

The background is a dark, textured red surface. In the lower right quadrant, there is a bright, glowing, and blurred object that resembles a hand or a cluster of fingers, possibly holding a light source. The overall effect is dramatic and artistic.

# 29th ESHHS conference Utrecht 23-27 aug. 2010



Utrecht, August 23, 2010

Dear colleague,

Welcome to the 29<sup>th</sup> annual conference of the *European Society for the History of the Human Sciences*! Jaap Bos and I, as local organizers, are very pleased that you have come to Utrecht. We are looking forward to the presentations and discussions concerning the history of the human sciences, based on scholarly investigations coming from all over the globe. Apart from a wealth of papers on various topics, we have three key note speeches (by Trudy Dehue, Douwe Draaisma and Johan Heilbron), a symposium on psychical research, organized by Elizabeth Valentine, two film presentations, a variety of excursions and, of course, the traditional conference dinner.

In the conference preparations Jaap Bos and I have been advised by a scientific program committee, consisting of Jannes Eshuis (Netherlands), Zsuzsanna Vajda (Hungary), Uljana Feest (Germany), Annette Mülberger (Spain), Petteri Pietikainen (Finland).

Wishing you a pleasant and inspiring conference!

Ruud Abma  
(ESHHS President)



## Table of contents

### CONFERENCE PROGRAM – page 5

### LIST OF PARTICIPANTS – page 8

### KEY NOTES – page 10

*Dehue, Trudy:* Other times, other suffering

*Draaisma, Douwe:* The chequered history of Asperger syndrome

*Heilbron, Johan:* Disciplinarity and its discontents

### PAPERS – page 12

*Abma, Ruud:* Buytendijk's interdisciplinary human science

*Allesch, Christian:* Richard von Krafft-Ebing and the "Golden Age of psychiatry"

*Arinina, Marina:* Development of socio-psychological ideas of McDougall and Wallas

*Baggerman, Arianne:* The development of biography as a form of human science after 1700

*Bartolucci, Claudia:* Canguilhem on biological individuality

*Behrens, Peter:* Psychology takes to the airwaves: Women and radio broadcasting

*Bell, Philip:* Confronting theory: The psychology of cultural studies

*Bos, Jaap:* Enter ghost. On disappearing and reappearing in phenomenological discourse

*Bouterse, Jeroen:* Explaining *Verstehen*

*Brauns, HP:* Empirical psychology in 18<sup>th</sup> century Germany

*Brock, Adrian:* The IQ controversy, apartheid's anthropology and David Hume

*Buchanan, Rod:* Reflections on writing a biography of Hans Eysenck

*Burnham, John:* Anthropologist Kroeber's career as a psychoanalyst

*Clark, David:* The cultural explanation for the rise and fall of American behaviorism

*Dekker, Rudolf:* A diarist with a sociological view: Constantijn Huygens jr.

*Erös, Ferenc:* How Sandor Ferenczi became the world's first professor of psychoanalysis

*Eshuis, Jannes:* Psychology as the ethologist views it

*Feest, Uljana:* Revisiting the Brentano puzzle

*Gärtner, Kathrin & Adrian Brock:* Historical psychology in Germany, 1980-2000

*Guski-Leinwand, Susanne:* Karl Julius Lohnert on Awareness, Aesthetics and Astronomy

*Gyimesi, Julia:* Sándor Ferenczi and the problem of telepathy

*Harris, Ben:* Arnold Gesell's eugenical analysis of his hometown

*Harvey, Matt:* Why did culture fall to the wayside in psychology?

*Heukelom, Floris:* Eric Wanner and the making of Behavioral Economics

*Hezewijk, René van & Henk Stam:* The psychologist's dilemma game

*Hui, Alexandra:* The bias of *Musikbewusstsein*: The Carl Stumpf and Wilhelm Wundt debate

*Jiménez, Belén:* The psychological measurement of responsibility, early 20th century Spain

*Jovanovic, Gordana:* The renaissance of qualitative research and the social amnesia in psychology

*Kiss, Julien & Mihai Anitei:* The history of psychology in Romania

*Kloosterman, Ingrid:* Psychical research and parapsychology interpreted

*Larsen, Tord:* Cassirer and the "crisis of representation" in anthropology

*Leal Ferreira, Arthur:* William James' pragmatism

*Lombardo, Giovanni & Chiara Bartolucci:* Historical-quantitative analysis on the disciplinary contexts characterising the origin of the Italian psychology



*Marks, Sarah:* Cognitive Behavioural Therapies in Britain, 1952-2010

*Minkova, Elena:* Mental development in Simonovich's theory of recapitulation

*Mülberger, Annette:* Spiritualism and medicine in Spain

*Pietikainen, Petteri:* All the world's a hospital? On the history of "medicalisation"

*Plas, Régine:* Psychology and psychical research in France at the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> century

*Rappard, Hans van:* Consciousness in Zhu Xi and Wundt

*Rijks, Marlise:* Conceptualizing the masses

*Shapiro, Steve:* Subliminal advertising

*Sommer, Andreas:* The rejection of psychical research by early American psychologists

*Staeuble, Irmingard:* From 'indigenous anthropologies' to a 'world anthropologies network'

*Takasuna, Miki:* Parapsychology and the history of psychology in Japan

*Vajda, Zsuzsanna:* Géza Róheim and Budapest psychoanalysts

*Valentine, Elizabeth:* Psychical research and orthodox psychology in Britain 1880-1940

*Veer, René van der:* Vygotsky in London

*Wolffram, Heather:* Psychical Research and Psychology in Late Nineteenth-Century Germany

*Yasnitsky, Anton:* International contacts of Soviet psychology in the interwar period

---

#### **SYMPOSIUM – page 79**

Introduction *Psychical Research:* Psychical research and mainstream psychology in Europe, the USA and Japan

#### **FILMS – page 80**

*Film 1:* Herskovits at the Heart of Blackness (Ben Harris)

*Film 2:* Geheimnisse einer Seele (Secrets of a Soul) (Jaap Bos)



**PROGRAMME ESHHS CONFERENCE 2010 Academiegebouw (Domsquare, Utrecht)**

**MONDAY AUGUST 23 16.30-17.30: Reception and registration participants - Senate Hall**

**TUESDAY AUGUST 24**

08.30 - 09.00: Coffee and tea - and registration participants - Maskerade Hall

**09.00 - 10.30: Workshops B1 and C1**

**B1** - Senate Hall - Philosophy & psychology (Chair: Rappard)

- Leal Ferreira: *William James' pragmatism*
- Bartolucci (Claudia): *Canguilhem on biological individuality*
- Feest: *Revisiting the Brentano puzzle*

**C1** - Belle van Zuylen Hall - Psychology & anthropology (Chair: Abma)

- Burnham: *Anthropologist Kroeber's career as a psychoanalyst*
- Vajda: *Géza Róheim and Budapest psychoanalysts*
- Erös: *How Sandor Ferenczi became the world's first professor of psychoanalysis*

10.30 - 11.00: Coffee & tea - Maskerade Hall

**11.00 - 12.00: Key-note lecture** - Senate Hall

Trudy Dehue: *Other times, other suffering. On studying depression from a nominalistic point of view*

12.00 - 13.30: Lunch break at one's own leisure

**13.30 - 15.00: Workshops B2, C2 and D2**

**B2** - Senate Hall - The Utrecht School of Phenomenology (Chair: Eshuis)

- Abma: *Buytendijk's interdisciplinary human science*
- Bos: *Enter ghost. On disappearing and reappearing in phenomenological discourse*
- Van Hezewijk & Stam: *The psychologist's dilemma game*

**C2** - Belle van Zuylen Hall - Early German psychology (Chair: Bryson)

- Hui: *The bias of Musikbewusstsein: The Carl Stumpf and Wilhelm Wundt debate*
- Rappard: *Consciousness in Zhu Xi and Wundt*
- Brauns: *Empirical psychology in 18th century Germany*

**D2** - Foyer - Soviet psychology (Chair: Larsen)

- Van der Veer: *Vygotsky in London*
- Yasnitsky: *International contacts of Soviet psychology in the interwar period*

15.00 - 15.30: Coffee & tea - Maskerade Hall

**15.30 - 17.00: Workshops B3, C3 and D3**

**B3** - Senate Hall - 'Verstehen' (Chair: Van Hezewijk)

- Jovanovic: *The renaissance of qualitative research and the social amnesia in psychology*
- Bouterse: *Explaining Verstehen*
- Larsen: *Cassirer and the "crisis of representation" in anthropology*

**C3** - Belle van Zuylen Hall - Biography as a genre (Chair: Bos)

- Baggerman: *The development of biography as a form of human science after 1700*
- Dekker: *A diarist with a sociological view: Constantijn Huygens jr.*
- Arinina: *Development of socio-psychological ideas of McDougall and Wallas*



- D3** - Foyer - Psychology and culture (Chair: Pietikainen)  
- Harvey: *Why did culture fall to the wayside in psychology?*  
- Bell: *Confronting theory: The psychology of cultural studies*  
- Allesch: *Richard von Krafft-Ebing and the "Golden Age of psychiatry"*

21.00 - 22.30: Screening of *Geheimnisse einer Seele* - Belle van Zuylen Hall  
Introduction: Jaap Bos

### **WEDNESDAY AUGUST 25**

08.30 - 09.00: Coffee & tea - Maskerade Hall

#### **09.00 - 10.30: Workshops B1, C1 and D1**

- B1** - Senate Hall - Psychical Research (part I) (Chair: Valentine)  
Introduction: Psychical research and mainstream psychology in Europe, the USA and Japan.  
- Kloosterman: *Psychical research and parapsychology interpreted*  
- Sommer: *The rejection of psychical research by early American psychologists*  
- Wolfram: *Psychical Research and Psychology in Late Nineteenth-Century Germany*

- C1** - Belle van Zuylen Hall - Behaviorism and beyond (Chair: Schruijer)  
- Clark: *The cultural explanation for the rise and fall of American behaviorism*  
- Eshuis: *Psychology as the ethologist views it*

- D1** - Foyer - Mass psychology (Chair: Brock)  
- Behrens: *Psychology takes to the airwaves: Women and radio broadcasting*  
- Rijks: *Conceptualizing the masses*  
- Shapiro: *Subliminal advertising*

10.30 - 11.00: Coffee & tea - Maskerade Hall

**11.00 - 12.00: Key-note lecture** - Senate Hall  
Johan Heilbron: *Disciplinarity and its discontents*

12.00 - 13.30: Lunch break at one's own leisure

#### **13.30 - 15.00: Workshops B2 and C2**

- C2** - Belle van Zuylen Hall - Against the mainstream (Chair: Behrens)  
- Pietikainen: *All the world's a hospital? On the history of "medicalisation"*  
- Staeuble: *From 'indigenous anthropologies' to a 'world anthropologies network'*  
- Guski-Leinwand: *Karl Julius Lohnert on Awareness, Aesthetics and Astronomy*

- D2** - Senate Hall - Psychical Research (part II) (Chair: Sommer)  
- Valentine: *Psychical research and orthodox psychology in Britain 1880-1940*  
- Plas: *Psychology and psychical research in France at the turn of the 19th century*

15.00 - 15.30: Coffee & tea - Maskerade Hall

#### **15.30 - 17.00: Workshops B3 and C3**

- C3** - Belle van Zuylen Hall - Eysenck's Legacy (Chair: Pietikainen)  
- Buchanan: *Reflections on writing a biography of Hans Eysenck*  
- Brock: *The IQ controversy, apartheid's anthropology and David Hume*  
- Marks: *Cognitive Behavioural Therapies in Britain, 1952-2010*

- D3** - Senate Hall - Psychical Research (part III) (Chair: Wolfram)  
- Mülberger: *Spiritualism and medicine in Spain*  
- Gyimesi: *Sándor Ferenczi and the problem of telepathy*  
- Takasuna: *Parapsychology and the history of psychology in Japan*

→ **17.15 - 18.00: Business meeting** - Sterrecamer



21.30 - 22.30: Screening of *Herskovits at the heart of Blackness* - Belle van Zuylen Hall  
Introduction: Ben Harris

**THURSDAY AUGUST 26**

08.30 - 09.00: Coffee & tea - Maskerade Hall

**09.00 - 10.30: Workshops B1 and C1**

**B1** - Senate Hall - Interdisciplinary approaches (Chair: Buchanan)  
- Minkova: *Mental development in Simonovich's theory of recapitulation*  
- Gärtner & Brock: *Historical psychology in Germany, 1980-2000*  
- Heukelom: *Eric Wanner and the making of Behavioral Economics*

**C1** - Belle van Zuylen Hall - American citizenship (Chair: Sokal)  
- Harris: *Arnold Gesell's eugenical analysis of his hometown*

10.30 - 11.00: Coffee & tea - Maskerade Hall

**11.00 - 12.00: Key-note lecture** - Senate Hall  
Douwe Draaisma: *Stereotyping autism: the chequered history of a syndrome*

12.00 - 13.00: Lunch break at one's own leisure

13.00 - 18.00: Special programme

18.00: Conference dinner - Restaurant Stadskasteel Oudaen, Oudegracht

**FRIDAY AUGUST 27**

08.30 - 09.00: Coffee & tea - Maskerade Hall

**09.00 - 10.30: Workshops B1 and C1**

**B1** - Senate Hall - National psychologies (Chair: Harris)  
- Lombardo & Bartolucci (Chiara): *Historical-quantitative analysis on the disciplinary contexts characterising the origin of the Italian psychology*  
- Kiss & Anitei: *The history of psychology in Romania*  
- Jimenez: *The psychological measurement of responsibility, early 20th century in Spain*

10.30 - 11.00: Coffee & tea - Maskerade Hall

11.00 - 12.00: Key-note lecture - Senate Hall

12.00: Departure



ESHHS 2010 participants	Email adress
Abma, Ruud	r.abma@uu.nl
Allesch, Christian	Christian.Allesch@sbg.ac.at
Anitei, Mihai	Mihai.anitei@unibuc.ro
Arinina, Marina	arimari@rambler.ru
Baggerman, Arianne	baggerman@fhk.eur.nl
Bartolucci, Claudia	claudiabartolucci@gmail.com
Bartolucci, Chiara	chiara.bartolucci@uniroma1.it
Behrens, Peter	pjb4@psu.edu
Bell, Philip	p.bell@unsw.edu.au
Bizimana, Charles	bizimanacharles28@yahoo.fr
Boer, Suzan van den	svdboer@gmail.com
Bos, Jaap	j.c.bos@uu.nl
Bouterse, Jeroen	J.Bouterse@students.uu.nl
Brauns, Horst-Peter	hpbrauns@zedat.fu-berlin.de
Brock, Adrian	adrian.c.brock@ucd.ie
Bryson, Dennis	dennis@bilkent.edu.tr
Buchanan, Rod	r.d.buchanan@optusnet.com.au
Burnham, John	burnham.2@osu.edu
Choi, Jayoon	jyc8794@gmail.com
Clark, David	doclark@yorku.ca
Dehue, Trudy	g.c.g.dehue@rug.nl
Dekker, Rudolf	r.dekker@fhk.eur.nl
Derksen, Maarten	m.derksen@rug.nl
Draaisma, Douwe	d.draaisma@rug.nl
Erös, Ferenc	erosferenc@gmail.com
Eshuis, Jannes	jannes.eshuis@ou.nl
Feest, Uljana	uljana.feest@tu-berlin.de
Gärtner, Kathrin	kathrin.gaertner@gmx.at
Guski-Leinwand, Susanne	art-guskileinwand1@arcor.de
Gyimesi, Julia	juliagyimesi@gmail.com
Good, James	j.m.m.good@durham.ac.uk
Gulpers, Judith	gulpers@ubib.eur.nl
Harris, Ben	bh5@unh.edu
Harvey, Matt	Matthew.harvey@ucdconnect.ie
Heilbron, Johan	johan.heilbron@planet.nl
Heukelom, Floris	f.heukelom@fm.ru.nl
Hezewijk, Rene	Rene.vanHezewijk@ou.nl
Hui, Alexandra	AHui@history.msstate.edu
Jimenez, Belen	bjimenez.alonso@gmail.com
Jovanovic, Gordana	gjovanov@f.bg.ac.rs
Kiss, Julien	julien.kiss@gmail.com
Kloosterman, Ingrid	ingrid.kloosterman@gmail.com
Larsen, Tord	tord.larsen@svt.ntnu.no
Leal Ferreira, Arthur	arleal@superig.com.br
Levinson, Sharman	sharman.levinson@wanadoo.fr
Lombardo, Giovanni Pietro	giovannipietro.lombardo@uniroma1.it
Marks, Sarah	sarahmarks@ymail.com
Minkova, Elena	helensea59@mail.ru
Moore, Hannah L.	hlm.moore@gmail.com
Mulberger, Annette	Annette.Mulberger@uab.es
Mucuranyana, Justin	jrunezerwa@yahoo.fr
Mukiza, Vianney	runezerwa@email.com
Pieper, Madelon	m.pieper@uu.nl
Pietikainen, Petteri	petteri.pietikainen@helsinki.fi
Plas, Regine	regine.plas@parisdescartes.fr
Pulido-Martinez, Hernan	pulido-martinezhc@Cardiff.ac.uk
Rappard, Hans van	hansvanrappard@collectieconsult.nl
Rijks, Marlise	M.N.Rijks@students.uu.nl



# Conference Programme ESHHS 2010

Roh, Youngdoun	youngdounghroh@gmail.com
Schruijer, Sandra	s.g.l.schruijer@uu.nl
Schuur, Reinier	rayray484@hotmail.com
Shapiro, Steve	S.S.Shapiro@students.uu.nl
Smits, Paul	paulsmits@smitspsychologie.nl
Sokal, Michael	msokal@WPI.EDU
Sommer, Andreas	andreas.sommer.09@ucl.ac.uk
Staeuble, Irmgard	staeuble@zedat.fu-berlin.de
Stam, Henk	stam@ucalgary.ca
Suzuki, Keitaro	esuzuki751@hotmail.com
Takasuna, Miki	takasuna@tiu.ac.jp
Vajda, Zsuzsa	vajdazsuzsanna@gmail.com
Valentine, Elizabeth	E.Valentine@rhul.ac.uk
Veer, Rene van der	VEER@FSW.leidenuniv.nl
Vizcaino López, Miroslava	mivilo@gmail.com
Wolffram, Heather	heather.wolffram@uq.edu.au
Yasnitsky, Anton	anton.yasnitsky@gmail.com



## KEY NOTES

### **Other times, other suffering**

#### **On studying depression from a nominalistic point of view**

**Trudy Dehue**

University of Groningen

---

When it comes to the question of why psychiatric diagnoses rapidly expanded in the 21<sup>st</sup> century the most common answer by present-day neurosciences is that not the diseases themselves increased but only their detection and treatment. Consequently, the typical historical account demonstrates that disorder X or Y has always existed. Such 'feel good histories' affirm the social significance of present-day biomedical views. In addition, they preclude the counter-explanation that neuroscience and mental health care, together with pharmaceutical companies, have mongered psychiatric diseases.

Whereas these two explanations diverge in important ways, they do have one factor in common. Both assume that we are increasingly treating less severe cases too - be it to our benefit according to the first explanation and to our detriment according to the second. Stated differently, both hold the 'essentialistic view' that not the disease itself has increased but only its diagnosis and treatment. Focusing mainly on the example of depression, I will challenge this assumption by arguing that the label of depression acquired various meanings in the course of time. In order to come to grips with their remarkable increase in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century, we need to substitute the essentialistic view of psychiatric diagnoses with a thoroughly 'nominalistic' one.

The example also illustrates the relevance of historical points of view in current debates. This keynote will be based on my book *De depressie-epidemie* (The depression-epidemic; 2008) arguing that since its early 20<sup>th</sup> century introduction the word 'depression' acquired extra meanings and that we are now treating 'the' disorder in these new meanings too. The media-attention for this book in the Netherlands and Belgium has been overwhelming and it has been as ardently rejected as highly praised.

### **The chequered history of Asperger syndrome**

**Douwe Draaisma**

University of Groningen

---

In the original publication on the syndrome that was to bear his name, Hans Asperger (1944) introduced his case histories with a series of reflections on the proper methodology of classifying and diagnosing psychiatric disorders. In these pages Asperger grappled with issues that are still very much with us, issues of labeling, description and stereotyping. Some of his considerations on diagnosing and describing autism may help us reflect on the professional and media representations of autism. Specifically, it will be argued that Asperger's Gestalt-like assessment and description of autism, even if it is officially denounced in modern psychiatric practice, offers a convincing model of the way stereotypes may build up as a result of representations of autism. Considering that much of what society at large learns on disorders on the autism spectrum is produced by representations of autism in novels, TV-series, movies and autobiographies, it will be of vital importance to scrutinize these representations and to check whether they are not, in fact, misrepresenting the clinical reality of the autistic condition.

---



## **Disciplinaryity and its discontents**

**Johan Heilbron**

Centre européen de sociologie et de science politique (CESSP) Paris & Erasmus University Rotterdam

While 'disciplinaryity' is one of the most general characteristics of the production and reproduction of knowledge in contemporary societies, its counterpart 'interdisciplinaryity' has become a widely promoted objective of science policy. This somewhat paradoxical state of affairs raises questions about the historical origins and changing meaning of 'disciplines' and 'disciplinaryity'. I will, first, argue that the institutionalization of disciplines was the central feature of what may be considered as the 'second scientific revolution', which occurred in the decades around 1800. The new model originated in the sciences in France and spread through national academic fields during much of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The establishment of a disciplinary regime of knowledge formed the background for the advocacy of 'interdisciplinaryity', first by parties outside of the academic world proper, in particular American philanthropic foundations, and in the wake of the university crisis of 1968, by other science policy agencies as well. Many of the interdisciplinary initiatives, however, testify to the difficulties of challenging the disciplinary order, since the most successful ones have done so by becoming disciplines themselves.



**PAPERS (in alphabetical order of names)**

**Across the great divide. Buytendijk's interdisciplinary human science**

**Ruud Abma**

Utrecht University

Trained as a physician and a physiologist, F.J.J. Buytendijk (1887-1974) in the early stages of his career devoted himself to experimental studies in animal physiology and psychology. Impressed by the results of physical and chemical research, many biologists and medical researchers from the 1850s onwards chose to follow and promote the reductionist methodology of the natural sciences, while others, Buytendijk among them, opted for a more holistic approach. For him, there was an irreducible division between the physical order and the order of the living creatures: plants, animals and human beings. Although physical facts were necessary building bricks for the life sciences, theoretical explanations should be in correspondence with the characteristics of the object of investigation. Animal behaviour is not determined by its environment in the way material objects are determined by, for instance, gravity. Human behaviour even shows a greater degree of freedom, according to Buytendijk, whose view concurred with and was inspired by Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner and at a later stage Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In the 1930s, Buytendijk gradually abandoned his laboratory studies and started to develop a phenomenological-anthropological frame of reference, which temporarily became a major influence within post-war psychology in the Netherlands. His books *A general theory of human posture and action* (1948) and *Prolegomena to an anthropological physiology* (1965) aimed at building bridges between physiology and psychology, and more broadly between the natural sciences and the humanities. Although he highly valued disciplinary, empirical research, in his view progress in the human sciences could be only be achieved by philosophically grounded, interdisciplinary work. What is to be learned from his approach for the human sciences of today?

**References**

- Abma, R., J. Bos, W. Koops & H. van Rinsum (2009) *Ontmoeting over de grenzen: De Utrechtse School*. In: L.J. Dorsman & P.J. Knegtman (red.) *Over de grens. Internationale contacten aan Nederlandse universiteiten sedert 1876 (Universiteit en samenleving 5)*. Hilversum: Verloren, 141-166.
- Dekkers, W. (1985) *Het bezielde lichaam. Het ontwerp van een antropologische fysiologie en geneeskunde volgens F.J.J. Buytendijk*. Zeist: Kerckebosch.
- Smith, R. (2007) *Being Human: Historical Knowledge and the Creation of Human Nature*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Spiegelberg, H. (1972) *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.



## **Richard von Krafft-Ebing and the "golden age of psychiatry"**

**Christian G. Allesch & Heinrich Ammerer**

Universität Salzburg

The doctoral thesis of Austrian historian Heinrich Ammerer (\*1979), which will be discussed in the paper for the first time, is the most recent attempt to reconstruct the life and times of a quite influential psychiatrist of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Richard von Krafft-Ebing (1840-1902). In the history of psychiatry, Krafft-Ebing's name was brought into somewhat unfortunate prominence by his studies in the field of sexual psychopathology, especially by his famous and best-selling book "Psychopathia sexualis" (first edition 1886). The German-Austrian psychiatrist was the first to describe and discuss the phenomenon of Homosexuality from a degeneration-theoretician's point of view and, what is more, like a modern Linné he examined, classified and labelled a huge number of sexual perversions like Masochism, Sadism, Fetishism, or Exhibitionism for the first time. While his aetiological explanations for the development of "abnormal" sexual behaviour were much disputed during his lifetimes and abolished soon after his death, Krafft-Ebing's nomenclature of sexual aberrations persisted and still determines our modern-day concept of sexuality. Since his pioneer works on sexual pathology appealed strongly on the scientific community (and the public likewise) and thereby awoke much interest in the formerly hushed-up matter, the publication of "Psychopathia sexualis" has been described as the "single most important event in the history of sexual life" (Hoenig).

Researchers on Krafft-Ebing have therefore mostly focused on "Psychopathia sexualis" and related matters, such as the case studies of sexual perversions or Krafft-Ebing's view on Homosexuality. Other aspects of his work received less notice, despite the fact that Krafft-Ebing also had huge influence on the forensic psychiatry of his times and was praised for his didactic efforts. Although Swiss psychiatrist Renate Hauser and Dutch historian Harry Oosterhuis made very valuable attempts to research the life, time and work of Krafft-Ebing, a comprehensive biography has remained a scientific desideratum. This is mainly due to the fact that for almost a century hardly any private documents have been traceable. "Nothing is known about his private life" Kruntorad wrote in 1984. This changed in 2000, when a huge convolute of literary remains was discovered in the family archive of Krafft-Ebing's descendants. The now available private and professional correspondence, the manuscripts, records, case studies and press cuttings form a promising basis for new biographical attempts. The material, however, is still fragmentary: It lacks manifestations of Krafft-Ebing's inner life such as diaries or private letters to friends. At the time being, biographical approaches to Richard von Krafft-Ebing therefore must still remain at the incomplete stage of "biographical sketches", and this is what Mr. Ammerer describes his thesis to be.

The German-language thesis, submitted in 2009, tries to oversee the life and times of Krafft-Ebing mainly from a social historian's point of view. It covers the curriculum vitae of Krafft-Ebing, the career, the teachings, the professional standing as a psychiatrist, the scientific ascent, the struggles, and his acceptance in the media and in the scientific community. It describes Krafft-Ebing as a nearly prototypical 19<sup>th</sup>-century German academic, descending from families that are easily identified as members of the culturally dominant social group of the century, the "Bildungsbürgertum". Raised in an intellectual household, trained to high levels of humanist education and socialized in the spirit of Southern German national-liberalism, Krafft-Ebing's political and ethical convictions, his medical and forensic interests, and also his academic career were anticipated much by his family roots. His two most prominent theoretical axioms, the concept of degeneration and the concept of the vulnerability of the nervous systems (neurasthenia), have their fundamentals in his adolescence, and his pathologizing – yet compassionate – approach towards abnormal human behaviour also derives from the "Weltanschauung" of the specific milieu he was raised up in. The thesis furthermore describes Krafft-Ebing's career progression and its backgrounds, his professional strategies and networks, his achievement of psychiatric expertise, the institutions he worked in and the patients he treated, his roles as an academic teacher, psychiatric researcher, author, forensic expert and as a sexual pathologist. It examines the genesis and the teachings of the "Psychopathia sexualis" and finally takes a look on Krafft-Ebing's reflection in the contemporary media and in science: How comes that although the popular psychiatrist and his teachings were much appreciated during his lifetimes, the history of psychiatry treats him with contempt to date?



## **Bibliography**

- Ammerer, H.: Seelenheilkunde und Wissenschaft 'im goldenen Zeitalter der Psychiatrie': Richard von Krafft-Ebing (1840-1902), doctoral thesis (unpublished), Salzburg 2009
- Hauser, R.: Sexuality, neurasthenia and the law: Richard von Krafft-Ebing (1840-1902), doctoral thesis (unpublished), London 1993
- Hoenig, J.: Sexology, in: Handbook of psychiatry, Vol. 1, Cambridge 1983
- Krafft-Ebing, R. v.: Psychopathia sexualis. Eine klinisch-forensische Studie, Stuttgart 1886
- Kruntorad, P.: Krafft-Ebing, in: Richard von Krafft-Ebing, Psychopathia Sexualis, Munich 1997
- Oosterhuis, H.: Stepchildren of Nature. Krafft-Ebing, Psychiatry, and the Making of Sexual Identity, Chicago 2000
- 
- Sigusch, V.: Richard von Krafft-Ebing: Bericht über Nachlass und Genogramm, in: Dannecker, M. et al.: Zeitschrift für Sexualforschung, Stuttgart 2002



## **Development of socio-psychological ideas of W.McDougall and G.Wallas in modern social psychology**

**Marina Arinina**

N. Novgorod

Despite the fact that W. McDougall's and G. Wallas' ideas were either criticized or even forgotten for a long period of time, many of the issues discussed by them are developed in modern social psychology.

McDougall regarded instincts as a complex mental process, consisting of three components - cognitive, affective and volitional. These three components have become part of the terminology of modern social psychology, but in different context. In his dispositional theory V. Yadov, for example, distinguishes the same three components, they are the three subsystems of disposition: cognitive, emotional and behavioral. (Yadov, 1975). In the works of McDougall the beginnings of modern ideas about group psychology can be found. The scientist considered the organization of the group to be one of the conditions of formation of a group, which may be based on group traditions and habits. Modern social psychology of the group also studies group organization and traditions. McDougall's description of internal and external control in a group could be identified with modern ideas about the characteristics of group processes in formal and informal groups. The scientist also described a gradation of relationships in the group depending on the time of its existence and level of organization. I.Meizhis and L.Pochebout name time of interaction between group members as one of the conditions of small groups formation. (Meizhis, Pochebout, 2009, p.152)

McDougall believed that the group spirit is one of the most important phenomenon in group psychology. He wrote that the spirit of the group elevates man above animals and encourages people to do the deeds bringing benefits not only to themselves, but to the group they belong to, and society as a whole. W.McDougall named two processes as the condition for the emergence of group spirit: the emergence of group identity and sense of affection to the group. Awareness of the group as such contributes to a clear distinction between their own group and other groups. In modern psychology this is called "we-feeling". (Parygin, 2003, pp. 264-265)

McDougall's assumptions about highly organized groups are in many ways similar to the ideas of A. Bruschlinsky and his scientific school of the collective (group) subject. In the book "The Psychology of individual and group subject" the authors defined collective subject as: "any co-operating or jointly behaving group of people." (Broushlinsky, Volovikova, 2002, p. 58) The authors point out the following three characteristics of the collective entity: 1) the interconnection and interdependence of individuals in group 2) "ability of groups to exercise various forms of joint activity", and 3) the ability to self-reflection ("we-feeling", and "we-image") (Broushlinsky, Volovikova, 2002, pp. 60-64). Implicitly, the same points can be found in the work of McDougall "Group Mind", although they are differently structured. For example, one of the problems of group psychology is "to study the interaction between group members, as well as between the group as a whole and each member of it" - wrote McDougall (Group Mind, p.31) And one of the key conditions for the formation of the group mind, according to McDougall, is self-consciousness which includes a "group sense" ("group sentiment") and "idea of the group" (i.e. self-reflection in the terminology of Bruschlinsky).

In regard to G. Wallas, in his social psychological works he used a quantitative criterion to classify social groups. In modern social psychology such approach is also used (B. Grushin, B. Parygin, B. Porshnev). L. Pochebout describes this approach among six others, and believes that "the division of communities by quantity is quite justified and often used in social psychology". (Pochebout, 2005, p.24) Socio-psychological phenomena often vary depending on the number of people in a group. Wallas was one of the first to focus on the characteristics and mechanisms of interaction between people in large communities. "In a large group people, of course, cannot know each other personally. Interaction between them is based on the social structure of society, public institutions, media, cultural characteristics", - writes Pochebout (2005, p.23) Wallas proposed the same ideas.



In his study of group social psychology Wallas was one of the first to raise the question of the characteristics of group decision making. He saw it in the context of joint thinking and suggested ways of improving co-thinking in the group. In modern social psychology this phenomenon is considered within the study of group dynamics. The scientist pointed out the difficulties associated with the so-called "conflict of will" that can be correlated with the idea of egocentric obstacles in making group decisions (R. Verderber, K. Verderber) (Mezhis, Pochebout, 2009) Expressed in terms of modern social psychology, Wallas was a supporter of a consensus procedure in group decision making, which is considered the most acceptable one in modern psychology. (Mezhis, Pochebout, 2009, p.211).

Today the works of the first British social psychologists W.McDougall and G.Wallas still need a closer analysis and revision.

## References

- Broushlinsky, A.V., Volovikova, M.I. (Ed.) (2002). Psychology of individual and group subject. Moscow: Institute of Psychology, Russian Academy of Science, Per Se. 365 p.
- Parygin, B. (2003). Social psychology. St. Petersburg: StPSU Press. 616 p.
- Pochebout L.G. (2005) Social communities: psychology of crowd, society, ethnos. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg State University Press. 285 p.
- McDougall, W. (1914). An Introduction to Social Psychology. (8th ed.) London: Methuen and Co., Ltd. xvii, 431 p.
- McDougall, W. (1920). Group Mind: A Sketch of the Principles of Collective Psychology, with Some Attempt to Apply Them to the Interpretation of National Life and Character. New York and London: The Knickerbocker Press. 418 p.
- Meizhis, I.A., Pochebout, L.G. (2007). Social psychology of social development, (in 2 volumes). K.: Millennium. -Vol. 2. 404 p.
- Wallas, G. (1921). Our social heritage. London: G. Allen & Unwin. 291 p.
- Wallas, G. (1967). The Great Society. A Psychological Analysis. Lincoln University of Nebraska Press. (original version 1914). 383 p.
- Yadov, V. (1975). Toward dispositional regulation of behaviour of personality. Methodological problems of social psychology. Moscow.

Seeing the difference: is there not  
a school or discipline,  
humans are = animals that need to be educated  
obligatory reading

we wanted  
a school

15:10

15:05

15:00

14:40



## **The development of biography as a form of human science after 1700**

**Arianne Baggerman**

Erasmus University Rotterdam

Since the 16th century self knowledge was more and more valued. The popularity of the essays of Montaigne confirm and stimulated this. This was paralleled by a growing emphasis on the importance of knowledge about man in general. This became a central issue in theology and philosophy. There also was a growing need for books about these subjects, not only expressed in theoretical works, but also in a steady flow of biographies. In biographies individual lives were described, and thus contributed to the knowledge of human nature. In biographies the focus was more and more directed at the character and private life of the biographed person. Character and personality were depicted with more and more nuance. This led in the late 17th and 18th centuries to a booming market for biographies, especially for books in which character and private life of well-known persons was revealed. In such biographies the readers were promised a look behind the mask of kings, generals, diplomats, and later also famous actors, painters and writers. Scholars also developed a new interest in the human character, or in what in Dutch was called 'menskunde', which can be seen as a precursor of psychology and anthropology. One of the expressions of this development was 'physiognomy', which aimed at knowledge about the human character through outward appearance. The unmasking of others, sprang from the same source as the new need of unveiling the self among diarists and autobiographers. In this paper a link is made between these developments, in a first exploration of this field in the Netherlands. And it will explain why one of the first times the word 'psychologie' is used in the Dutch language, is not in a scholarly work, but in an early 19th-century biography.



## Georges Canguilhem on the Question of the Individual

**Claudia Bartolucci**

University of Perugia

The research addresses the question of biological individuality in the thought of Georges Canguilhem (1904–1996) as an insight into French epistemology of the second half of the twentieth century. In his early work (*Essai sur quelques problèmes concernant le normal et le pathologique*, 1943) he takes into account the question of subjectivity in the history of biology and the ambiguous role played by the notion of "individuality". Nonetheless, the focal point addressed by Canguilhem regards the role played by the metaphor into the construction of biological theories, and the related conceptions of individuality: "The history of the concept of the cell is inseparable from the history of the concept of the individual." (cf. *La connaissance de la vie*, 1965).

Canguilhem's works therefore investigate the notion of "individuality" not only in relation to the question of the nature of norms and health for living individuals, but above all in relation with molecular biology and the idea of the "code" (cf. D. Lecourt, *Pour une critique de l'épistémologie*, 1972). Canguilhem's analysis hence aimed at the comparison between different cell theories of the second half of 1800: from the analogy between biology and sociology introduced by Rudolf Virchow and facilitated by the metaphor of the Cell-State, (cf. *Die Cellularpathologie*, 1858) through the reception of cell theory in France by the work of Claude Bernard (cf. *Leçons sur le phénomènes de la vie communs aux animaux et aux végétaux*, 1878-79), until Ernst Haeckel's theory, that brings the zoologist to his conception of organism as a hierarchy of organic individuals (cf. *Generelle Morphologie der Organismen*, 1866).

Starting from this "problematization" of the history of a science, biology, emerges not only the central role played by historic research on French epistemology (cf. G. Canguilhem, *Écrits sur la médecine; Idéologie et rationalité dans l'histoire des sciences de la vie*), but mainly the close correlation between biology and technique (cf. also G. Simondon, *L'individu et sa genèse physico-biologique*, 1964), and its relevance on behalf of the construction of a certain notion of the "subject", as it has been shown also by the reintroduction of these instances on the important work of Michel Foucault and his "archaeology of knowledge" (cf., above all, *L'archéologie du savoir*, 1969; *L'Herménéutique du Sujet*, Cours au Collège de France 1981-1982; *Omnes et singulatim: Toward a Criticism of Political Reason*, 1981).



## **Psychology Takes to the Airwaves: Women in Early Radio Broadcasting And Women as Consumers of Radio Broadcasting**

**Peter J. Behrens**

Pennsylvania State University

It is common for women today to contribute to psychology through radio talk programs and for their names to be familiar by their national prominence. One of the earliest females in the United States to engage in broadcast radio regularly was Dr. Joyce Brothers, beginning in the 1950's. Even though her topics were clearly psychological in nature – relationships, adjustment, family matters, and child-rearing – her professional training was in experimental psychology, not clinical or counseling psychology. Yet, she became a household word for many years. More contemporary examples of women broadcasting psychology on the radio are Dr. Ruth Westheimer, trained in psychodynamic psychotherapy, and Dr. Laura Schlessinger, trained in physiology. Both of these women, among others, have established reputations and expanded their media presence from radio into television, syndicated columns, and books. Female psychologists, counselors, and therapists commonly expound on psychological topics in the American media today along with their male counterparts.

But the early days of network radio in America were not without the voice of women. In fact, research into early broadcast schedules shows programs on psychological topics were often by women, although they never gained notoriety. Some examples are Grace Abbott, Estelle Reilly, and Edna A. W. Teall. These women are not easily recognizable compared to their contemporary male counterparts in psychology, such as Arthur Payne, James Angell, and Joseph Jastrow (Behrens 2009), but this paper chronicles the careers of the above women who broadcast psychology programs in the 1920's and 1930's in America. This paper also reviews the radio content of the programs by women, such as child rearing, education, and personal adjustment. It was the contributions of women who made the first impact on radio psychology and helped define and popularize the character of psychology in the inter-war period in America to a large and expanding radio audience.

A related theme of this paper is the topic of women as audience in early radio psychology. So, a second focus is the way that American radio defined women as the audience, based on the prevailing *Zeitgeist* about the roles and social and economic status of women in the early part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century as understood by psychological science of the time. Several writers have drawn upon both British and American science to support the view that evolutionary theory was influential in informing social and gender views and policy (Shields, 2007).

A major component of radio programming in the inter-war period was born out of the necessities of the Great Depression to target recovery, both economic and psychological. Radio programming mostly called upon male figures in psychology in its broadcasting.

An important contribution was made early by The National Advisory Council on Radio in Education, which was organized in 1930 to further the connection between radio and American education. Beginning in 1931, 10 half-hour "courses" on Saturday nights featured topics on economics and psychology for its listeners. Arnold Gesell, John Dewey, and James Angell were featured male psychologists. Florence Goodenough was the sole female psychologist to participate (Tyson 1931). Here, the audience was predominantly male, because American men, not women, would benefit from programming to enter the workforce, retrain, and be available to listen to the radio on Saturday nights.

A major Depression-era program that was directed at a female audience was the "Women's Radio Review," which aired from 1931 to 1936 on the NBC network. Guests included authors, playwrights, foreign dignitaries, educators, and psychologists. Topics ranged widely, and the series was known for its controversial and provocative content. Hosted by women, its audience was decidedly female, as can be inferred from the program schedule and its content.



Questions addressed in this paper are the place and influence of women broadcasting psychology and the women who were the consumers of broadcast psychology. These questions consider the contemporary issues of the day and the scientific understanding of the nature of the differences between females and males. These considerations, it is argued, had social, cultural, and professional implications for the careers of women in broadcasting psychology in America in the inter-war period. Among these are considerations of gender roles, occupational inequality, and educational opportunities for women. These factors greatly contributed to both the presence and absence of female voices on the radio. Further, this paper draws from American and British scientific thinking that dominated early 20<sup>th</sup> century psychological science and influenced radio broadcasting. References are made to G. Stanley Hall and William McDougall, among others (Lewin 1984).

---

### **Selected References**

- Behrens, P. J. (2009). Psychology takes to the airwaves: American radio psychology between the wars, 1926-1939. *The American Sociologist*, 40, 214-227.
- Lewin, M. (Ed.) (1984). *In the shadow of the past: Psychology portrays the sexes*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Shields, S. J. (2007). Passionate men, emotional women: Psychology constructs gender differences in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. *History of Psychology*, 10, 92-110.
- Tyson, L. (Ed.) (1931). *Radio and education: Proceedings of the 1<sup>st</sup>-assembly of the national advisory council on radio in education*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
-



**Confronting Theory The Psychology of Cultural Studies**

**Philip Bell**

University of Technology, Sydney

*In olden days a glimpse of theory was looked on as something dreary; now, heaven knows, anything goes!*

This paper presents an outline and examples from my recently published book, *Confronting Theory: The Psychology of Cultural Studies* - a philosophical critique of post-disciplinary neo-Psychology that has become central to post-disciplinary Humanities education in the Anglophone academy.

*Confronting Theory* analyses how key concepts from post-war French metaphysics have been adopted by Cultural Studies despite the warnings of the 'Sokal Hoax' and of Sokal And Bricmont's cautionary 'Intellectual Impostures' (1998). I argue that realism must be the 'default position' in analyses of psychological phenomena such as those that Cultural Studies now sees as central to its success in displacing academic Psychology. However, rather than revolutionising Psychology, the writing that I critique offers only incoherent, vitalist and idealist alternatives that few students can understand even as they reproduce them parodically in their own work. Chapters of *Confronting Theory* focus on concepts such as 'affect', 'the subject', 'post-humanism', 'Body-Theory', and 'essentialism/reductionism'.



## **Enter ghost. On disappearing and reappearing in phenomenological discourse**

**Jaap Bos**

Utrecht University

This paper presents a chapter from a biography in the making, namely that of pedagogue Martien Langeveld (1905-1989), one of the founding fathers of the Utrecht School of Phenomenology. Collaboration with other proponents of this school, who held chairs in psychiatry, developments psychology and theoretical psychology, and the ambition to develop a powerful international stronghold, allowed Langeveld to dominate the field of social sciences in Utrecht during the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s. During the 1960s, however, a younger generation of researchers started to move away from a generally interpretative philosophical approach towards an experimental and empirical approach, which eventually led to the demise of the Utrecht School of Phenomenology.

In line with phenomenological methodology which presupposes a non-reductionist approach to the subject and his 'life-world' [*Lebenswelt*], and entails furthermore a normative and interpretative orientation towards scientific problems, strongly rooted in German anti-positivist and anti-materialist philosophy, Langeveld's work develops around concepts such 'responsibility', 'trust', 'the encounter' etc..

As an 'essentialist', Langeveld argued that it is possible to perceive phenomena 'undistorted' or 'neutrally', i.e. devoid of preconceived expectations and images, simply 'as they are'. Phenomenological research produces, he claimed, 'objective results' from which follows a complete understanding of the actor and its relation to the world.

This paper explores the discursive foundations to this phenomenological approach. Specifically, it discusses the function and role of debate in phenomenological discourse. The claim developed in this paper is that phenomenological debate is marked by a disappearing of the author as an authoritative agent on the one hand, and the reappearance of the actor as a reflexive agent in disguise on the other.

Two cases are discussed. One is the 'friendly exchange' between Langeveld and his colleague Perquin on the issue of religious faith. A reconstruction of this debate that took place in the late 1950s and was never published is followed by discussion of the notorious betrayal by one of the 'star students' of the Utrecht School of Phenomenology, namely J. Linschoten, who in his work 'Idols of the psychologist' (published posthumously in 1963) strongly argued against phenomenology, although, it is claimed, remained in a number of respects a follower of phenomenology at the same time.

How were rival claims represented by the various parties in these debates? How did these parties interact and what means of interaction did they employ vis-à-vis the other? Which (conflicting) (re)construction of historic occurrences and events have been proposed by the parties? Why does the author have to disappear and then to reappear on the scene?

## **References**

- Eisenga, L.K.A. (1978) *Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse psychologie*. Deventer: Van Loghum Slaterus.
- Fairclough, N. (1992) *Discourse and Social Change*. Oxford: Polity Press.
- Farrell, (2001) *Collaborative Circles. Friendship Dynamics & Creative Work*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Fuller, S. (1997) *Science. Concepts in Social Thought*. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis.



## Explaining 'Verstehen'

**Jeroen Bouterse**

Utrecht University (student of Descartes Mastersprogram)

The guiding question is how Max Weber, in his attempt to construct a 'verstehende Soziologie' as a legitimately scientific discipline, redefined the already-existing notion of 'Verstehen' in such a way as to make it scientifically useful. It will be argued that within the intellectual context in which this redefinition took place, the challenge of scientific psychology played a significant role.

'Verstehen' was originally thought of in opposition to 'Erklären', and in terms of the dichotomy between idealism and positivism, between *Geisteswissenschaften* and *Naturwissenschaften*, etc.: it was a notion denoting the implementation of an intuitive faculty, fit for the understanding of human thought and action not in terms of universal laws (like in psychology) but in terms of meaning that could be recovered by a 'method' of empathy. Though the domain of human culture could be 'studied' and in some sense 'understood', it could not be 'explained' in similar terms as the domains of lifeless matter or spiritless life.

Max Weber's project, however, was aimed to *explain*, and his ideals were in that sense very scientifically oriented. Nonetheless, he refused to see this go at the cost of the whole conceptual arsenal of idealism: he did not try to reduce the human experience of ideas, value and meaning etc. to material conditions (thereby conveniently dispensing with the obligation to study this experience on its own terms and thus with the risk of becoming 'unscientific'), but on the contrary viewed purpose and meaning etc. as among the most significant explanatory factors of human behaviour. For all his dismissal of intuitionist and impressionistic sketches, Weber very clearly recognized that to do justice to human history and culture was not just to *explain* them in terms of natural laws, but to *understand* them. But what did this *Verstehen* mean within the context not of idealist philosophy, intuitive psychology or history-based-on-empathy, but of a social science (*Sozialwissenschaft*)?

In answering this question, I propose to pay attention to the role of (Wundtian) scientific psychology as an intellectual factor: the threat of scientific psychology to the disciplinary autonomy of the human sciences was a driving force behind the redefinition of those sciences, for example by the neo-Kantians Wilhelm Windelband and (notably) Heinrich Rickert. In Weber's methodological essays, too, Wundt and what are perceived as the too ambitious claims of scientific psychology figured prominently as a challenge to be met.

Nonetheless, the answers Weber gave were quite different. Instead of separating scientific psychology from the human sciences on the basis of the logical incommensurability of their respective modes of understanding, Weber decided that *as sciences*, these disciplines were working on the same terrain and could not simply ignore each other. All empirical sciences had in common that they attempted to construct objectively valid knowledge of aspects of reality, and for knowledge to be objectively valid meant for it to be value-free, conceptually articulate and empirically supported – there was no difference here between sciences occupied with the physical and the mental domain, nor was there a difference between generalizing and individualizing sciences.

'Scientific' psychology had to be purified from value-laden or metaphysical concepts, but the same was the case for historical understanding. For the notion of *Verstehen*, this meant that in the sense of a 'subjectifying', valuing, intuitive act it had no place in science. The cultural scientist *could*, however, identify the motives of actors as causes of their behavior, motives which were connected to value-related concepts, which he in turn could understand because of his own value-relatedness. When his empathic 'feeling' was by means of articulate *Wertbeziehung* translated into definite concepts and made part of intellectual statements applicable to empirical reality, it could serve the goal of causal explanation of those aspects of reality considered relevant, which was (by definition) the goal of all empirical sciences.



### Selective bibliography

- Burger, T. (1976), *Max Weber's theory of concept formation. History, laws, and ideal types* (Durham).
- Henrich, D. (1952), *Die Einheit der Wissenschaftslehre Max Webers* (Tübingen).
- Huff, T.E. (1984), *Max Weber and the methodology of the social sciences* (New Brunswick, London).
- Homann, H. (1989), *Gesetz und Wirklichkeit in den Sozialwissenschaften. Vom Methodenstreit zum Positivismusstreit* (Tübingen).
- Feest, U. ed. (2010), *Historical perspectives on Erklären and Verstehen* (Dordrecht etc.)
- Rickert, H.J. (1899), *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft: ein Vortrag* (Freiburg).
- Ringer, F., *Max Weber's methodology. The unification of the cultural and social sciences* (Cambridge (Mass), London 1997).
- Weber, M. (1903-1906), 'Roscher und Knies und die logischen Probleme der historischen Nationalökonomie' in: M.Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre* (Tübingen 1922) 1-145.
- Weber, M. (1904), 'Die Objektivität sozialwissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis' in: M. Weber, *Soziologie, Weltgeschichtliche Analysen, Politik*. J. Winckelmann ed. (Stuttgart 1956) 186-262.
- Weber, M. (1913), 'Ueber einige Kategorien der verstehenden Soziologie' in: M. Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre* (Tübingen 1922) 403-450.
- Windelband, W. (1894), *Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft* (Strassburg).



## On the development of empirical psychology in the 18<sup>th</sup> century

**HP Brauns**

Freie Universität Berlin

History of psychology neither starts in the 18<sup>th</sup> century nor does it end there. That is why, an introductory part outlines its earlier times, in particular the 17<sup>th</sup> century (Brauns, 2010). A main section deals with conceptions of empirical psychology as presented by Wolff in his *Deutsche Metaphysik* (1720) and the extended "Psychologia Empirica" (1732), Baumgarten's (1768) "Psychologia empirica" in his "Metaphysica", Kant's (1783) "Von der empirischen Psychologie", Jakob's (1791) "Grundriß der Erfahrungsseelenlehre" and Hoffbauers (1794) "Grundriss der Erfahrungsseelenlehre". For the sake of a first contextualization biographical sketches of these authors and their paths into and through their respective scientific communities are given which will shed some light upon their disciplinary affiliations too.

The sources selected will be longitudinally analyzed. So it is possible to find various developmental components by means of comparisons between states of affairs at different points in time: in regard to the scope of empirical psychology, its main objects, their conceptualizations as research problems and research-problem solutions delivered. Here, special consideration will be taken into the type of concepts used.

The main object classes as put forward by Wolff are cognition and desire. While cognition comprises a lower faculty (including sensation, fantasy and memory) and a higher faculty (including intellect and reason) the faculty of desire consists of will (by reason) and carnality. Basically, these objects continue to be the same until Hoffbauer, but the scope of the discipline broadens.

Attention is paid further to the interrelatedness of research problems, the methodological approaches followed as well as the methods finally applied. Throughout the whole century an explicit basic empirical orientation is never given up. However, observation even in his weak form of common daily experience suffices already to lay the ground for various farer reaching inferences including true rules. Generally it can be demonstrated that the development of psychological methods progresses from a multidisciplinary monomethodic to a variety of monodisciplinary multimethodic. (Brauns, 2002).

In order to relate 18<sup>th</sup> century empirical psychology to a later phase of the history of psychology some of its connections with 19<sup>th</sup> century new experimental psychology as executed by Weber (1846) and Fechner (1858) will be depicted (Brauns, 1990; 1996). The final discussion will consider contextual perspectives like theologization and secularization of psychological thinking as well as its formal criteria like developmental differentiation and integration.

## References

- Baumgarten, A. (1768). *Metaphysica*. Halae: Hemmerde.
- Brauns, H.-P. (1990). Fechners experimentelle Versuchsplanung. *Psychologie und Geschichte*, 1, 10-23.
- Brauns, H.-P. (1996). Ernst Heinrich Weber und das Paradigma seiner sensumetrischen Experimente. In H. Gundlach (Hrsg.), *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Psychologie und Psychotechnik* (S. 25-44). München: Profil.
- Brauns, H.-P. (2002). Zur Methodenfrage der Psychologie im 18. Jh. *Psychologie und Geschichte*, 10, 178-199.
- Brauns, H.P. 2010. Einige soziographische Daten und Bemerkungen zur Psychologie im 17. Jh. Paper at the 'Symposium zu Ehren von H. Gundlach', Würzburg, 25.-26.2. 2010.
- Fechner, G.T. 1858. Das psychische Maß. *Ztschr. f. Philosophie und phil. Kritik*, 32, 1-24.
- Hoffbauer (1794) "Anfangsgründe der Logik nebst einem Grundrisse der Erfahrungsseelenlehre" Halle: Hemmerde.
- Jakob, L. (1791). *Grundriß der Erfahrungs-Seelenlehre*. Halle: Hemmerde. 2. Aufl. 1795.
- Weber, E.H. (1846). Der Tastsinn und das Gemeingefühl. In Wagner, R. (Hrsg.), *Handwörterbuch der Physiologie*, 3 Bde.(S. 481-588). Braunschweig: Vieweg.
- Wolff, C. (1751) *Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen*.



**Understanding ideology: the IQ controversy,  
Apartheid's anthropology and David Hume**

**Adrian C. Brock**

University College Dublin

In the early 1980's, long before I made a decision to study psychology, I read a popular book on the IQ controversy (Eysenck & Kamin, 1981). What was unusual about this particular book was that the first half of it was an interview with a well-known hereditarian, Hans J. Eysenck, and the second half was an interview with a well-known environmentalist, Leon Kamin.

---

The politics of the controversy seemed to be very clear to me up to that point. If intelligence was hereditary, social intervention to bring about greater equality of opportunity was unlikely to work. If, on the other hand, intelligence was the product of the environment, social intervention would help to bring about a more just society. Thus hereditarianism was associated with a conservative point of view and environmentalism with a liberal or socialist point of view. However, when this point was put to Eysenck, he denied the existence of such a link and pointed out that one of his teachers was the geneticist, J. B. S. Haldane who was a staunch hereditarian and a member of the Communist Party. For Haldane, there was no contradiction between the two since he did not subscribe to the values of meritocracy by which people should be differentially rewarded according to their ability. He believed in the Marxian principle of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need". The origins of people's abilities are irrelevant in such a situation since they do not lead to differential rewards (Haldane, 1932).

Many people who share Eysenck's views on this subject refer to a famous statement by David Hume to the effect that one cannot logically derive an "ought" from an "is" (e.g. Baille, 2000). Given that there is no logical connection between the two, the idea that hereditarianism is inherently conservative and that environmentalism is inherently liberal or socialist is false.

It was a clever argument and I had no way of countering it at the time. In spite of that, there seemed to be something about it that was not entirely right. If it was true that an "ought" cannot be logically derived from an "is", it was a rule that was widely ignored. The most recent phase of the IQ controversy had begun after Arthur Jensen argued that the Headstart Program, which had been introduced to provide preschool education to poor children, had been a failure since the children lacked the intelligence to profit from it (Jensen, 1969). Presumably, no one was going to argue that public funds should be spent on something that does not work.



## **Fact, opinion and libel: Reflections on writing a biography of Hans Eysenck**

**Rod Buchanan**

University of Melbourne

Hans J. Eysenck was probably the most prominent and polarizing figure British psychology has ever produced. As a science biographer, I attempted to provide a full and frank account of this inveterate controversialist's career – the man they loved to hate. However, in the course of getting this book to print in the UK I learnt a lot about what Simon Singh has described as the most hostile libel laws in the world.

My experience relates to Eysenck's role in the smoking and cancer debate. For over 30 years Eysenck claimed that medical scientists and the public health lobby had got it wrong. Eysenck felt they had greatly exaggerated the ill-effects of tobacco. In their haste to condemn smoking, they had ignored the possibility that genetic and personality factors were largely to blame. Increasingly pilloried for this heterodoxy, Eysenck held out for evidence that would back his position.

In the early 1980s, Yugoslav sociologist Ronald Grossarth-Maticek offered Eysenck the ultimate comeback. Grossarth-Maticek's data strongly suggested that personality coping styles greatly affected the course of various physical diseases. In a series of papers published in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Eysenck and Grossarth-Maticek reported a variety of results that demonstrated a strong association between particular personality types and cancer, coronary heart disease and other ailments. Although these were mostly write-ups of studies set in train by Grossarth-Maticek more than a decade earlier, Eysenck's input helped fine-tune the presentation to English-speaking tastes, as well as develop theoretical explanations and analyses. A number of intervention studies were also carried out, each suggesting that particular forms of psychotherapy that targeted cancer sufferers or unhealthy personalities could have remarkable therapeutic or preventive effects.

A raft of questions arose from Eysenck's actions. Why did he go out of his way to defend a suspect product like cigarettes in the face of mounting evidence? Certainly he received millions of pounds from the American tobacco industry over several decades, only some of which was declared at the time. Litigation-driven archival stores have made it possible to investigate just how deep this relationship went. While Eysenck always waved away the criticism, his certainty in his own independence was not shared by many observers, nor his indifference to issues of conflict of interest and ethical oversight.

We may still debate whether we should lumber Eysenck with the dreaded term "bought advocate." Nevertheless, his collaboration with Grossarth-Maticek may have been a bridge too far. One wonders why he took up with Grossarth-Maticek in the first place, a man short on allies within the scientific community. This scepticism only intensified with Eysenck's unabashed promotion of the Yugoslav's astonishing results in the English-speaking world. A diverse chorus of opinion suggested that Grossarth-Maticek's research had some potentially serious problems. So where did this leave Eysenck, given that he effectively acted as guarantor for Grossarth-Maticek's work?



**Anthropologist a. L. Kroeber's career as a psychoanalyst:  
New evidence and lessons from a significant case history**

**John Burnham**  
Ohio State University

One of the dominating figures in anthropology during the first half of the twentieth century was Alfred L. Kroeber (1876-1960) of the University of California, Berkeley. It is known that Kroeber practiced as a psychoanalyst, with an office in San Francisco, from about 1920 to 1923. Kroeber also wrote two famous reviews of Freud's *Totem and Taboo*. Altogether he represents one of great early conjunctions between anthropology and psychoanalysis, which eventually became one of the most influential and productive intellectual encounters between disciplines in the history of the human sciences.

In 1970, Theodora Kroeber, who had married Kroeber in 1926, published a biography that covered his practice as an analyst. The account appears to have been based largely on what she remembered Kroeber's telling her. She recounts that Kroeber had a period of breakdown and sought analysis in New York. A friend of hers was able to identify the analysts Kroeber apparently told her he consulted. He subsequently established a psychoanalytic practice, she wrote, in San Francisco.

Meanwhile, in 1955, a young historian had had the privilege of interviewing Kroeber himself about his experience as a practicing psychoanalyst. Kroeber knew he was speaking for the record, and was, as was characteristic of him, very precise. When later the historian wanted to publish Kroeber's own version of his psychoanalytic practice experience, the historian sought to document the details of Kroeber's account. Theodora Kroeber, however, refused the historian access to the Kroeber Papers at the Bancroft Library because, as she explained in her abrupt letter, there was nothing he could possibly add to the account she had published.

Now, after more than half a century, material from the Kroeber Papers, which are finally open, can come together with the record of the historian's interview with Kroeber to show better what actually happened, and it is possible to suggest some conclusions from this remarkable historical incident, although no case material is available.

First, we can trace the ways in which psychoanalysis penetrated the intellectual communities in the United States in the World War I period. Most particularly, there was significant serious interest in the subject among intellectuals, and Kroeber as an eyewitness identified some of the channels of communication of psychoanalytic ideas—both popular and professional.

Second, this highbrow interest was substantial among professionals in San Francisco, where Kroeber found a sponsor for his practice, a physician who had treated shell shocked soldiers on the Western Front in Europe and had returned to practice at Stanford Medical School.

Third, psychoanalysis significantly affected Kroeber's thinking about human beings, although he may not always have revealed the extent of his expanded understanding. It is clear that, like many others of that generation, for Kroeber, personal dream analysis furnished critically convincing evidence of the validity of Freud's teachings.

Fourth, the kind of anthropology that Kroeber was doing was only marginally susceptible to influence from psychoanalysis, if at all. He was, therefore, an extreme case of the early influence of Freud in intellectual and avant-garde circles—without serious direct effect on the mainstream of established disciplinary practice or even theory. Kroeber therefore raises the question of how anthropology (and other disciplines) later changed so as to become receptive to psychoanalysis.

Fifth, the experience of many European anthropologists contrasts with that of Kroeber. He was clinical, at least in this time, and historical. They were theoretical.

The paper is based on the interview notes, on letters and daybooks in the Kroeber Papers, on other interviews carried out in the 1950s and 1960s, on published primary sources, and on secondary materials about Kroeber, about anthropology and psychoanalysis, and about the intellectual and cultural history of that period.

**Bibliography**

- Carl L. Alsberg, "Alfred L. Kroeber: I. Personal Reminiscences," in *Essays in Anthropology Presented to A. L. Kroeber in Celebration of His Sixtieth Birthday, June 11, 1936* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1936; reprinted New York: Kraus Reprint Co, 1969), xiii-xviii.  
A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1923)  
A. L. Kroeber, "Totem and Taboo: An Ethnologic Psychoanalysis," *American Anthropologist*, 22 (1920), 48-55.



## **The Cultural Explanation for the Rise and Fall of American Behaviorism**

**David Clark**

York University, Canada

Some psychologists believe that Behaviorism represented an explanation of human nature that was disproved. But a review of the psychological literature showed that few behavioral oriented scientists are dissuaded by criticism. Indeed, from my understanding of the supporting principles, although Behaviorism was presented as an ahistorical scientific explanation of human nature, it could not be disproved – or proved for that matter. If Behaviorism failed its critics as a satisfactory explanation of human nature, and if its rejection could not be attributed to a “crucial experiment” as they suggested, then the real reason behind its marginalization must be found elsewhere. I argue the reason Behaviorism became unsatisfactory was found embedded in the social-historical matrix, and that any failure of Behaviorism as an explanation of human nature was best explained from a change in the social organization. With changing circumstances, the motive to believe in Behaviorism flowered, and when circumstances changed again, it faded. This case study of the rise and fall of Behaviorism points to important considerations when evaluating claims about human nature made by psychology - and other human sciences as well.

Psychologies make explicit or implicit claims about human nature, and whether or not policy makers are conscience of them, these ideas work their way into political decisions. Explanations of human nature and the historical circumstances interact to mutually influence policy that becomes the individual's subjective experience. In this presentation, the history of the rise and fall of Behaviorism is told as a story of major economic changes in the American society during the period of approximately 1880s through 1960s. This paper then emphasizes the possible effects of new political realities that shaped acceptable beliefs about what was received as explanation of human nature.

The narrative begins with a definition for Behaviorism that differs from traditional psychology courses. Here, the working definition of Behaviorism is rooted in Western culture, post Enlightenment, where Behaviorism is part of larger need to describe the human scientifically, ahistorically. Essentially, Behaviorism described a human nature based upon the principle of adjustment, where adjustment was a synonym for adaptation – which alluded to the mechanism of natural selection. Although a secular-mechanistic approach, it did not universally exclude a belief in purposive activity. Observed purposive behavior, especially learned behavior, became representative of the principle of adjustment (or learning by another name), and then by inference, adjustment when associated with learning defined mental activity. This warranted its inclusion in psychology. As a science, Behaviorism then justified the search for the laws of learning. This of course served the Progressive sensibilities from which it emerged.

As time will allow, there is a brief description of the historical facts and theories that converged to serve as the foundation of Behaviorism. In addition to discoveries in biology, the exposition will include a brief discussion of Behaviorism in relation to Empiricism. Insofar as Behaviorism represented an experimental psychology, experiments will be considered in the context of proof. After the question is revisited (Can Behaviorism be disproved?), the suggested answer begins the story of how social changes, changed the meaning of Behaviorism for the American citizen.

The narrative of the rise and fall of Behaviorism is loosely divided into 4 periods: from the late 1800s to 1929 (from the Progressive Era/ Gilded Age to The Great Depression), from 1929 to 1950s (through the Great Depression, through the Second World War, and into the Cold War), from about 1960 to 1970 (the significance of the Counter Cultural Revolution). In addition, for the purposes of explaining the rise and fall of Behaviorism the significance of transition from the Second Industrial Revolution to the emergence of the modern industrial state is discussed. I will argue as a new social organization arose, the old ethos was replaced, and the need for Behaviorism was diminished among segments of the population.



With Behaviorism in mind, the narrative progresses by discussing dominate economic situations and corresponding social organization of the eras in terms of the values influencing policy making as America transitioned from laissez-faire capitalism, through the reformation of the great depression, and finally to the transfer of policy decisions to committees of experts across social institutions. Accompanying the corresponding changes in the social ethos, ideas of a representative American changed. Correspondingly, I argue the individual's motive for believing in Behaviorism changed depending where they were in the historical moment and the social hierarchy.

To evaluate the motives for accepting the expressed and implied statements of human nature represented by Behaviorism, I look at it as if it were presented as a rhetorical argument to the population at large. And I try to answer the question, when you look at the population in context of their historical situation and subjective experience, did Behaviorism provide a satisfactory explanation of human nature? I suggest that although Behaviorism was constructed as a promise for progressive sensibilities in the early 1900s as the century progressed its was increasingly received with skepticism among increasing numbers of the population, and this has played a significant role in its rejection in America.

## References

- Papers from the Edwin R. Guthrie archives located at the University of Washington in Seattle, Washington.
- Edwin Guthrie's publications regarding learning theory and the nature of scientific explanations.
- Daston, L. & Galison, P. (2007). *Objectivity*. New York: Zone Books.
- Fromm, E. (1941). *Escape from Freedom*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
- Fromm, E. (1980). *Greatness and Limitations of Freud's Thought*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Galbraith, J. K. (1967). *The New Industrial State*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.
- Galbraith, K. (1977). *The Age of Uncertainty: A history of economic ideas and their consequences*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.
- Hoffer, E. (1951). *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements*. New York: Harper.
- Holton, G. (1998). *The Scientific Imagination*. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press.
- Mills, C. W. (1959). *The Sociological Imagination*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Pirsig, R. M. (1974). *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance: an Inquiry into Values*. New York: Harper.
- Reich, C. A. (1970). *The Greening of America*. New York: Random House.
- Smith, R. (2007). *Being Human: Historical Knowledge and the Creation of Human Nature*. New York: Columbia University Press.



## **A diarist with a sociological view: Constantijn Huygens jr. at the court of King and stadhouder William of Orange, 1688-1698**

**Rudolf Dekker**

Erasmus University Rotterdam

In the 17th century the personal diary took a new shape. One of the modern characteristics is its regularity, as diaries were now usually written on a daily basis. The well-known diary of the 17th-century Englishman Samuel Pepys is a much studied example. The virtually unknown diary kept by his contemporary Constantijn Huygens jr, secretary to William of Orange, King of England, stadhouder of the Dutch Republic, is another example of a modern diary. In both diaries a link is found with a new, linear concept of time, and the introduction of exact time keeping. Huygens's brother Christiaan was a well-known scientist, who contributed much to this development. It is very likely that Pepys and the Huygens brothers have met each other in the meetings of the Royal Society, which they all attended. Another modern characteristic of Huygens's diary is the sharp and systematic observation of social life at court, both in England and in the Dutch Republic. While his brother observed the sky and calculated the movements of the sun and its planets, his brother observed the movements of the King and the courtiers around him. Both were expressions of a new way of looking, which was being developed in science. The same attitude is found in some other diaries kept at European courts in the 17th and 18th centuries. It is probably no coincidence that one of the most influential sociological studies of the 20th century, Norbert Elias' *Die höfische Gesellschaft*, was based upon observations of a (French) courtier, Saint-Simon. When Elias introduces his chief witness, he uses the metaphor of 'looking behind the screens'. Books in which the author looked behind the screens of courts became more and more popular in the 17th and 18th centuries. 'Secret histories', as these books were called, flooded the book market after around 1680. Even in court circles such books were read eagerly, as Huygens confirms. Court diaries written before the invention of anthropology, psychology and sociology, were as much a product of observation as of introspection. Court diaries offer insight in this changing culture, which prepared the development of modern human sciences.



## How Sándor Ferenczi became 'the world's first professor of psychoanalysis'

**Ferenc Erős**

Hungarian Academy of Sciences

The paper unfolds the historical background and the particular circumstances of Sándor Ferenczi's invitation to the newly established Chair of Psychoanalytic Studies and a psychoanalytic clinic at the Medical Faculty of the Budapest University in 1919. Ferenczi's professorial appointment was ordered on April 25, 1919 by the People's Commissariat for Public Education of the government of the Hungarian Councils' Republic led by Béla Kun. Ferenczi's professorship became a legendary topic in the history of psychoanalysis. In the legend facts and fictions are mixed. While it is true that Ferenczi was indeed the first full professor who had been invited to head a psychoanalytic chair and clinic, the relationship between psychoanalysis and higher education, especially medical training was a much more complicated story. The integration of psychoanalysis into medical training was a long discussed topic, and in this period several attempts had been made in various countries to include psychoanalysis into university curricula. (see Kaderas 1998, 2000). The basic principles of teaching psychoanalysis at universities was formulated by Freud himself, in his famous article "Soll die Psychoanalyse an den Universitäten gelehrt werden?", which was first published in March 1919 in a Hungarian medical journal (Freud 1919, see also Schröter 2009.)

In Hungary Ferenczi was not the only psychoanalyst who received university appointment in the revolutionary period 1918/1919. Other, younger psychoanalysts like Sándor Radó, Erzsébet Révész, Jenő Hárník, Franz Alexander) got university assistantships at the Medical Faculty. Imre Hermann became an assistant to Géza Révész at the newly founded department of experimental psychology at the Faculty of Humanities. The economist Jenő Varga, this time still member of the Hungarian Psychoanalytic Association, was appointed as professor of political economy at the Faculty of Law. On the other hand, the ethno-psychoanalyst Géza Róheim's claim for a university chair was refused. Ferenczi himself obtained his professorship after several unsuccessful attempts made since 1913 to get a university lectureship (*Habilitation*). His final success was due to several factors of which the most important was that the subsequent governments after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the autumn of 1918 had gradually limited and finally suspended the autonomy of the university authorities. Ferenczi's professorship was part and parcel of a *Kulturkampf* (cultural struggle) between the progressive reform initiatives and centralisation plans of the revolutionary governments on the one hand, and the bitter resistance of the conservative faculties, especially the medical faculty on the other. In the paper I will show – on the basis of archival documents and other sources – the stages of this cultural struggle, and how psychoanalysis became one of the crystallization points of it. (see more details in Erős 2009).

I will argue that Ferenczi's professorship – along with other appointments – was an important step in the early legitimisation and institutionalisation of psychoanalysis. I will point out that the experiences of the first world war (in which Ferenczi served as an army psychiatrist) largely contributed to the acknowledgment of psychoanalysis as a legitimate treatment of war neurosis, and this acknowledgment opened the way to the new ideas about psychoanalytic clinics. (see Danto 2005. ) War neurosis was one the central themes in Ferenczi's university courses which took only a few weeks in the spring and early summer in 1919. After the defeat of the Councils' Republic in August 1919, the conservative faculties drastically revenged, and psychoanalysis had been marginalized again in the Hungarian intellectual life.

### Literature

- Danto, Elizabeth Ann 2005. *Freud's free clinics: Psychoanalysis and social justice 1918–1938*. Columbia University Press, New York.
- Erős Ferenc 2009. Ferenczi Sándor professzori kinevezése: háttér és kronológia. [Ferenczi's professorship – background and chronology. *Thalassa*, 2009/4, 3–28.
- Freud, Sigmund 1919. *Soll die Psychoanalyse an den Universitäten gelehrt werden?* Kell-e az egyetemen pszichoanalízist tanítani? Ford. Ferenczi Sándor. *Gyógyászat*, 1919, 59. évf. 13. sz. 192.
- Kaderas, Brigitte 1998. Karl Abrahams Bemühungen um einen Lehrauftrag für Psychoanalyse an der Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität. In: *Jahrbuch für Universitätsgeschichte*. Band 1.
- Kaderas, Brigitte 2000. Hans Liebermanns Plädoyer für die Einführung der Psychoanalyse als Unterrichtsfach an der Universität. *Luzifer-Amor*, 13. Jg. Heft 26, 113–123.
- Schröter, Michael 2009. Freuds Memorandum »Soll die Psychoanalyse an der Universität gelehrt werden?« Zur Wiederauffindung des verschollenen Originals. *Merkur* 2009, no722, 599–609.



## Psychology as the ethologist views it

**Jannes Eshuis**

Open Universiteit Nederland

With his famous paper *Psychology as the behaviorist views it*, John B. Watson, eliminated all internal states from the explanatory scheme of psychology. This position culminated in his later claim that given a dozen of healthy infants he could "take any one at random and train him to become any type of specialist (...) regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of his ancestors" (Watson, 1930). Clearly, together with conscious states and cognitions, he brushed aside innate factors, keeping only learning by association as the one mechanism through which human behavior is shaped. It took the behavioral sciences almost half a century to recover from this lesion. By that time the work of biologists such as Konrad Lorenz and his pupil Niko Tinbergen (e.g. Lorenz, 1937; 1950; Tinbergen, 1951) had shown that innate factors had to be taken into account, leading to the formation of a new discipline: classical ethology.

This school of thought has not been without its critics. Especially Lehrman pointed out several difficulties with the classical views of Lorenz, leading to a rift within the school of ethology. One camp, mainly consisting of German ethologists headed by Lorenz, stuck to the classical view and rejected Lehrman's critique as being outright behaviorist. The other camp, mainly consisting of English and Dutch ethologists headed by Tinbergen, tried to incorporate Lehrman's key message that the classical distinction between innate and acquired behavior led to a disregard of ontogeny (Manning, 2009).

In an attempt to face this criticism, and to consolidate the ethological framework, the Dutch ethologist Niko Tinbergen proposed a more refined framework of aims and methods that, according to him, should be adhered to when studying behavior (Tinbergen, 1963). Amongst his guidelines was his famous discussion of the four why's of the behavioral sciences. Although Tinbergen did not claim ethology to be psychology, he explicitly addressed psychology also, when sketching its place within the field of behavioral sciences and declaring his principles applicable to it.

It would take another three decades, but with the rise of evolutionary psychology at the start of the nineties (e.g. Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992; Buss, 1995; Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Tooby & Cosmides, 1989) this message was finally incorporated in the psychological framework. Ever since then the work of Niko Tinbergen is mentioned in textbooks as one of the cornerstones of evolutionary psychology (e.g. Barrett, Dunbar, & Lycett, 2002; Buss, 1999; Workman & Reader). This is primarily done to support the claim that the study of adaptation is necessary and at the same time neglected by psychology. This argument however is inadequate for two reasons.

First, as we have argued in a previous paper (Eshuis & Hezewijk, 2008), Tinbergen's own notion of the function of behavior was faulty, introducing a confusion over levels of analysis that, since then has been solved in biology, but still exists in evolutionary psychology today. This is most notable when evolutionary psychology tries to grasp cultural behavior. Secondly, Tinbergen offered much more guidelines for the study of behavior than the famous 'four why's' that are constantly paid lip service to. Most notably in this respect is his emphasis on observation and description and his warning for an abstraction of these into inoperative categories and catch-all phrases. Focusing on the historical debate surrounding the rise of ethology these two theme's will be analyzed, showing that evolutionary psychology is in many ways based on outdated notions from 'classical ethology' rather than the refined ethology that was the result of Tinbergen's incorporation of Lehrman's critique (1953). Concluding, we will paint a picture of *Psychology as the ethologist views it*. It is our claim that such a psychology offers not only a better approach of human behavior, but also could lead towards a theory of culture that is more biologically valid than theories put forward by evolutionary psychology.



## References

- Barkow, J. H., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (Eds.). (1992). *The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary psychology and the Generation of Culture*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Barrett, L., Dunbar, R., & Lycett, J. (2002). *Human Evolutionary Psychology*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Buss, D. M. (1995). Evolutionary Psychology: A New Paradigm for Psychological Science. *Psychological Inquiry*, 6(1), 1-30.
- Buss, D. M. (1999). *Evolutionary Psychology, the new Science of the Mind*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
- Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1994). Better than Rational: Evolutionary Psychology and the Invisible Hand. *The American Economic Review*, 84(2), 327-332.
- Eshuis, J. H., & Hezewijk, R. v. (2008). *Evolutionary logic and psychology - a historical comparison of explanatory frameworks*. Paper presented at the 27th Annual Conference of the European Society for the History of the Human Sciences.
- Lehrman, D. S. (1953). Critique of Konrad Lorenz's theory of instinctive behavior. *Quarterly Review of Biology*, 28(4), 337-363.
- Lorenz, K. (1937). Über den Begriff der Instinkthandlung. *Folia Biotheoretica*, 82, 17-50.
- Lorenz, K. (1950). The comparative method in studying innate behaviour patterns. *Symposia of the Society for Experimental Biology*, 4, 221-268.
- Manning, A. (2009). Four decades on from the "four questions". In J. J. Bolhuis & S. Verhulst (Eds.), *Tinbergen's Legacy: Function and Mechanism in Behavioral Biology*. Cambridge: University Press.
- Tinbergen, N. (1951). *The study of instinct*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Tinbergen, N. (1963). On aims and methods of ethology. *Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie*, 20, 410-433.
- Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (1989). Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture, Part I. *Ethology and Sociobiology*, 10, 29-49.
- Watson, J. B. (1913). Psychology as the Behaviorist Views it. *Psychological Review*, 20, 158-177.
- Watson, J. B. (1930). *Behaviorism*. Chicago: University Press.
- Workman, L., & Reader, W. (2008). *Evolutionary psychology: An Introduction* (2nd ed.). Cambridge: University Press.



## Revisiting the Brentano Puzzle: The Autonomy of Psychology and Shifting Status of Conscious Experience

Uljana Feest

Technische Universität Berlin

Throughout its history, psychology has had recurring phases of debates and reflections about its methods and subject matter in relation to other scientific enterprises, such as neurophysiology and philosophy. Some themes of these debates – such as the question of whether psychology can be autonomous – have remained remarkably similar over the years. However, in looking at particular arguments in support for the thesis of the autonomy of psychology, it is important to keep in mind the very specific contexts in which they were made, the very different premises employed, and the very different agendas scholars pursued in formulating what may – *prima facie* – look like similar theses. In this paper, I will use key topics in Franz Brentano's concept of a descriptive psychology to illustrate this point.

Franz Brentano (1838-1917) was by all accounts an incredibly charismatic teacher, leaving his mark on figures like Carl Stumpf, Christian von Ehrenfels, Edmund Husserl, Sigmund Freud, Alexius Meinong and others (Smith 1994; Rollinger 1999). Yet, despite the lasting impact of his teachings, Brentano's own original contribution is not well known or highly regarded in either psychology or philosophy today, a fact that has in the literature been referred to as the "Brentano Puzzle" (Poli 1998). This claim needs to be qualified in an important way, since in contemporary philosophy of mind Brentano is in fact quite well known for having emphasized the intentional nature of mental phenomena (they are *about* something), with the implications of this idea still being hotly debated (see, for example, Crane 2003). I argue, however, that philosophical reconstructions of the notion of intentionality tend to treat it in isolation, leaving out the fact that Brentano's conception of *mental phenomenon* was closely tied to his goal of laying the theoretical foundations for an empirical scientific psychology, as distinct from neurophysiology. His conception of an empirical psychology, in turn, was characterized by two premises: (1) that the subject matter of psychology was, by definition, conscious experience, and (2) that we have direct and infallible perceptual access to our conscious experiences. This made it possible for him to argue that we can arrive at a taxonomy of mental phenomena by means of inner perception (a notion he was careful to distinguish from introspection). (Brentano 1874)

It is easy to see that both of these assumptions are at odds with current ideas about the subject matter and methodology of psychology. Recognizing this makes the Brentano Puzzle somewhat less puzzling. We may ask, however, (a) what set of factors made Brentano's ideas so compelling at the time (at least to some), and (b) what set of factors led to them appearing less compelling to subsequent psychologist/philosophers. With regard to both questions, it is central to understand the shifting status of the notions of *conscious experience* in both psychology and philosophy in the latter half of the 19<sup>th</sup> and early decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. While widely regarded as fundamental not only to psychology, but also to epistemology, opinions differed as to the scope of the concept, with Brentano attempting to develop a rich account, in contrast to what he regarded as the impoverished notions employed by psychophysical research on the one hand and phenomenalist epistemology on the other. My talk will highlight some factors contributing to an intellectual culture that ultimately favored a leaner conception of consciousness, both as an object and method of psychological and philosophical investigations.

## References

- Brentano, Franz Clemens. 1874. *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte*. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot
- Crane, Tim. 2003. "The Intentional Structure of Consciousness." In *Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives* edited by A. Jokic and Q. Smith (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press 2003) 33-56
- Poli, Roberto (Ed.). 1998. *The Brentano Puzzle*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Rollinger, Robin D. 1999. *Husserl's Position in the School of Brentano*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Smith, Barry 1994. *Austrian Philosophy. The Legacy of Franz Brentano*. Chicago and LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court.



## **The rise and fall of historical psychology in Germany, 1980-2000**

**Kathrin Gärtner & Adrian C. Brock**

Independent Scholar & University College Dublin

In his recent book on the history of memory, Kurt Danziger (2008) points out that psychology has interests in common with many other subjects but these interests are differentially pursued. Thus while it is acceptable to explore the common ground between psychology and neuroscience, an exploration of the common ground between psychology and history is less likely to be tolerated. The difference lies in the social status of these disciplines. It is similar to the difference between ~~someone who marries into a higher social class and someone who marries into a lower social class.~~ In the latter case, family members will often boycott the wedding.

What is historical psychology? The question is much more difficult to answer than it seems since there are many different definitions of the term. There has also been a great deal of work that is usually associated with historical psychology, even those it goes under a different name. The "history of mentalities" is a case in point (Peeters, 1996). Historical psychology is to be distinguished from history of psychology in that it is not directly concerned with the activities of psychologists but with the subject-matter of psychology. An example of a study in historical psychology would be an examination of popular views on human sexuality in Ancient Greece. Historical psychology should also be distinguished from psychohistory which takes some theory of psychology, usually psychoanalysis, and tries to apply it retroactively to historical figures like Mahatma Gandhi or Martin Luther. As the different names imply, psychohistory applies psychology to history, whereas historical psychology applies history to psychology.

In spite of the slightly disreputable nature of the field, the links between psychology and history are so obvious to many people that the idea of a historical psychology has constantly resurfaced in different places at different times. Some examples from the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century include *Problems of Historical Psychology* (1960) by Zevedei Barbu and *The Changing Nature of Man: Introduction to a Historical Psychology* (1961) by Jan Hendrik van den Berg. Some years later, an article by Kenneth Gergen titled, "Social psychology as history" (1973) became one of the most widely read and cited articles in the history of psychology but a later attempt to provide some substance to the arguments in the form of an edited volume, *Historical Social Psychology* proved to be much less successful (Gergen & Gergen, 1985).



**Extensive Dimensions of Psychology in the early 20<sup>th</sup> Century:  
Awareness, Aesthetics and some Astronomy –The Discoveries of Karl Julius Lohnert.**

**Susanne Guski-Leinwand**

Universität Heidelberg

This contribution would like to give a remembrance to a very unknown psychologist, which made various discoveries in psychology and in astronomy as well. For psychology and its history it is interesting, how early the dimensions of perception and aesthetic were examined:

It was Karl Julius Lohnert, who found out, that informations about variations on geometrical figures were neglected, although they were given: In his psychological examinations at Wundt's laboratory in Lipsia he presented various rectangles and squares on canvas. By changing their extensions and informing his Pb about this, they did not guess the right ones as changed while being asked for the right *form*. But they were able to find out the changed geometrical forms while being asked for the length or height. This difference was shortly discussed in his dissertation "Untersuchungen über die Auffassung von Rechtecken" (examinations about the view of rectangles) as aspects of aesthetics. The results of Lohnerts experiments could be seen as early impulses and as a contribution to the experimental examination of the role of aesthetics and of information processes as well.

Aesthetics is the philosophical notion of beauty and depends on education and awareness of elite cultural values. The results of Lohnerts experiments show that learned "aesthetical items" are able to falsify the awareness for presented and informed details. The judgement of perhaps more aesthetical geometrical figures led to a neglect of clear informations about them. The judgement of visual presentations were taken against a better knowledge.

In how far these results were later used for visual propaganda against Jews in Germany is not examined, but Lohnerts experiments show that there are aspects which could be discussed in this context. Lohnert himself seemed to follow other goals: He worked as a teacher in Lipsia until he died there in 1944.

But before studying philosophy and psychology in Lipsia he studied astronomy, physics and mathematics in Heidelberg. While observing the stars on the Koenigstuhl in Heidelberg he discovered 4 minor planets in the years 1906 and 1907. One of them was called in the name of Wilhelm Wundt by Karl Julius Lohnert in the year 1912. His whole engagement for science shows that he was able to discover new dimensions and spheres: In psychology he combined the examination of visual perception and information processes, which led to the discovery of the "aesthetic sphere" – in astronomy he discovered four minor planets which were tenth of years very unknown, included the planet named by Wilhelm Wundt. The family of Wundt did not know about this fact before. They were astonished about the various unknown honors for Wilhelm Wundt.

This contribution would like to give a remembrance to the work and person of Karl Julius Lohnert as well as of the honorable work of Wilhelm Wundt and the short correspondence with Karl Julius Lohnert and from Karl Julius Lohnert during his studies in Lipsia.



## Sándor Ferenczi and the Problem of Telepathy

**Julia Gyimesi**

Hungarian Academy of Sciences

It is well known that Sándor Ferenczi, the great representative of the Budapest School of Psychoanalysis, was a real innovator. His contributions to the technique and theory of psychoanalysis proved to be fundamental in the history of psychoanalysis. It is less known that Ferenczi was also deeply influenced by psychical research and spiritualism. Although it is not easy to estimate the effects of his telepathy experiments in light of his innovations, it is unquestionable that Ferenczi was strongly interested in thought-transference and forced systematic research in the field.

Ferenczi was one of those few psychoanalysts who did not intend to disprove the validity of the seemingly supernatural phenomena; however, in his basic theories he ignored the results of his experiments. His researches in the field of spiritualism and psychical research remained isolated fragments, which supposedly influenced his professional development, but did not determine it.

However, it is not accidental that Ferenczi discusses spiritualism in one of his earliest publications (1899). It tells a lot about the content and the significance of Ferenczi's psychoanalysis. It reveals not only the scientific attitudes of the young Ferenczi, but the innovative enthusiasm which characterized so many scientists at the turn of the last century. Nevertheless, the publication raises many questions: What is the significance of this early article in Ferenczi's life-work? Is his interest in spiritualistic phenomena determining or is it only a transitory enthusiasm? Why did Ferenczi devote an article to spiritualism in the first years of his psychological career? What is the connection between this article and his later psychoanalytic theories?

Ferenczi's interest in spiritualism seems to be an important component of his psychology since it was present all his life and supposedly influenced his ideas. Ferenczi was connected with several mediums which affected him both emotionally and intellectually. For him telepathy proved the permeability of the human psyche and the existence of the hidden channels of the unconscious.

The attitude outlined in his article on spiritualism proves to be fundamental in his further researches with mediums and clairvoyants searching for evidence for the reality of seemingly supernatural phenomena. Later he declared that transference and counter-transference in psychoanalytic therapy could be analogous with the functioning of thought-transference. In 1910 he told Freud of his discovery: "Interesting news in the transference story. *Imagine, I am a great soothsayer, that is to say, a reader of thoughts!* I am reading my patients' thoughts (in my free associations). The future methodology of  $\Psi$ A must make use of this... This method will be suitable to catch the patient's most active complexes at work. – It can be refined even more! When I come to Vienna, I will introduce myself as "court astrologer of the psychoanalysts." (Ferenczi (November 22, 1910) 1993, 235-236)

It is not accidental that in the correspondence of Freud and Ferenczi, Ferenczi's telepathy experiments are rather frequently mentioned. In my presentation I attempt to outline the basic characteristics of his psychical researcher attitude and try to understand its significance in the life-work of Ferenczi.

## References

- Ferenczi, Sándor. 1899. Spiritizmus. *Gyógyászat* 30:477-479.  
Freud, Sigmund, Ferenczi, Sándor. (1993-2000). *The Correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Sándor Ferenczi*. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.



## Arnold Gesell's Eugenical Analysis of His Hometown

**Ben Harris**

University of New Hampshire

In North America, Arnold Gesell was the most prominent figure in the field of child development and foremost expert on parenting and child rearing from the 1920s to the 1950s. Less well known are his strong eugenicist views. Building upon recent scholarship on Gesell, this paper describes and analyzes Gesell's eugenical analysis of his hometown, published when he was a thirty-three year old medical student at Yale University.

In 1913 the reformist *American Magazine* published a popular article by Gesell, "A Village of a Thousand Souls". In it, he described his hometown of Alma Wisconsin – but did not name it. He argued that a disproportionate number of its residents were defective in character or habits, and attributed this to hereditary defect, since the physical environment was healthy and scenic. What was needed, he said, was dynamiting the source of this social pollution, rather than adding attractive plants to the banks of the river of life. The article was illustrated with photos from the collection of his father (Gerhard Gesell), who had a photography business in Alma for decades.

Although this article has been noted by historians (e.g., Harris, 1999), no one has asked why and how he wrote it. A simplistic view is that he was a politically conservative eugenicist and was settling scores with the town he had left. In fact, Gesell was a fervent socialist and had strong, positive feelings for his family and home town. For example, after finishing his Ph.D. at Clark University, Gesell taught at a boy's camp in NH and then moved to New York, where he taught elementary school at night and lived at the East Side Settlement House. There he was inspired by Edmond Kelly and Edith Kelly, whose anti-aristocratic temperament and evolutionary socialism resonated with the values Gesell had learned from his parents. As a socialist, Gesell was outraged at the chasm between the living conditions for New York's rich and poor. What was needed was not a settlement house funded by the wealthy, but a redistribution of wealth.

When he moved to Los Angeles to teach in the same university as Lewis Terman, he frequently walked from his job to the large park nearby and socialized with war veterans, socialist agitators and preachers. One night he accompanied a tramp to a doctor's office and was mistaken by the doctor's assistant for a working man. His reaction was to write in his journal:

*"In the night all cats are black; so too I suppose in the night all men are brothers. Anyway it flattered my silly socialist heart to be classed as brother with the penniless tramp in the yard below. It was all like Primitive Christianity and felt strangely so. It was like a transfiguration. When walking home I remarked to the lady 'well we are all chips from the same block' and she said 'Ah, wouldn't it be grand if all of us only realized that'."*

Inspired by the experience he wrote a remarkable essay on "comradeship" that could not be further away from the anti-immigrant beliefs of Terman and other contemporaries:

*What is comradeship? It were a pity if we had to define that most democratic of all words. Not long ago I saw two or three immigrants- just-over-from Italy-landed on our hospitable shores. They were lugging at their bulky hand trunks, lugging them up the long flight of stairs to an elevated railroad station. No one needed to be informed that they had just landed. They talked in the vernacular; their clothes had not yet been naturalized and there was a strong betraying smell of garlic. Along comes a young man, who never landed, a native American up to date in attire and bearing and altogether odorless. Does he give the Italians a lift at their luggage? Not he. He puts his fingers to his nostrils and remarks so that those who ran might have heard, "And they let them things into this country!" It was no joke. The man was expressing his attitude.*

Using Gesell's papers at the Library of Congress, this paper will describe the German-American community in which Gesell was raised, and the republican values that he learned as a child (Gesell, 1906). It will also show Gesell's socialist views as a student and post-doctoral teacher (Gesell, 1909). One theme in this paper is the compatibility of socialism and eugenics in the United States in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century—which one hopes will be a discussion point with a European audience.



From Gesell's papers, the archives of the Wisconsin State Historical Society and other archival sources, this paper will reconstruct Gesell's deployment of photographic evidence in favor of his eugenical views. One can see, for example, his substituting a street scene from a nearby town for one in Alma, because that scene featured a tavern which Gesell used to symbolize alcoholism in Alma. The reactions of his family and of local townspeople will also be described, which may have been connected with the removal from his papers of correspondence about his 1913 article. For context, this paper will review the *genres* of eugenical exposé and social survey, and connect Gesell's article with them.

One question that will be raised is how and when Gesell's political beliefs changed, or whether they really did change-- rather than become adapted to his status and the changing questions addressed by psychology in the 1920s and 1930s.

---

## References

- Gesell, A. L. (1906). Funeral Oration. Arnold Gesell Papers, Box 228, folder "Funeral Oration On Gerhard Gesell", Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
- Gesell, A. L. (circa 1909). Untitled talk to teachers at Los Angeles Normal School. Arnold Gesell Papers, Box 236, folder "Notebooks", Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
- Gesell, A. (1913, October). The Village of a Thousand Souls, *American Magazine*, pp. 11-16.
- Harris, B. (1999). Arnold Gesell. In J. A. Garraty and M. C. Carnes (Eds.), *American National Biography*, Vol. 8, pp. 877-878. New York: Oxford University Press.



## Why did Culture fall to the wayside in Psychology?

**Matt Harvey**

University College Dublin

Culture has lately enjoyed an increasingly prominent place in Psychology, fitting neatly in the general trend towards the social constructionist perspective among many in the field, and the increasing international character of the discipline. This is reflected in the rise of discrete fields such as cross-cultural psychology and cultural psychology, as well as an increasing number of works analysing the role of culture in psychological phenomena.

Equally too, early on in the history of Psychology 'culture' also enjoyed popularity in theory and research, with early figures such as Wilhelm Wundt, W.H. Rivers, C.S. Rivers and Fredric Bartlett taking an interest in the area. In particular Wilhelm Wundt produced a 10 volume *Volkerpsychologie* exploring the relationship between culture and psychology.

However after this period of grace, culture very much fell to the wayside until towards the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Trends inside the discipline lead to culture being regarded as an aside to human nature, and thus placing it outside the realm of psychological inquiry - even viewing it as an anathema to psychology as an empiricist research tradition.

Culture is evidently a perennial a factor in behaviour, shaping innumerable aspects of our lives, so how and why did it fall by the wayside in Psychology? How could something so evident and important simply be ignored? Moreover, what can it tell us of the culture's return to prominence within the discipline?

Several theoretical, methodological and historical factors are considered in the present work, considering the narrowing of theory and methodology within the discipline that lead to the decades of marginalization of the concept of culture from Psychological theory and research.

Principally the move towards logical positivism, empiricism and universal laws of human, epitomized by Behaviourism, is considered. Empiricism and logical positivism remained the dominant paradigm in academic psychology until the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, successfully marginalizing alternatives in theory and practice. Working on the presumption of universals in human behaviour and using experimentation to uncover them, context such culture was either just another obstacle to be filtered out or accounted for, or simply something to be ignored as a potential influence.

Likewise the methodological approaches that became popular in the discipline were not necessarily geared to accounting for culture, also contributing to culture's decline within the discipline. The subjective nature of the study of culture and cultures in Anthropological field work was very much divorced from the conceptions of objectivity laboratory studies and statistical analysis of data, and the 'scientific' qualities which they represented.

Wilhelm Wundt had postulated non-experimental methods for the psychological exploration of parts of culture such as myth, religion, custom and language given their resistance to experimental methods; the dominance of experimental and statistical approach in Psychology however did not allow for this duality, and therefore such areas like culture were not really suited for the methodological tools that were considered credible and most widely used.

In a similar vein the trend formerly in Psychology of guarding against influences of other human and social sciences, and of Philosophy, helped buttress against concepts and influences of other fields that did not fit easily into the accepted canon, and indeed of methodologies related to their study. This period of intransience helped solidify the monoculture within the discipline, that of prizing logical positivism and empiricism, and rejecting alternatives as unscientific, further making the integration of concepts such as culture unlikely until the eventual rise of social constructionism.

This paper consolidates and considers the influence of these factors in further detail, and discusses the possible implications for the future of the role of culture in Psychology and also the implications of the culture's acceptance within the field.

## References

- Cohen, B. (2009). Many forms of Culture. *American Psychologist*, 64 (3), 194-204.
- Danziger, K. (1990) *Constructing the Subject: Historical origins of psychological research*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Fancher, R.E. (1996) *Pioneers of Psychology* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.). London: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Hobart, M. (2000) *After Culture: Anthropology as Radical Metaphysical Critique*. Yogyakarta: Duta Wacana University Press.
- Kashima, Y. (2000). Conceptions of Culture and Person For Psychology. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 31(1), 14 - 32.
- Kuper, A. (2000) *Culture: The Anthropologists' Account*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.



## Eric Wanner and the Making of Behavioral Economics<sup>1</sup>

**Floris Heukelom**

Radboud University Nijmegen

Based on interviews and archival research, this paper documents and discusses the role of Eric Wanner in the making of behavioral economics. Extending the author's earlier work on behavioral economics (Heukelom, 2009, 2010, 2011, forthcoming a,b), it covers the inception of Wanner's behavioral economic program at the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation in 1984, through to Wanner's creation of the behavioral economic roundtable at the Russell Sage Foundation in 1992. Based on a detailed historical discussion of the interactions between Wanner, the behavioral advisory committee, the boards of trustees of the two foundations, and the different scientists involved, the paper shows that during these eight years Wanner played a crucial role both in creating and supporting the (at the time) small new economic sub-discipline.

Cognitive psychologist Wanner was a PhD student and subsequently post doc at Harvard's Center for Cognitive Studies in the 1960s and 1970s. As Cohen-Cole (2007) convincingly argues, a main focus of the Center in the early 1960s was to create an interdisciplinary research culture that would bring together the best tools, theories and researchers from psychology, linguistics, philosophy, biology, mathematics, history, and other disciplines. Wanner's research of the late 1960s and 1970s on experimental psycholinguistics is a clear exponent of the type of research advanced by the Center. However, Cohen-Cole (2007) also shows that the interdisciplinary culture proved to be an elusive target for managerial control and was less successful in producing scientific output than initially hoped. Thus, the interdisciplinary culture gave way to a multidisciplinary culture in which the different disciplines worked in parallel and with little interaction.

In the late 1970s, Wanner gradually moved from academia to Harvard University Press, where for a few years he was the general editor of the Press's Cognitive Science Series. Again a few years later, in 1984, Wanner became a program officer at the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, through which he had been funded previously as a PhD and post doc at Harvard. In 1985 Wanner became Sloan's Vice-President, and in 1986 he was appointed President of the Russell Sage Foundation, a position he has held ever since. At Sloan and Russell Sage, Wanner created a small, but eventually highly successful program called the behavioral economics program, which aimed to apply behavioral (used interchangeably with 'cognitive') psychology to economics. Based on his experiences at Harvard's Center for Cognitive Studies, Wanner from the start carefully balanced psychologists and economists in the advisory committee, in the group of scientists invited to participate, and in the grants awarded. Also the program's name, behavioral economics, was understood as deliberately half psychology-half economics.

The behavioral economics program was designed as much to serve Wanner's career in the world of foundations as it served Wanner scientific interests. Wanner's scientific interests explain why he always wanted to go further and to take more risk than the Sloan and Russell Sage boards of trustees. At the same time, the – in retrospect – high quality of researchers who quickly flocked to the new program, the clear enthusiasm and effort put into the program by the contributors, and the undisputed success of the program from the early 1990s onwards, equally illuminate a relatively short time horizon and narrow definition of success on the part of the boards of trustees. The paper argues, however, that this tension is largely compatible with the organization of foundations vis à vis behavioral sciences in the post war period (e.g. Grossman, 1982, Goodwin, 1998). Yet, it draws attention to the double role played by the behavioral economics program's advisory committee as both safeguarding scientific quality and neutrality, as well as providing a claim of authority to Wanner in making his case at the boards of trustees of the Sloan and Russell Sage foundations. It is a testimony to the beauty – or, depending on one's perspective, the irony – of history that the program was eventually terminated in 1992 at the very moment when behavioral economics began its ascendance to economic prominence. The awarding of the Nobel memorial prize in economics to psychologist Daniel Kahneman in 2002, and the prominence of behavioral economists in United States President Obama's team of economic advisors is a direct consequence of Wanner's program.

<sup>1</sup> Research for this paper has been supported by a Grant-in-Aid from the Rockefeller Archive Center.



## Bibliography

- Cohen-Cole, J. (2007). "Instituting the science of mind: intellectual economies and disciplinary exchange at Harvard's Center for Cognitive Studies." British Journal for the History of Science 40(4): 567-597.
- Goodwin, C. D. (1998). "The Patrons of Economic in a Time of Transformation." History of Political Economy Annual supplement: 53-81.
- Grossman, D. M. (1982). "American Foundations and the Support of Economic Research, 1913-1929." Minerva 20(1-2): 59-82.
- Heukelom, F. (2009). Kahneman and Tversky and the Making of Behavioral Economics. Economics. Amsterdam, University of Amsterdam. PhD: 170.
- Heukelom, F. (2010). "Measurement and Decision Making at the University of Michigan in the 1950s and 1960s." Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 46(2): 187-205.
- Heukelom, F. (2011). "What to Conclude from Psychological Experiments: The Contrasting Cases of Experimental and Behavioral Economics." History of Political Economy.
- Heukelom, F. (under review). "An explanation of the Kahneman-Tversky collaboration." Journal of the History of Economic Thought.
- Heukelom, F. (under review). "Normative mistakes and descriptive solutions: Kahneman and Tversky's research of the 1970s." History of Political Economy.



## The Psychologist's Dilemma Game

**René van Hezewijk & Henderikus Stam**

Open Universiteit Nederland & University of Calgary, Canada

"The only thing then is to use as much sagacity as you can possess, and to be as candid as you can." (James, 1890, p. 194).

Among the recurrent cleavages that define 20<sup>th</sup> century psychology is the deep division between psychologies that distance the psychologist from the phenomenon under investigation from those that engage the question under investigation from the perspective of the reflexive capacities of the psychologist as one among other human beings and/or members of a specific culture. Most obvious was the emergence of phenomenology, an explicit *philosophical* position in the debate on the foundations of science. Focusing on psychology it sought to provide an alternative formulation of interiority that Husserl claimed was the transcendental science of pure consciousness, what he called in 1913 still the "science of essential Being." But it was not Husserl who succeeded in creating a phenomenological *psychology* but a number of his followers who revised phenomenology so that it would provide the justification for a categorization of experience. Although the label "phenomenological psychology" is now widely and loosely applied to a range of methods that bear little resemblance to the debates of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century attempt to create a unique phenomenological psychology was successful in establishing an alternative position, albeit ever so briefly, within the discipline. The later incarnations of humanistic psychologies and social constructionisms owe their initial form to this debate.

North American psychology after World War II however took its purpose clearly to be the psychology that was capable at every turn of demonstrating the limits of human subjectivity. Both behaviorism and cognitive psychology premised on the thesis that behavioral continuities could provide the mechanism by which one might articulate the features of the system. Social psychology, in the meantime, adopted a version of experimentation whose functions were to demonstrate that human beings were fallible and incapable of cognizing the determinants of their own actions.

As early as 1890 William James articulated the Psychologists' Fallacy (the "great snare of the psychologist") as the "confusion of his own standpoint with that of the mental fact about which he is making his report" (p. 196). Although this could be read as a critique of introspection, and James meant it as such in part, it is also a critique of the failure to recognize the reflexive nature of psychologists' claims. For James, "we must avoid substituting what we know the consciousness *is*, for what it is a consciousness *of*, and counting its outward, and so to speak physical, relations with other facts of the world, in among the objects of which we set it down as aware" (James, 1890, p. 197).

On the one hand the psychologist takes the standpoint that seems capable of recapitulating recreating from scratch the determinants governing the behavior of persons without ever involving the background or tacit knowledge of the recreating psychologist him or herself. On the other hand the psychologist is supposed to be incapable of understanding and explaining the behavior of a person without using knowledge of the meanings those persons employ. The first type of psychologist is not – or does not want to be – aware of the implicit knowledge they need for understanding behavior, the second type of psychologist is vulnerable to the fads and fallacies to which every human being in every culture is vulnerable.

Interestingly, we now find psychologists of the first type that meet the boundaries of their rationalism when they find that some of the alleged fads and fallacies are very clever after all. Survival seems more successful if we ignore the explicit knowledge that one's behavior is fallacy-bound. For instance Gerd Gigerenzer claims that fallacies are not fallacious after all; they are fallacies only in the light of theories claiming truth or justice or rightness in situations that are ecologically irrational. (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001; Gigerenzer, 2007; Wegner, 2002)

In trying to find a counter instance of the latter, we have an interesting example in the work of Johannes Linschoten (1925-1964). Referring and adding to earlier presentations in the ESHHS conferences we think we have found a way to understand the allegedly significant "paradigm switch" from phenomenology to positivism, or the "conversion to positivism" of Johannes Linschoten in his "Idols" (Linschoten, 1964). We even have a better understanding of why Linschoten used the word "Idols", which he borrowed from Francis Bacon.



## References

- Bargh, J. A., Gollwitzer, P. M., Lee-Chai, A., Barndollar, K., & Trötschel, R. (2001). The Automated Will: Nonconscious Activation and Pursuit of Behavioral Goals. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 81(6), 1014-1027.
- Gigerenzer, G. (2007). *Gut feelings : the intelligence of the unconscious*. New York: Viking.
- James, W. (1890). *Principles of Psychology*, vol. 1&2. New York: Dover.
- Linschoten, J. (1964). *Idolen van de psycholoog (Idols of the psychologist)* (2nd ed.). Utrecht: Bijleveld.
- Wegner, D. (2002). *The illusion of conscious will*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.



## The Bias of *Musikbewusstsein*: The Carl Stumpf and Wilhelm Wundt Debate

Alexandra Hui

Mississippi State University

In the early 1890s, the physiological psychologist (though he could also be termed psychophysicist, philosopher, and/or ethnomusicologist) Carl Stumpf engaged in a vicious polemic with Wilhelm Wundt, also a physiological psychologist, over their respective tone-differentiation studies. Repeatedly, in the series of articles that constituted the exchange, Stumpf insisted on experimentation that accounted for the bias of "music-consciousness," even "music-infected-consciousness." He criticized Wundt's disregard for the role of musical expertise in psychophysical studies sound sensation.

The language employed by Stumpf is provocative, and implies that musicianship was a disease or at least a pre-existing condition. Musical expertise manipulated one's aesthetic experience, both in the concert hall and inside the lab. And yet, Stumpf certainly would not have condemned musicianship itself. For Stumpf, the bias of "music-consciousness" allowed for better insight into sound sensation, indeed such a bias in the experimental subject was ideal. Stumpf claimed musical expertise was a necessary component of scientific expertise.

The four-year polemic between Carl Stumpf and Wilhelm Wundt is an example of how the shifting cultural niche reflected and reinforced the end of the psychophysical study of sound sensation an enterprise bound up with the values and issues of late nineteenth-century musical aesthetics. The debate was initially framed in terms of the proper application of the Fechner-Weber law to studies pitch sensitivity. However, it was quickly reframed around the role of musical expertise in sound sensation studies and the bias of Stumpf's conception of music-consciousness. Stumpf's theory of music-consciousness, *Musikbewusstsein*, can be understood as one final attempt to psychophysically reconcile universal laws of sound sensation with Western musical aesthetics. I argue that the debate's turn to psychophysical expertise reflected a significant shift in the psychophysical study of sound sensation: there was now a right and wrong way of hearing. Further, with subjective, individual experience of sound no longer considered valid, there was no longer a place for musical aesthetics in the psychophysics of sound sensation.

This shift was the culmination of a trend that had its roots in the 1840s. From the middle to the end of the nineteenth-century, the psychophysical study of sound sensation, an orientation that addressed questions of musical aesthetics, was bound up with both the world of natural science and the world of music. The goal of many psychophysical investigators – Gustav Fechner, Hermann von Helmholtz, Ernst Mach, and of course, Carl Stumpf, to name a few – was to reconcile universal laws of sound sensation with historically and culturally contingent aesthetics of music. As a result, music was both the object of experimental study and the means of experimental study. This practice did not last. By the end of the century a shift occurred and soon psychophysics and musical aesthetics were separated, relegated to the young disciplines of experimental psychology and comparative musicology. The psychophysical study of sound sensation was no longer a study of musical aesthetics. I argue that the end of the psychophysical study of sound sensation as a project bound up with musical aesthetics, was associated with significant changes in both German academia and German music culture. Disciplinary splits, the proliferation of new disciplines meant the frameworks within which Wundt and Stumpf defined their projects were unstable. Further, the music itself changed. Traditional music of the classical German style could no longer be treated as equivalent to sound, at least not exclusive of other cultural traditions and the increasingly radical harmonies and rhythms of contemporary Western music. Through a close examination of the debate between Wilhelm Wundt and Carl Stumpf over the bias of music-consciousness (*Musikbewusstsein*), I show the ways in which the new disciplines and new sounds contributed to a shifting cultural niche, that, ultimately, resulted in a new practice of listening, within which a psychophysical study of sound sensation as a study of musical aesthetics could no longer survive.

In this paper I explore the ways in which the changing status of musical expertise informed and was reinforced by two significant shifts in the psychophysical study of sound sensation. First, as evidenced in the Stumpf-Wundt debate, there was a narrowing of the conception of hearing. Second, the uncertain status of musical expertise reflected a similarly uncertain role for subjective, individual musical experience in the laboratory and, ultimately, a decoupling of musical aesthetics from psychophysical studies of sound sensation. I examine how Stumpf's efforts to defend the status musical expertise reflect the inversely related conceptions of hearing and listening – as the definition of hearing narrowed, the understanding of listening widened and became increasingly layered – at the end of the nineteenth century.



**Is not the responsibility a moral problem anymore? Towards the psychological measurement of responsibility at the beginning of 20th century in Spain**

**Belén Jiménez**

Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha (UCLM)

This paper presents the transformation of the imputation model that takes place in the Spanish context at the end of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth. More specifically, the aim is to show how the "moral problem" of responsibility was understood more and more in terms of a "psycho-metric problem"; this is to say, the problem of responsibility is displaced from an ethical-legal sphere into a psychological one. This answers the scientific ideal of objectification and technification.

At the end of the 19th century there is a transformation of an imputation model focused on the *criminal act* committed by man towards one focused on *criminal man* himself: particularly (1) in his "individuality", which characterises and differentiates him from other individuals, (2) his biographical history, the analysis in which tried not only to discover the biological and psychological heritage, but the "sense" of a personal history that has led the individual to commit a crime (see, for example, Carpena, 1930), and (3) the "degree" or "development" of his capacities and potentialities. This transformation of the classical imputation model implies a reconfiguration of the legal system which imposes penalties on offenders.

After all, this change deals closely with other transformations on politics, economics and culture in Spain at the time; specifically, with the development of a liberal, industrial and capitalist society. In the new society, "Psi Sciences" would have an important role in ensuring that citizens accept the new socio-political order: they would help to construct responsible and productive subjects.

Along with this shift towards the *criminal man* (individuality, biographical history, grades and development of potentialities), a new centre for imputation appears: the "criminal capacity", i.e. the subject's "temibility" or "dangerousness" in the process of law (Jiménez de Asúa, 1920). At the beginning of the twentieth century, this *criminal potentiality* became the main object of study in Criminal Psychology. The criminal potentiality was studied using quantitative psychological measures.

Once it is accepted that the important thing for maintaining the socio-political order is to know what man has inside to prevent the crime (the "defence of society"), the problem of responsibility is reduced to finding the mechanisms to enable easier and more successfully the measurement of the dangerousness.

This is clearly expressed by Anselmo González (1927), responsible for the *Servicio de Pedagogía de Anormales* (Service of Pedagogy for Mental Inferiority) de la *Escuela de Estudios Superiores de Magisterio* (School of Advance Studies in Education) in Madrid. Anselmo González was also a disciple of the Spanish lawyer Quintiliano Saldaña (1914 and 1927) and one of the first Spanish criminologists in Spain, Rafael Salillas (1901). González points out:

"The fundamental problem of expertise in relation to the changed circumstances based on an individual's mental inferiority should not be a diagnostic problem in the current state of science, but a forecasting problem. At the time of determining the subject's 'temibility' and therefore the security or the *forecast* measures that society should take, what matters is not to know what the offender was when he committed the crime, but what he will be in his afterlife" (González, 1927, p. 36, emphasis added).

Modern Psychology and, specifically, quantitative Psychology, in terms of Anselmo González, offers the most suitable tools to "enter" *objectively* in the "interiority" of man: they discover his individuality and the development, the evolution and/or the degree of his particular characteristics and differences (as a criminal).

**Bibliography**

- Carpena, F. (1930). *Hermanos-Lobos y hermanos-delincuentes*. Madrid: Galo Saez, palabras preliminares de José Maldonado Ayuso.
- González, A. (1927). *El problema de la responsabilidad*. Madrid: Góngora.
- Jiménez de Asúa, L. (1920). *El estado peligroso del delincuente y sus consecuencias ante el Derecho penal moderno*. Madrid: Reus.
- Saldaña, Q. (1914). *Los orígenes de la Criminología*. Madrid: Librería General de Victoriano Suárez.
- Saldaña, Q. (1927). *Capacidad criminal de las personas sociales (doctrina y legislación)*. Madrid: Editorial Reus.
- Salillas, R. (1901). *Teoría básica (bio-sociología)*. Madrid: Librería de Victoriano Suárez.



## **The renaissance of qualitative research and the social amnesia in psychology**

**Gordana Jovanović**

University of Belgrade

The aim of this paper is to examine specific features of reception of qualitative research paradigm in psychology. This is relevant not only in a historiographic sense but has important implications also for self-understanding of psychology as science.

A «quiet methodological revolution», as Norman Denzin and Ivonna Lincoln (1998) have described the new approach to theory and research taking place in the social sciences since 1960's, is also described as «a renaissance» of qualitative research (Flick, von Kardorff & Steinke, 2003; Gobo, 2005). By the renaissance is usually meant a revival of an older theoretical and research tradition which started in anthropology and especially in Chicago School of sociology in 1920's and 1930's.

As a matter of fact there were more origins located in different places, but remarkably also at the very same place – University of Chicago. George Herbert Mead thought social psychology based on symbolic interactionism in the philosophy department in Chicago in the first decades of twentieth century (and Mead studied in Germany under Wundt, Ebbinghaus and Dilthey). There was another influence of German thought (Simmel and Weber) coming to the Chicago School in the 1930s and 1940s. Nevertheless the prevailing historiography of qualitative research – still a rather rare subject-matter – repeats the Chicago origin story. As the renaissance of qualitative research started first in the USA in the 1960s and with a decade of delay in German-speaking area (Flick, 2002), the dominant 'Chicago origin story' could be understood as an expression of the power of cultural centration (or myopia) of the first returnees.

As far as psychology is concerned, it was delayed with a rediscovery of qualitative tradition – it is only now being rediscovered after a new crisis in psychology which started in the 1960s' (Nerlich, 2004).

Additionally to the delay in rediscovery of qualitative tradition, it is remarkably that psychology in a qualitative key repeated some omissions and attitudes of its mainstream historiography. The fact that Dilthey (1894) is usually not mentioned in the histories of psychology could be understood in view of the dominance of the natural science model within psychology. But the fact that Dilthey is missing also in qualitative reconceptualizations of psychology (for example, Willig, 2007, Smith, 2008) deserves a closer examination. Even more so as he is rather exceptionally mentioned even in very influential German publications on qualitative research (Flick, von Kardorff & Steinke, 2003).

If we take into account that Dilthey's (1894) concept of descriptive psychology was elaborated in opposition to explanatory psychology, we recognize a similar situation in distinction qualitative – quantitative approach – thus it would be possible to refer back to Dilthey. Dilthey's definition of subject-matter of descriptive psychology in terms of lived experience corresponds to the privileging of lived experience in the qualitative psychology. Understanding as opposed to prediction and explanation is also repeated in distinction qualitative-quantitative.

Why has the rediscovery of qualitative tradition in psychology remained without a serious recovery from amnesia of Dilthey? Has the separation from philosophy still an identity shaping function for psychology? Or has Dilthey's neglect of language (Nerlich, 2004) made him unattractive for a position so strongly oriented toward language?



## Bibliography

- Denzin, N. & Y. Lincoln (1998) *The Landscape of Qualitative Research*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Dilthey, W. (1974). Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie. In: W. Dilthey: *Die gestige Welt: Einleitung in die Philosophie des Lebens* (Gesammelte Schriften, B. 5) (pp. 139-240). Stuttgart: Teubner. (First published 1894).
- Flick, U. (2002) Qualitative research – state of the art. *Social Science Information*, 41 (1): 5-24.
- Flick, U., von Kardorff, E., & Steinke, I., eds. (2003) *Qualitative Forschung. Ein Handbuch* [Qualitative Research. A Handbook]. Reinbek: Rowohlt.
- Gobo, G. (2005) 'The Renaissance of Qualitative Methods'. (22 paragraphs). *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum Qualitative Social Research* 6 (3), Art. 42, Retrieved February 15, 2007. <http://www.qualitative-research.net/fqs-texte/3-05/05-3-42-e.htm>.
- Nerlich, B. (2004) 'Coming Full (Hermeneutic Circle). The Controversy about Psychological Methods' in Z. Todd, B. Nerlich, S. McKeown & D...D. Clarke (Eds.) *Mixing Methods in Psychology: The Integration of Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in Theory and Practice*. New York: Taylor, pp. 17-36.
- Smith, J. A. (ed.) (2008). *Qualitative Psychology*. London: Sage.
- Willig, C. (2007). *Introducing Qualitative Research in Psychology*. Maidenhead: Open University Press.



## **A brief introduction to the history of psychology in Romania**

**Julien-Ferencz Kiss & Mihai Anitei**

University of Bucharest

The aim of this paper is to analyze the establishment of scientific psychology in Romania at the end of the XIX-th century and the beginning of the XX century. Also we will focus on the interferences between psychology and ideology during the totalitarian regime from 1948 to 1989. The researches on the history of psychological culture in Romania revealed psychological concepts of classical origin, that had been found in religious writings (especially of Byzantine origin) or in philosophical papers (inspired by Aristotle, Wolff, Kant or Condillac), promoted in particular in the Royal Academies from Iasi and Bucharest.

Also at the end of XIX-th and early XX century, Eduard Gruber, in Iasi (1893), and Constantin Radulescu-Motru in Bucharest (1906), initiated in Romania experimental psychological research, both of them trained at Leipzig by Wilhelm Wundt. The laboratory established by Gruber, was mentioned by Victor Henry in a statistical survey on existing experimental psychology laboratories in the world, in 1893. It was one of those 10 existing laboratories in Europe at that time. So we can say that psychology as an experimental science, entered into Romania relatively quickly, just 14 years after the establishing of the first experimental psychology laboratory in Leipzig. Unfortunately, after Eduard Gruber's death (as a result of overworking) in 1896, the experimental psychology laboratory ends its activity. Also, the laboratory founded by Radulescu-Motru in Bucharest will cease to work around the onset of World War I, as then to be scattered during the war, and for the restoration and proper equipment Rădulescu-Motru waited until 1928.

A major impact on the development of psychology in Romania was the experimental psychology course held by Alfred Binet at the University of Bucharest, in 1895, which fundamentally influenced Nicolae Vaschide, who will conduct further research in France with Binet, Toulouse and Pieron alongside he will publish in 1904 a paper of great impact at that time, "The technique of experimental psychology". Unfortunately, the premature death of Vaschide before returning to his native country, hinders again the development of psychology in Romania.

Romanian psychology, steps in universality when Florian Stefanescu-Goanga (who was also being trained at the school of Wilhelm Wundt), established in Cluj-Napoca (1922), The Institute of Experimental Comparative and Applied Psychology. Psychology suffered at that time a significant development both in terms of consolidation of schools and specific current, and the applications in the social area.

Both, Florian Stefanescu-Goanga and Constantin Radulescu-Motru made a political lobby for the introduction of psychology in schools, industry, hospitals and army. The effects of their initiative in Romanian society of the 1930's were: the adjustment of educational services to the needs of the children, the introduction of selection and training of personnel for the industry, evaluating personnel involved in transport or evaluation and selection of soldiers for different tasks depending on their capabilities. Thus by the beginning of World War II, in Romania there were a number of psychological institutes that implemented psychology in various sectors of society. Also universities from Cluj- Napoca and Bucharest sent to training their students in the greatest centers of psychology of the world.



**Psychical Research and Parapsychology Interpreted: An Overview of Scholarly Interpretations of the History of Scientific Investigation into 'Paranormal Phenomena'**

**Ingrid Kloosterman**

Utrecht University (graduated in Descartes Mastersprogram)

Although as late as 1985 Oppenheim referred in her study to psychical research as a 'pseudoscience', nowadays it is deemed ahistorical and presentistic when psychical research and its successor, parapsychology, are not being studied in their own historical and cultural context. In this paper an overview is given of the scholarly accounts of the history of psychical research and parapsychology to argue for a new direction in the historiography of the subject: one that is centred upon the relation between parapsychology and psychology throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century in the Netherlands.

The first accounts of the history of psychical research and parapsychology were written by insiders who either felt they needed to defend the research into 'paranormal' phenomena against allegations of fraud or were the ones making these allegations themselves. The discussion about the validity of the results of the experiments and the reality of the proof for the existence of paranormal phenomena appears to be a never-ending one and is also persistent in the first historical accounts.

Developments within the field of the social sciences and humanities made psychical research and parapsychology a respectable subject for more unbiased scholarly attention. Kuhn's ideas regarding scientific revolutions showed the relativity of the ideas of demarcation in science and thus the practical and contextual aspects of science were emphasized. This led to a whole new field of studies: the sociology of science and knowledge. Regarding the subject of parapsychology, these sociologists hoped to be able to witness a 'live' scientific revolution. But not only interest in the contemporary development of parapsychology was stimulated; the history of psychical research and parapsychology was taken to be of interest as well. The first attempts were made to put psychical research and parapsychology into their historical and cultural contexts, mostly by showing how these new fields of investigation filled the gap in between science and religion. In the paper it is shown that some of these historical studies were more successful in this enterprise than others.

Gradually, psychical research and parapsychology (and related fields) were not viewed as marginal or deviant sciences but as central to the culture in which they emerged. In the last ten years or so a growing number of historians have concentrated their scholarly activities hereon. These studies try to show for example that scientific concepts such as 'telepathy' do not emerge in a scientific vacuum but in a matrix of social and cultural influences, or that in its specific period and culture deviant sciences were very much part of the discussion what constitutes science, or that occult sciences are very much concerned with the development of the idea of self that first emerged at that specific time.

Psychical research and parapsychology appear firmly rooted in their cultural and historical context in the most recent historical accounts. However, the scientific context has received far less attention. Certainly, the intertwinement between psychical research and physics has been thoroughly researched, but the connection between parapsychology and psychology has received far less attention. In the majority of the literature the opinions of Freud, Janet and Jung regarding psychical research and their involvement in the field is cited (briefly), but a full analysis of the stances psychology and parapsychology held towards each other is currently lacking.

The word parapsychology is used deliberately here, for the majority of the literature is more concerned with psychical research than with parapsychology. Most studies focus on the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century – sometimes extended towards the 1930s or 1940s – when the term parapsychology had not yet fully replaced the older term psychical research. Apart from a handful sociologists, not one recent scholar has fully researched the developments of parapsychology after the second world war. It is in the 20<sup>th</sup> century that the field of psychology is getting truly professionalized and it is worthy of investigation to see how psychology related then to the development of parapsychology as a scientific (sub)discipline.



Not only does most of the literature share an interest for the same period, the majority concentrates on the Anglo-Saxon world as well. There are certainly a few noteworthy exceptions, but in the paper it is argued that more emphasis on the developments in other countries is much needed, especially because the situation in other countries is sometimes very different. In the Netherlands not only were pioneering psychologists such as Gerard Heymans actively involved in experiments into telepathy, the first professor in parapsychology in the world (W.H.C. Tenhaeff) was appointed in 1953 at Utrecht University and in the 1970s and 1980s parapsychology had at Utrecht University its own research laboratory in the division of psychology. Arguably, the unique situation in the Netherlands deserves scholarly attention and would make an interesting case to investigate the much neglected connections between the fields of psychology and parapsychology in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

## References

- Beloff, John, *Parapsychology: a concise history*. (London: Athlone Press, 1993).
- Collins, Harry M., and Trevor J. Pinch, *Frames of Meaning: the social construction of extraordinary science*. (London, 1982).
- Dingwall, Eric John, *Very Peculiar People Portrait Studies in the Queer, the Abnormal and the Uncanny*. (New York: University Books, 1962).
- Gauld, Alan, *A History of Hypnotism*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
- , *The Founders of Psychical Research*. (Michigan: Schocken Books, 1968).
- Hall, Trevor H., *The Spiritualists: The Story of Florence Cook and William Crookes*. (New York: Helix Press, 1962).
- , *The Strange Case of Edmund Gurney*. (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1964).
- Inglis, Brian, *Natural and Supernatural: A History of the Paranormal from Earliest Times to 1914*. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977).
- , *Science and Parascience: A History of the Paranormal, 1914-1939*. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1984).
- Luckhurst, Roger, *The Invention of Telepathy, 1870-1901*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
- Mauskopf, Seymour H., and Michael R. McVaugh, *The Elusive Science: Origins of Experimental Psychical Research*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).
- Monroe, John Warne, *Laboratories of Faith: Mesmerism, Spiritism, and Occultism in Modern France*. (Ithaca: Cornell Univ Pr, 2008).
- Moore, Robert Laurence, *In Search of White Crows: Spiritualism, Parapsychology, and American Culture*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).
- Noakes, Richard, "The "bridge which is between psychical and psychical research": William Fletcher Barrett, sensitive flames, and Spiritualism." *History of Science* 42, no. 4 (December 2004): 419-464.
- Noakes, Richard J., "Telegraphy is an occult art: Cromwell Fleetwood Varley and the diffusion of electricity to the other world." *British Journal for the History of Science* 32, no. 115 (December 1999): 421-459.
- Oppenheim, Janet, *The Other World: Spiritualism and Psychical Research in England, 1850-1914*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
- Owen, Alex, *The Darkened Room: Women, Power, and Spiritualism in Late Victorian England*. (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1989).
- , *The Place of Enchantment: British Occultism and the Culture of the Modern*. (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2004).
- Sawicki, Diethard, *Leben mit den Toten: Geisterglauben und die Entstehung des Spiritismus in Deutschland 1770-1900*. (Paderbronn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2002).
- Wallis, Roy, ed., *On the margins of science: the social construction of rejected knowledge*. (Keele: University of Keele, 1979).



**Beyond Representationalism and Performativity: Cassirer and the "Crisis of Representation" in Anthropology**

**Tord Larsen**

NTNU Trondheim

Although Cassirer's understanding of language and myth has had some influence on anthropological thought (e.g. Hallowell, Herskovits, Geertz), his approach to meaning contains untapped resources for dealing with the "crisis of representation" which beset anthropology after the postcolonial onslaught of the 1980s. The crisis was in part the result of the continued presence of "the episteme of representation" in anthropology, and it was not entirely overcome by various theories of performativity which were introduced to remedy the flaws of representationalism.

By presenting the symbolic forms as organs of reality rather than imitations of it, Cassirer sought to overcome the subject/object polarity of representationalism, which too often saw sense making as a conquest or an imposition of webs of meaning on an inchoate and meaningless substrate. It was this "imposition" – consonant with the self-defining subject of modernity and the age of the *Weltbild* (Heidegger) – which acquired a double meaning in the heyday of postcolonial critique: conferral of meaning and colonial domination.

Yet, I will argue that Cassirer was not a forerunner of multiculturalist philosophy and postcolonial theory, at least not in all their guises. Multiculturalist philosophy and postcolonial theory presuppose a concept of culture, often derived from anthropology in its romantic mode. And Cassirer did have a romantic strain in him. But he was also heir to the legacies of Kant and Hegel, and was definitely a man of the Enlightenment as well.

As I see it, *The Myth of the State* is in part an anticipation of and warning against some strains of modern identity politics. At least some varieties of modern identity politics strive to identify some cultural premises to which a group allegedly subscribes, and then to sanctify them as group emblems. This is an effort to convert cultural forms into objects in the world on a par with other objects, material or immaterial. In my opinion, such an endeavour rests on a misguided interpretation of Cassirer's notion of form: cultural forms articulate the world, they are not objects in it.



## **The Double Cast Of William James' Pragmatism In History Of Psychology: A Historical Object And A Possible Model**

**Arthur Arruda Leal Ferreira**

UFRJ – Brazil

The relation between the pragmatic philosophy and the history of psychology could point to two paths. In the first one, we wish to demonstrate how the pragmatic thought operates an essential transformation in the history of psychology, in the transit of an immediate experience analysis (as done by the German psychology of the nineteenth century) to the functional analysis of this experience, considering it as a part of an organism in an adaptation process. In these new frames, conscience and the immediate experience is no longer worked in analytic effort, reducing it to its minimal elements (sensations), aiming to distinguish the true components of this experience from illusions. As the pragmatist thought argues, truth is not a representation in our minds of a previous state of the things, but the adaptation effects in our mind process. Then this is the way how our conscience and immediate experience are now taken: as a dynamic and organic process with an adaptative finality. Here our awaken experience is considered through a new question: what is its biological function? The answer is that our conscience works aiming to fit us in problematic situations, being activated to select the best hypothesis and action plans. Then, we have a new psychological project in what our immediate experience is considered by a new question (how our mind could adapt us?), through a great number of new methods (the comparative with animals, the psychometrics, the natural observations and so on), and regulated by a new model inspired by the natural selection theory, putting biology as the psychology guide-science. Then we have a transition from a psychological scientific project characterized as what Canguilhem (1973) called a "Physics of external experience" to another one that we would call "Science and technique of adaptation".

Nevertheless the more radical turn in this new psychological scientific project is that it is not only oriented to study adaptation, but mainly to change the subjects; to promote a general state of adaptation. This new practical orientation is especially inspired in pragmatic philosophy, in the sense that a good knowledge must be measured by its adaptative effects. Then an official channel to the applied psychology is opened, absorbing the educational psychology, the work psychology, the mental tests and the clinical efforts to the psychological field. At the same time the laboratories doors begin to be officially open to children, animals, and the mentally ill. In this moment psychology officially begins to acquire its present face: it is mainly defined as a practical and applied science. We can put in question if this James Pragmatist heritage (especially in functional psychology) is in congruence to its original intentions. But we can find other forms to return to James pragmatist thought. And it is in this sense that we propose our second path: here James' pragmatism is not only an object to study, but a conceptual tool-box able to help us to think about the history of psychology, especially considering its multiplicity of projects, theories, practices and hypothesis. Here this historical multiplicity is thought without any effort to reduce it to an unsuspected ontological entity (the man, the psychic reality, the functional reactions, and so on). At the same sense any effort to reduce this multiplicity to an evolutionary perspective (waiting to our future epistemological redemption) is refused.

Thought in a pragmatist way, the diverse (and even contradictory) kinds of psychologies coexist because they create effects in our experience, actions, bodies and forms of life. In other words, each kind of psychology realizes itself in the sense that it produces new process of subjectification, "teach" us about the last determinants, laws and meanings that constitute our lives. In this sense we have to study the specific forms in what each psychological device (in factory, school, clinic, laboratory, articles of diffusion and so on) could produce subjectivity. But in general we can expect that the wide effects of the psychological devices are due to its supposed scientific authority, that would make psychologists capable of teaching us about our more profound truth. Something that Latour (1997, 2004) and Despret (2002, 2004) called docility in opposition to recalcitrance often present in the natural sciences research. By other way we can also ask about the historical conditions of these nowadays psychological devices. As James (1979/1907) points our new truths arise in articulation with old respected truths. And where did these old truths come from? We can find them in old common life practices (confession, discipline, self techniques and so on) and in scientific practices (methods and models) from where psychology extracts its scientific respectability and authority. We will call *Machine of Multiple Captures* this re-appropriation of James pragmatism as devoted to think the historical plurality of the History of Psychology.



### **Bibliographical References**

DESPRET, Vinciane (2002) *Quand le loup dormira avec l'agneau*. Paris: Les empecheurs de penser en ronde.

\_\_\_\_\_ (2004) *Le cheval qui savait compter*. Paris: Les empecheurs de penser en ronde.

JAMES, William (1979) Pragmatismo. In: *Pensadores*. São Paulo: Abril Cultural (original book published in 1907).

LATOUR, Bruno (1997) Des sujets recalcitrants. In: *Recherche*, Septembre 1997: 301.

\_\_\_\_\_ (2004) How to talk about the body. *Body & Society*, Vol. 10 (2-3): 205-229.



**Historical-quantitative analysis on the disciplinary contexts characterising the origin of the Italian psychology**

**Lombardo Giovanni P. & Chiara Bartolucci**

University of Rome "Sapienza"

The study examines the research conducted in various disciplinary contexts with the aim of identifying the primary and characteristic thematic areas within Italian psychological science at the end of the 1800s. This analysis is carried out in line with the recent historiographical developments (Cimino & Plas, 2006; Danziger, 1990; Cimino & Lombardo, 2004), which favours the study of national traditions within psychological research over a genealogical and unitary view of psychological science that derives from the first Wundtian model as in Boring's (1929) historical reconstruction. The research hypothesis, then, includes a differential analysis of the themes proposed by some authors from the period in order to highlight the transversal birth of some psychological themes in relation to how they presented themselves within the 18<sup>th</sup> century disciplines considered.

The study utilizes the historical-quantitative method (Brožek, 1972; Kragh, 1987), examining articles from one of the most prestigious journals of the period, *Rivista di Filosofia Scientifica*, in order to identify the areas that characterize psychological research. Our study, then, utilizes a quantitative analysis alongside the classical interpretative methodology for historiographical psychology (Solla Price, 1980). The research also utilizes content analysis (Berelson, 1952) to examine the articles' contents as this allows for an empirical examination of the primary constructs present in the articles by noting the frequency with which specific themes appear or reoccur. The analysis demonstrates that Italian psychology is characterised by themes and disciplinary contexts that fall within a pre-eminent physiological and differential model.



## **Cognitive Behavioural Therapies in Britain, 1952-2010: Origins, Development, Controversies**

**Sarah Marks**

Wellcome Trust Centre for the History of Medicine at UCL

Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT) is now the dominant mode of psychotherapeutic intervention in the United Kingdom, and has been the subject of substantial NHS investment in the last two years; but the question remains to be asked as to how it came to occupy this position of dominance. To date, there is a lack of historical work on the history of cognitive behavioural therapy, its intellectual and social development, or consideration of its place in healthcare and society. This paper will address this lacuna, drawing on published primary sources from academic psychology, press coverage, policy documents, parliamentary records institutional histories. Importantly, it will also be based upon oral history interviews conducted with participants in the early development of the field, practising cognitive-behavioural therapists, and key policy-makers. It will chart the origins of CBT in the newly socialised healthcare system of the NHS, and the Eysenckian backlash against psychoanalysis in the post-war period. I will focus specifically upon the institutional setting of the Maudsley Hospital as a site for the production of behaviourist approaches to psychotherapy. I will argue that the particular working relationship fostered between psychiatrists and clinical psychologists at the Institute of Psychiatry, along with a training syllabus structured around contemporaneous philosophies of scientific method, were key factors in opening up the intellectual and practical space for behavioural therapies to develop.

I will trace the integration of behavioural and cognitive therapies in the early 1970s after the 'cognitive revolution' in psychology, arguing that this union came about in part as a result of economic considerations and the pragmatics of time-limited psychotherapeutic practice. The subsequent professionalisation of cognitive behavioural therapists in the 1980s-90s through the establishment of research journals and professional associations will be discussed, along with the widening of the practice of CBT from the traditional professions to its use as an intervention by nursing and social work practitioners, and even non-human 'agents' with the rise of computerised CBT.

In light of the UK Government's recent Increasing Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) scheme, which saw £17m worth of public funding invested in making CBT-based therapies available on the NHS, I will examine the social and political considerations leading up to the policy's inception.

The response of the psychotherapeutic community to these transformative developments, and the place of cognitive and behavioural psychological knowledge in the wider public sphere will be discussed. I will argue that, in the British context, the rise of cognitive and behavioural models in psychotherapy has come about, in part, through the economic considerations of the state-financed healthcare system, governed increasingly by considerations of evidence-base and cost-benefit analysis. The self-conscious participation of the academic CBT community in this system, and their use of evidence-based lobbying tactics, has led to the exclusion of other forms of psychotherapy from NHS practice, and has had a transformative impact on the practise of CBT itself. Coupled with a rise in demand, there has also been a concurrent medicalisation of the profession in terms of its governance, along concerns about the narrowing of the range of therapeutic techniques as a result of the imperative towards uniformity in practice.

Finally, I will demonstrate that there has been a rise in the public profile and consumption of cognitive and behavioural psychological knowledge, and that CBT has come to provide a publicly visible discourse of *psychological* subjectivity and mental health, which offers an alternative to the supposedly dominant discourses of 'the New Brain Sciences' (Nikolas Rose et al.) based on biologically deterministic principles of genetic, pharmaceutical and neuro-anatomical knowledge.



## Selected Bibliography

### Interviews and Personal Communications

- Isaac Marks, Professor Emeritus of the Institute of Psychiatry. Interview with Sarah Marks, London, 6<sup>th</sup> August 2009  
Lord Richard Layard, Labour Peer. Interview with Sarah Marks, London, on 21<sup>st</sup> August 2009.  
Dr Meir Stolear, CBT therapist. Interview with Sarah Marks, London, 4<sup>th</sup> July 2009  
Anonymous CBT Therapist employed in a community Mental Health Team. Interview with Sarah Marks, London, 20<sup>th</sup> August 2009
- 

### Written Sources

- Boardman, Jen and Michael Parsonage *Delivering the Government's Mental Health Policies: Services, Staffing and Costs* (London: Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health, 2007)  
Bower, Peter and Simon Gilbody 'Managing Common Mental Health Disorders in Primary Care: Conceptual Models and Evidence Base' *British Medical Journal*, Vol. 330 (9<sup>th</sup> April 2005), pp. 839-842  
Burns, Laurence E. and James L. Worsley (eds) *Behaviour therapy in the 1970s : a collection of original papers: proceedings of a symposium held at the Bateman Centre for Postgraduate Medical Studies, Birch Hill Hospital, Rochdale on 25 October, 1969, under the auspices of the Manchester branch of the Division of Clinical Psychology of The British Psychological Society* (Bristol: John Wright, 1970)  
Eysenck, Hans 'The Effects of Psychotherapy' *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, Vol. 16 (1952), pp. 319-324  
Furedi, Frank. *Therapy Culture: Cultivating Vulnerability in an Uncertain Age* (London: Routledge, 2003).  
Gelder, Michael. *Verbal Conditioning in Psychiatric Patients*, unpublished D.M. Thesis, University of Oxford, 1965  
Grant, A. Evidence-based practice and the need for paradigmatic pluralism in cognitive behavioural psychotherapy. *Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing* Vol 16. No 4 (2009) pp368-75  
Hays, V. and K.J. Waddell 'A Self-Reinforcing Procedure for Thought Stopping' *Behaviour Therapy*, Vol. 1 (1976) pp. 12-24  
Hodson, Phillip. 'Cognitive Misbehaviour?' *The Times*, 4<sup>th</sup> November 2006  
Mayor, Susan 'NICE Advocates Computerised CBT' *British Medical Journal*, Vol. 332 (4<sup>th</sup> March 2006), p. 504  
Shepherd, Michael and D.L. Davies (eds) *Studies in Psychiatry: A Survey of Work Carried out in the Department of Psychiatry of the Institute of Psychiatry, Under the Chairmanship of Sir Aubrey Lewis, 1945-66* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968)
-



## **The approach to the problem of mental development of children from the standpoint of Simonovich's theory of recapitulation**

**Elena Minkova**

Volzhsky State Engineering and Pedagogical University Nizhny Novgorod, Russia

In the scientific literature it is considered that Stanley Hall is the author of the theory of recapitulation, who explained psychological development up to adolescence mainly basing it on the biological theory of recapitulation. Hall outlined his vision in the "Adolescence: Its Psychology, and Its Relations to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion and Education" (1904). Meanwhile, few people know that in Russia the recapitulation theory of Haeckel in relation to mental health was described in the book "A comparison of the periods of the individual child's development the era of mankind" (1884) by Simonovich, it was 20 years before the appearance of the American psychologist.

Jacob Mironovich Simonovic (1840-1883) was a famous doctor of medicine, a graduate of Medical-Surgical Academy, who devoted all his life to treating children. As a young man, Jacob and his wife listened to Froebel's lectures in Switzerland and after returning to Russia, along with his wife organized one of the first kindergarten in St. Petersburg. He then initiated publication of the magazine called "Kindergarten" (1866-1868) and produced a number of medical and psychological studies. Jacob Mironovich Simonovic contracted Typhus from one of his patients and died in 1883. . The author of an obituary published in the "Physician statements", Yazikov, wrote: "Simonovic left an honest memory of a man who was perfect and absolutely honest, he faithfully served the high principle of mental and moral improvement of a man within both public and domestic aspects of lives. "

Darwin's theory of evolution and Ernst Haeckel's theory of recapitulation had an important influence on Simonovich's career. One of the founders of the child study movement, he argued that child's development recapitulates the history of human evolutionary development. These ideas prompted Simonovich to explain aspects of childhood development in order to study the inheritance of behavior. Simonovich established internal (hereditary) and external (environmental) factors of child's development. That inheritance was a major contributory factor in child's development. Based on the change in the intrinsic qualities of a child, Simonovich divided childhood into 9 periods of mental development.

Hall analysed child's development from birth until the age of 20, dividing it into 5 stages. Unlike Stanley Hall, Simonovic specified not 5 but 9 periods in child development from birth until the age of 7. Recapitulation theory of Haeckel, upon which Simonovic suggested periodization of psychological development of the child, has now been discredited, however we may say that the number of ideas that were put forward by Simonovic were very relevant for that period.

Simonovic made the following important conclusions: (1) The development of the child "is being performed gradually and consistently"; (2) The only difference between the development of the child and human development is the length of time of change: humanity needed millennium to move from one stage to another; (3) An important incentive for individual development is among the environment. Simonovic made a great personal contribution to the development of developmental psychology. In our view, his name should not be forgotten by his contemporaries.

### **Selected references**

- Simonovich, Y. (1870) Visual learning for children who had just enrolled in public school. Trifles.
- Simonovich, Y. (1872). The theory of natural selection and its application to humans. Trifles.
- Simonovich, Y. (1884). A comparison of periods of the individual child's development with the era of mankind. SPb.



## Spiritualism and medicine in Spain: Between science and ethics

Annette Mülberger

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

Spain in the first decades of the 20th century is mainly a catholic country making some more or less successful efforts for getting involved into scientific enquiry. In such a context we hardly expect parapsychology or spiritualism to root. Nevertheless, spiritualism became widespread, and psychical research in form of "metapsychique" was present and attracted some public attention in the 20ies and 30ies in cities like Madrid or Barcelona.

Until now we only have a few historical contributions on the history of spiritualism but nearly no publication on the history of psychical research in Spain. Our contribution tries to show traces of psychical research in Spanish society. At the same time we want to compare how psychical research was dealt with in certain social circles. In order to meet this objective/aim we consulted not only books and journals, published at that time, but also the daily press. The documentary research helped us identify several historical actors involved in the debate about psychical research coming from different intellectual and social backgrounds.

In the first decade of the 20th century, paranormal phenomena produced in the realm of spiritualism, was able to attract attention on the part of some scientists, like the astronomer Comas who followed the example of French scholars like Flammarion.

When in the twenties through the treatise of Richet the link between spiritualist phenomena, on one side and science and psychology, on the other, became very clear as the basis of this new "metapsychique", Spanish psychologists like Mira decide to intervene.

At the beginnings of the thirties a Jesuit psychologist developed a heavy attack on psychic research but he could not stop an activity that was to reach its peak of popularity towards the middle of the same decade, as can be deduced from the presence of the subject in the daily press.

Our work with the press turned out to be very helpful for two reasons: first because it offered insights into the discussion about the "metapsychical" activity of Spanish mediums and second because it showed how the spirit of psychical research was quickly introduced and adapted for the theater.

## References

- Comas, Josep, *El espiritismo ante la ciencia*. (Barcelona: Altafulla, 1908).  
Comas, Josep, Lo inexplicable, *La Vanguardia*, 27.2.1924, p. 5.  
Horta, Gerard, *De la mística a las barricadas*. (Barcelona: Proa, 2001).  
Masriera, M., Información de actualidad: la metasomoscopia (I & II), *La Vanguardia*, 10.1.1924 and 16.2.1924, p. 1.  
Mira, Emilio, Comentario a "Traité de métapsychique" de Charles Richet, *Archivos de Neurobiología*, III, 3, 319-327.  
Mülberger, A. (2008). Marginalisations de la parapsychologie et du spiritisme dans le discours scientifique en Espagne, *L'Homme et la Société*, 167/168/169, 101-118.  
Mülberger, Annette; Balltandre, Mónica.; Vilaplana, Elisabet; Leal Cavalcante, Maria Teresa; Moreno, Vanessa, La metapsíquica en la prensa diaria barcelonesa: Un análisis de La Vanguardia (1923-1936). *Revista de Historia de la Psicología*, 30, 269-277, 2009.  
Palmés, Fernando Maria, *Metapsíquica y espiritismo* (Madrid: Razón y Fe, 1932).  
Richet, Charles, *Traité de métapsychique*. (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1922).  
Vilaplana, Elisabet & Mülberger, Annette, Espiritismo, metapsíquica y ciencia: Análisis de tres aportaciones catalanas de principios del siglo XX, *Revista de Historia de la Psicología*, 25, 3-4, 477-488, 2009.  
Vilaplana, Elisabet, *Tritulques espirituals: Espiritisme i catolicisme a la Catalunya de finals del segle XIX* (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona: Treball de Recerca, 2006).



**All the world's a hospital? (And all the men and women merely patients?):  
On the history of "medicalisation"**

**Petteri Pietikainen**

University of Helsinki

"Medicalisation" is currently defined by Wikipedia as a process that defines human conditions and problems in terms of medical conditions that require treatment. Medicalisation then functions to warrant health professionals as the experts and authorities, and it justifies their license to study, diagnose, and treat these created ailments. In this context, the definition places an emphasis on process, and I argue that phenomena that emerge from processes are by definition subject to the contingencies of history. In that light, this presentation asks the questions: What historical contingencies are relevant, and how have they influenced medicalisation, and moreover, how have they shaped the discussion of medicalisation?

The amount of critical studies on medicalisation has increased rapidly in recent years. Many of these studies are authored by physicians and medical scientists, which has signified a turning point in the contemporary history of medicalisation. In the 1970s, when the phenomenon of "medicalisation" was discovered or invented, most critics represented non-medical disciplines. Perhaps three most well-known of these critics were theologian-philosopher Ivan Illich, sociologist Peter Conrad and sociologist Irving Zola, who coined the term "medicalisation" in 1972. But in the 2000s, more and more critics are recruited from the ranks of physicians. It seems as if doctors themselves are becoming increasingly concerned about developments within medicine and in larger society. They appear to be especially worried about the phenomenon called "disease mongering", a strategy for "selling sickness" in which "doctors and drug companies unnecessarily [widen] the boundaries of illness in order to see more patients and sell more drugs" (Moynihan & Cassels 2005, p. xvii). Disease mongering is a new term that has attracted wide attention both from physicians and other "stakeholders", such as medical journalists and medical sociologists.

Recently, the focus of criticism has been on the pharmaceutical industry, The Big Pharma. According to critics, The Big Pharma was not content selling drugs to the ill and needy, and so it has increasingly turned its marketing strategies to include those who consider themselves healthy, or at least not ill. Critics use the terms, or slogans, "pill for every ill", "worried well" and "healthism" to describe the idea that The Big Pharma, and its lackeys, are turning the world into one huge hospital resembling the soma-filled social reality of Huxley's dystopia *Brave New World*. Assisted by influential physicians, the pharmaceutical industry appears to be branding conditions and constructing disorders in order to sell its products. Parallel to these developments in the medical sciences, since the 1960s there were also critics of a psycho-culture, or a therapeutic culture. They have discussed the "government of the soul" and "trauma industry" created or moulded by representatives of "psy"-professions and their supporters (these critics include Philip Rieff, Nikolas Rose, Tana Dineen and Frank Furedi).

In my presentation, I will examine the historical development of the critique of medicalisation, starting from the "anti-psychiatry" movement of the 1960s (Szasz, Goffman, Scheff, Laing/Cooper etc.). I will then move to the emergence of criticism aimed at medicine as a whole, including (biological) psychiatry. Conrad and Illich were important representatives of the new wave of critical inquiry that launched medicalisation. Finally, I will discuss the latest criticism that has gathered momentum since the 1990s. This recent criticism focused on the pharmaceutical industry, emphasizing psychopharmacology's manufacture of diagnostic categories (especially depression) and the influential diagnostic manuals (DSM in particular). Since 2004, an open-access journal Public Library of Science (PLOS) of Medicine has provided a popular forum for authors who are critical towards various aspects of medicalisation.

In this presentation, I will illuminate the forms of reasoning the critics used, and I will refer to the larger contexts (intellectual, socio-cultural, economic, etc.) of the medicalisation discourse. Also, if we are becoming patients, like some critics contend, then our sick-roles today are not identical with those of previous generation, those of the 1960s and 70s. I will conclude by arguing that our perceptions of what should be labelled as illness are subject to changes, and I will suggest possible historical reasons for these changes.



**Short bibliography**

- Conrad, Peter & J.W. Schneider, *Deviance and Medicalization: From Badness to Sickness*. Temple University Press 1992 (1<sup>st</sup> ed. 1980).
- Conrad, Peter, The shifting engines of medicalisation, *Journal of the Health and Social Behavior* 46(1), 1-5.
- Healy, David, *Let them Eat Prozac*. New York: NYU Press 2004.
- Illich, Ivan, *Limits to Medicine*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 1984 (1<sup>st</sup> ed. 1976)
- Kirsch, Irving, *The Emperor's New Drugs*. London: The Bodley Head 2009.
- Moynihan, Ray & Alan Castells, *Selling Sickness*. New York: Nation Books 2005.
- Szasz, Thomas, *Myth of Mental Illness*. New York: Harper & Row 1961.
- Zola, Irving, Medicine as an institution of social control, *Sociological Review* 4, 1972, 487-504.
-



## Psychology and Psychical Research in France at the Turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century

**Régine Plas**

Université Paris Descartes

During the last third of the 19th century, in France, the "new" psychology grew between philosophy and medicine, within "the hypnotic context" opened by Charcot. As many scholars have shown, hypnosis is the heir of mesmerism which had been condemned by the French medical academies and societies in 1784 and in 1840. The psychological side of mesmerism had been discovered in 1784 by Puységur. Having mesmerised a young man called Victor, Puységur was surprised to notice that, instead of convulsing, Victor had fallen asleep. In this somnambulistic state he was able to describe the inside of his body and to diagnose his own illness. Victor inaugurated the 19<sup>th</sup> century's very popular figure of the "lucid somnambulist", endowed with miraculous gifts. The 19<sup>th</sup> century also witnessed the appearance of another character endowed with extraordinary powers, the spiritualist medium.

In spite of their claims to the scientific nature of their hypnotic experiments, Charcot and his followers were unable to avoid the miracles that had gone with mesmerism. The hysterics hypnotized in the Salpêtrière hospital were, like the lucid somnambulists and the spiritualist mediums, expected to have supernormal faculties and these experiments opened the door to psychical research.

In 1885 the *Société de psychologie physiologique* was founded, with Charcot as president. The vice-presidents were the philosopher Paul Janet – Pierre Janet's uncle – and Théodule Ribot. The general secretary was Charles Richet, Nobel Prize-winner in medicine in 1913. As early as 1875 Richet had published an influential paper on hypnosis. In later years, he considered that his paper had contributed to convincing Charcot of the relevance of hypnosis. Richet was particularly interested in strange phenomena like magnetic lucidity, thought reading, the action of medicaments at a distance, etc. The researches of the *Société de psychologie physiologique* during the two first years of its short life may seem surprising: like Richet, its members were interested in strange phenomena, especially in "mental suggestion". The young Pierre Janet related his experiments, led by a Dr Gibert, on a woman supposed to be able to accomplish mental suggestions and to be mentally sent to sleep. This woman, called Léonie, became famous throughout Europe. Frederic W. H. Myers made a special visit to France to observe Janet and Gibert's experiments.

At the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, French psychologists (and French-speaking psychologists like Théodore Flournoy) applied themselves to finding rational explanations of these supposedly miraculous gifts. Generally, they ascribed them to unconscious or subconscious perceptual mechanisms. Finally, after a few years, studies of psychical phenomena were excluded from the field of psychology. However, during the 4<sup>th</sup> International Congress of Psychology, which took place in Paris in 1900, the foundation of an "Institut psychique international" was announced, devoted to the study of psychical phenomena. But, very quickly, Pierre Janet and Georges Dumas founded within it the *Société française de psychologie*, from which psychical research was excluded. As for Charles Richet, disappointed by the psychologists, he devoted himself to the development of a new "science" which he called "Métapsychique".

### References

- Binet A. & Féré Ch (1887). *Le Magnétisme animal*. Paris: Alcan.
- Carroy J. (1991). *Hypnose, suggestion et psychologie. L'invention de sujets*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- Edelman N. (1995). *Voyantes, guérisseuses et visionnaires en France. 1785-1914*. Paris: Albin Michel.
- Flournoy Th. (1900). *Des Indes à la planète Mars*. Paris: Seuil, 1983.
- Harrington A. (1988). "Hysteria, hypnosis and the lure of the invisible: the rise of neo-mesmerism in fin-desiècle French psychiatry" in Bynum W. F., Porter R. & Shepherd M. (Eds), *The Anatomy of Madness*, Vol. III. Routledge: London and New York, 226-246.
- Plas R. (2000). *Naissance d'une science humaine : la psychologie. Les psychologues et le «merveilleux psychique»*. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes.



## Consciousness in Zhu Xi and Wundt

**Hans van Rappard**  
Amsterdam

After a brief introduction to the history of Chinese philosophy the paper focuses on Zhu Xi (1130-1200), the most important Neo-Confucianist. The Neo-Confucian program may be summarised as an attempt to restore authentic Confucianism, which since the end of the Han dynasty (2<sup>nd</sup> century) had been eclipsed by Daoist and Buddhist metaphysics. Since Confucianism originally did not feature any metaphysical notions Zhu Xi felt that it could be restored to its rightful position by redressing this lack. He developed a metaphysical system in which the 'ten thousand things' are produced by the interaction of *Li* (pattern or principle) and *Qi* (ether). *Qi* is an ancient concept meaning the air we breathe but when used philosophically it refers to a dynamic combination of energy and matter. In other words, it is the 'stuff' of the universe. Moreover, *Qi* has two aspects, a relatively pure mental, and a turbid corporeal one. This cosmic stuff derives its particular forms from *Li*, the blue print or principle of things, including human beings. It will be demonstrated that everything 'under Heaven', possesses all principles (*Li*) but in different degrees of mentality or consciousness (*Qi*). Hence, according to Zhu Xi consciousness is a graded phenomenon. The paper then moves to 19<sup>th</sup> century German psychology. Drawing on Danziger's chapter on *The unknown Wundt. Drive, apperception and volition* it will briefly go into the views of R.H. Lotze (1817-1883) and A. Bain (1818-1903) on purposive behaviour. The important point is that both assumed that voluntary action arises on the basis of involuntary movement as a result of learning. Wundt could not accept this view. He felt that on the contrary, all mental activities are initially voluntary but become automatic in the process of learning. Wundt's theoretical tool to craft this solution was the concept of impulse or drive (*Trieb*). Drawing on A. Kussmaul's (1822-1902) work on neonatal responses he proposed that these responses were of three kinds of which we are concerned with the 3<sup>rd</sup>, the 'impulsive movements' (*Triebbewegungen*). In the case of these movements the response was thought to be more than just a reaction because it included an aspect of 'striving' or direction towards or away from the stimulus – that is, a primitive kind of choice and hence, volition. Conceived thus, drives are conscious but to a lesser degree than choice and decision. In other words, the emphasis on the primacy of motivational processes enabled Wundt to see the (essentially conscious) drives as the basis of all psychological phenomena. In sum, Wundt assumed a continuity of psychological processes, which entails that all of them possess some degree of consciousness. Hence, consciousness is a graded phenomenon. The final section of the paper will suggest that a link between Zhu Xi and Wundt may be found in G.W. Leibniz (1646-1716). The relation Wundt – Leibniz will be treated briefly but more time will be spent on the Leibniz – Zhu Xi connection. Leibniz was probably the most important 17<sup>th</sup> century philosopher interested in China. Among the many things Chinese that drew his attention was Zhu Xi's Neo-Confucianism in which similarities may be found with the *Monadology*, such as a graded conception of consciousness. But in spite of the pervasive Leibnizian influence on German psychology Wundt's concept of graded consciousness was deemed idiosyncratic and heavily criticised by his colleagues. Danziger (2001) agreed and concluded that Wundt had painted himself into a corner. We may add that it may well have been a Neo-Confucian corner.

## Brief bibliography

- Chan, Wing-tsit (1963). *A sourcebook in Chinese philosophy*. Princeton: Princeton U.P.
- Danziger, K. (2001). *The unknown Wundt. Drive, apperception and volition*. In R.W. Rieber & D.K. Robinson (Eds.). *Wilhelm Wundt in history* (pp. 95-120). New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers
- Fung, Yu-lan (1983). *A history of Chinese philosophy, 2 Vols*. Princeton: Princeton U.P.
- Rappard, J.F.H. van (2009). *Walking two roads. Accord and separation in Chinese and Western thought*. Amsterdam: VU University Press
- Zhang, Dainian (2002). *Key concepts in Chinese philosophy*. New Haven/Beijing: Yale U.P./Foreign Languages Press



## Conceptualizing the masses. Change and continuity in discipline formation

**Marlise Rijks**

Utrecht University (student of Descartes Mastersprogram)

Since the French Revolution, elites throughout Europe have theorized, used and interpreted the concepts 'mass' or 'the masses' in various ways. Fears of revolution, mob violence, workers' strikes, and unsanitary city districts became big concerns for nineteenth and twentieth century elites, not the least because these troubles could harm their own well being. Portraits of the masses by novelists like Dickens, Tolstoy and Zola settled in their minds.<sup>2</sup> Related to large historical developments like industrialization, urbanization, and democratization, the masses became a constant and menacing factor of modern life in the minds of artists, politicians and scientists alike. Scientific theories of the masses are the focus of this paper. The main disciplines of interest are psychology and sociology (or social theory). I am aiming at a history of these social sciences, in which discipline formation, the difference between 'real' and 'pseudo' science, and the connection between 'cognitive' and 'ideological' factors are analyzed by focusing on the conceptualization of the masses.

The concept 'masses' has ambivalent meanings; it can imply an active subject or a passive object; it can be seen as a sign of modernity or a sign of degeneration into barbarity; it can stand for a short-lived assembly of people or a long-term organization of people; it can be approached with pessimism or optimism. Repeatedly, the identity of the masses is set in opposition to that of intellectuals, as being irrational, lazy, or barbarian. There is no evading the impression that the masses posed challenges to the role of scientists, science, and rationality. In short: it is a contested concept. Uncontested however, was the significance of the masses in modern life. Both facets (the contested-ness and the significance) make it such an appropriate concept for the investigation – and comparison – of disciplines dealing with modern society.

Between 1890 and 1939 – the period of investigation – the social sciences and humanities started to demarcate their subject-fields and methodologies. Sharp borderlines between disciplines were often still absent; it was a constitutive period in which those disciplines formed their identities. This offers the opportunity to compare the process of identity creation and the opportunity to analyze the context in which knowledge claims came about. The respective role of the concept masses in the disciplines psychology and sociology can demonstrate these processes.

Looking at discipline formation from the angle of conceptual history gives the opportunity to show a relationship between change (in meaning and use) of broader concepts, and specialized knowledge of the new disciplines. Without this intellectual movement, discipline formations (or new interdisciplinary fields) are hard to imagine. If we define a discipline by a clear object of investigation, a certain level of theory and methodology, and long-term stability<sup>3</sup>, the first two can be analyzed by means of conceptual history. The last characteristic refers to institutional history, a point of interest for the sociologist of science. The relationship between conceptual history and discipline formation can be summarized by the following hypothesis: conceptual change leads to debates about "correct" knowledge and then results in the formation of disciplines, with their own (divergent) interpretations of the concept. This interpretation of the nature and role of a concept can shed new light on the borders of object-definition as well as on new theories or methodologies. When concepts change again, new debates arise, and new (inter)disciplinary fields are established.

<sup>2</sup> For a discussion of the masses in novels, see Jaap van Ginneken, Mass movements in Darwinist, Freudian and Marxist perspective. Trotter, Freud and Reich on war, revolution and reaction 1900-1933 (Apeldoorn and Antwerp 2007).

<sup>3</sup> As Huber Laitko does, referred to by Bart Karstens in "Die Boppsche Wissenschaft?"



Disciplinary comparisons of the concept 'masses' can illuminate different kinds of arguments and knowledge claims. A concept such as 'masses' is suitable to investigate longitudinal processes in the history of science, because it serves as a constant in the midst of change, it has "more than a local significance", and is "dense enough to carry varied, even contradictory concerns."<sup>4</sup> Hence, conceptual history does not only demonstrate change, it leaves room for continuity too. The flexibility of this method contrasts with Kuhn's idea about radical paradigm shifts. It shows that scientific change happens slower, and that incommensurability is not that drastic.<sup>5</sup> The conceptual history of the masses demonstrates that commensurability over time and between disciplines is much larger than Kuhn assumed. Furthermore, conceptual history is suitable for the historians of science because it is attentive to the "tension between concept and materiality".<sup>6</sup>

---

The main problem I want to address is the historically changing use and meaning of the concept "masses" by practitioners of the rising disciplines of psychology and sociology. The debates over a concept in a specific discipline are determined both by 'scientific/cognitive' and 'ideological' arguments.<sup>7</sup> This can have important results in the formation of disciplines: which arguments are adapted and translated from one discipline to the other, and which arguments are rejected – and does this happen on scientific or ideological grounds? What was the impact of important scientists? In short: how is knowledge translated from one (sub-)discipline to the other?

---

<sup>4</sup> Jordanova, "Gender and the historiography of science" 471.

<sup>5</sup> Not only in contrast to Kuhn, but also in contrast to Foucault's shifts of episteme and discourse.

<sup>6</sup> Iain Hampsher-Monk, "Speech acts, languages or conceptual history?" in: Hampsher-Monk, Iain, Karin Tilmans, and Frank van Vree (eds.), *History of concepts. Comparative perspectives* (Amsterdam 1998) 47.

<sup>7</sup> Some historians of science have rejected the distinction between pure scientific and ideological arguments. Although the distinction is complicated, I think that – at least for practical historical research – it is still valid, because it helps to differentiate between arguments relating to knowledge claims.



## **Subliminal Advertising**

**Steve Shapiro**

Utrecht University (student of Descartes Mastersprogram)

This paper examines the role and impact of the 1957-58 subliminal advertising "scare" on the fields of both marketing and psychology. The notion of subliminal advertising gained popularity through Vance Packard's book *The Hidden Persuaders* and a market researcher named James Vicary who claimed that he had performed experiments at a cinema where patrons were supposedly persuaded to purchase more popcorn and cola through subliminal messages. Vicary appropriated the psychologically established notion of subliminal perception into his theory of subliminal communication and sparked enormous public interest and concern. While Packard placed subliminal advertising in a context critical of a new marketing approach called motivational research, public concern was expressed more through fears of loss of free will through explicit brainwashing. This paper also examines some of the cultural roots for this outcry in order to establish some of the main causes for this concern. As the myth of subliminal advertising was gradually exposed it dealt a blow to both motivational research and exposed incompatibilities in contemporary psychological thought. Concerned psychologists consciously reevaluated their data for subliminal perception out of moral obligation or to distance their field from an already widely-prevalent fear of mind control. Furthermore it created a distraction from a host of emerging and more-founded concerns over advertising by linking suggestive or persuasive advertising to an empirically disproved concept. Similarly, the marketing field of motivational research came under attacks for using pseudo-scientific methods such as those embodied in subliminal advertising.

Through the mass media and intellectual linking of subliminal advertising to its constituent origins people began to apply different definitions to subliminal. Advertising agencies played off popular notions and created spoof commercials which, while portrayed as subliminal, fell short of the original psychological definition. By blurring the lines between what constitutes subliminal, advertisers and commercial proponents were able to discount other claims of less explicit manipulation and focus on one extreme end of a spectrum.



# **"No scientifically-minded psychologist believes in telepathy": The Rejection of Psychical Research by Early American Psychologists as a Crucial Move to Construct a Scientific Identity**

**Andreas Sommer**

University College London

By the end of the nineteenth century, psychical researchers were still actively involved in the making of the fledgling science of psychology. They initiated and organised the first international congresses of psychology, and contributed methodological innovations such as randomised and blinded study designs as well as novel empirical findings, e.g., regarding the psychology of perception, mechanisms of dissociation and hypnotism, and the prevalence of hallucinations in the sane. These methodological and empirical innovations enriched early psychological knowledge quite independently of their roots in controversial research questions, such as the existence of telepathy, clairvoyance and the possibility of survival of bodily death.

After Wilhelm Wundt had openly rejected psychical research as unscientific in the same year in which he founded his laboratory for experimental psychology at Leipzig university, students of Wundt who became important early psychologists in the US, combated attempts by William James at integrating psychical research into nascent psychology. Early American psychology was deeply divided by competing research questions, methodologies, and epistemologies. In this paper, I shall argue that the construction of psychical research as the 'unscientific Other' of early psychology served to compensate for profound disagreements between some of the main founders of American psychology. Ultimately, the demarcation of psychical research as intrinsically unscientific served to create a much needed scientific identity.

After an exposition of general strategies employed by James' opponents to dismiss psychical research as inherently unscientific despite being *en par* with, and sometimes even exceeding, scientific standards employed by psychologists, we shall focus on two strategically crucial debunking exercises in the year preceding James' death to expel psychical research outside the boundaries of psychology once and for all: G. Stanley Hall's compromising of William James' 'mental' medium, Leonora Piper, and Hugo Münsterberg's public exposure of the famous 'physical' medium, Eusapia Palladino.

Finally, we shall address some of the inevitable difficulties historians face when starting to question certain profoundly Whiggish accounts of psychical research and some of their leading proponents, and try to account for the almost complete absence of works in the history of psychology addressing the important role of psychical research in the making of scientific psychology.

## **References**

- Alvarado, C. S. (in preparation). Telepathy, mediumship and psychology: Psychical research at the international congresses of psychology, 1889-1905.
- Boring, E. G. (1966). Introduction. Paranormal phenomena: Evidence, specification, and chance. In Hansel, C. E., *ESP. A Scientific Evaluation* (pp. xiii-xxi). London: McGibbon & Kee.
- Coon, D. J. (1992). Testing the limits of sense and science. American experimental psychologists combat spiritualism. *American Psychologist*, 47, 143-151.
- Ellenberger, H. F. (1970). *The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry*. New York: Basic Books.
- Gauld, A. (1968). *The Founders of Psychical Research*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Gurney, E., Myers, F. W. H., & Podmore, F. (1886). *Phantasms of the Living*. London: Trübner.
- Hacking, I. (1988). Telepathy: Origins of randomization in experimental design. *Isis*, 79, 427-451.
- Hall, T. H. (1964). *The Strange Case of Edmund Gurney*. London: Gerald Duckworth.
- Nicolas, S., & Söderlund, H. (2005). The project of an International Congress of Psychology by J. Ochorowicz (1881). *International Journal of Psychology*, 40, 395-406.
- Shamdasani, S. (1994). Encountering Hélène: Théodore Flournoy and the genesis of subliminal psychology. In S. Shamdasani (Ed.), *Théodore Flournoy. From India to the Planet Mars: A Case of Multiple Personality with Imaginary Languages* (pp. xi-li). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Taylor, E. (1983). *William James on Exceptional Mental States. The 1896 Lowell Lectures*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.



**From 'indigenous anthropologies' to a 'world anthropologies network':  
Decolonizing the power relations of knowledge production**

**Irmingard Staebule**

Free University Berlin

In 1978, a symposium with the remarkable title 'Indigenous Anthropology in Non-Western Countries' was convened at Burg Wartenstein, Austria (Fahim, 1982). It was sponsored by the Wenner-Gren Foundation and based on the premise that Third World anthropologists should be given an opportunity equal to that of their colleagues in the US "to report on the state of anthropology and field-work experiences in their local settings" (Fahim, p. xii). Though the decade of the 1970s was marked by a widely raised call for indigenization of the social sciences, there was no comparable event in any other social science.

Subsequent to the symposium, one might have expected a growing interest in indigenous anthropologies, yet for about two decades signs of a lively debate are rare. Not before 1997 did the journal *Critique of Anthropology* open a debate on anthropologies of the South that proved sadly short-lived. What did flourish was the critique of anthropology, still with a focus on decolonizing the discipline, yet in an inward gaze on the hegemonial traditions and mostly oblivious of the previously colonized. Even ceremonial accounts of the history of the discipline, often a target of critics, could pass unchallenged for silencing the work done by Third World anthropologists.

At last, in 2003 an international symposium on 'World Anthropologies' convened in Pordenone, Italy, and also sponsored by the Wenner-Gren Foundation signaled a renewed effort to decolonize the power relations of anthropological knowledge production (Ribeiro and Escobar, 2006). At the symposium, the beginnings of a "world anthropologies network" (WAN) were introduced, a project geared to the mapping of the world-wide academic power relations between 'dominant' and 'marginalized' anthropological production sites. Systematic mapping, so the assumption of the initiators, would make the inequalities visible and thus prepare for analysis in terms of what conditioned them locally and globally. The envisioned map is to be sufficiently differentiated to avoid the impression of "a new attempt on the part of the 'periphery' to strike back" (Ribeiro and Escobar, 2006, p. 24). It is to show how the 'dominant' British, French and US-American anthropological centers are surrounded by and interspersed with both non-hegemonic centers and a broad variety of work-sites of 'indigenous', 'local' or 'peripheral' approaches. The WAN project is still alive. Since 2005, an e-journal devised to support horizontal communication among anthropologists worldwide offers access to the ongoing debate.

The innovative potential of the WAN project is, in my view, most sharply outlined in an article 'Other anthropologies – anthropology otherwise' (Restrepo & Escobar, 2005). When I first came across it in *Critique of Anthropology*, I was impressed by what appeared as a milestone in terms of both a sharp polycentric view of the history of anthropology and an imaginative transformative vision. So I went into gathering material related to the project and unearthed my worn copy of the 1978 symposium to get a clearer idea of what has changed.

In my talk I will try a brief comparative characterization of the 1978 and 2003 symposia in terms of the social constituency of the participants, scope of perspectives, and focus of critique. The focus of my analysis will be on changes in the perception/articulation of power relations between and within the sites of anthropological knowledge production. This includes questions addressing the changed geopolitical context and its relation to the geopolitics of knowledge production, the conceptual tools used to draw attention to the colonial legacy, and the institutional practices that reproduce anthropology and anthropologists. As to the chances of the WAN project to radically transform the discipline, I would like to offer some observations concerning responses of the discipline at large. The largely positive echo to the promise of a multiperspectival enrichment leaves the question of which sites are most likely to benefit from it.

**Selected references**

- Fahim, Hussein (Ed.) (1982). *Indigenous Anthropology in Non-Western Countries*. Proceedings of a Burg Wartenstein Symposium. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.
- Ntarangwi, Wenda, David Mills & Mustafa Babiker (Eds.) (2006). *African Anthropologies: History, Critique and Practice*. Dakar: CODESRIA.
- Restrepo, Eduardo, and Arturo Escobar (2005). 'Other Anthropologies and Anthropology Otherwise': Steps to a World Anthropologies Framework. *Critique of Anthropology* 25(2): 99-129.
- Ribeiro, Gustavo Lins, and Arturo Escobar (Eds.) (2006). *World Anthropologies: Disciplinary Transformations within Systems of Power*. Oxford: Berg.



## The Fukurai Affair: Parapsychology and the History of Psychology in Japan

Miki Takasuna

Tokyo International University

*The Ring* (2002) was an American remake of the Japanese horror film *Ring* (1998), originally based on the novel of the same name written by Koji Suzuki and published in 1991. In the novel, there was a scene of conducting a public experiment with a psychic woman, which reflected a real story in the history of psychology in Japan.

In the late 1880s to 1890s and 1910s, a boom of spiritualism was observed among people in Japan. By 1890, *kokkuri-san*, a Japanese style of Ouija board, had been in popular use for years. This spiritual period reflected the delayed import of overseas news on psychical research or parapsychology, whereas the latter boom in the 1910s reflected an argument that science could not thoroughly explain psychic phenomena.

Tomokichi Fukurai (1869-1952) graduated from Tokyo Imperial University and became interested in the hypnotic theory proposed by William James (1842-1910). Beginning in 1905, Fukurai lectured on abnormal psychology at Tokyo Imperial University. After practicing hypnotism and conducting experiments, he completed a dissertation of psychological research on hypnosis, which earned him a PhD from Tokyo Imperial University in 1906. It was one of the first cases of a Japanese psychologist obtaining a doctoral degree without having studied abroad. In 1908, Fukurai was appointed associate professor under Yujiro Motora (1858-1912) at Tokyo Imperial University.

Fukurai then pursued psychical research. If he had gone abroad to study like many of his colleagues, he would have likely cast a critical eye on psychic research. Instead, from 1910 until 1911, he began experiments on clairvoyance, aided by subjects Ms. Mifune and Ms. Nagao. These experiments, including a public experiment, eventually caused a major dispute among academics, including psychologists and physicists. Although Motora tried to dissuade Fukurai from further pursuing parapsychological research, Fukurai insisted on the existence of clairvoyance and "thoughtography." The latter term he coined after finding that Ms. Nagao could project her thoughts onto photographic film in a camera.

After Motora's death in 1912, Fukurai published *Clairvoyance and Thoughtography* (Fukurai, 1913). He began the book with writing that "In front of opponent academics in swarms, I declare that clairvoyance is real, so is thoughtography." Although an English version was later published in 1931, the book was criticized among academics because it lacked a valid scientific approach, which requires verification. Fukurai eventually resigned his post in 1913 over disparagement of the work. He was an elite psychologist who would later become the next professor at Tokyo Imperial University, but because of the controversy, Matataro Matsumoto (1865-1943) instead became the next new professor there in 1913. Matsumoto then declared that psychologists in the department should focus on normal phenomena to regain the department's credibility. All future lectures on psychology given at the university were delivered by "not mentioning abnormal psychology," which prevented the rise of clinical psychology in pre-war Japan.

Though most textbooks on the history of psychology in Japan written before the mid-1990s did not include the episode of the Fukurai affair, many psychology students knew that the story of *Ring* was based in part on a true history. In the novel, a psychiatrist corresponding to Fukurai made a public experiment with a psychic woman, and both of them were accused of having deceived people. Unfortunately this storyline disappeared in the American version.

## References

- Fukurai, T. (1913). *Toshi to nensha* [Clairvoyance and thoughtography]. Tokyo: Hobunkan. (In Japanese.)
- Fukurai, T. (1931). *Clairvoyance and thoughtography*. London: Rider.
- Ichiyanagi, H. (1994). *Kokkuri-san to senri-gan* [Kokkuri-san and clairvoyance: Modern Japan and spiritualism]. Tokyo: Kodansha. (In Japanese.)
- Sato, T. & Sato, T. (2005). The early 20th century: Shaping the discipline of psychology in Japan. *Japanese Psychological Research*, 47, 52-62.
- Suzuki, K. (1991). *Ring*. Tokyo: Kadokawa. (In Japanese.)
- Suzuki, Y. (1997). Shinrigaku kihan no meikakuka [Clarifying the norm of psychology]. In T. Sato & H. Mizoguchi (Eds.), *Tsushi nihon no shinrigaku* [General history of psychology in Japan] (pp. 137-155). Kyoto: Kitaoji-Shobo. (In Japanese.)



**Analysis of the individual and analysis of the society: Géza Róheim and Budapest psychoanalysts**

**Zsuzsanna Vajda**

University of Miskolc, Hungary

Psychoanalytic anthropologist Geza Roheim is one of the most famous Hungarian authors, whose works have been issued several times and are also extensively referred. However despite of Róheim's extraordinary erudition, special skills for languages and the fact that his ethnographic observations were widely collected, he could not summarize his thoughts in a coherent theory about the „psyche and society“. His broad and sharp-eyed observations are not available to be integrated into a whole, his work remained fragmented.

In this talk I would like to draw your attention to Róheim's close relationship with Budapest psychoanalysts, which had a strong impact on his evolving ideas. It is evident that those who study his work are not aware of this fact. It seems that even Paul A. Robinson (1970), one of his most famous researcher did not know about that. Others who were more familiar with Róheim's work in Hungary (Verebélyi, 1984, Tóth, L. 1999) mention Imre Hermann and Ferenczi, as the members of Budapest circle of psychoanalysis, who were related to Róheim but surprisingly, the couple Balint never comes into play. In fact a closer examination of their works makes it clear that a number of categories, which the literature essentially attaches to Róheim, were results of common thinking with Alice and Michael Balint. It is assumed that disruption of this fruitful cooperation played a role in that Roheim's work on theory about human nature left torso.

As is well known, remote expeditions of Róheim were designed to obtain evidence against Malinowsky, proving that the stages of the organization of pregenital libido, assumed by Freud, were universal. But Róheim's experiences showed precisely the opposite direction. Even for him who sought to be unbiased, was surprising that for the peoples whom he visited, who were not affected by modernization, the manners of „civilization“ often meant nothing. They did not limit themselves to eating, did not constitute a reserve, they had no sexual inhibitions. Roheim also realized that this could be related to early childhood patterns forming. For example, he observed that the Australian aborigines were always nursing their children when they wished. The children never lived through the trauma of weaning, as in this ethnic group the custom was, that if the mother no longer wanted to continue breast-feeding, the child can easily find another woman who fed him/her from her breast. "Oral pessimism." was far from Australian Arandas, so members of this community never worried about tomorrow's food, did not constitute a reserve, despite the fact that they were often exposed to famine – found Róheim.

Although Róheim rarely refers to Michael Balint – he probably erroneously ascribed to him the study about the special relationship between mother and child which was actually written by Alice Balint – it is clear, that the couple Balint and Roheim had an impact on each other reciprocally. Roheim in a footnote to his study "The primitive man," indicates that it was Michael Balint who had drawn his attention to the famous work of L. Bolk (Roheim, 1933/1993). Both of Michael and Alice Balint referred to Roheim's experiences in formulating their own assumptions. Michael Balint mentioned Roheim in a lecture in 1934 (1999) in which he criticized Freud's assumptions about the organization of pregenital libido.

For Alice Balint (1932/1940), who was preoccupied with the issues of education of children, Roheim's observations were particularly valuable, because according to them the environment of the child, which was created by the mother (nursing or weaning) can become a model of the later environment. Infants who were separated in an appropriate time, will learn to surrender and become capable to set long-term goals. By contrast, children who were nursed as long as they wished, growing up were not able to dominate their instincts. The product of the common reflection of Róheim and Balints was to realize that children, let them be Australian Arandas, Hungarians, or of indigenous Papuans, are born not into the nature, but into the culture that is taken by the people. For Roheim, this fact was equal with the universality of the human race, Alice Balint, however, saw the prerequisite of the possibility of education in it.



Unfortunately, this productive and promising cooperation was interrupted in the late thirties. All the three scientists were forced to leave their country, and soon Alice Balint died in exile. True the studies that Balints from this time were published in English in the late 40ies, but they did not arouse any particular effect. The Budapest school of psychoanalysis did not exist anymore and its scattered representatives had no longer enough prestige to let the scientific community to be noticed the originality of their ideas.

## Notes

---

Bálint M. 1934/1999: Kritikai megjegyzések a libido pregenitális szerveződésének elméletéhez. (Zur Kritik der Lehre von den pregenitalen Organisationen der Libido, 1934.). Budapest, Animula

Bálint A. 1932/1990: Tiltás és megengedés a nevelésben. (Prohibition and allowance in education) Budapest, Animula

Robinson, P. A., 1969: The Freudian Left. New York – London, Harper and Row

Róheim, G.: Psziché és társadalom (The psyche and society). In Tóth L. 1990.

Róheim, G.: A primitív ember (The primitive man) In. Lélekelemzési tanulmányok. Írták a Magyarországi Pszichoanalitikai Egyesület tagjai. Budapest, Somló

Tóth L. 1990: Róheim Géza. Budapest, Új Mandátum

Verebélyi K., 1984: Utószó Róheim Géza „Primitív kultúrák vizsgálata” című könyvéhez. (Afterword to the book of Geza Roheim: Investigation of Primitive Cultures). Budapest, Gondolat



**"Methodological Innocence but Metaphysical Guilt"? Relations between Psychical Research and Orthodox Psychology in Britain 1880–1940.**

**Elizabeth R. Valentine**

Royal Holloway, University of London

This paper traces the vicissitudes of relations between psychical research and orthodox psychology in England between 1880 and 1940. Post-Kuhnian developments in the philosophy of science have led to explorations of the role of social factors and 'boundary-work' in the demarcation of science from pseudo-science, thus emphasising rejection rather than acceptance and focussing on cultural rather than specifically scientific factors. In addition, more attention has been devoted to the role of physicists than psychologists in the early days of psychical research. Although it is well known that there were close connections between psychologists and the Society for Psychical Research at the end of the nineteenth century, it is less well known that a number of orthodox psychologists were actively engaged in psychical research in the inter-war years in Britain. After sketching the early period, this paper will discuss Harry Price's attempt to secure university support for psychical research, successful for a while but ultimately a victim -- as was so much psychical research -- of personal factors, fraud and deception.

The Society for Psychical Research (SPR) was founded in 1882 by a group of Cambridge intellectuals, with the aim of researching paranormal phenomena in an unbiased manner, so far as possible by scientific methods. Many psychologists were members. FWH Myers, the Society's chief researcher, was joint secretary of the Second International Congress of Experimental Psychology, held in London in 1892. His theory of subliminal consciousness was seen as part of abnormal psychology. The SPR was the route by which Freud's work became known in England. But the nascent discipline of psychology was itself fighting for scientific recognition. Thus many psychologists were cautious about becoming associated with anything tainted with superstition, spiritualism, or the occult.

However, by 1930 the SPR was in disarray, split by factions. Several rival institutions were set up. Harry Price, a businessman and amateur psychical researcher, took advantage of the hiatus to further his own personal aims. In 1926 he set up a National Laboratory of Psychical Research, which carried out series of sittings with (mostly physical) mediums. After failing to develop collaborative links with a number of societies, Price approached the University of London in 1933. The University's Senate, after due deliberation, pronounced psychical research "a fit subject of university study and research" but failed to provide space or funding. Nevertheless, Price managed to organise a University of London Council for Psychical Investigation of ten academics including four psychologists, who advised on research projects and supervised postgraduate students. For a while Price managed to straddle academe and the popular press. But in the end his headstrong pursuit of publicity, if necessary at the expense of honesty, lost him academic support. The Council was disbanded in 1938.

The final section of the paper discusses the ambivalent attitudes of psychical researchers and orthodox scientists towards each other with respect to methods and metaphysics. Some psychical researchers saw psychical research as part of orthodox science, whereas others viewed it as in opposition and were of the opinion that seeking recognition by orthodox science is misguided. While the "high and dry" faction of the Society for Psychical Research (SPR) strove to maintain rigorous scientific standards, others questioned the appropriateness of scientific methods for the study of paranormal phenomena, arguing that introducing the necessary experimental controls militates against the production of psi phenomena. The entangled study of physical mediums demonstrated the impossibility of full control and consequent difficulty of ruling out fraud conclusively. Fundamental disagreements were also present with regard to metaphysical underpinnings. The so-called left wing of the SPR consisted of spiritualists dedicated to seeking evidence for survival after death, whilst the more conservative right-wing were intent merely on demonstrating the inadequacy of what they regarded as materialistic and mechanistic dogmas. For the most part, with some notable exceptions, psychical research has been rejected by orthodox scientists.



## References

Harry Price Collection, Special Collections, University of London Research Library Services.

Kloosterman, I. (2009) Capturing the paranormal scientifically. Unpublished master's thesis, Utrecht University.

Leahey, T. H. & Leahey, G.E. (1983) *Psychology's occult doubles. Psychology and the problem of pseudoscience*. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.

Mauskopf, S.H. & McVaugh, M.R. (1980) *The elusive science. Origins of experimental psychical research*. Johns Hopkins University Press.



## Vygotsky in London

**Rene van der Veer**  
Leiden University

Vygotsky's only trip to the West took place in the Summer of 1925. His primary goal was to attend the 8<sup>th</sup> *International Conference on the Education of the Deaf*, which took place in London from Monday, July 20, to Friday, July 24. Several months earlier the Soviet government had received an invitation from the British government to send a delegate to this conference and in the highest ranks of the Ministry of Education it had been decided to appoint Vygotsky (Vygodskaya & Lifanova, 1996, p. 84). In April, Vygotsky received a letter, signed by the Minister of Education Lunacharsky himself, with detailed instructions as to how to behave and which positions to defend in far-away England (Van der Veer & Valsiner, 1991, pp. 45-6).

At the time, Vygotsky was a beginning specialist in the field of what was called 'defectology', the science concerned with persons with a handicap such as blindness, deafness, or mental retardation. In 1924, he had been appointed Head of the Bureau for the Education of Physically and Mentally Disabled Children, a position that he combined with various other appointments, including one at the Psychological Institute of Moscow University. Apart from an edited volume (Vygotsky, 1924), Vygotsky had published virtually nothing in the field of defectology and it would take several years before he became acknowledged as an authority in the field in the Soviet Union. Outside his home country, Vygotsky was still unknown.

Before he turned to defectology and psychology, Vygotsky worked as a literary critic and organizer of cultural events in his hometown Gomel. In that quality, he published dozens of reviews in journals and newspapers. Part of these writings went into his doctoral dissertation *The psychology of art*, which he planned to defend in 1925. However, Vygotsky had suffered from tuberculosis since at least 1920 and due to a relapse of his illness after his trip to London, he was unable to defend his thesis in public. In October 1925, Vygotsky was formally exempted from this duty (Van der Veer & Valsiner, 1991, p. 46). It is obvious that the years 1924 and 1925 for Vygotsky formed a period of transition from the psychology of art to psychology proper and it comes as no surprise that Vygotsky thought about the effects of works of art on the human mind during his stay in London.

So far, little was known about the details of Vygotsky's trip. It was thought that Vygotsky on his way to and from London visited colleagues in Germany, Holland, and France, but no one was able to recover which institutes Vygotsky visited, whether he held or attended lectures, and so on. Research in schools and institutions for the deafmute in various countries yielded no results. About the only trace that was left of Vygotsky's actual stay in London was the text of his conference talk and a few pictures in the proceedings where he can be seen amidst the other delegates. Fortunately, quite recently, one of Vygotsky's notebooks, dealing directly with this journey, was discovered in the archives. It is a truly unique notebook in that it not only enables us to partially reconstruct Vygotsky's foreign trip but also provides an insight into his state of mind. Unlike other notebooks that have been found or published, this one is filled with very personal remarks, which reveal unexpected tribulations and trepidations.

In this paper, we will take a chronological approach, describing Vygotsky's journey and interspersing this with texts from his notebook to the extent that these were still legible. In presenting these notes, we believe we can shed some light on Vygotsky's complex personality, his motives to do psychological research, and the themes that occupied him in the mid 1920s.



## References

- Adams, M. B. (2001). Networks in action: The Khrushchev era, the Cold War, and the transformation of Soviet science. In G. E. Allen & R. M. MacLeod (Eds.), *Science, History, and Social Activism: A Tribute to Everett Mendelsohn* (pp. 255-276). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Alexandrov, D. A. (1996). Pochemu sovetskie uchenye perestali pechatat'sya za rubezhom: stanovlenie samodostatocnosti i izolirovannosti otechestvennoj nauki, 1914-1940 [Why Soviet scholars quit publishing abroad: the development of self-sufficiency and isolationism of the national science, 1914-1940]. *Voprosy istorii estestvoznaniia i tekhniki*(3), 3-24.
- Carpintero, H., & Lafuente, E. (2008). The Congress that never was: The Madrid International Congress of Psychology (1936). *History of Psychology*, 11(4), 220-238.
- Joravsky, D. (1989). *Russian psychology: a critical history*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Krementsov, N. L. (1997). *Stalinist science*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Krementsov, N. L. (2005). *International Science between the World Wars: The Case of Genetics*. London: Routledge.
- Luchkov, V. V., & Pevzner, M. S. (1981). Znachenie teorii L.S. Vygotskogo dlya psikhologii i defektologii [Contribution of L.S. Vygotsky's theory to psychology and defectology]. *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Seriya 14. Psikhologiya*(4), 60-70.
- Marochko, V., & Hillig, G. (2003). *Represovani pedahohy Ukrajin: zhertvy politychnoho teroru (1929-1941)* [The repressed pedagogues of Ukraine: the victims of political terror]. Kyiv: Naukovyi svit.
- Razran, G. (1935). Psychology in the U.S.S.R. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 32(1), 19-24.
- Razran, G. (1957). Soviet psychology since 1950. *Science*, 126(3283), 1100-1107.
- Razran, G. (1965). Russian physiologists' psychology and American experimental psychology: A historical and systematic collation and a look into the future. *Psychological Bulletin*, 63(1), 42-64.
- Solomon, S. G. (2006). *Doing medicine together: Germany and Russia between the wars*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Yaroshevskii, M. G. (Ed.). (1991). *Repressirovannaya nauka [The oppressed science]*. Leningrad: Nauka.
- Zhdan, A. N. (1988). Sostoyanie i aktual'nye zadachi istoii psikhologii v SSSR [State of the art and contemporary goals of the history of psychology in the USSR]. In A. N. Zhdan (Ed.), *Izuchenie traditsii i nauchnykh shkol v istorii sovetskoi psikhologii* (pp. 4-13). Moscow: Moscow State University.



## SYMPOSIUM

### **Relations between psychical research and mainstream psychology in Europe, the USA and Japan**

Convenor: **Elizabeth Valentine**

Royal Holloway, University of London

This symposium explores the relations between psychical research and mainstream psychology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Europe, the USA and Japan. Kloosterman's paper introduces and motivates the symposium. Following a brief review of the historiography of psychical research, she emphasises the need to consider scientific as well as social contexts, psychological as opposed to physical sciences, and other countries besides the Anglo-Saxon world. Our symposium seeks to redress these imbalances in previous research.

Sommer shows how the opposition of leading American psychologists (G. S. Hall and Hugo Münsterberg) to William James' attempt to incorporate psychical research into scientific psychology in the early days of American psychology, led to the demarcation of psychical research as 'unscientific' and served to create an identity for scientific psychology. As a consequence the important early contribution of psychical research to scientific psychology was expunged from later historical accounts.

Wolffram likewise uses the animism vs spiritism debate between Hartmann and Aksakov in late nineteenth century Germany to illustrate the way in which such boundary disputes helped establish disciplinary borders by refining methodologies and theoretical interpretations.

Valentine traces some of the ambivalences and vicissitudes of relations between psychical researchers and institutionalised psychology in England, first with respect to the Society for Psychical Research in the late nineteenth century, then focussing on Harry Price's attempt to enlist the support of the University of London in the 1930s.

Plas discusses the relations between psychical research and psychology in France at the turn of the twentieth century, focussing in particular on the relevance of Charcot's and Richet's work on hypnosis, and the approach to the study of apparently miraculous powers by medicine and psychology.

Vilaplana et al. contrast the views of natural scientists with those of physicians and psychologists on parapsychology in Spain prior to the Civil War using national newspapers and the popular press.

Gyimesi assesses the significance of the Hungarian psychoanalyst Sándor Ferenczi's interest in spiritualism and his experiments on telepathy for his life-work and theoretical interpretation of psychoanalysis, e.g. the relation of thought-transference to the psychoanalytic concepts of transference and counter-transference..

Takasuna discusses the controversy surrounding Fukurai's work on clairvoyance and "thoughtography" c. 1910, which impeded his career and delayed the development of clinical psychology in Japan. Although banished from psychology textbooks, the "Fukurai affair" is widely known in the popular domain from a recent novel and film.



## FILMS

**Film proposal 1 (Ben Harris)**  
**Herskovits at the Heart of Blackness**  
57 minutes, 2009

A Vital Pictures Production, Producers: Llewellyn Smith, Vincent Brown and Christine Herbes-Sommers, A co-production of Vital Pictures and the Independent Television Service (ITVS), Executive Producer for ITVS Sally Jo Fifer.

---

**Winner, 2009 John O'Connor Film Award of the American Historical Association**  
**Winner, Best Documentary, Hollywood Black Film Festival**

Is there a politics of knowledge? Who controls what knowledge is produced and how it will be used? Is there "objective" scholarship and, if so, how does it become politicized? These questions are examined through this groundbreaking film on the life and career of Melville J. Herskovits (1895-1963), the pioneering American anthropologist of African Studies and one of the most controversial intellectuals of the 20th century. How did this son of Jewish immigrants come to play such a decisive role in the shaping of modern African American and African identities? Herskovits emerges as an iconic figure in on-going debates in the social sciences over the ethics of representation and the right of a people to represent themselves.

This quick-paced, carefully researched documentary traces Herskovits' development as a scholar to the shared African American and Jewish experiences of exile, exclusion and political oppression. Faced with resurgent racism and persistent discrimination in the early 20th century, black and Jewish intellectuals grappled with a common question: could they retain their distinct ethnic identities and still participate as equals in American life? Prominent scholars like Princeton philosopher, K. Anthony Appiah, and Columbia University historian, Mae Ngai, explore this paradox not only in historical and contemporary terms, but through their own experiences as people of color.

Lee D. Baker, a cultural anthropologist at Duke University, locates Herskovits at the heart of a transformation in anthropology which continues to this day. 19th Century anthropology grew out of European colonialism and too often provided a pseudo-scientific justification for its subjugation of non-Western people. Physical anthropologists drew specious correlations between anatomical features and supposed behavioral traits of the various "races."

By the time Herskovits arrived at Columbia University, the Jewish anthropologist, Franz Boas, was revolutionizing the discipline. Boas used impeccable research to demonstrate that different didn't mean inferior. Herskovits became a vigorous advocate for "cultural relativism," the idea that cultures should be understood from the inside, on their own terms, not the anthropologist's. This provided strong academic backing for the anti-colonial and anti-racist movements of the day and laid the groundwork for today's critical cultural theory.

In the late 1920's, Herskovits turned his attention to Africa at a time when other white scholars insisted there was nothing to learn there. During field work in Benin, Surinam and Trinidad, he shot thousands of feet of film (some shown in this documentary) revealing undeniable similarities between African and New World planting techniques, dance, music, even everyday gestures. Harvard historian and co-producer, Vincent Brown, explains how this proof of cultural retention across the African Diaspora refuted the common wisdom that all ties to Africa had been lost in the traumatic rupture of the Middle Passage. Johnnetta Cole, President Emerita of Spelman and Bennett Colleges, current Director of the Smithsonian's National Museum of African Art and an early student of Herskovits, recalls how empowered she felt by Herskovits' "discoveries," even though black scholars had been writing about these same ideas for decades.



But a number of African American intellectuals like sociologist E. Franklin Frazier openly attacked Herskovits' contentions. They worried if black Americans were seen as distinctively "different" it could provide a further rationale for the segregationist policies they were fighting. For example, if, black, female-headed households were a continuation of African matriarchal tradition, as Herskovits contended, not the result of persistent discrimination and poverty, the struggle for progressive social reforms might be undermined.

North Carolina Central University historian, Jerry Gershenhorn, author of *Melville J. Herskovits and the Racial Politics of Knowledge*, explains that Herskovits, despite his left-wing sympathies, insisted scholarship should be "objective" and apolitical. He even secretly sabotaged W.E.B. DuBois' life-long project, the *Encyclopedia Africana*, on the grounds that it would be propagandistic. The film reveals, however, that American anthropology was often entangled with political power. During the Cold War, wealthy foundations and government agencies funded the development of "area studies" to support "anti-insurgency" and neo-colonial "nation-building" strategies in the Third World.

In 1948, Herskovits established the African Studies Center at Northwestern, the first at an American university. And he became openly political, campaigning to head the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs. But he was denied a security clearance on the grounds of membership in 17 "communist front organizations" as defined by the House Un-American Activities Committee.

By the end of his life, Herskovits' own research had become a tool for social movements he could not have anticipated—and might not have welcomed. His daughter, historian Jean Herskovits Corry, recalls how his seminal work, *The Myth of the Negro Past*, was embraced by the Black Panther Party and Black Nationalist students of the '60s. Ironically, Herskovits may not have understood the scope of his own influence. When he asked the great Martinican poet and philosopher, Aimé Césaire, the meaning of *negritude*, the world-wide political-literary movement known as the "Great Black Cry," Césaire replied: "You yourself are one of the fathers of negritude. Read *The Myth of The Negro Past*!"

The film raises unsettling questions, asking who has the authority to define a culture, especially if people from that culture are denied the opportunity to engage in the scholarly discourse of defining themselves. Vincent Brown provocatively sums up Herskovits as "the Elvis of anthropology," a man who appropriated African culture, but simultaneously mainstreamed its study into the American academe and popular consciousness.

**Herskovits at the Heart of Blackness** will challenge students to think of "knowledge" as a socio-political construct, shaped by the implicit values and underlying power dynamics of the society in which it is produced. It calls on each viewer to ask "Who controls my cultural identity?" As a result, the film promises to become a core text in Introductory Anthropology, Cultural Anthropology, Sociology of Knowledge, African Studies, African American Studies, and Race Relations classes.



**Film proposal 2 (Jaap Bos)**

**Secrets of a Soul (*Geheimnisse einer Seele*)**

90 minutes, 1926

A Ufa, Berlin silent German drama film directed by Georg Wilhelm Pabst.

A silent film about the talking cure which tells the story of the outbreak, psychoanalytic treatment, and cure of a knife phobia in a man, who has been living for some years in a happy but childless marriage. A murder next door and the return of his wife's cousin from abroad release in him a desire to murder his wife, which he does in a nightmare, but which a sudden inability to touch knives of any kind prevents him from carrying out in reality. Distressed to the point of suicide, he flees to his mother's house where he remembers a psychoanalyst, who had previously recognized his state of mind, and whose help he now seeks. During months of treatment, telescoped into three sessions of intense dream interpretation, the analyst takes the analysand through the presenting problem back to the original childhood trauma and forward into health via a cathartic abreaction as unconscious processes are made conscious.

Originally conceived as an educational film (Lehrfilm) with a booklet explaining the basic tenets of psychoanalysis in simple yet scientifically correct language, and based on an actual case history supplied by Karl Abraham and Hanns Sachs, the film developed into a full-length feature film with a cast of famous actors directed by Georg Wilhelm Pabst. Hailed as a masterpiece on its first showing in Berlin on March 24, 1926 it remains a milestone in the history of European cinema.

By contrast, it sparked off an intense controversy among psychoanalysts. Siegfried Bernfeld and Adolph Joseph Storfer used Vienna and the *Verlag* to publicly accuse their Berlin colleagues of bringing psychoanalysis into disrepute by presenting it in a facile and bowdlerized version and tried, unsuccessfully, to launch a rival project of their own. Freud, who from the outset had expressed his doubts about the feasibility of the Berlin project, was supported in his opposition to the making of any psychoanalytic film by Max Eitingon, Sándor Ferenczi, and Ernest Jones.

The even-handed review printed in the *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*—but not in the *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*—praised Abraham and Sachs for what they had achieved within the limitations imposed by the medium, and Sachs's booklet as a textbook on the essentials of psychoanalysis. But it also made the point that the resolution to psychic conflict as presented was similar to the cathartic abreaction as described by Freud in his first two American lectures, and concluded that the film did not represent psychoanalysis as a whole, but the quintessence of "psychoanalytic therapy."

**Bibliography**

Fallend, Karl; and Reichmayr, Johannes. (1992). *Psychoanalyse, Film und Öffentlichkeit : Konflikte hinter den Kulissen*. In Fallend and Reichmayr, (Eds.): *Siegfried Bernfeld oder Grenzen der Psychoanalyse* Frankfurt am Main: Stroemfeld-Nexus.

Harnik, Jenö. (1927). Psychoanalytischer Film. *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 13, 580-581.

Lacoste, Patrick. (1990). *L'Étrange Cas du Pr. M. Psychanalyse à l'écran*. Paris: Gallimard.

Ries, Paul. (1995). Popularise and/or be damned. Psychoanalysis and film at the crossroads in 1925, *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 76, 759-792.

Sachs, Hanns. (1926). *Psychoanalyse. Rätsel des Unbewussten*. Berlin: Buchdruckerei Lichtbildbühne.