) who was one of his first students at the Imperial University. Therefore, the new subject of experimental and scientific psychology initially became an academic discipline at the Imperial University and spread to other public and private institutes in Japan. It is interesting for those of us in the psychology profession in Japan to know that Dr G. Stanley Hall and his laboratories of experimental psychology in Johns Hopkins and Clark Universities were the sources of Japanese Psychology. It is possible to count about ten Japanese who went to Clark University to study psychology there and who received PhD degrees under the direct or indirect supervision of Dr G. Stanley Hall. A list of those names is shown on the poster in Table 1. Who are they? What are they? It is only possible to say that half the scholars on the list got university positions. Dr Hori and Dr Yokoyama found positions in Keio-Gijuku University, Drs Yamada and Kurihara in Aoyama University, and Dr Kubo in Hiroshima University. Drs Kubo, Misawa and Kakise, who had been students of Dr Motora, graduated in 1909, 1904, and 1901 respectively. However, Dr Misawa and Dr Kakise did not take up professorships after returning to Japan. Historical documents tell us that Dr Kakise became an archivist at the national library of the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture. Unfortunately, we have no further records of what happened to Dr Misawa. We are still in the process of gathering information about Drs Yamada and Kurihara and their work at Aoyama-Gakuin University, as well as other scholars whose name we only know from the list. It was Dr Yokoyama, not Dr Hori, who in 1926 founded the first department of psychology at Keio-Gijuku University, the oldest private university in Japan. On the other hand, Dr Yokoyama’s career differed considerably from those of the other scholars, with the exception of Dr Motora. He dropped out of junior high school in Japan and went to the USA by ship in 1907. He landed in San Francisco and moved to Oregon, in the state of Utah. He went to an elementary school there at first and then to junior high school. In 1910, he went to Colorado high school and graduated in 1913. After that he entered Colorado University and graduated with excellent grades in 1917. As a result, he was offered a scholarship to the graduate course at Harvard University in September 1917 and received an MA in experimental psychology in 1918. In September 1918 he entered the PhD course at Clark University to continue research under the direction of Dr G.S. Hall and received

his PhD in 1921, under the direct supervision of Dr E.G. Boring of Clark University, 33 years after Dr Motora at Johns Hopkins University and five years after Dr. Hori at Clark University, 14 years after he had landed in San Francisco In 1907. In October 1921 he returned to Japan and in 1922 he got a position as an English and psychology teacher at Keio University. In 1926 Dr Yokoyama was asked to establish the laboratory of experimental psychology at Keio University, which has since become one of the most important centers of psychology in Japan. It was also the first laboratory set up by a private university in Japan and established by a scholar who bears no relationship to the Imperial University. Dr Motora was in a similar situation to Dr Yokoyama. His educational career in Japan was as follows: In 1875, he was one of the first students to attend the private Doshisha English School in Kyoto, founded by Jo Nijima, today as the Doshisha University. Nijima had stayed for ten years in the USA, from 1864 to 1873, without permission of the Edo Government in Japan. Motora came to Tokyo in 1879 and became a teacher at the 'Gakunoshanogakko' (agricultural school) and 'kokyogakusha' which was founded by Sen Tsuda in 1876, and 1878, and was one of the founders of the 'Tokyo-Eiwa gakko' (Tokyo English School) in 1882, the former school of the Aoyama-Gakuin University of today. Do you remember the names of Drs Yamada and Kurihara from the list in Table1? They had received professorships in psychology at Aoyama-Gakuin University. By the way, Motora had first studied at Boston University in 1883 with the aide of the Christian church. He moved to Johns Hopkins University where there was a center of scientific psychology in 1885. This is the story of the founders of scientific psychology in Japan.

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The work of Maurice Pradines: A forgotten genetic psychobiologist

Maurice Pradines (1874–1958) is one more of the almost unknown European psychologists of 20th century. He taught the greatest part of his life at the University of Strasburg, but his last courses took place at the Sorbonne, where he went to teach Psychology in 1937 after the death of Henri Delacroix. His first works are framed in the philosophy of action. His PhD thesis, *Critique de Conditions de l'Action*, presented in 1909, defended a critical rationalism and it was far from current pragmatism and empiricism (Guy, 1977:87).

Immediately after that, with the purpose of constructing a more realistic philosophy of action, Pradines completely dedicated to psychology, concretely to the problem of sensation. He wrote certain articles about that topic that were published at *Revue Philosophique* and *Journal de Psychologie*. The most important one was 'La vraie signification de la loi de Weber-Fechner' (*Revue Philosophique*, 1920), a reinterpretation of the well-known law of psychophysics.

With the aid of Henry Head and von Frey's experiments on touch and pain, Pradines defended that *intensity*, at its roots, is not the origin of a representative knowledge but of aversion and appropriation reflexes. Hence he proposed a distinction between affection and sensation, which he based his 'Philosophie de la Sensation' (1928–1934) on (he also reinterpreted Head and von Frey's experiments throughout it).

Affections, which answer to two different functions (pleasure or pain), lead to reflected excitations. Pleasure looks for the union with the object, its appropriation, whilst pain separates from it and, as we exclude it from us, it drives to the creation of certain 'externals'. Only from pain a sensation is born. Yet the function of sensation is not to promote a reaction but to give notice of the object as opposed to us, due to its

qualities more than because of its convenience to our needs. Pradines stated that sensation is not based on the reception of impressions but in its weakness, to the point that we can foresee a stimulus without being affected by it.

In the first and second volumes of his *Philosophie de la Sensation*, Pradines assembled the first senses on the basis of their double function presented in affection. In the first volume he dealt with the senses of need (*Le sensibilité élémentaire: Le sens du besoin*, 1932), which are *taste* and *smell*. In the second volume, (*Le sensibilité élémentaire: Le sens de la défense*, 1934), Pradines attended to the sense of defence: *touch*. Still taste and smell are not far from the need, they inform about us more than do things. When touching, objectivity is clearer. Although there are multiple sensations specifically tactile, the real touch is the sense of pressure, where the key law of sensation is best expressed: the law of the threshold delays (*loi du retard des seuils*). This law states that the fittest organ, the finest, is not the one with the lowest absolute threshold but the one that separates more the pressure and the pain thresholds, the organ that foresees most.

Superior senses, sight and hearing, not studied at this philosophy of sensation, appeared in a later work, *Traité de Psychologie Générale* (1943–1946). This book has three volumes (*Le psychisme élémentaire*, *Le génie humain: ses oeuvres*, *Le génie humain: ses instruments*) whose order and internal organisation accurately answer to the author's thinking about the genesis of psychism. Pradines asserted that the only way to know which are the relatively independent and simple functions is to study them within the history of species, paying attention to how they organise to answer the aims of adaptation. In believing that, Pradines started with a synthetic analysis of the mental activity, which he distributed at three successive levels (automatism, memory, and reason), characterised by great mutations, where all the functions are intrinsically related to each other. In this distribution, now located within a wider frame, there is the root of the perceptual behaviour. This synthetic work is followed by one of the analysis, where the different affective, sensorial, and associative mechanisms are examined separately. Then sight and hearing, not studied in his former work, are now described at the sensorial mechanisms part.

The second volume of this particular treatise of psychology collects Pradines' concerns about the great human productions, the products of human activity (technique, religion, art, language, society) where different "mental tools" -here functioning globally- are implied. He took the other way round with the third volume: instead of departing from products, he departed from tools, from the different mental functions implied at those great productions. Hence these functions are modelled, to a great extent, on those same productions. Psychological functions studied here (imagination, memory, logic, feelings, emotions, will) compose the mutation, due to the specialisation, of elemental mechanisms presented throughout the first volume.

In a broad outline, Pradines' work explains how the biological organism builds up, from a defensive reaction, sensation, the exploration of the world, and how space and psychism are formed reciprocally throughout that exploration. Such a genetic psychobiology, resumed in his two last works (*L'aventure de l'esprit dans les espèces*, 1952 and *Beau Voyage*, 1957), is generally indebted to J.M. Baldwin, which under the influence of Darwin's theory of evolution –taken in its not-mechanicist version- studied psychism in its genetic dimension.

Marinette Dambuyant (1965), contributor to the *Journal de Psychologie* –a journal where she reviewed and commented Pradines' works, and at the same time being in correspondence with him- described Pradines' conception as a mutationist genetics. The explanations that Pradines himself gave about the appearance of these mutations, moving between the reference to a somehow latent energy and the new requirements of

the environment, place his genetic psychobiology in a position near vitalism. By means of M. Dambuyant some keys will be studied in order to clear this position up, and to appraise his evident finalism.

Maurice Pradines, acknowledged for some time, was soon overshadowed by new intellectual courses that related his tenets to current idealist positions, precisely those that they wanted to be far from. This confusion, that epistemological cut with the period before the war, and the early disappearance of his books from the libraries, are the three reasons pointed out by Rolant Guyot that caused the ignorance of Pradines. Guyot studied other aspects of Pradines' biography and so his works in *Vie et philosophie de Maurice Pradines*. He also honoured him in 1977, he was the editor of many of Pradines' teaching courses at the Sorbonne, and he was also behind the reprinting of the *Traité de Psychologie*. Guyot's work tried to palliate "the negligence responsible of the lack of knowledge about Maurice Pradines' main work" (Ricoeur, 1992). The aim of ours is to contribute to that relief and to deep into the aspects of his work that enlighten certain chapters of the history of psychology.

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Karl Pearson: The scientific self in a statistical age

One of Karl Pearson's teachers at King's College, Oscar Browning, joked that he would hang this slogan outside the young man's door: 'Der Teufel ist ein Egoist.' Pearson was deeply troubled by the preoccupation with self that he found in himself, as well as by shortcomings of a capitalistic society founded on individualism, and one theme running through his entire career is the effort to confine this egoism. His appreciation for medieval folk culture and for Catholicism, his advocacy of socialism, his involvement in the women's movement, and his eugenics all reflected this concern. So also did his advocacy of scientific method as the form of thought that raises the individual above personal interest and prejudice. Statistics itself was in more than one sense an expression of anti-individualism.

Yet Pearson did not seek to attain greater selflessness by imposing scientific method as an external constraint on personal freedom. Rather, he looked to science and statistics as a path to a higher morality – as ways to elevate and strengthen the self, not to chain it down or to impose artificial uniformity on it. On a personal level, too, he was very much concerned to preserve and even enhance his own individuality.

So perhaps it is not, after all, so startling that this pioneering statistician and socialist should have found so many ways in later life to assert the possibility and necessity of individuality in science. He came to see individuality everywhere, even in atoms, and he insisted, to take an extreme example, that numerical tables reflect the personality of the men (and women?) who calculated them. He became, in short, increasingly disenchanted with the impersonal world he had helped to make, a world in which science seemed to have fallen into the hands of careerists and specialists. His was a quite different vision, of scientists who, through their command of method, would develop the skill and wisdom to form a genuine elite.

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A dialogue with Vygotsky

This presentation will basically consist of excerpts of an imaginary dialogue with Vygotsky, which will be published in its entirety in the forthcoming volume, *The Essential Vygotsky*. In this dialogue the view that Vygotsky expresses is based upon the ideas that are written by him in various papers and books. Nevertheless, the statements of Vygotsky's ideas in this metalogue are my interpretations of what I believe Vygotsky probably meant. Interpretations are unavoidable when attempting to understand the writings of great scholars. It is my hope that my interpretations will stimulate and facilitate your interpretations in such a way that they emerge even more accurate than mine. Throughout this imaginary dialogue I will also attempt to show how William Shakespeare's works, particularly Hamlet, were a stimulus for Vygotsky in developing some of his major concepts. Furthermore I will discuss how Vygotsky, with a spinozaesque cognitive style of activity turned life inside out - driving semiotic cultural evolution into personal history - scaffolding brain levels into developmental stages as he fused the external into the internal world. With all of that a new theory was born. In short, Vygotsky was a revolutionary intellectual. It is all that we have mentioned above that places him outside the mainstream of psychological thought.

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Belief, suggestion and influence in medicine and psychology: Towards a genealogy of the concept of the placebo

The concepts of the placebo and of the placebo effect play critical roles in the manner in which the efficacy of medical remedies is tested and in how trust in them – indeed in medicine itself – is established and maintained. The use of placebos in randomised clinical trials has become a fundamental defining trait of modern biomedicine in enabling the differentiation between the material causality of active substances and the effects of nonspecific psychological factors. As such, the placebo concept is critically bound up not only with the procedures of medical testing, but also with the ontology and epistemology of biomedicine. This presentation situates the modern formulation of the placebo effect within debates concerning the role of influence, belief and suggestion and how these may be calibrated, controlled and utilised in medicine, psychiatry, psychotherapy and experimental psychology from the end of the 19th century onwards.

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Of laboratory mice and salesmen: The history of early 20th Century advertising psychology from the business history perspective

In the succession of Vance Packard's *Hidden Persuaders* (1957), the first comprehensive critical study of the use of psychological techniques in modern consumer culture, several authors have attempted to investigate the collusion of advertising business and consumer psychology.

From Stuart Ewen's *Captains of Consciousness* (1976) to T.J. Lears' account of the 'therapeutic roots of consumer culture' (1983), Rachel Bowlby's *Shopping with Freud* (1993) and most recently the BBC series *The Century of the Self* (2002), a picture has been popularised wherein reckless professional or semi-professional psychologists join forces with unscrupulous advertising men in order to find ways and means to search and train the minds of the buying public. The motivational researcher Ernest Dichter and his Institutes as well as John Broadus Watson and his advertising career with New York's J. Walter Thompson agency figure prominently in these stories of a rising culture of observing and utilising the patterns of consumer behaviour. In this picture, a professional class of 'advertising psychologists' has eventually succeeded in establishing itself as command centre of modern consumerism.

This narration, however, is characterised by a certain lack of explanatory power for all interested in studying the processes shaping modern consumer culture. Strongly influenced by theoretical approaches and assumptions of Cultural Studies, scholars such as Ewen and Bowlby have presented a notion of 'psychology' which does not quite know any distinctions between major schools or its main protagonists. Thus, a rather undifferentiated view of academic psychology's role in the professionalisation of advertising is prevailing where sources from the 1910s are quoted next to voices from the 1960s. Moreover, all these accounts have failed to ask the crucial question to what extent psychological findings did actually inform or change the way in which advertising agencies were devising campaign schemes and deciding upon certain graphic designs or catch slogans.

My paper suggests that since WWI advertising agencies both in the UK and the US deliberately used psychologists, means of psychological measurement and styles of what was believed to be 'scientific' advertising strategy in order to improve their image and professional status in the eyes of potential clients on a highly competitive market. The question as to whether internal decision-making processes in agencies were influenced by laboratory or field studies results can in most of the cases not be answered in the affirmative. Also, I am going to argue that as far as the example of the UK is concerned it was rather the state and the public service sector that was interested in a co-operation with psychologists for the betterment of product design and salesmanship than the private sector advertising agencies.

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James McKeen Cattell, Columbia University, and the ironies of academic freedom, 1891-1917

In October 1917, James McKeen Cattell – distinguished experimental psychologist, long-term owner and editor of *Science* and other scientific journals, and leader of the American Psychological Association and the American Association for the Advancement of Science – was summarily dismissed from the professorship at Columbia University in New York that he had held since 1891. This dismissal was ostensibly Columbia President Nicholas Murray Butler's response to Cattell's opposition to federal government policies instituted soon after the United States entered the First World War. In the years that followed many have denounced Butler, have cited this episode as a flagrant violation of academic freedom, and have honoured Cattell as one of America's first martyrs to its cause. Indeed, the nation's response to Cattell's dismissal helped shape American professors' and universities' thoughts about academic freedom through the 20th century. In this presentation I argue, however, that such conventional wisdom greatly oversimplifies both the episode itself and the roles of its two main protagonists. Indeed, my historical thesis is that for many years Cattell's actions threatened (and even damaged) his colleagues' academic freedom much more seriously than Butler violated his when he dismissed him. This argument – derived from extensive research in the massive documentary record available in New York and Washington – further illustrates just how a 'thick description' of 'the fine texture of the past' sheds new light even on previously well researched historical topics.

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Historicising the disciplinary order of Western knowledge postcolonial perspectives

In exploring Third World responses to the expansion of psychology into the non-Western world I have been puzzled by a pattern of, on the one hand, articulate criticism of the imported product and, on the other hand, attempts at creating alternative cultures of psychology that remain confined to disciplinary blindfolds. Critics from Asian and African countries have stressed the origins of the foreign product in an individualistic culture, the behavioral reductionism, the microcentric approach, and the deification of measurement. Diagnosing the problems of rapid social transformation, some have advocated a role for psychologists in close alliance with social scientists to enable the study of subjective effects in social restructuring. Others envisage a role in sensitizing people to the potentialities of action. As to attempts at creating alternative cultures of psychology, theoretical indigenisation, i.e. the reconstruction of local concepts and practices that reflect the culturally-rooted understanding people have of themselves and of the world, is favored by most critics of the cloning of foreign models. Yet as observed even in India where indigenising attempts have flourished for decades their

fate does not seem encouraging. Why is this so? I have argued that the unquestioned acceptance of the disciplinary order puts systematic constraints to attempts at indigenisations of psychological knowledge. Psychology is but one component of the modern Western disciplinary order which guides "the way we think, perceive and seek to understand reality and the universe in the modern world" (Giri, 1998, p. 380). What needs to be addressed is the particular social construction of reality reflected in the disciplinary order. The historical roots of this construction date back to modern state formation and the institutions set up with industrialization for the exercise of social and human engineering. Once established, however, the disciplines tend to be taken as simply reflecting 'given' segments of reality (Staeuble, in press).

In my paper I will probe further into the question of the social construction of reality reflected in the disciplinary order of modern knowledge. By historicizing the disciplinary order I understand an analysis that makes the hidden assumptions of field demarcations, of basic conceptual distinctions, and of the selection of problematics that create 'patterns of knowledge and ignorance' (Hading) visible. Drawing on contributions from the postcolonial critical debate, my focus will be on the Eurocentric implications of the disciplinary construction of social reality established between mid-19th to early 20th century. To give but a preliminary glimpse: This construction implied an imperial divide, on both an organizational and theoretical level, between European modernity as subject and the colonized world as object. The 'colonizer's model of the world' (Blaut, 1993) was first inscribed in historiography which detached itself from the 18th c. comparative concern with Asia in favour of national historiographies and a macrohistorical master narrative of why Europe was able to rise to world dominance. In turn, Asia was left to a timeless study of Sinology, Japanology, and Indology (Osterhammel, 2001). The establishment of disciplinary boundaries between, on the one hand, the study of European modernity in national economy, sociology, and political science and, on the other hand, the study of 'premodern' cultures in anthropology and ethnology followed (Wallerstein *et.al.*, 1996; Conrad & Randeria, 2002). The entangled histories of 'metropolitan centers' and colonial 'peripheries' were thus made as invisible as the use of foreign worlds as laboratories for universal knowledge claims, the incorporation of elements of other cultural knowledges, and in the suppression of competitive local knowledge systems (Smith, 1999; Harding, 1997). The insulation of the disciplines concerned with European modernity from each other precluded scholarly debate on the nature of this modernity, thus marginalising the critical theory tradition.

I will end with some reflections on why the question of how to historicize the disciplinary order depends itself on historically changing perspectives of socially situated historians.

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Stumpf Collection in Japan: A report

In 1923, Kanae Sakuma (1888-1970), a Japanese psychologist, went to Germany to study Gestalt psychology, mainly at Berlin University. Two years before Sakuma arrived, Carl Stumpf (1848-1936) had retired from Berlin University. Sakuma obtained most of the books and reprints Stumpf had, thinking the collection would give prestige to the new department of psychology at Kyushu Imperial University, where he was going to head from 1925. There was not enough material found to explain how Sakuma came to purchase this Stumpf Collection as well as the collection of Paul Barth (1858-1922), a philosopher at Leipzig University.

Today one can read some of the books in the Stumpf Collection at the main library of Kyushu University (Fukuoka, Japan). There is no catalogue for the Stumpf Collection, and it is not as well preserved as the Wundt Collection at Tohoku University (see Takasuna, 2001). However, I reconstructed the Stumpf Collection by picking up corresponding bibliographical cards. Each card has a stamp mark indicating 'Stumpf-Bunko' ('Bunko' means Collection in Japanese), and I have found 2,044 cards out of 600,000 of the whole library cards.

Forty-two cards, the largest group, were of William James (1842-1910), which included many reprints, suggesting the close relationship between the two psychologists. The detail of the Collection will be listed.

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The limits of the experiment as a psychological method: A view from 1901

On July 7th 1901 Beatrice Edgell was orally examined on her thesis, 'Die Grenzen des Experiments als Einer Psychologischen Methode', having studied for a year under Oswald Külpe. She was awarded a doctorate, thus becoming not only the first woman graduate of the University of Würzburg but also the first British woman to obtain a doctorate in psychology. But what was her thesis? What did she consider the limits of the experimental method in psychology to be? (What did she think of an experiment as being?) In particular, did she toe the Würzburg line that systematic introspection could be extended from the study of sensory processes to those of thinking and judgment? And how do her conclusions relate to the situation today? Unlike Edgell's, my German is limited to such phrases as 'nicht rauchen' viewed on railway carriage windows but I hope and intend by September to have reached answers to the above questions.

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