


ABSTRACTS

of the Papers and Posters presented at the
23rd Annual Conference of the
European Society for the History of Human Sciences



Edmundsburg
Salzburg, Austria
20th – 24th July, 2004

Programme Committee:

Christian G. Allesch (local organiser), Fachbereich Psychologie, Universität Salzburg;
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Tue 20		Wed 21		Thu 22		Fri 23	Sat 24
09:00-09:30	Registration	Panel Koerner /Osbeck: Introduction (Osbeck) Brauns, Lee		Human Sciences in France: Introduction (Vidal), Carroy, Braunstein, Renneville		Keynote address: Leary	"migrating ideas": Mülberger, Herrero et al., Jovanovic
09:30-10:00							
10:00-10:30	Keynote address: Rheinberger	10:15: coffee break	20th century American psychology: Behrens, Clark, Bryson, Vilar-daga & Lichtenstein			coffee break	
10:30-11:00	Arnheim-Panel I: Reichenberger, Brauns, Allesch	10:45: Koerner/Osbeck II: Richards, Koerner		coffee break			"migrating ideas": Vajda, Dumont & Louw, Jacó-Vilela
11:00-11:30		11:45: Norms and Values: Zecha, Smith, Aiftinca	H.S. in France II: Plas, Richard	Special develop-ments: Borgard, Vilaplana, Huttegger			
11:30-12:00							
12:00-12:30			lunch	lunch		lunch	
12:30-13:00	closing conference						
13:00-13:30		recreation	recreation		recreation		
13:30-14:00	13:15: lunch, recreation						
14:00-14:30		14:45: poster session	Panel Feest: Introduction, Osbeck/Machamer, Sturm, Brauns		20th century psychology: Bem, Sirotkina, Newbery		
14:30-15:00	Contemporary debates on Human Sciences: Collins, Bell						
15:00-15:30		coffee break	coffee break		break		
15:30-16:00	Arnheim-Panel III / Gestalt psychology: Schiewer, Höge, Walsh					Panel Feest II: Feest, Good, Petocz, discussion	Workshop "painful truths": Bos, Abma, Pietikäinen
16:00-16:30		Early devel.: Vidal, McMullen	Panel Hypnotism: Rieber, Neary				
16:30-17:00	short break			Dinner (optional): Hotel Elefant			
17:00-17:30			Business meeting (Sternbräu)		excursion, conference dinner		
17:30-18:00	Dinner (optional): Stieglkeller						
18:00-18:30		break					
18:30-19:00	Dinner (optional): Hotel Elefant						
19:00-19:30		Dinner (optional): Stieglkeller					
19:30-20:00	Dinner (optional): Stieglkeller						
20:00-20:30		Dinner (optional): Stieglkeller					

PROGRAMME

Tuesday 20 July

- 09:00-10:00 **Registration**
- 10:00-10:30 **Opening Ceremony**
- 10:30-11:30 **Keynote Address I:**
Hans-Jörg Rheinberger (Berlin):
The 'Culture' of the Natural and the 'Nature' of the Cultural Sciences.
- 11:30-13:00 **Paper Session: Arnheim panel I**
Andrea Reichenberger (Konstanz)
Computer – Brain - Gestalt
Horst-Peter Brauns (Berlin)
Rudolf Arnheim's Experimental Contribution to a Gestalt-theoretical Psychology of Expression
Christian G. Allesch (Salzburg)
Rudolf Arnheim and the Project of Reconceptualising "Psychological Aesthetics"
- 13:00-14:30 **Lunch/Recreation**
- 14:30-16:30 **Paper Session: Arnheim panel II**
Otto Neumaier (Salzburg)
Chance in Art
Rainer Schönhammer (Halle/Saale)
Arnheim on the Perception of Moving Images
Dimitri Liebsch (Bochum)
The Long Ending of the Silent Movie
Peter Bendixen (Hamburg)
Visual Thinking and Economics
- 16:30-17:00 **Coffee Break**
- 17:00-18:30 **Paper Session: Arnheim, Gestalt psychology**
Gesine Schiewer (Bern)
Art as Critique of Formal Communication Theory
Holger Höge (Oldenburg)
The History of Research on Proportions
Simon T. Walsh (Calgary, CA)
Gestalt Theory as a Philosophical Worldview and its Reception in North America 1925-1955

Wednesday 21 July

09:00-10:15 **Symposium "Crises of Representation" I**

Lisa M. Osbeck (Carrollton, USA)

Introduction

Horst-Peter Brauns (Berlin)

Some Notes on Wolff and Kant's Psychology

David Lee (Amsterdam)

Futures and Illusions: Freud, Pfister and Their Exchange on Religion and Religious Belief

10:15-10:45 **Coffee Break**

10:45-11:45 **Symposium "Crises of Representation" II**

Graham Richards (Staffordshire, UK)

Circulating Psychological Knowledge - And When And Who Believes It

Stephanie Koerner (Manchester, UK)

Iconoclasm: Invisibilia and Iconoclasm as a 'Cultural System.'

11:45-13:15 **Paper Session: Norms and Values**

Gerhard Zecha (Salzburg)

The role of value judgments and norms in the history of Pedagogics (Educational Science)

Roger Smith (Moskva)

What can a historian say clearly and briefly about values in science?

Marin Aiftinca (Bucuresti)

The Question of Norm and Value in Contemporary Philosophy: a Historical View

13:15-14:45 **Lunch/Recreation**

14:45-15:30 **Poster Session**

15:30-16:30 **Paper Session: Contemporary Debates on Human Sciences**

Alan Collins (Lancaster, UK)

What is the history of the human sciences for?

Philip Bell (Sidney)

The 'New Humanities', Humanism and the 'post-human': some conceptual confusions.

16:30-17:00 **Coffee Break**

17:00-18:00 **Parallel Sessions**

A: Early Developments:

Fernando Vidal (Berlin)

Methodological discussions in 18th-century psychology

Terence McMullen (Sidney)

Comte's objection to introspection: Is "metacognition" the answer?

B: The History of Hypnosis:

Robert W. Rieber (New York)

Boring and Orne on Hypnosis

Francis Neary (Manchester)

F.W.H Myers, Hypnotism and the Subliminal Self

Discussant: Graham Richards (Staffordshire, UK)

18:30 **Business Meeting**

Thursday 22 July

09:00-11:00 Paper Session: Human Sciences in France I

Fernando Vidal (Berlin)

Introduction

Jacqueline Carroy (Paris)

The history of the human sciences in France. A presentation of the Société Française pour l'Histoire des Sciences de l'Homme (SFHSH)

Jean-François Braunstein (Paris)

The "French style" in the history of science and in the history of the human science.

Marc Renneville (Agen Cedex/FR):

« Criminocorpus » : un site web de ressources pour l'histoire des crimes et des peines.

11:00-11:30 Coffee Break

11:30-13:00 Parallel Sessions:

A: Les Sciences Humaines en France II:

Régine Plas (Paris)

Présentation et mise en oeuvre du projet « De l'âme corps au corps esprit. Les concepts mis en pratiques et les pratiques mises en concepts. Histoire croisée de la psychologie, de la psychiatrie et de la psychanalyse, 19^e- 20^e siècles » (Programme CNRS « Histoire des savoirs »).

Nathalie Richard (Paris)

Une recherche collective en histoire des sciences de l'homme: le programme "Archives Breuil". Entre préhistoire européenne et africanisme, un univers intellectuel et institutionnel au XX^e siècle.

B: Special Developments in 20th Century Human Sciences:

Thomas H. Borgard (Bern/CH)

Philology and literature between scientific claim and political corruption: The emergence of „Classical Modernism“ (1918-1949).

Elisabet Vilaplana Traveria & Annette Mülberger (Barcelona)

Controversies between Catholics and Spiritualists in Catalonia.

Simon Huttegger (Salzburg)

Static and Dynamic Approaches to Rational Decisions in Games.

13:00-14:30 Lunch/Break

14:30-16:00 Panel "Historical Reflections on the Distinction Between Quantitative and Qualitative Methods in the Human Sciences" I:

Lisa M. Osbeck (Carrollton, Georgia) & Peter K. Machamer (Pittsburgh)

The Status and Use of Mathematical Objects in Descartes and Human Science

Thomas Sturm (Berlin)

What's Wrong with Mathematical Psychology in the 18th Century? A Fresh Look at Kant's Old Argument.

Horst-Peter Brauns (Berlin)

G. T. Fechner's Use of Qualitative and Quantitative Methods During the Genesis of his "Psychophysik" (1850 -1860).

16:00-16:30 Coffee Break

16:30-18:30 Parallel Sessions:

A: Panel "Historical Reflections on the Distinction Between Quantitative and Qualitative Methods in the Human Sciences" II:

Uljana Feest (Berlin)

Preliminary Historical Thoughts On the Quantification of Gestalt-Qualities.

James Good (Durham, UK)

Minding their Rs and Qs: Charles Spearman, Cyril Burt, William Stephenson and the Role of Factor Analysis in the Assessment of Psychological Events.

Agnes Petocz (Sydney)

The Role of "Meaning" in the Qualitative/Quantitative Debate.

Discussant: Joel Michell (Sydney)

B: Workshop: "painful truths":

Jaap Bos (Utrecht)

Words that turn against its author: subversive knowledge in psychoanalysis.

Ruud Abma (Utrecht)

The politics of experience: Dangerous knowledge in (anti)psychiatry.

Petteri Pietikainen (Helsinki)

Sociobiology as Dangerous Knowledge: On the Moral Reading of 'Biological Determinism'

Friday 23 July

09:30-10:30 Keynote Address II:

David Leary (Richmond)

The Influence of Literature in the Life and Work of William James

10:30-11:00 Coffee Break

11:00-13:00 Paper Session: 20th Century American Psychology

Peter Behrens (Penn State University, USA)

Psychology Takes to the Airwaves: Popularizing Psychology on the Radio in the 1930's

David Clark (Toronto)

The Early History of the 'Psychology of Adjustment': Edwin Guthrie's Theory of Abnormal Behavior.

Dennis Bryson (Ankara)

Rockefeller Philanthropy and the Development of the Concept of 'Personality'

Roger Vilardaga Viera & Fanny Lichtenstein Tiviroli (Barcelona)

Between Freedom and Control: The Skinner's Point of View About the Role of Science in Society.

13:00-14:30 Lunch/Break

14:30-16:00 Paper Session: 20th Century Psychology

Sacha Bem (Leiden, NL)

A Quick History of Different Conceptions of Subjectivity

Irina Sirotkina (Moskva)

Was Strindberg mentally ill?

Glenn Newbery (Sidney)

The Concept of Intrinsic Motivation in Sport Psychology: A Historical Examination

17:00 Departure to Excursion and Conference Dinner

Saturday 24th July

- 09:30-11:00 **Symposion "Migrating Ideas" I**
Annette Mülberger (Barcelona)
Travelling Science: German Psychology in Spain.
Fania Herrero, Enrique Lafuente, Jorge Castro & José-Carlos Loredó (Madrid)
The Reception of Evolutionism in Spain - A View from Psychology.
Gordana Jovanovic (Beograd)
The Hidden Agendas of Modernity in the Early History of Psychology.
- 11:00-11:30 **Coffee Break**
- 11:30-13:30 **Symposion "Migrating Ideas" II**
Zsuzsanna Vajda (Szeged)
Individuals as Islands: Selfhood and Individuality from Psychoanalysis to Humanistic Psychology.
Kitty Dumont & Johann Louw (Cape Town, ZA)
Ideas Migrating Cross Countries - Henri Tajfel's Social Identity Approach.
Ana-Maria Jacó-Vilela (Rio de Janeiro / Barcelona)
Psychology and Social Intervention - Radecki and Antipoff in Brazil
Discussant: Robert W. Rieber
- 13:30 **Closing Conference**

KEYNOTE ADDRESS I

The 'Culture' of the Natural and the 'Nature' of the Cultural Sciences

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PAPER ABSTRACTS

SESSION: ARNHEIM PANEL I

Panel organisers: Christian G. Allesch & Otto Neumaier (Salzburg):

Panel description:

Rudolf Arnheim, a pioneer of Gestalt psychology and psychology of art, will celebrate the 100th anniversary of his birth on July 15, 2004. To acknowledge his work and his contribution to human sciences we are going to point to the variety of his scientific thought. Scholars from different disciplines will emphasise the interdisciplinarity of Arnheim's writings.

Reference

Allesch, C.G. & Neumaier, O. (Eds.) (2004). *Rudolf Arnheim oder der Kunst der Wahrnehmung*. Wien: Wiener Universitätsverlag.

Computer – Brain – Gestalt The Renaissance of Gestalt Theory in Neurobiology and Neuroinformatics

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In the article "Gestalten and Computers" (1999) Arnheim follows to the question about the relevance of "gestalten" for productive problem solving by comparing the physiological elements of the Nervous system with the elements of which computers are designed. Its conclusion is that until today computers "remain far below the high achievements of cognitive problem solving by gestalten". However, "there seems to be no technical limit to what problem solving by Computers can achieve."

At the same time as the "Gestalt theory" was rediscovered in cognitive and computer sciences two old questions were again placed. First of all: What can computers (in principle) do? Secondly: Is this question correctly posed? At least some critical objections can be raised against the first question.

Computers are tools, designed and manufactured by humans. One can regard not only artificial, but also biological objects as instruments (both follow specific functions). But we usually don't

say of instruments that they possess (cognitive) abilities. Therefore we should ask better, whether we want to attribute abilities to instruments and, if we are doing this, according to which criteria.

References:

Arnheim, R. (1999). Gestalten and Computers. *Gestalt Theory*, 21, 181-183.

Rudolf Arnheim's Experimental Contribution to a Gestalt-Theoretical Psychology of Expression

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This paper reconstructs the main features of Arnheim's early contribution – published in 1928 – to the psychology of expression based on Gestalt-theoretical principles. Obviously, Arnheim (1928) carries on with experiments Wertheimer already started in Berlin before World War I in the contexts of justification of Gestalt-theory in order to extend it further on traditional grounds of psychology like physiognomy and graphology. According to Wertheimer (1925) expression is conceptualised as a primary perceptual phenomenon, bound to the situation of perception governed by Gestalt laws. Arnheim shows in his broadly designed mass experiment that there is a basic human capability of matching correctly expressive material.

The processes underlying these achievements seem to be at least analogous if not identical with the operation of "Gestalten". It can be demonstrated further that even under more unrestricted experimental conditions Gestalt-like processes emerge to produce impressions of traits and character as a whole and that determining forces of a whole overcome tendencies originating from parts. On the other side, it can be shown that there are certain parts – of a human face e.g. – whose variation changes the impression of a whole and that there are others whose variation does not have this effect. Having successfully opened the traditional realm of expression with its branches of physiognomy and graphology to Gestalt-psychological experimentation and explanation Arnheim (1949) puts forward a general Gestalt-theory of expression in 1949. By this, Arnheim falsifies the Kantian prediction of 1798 that physiognomy can never become a science (Kant, 1820).

References

- Arnheim, R. (1928). Experimentell-psychologische Untersuchungen zum Ausdrucksproblem. *Psychologische Forschung*, 11, 2-132.
Arnheim, R. (1949). The Gestalt theory of expression. *Psychological Review*, 56, 156-171.
Kant, I. (1820). *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*. Königsberg: Universitätsbuchhandlung.
Wertheimer, M. (1925). *Über Gestalttheorie*. Erlangen: Weltkreis Verlag.

Rudolf Arnheim and the project of reconceptualising "psychological aesthetics".

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This paper aims at linking two scientific projects that have not been sufficiently acknowledged until now. One of them is the implementation of Gestalt theory to aesthetics, which is an

essential aspect of Rudolf Arnheim's writings. The other is the attempt to integrate the different kinds of "partial aesthetics" (like "music psychology", "psychology of literature" and "psychology of art") into a common theory of aesthetic experience which is not restricted to the experience of art but includes also other fields of aesthetic experience like "environmental aesthetics". I would like to argue that these two projects can find a useful foundation in the work of Rudolf Arnheim.

I suggest to call this approach of integrating theories of aesthetic experiences directed to different types of aesthetic objects "psychological aesthetics" because a discipline already existed in history under this name and was the predominant approach within German aesthetics at the beginning of the 20th century. By different reasons, this project has not been pursued after the 2nd world war. One of the reasons was that Gestalt psychology, which was the most interesting approach within the context of psychological aesthetics, was forced to emigration and lost its inner connection as a scientific "school".

However, the ideas of Gestalt psychology were most influential in different fields of scientific research. Rudolf Arnheim was the one who carried on the traditional interest of Gestalt psychology in the arts, in particular by his works *Visual Thinking* (1969/2004) and *Art and Visual Perception* (1975). It can be shown that these writings are closer to the historical project of "psychological aesthetics" than to recent concepts of "psychology of art".

References

- Allesch, C. (1987). *Geschichte der psychologischen Ästhetik*. Göttingen: Hogrefe.
Arnheim, R. (1967). *Towards a psychology of art. Selected essays*. (2nd ed.). Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
Arnheim, R. (2004). *Visual Thinking* (1969). Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
Arnheim, R. (1975). *Art and visual perception. A psychology of the creative eye; the new version*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.

SESSION: ARNHEIM PANEL II

Chance in Art

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For Rudolf Arnheim, the main function of art is to further the understanding of the order underlying the phenomenal world, which appears to our senses as accidental and irrational – where the assumption that some event x happens accidentally, or by chance, amounts to saying that it is impossible to explain it causally by relating it to some other event y. Accordingly, what is called "chance" is not something absolute, but has to be understood relatively, that is, in relation to our ability of recognizing the "structure" of what appears to our senses. Due to the development of art it might happen that some work appears as chaotic relative to some traditional conception of order, but not with regard to some new conceptual framework which helps us to understand the order the artist has in mind. Nevertheless, Arnheim wants to set certain limits to this development, that is, in cases where some artist seems only to add cultural chaos to natural chaos, as it is done – in Arnheim's eyes – by people like Cage or Pollock who use chance as a principle of creation.

Now, the aim of my paper is to clarify Arnheim's view of the role of chance in art as well as to analyze the reasons for his reluctance to accept chance as a principle of creation. It is shown that Arnheim, according to his own presuppositions, cannot exclude the possibility of explaining

such works relative to some appropriate conceptual framework and that his aversion against chance as a principle of creation is mainly due to the fact that it is rather difficult to identify Gestalten in the texture of paintings like those created by Pollock (whereas those varieties of contemporary art which are based on "elementary prototypes" are highly estimated by Arnheim). On the other hand, chance is not used as a principle, but as a means of creation in art, and there is a great variety of meaningful uses of chance. In addition, we have also to take into account, however, that the use of chance in art, which is a question of free will, should not be confused with chance in nature, which is a matter of indeterminism. Although Arnheim is right that art theorists have the "responsibility of diagnosing disorder where [...] it prevails", it seems, after all, that his more important insight is that "what looks like disorder today may turn out to be the order of tomorrow." Therefore, we should be rather cautious with regard to generally refusing chance as a means of creation in art.

Relevant Works by Rudolf Arnheim:

Toward a Psychology of Art. Collected Essays. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press 1966.

Visual Thinking. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press 1969.

Entropy and Art. An Essay on Disorder and Order. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press 1971.

Arnheim on the perception of moving images

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The most eminent feature of Arnheim's theory of film is the author's sceptical view of sound film ("the introduction of the sound film smashed many of the forms that the film artists were using in favour of the intrinsic demand for the greatest possible 'naturalness'"; 1957, p. 154). Instead of discussing dimensions of this 'anachronism' the present paper focuses on a still actual topic of Arnheim's theory: the perception of moving images. Arnheim stressed that the movement of objects (not in the least: the moving human body) – besides from being expressive – is essential for the viewer's impression of three dimensional space. As for the movement of the camera Arnheim explained why it tends to produce disorientation and dizziness (which sometimes may be an intended effect). These insights contradict the still widespread mystification of camera movements as the core of the movie experience (cf. Gibson, 1982; Bordwell, 2001).

References

Arnheim, R. (1957) *Film as Art*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Bordwell, D. (2001). *Visual style in cinema*. Frankfurt/Main.: Verlag der Autoren.

Gibson, J. J. (1982). *Wahrnehmung und Umwelt* (engl. Orig. 1979). München: Urban & Schwarzenberg.

The Long Ending of the Silent Movie: Remarks on Arnheim's Theory of Film

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Arnheim has been recognized as one of the earliest theoreticians to take film seriously. His theory of film has often been reduced to his seminal work on film entitled *Film als Kunst* (1932) in which he discusses four pivotal aspects: a) aesthetics, b) a stress on form, c) art, and d) the silent movie. The main purpose of this talk is to assess the modifications that Arnheim made during the course of nearly 70 years. Keeping the perspectives and concerns of *Film als Kunst* as the basis, Arnheim elaborated on further corresponding issues in his subsequent work, including: a) a more general theory of media, b) a step towards realism, c) documentary dimensions of film, and d) the further development of color and sound film. Against all prejudices (which Arnheim himself encouraged with his article "The New Laocoon") Arnheim has not been a pure formalist, who only appreciated the silent movie, but incorporated at various points in his work a number of important developments in the history of film.

References

- Arnheim, R. (2002). *Film als Kunst*. Frankfurt a.M.
Arnheim, R. (1977). *Kritiken und Aufsätze zum Film*. München et al.
Carroll, N. (1988). *Philosophical Problems of Classical Film Theory*. Princeton.
Beiküfner, U. (2003). *Blick, Figuration und Gestalt*. Bielefeld.
Koch, G. (1992). Rudolf Arnheim – Der Materialist der ästhetischen Illusion. In U. Jung et al. (Eds.), *Filmkultur zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik* (pp. 15-25). München.

Visual Thinking and Economics - Abstract

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If we accept the saying >we don't see things as they are, we see them as we are<, which is somehow a conclusion of Rudolf Arnheim's "Visual Thinking", a crucial light can be thrown on economics, because its still dominating neo-classical rationale creates a highly selected view on the economic reality without sufficient control by perceiving the entirety of the respective part of society and, therefore, lacking an extensive interpretation. Models of economics usually work like machines, and they tend to create a world made of machines.

In this article an example is being discussed by putting a simple question: What is a product? The common answer would be: It is a useful material thing. But the truth is this: Any kind of production begins in the mind of someone as an idea of the product. Single objects that we can see displayed in a shop are nothing but specimen of the producer's idea, and they can be useful for the customer only if he has got an idea about things of that kind in his mind before.

The conclusion is that market processes are an exchange of ideas (not simply an exchange of goods for money) and that marketing is communicating a product idea to the public, in order to implant the image of the product in the customers' minds. In other words: Individuals acting on the market are exchanging pictures or images of products, in order to make their respective inner visions congruent to each other and finally to exchange the real thing for money. Therefore, economics should be extended to a specific kind of visual thinking.

SESSION: ARNHEIM, GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY

Art as critique of formal communication theory. „Gestaltistic“ thinking in the works of Oswald Wiener and Rudolf Arnheim

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In reference to psychology of information processing concepts of „Gestalt“ were known already before 1950 as Herbert A. Simon, distinguished investigator of artificial intelligence, accentuates. From there these concepts not only affected cognitive sciences as well as digital data processing but also Oswald Wiener's famous literary work *Die Verbesserung von Mitteleuropa, Roman* (1969). Less known are a series of essays on literature and epistemology; here Wiener develops a theoretical fundament to combine theory of automation with a concept of „understanding“ and „consciousness“. Media and communication are ascribed to a specific ability of natural man and an esthetic theory is thus formulated in which conventional patterns of language are significantly changed – not annihilated.

Wiener finally aims at an analysis of the preconscious effects of language and semiotic theory of automation; here Wiener explicitly absorbs the early gestaltistic thinking of Christian von Ehrenfels and Carl Stumpf. The contribution will illustrate the epistemology of Wiener in comparison with important considerations of Rudolf Arnheim. From here the effects of gestaltistic theory on the problems of „social science“, raised around 1850 by John Stuart Mill, and German „Geisteswissenschaften“ can be made clear.

References

- Arnheim, R. (2001). *Anschauliches Denken. Zur Einheit von Bild und Begriff*. Köln: DuMont.
Mill, J. S. (1973 f.[1843]). *A System of Logic. Ratiocinative and Inductive. Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation*. Toronto: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Murray, D. (1995). *Gestalt psychology and the cognitive revolution*. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Wiener, O. (1970). subjekt, semantik, abbildungsbeziehungen. In S. J. Schmidt (Hrsg.), *text bedeutung ästhetik* (S. 1-14). München: Bayerischer Schulbuch-Verlag.
Wiener, O. (1979). Einige Gedanken über die Aussichten empirischer Forschung im Kunstbereich und über Gemeinsamkeiten in der Arbeit von Künstlern und Wissenschaftlern. In S. J. Schmidt (Hrsg.), *empirie in literatur- und kunstwissenschaft* (S. 182-189). München: Fink.
Wiener, O. (1985 [1969]). *Die Verbesserung von Mitteleuropa, Roman*. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt.
Wiener, O. (1996). *Schriften zur Erkenntnistheorie*. Wien/New York: Springer.
Wiener, O. (1996a). Notizen zum Konzept des Bio-Adapters, in: Wiener 1996, 1-56.

The History of Research on Proportions

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Since a long time proportions are one of the decisive basics of constructing buildings and finding the most appropriate harmony for different environmental and artistic objects. One of the proportions said to result in a maximum of pleasingness was the Golden Section (*sectio aurea* or *divine proportion*; cf. Zeising, 1854). Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801-1887) was the first to

introduce empirical methods to answer this question. Although the method in itself is precise and based on the new movement to sensory experience conceived of in the 18th century, it remained open to criticism from both sides: the philosophy of aesthetics and the psychology of art. Especially Rudolf Arnheim wrote a considerable attack against empirical methods in aesthetics, mainly based on the argument, that empiricism in the arts is going to reduce the question of how art does influence the human mind to the question of taste asking for likingness and pleasingness in the same way one may ask about the taste of ice-cream (Arnheim, 1985).

This line of arguments is interesting for the research strategies still in use. To demonstrate the development of thinking and researching the history of the investigations into the question of the Golden Section will be taken as an example. Fechner presented results confirming the belief of a special attractiveness of the Golden Section, whereas a number of studies proved that the golden section seems not to be of special aesthetic attractiveness (cf. the special issue of *Empirical Studies of the Arts*, vol. 17(2), 1997). Moreover, the preference for proportions itself is still an open question, especially if it is (a) not restricted to the discussion of one and only one proportion, namely the golden section. The second question (b), however, is how to combine all the factors that may contribute to the preference for proportions.

Gestalt Theory as a Philosophical Worldview and its reception in North America 1925-1955

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The transference of Gestalt theory from Germany to the United States has received limited attention from historians of psychology, and even then the focus has overwhelmingly been on the Gestalt approach as an experimental program. Yet just as important was the attempt by the leading Gestalt proponents to establish their particular worldview as a philosophical one. To this end Wertheimer, Köhler, and Koffka all developed their shared philosophical orientation not only according to the institutional constraints which demanded that German psychologists of the period anchor their discipline within philosophy, but also as a response to broader social and cultural movements within early twentieth-century Germany. By the mid-1930s the above three men had emigrated to the United States, having by this time already established Gestalt theory as an internationally recognised 'school'. In its North American context, however, the Gestalt approach was forced to compete with the behaviorist orientations dominant in that country. Although the institutional ties linking psychology with philosophy had traditionally been weaker in the United States, Laurence Smith has shown that many behaviorists continued to concern themselves with 'philosophical questions' throughout the 1930s and 40s, whatever they took them to be. It is of interest, then, to chart the American reception of Gestalt theory from a philosophical standpoint. It is not suggested here that the terms 'philosophy' and 'psychology' should be accepted uncritically. It may well be, as Mitchell Ash has suggested, that the very relationship between psychology and philosophy underwent a process of renegotiation and subsequent redefinition throughout the period in question, and that the philosophical content of Gestalt theory fell somewhere 'between the cracks' in this process.

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SYMPOSIUM "CRISES OF REPRESENTATION"

Panel organisers: Stephanie Koerner (University of Manchester) & Lisa M. Osbeck (University of West Georgia)

Panel description:

Rethinking 'Crises of Interpretation' and the Dynamics of Epistemic Debate and Social Strife

The last decades have seen the humanities, social sciences and philosophy experience a series of 'crises of interpretation' whose causes and effects are examined in diverse interdisciplinary literatures. In what concerns the history and philosophy of human sciences, the crisis is felt especially by those who have engaged in serious reflection on historical roots that today's disciplinary definitions and divisions share with images on which have hinged the most powerful colonialist, imperialist and nationalist political ideologies of modern times. At issue are images that objectify assumptions about the interrelatedness of such themes as:

- (a) the scope and thresholds of human knowledge,
- (b) the structures, composition and forces of the physical world,
- (c) the diversity of human history,
- (d) sources not just of the certitude (or consistency) but importantly also of the uncertainty (contingency) of human knowledge
- (e) criteria for supporting claims to truth (or the distinguishing of the true from the false, fact from fiction)
- (f) relations of truth to social norms and morality,
- (g) the importance of images (or 'figures' more broadly) among conditions of possibility for human life forms (What is the reality status of images, and/or the 'power' of images?)
- (h) the conditions of possibility for resolving discrepancies between 'is' and 'ought.'

The expression, 'crisis of interpretation,' occurs in works written between World Wars I and II by Walter Benjamin (1977) that may bear on major episodes of epistemic debate and social strife since the late Middle Ages, which radically undermined what have been seen as authoritative medieval approaches to the abovelisted themes (a-h). Pivotal episodes turned on such dichotomies as those of faith/idolatry, tradition/truth, customary practice/standardized rules, fact/fiction, science/values, in which caricatures of contrasts between 'modern scientific knowledge' and the beliefs in - (not about) - images and ritual objects of 'ordinary' people, children, women, 'heathens,' 'primitives', 'pre-modern others' came to play central roles.

Benjamin's (1977) approach to such 'crises' may have related to his famous argument that 'state of emergency' was not an anomaly but a foundational principle of modern thought and culture. Such insights, he said, might facilitate challenging ideologies that render invisible the 'barbarity' of what colonialist, imperialist and nationalist ideologies call 'civilising processes'. The argument was both too early and too late. Subsequent decades have seen increasingly phantasmagorical ideologies employed to legitimate the marginalisation, exploitation and oppression even until death of 'minorities.' Key issues posed by 'critiques of meta-narratives' have repeatedly been overshadowed by polemical debates, which turn on apparently antithetical premisses on the

abovelisted themes (a-h) and widening gaps between interpretations of the abovelisted dualist categories.

Today images of 'globalisation and multi-culturalism' are the focus of extraordinary artistic, academic, and public media attention. Now 'crisis of interpretation' are experienced by those engaged in serious reflection on the implications of the ways in which these images caricature the history and current state of the world - the ways they caricature sites classify either as multi-cultural or global. Attention is drawn to the importance to the efficacy of these images' treatments of (a) the categories, social constructs, fiction, individuals, events, customary practice, values, pre-modern, and (b) reality, facts, society, long-term processes, standardized rules, science, modern as systems of synonymous opposites. It bears stressing that, in homogenising core-periphery images, the encounter of multi-cultural sites with the global is always caricatured as the moment at which the former become either part of a 'vanishing past,' 'inauthentic fabrication' or 'alternative realities' lost. Like in Benjamin's (1977) allegory of modernity 'authentic' alternatives are in ruins emptied of their original sources of meaning and value - 'any person, any object, any relationship can mean absolutely anything else...in a world in which the detail is of no importance. Perhaps it is not surprising that a number of critics have called for reassessing views that there is something 'mere' about social constructs, and raise questions about the conditions under which fears arise that the consequence of being unable to divide knowledge/belief, customary practice/standardized rules, etc. may be war of all against all (e.g., Latour 2000).

This panel seeks to reopen discussion of such issues posed by 'crises of interpretation' as the following.

- The continuing significance of Max Weber's article on the 'objectivity of the social sciences' (cf. the panel organised by Gerhard Zecha).
- Approaches to the abovelisted themes (a-g) of iconic figures in the history of the human sciences.
- Implications of authoritative views not only on sources of the certainty, but importantly also of the uncertainty of knowledge for the dynamics of (the content) epistemic debate and (contexts) social strife.

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Some Notes on Wolff's and Kant's Psychology

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While Wolff's psychology is published in his "Deutsche Metaphysik" of 1720 and in his "psychologia empirica" (1732) and his "psychologia rationalis" (1734), Kant's psychology seems

to be found mainly in the records of his lectures on "Metaphysik" (eg. Mrongovius 1783; Poelitz 1779). This paper develops a [basically follows] a comparative approach to the psychologies of both thinkers. It starts with more general observations as regards systematic location, subdivision and contents as well as the basic methodological orientations (Wolff, 1728; Kant 1764). In particular, those issues will be raised which can be shown to have explicit references by Kant to Wolff as there are the issues at confused knowledge and at the number of mental forces. They will be dealt with comparatively. Here, Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* (1768) must be considered as well. Finally, the historical hypothesis will be put forward that Kant's psychology, as published in his lectures on Metaphysics constitute a traditional subject with relationships to Wolff's approach, relatively untouched by his critical philosophy and quite distinct from his pragmatic anthropology.

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Futures and Illusions: Freud, Pfister and Their Exchange on Religion and Religious Belief

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I will analyze the narratological strategies, philosophical arguments, and cultural prejudices of Freud's important essay and Pfister's rejoinder to it in order to assess their relative strengths and reveal their contextual limitations as well as potential areas of productive exploration. I focus on the validity of their respective arguments supporting their claims to truth, the way each employs these arguments to disguise or hide their quest for authority and "the 'barbarity' of the 'civilizing process' that they legitimise" (within the Enlightened framework in which they debate), and their interpersonal and group (i.e., psal movement) dynamics of their epistemic debate.

Top-down, Bottom-up or simply rotating

Circulating Psychological Knowledge – And ~~the~~ When and Who Believes It

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In order to begin analysing the factors which contribute to the broader credibility and authority of Psychological 'knowledge', three quite different cases will be briefly examined: the 'craze' for psychoanalysis in Britain during the 1918-1930 period; research on 'race' differences in intelligence in the US 1913-1935; early Cognitive Psychology. It will be suggested that the conditions of credibility for Psychology's knowledge claims involve several interacting factors, such as the psychological state of the host society, perceptions of the technical scientific merits of the claims and the ideological interests of those in power positions. Insofar as these are stable over time, and change in part at least as a result of the reflexive effects of Psychology itself, so the credibility of particular Psychological knowledge claims and wider theoretical

orientations constantly fluctuates. It is, moreover, not inconceivable, that circumstances might arise in which the credibility of the entire discipline collapses, or its credible elements cease to identify themselves as being 'Psychology'.

Iconoclasm: Invisibilia and Iconoclasm as a 'Cultural System'

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Today few expressions occur with greater frequency than those of 'invisible things of the world' and 'invisible people and processes.' This is especially the case for recent literatures on the histories of the arts and science and anthropological methodology and theorising. Invisibilia is a key theme in literatures on the roles of curiosity into praetor-natural phenomena and sub- and supra-visible realms in the replacement of the closed and finished medieval world picture by the open and unfinished post-Newtonian universe (ca. 1150-1750) (cf. Koyré 1968; Blumenberg 1983). Invisibilia is a likewise key theme in anthropology's current discussion of the ways in which homogenising core-periphery models of 'modernisation' and 'globalisation and multiculturalism' obscure discrepant experiences of the contemporary world. The expression, 'invisible people and processes' refers to realms of the disenfranchised and subaltern that both define and are excluded from realms of the social and franchised (eg., Buchli and Lukas (2000)

Several issues traverse disciplinary divisions between these discussions, including: (a) the dynamics of epistemic debate and social conflict, and (b) clashes in works by the iconic figures of the historiography of modern thought and culture between iconoclast arguments and the extraordinary images on which these arguments hinge. Consider, for instance, the cases of Aquinas (1224-1274), Ockham (1288-1347), Dante (1265-1321), Valla (1430-1499) Luther (1483-1546), Bacon (1561-1626), Galileo (1564-1648), Descartes (1596-1650), Hobbes (1588-1679, Newton (1642-1724), Kant (1724-1804), Freud (1856-1939).

This contribution argues for the bearing that (a) the history of 'crises of interpretation' may have on overlaps between areas of research centring on invisibilia and (b) the notion, 'iconoclasm as a cultural system,' may have on 20th century episodes of epistemic debate and social strife centring on dichotomies listed in the panel abstract (cf. Latour 2000; Geertz 1973).

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SESSION: NORMS AND VALUES

The role of value judgments and norms in the history of Pedagogic (Educational Science)

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As the pedagogical discipline developed differently in different countries and continents, I am confining myself in this report on the debate in German speaking countries during the second half of the 20th century.

After World War II, the pedagogical discourse mainly focused on normative issues like educational values, instructional goals and objectives, the aims of education and their philosophical justification (Röhrs 1964, Peters 1973). In the mid-sixties, along with the so-called "Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie", the "realistic turn" was propagated. Contrary to the normative discipline of "Pädagogik", an "empirical science of education" was established (Brezinka 1971, Brezinka 1978). Part of this empirical paradigm was the so-called "Principle of Value Neutrality" which was supposed to be an effective tool to eliminate all value elements and normative considerations as "unscientific". Detailed arguments followed specifically applicable to educational issues (Büttemeyer/Möller 1979), then a systematic investigation of the pros and cons with respect to the problem of value freedom was published (Zecha 1984). Ten years later, attempts to turn back the "wheel of scientific progress" were suggested (Pollak/Heid 1994). However, an open and problem-oriented (and not school-oriented!) perspective has been gaining ground in recent years and appears to be more reasonable and realistic than the mind-numbing battle between various traditions and points of view (Zecha 1999).

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What can a historian say clearly and briefly about values in science?

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Many observers would perhaps agree that western inquiry into the place of values in knowledge has become diffuse, confusing and, perhaps hopelessly, complex. In the course of my work on the philosophy and history of the human sciences (which includes an attempt to say what this

title denotes), I have come face to face with this complexity. I share the view, now commonplace in the social sciences, that the fact/value distinction cannot be maintained. But it is often not at all clear what people mean when they reject this distinction.

I wish to explore whether a schema for clarifying what is at stake is cogent and helpful. There are two dimensions to the schema. The first distinguishes four levels, four types of statement about the presence of values in science: statements about the 'absolute' standing of certain values (including those some philosophers hold are required by the exercise of rationality itself); statements about the distinction between description and evaluation; statements about the practical interests that inform scientific practice; and statements about nature as a norm, standard or value in itself. In the second dimension, I note how a number of key analytical terms or phrases cut across, or are variously applied in, the four levels discussed. Such terms or phrases include: the fact-value distinction (or 'is'/'ought'; ideology; the naturalistic fallacy; and, not least, the emotive expression 'anything goes'.

A brief paper about such matters needs a little self-irony. But I hope to suggest some uses of rhetoric for people, like myself, who cannot deal full-time with the philosophical questions at dispute (and, we may take note, they very much are in dispute) but nevertheless wish to go beyond the clichés that pass for understanding. What practical course is open to writers who wish to be clear how values inform what they and others say but nevertheless appreciate the deep complexity of what is at issue?

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The Question of Norm and Value in Contemporary Philosophy: a Historical View

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The concept of value originates in the Kantian analysis of validity and more specifically of the "practical rule". Continuing the work of Kant, Lotze instituted the concept of "value in itself" and proposed concept of validity as a genus to be predicated of value, thesis which will become constitutive of the Neokantian and the phenomenological orientation in the philosophy of value. In relation to Scheler's principle, N. Hartmann introduced the distinction between value as value and value realizations, as well the idea of a system of values. In addition to this, research has gradually brought forward: a logic of value, a sociology of value, and ontology of value. Among these, it is phenomenology which offers new explicative valences for understanding the essence and functionality of values and norms. An important role in this trend was played by the Husserlian theme of intersubjectivity and the "Life-World" (Lebenswelt): value as well as norms has intentional existence. This project includes the historical dimension, and the which Husserl called "a new humanity", making evident the unity between creation and the human condition.

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SESSION: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ON HUMAN SCIENCES

What is the history of the human sciences for?

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In all forms of history there has been reflection on its intended audience and its intended effects. In the history of the human sciences, and of psychology in particular, this issue has been given added weight in recent years by those who have argued that the audience for such histories should include the human scientists themselves. Nevertheless, despite the sophistication of recent historical work, the present paper contends that the majority of psychologists simply ignore what is being done in the history of their disciplines and practices. Instead, the history of the human sciences appears to be read only by other historians of the human sciences. Yet many of the justifications of the history of the human sciences have included, either explicitly or implicitly, the aim of improving the conduct of those discipline areas they study (occasionally going so far as to imply the wholesale abandonment of some areas of inquiry and practice). The gap between aim and achievement seems painfully wide. Drawing on the early work of historians of science, such as Sarton, and the recent work of Harry Collins and Robert Evans, the present paper argues that the nature and functions of the historian's expertise need to be continually reviewed. Although the paper promises no solutions, it does argue that what is sometimes regarded as a cliché, the pedagogical role of history, is in fact a role that should be given increased emphasis.

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The 'New Humanities', Humanism and the 'post-human': some conceptual confusions

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This paper presents an outline of several recent uses of the term 'post-human' in American and European Cultural Studies literature. It then critically analyses the epistemological and ontological assumptions to which the most prominent recent theorists of the post-human seem to be committed. It argues that many of their speculations (those relying on poststructuralism, especially) are idealist and frequently incoherent. Moreover, they seem to have little to say about human culture and are naive about technology as an augmentation of, or determinant of, 'subjectivity'.

Although their concepts would seem to imply particular biological and psychological understandings of human 'nature', recent 'Cultural Studies' writers are generally silent on how to characterise the biological predispositions of the species. It is concluded that the contemporary Humanities (or the 'New Humanities' as they are sometimes now labelled) in their rush to avoid 'essentialism' and 'positivism' often endorse naive philosophical and psychological assumptions.

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PARALLEL SESSIONS

A: Early Developments

Methodological discussions in 18th-century psychology

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Starting in the 1750s, especially in Germany, psychology includes active methodological discussions; this paper will examine three major examples. The first one concerns

psychometrics. In his 1732 *Psychologia empirica* Christian Wolff imagined the possibility of establishing a mathematical knowledge of the mind, for example in the fields of attention and pleasure/displeasure. Barely a decade later, the physician and philosopher Johann Gottlob Krüger came up with "mathematical laws" about the relation between the intensity of a stimulus, the "tension" of the stimulated nerves," and the "liveliness" of the sensation.

The second example concerns experimentation. Gottlieb Friedrich Hagen, a Wolffian, elaborated the idea of experiments aimed at measuring different faculties (attention, judgment, will). Later on, Krüger developed an entire program of experimental psychology. Experiments were to be done with criminals and animals (and, indirectly, by means of medical case-studies taken as natural experiments).

The third example concerns methodology. The Jena philosopher Christian Gottfried Schütz examined the "psychological difficulties" that derive from the fact that the soul is both subject and object of investigation. For example, he pointed out that many phenomena (affects, rapidly concatenated perceptions, processes of psychological change, or early development) elude even the most attentive introspection. Schütz favored the integration of three methods: the empirical to establish phenomena, the analytic to develop hypotheses, and the synthetic to deductively derive phenomena from the formulated hypotheses.

A decade later, Jean Trembley, a disciple of Bonnet's, argued that psychology should follow physics, which had "made progress only since it became experimental, and calculated effects without worrying about causes." An additional problem with psychology, Trembley said, is that since each author tries to form an "entire system," he cannot examine anything in depth. Physics, however, advanced through specialization; similarly, some psychologists should study the senses, others child development, other the passions, and so forth.

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Comte's objection to introspection: is "metacognition" the answer?

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In outlining his positivist philosophy early in the nineteenth century, Auguste Comte repudiated introspection. It entailed, he claimed, the paradox of a mind scanning itself. William James and J. S. Mill drew this objection to the attention of English-speaking psychologists. Recently T. O. Nelson in America has proposed that the concept of "metacognition" resolves Comte's paradox: introspective reports are to be seen as metacognitive. This paper argues that, if taken literally, metacognition is a dangerously metaphysical notion. Comte's objection can be obviated, however, by a pluralistic account of mind.

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B: The History of Hypnosis

F.W.H Myers, Hypnotism and the Subliminal Self

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This paper explores the use of hypnotism as a key investigation in the development of F.W.H Myers's hypothesis of the subliminal self at the turn of the 20th Century. Myers forged his influential model of the self while participating in the debates of the Society for Psychical Research in the 1880s and 90s. He looked for a middle path between investigators who sought to display the phenomena of abnormal consciousness as instances of the fragmentation of the normal personality (explicable by the principle of cerebral dissociation), and those who regarded all such manifestations as instances of the possession and control of the organism of one person by the spirit or soul of another, generally a deceased person. Myers's hypothesis of the subliminal self reconciled these two kinds of explanation, and brought them into line with other perplexing facts, especially various types of communication at a distance, veridical hallucinations, and instances of the operation of suggestion and of hypnosis, including the exaltation of the powers of the senses, of the memory and of control over the organic processes.

Myers saw hypnosis as the experimental exploration of the sleep phase of human personality. The unusual phenomena that occur in hypnosis were attributed to the power of the subliminal self that is manifest in such states. The subliminal self appeared to enjoy greater control over the body than the supraliminal. Myers also described the relationship of hypnosis to other phenomena such as faith healing, the miraculous cures at Lourdes, and the use of magical charms. He highlighted the experimental work done in telepathic hypnotic induction at a distance as well as telepathy, clairvoyance and precognition observed in the hypnotized subject. Hypnotism was considered by Myers to be one of the most effective tools for exploring the two phases of our existence: "one mainly adapted to material or planetary, the other to spiritual or cosmic operation." This route to accessing the subliminal mind could lead to such remarkable

abilities as dowsing and clairvoyant 'distant diagnosis'; subliminal calculation; stigmatisation; and supernormal access to information of various sorts.

In his work as a leading light in the Boston School of Psychotherapy, beginning in the late 1890s, William James recognised Myers, and not Janet or Freud, as the originator of the psychogenic hypothesis- that physical symptoms can result from psychological trauma. James's most important interpretation of Myers was expressed as 'Myers's Problem': the fact that the worst and the best present themselves to consciousness through the self-same channels.

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Discussant: Graham Richards (Staffordshire, UK)

SESSION: HUMAN SCIENCES IN FRANCE I

The History of the Human Sciences à la française

A session of the French Society for the History of the Human Sciences

Panel organiser: Fernando Vidal, Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Berlin

Panel description:

The purpose of this session is to present the French Society for the History of the Human Sciences (Société française pour l'histoire des sciences de l'homme, SFHSH) with the goal of furthering collaboration and mutual acquaintance with the European Society for the History of the Human Sciences. Since its foundation in 1986, the SFHSH has made consistent efforts to consider the totality of the field and to promote interactions among historians of different disciplines; it has thus managed to attract an extremely diversified membership, ranging over the entire spectrum of the human and social sciences. The first paper of the session, dealing with the history and activities of the SFHSH, will be followed by an examination of the French tradition in the history of science and medicine, and its impact on the history of the human sciences. These two initial papers will in turn be followed by illustrations of current projects funded by the French ministry of Culture, known as "Action Concertée Incitative" (ACI), conducted by SFHSH members in the areas of the history of psychology, psychiatry and psychoanalysis, criminology and the justice system, and ethnography and prehistoric studies. The ACI structure, which necessarily brings together specialists of different areas, is

representative of the interdisciplinary ideal that characterizes the history of the human sciences *à la française*.

The history of the human sciences in France. A presentation of the Société Française pour l'Histoire des Sciences de l'Homme (SFHSH)

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The goal of this paper is to sketch the history and activities of the French Society for the History of the Human Sciences (SFHSH). The Society has about 200 members, and its program can be summarized in the following manner: The SFHSH promotes research on all areas that investigate "man," from the most ancient to the most recent. It examines the processes of autonomization and institutionalization of the human and social sciences. It explores the interactions between knowledge about man and society, and the natural, biomedical and mathematical sciences. It explores their internal coherence, their discursive, narrative or technical forms, their institutional affiliations, their cultural and philosophical foundations, as well as their social, ethical, and political significance and relations.

The SFHSH favors interactions among different historical, epistemological and sociological approaches. By itself or together with other institutions, it organizes local or international colloquia on specific areas of knowledge, on transversal themes, on historical periods or moments, or on historical processes in the perspective of the "longue durée."

For its tenth anniversary, the SFHSH published a collective work – *L'histoire des sciences de l'homme. Trajectoire, enjeux et questions vives*, edited by Claude Blanckaert, Loïc Blondiaux, Laurent Loty, Marc Renneville and Nathalie Richard (Paris, L'Harmattan, 1999) – that makes an inventory of the epistemological and historiographical problems of the history of the human sciences as they present themselves in the French context. Can one speak of a unity of the human sciences? How can their history or histories be structured into periods? What is the significance and impact of Michel Foucault's work? Which uses one make of the opposition between presentism and historicism? How should one deal with disciplinary histories? Where are the boundaries of the human sciences?

These questions are related to institutional issues: who writes the history of the human sciences, and who is authorized to engage in such a task? The epistemological and historiographical questions dealt with in the book mentioned above are to be completed by an examination of the institutional affiliation of the members of the SFHSH and themes of their research.

The "French style" in the history of science and in the history of the human science.

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It is possible to argue that there is a "style" characteristic of the history of science *à la française*, as illustrated by the names of Auguste Comte, Gaston Bachelard, Georges Canguilhem or Michel Foucault. This history is a "philosophical" or "critical" history, which makes large use of the notions of "recurrence" and "discontinuity." In the history of the human sciences, the central oeuvre is that of Michel Foucault. It has often been interpreted as a radical critique of the very idea of human sciences, similar to Jacques Lacan's equation of the denomination "human sciences" to a "call to submission." Foucault's work is thus seen as having constituted an obstacle to historical research in the area. Hence the temptation of some French historians of the human sciences to present themselves as "pure" historians, as opposed to the "philosophers" and their "arrogance."

The present paper will argue that, in the work of the above-mentioned authors, the human sciences are criticized only from a certain point of view, and that the current interest in the history of the human sciences originates in their original epistemological stance. It is crucial to highlight the importance of Canguilhem, whose interest for the history of the human sciences has been barely noticed, yet whose work is more decisive than Foucault's for the current interest in the history of the human sciences. On the one hand, it is particularly relevant to examine his treatment of the history of psychology. On the other hand, it would be necessary to show the impact of the history of medicine, which furnishes certain concepts basic to the history of the human sciences. More recent work, such as Ian Hacking's, suggest that the history of the human sciences *à la française*, far from being an obstacle, has on the contrary been particularly fertile for the development of the field.

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"Criminocorpus": a website of resources for the history of crimes and punishments

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This paper will present the project of creating a website on the history of crime and justice. The goal of the project is to create or make more widely accessible information services related to the birth of French criminology at the end of the 19th century. This theme is deeply linked with present-day concerns about crime and punishment, security, and the scientific study of delinquency. Moreover, it is not confined to a single academic discipline. The development of such a website therefore leads to a reflection on the constitution of criminological knowledge at the intersection of several fields that sometimes converge, other times are in conflict: legal medicine, criminal law, psychology, sociology, anthropology. The structure of the website will provide three types of data:

- a bibliographic database on the history of the French administration of justice from 1789 to 2003;

- a digitalized version of the influential journal Archives d'anthropologie criminelle (1886-1914);
- various syntheses and historical analyses on the birth of criminology at the end of the 19th century.

The team responsible for the website attempts to examine in an integrated manner the Archives as a major source for the history of criminology, the limits of the bibliographic database, and its own historical practices. Is the history of science the best way to provide a critical approach to the area of criminology? Is a website an adequate tool to reach at the same time the scholarly community and a larger non-professional but interested audience? Should scholars work with specialists in cultural communication? The paper will focus on three points: the institutional context of the project, its current state, and future perspectives.

PARALLEL SESSIONS

A: Les Sciences Humaines en France II

The research program "From body-soul to body-mind relationships. Concepts practiced and practices conceptualized at the crossroads of the history of psychology, psychiatry and psychoanalysis, 19th-20th centuries"

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The fields that study historically our understanding of the human psyche (psychiatry, psychology and psychoanalysis) are relatively dispersed in France, and it is only recently that the predominance of disciplinary histories of these bodies of "psy" knowledge was reconsidered on the basis of the hypothesis that they developed from a common source.

The project described in this paper originates in this critical perspective. On the one hand, its goal is to provide an original approach to a history referred to 19th- and 20th-century France in terms of the relationships between "the physical and the moral," the soul and the body, and the body and the mind, starting with the interwoven histories of psychology, psychiatry and then psychoanalysis. On the other hand, we make the hypothesis that, although there were (and there are) major differences between the "psy" areas that claimed (and claim) to be more or less scientific, there is no clear-cut discontinuity among them – no more, in any case, than between areas that imposed themselves as scientific and areas, such as psychical research and parapsychology, that ended up being marginalized. It is thereby hoped to bring to light the complexities of the origins and evolutions of the various psychological disciplines.

This paper will illustrate the approach just described by examining in the French setting the complex relationships that the branch of psychology long referred to as "experimental" and more recently rebaptized "cognitive," has maintained with nerve physiology, nowadays called "neurosciences."

A collective work in progress in the history of human sciences. The research program "Archives Breuil. Between European prehistory and Africanist research: a 20th-century intellectual and institutional universe"

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Henri Breuil (1877-1961) was undoubtedly a crucial figure in twentieth-century human and social sciences: a major actor of prehistoric research in Europe and Africa, a tireless traveller, a surveyor of new grounds, a transit point across disciplines, a creator of world-wide institutional networks, and, finally, a man of faith as well as science. The multiple facets of his work literally call for a collective interdisciplinary exploration of a unique oeuvre and itinerary (intellectual, institutional, political, geographical), which are clearly enmeshed in a tight matrix of relations and institutions, in the history of several disciplines, and in shifting scientific and ideological contexts. The research program "Archives Breuil" brings together historians of science and historians of ideas, prehistorians and africanist researchers. Their common goal is to examine the figure of Henri Breuil – his biography, archives, practices, theories, and texts – either to identify new research objects, to connect them with the main strands of the history and epistemology of twentieth-century human and social sciences, or to reconsider the theoretical and practical frameworks of the disciplines concerned. Themes and objects of research include the abbé's Breuil's archives (involving the identification of extant resources, history, status, inventory), the general question of biography and autobiography (self-presentation, scientific testimony), the history of research networks in relation with processes of disciplinary institutionalisation, science and religion, field practices in archeology (tracings, data gathering, notebooks, travels), the interpretation of prehistoric art, and ethnographic analogies. It is hoped that the "Archives Breuil" research program, which is being developed in the framework of the ACI "Terrains, techniques, théories" (Fields, Techniques, Theories), will shed new light on a little-known chapter in the history of the human sciences: the history of the study of prehistory in the first decades of the twentieth century.

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B: Special Developments in 20th Century Human Sciences

Philology and literature between scientific claim and political corruption: The emergence of „Classical Modernism“ (1918-1949)

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The lecture discusses the specific meanings of the „classical“ in german speaking literature, cultural philosophy and law from 1918 to 1949.

Neo-humanistic ideology combines the study and canonisation of „timeless“ works of art with an implicit anthropology of human „dignity“. The activities of understanding and valuation are interconnected especially in philology. Here the paradigm is the culture of antiquity, or better a specific concept of it, in which the ideal of harmonisation amalgamates the understanding of secular activity and common standards. Meanwhile at the end of the 19th century two conflicts prevail: on the one hand the conflict between historicism and the pretension of philology to maintain „Geisteswissenschaften“ as „bürgerliche Wertwissenschaften“ against modern relativism; on the other hand the artistic conflict between esthetic innovation and the wish to communicate. Against the background of political radicalisation these contradictions bring forward the question of social relevance of literature and literary science. In this context the synthesis of „Geisteswissenschaft“ and literature is given up in favour of literature by Stefan George and his devotees. In opposition to this programme literature itself begins to adopt the function of a value-free cultural science, i.e. where dogmatic hermeneutics are rejected.

To study the present without valuing here stands for prevention of the illusoriness of esthetic harmonisation as well as to antagonise political abuse. But in the moment of detachment, separating philology and modern literature under the prevailing circumstances of the decline of the „bürgerliche Kultur“, two new syntheses become apparent: „third humanism“ announced by the Protestant and classical philologist Werner Jaeger (1888-1961) – as an alternative to National Socialism and its idea of „Volkskultur“ – and Catholic reminiscence of the „Pax Augusta“ in the framework of the periodical „Hochland“. This not only has an effect on the novel *Der Tod des Vergil* (1945) written by Hermann Broch but also on two prominent normative statements of the West German Grundgesetz (1949). Here the main issues reoccur: indefeasible human dignity and freedom of scientific research.

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Controversies between Catholics and Spiritualists in Catalonia

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During the second half of the nineteenth century, spiritist ideas arrived at Catalonia through the secret commerce of books which came from France. Through this commerce books like A. Kardec's *Le Livre des Esprits* entered Spain. Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, spiritualism settled among Catalan society. This helped the emergence of parapsychology at the beginnings of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, Catholicism still was the official religion in Spain as it had been time before. Thus, the Catholic Church constituted an institution with great political and economical power. Beside this, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the industrialization arrived at Catalonia and the revolutionary movements such as communism and anarchism grew stronger and, with them, anticlericalism increased its influence until 1939. Some particular controversies were initiated by the Catholics with writings like Manterola's book about Satanism and Sarda's polemical contribution entitled *What about spiritualism?*. These kind of attacks received answers by the spiritualists like A. Domingo's book refuting the "errors" of Roman Catholicism. In this paper we will analyze in more detail how the exchange of criticism took place between the priests and the spiritualists. The aim of this work is to study the development of the relations between the Catholic Church and the spiritualism during the second half of the nineteenth century in Catalonia.

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Static and Dynamic Approaches to Rational Decisions in Games

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Game theory was originally developed as a static approach to rational decision. In order to reach a Nash equilibrium all players must have a lot of common knowledge about the game and the other players, e.g., the other players' strategies, their preferences etc. In addition they have to undergo a complex reasoning process that consists in reflecting on the various strategies

they may choose given all possible strategy combinations of the other players. Although human beings scarcely meet the assumptions of the static approach, it would be highly inadequate to characterize all their decisions as irrational. A more realistic approach – partly inspired by evolutionary biology – has been developed since the 1970ies. Its distinctive feature is the emphasis on the dynamical aspect of human decision-making. Within this approach many models are possible. Players may interact repeatedly, or they face each other in whole populations of agents where some players use the same and others use different strategies. In such settings learning and adaption processes are possible. The dynamic approach may also lead to new insights concerning rational decisions. – The aim of this paper is to briefly review the main characteristics of these approaches in their historical order, and to contrast the static and dynamical approach to rational decisions in games.

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Panel "Historical Reflections on the Distinction Between Quantitative and Qualitative Methods in the Human Sciences" I

Panel organiser: Uljana Feest, Max Planck Institute for History of Science

Panel description:

Historical Reflections on the Distinction Between Quantitative and Qualitative Methods in the Human Sciences

The issue of whether psychology can be a science has long been closely tied to two questions, i.e., (1) what standards have to be met in order for a human activity to be regarded as scientific, and (2) what kinds of phenomena are accessible to methods that meet those standards. For a well-known example, Immanuel Kant formulated the doctrine that scientific methods necessarily involve measurement in space and in time. He concluded that since mental phenomena are not extended in space, they cannot be measured, and thus, cannot be investigated scientifically. Hence, psychology cannot be a science (see Fancher 1996). This conclusion was subsequently challenged in two ways. First, members of the psychophysical tradition attempted

to show that it is possible to measure mental states (e.g., Fechner 1860). Second, the notion that measurement is a necessary component of science was challenged. It was argued that whether or not a given method is adequate, depends on the subject matter and epistemic goals of a given investigation. In this vein, Windelband (1894) distinguished between "nomothetic" and "idiographic" methods. A related – though not coextensive – distinction was that between "Natur-" and "Geisteswissenschaften" (with each of these kinds of sciences having different subject matter, and thus, unique goals and methods). Dilthey (1926) distinguished between "explanatory" and "interpretive" sciences, demanding that Geisteswissenschaften be entitled to choose their own methods in an autonomous fashion.

In contemporary psychology and other human sciences, we find a division that is in some ways reminiscent of the conceptual dichotomies mentioned above, i.e., between proponents of "quantitative" and "qualitative" methods. Within empirical psychology, qualitative methods have been marginalized as unscientific. However, it is less clear that this happened to the same degree in other human sciences, such as cultural anthropology. In recent times, there has been a move towards so-called "mixed methods" in many areas of research practice, raising interesting issues regarding the parameters of such "mixing".

The panel proposed here seeks to get a historical understanding of ideas about "qualitative" vs. "quantitative" methods in the human sciences (and associated notions of what is the subject matter under investigation). It offers a variety of different perspectives, stemming from investigations of different episodes in the history of philosophy and the history of the human sciences.

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Panel Contributions:

The Status and Use of Mathematical Objects in Descartes and Human Science

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Tradition credits Descartes with an effort to 'mathematicise physics' in the interests of reforming Scholastic educational methods and their emphasis on syllogistic logic and dialectic. Moreover, interpretations of Descartes' mission as one to quantify all knowledge are common, frequently made on the basis of his favorable reference to the tradition of 'mathesis universalis' in the

Regulae ad directionem ingenii (1628) (e.g. Gilson, 1937; Allard, 1963). Complications in understanding Descartes' effort, however, are introduced by the variety of ways in which mathematics was used in natural philosophy and held to be methodologically important during the 16th and 17th centuries, and by the role and meaning of pure mathematics in the broader context of Descartes' philosophy (Sasaki, 2003). This paper examines, in particular, the status of mathematical objects in the Regulae as simple ideas, known by intuition, thereby making them paradigm cases of what are the epistemic foundations for analyzing the scope and limits of scientific knowledge. The function of these foundations for Descartes' later philosophy, after 1642, and his changing position on the nature of mathematical objects are considered.

Discussing Descartes will point to some difficulties in understanding the role and meaning of quantification in relation to the philosophical foundations of the natural science tradition, and we consider implications of these difficulties as they relate to later efforts to cleave human science from natural science.

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What's Wrong with Mathematical Psychology in the 18th Century? A Fresh Look at Kant's Old Argument

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Already in the 18th century, philosophers and scientists tried to develop psychology into an autonomous scientific discipline. One of the main tasks in this context, indeed a "chef-d'oeuvre de l'esprit humain", as the Berlin Academy member Johann Bernhard Merian said in 1766, was to develop psychometry. There were a few attempts to make progress here, such as experiments in which the duration of perceptions after the removal of external stimuli were measured. In 1786, however, Immanuel Kant claimed that "in every special doctrine of nature only so much science proper can be found as there is mathematics in it"; and he claimed that psychology would never become a science "properly so-called". Up until today, Kant's impossibility claim is viewed as an unfortunate instance of a philosopher attempting to predict the prospects of a science where one should let the future decide the issue - and subsequent history of psychology is usually said to have refuted Kant's argument. However, such dissatisfaction is hardly ever based upon a recognition of the historical background and the true meaning of his considerations.

I shall clarify the background of Kant's impossibility claim. Although he was not alone in his skepticism about mathematical psychology, reasons for such a skepticism varied with differing views of the distinction between quantitative and qualitative properties. Most particularly, opinions differed over whether this distinction is identical with the distinction(s) of the so-called "extensive" and "intensive" magnitudes, or between primary and secondary qualities (part I). Next, I shall clarify that Kant does neither claim that psychological phenomena cannot be

mathematized at all, nor that causal laws governing psychological phenomena cannot be mathematized (part II). He means, rather, that under a specific conception of empirical psychology -- one shared by many of his contemporaries -- one conceives of psychological phenomena in such a way that they cannot be mathematized appropriately (part III). A proper understanding of the impossibility claim shows that psychologists who share a different conception of their discipline do not have to be bothered by Kant's considerations. On the contrary, they can learn from him how to liberate themselves from a misguided conception of psychology's subject-matter and method.

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G.T. Fechner's Use of Qualitative and Quantitative Methods During the Genesis of his "Psychophysik" (1850 -1860)

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According to a methodological dichotomy of our times, the methods that G.T. Fechner employed in order to find convincing evidence for his pantheistic "Weltanschauung" can be roughly divided into qualitative and quantitative ones. While the use of qualitative methods like systematic reasoning and inferential judgment can be mainly demonstrated in the preparatory phase of the "Elemente" from 1851 on, quantitative methods seem to bear the main burden of proof in the "Elemente" themselves. This holds true for the application of mathematization, measurement and statistics.

Depending on the breadth of the concept of method it can be shown that both types of methods were applied in a conjoint manner in the first half of the 19th century, aiming at a high level of proof under the general heuristic value (pace Kuhn) of accuracy.

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Gestalt Psychology and the Measurement of Experience

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In this paper, I examine the question why, and the sense in which, Gestalt psychology regarded the intensity of conscious experience as measurable. I argue that while Gestalt psychologists did not think of experience as consisting of parts (and hence, did not think of measurement as an adding up of parts), they thought of experience as an intensive magnitude, and they endorsed a correlative notion of measurement. I place this endorsement in the context of theoretical, institutional, and cultural debates about the status of conscious experience, both as an object of scientific investigation and as the evidential basis for scientific claims. As an aside, I also raise the question of what it would take to "settle" the issue of whether a given scale of measurement adequately captures the property being measured.

Minding their Rs and Qs: Charles Spearman, Cyril Burt, William Stephenson and the Role of Factor Analysis in the Assessment of Psychological Events

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In a letter to *Nature* published in 1935, William Stephenson set out the basic principles of what was later to be called Q methodology. Q methodology involved an inversion of the then current use of factor analysis in psychometrics to explore the relationship between tests or test items (R methodology). This terminology had first been proposed by Godfrey Thomson (Thomson, 1935) and the idea of correlating persons rather than tests had been introduced as early as 1915 by Cyril Burt (Burt 1915). But it was Stephenson who most clearly saw the radical possibilities of this new 'probabilistic' for helping psychology 'put its house in scientific order' (Stephenson, 1953).

For Stephenson, Q methodology, with self-reference at its centre, offered a new metric for a scientific assessment of subjectivity. Initially, Stephenson proposed the methodology as means of studying shared points of view. He later extended the methodology to the study of single cases (Stephenson, 1953, 1974). With its combination of an attempt to capture within a Q sort the unique configuration of each individual's point of view and its utilisation of powerful mathematics to extract factors representing shared points of view, Stephenson's work does not conveniently map onto the qualitative/quantitative distinction. In this paper I attempt to locate Stephenson's work in relation to the development of the qualitative/quantitative binary in psychology and consider the extent to which Q methodology could be said to undermine its utility.

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The Role of "Meaning" in the Qualitative/Quantitative Debate

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The reinvigoration of qualitative research methods in psychology and the social sciences has been associated with a "meaning revolution". However, despite consistent emphasis on the centrality of meaning across the entire range of qualitative approaches, explicit discussion of the meaning(s) of "meaning" has been relatively scarce. In this paper, I propose to do four things: (1) First, I shall follow up on earlier work (ESHHS, Barcelona 2002) by presenting a taxonomy and classification of the variety of possible meanings of "meaning"; (2) Next, I shall attempt to identify those particular conceptions of meaning which lie at the heart of the various qualitative approaches; (3) Third, I shall present examples within the qualitative field of tensions between the broad philosophical approaches (the "paradigms" of symbolic interactionism, grounded theory, post-structuralism, phenomenology, etc.) and the specific qualitative techniques or methods which are employed within those (e.g., discourse analysis, ethnography, protocol analysis, narrative analysis). These tensions appear to result from contradictions between explicit theoretical commitments and implicit conceptions of meaning driving the "operationalisation" of research questions; (4) Finally, I shall consider how these tensions have fuelled the problems in the qualitative field (the "dilemma of qualitative method", the "crisis of representation" in "naturalistic" qualitative inquiry, etc.), and how they have led to the prominence of philosophical pragmatism as the dominant paradigm for the qualitative/quantitative "mixed methods" in the most recent "third methodological movement" (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003).

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WORKSHOP: "PAINFUL TRUTHS"

Panel organiser: Petteri Pietikäinen (University of Finland)

Panel description:

Painful truths: On moral and political consequences of 'dangerous knowledge'

Can truth-telling be a bad strategy? Are there situations in which knowledge should be suppressed for the sake of prudence and the common good? Is there such a thing as 'dangerous knowledge'? Jean-Paul Sartre would probably have answered 'yes' to these questions, for he was of the opinion that one should keep silent about Soviet camps (gulags) 'pour ne pas désespérer Billancout' (in order not to throw the auto workers of Billancout into despair). Here Sartre gives expression to a belief that is not that uncommon among members of cultural elites in the West, namely that people should be protected from dangerous knowledge - 'dangerous' in the sense that there are factual statements which are thought of as having negative political or moral consequences. A belief in the negative consequences of dangerous - that is, politically and/or morally suspicious - knowledge represents an intellectual tradition that goes back to Plato and his famous state-utopian work *Republic*. According to Plato, there are situations in which it would be better for the ruling members of society to suppress 'authentic facts' for the good of the republic, because such facts are detrimental to the morality of the common man. From Plato to Sartre there is a long line of European thinkers who have thought that there is dangerous knowledge (often related to the question of the existence of God) that people should be protected from, and that it is better for the elites to create and propagate certain Noble Lies rather than insist on the ideal that *everyone* should have an equal access to knowledge.

In this workshop, we will examine the idea of dangerous knowledge in various contexts and draw some conclusions about the reasons why knowledge can be considered dangerous to 'the people' or to some specific groups in the population, such as children, mothers, students, artists, the sick and dying, and the working class. On the other hand, it might be said that deviant groups themselves represent forms of dangerous knowledge, unwelcome truths about the workings of society, which are intellectually amplified by such diverse strands as Marxism, feminism and antipsychiatry. We approach the question of 'knowledge' not epistemologically but pragmatically: for us, 'knowledge' refers to specific *beliefs* which are held to be true by specific groups and individuals in the society. This work shop will illustrate how particular factual statements were interpreted by groups and individuals who for some reason or another opposed (the implications of) these statements. As 'case studies', we will present and analyze the sociobiology debate in the 1970s and the 1980s (sociobiology as dangerous knowledge); the ways in which psychoanalytic knowledge can be seen as both subversive and limiting

(psychoanalysis as dangerous knowledge); and finally the attempts of both psychiatry and antipsychiatry to find 'reasonable' explanations in the 'unreason' of psychiatric patients. In all three cases, it will be shown that the forms of knowledge implied are never 'innocent': even when they limit themselves to the intellectual domain, they are part of social debates and struggles.

Words that turn against its author: subversive knowledge in psychoanalysis

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Freud, as is well known, often likened psychoanalytic treatment with surgery, presumably because he identified with its precise and medical-operative image, not to mention the higher status attached to it. Thus, for example, in his *Ratschlaege fuer den Arzt* (1912), he urged his colleagues that while performing psychotherapeutic treatment they should take the surgeon as a model, for he sets aside all his affections and compassions for the patient, and so should they. Elsewhere he warns against breaking off therapy too soon, because that might result in a wound that will not cure. That last observation points to an interesting implication in the analogy with surgery: since surgery means cutting away part of the body, would it not also mean that the psychotherapist cuts into the patient by using his own words? Freud seem to have been aware of that, or at least confirmed that psychoanalysis can potentially be dangerous: a contraindications against its use would be if there were a danger of the patient becoming psychotic. But that was by far not its only danger: some of the more imaginative therapists believed that psychotherapy could rob poets of their creativity; others that an overdose of Freudian wisdom might paralyse the patient, and yet others expressed the idea that psychoanalysis, if applied incorrectly, would unleash the sexual, aggressive monster that houses in the patient (well known is the case of the nephew-patient who murdered his analyst-aunt, Hermine Hug-Helmuth). And of course in the lay public there lived the fear that psychoanalysis would morally corrupt society (some left-wing therapists, such as Reich and others, agreed: they hoped to overthrow the narrow minded petit bourgeois mentality of their days with the aid of psychoanalysis).

It is to these real or imagined dangers that I turn my attention. In what sense was psychoanalysis believed or perceived to be dangerous, and to whom? I explore three types: therapeutic, moral and creative dangers, and seek an answer to the question in what way they helped contribute to psychoanalysis as a practice.

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The politics of experience: Dangerous knowledge in (anti)psychiatry

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For most human beings, the encounter with psychiatric patients usually is an uneasy affair. Their behaviour is often unpredictable and unintelligible, but moreover it reminds us of some hidden truths about the intricacies of the human psyche, *our* psyche. In order to fulfil our daily roles properly, we have to suppress many desires and anxieties which are clearly prevalent in psychiatric patients. These patients 'know' something that we would rather forget. This claim of 'patient knowledge' as 'dangerous knowledge' was brought forward in the 1960's and 1970's by the antipsychiatric movement. While siding with psychiatric patients, Laing and others themselves constituted a threat to the psychiatric establishment: its theories and practices were seen as attempts to repress the truths in the verbal and nonverbal expressions of patients, for instance that Western culture only can survive by reproducing 'one dimensional men and women'. Psychiatric institutions allegedly served to isolate and curb the few individuals that could not be brought to reason by normal socialization processes.

So here we have three forms of dangerous knowledge: the gloomy insight that psychiatric patients allow us in the darker sides of the human psyche; the antipsychiatric 'knowledge' about both the alienation produced by Western capitalism and the 'policing of patient resistance' by psychiatry; and finally the theories and practices of psychiatry itself, officially sanctioned forms of power / knowledge that are seen as dangerous to psychiatric patients. Of these three, the latter two both claim that they possess the 'real knowledge' about the causes of the deviant behaviour of psychiatric patients, and accuse the other party of disseminating not just false, but also 'dangerous' knowledge about them. Should we conclude that both psychiatry and antipsychiatry have been alternative, but failing attempts of dealing with the dangerous knowledge present in psychiatric patients?

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Sociobiology as Dangerous Knowledge: On the Moral Reading of 'Biological Determinism'

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Is it an exaggeration to say that Darwinism is still regarded as dangerous knowledge by many

academics working in the field of the human sciences? Is 'biophobia' a valid term when one describes the attitudes of many philosophers, psychologists, social scientists, anthropologists and historians towards evolutionary theories, especially towards the suggestion that Darwinian perspectives on society and the human mind are potentially valuable? Has 'biological determinism' to some extent replaced atheism as the major form of dangerous knowledge? I will try to find some preliminary answers to these questions by referring to the so-called sociobiology debate, a controversy that started with the publication of the zoologist E.O. Wilson's *Sociobiology* in 1975. In the fierce debate on sociobiology that erupted in the mid-1970s and lasted well into the 1980s (and continued as a debate on evolutionary psychology), one can see how the notion of 'dangerous knowledge' occupies a major role in the drama. Many future participants in the debate were irritated to read in the preface of Wilson's book that a new discipline, sociobiology, would undertake a systematic study of the biological basis of all social behavior - including the social behaviour of homo sapiens. Judging by violent reactions to this thesis, sociobiology was nothing short of blasphemy in an academic world where a biological approach to human behaviour had been more or less a taboo for decades. Proponents of 'biological determinism' (esp. Wilson, William Hamilton, Robert Trivers, and Richard Dawkins) were routinely labelled as bad scientists and right-wing enemies of the welfare state. In my presentation, I will relate the idea of moral reading (moral interpretations of statements regarding matters of fact) to the sociobiology debate and examine some basic assumptions of moral reading in general.

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KEYNOTE ADDRESS II

The Influence of Literature in the Life and Work of William James

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It is well known that William James has had a significant influence upon the development of literature, both through such poets as Robert Frost and Wallace Stevens and through such prose writers as Gertrude Stein and Jorge Luis Borges. It has not been sufficiently noted, however, that literature had a significant influence upon his own personal development as well as upon the development of his psychological and philosophical views. Even those biographers who have noted James's wide reading of literature (such as Ralph Barton Perry, Gay Wilson Allen, and Linda Simon) have characterized this reading simply as 'edifying' and have not tried

to explain why he found it so or what significance it might have had beyond making him feel better when he was in one of his well-known periods of depression.

Through a careful, ongoing review of James's diaries, notebooks, letters, marginal and textual notations, library-charging records, unpublished manuscripts, and published work, I have begun the process of reconstructing the ways in which literature – in particular the works of Shakespeare, Goethe, Wordsworth, Emerson, and Browning (but also those of Homer, Schiller, Shelley, Longfellow, Tennyson, Eliot, Turgenev, Whitman, Tolstoy, Stevenson, and his brother Henry) – influenced him, both personally and professionally. In this address, I will review some of the key evidence and some of the central conclusions that are emerging from this research.

SESSION: 20TH CENTURY AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY

Psychology Takes to the Airwaves: Popularizing Psychology on the Radio in the 1930's

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Modern American culture has seen a proliferation of radio and television personalities associated with talk therapy and advice-giving. Dr. Phil, Dr. Laura Schlessinger, Dr. Dan Gottlieb, and many others, with or without syndication, fill the airwaves and their bank accounts touting various approaches to solutions of individual, relationship, and family problems (Epstein, 2001). But even before Dr. Joyce Brothers, a recognizable personality from the 1950's, became an airtime psychologist, several individuals found their way onto the radio during its early period of development. In the 1930's, at the height of the American Great Depression, Joseph Jastrow, A. F. Payne, and others, conducted radio broadcasts on psychology.

Jastrow was better known in the history of psychology as the first chair of the department of psychology at the University of Wisconsin. He was also the recipient of the first Ph.D. in experimental psychology from The Johns Hopkins University in 1886. By the time Jastrow became involved in a series of radio broadcasts with the NBC affiliate in New York City between 1935 and 1938, he had retired from Wisconsin and turned his full attention to popularizing psychology through public lectures, popular books, and newspaper columns, primarily related to mental fitness (Blumenthal, 1991; Cadwallader, 1987).

This paper will propose that psychology, through radio broadcasting, may have played a vicarious social support role for individuals during the dark days of the Great Depression, much as modern interactive talk radio does today (Ricks, 1984). Attention will focus on the history of the development of the relationship between psychology and the radio broadcast industry, the connection, specifically, between Jastrow and several other psychologists and radio broadcasting in the mid-1930's, and the impact that radio broadcasting had on the institutionalization of psychology in America prior to World War II.

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The Early History of the "Psychology of Adjustment:" Edwin Guthrie's theory of abnormal behavior

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My proposed paper covers Edwin Guthrie's role in the early history of the "psychology of adjustment." The title of a course that was common in many American universities in the mid 1900s, and that continues to be found in some today. The roots of the psychology of adjustment are planted in the late 19th century and early 20th century where one finds a number of studies investigating acquisition of adaptive habitual responses by organisms and animals following changes in their environment. Biology often crossed-over into psychology as when Pavlov turned from the physiology of digestion to the associative functions of the cortex, and biologists informed by Darwin viewed behavior in general as adapted for survival. Stereotyped behavior was understood as an evolved biological mechanism equipped with receptors with an organizing nervous system connected to muscles adapted for seizing opportunity and avoiding hazard; however, the mechanism behind the observed plasticity of behavior remained a mystery.

Naturally, a great deal of the experimental research focused on the successful learning of adaptive habits, but the story of adjustment is only complete with the sinister side of natural selection. Maladjustment, also known as functional disorder, provided an important influence on Guthrie's theory of learning. Guthrie's ideas are in part formed by the work on hysteria by P. Janet and the work on disorganized behavior by Luria. The abnormal perspective provides a fascinating insight into learning, and disorganized behavior plays a prominent part in this paper. The student of psychology is reminded that the successful response is constrained by time and dependent upon available resources. My proposed paper focuses on the role of the prominent behaviorist Guthrie during a period between the early 1920s and the late 1930s when the psychology of adjustment became a defined subject suggesting insights into areas such as personality and abnormal psychology.

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Rockefeller Philanthropy and the Development of the Concept of 'Personality'

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During the 1920s and 1930s, the Rockefeller philanthropies—including the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the General Education Board—contributed in a significant manner to the elaboration of the concept of personality in the discourse of American social science. By sponsoring conferences, seminars, and other projects, the Rockefeller foundations fostered dialogue and networks of communication among social scientists and other specialists concerned with personality—including sociologists such as W. I. Thomas and Ernest Groves, psychologists such as Gordon and Floyd Allport, anthropologists such as Edward Sapir, and psychiatrists such as H. S. Sullivan. Within the context of these conferences, seminars, and projects, social scientists and other specialists came to envision personality as inseparably intertwined with society and culture. Moreover, a number of social scientists and investigators came to see personality development, especially in its pathological forms, as the key to the social disorganization and problems that seemed rampant in modern industrial society. The notion of culture came to assume a special significance for the investigation of personality—and, by the 1930s, a new branch of specialized knowledge, personality and culture, had begun to emerge. Indeed, increasingly during the 1930s, American social scientists, clinicians, educators, and foundation officers became convinced of the importance of the study of personality and culture for advancing both social science and social reconstruction.

Drawing upon archival materials, including the transcripts of the discussions on personality and its formation which occurred in the Rockefeller-sponsored events, as well as the relevant publications of the social scientists, clinicians, and others involved in these events, I will explore how personality became an object of knowledge in the United States during the 1920s and 1930s. I will be especially concerned with the impact of the sociopolitical agenda promoted by Rockefeller philanthropy on the production of knowledge on personality.

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(In addition to these sources, I shall consult the extensive archival materials that I have obtained while conducting research at the Rockefeller Archive Center in Sleepy Hollow, New York, and the Lawrence K. Frank Papers at the National Library of Medicine, History of Medicine Division, in Bethesda, Maryland.)

Between freedom and control: the Skinner's point of view about the role of science in society

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A general discussion about the role of science in society and at the same time about the validity of psychology as a science, remains in human sciences. B.F. Skinner works faced that discussion in a clear and explicit way. First of all Skinner did hard statements about the meaning and possibilities of science, and second, he tried to explain several social phenomena using the procedures and principles of behaviorism. The purpose of this work has two sides. The first one is to do a philosophical and epistemological consideration of Skinner's conception of science and knowledge, and the second one to reanalyze the force of behaviorism in society through the concepts of freedom and control. In order to achieve this purpose we have focused on two of his main works, "Science and human behavior" and "About behaviorism".

The justification of that election is the next. Both works have a similar structure and both are trying to define, to describe and to explain behaviorism, but at the same time, they are trying to place and to focus that discussion on society. But there is another reason. These books were written by twenty years of distance and two different social contexts. At the time that "Science and Human behavior" was written, behaviorism was a dominant orientation, and science had the confidence of most of society. On the other hand, at the moment that "about behaviorism" was written, behaviorism was not such a dominant orientation, and had received yet most of the criticisms from intellectuals and different representatives of society. Both contexts give these works an interesting strategic position to be analyzed.

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SESSION: 20TH CENTURY PSYCHOLOGY

A Quick History of Different Conceptions of Subjectivity

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The ambition of modern scientists in general is objective knowledge, that is, knowledge not contaminated by subjective bias, viewpoints and perspective. Here objective and subjective are both epistemological qualities and for this reason they are supposed to be different and contrasting. This is one sense of "subjective", the epistemic meaning. Another sense of subjective or rather "subjectivity" is the phenomenal sense. Phenomenal subjectivity occurs in beings with a faculty of sensing their own body; and in more evolved beings, able to take track not only of their own body, but also, in various gradations, of their own cognitive functions. These senses are involved in modern discussions about cognition and consciousness. Some see in the existence of this phenomenal subjectivity reason for deflating the dreams of cognitive scientists. Others, cognitive scientist mainly, dream about a cognitive solution of psychological and philosophical mysteries by downplaying, or even negating, the existence of this phenomenal subjectivity. Mostly, however, the two senses of subjectivity are not differentiated in the first place, leading to those controversies and insurmountable problems.

This lack of distinction has historical roots in theoretical positions of different philosophical psychologists. For Descartes, for instance, knowledge, by coming from the ego, was fundamentally subjective, but was also the most objective knowledge we humans could grasp. There was no conflict between the two epistemic qualities. At the same time the subject was also always aware of his knowledge. The phenomenal subjectivity was included in the epistemic one.

The classical empirists, Kant, James and modern cognitive philosophers, have different opinions about subjectivity. It is these roots of the different roles ascribed to subjectivity or not taken seriously that I will call attention to.

Was Strindberg mentally ill? A critique of Karl Jaspers' pathography

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The work, *Strindberg und Van Gogh: Versuch einer pathographischen Analyse unter vergleichender Heranziehung von Swedenborg und Hölderlin* (1922), by the German psychiatrist and philosopher, Karl Jaspers, became one of the most famous examples of pathography – a biographical genre in which a person's creative achievements are explained by a person's illnesses. In the book, Jaspers ventured the idea that, by contrast with the previous epoch which bore the mark of hysterical temperament, his own age was characterized by some schizophrenic features. Translated into many languages in the course of the twentieth century, the book acquired world-wide renown. Due to this book, Strindberg became one of the most famous psychiatric patients, albeit only virtually, for Jaspers had neither treated him nor met him in person. This pathography laid out the way for other biographers who wanted to dwell on Strindberg's psychological problems, and gradually he was transformed into an archetype of a "mad genius". This happened despite the absence of direct medical evidence, least of all of a confirmed psychiatric diagnosis. Even Jaspers failed to reach a definite opinion about what exactly Strindberg's illness was – whether delusion of jealousy, paranoia or schizophrenia, each of which Jaspers mentioned in his book. Other authors also referred to "paranoid schizophrenia", hardly a coherent psychiatric category.

In my paper, I will offer a critique of Jaspers' pathography and show which literary devices helped its author to build up a picture of Strindberg's mental illness and to apply the popular cliché of "mad genius". These devices are common to the genre of pathography. I hope this would be of interest to both Strindberg students and other scholars of literary figures whose image traditionally is that of an infirm genius.

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The concept of intrinsic motivation in sport psychology: A historical examination

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Sport psychology has been recognised as an independent branch of applied psychology since the mid-1960s. Throughout its relatively brief history, the central topic of sport psychology - that is, sport motivation - has been dominated by the concept of "intrinsic motivation". The present paper has two aims. The first is to trace the development of the concept of intrinsic motivation, from the post-World War II studies in experimental psychology which were taken as evidence for the inadequacy of orthodox drive theory, through to the various formulations of intrinsic motivation that have been advanced to date. The second aim is to address the recent complaint (Roberts, 2001) that sport psychology still lacks an "integrated" theory of motivation, and to demonstrate that the concept of intrinsic motivation does not advance scientific understanding, but is instead an attempt to legitimise a value system.

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Glenn Newbery - brief biographical details:

Glenn Newbery has lectured in a number of areas in psychology - ranging from History and Philosophy of Psychology to Motor Control and Learning - at the University of Sydney, the University of Wollongong, and the University of Western Sydney. He is presently a Lecturer in Sport Psychology at the University of Western Sydney. His PhD thesis on the concept of motivation in sport psychology has just been completed.

SYMPOSIUM "MIGRATING IDEAS I"

Panel organiser: Zsuzsanna Vajda (Szeged University)

Travelling Science: German Psychology in Spain

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Modern sociology of science recognizes the importance of social context for the understanding of the history of science (Barnes & Shapin, 1979). We are not able to see reality as it is but only mediated through our thinking codes which organize our daily life and knowledge system.

These ways of thinking express at the same time our ideas about the world, our values, social norms, and, basically, the culture we live in (Iranzo & Blanco, 1999). Taking into account these contributions we can not think of psychology as a universal science but of a cultural tainted social practice. Thus the expression 'German Psychology' used in the title refers to different psychological practices taking place within German culture at the beginnings of the twentieth century.

At that time, affords were made in order to import psychology 'made in Germany' within the Spanish context. In the public space these affords concentrate on the importation and translation of German writings whereas in the private space we find Spanish scholars travelling to Germany and German scholars lecturing in Spain. The contacts between German and Spanish research networks get reinforced through meeting points like international congresses and institutional connections.

Some Spanish scholars like Viqueira, Palmes, Mira, Lafora, Barnés and others get more or less attracted to German philosophy, Psychotechniques, Gestalt psychology, experimental Psychology, Psychopedagogy, Psychopathology and Psychoanalysis. Although opinions about these approaches diverge considerably, it is interesting to take a look at how these approaches were viewed and translated into the Spanish psychological context.

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The Reception of Evolutionism in Spain - A View from Psychology

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The initial reception of evolutionary conceptions in Spain was carried out by natural scientists, as was only to be expected. Soon, however, these ideas were to pervade many other fields, particularly those of philosophy, anthropology, religion, politics, history, fine arts, and psychology. The peculiar cultural, social and political circumstances of the country helped to bring evolutionary questions into the public light, and they became the subject of many heated debates and confrontations that constituted a determining factor in the emergence of the social sciences in Spain.

Darwin's *The Descent of Man* was first translated into Spanish in 1879. One year later, also the translation of *On the Origin of Species* appeared. Both these works fixed the limits of a new battlefield for the long-sustained war between the Catholic establishment, traditionally in control of Spanish science and education, and a number of liberal and positivist thinkers mostly interested in the development of modern thought and science in the country. In this scientific and ideological debate, it was not only Darwin but also other evolutionary authors that were taken into account. Particular salience was achieved by H. Spencer, whose far-reaching system allowed some space for the existence of God and was in consequence highly appreciated.

In this paper, special attention will be paid to evolutionary ideas of early Spanish psychologists and other relevant contributors to the emergence of psychology as a science in Spain. Two intellectual groups will be mainly considered: 1) On the one hand, a Neo-Scholastic group, that is, a large group made up of Catholic Aristotelian thinkers who were radically against any evolutionary approach; 2) on the other hand, a group of progressive intellectuals who were deeply influenced by modern positivistic trends. Coming for the most part from Krausist philosophical quarters, this latter group was to constitute the country's scientific elite throughout the final decades of the 19th century.

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The Hidden Agendas of Modernity in the Early History of Psychology

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Relying on Stephen Toulmin's reconstruction of the two trajectories of modernity and his plea for a rehabilitation of the repressed one, I shall examine Wundt's projects of two psychologies and the subsequent reductionist reception of Wundt's legacy in the early history of psychology.

In spite of Wundt's repeated arguments in favor of *Völkerpsychologie* (cultural historical psychology) as a necessary (and that superior) part of psychology as a whole, it was Wundt's experimental psychology only that has shaped the origin myth of psychology. In spite of Wundt's criticism of intellectualism and individualism psychology adopted from its early days individualist self-understanding as its prevailing attitude. How is to understand that biased reception of Wundt's psychology and the decisive role an individualist fallacy has played in shaping the development of psychology?

In his socio-historical study on the controversy between Wundt and the Würzburg School Martin Kusch relates their different psychologies to their different socio-ontological and religious beliefs (Catholicism-Protestantism, individualism- collectivism). Though Kusch has not dealt with the reception of Wundt's psychological ideas in other countries – and that reception is very important as it has shaped the early history of psychology – it is the reception that questions the offered interpretive model. How is to understand the fact that scholars who came from different countries to study at Wundt's Leipzig University all adopted Wundt's experimental individual psychology as the new psychology to be implemented in their home universities?

The uniformity of a biased reception of Wundt's psychology in different socio-historical contexts is a challenge to a hermeneutics grounded in sociology of knowledge as it suggests a possibility of autonomization of ideas from specific socio-cultural setting – be that USA where Titchner purified Wundt's purist psychology or Serbia where a Wundt's student Ljubomir Nedić taught new inductive psychology at the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade, a capital of a recently new recognized state committed to speed up its development.

The autonomization of ideas and knowledge can serve different functions. On one hand psychology as a new subject can be a modernization tool demonstrating an expansion of scientific and general rationality to new realms (and territories). On the other hand, the autonomization reproduces a social blindness of knowledge, broadening the gap between the rational and the social.

Consequences we are living in are: rationality is becoming instrumental, the social remains unreflected. Psychology is becoming a kind of exchangeable migrant.

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SYMPOSION "MIGRATING IDEAS" II

Individuals as Islands: Selfhood and Individuality from Psychoanalysis to Humanistic Psychology

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It is widely accepted among historians of culture that the emergence of individuality is one of the most important attainments of modernity. In both cross-cultural psychology and political rhetoric, the individual self is often considered as the crowning achievement of Western socio-historical development—an organic continuation of European civilization. The latter type of civilization came to stress the individualistic self, while non-Western societies, came to be seen as collectivistic and stagnating at an earlier stage of development.

In contrast, various branches of psychology, mostly cognitive in nature, call into question the individualistic organization of subjective self-experience and its role in the determination of behaviour. In my paper, I would like to show that this contrast is based on crucial differences between American and European psychological formulations of the ego and the self. Inner contradictions were not brought to light for various reasons; the twentieth-century American and European development of psychology has been treated as if it was a completely consistent process.

It is well known that behaviorism, in contrast to psychoanalysis and Gestalt psychology, does not assume a conscious, mental self. I would like to argue that humanistic psychology—which does not possess high prestige in academic psychology, but has had a huge influence on postmodern educational and political–legal thinking—works with an empty notion of self, one which does not possess substantive qualities of individuality either.

The Freudian notion of ego opens the door to both biological reductionism and historical interpretation. Freud's ego develops during the early years of life, through the interaction with the social environment—but the adaptability of the child depends on its "natural" instincts. Post-Freudians, among them Budapest psychoanalysts, put the emphasis on the determining role of the social environment. According to them, individuality emerges by means of the growth of the consciousness of the child in adapting his/her impulses to the reactions of social partners. In contrast, Jung, who has had a large impact on humanistic psychology, reduces the role of the individual life history, providing a collective character to the unconscious. Finally, Rogers and Maslow, in their interpretation of self, dismiss the role of history both in the individual and the social sense; according to them, the individual self is determined not by his/her past, but by the future. The point of my interpretation of alternative conceptualizations of the self is not an individualistic one. Rogers' 1961 statement that all people are islands is misguided, as he identifies isolation with autonomy and individuality.

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Ideas Migrating Cross Countries – Henri Tajfel's Social Identity Approach

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Henri Tajfel (1919-1982) belongs to the group of European social psychologists of the 20th century who developed and shaped (Western) European social psychology by founding both its own society (European Association of Experimental Social Psychology) and its own scientific publications (i.e. European Journal of Social Psychology and European Monographs in Social Psychology). The development of these (Western) European "institutions" was seen as contributing to a "second intellectual centre of social psychology, along with America" as part of the effort to "re-create our own [European] tradition" (Tajfel, 1977).

Along with other European psychologists Henry Tajfel provided "the intellectual justification for distinctively European work" (Turner, 1996). His considered opinion was that social science was not and could not be value-free, i.e. social psychology (like any discipline within social sciences) is dependent on the cultural, political and social context from which it arises. Hence social psychology must be pluralistic and varied, "to reflect and allow for the variety of human cultures and perspectives" (Turner, 1996). Both the consideration of European social concerns and European intellectual traditions influenced Tajfel's own theoretical and empirical work and consequently Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1974, Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986).

Tajfel's Social Identity Theory, which theorizes inter-group relations, developed into one of the most influential approaches in present European social psychology and beyond. This development was not sudden and without controversies. The course of this development will be addressed in this paper. Based on a citation analysis of five social psychological journals issued in Europe (Journal of European Social Psychology), the United States of America (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology), Great Britain (British Journal of Social Psychology), Germany (Zeitschrift für Sozial Psychologie), and South Africa (South African Journal of Psychology) it will be demonstrated how Tajfel's Social Identity approach gained "visibility" (Merton, 1957) over the last 30 years. The results of the analysis will also provide a deeper understanding of cultural and intellectual roots of the controversies surrounding Tajfel's approach.

Psychology and Social Intervention – Radecki and Antipoff in Brazil

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This paper analyzes the status of Psychology in Brazil in the early decades of the 20th century, presenting the contribution of European psychologists to the development of Psychology's autonomy. The Brazilian knowledge of European Psychology dates back to the 19th century. However, it was then restricted to medical doctors, who were interested in applying the new science through social interventions to the poor, and whose standpoint reflected the ideal for building modern and civilized nations. There was no academic education in psychology; only self-taught knowledge, and later, some stays in European laboratories, like George Dumas' laboratory in Paris. But Brazilian intellectuals demanded psychologists at the beginning of the 20th century. Two professionals played remarkable roles in those days were Wacław Radecki and Helena Antipoff. Radecki, who had studied at the University of Warsaw, stayed in Brazil from 1924 to 1933, when he founded an Experimental Psychology laboratory at the Colony of Psychopaths of Rio de Janeiro. He organized a working team, taught courses and offered services to the population. Allegedly, he left the Laboratory (and Brazil) because he attempted to create a psychologists' formation course, and he expected medical doctors to oppose his plan. Helena Antipoff, graduated in Moscow, arrived to Brazil in 1929. She had been invited by the Government of the Brazilian State of Minas Gerais to create and direct the Teachers' Improvement Laboratory. She developed considerable academic and professional activities, mainly in the field of services to exceptional children. She died in 1974, after having founded several institutions. These two professionals illustrate the main emphasis of the Psychology fostered in Brazil at the onset of the 20th century: not Wundt's psychophysics, but rather, the socially directed intervention approaches.

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POSTER ABSTRACTS

The notion of function by Gottlob Frege as an antecedent of representations in Cognitive Psychology

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The German logician and mathematician Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) is an outstanding figure in the history of Logic. His contributions since the last quarter of XIX century until the second decade of XX century, constitute the bases of modern Symbolic Logic. In this presentation, we would like to highlight his main work: an attempt for a logical foundation of Mathematics (also known as Logician Program). This project was initiated in 1879 with his book: *Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens*. However, the foundational text of Logician Program was Frege's *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik*, published in 1884. His program, that constitutes a refoundation of Logic, was fundamental for later developments of Computation Theory (e.g., Davis, 2002; Mosterin, 2000).

Mathematical logic was fundamental for the growth of the Cognitive perspective in Psychology, as it was shown in previous works (Moro, 2003a; 2003b). Together with Frege, other authors, especially those who developed Arithmetic foundations and Sets Theory, as Georg Cantor, Richard Dedekind, David Hilbert or Giuseppe Peano were emphasized in this respect.

This poster has two aims. First, to show how the representation, notion which Cognitive Psychology uses, is logically incorrect. This will be demonstrated with a logical argument. Second, to offer a new reading of the representation notion following the notion of function by Frege. This aim is developed through a description of mental processes and representations as functions and arguments of Frege's logic. It is concluded that this new reading allows a genuine computational perspective for cognitive sciences.

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The beginnings of Psychology of aging

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Applied Psychology was interested from the beginning in several subjects such as industry, advertising, professional selection, witness, education, etc. The old age, also, was studied for this first applied psychologists. In this area, Stanley Hall was considered the most important author of the first period with the book "Senescence, the last half of life" (1922). However, before this publication, the same Hall and other authors had worked about this topic and we have consider interesting to know this precedents and initials contributions.

Our poster has the aim to show this pioneers works in aging psychology and analyse the principal contributions of this initial studies. We present the works of Colin A. Scott (1896), F.W. Colegrove (1899), Edmund Clark Sanford (1913), Howard C. Warren (1918), M.F. Beeson (1920), and the Hall's article of 1921.

On can observed we studied problems about the views regarding of old people about the future life and death, or changes of the individual memories from age range of 9 month to 90 year old, or the mental decay of the continuous course of life or the study of I.Q. in the aged people.

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Japanese Translation of Wundt's Works

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According to Tomeri Tanimoto, a Japanese professor of pedagogy, who presented a paper at the 4th meeting of International Congress of Psychology in 1900, there were three periods in the 19th century history of Japanese psychology. In the first period, books by American moral philosophers such as Joseph Haven and Francis Wayland were used. In the next period, British philosophers such as Alexander Bain, Herbert Spencer and James Sully were referred most frequently. Then after a short period of George T. Ladd and Théodule Ribot, the period of German psychologists set in. Several well-known works of German psychologists were translated into Japanese, but the most noteworthy textbook was *Grundriss der Psychologie* (1896) by Wilhelm Wundt. The translation was published in three volumes from 1898 to 1899.

Considering the influences of Wundt on Japanese psychology, his works must have been read widely in Japan. However, from a short survey we found that many of the books written by Wundt were translated into Japanese only partially, or through English version. Any version of *Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie* was not translated into Japanese. One volume out of 10 *Volkerpsychologie* series was translated into Japanese before the WWII and one chapter of another volume of the same series appeared in 1980s. There are a few possible explanations why some books were translated so quickly but others were not. The detail will be shown in tables.

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