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PREFACE

This fifth volume of the annual CHEIRON proceedings will be the last one to appear in this format. A revamped series of the **Studies in the history of Psychology and the Social Sciences** is under consideration but as yet it is uncertain if, when and how the new series will be published.

The papers in this volume were arranged according to the programme of the Fifth Conference in Varna. Most of them are thoroughly revised. For various reasons some papers presented at the conference could not be included in this volume.

Christfried Tögel edited most of the papers of our East European Colleagues. Sandy Lovie and Michael Shortland improved the English of many papers. For that, we are indebted to them. We also want to thank Neline Ritsma who typed the manuscript and has lightened our labors in the arduous task of preparing it for publication.

Leiden, February, 1988

Hans V. Rappard
Sacha Bem.

PROGRAMME OF THE Vth CHEIRON EUROPE CONFERENCE,
4-7 SEPTEMBER, VARNA, BULGARIA.

Thursday, 4 September

9.00 - 9.15 Opening Adresses
9.15 - 9.45 Opening Lecture by Jürgen Kuczynski (Berlin): Some Remarks on the Development of the Social Sciences
10.00 - 12.00 **Philosophy, Theory and Methodology (I)**
Chair: Kurt Danziger (Toronto)
- Hans Rappard (Amsterdam): Essence Revisited
- Hristo Smolenov (Sofia): Marx and Freud on Alienation
- Jacques Vonèche (Geneve): The Semblence of Sciences: From Physiognomy to nonverbal Communication and Emotion Theory
- Lillyana Stoikova (Sofia): Historical Trends in Social Theories using Biological Categories and Laws

17.30 - 19.00 **History of Psychoanalysis**
Chair: Christfried Tögel (Sofia)
- Bernd Nitzschke (Düsseldorf): Wo Ich war, ist Es geworden. Kritische Anmerkungen zur Geschichte eines psychoanalytischen Begriffs
- Sybe Terwee (Leiden): Psychoanalysis as a Science - Some Historical Viewpoints
- Michael Shortland (Oxford): Shooting Freud: Reflections on Psychoanalysis in the Movies

19.00 - 20.30 Opening Reception
20.30 - 22.30 Film Projection: "Freud" (Directed by John Huston; Scenario by Jean-Paul Sartre).

Friday, 5 September

8.00 - 10.00 **Philosophy, Theory and Methodology (II)**
Chair: Roger Smith (Lancaster)
- Keizo Hayasaka (Morioka): The Totality and the Stratiform Logic as a Method of the Social Sciences
- Reny Avramova (Sofia): Alienation and the Problem of Man's Totality
- Jerzy Bobryk and Jacek Kurcewski (Warsaw): Twardowski's Theory of Actions and Products, Problem of Expression and the Computer Metaphor in Psychology
- Atanas Danailov and Christfried Tögel (Sofia): Evolutionary Epistemology: Prehistory, Varieties and Institutionalisation

10.30 - 12.00 **Biographical Data in the History of Psychology**
Chair: Fernando Vidal (Geneve)
- Odile Martin-Vacher (Paris): Experimentation comparitive sur trois demarches d'interestimation psychosociale dans leur application à l'encadrement: Godin, 1872
- Siegfried Sporer (Erlangen-Nürnberg): Hans Gross (1847-1915): Pioneer of Criminal Psychology
- Helga Sprung (Berlin), Lothar Sprung (Berlin) and Wolfgang Bringmann (Mobile): Erinnerungen an einen fast vergessenen Psychologen; Carl Stumpf (1848-1936) zum 50. Todestag

17.00 - 19.00 **National Developments in the History of the Social and Behavioral Sciences (I)**
Chair: Nikolai Genov (Sofia)
- Siegfried Jaeger (Westberlin): Zum Verhältnis von Aufklärung, Psychologie und Geschichte in Deutschland zur Zeit der französischen Revolution
- György Kiss (Budapest): Eigenartigkeiten der Anwendung der Psychologie in der Industrie Ungarns zwischen den zwei Weltkriegen
- Georg Eckardt (Jena): Die frühe Völkerpsychologie (Lazarus/Steinthal) - Wegbereiter oder Hemmnis für die Entstehung einer wissenschaftlichen Sozial- und Entwicklungspsychologie
- Tolja Stoizeva (Sofia): Social Psychology in Bulgaria.

Saturday, 6 September

8.00 - 10.00 **Philosophy, Theory and Methodology (III)**
Chair: Hovsep Tutundjan (Erevan)
- Roger Holmes (London): The Dog that did not Bark: The unacknowledged influence of Marx on Piaget
- Plamen Gradinarov (Sofia): Atomicity and Self-Identification. A new Approach to an Old Enigma
- Imre Hronszky (Budapest): Development of the Historiography of Science as Social Science: From the "Logic of Science" to the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge
- Nikolai Milkov (Sofia): Philosophy of History without Entities

10.30 - 12.40 **General Problems of a History of Psychology**
Chair: Irmingard Staeuble (Westberlin)
- Roger Smith (Lancaster): Does the History of Psychology have a Subject?
- Fernando Vidal (Geneve): The Difficult History of Behavioral Categories
- Kurt Danziger (Toronto): Background and Identification of Participants in Psychology Experiments
- Paul Voestermans (Nijmegen): A Case of History between Internalism and Externalism: Sex History's Bearing on Psychoanalysis
Work-in-progress-paper
- Edgar Heineken (Duisburg): Zum Nutzen der Psychologiegeschichte für die Lehre des Faches

17.00 - 19.00 **National Developments in the History of the Social and Behavioral Sciences (II)**
Chair: Lothar Sprung (Berlin)
- Jeroen Jansz (Leiden): A Lean Harvest: Dutch Social Science and Immigration from Indonesia 1945-1963
- Nikolai Genov (Sofia): The Development of National Sociological Traditions after the Second World War
- Yehuda Amir (Ramat Gan): History of Psychology in Israel
- Stojan Kamburov (Sofia): Darf eine Sozialwissenschaft ihre Chance verspielen?

20.00 - 21.30 Business Meeting.

Sunday, 7 September

8.00 - 10.00 **Philosophy, Theory and Methodology (IV)**
Chair: Hans Rappard (Amsterdam)
- Istvan Magyari-Beck (Budapest): The Main Paradigms in Social Science
- Horst-Peter Brauns (Westberlin): Sherif's (1935) "A study of some social factors in perception" nach 50 Jahren: eine Reanalyse und einige Nachfolgeuntersuchungen - oder: muss der Historiograph zum Versuchsleiter werden?
- Maxim Stamenov (Sofia): Perception, Cognition, and Language: Points of an old and new Controversies
- Vassilka Nikolova and Valery Dinev (Sofia): Man and his Relations to Social and Physical Environment according to the Medico-philosophical System of Hippocrates

10.30 - 11.30 **History of Pedagogics and Didactics**
Chair: Siegfried Jaeger (Westberlin)
- Hans-Georg Mehlhorn (Leipzig): Aspekte zur Geschichte der Erforschung und Entwicklung Hochbegabter
- Plamen Radev and Peter Katzarov (Plovdiv): Neuentdeckte Momente bei der Entstehung und Entwicklung der Unterrichtslehre

11.30 - 12.30 **Institutionalisation and Professionalisation of Psychology**
Chair: Horst Gundlach (Passau)
- Helio Carpintero, Esteban Perez-Delgado and Francisco Tortosa (Valencia): Eminent Authors in Psychology: A Quantitative Approach through Seven Journals
- Trudy Dehue (Groningen): On Psychologists and Graphologists. The Function of a Semi-Science in the Professionalisation of a Scientific Discipline

17.00 - 18.30 **National Developments in the History of the Social and Behavioral Sciences (III)**
Chair: Hristo Smolenov
- Jiri Hoskovec (Prag) and Josef Brozek (Bethlehem): Origins of Czechslovakia's Psychotechnology in International Context
- Ferenc Erös (Budapest): Social Psychology in Hungary
- Elga Nikolova (Russe): The History of the Eugenic Idea in Bulgaria.

NOTES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Jürgen Kuczynski
Berlin, GDR

During the last 3000 years humankind has always had some great figures in the field of the social sciences, that is, sciences dealing with problems of society as opposed to nature; but we also know of periods wich are characterised by a more general flowering of the social sciences. In Europe, we know of three such periods: ancient Greece, the Renaissance, and the first fifteen years after the October Revolution in the Soviet Union. These periods seem to have become shorter in the course of history. Furthermore, in ancient Greece and during the Renaissance the social sciences flowered along with the natural sciences, with literature and the arts. In the Soviet Union, however, only the social sciences developed so remarkably - except, of course for some important figures, who had usually been active and prominent in various cultural fields before the revolution.

The flowering of culture both in ancient Greece and at the time of the Renaissance did not begin with the social sciences. It began in the field of literature. The flowering of the social sciences in the Soviet Union, on the other hand, had its roots in extraordinary works of times past (some of them, long before the October Revolution) such as the works of Marx and Engels and Lenin, of Plekanov and Rosa Luxemburg.

How do such periods of flowering emerge? That problem has hardly been investigated. Little research has been devoted to the causes underlying the sequence of cultural developments, for instance the order in wich social sciences emerge: before or after literature or philosophy; before or after historiography.

Some people are of the opinion that the beginning of a new social formation fructifies the social sciences. But this does not hold true of the period of feudalism, or the formation of new societies after 1945 in Eastern Europe. There is not a single great figure, barely even an outstandingly talented one to be found among the authors published in the field of the social sciences in the new socialist countries wich emerged after 1945 - to say nothing of a phenomenon

such as a flowering Pleiade. Could it be that the deformations, due to the period of Stalin and its consequences, are responsible?

And what about the development of the social sciences in China and in India? We do as yet not know enough about their development. Question after question arise even when we deal with such a subject as the periods of flowering of the social sciences in world history.

Some branches of the social sciences develop very early; philosophy for instance, which, in Greece, emerges in very close contact with the natural sciences. Perhaps we can assume that the social sciences developed first in the great empires of the Orient, in the empires of the Babylonians, the Persians and the Egyptians as instruments of administration. In early times, but also during the Renaissance, religion played an important role in connection with the social and natural sciences. Even Newton needed God as first mover for his theory of mechanics.

Some social sciences have developed rather late in the course of cultural history. Political economy as a social science is the product of capitalism, but, as such it flowered with many splendid representatives only between about 1760 and 1830, although capitalism had already taken root almost 200 years earlier as the economic basis of English society. In France, on the contrary, it had already begun at the end of the feudal period, headed by Quesnay and Turgot. Marx and Engels were rather lonely figures in the second half of the nineteenth century. Political economy is followed by sociology only after 1850.

But the question arises: is sociology a fundamental social science, a system in its own right? We have not as yet a satisfactory definition of sociology in general, of sociology as a system - perhaps this is the reason why Lenin temporarily gave up using the word. We have, instead, numerous sciences which really are an interdisciplinary composite. One should distinguish them from fundamental sciences which find laws for one single scientific field.

One should also consider separately part-sciences which also differ from fundamental sciences. For decades I have been working in the field of economic history. Naturally I have found that the existence of a special institute of economic history in our Academy of Sciences is fully justified. But I have always maintained that economic history is only part of the science of political economy,

dealing with the history of economic formations. The political economists have studied the structure of capitalist economy and found many important laws of development. They have also tried - up to now not very succesfully - to find laws governing the socialist economy over and above those found by Marx and Engels. Their success was limited, but that should not surprise us since the stage of development of the socialist economy has as yet not advanced very far. And if the political economists are so occupied with the analysis of capitalist and socialist economies that they do not find time for the analyses of precapitalist societies and leave this to the economic historians, this is acceptable, as long as the economic historians are first taught political economy as it is the case in the German Democratic Republic.

The social position of the social scientists was very high in the times of their abundant flowering. They usually were friends, confidants and advisors of political leaders or heads of state. One tried, for example, to undermine the position of Pericles in Athens by accusing his friend and teacher, the philosopher Anaxagoras, of being an atheist or by accusing another friend of his, the great artist Phidias, of having stolen gold. During the Renaissance many social scientists were befriended by rulers of their country. The exchange of letters of Erasmus of Rotterdam with so many men in politics and with rulers of his time was used by the latter in order to spread rumours among politicians all over Europe. When the British prime-minister Pitt asked Adam Smith to attend a cabinet meeting in order to have his advice, all the ministers got up from their seats when he entered and Pitt greated him as "our teacher". A similar position was occupied in the Soviet Union by social scientists after 1917, and often they themselves were members of a ruling body.

Today most cabinet members in capitalist states are culturally rather uneducated - and as to the social sciences, especially as to political economy, they have special advisory bodies such as the Economic Council of the American President or the council of the heads of the most important economic institutes in the Federal Republic of Germany. These councils, consisting naturally of ideological representatives of the interests of monopoly capital, have a relatively independent status insofar as they make public their advice to the government even if it differs from actual government

policy - but in this case the government usually does not follow their advice.

In the socialist countries the social position of social scientists today is, in keeping with their general mediocrity, rather unimportant - naturally with certain exceptions such as in the case of my teacher Eugene Varga in the Soviet Union. On the other hand, their position is good from a material, that is, from a monetary point of view, and they are honoured by all sorts of decorations - which, by the way, did not exist during the life of Lenin and some time thereafter. But one must always keep in mind that the leading politicians in the socialist countries are (unlike their counterparts in capitalist countries) well educated in the social sciences, although this alone naturally does not turn them into creative social scientists, as they were with Lenin and some of his comrades in the uppermost governing bodies.

But this situation is at present undergoing a change in the Soviet Union. And in the future, one may again expect a flowering of the social sciences and an improvement in the social position of social scientists in the socialist countries.

Is it really important to study the history of the social sciences, their flow and quality as well as the social position of social scientists, especially in their relation to the leaders in politics in general and to the government? I believe it is and that we are not only justified in discussing the problems arising in that connection but that we must do so.

History shows that the flowering of the social sciences usually coincides with the flowing of society as a whole. Naturally, the latter is bound to be a pre-condition of the former. But I also believe that blossoming social sciences contribute to a raising of the level of society as a whole.

Social scientists have inspired politicians, have been their teachers and advisors as far back as we have reliably recorded history - of course, only if the politicians were generally well educated before they reached important offices, and that was not very often the case. As members of society, scientists should naturally be interested in helping to shape events, for instance by reacting to fortunate and unfavourable developments of the economy, by influencing and directing its course. And those who are responsible for the

course which society takes in general be it in material or spiritual, in economic or cultural affairs, should be glad to ask scientist's advice and put them, if advisable, into executive positions as well.

If advisable - for not all social scientists are capable of serving in executive positions which require not only insight based on knowledge but, in addition, the qualities needed for leadership.

On the other hand, people with special qualities for leadership, whom we find so often in politicians, unfortunately believe nowadays that they are also capable of solving social problems without having studied them, either by sheer common sense or on the basis of party ideology. Cabinet members regard themselves as able to tackle problems of education and economy, of ecology and philosophy, of sociology and criminology without any real knowledge in these fields. At the same time, they have already learned to be very careful when matters of natural science are at stake and to depend on the natural scientists for advice.

Both trends have a curious tradition. While princes before capitalism had either a court astronomer to advice them on acts of state with the help of astrology, alchemists in order to produce gold, or religious men and magicians who prophecied future events and actions, they often also had court jesters but never court social scientists.

Prominent men in politics and princes generally developed their own philosophy, their own rules of government, and usually left the administrative tasks to a well-trained bureaucracy without interfering too much, often being not even allowed to interfere.

Naturally, in many cases, common sense was in fact the only means to guide them as long as a social science, such as political economy before the seventeenth century, had as yet not developed. And common sense served them often quite well. The liberation, by Solon, of the Greek peasants from debt slavery was the result of penetrating economic thinking just like Luther's fight against usury or the antimonopolist pamphlets at the time of Elizabeth I.

But under capitalism there developed an economic system of global size the understanding and direction of which requires, even on a national scale, a very broad and deep knowledge of political economy. That does not mean that one can dispense with common sense, but it does mean that more than common sense, that scientific training is required in the very first place.

I believe that social scientists everywhere need to strengthen their position by raising their thinking to a higher level and by helping to educate the ruling circles in their countries so as to make them understand not only that their advice is necessary indeed, but also that quite a few of them should share in the executive work. I know there are exceptions to the relatively low position of the social scientists in society today - but as an old proverb says: the exception confirms the rule.

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ESSENCE REVISITED

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> "The German or a priori view of human knowledge (-) is likely for some time longer (though it may be hoped in a diminishing degree) to predominate among those who occupy themselves with such enquiries, both here and on the continent."
>
> J.S. Mill, quoted by Bubner (1981).

Summary.
The general argument of this paper is that a reinterpretation of the concept of essence may contribute towards the integration of psychology. In the first part essence is shown to have played an important role in Central-European psychology, notably in Wolff and Davydov. In the second part, a contemporary interpretation of Husserl is introduced according to which essence may be seen as the definition of an object-domain. This interpretation is illustrated and further clarified by a brief review of a recent historical study.

When in 1983 Staats's book on **Psychology's Crisis of Disunity** raised the problem of the almost total lack of organization and the ever increasing fragmentation of the discipline, some historians had already commented on the same topic while others were to follow before long (Gilgen, 1982; Hearnshaw, 1987; Marx & Hillix, 1973; Robinson, 1979; Woodward, 1987). Although none of these authors thought about the unification of psychology along Staatsian lines, all felt that at least a measure of integration of the "psychological studies" (Koch) would be a valuable goal to pursue. In this connection, the present author was struck by Robinson's (1979) view that indispensable to the business of integration are methodological and - especially - ontological foundations.

This paper forms part of a larger project aimed at investigating foundational concepts that might prove relevant to the integration of psychology. On the basis of earlier research (Rappard, 1979, 1984, 1987) it is assumed that the philosophical concept of essence might be such a concept. A contemporary interpretation of the Husserlian view of essence will be introduced, and an example will be presented of what, on the basis of the above, may be called essentialism in disguise.

Some remarks on essence in the Leibnizian tradition

In **Toward Transformation in Social Knowledge** (1982) Gergen distinguished between the exogenic and endogenic worldviews. Since Gergen was especially concerned with certain problems in late nineteenth century psychology, he gave little attention to the fact that both worldviews find their origins about one and a half centuries earlier in Locke and the so-called Leibniz-Wolff system. Hence, they largely concur with what Gordon Allport (1955) has coined the Lockian and Leibnizian traditions in psychology. Christian Wolff (1679-1754) has played an important part in the development of the Leibnizian tradition. This "prosy, pretentious, slightly comical professor" (Beck, 1969, p. 275) introduced several important concepts in Central-European philosophy and psychology, among them essence and ground. Although not totally identical, both concepts are inextricably linked. Hence, their subtle philosophical differences may be glossed over in the context of this brief paper.

Wolff. As demonstrated elsewhere (Rappard, 1979), in Wolffian thinking logic plays the same role that analytic geometry does in Cartesian philosophy; to Christian Wolff thinking virtually equals logic.

His philosophical method can be summarized as "elucidating the conceptually known". Wolff is often seen as one of the fathers of the German Enlightenment. As L.W. Beck points out, "there is a close connection, both substantive and etymological, between the act of the mind in moving from obscure to clear ideas (= aufklären) and Enlightenment (=Aufklärung) as a cultural phenomenon" (1969, p. 272).

At the beginning of the elucidation process, concepts are comparable to the Piagetian "spontaneous" concepts and the Vygotskian "living, non-scientific" ones. The way to elucidation is found in an analysis or "explication" of the initially obscure concepts, which

then appear to contain a number of predicates. Since this means that in the course of the explication, predicates are attributed to a logical subject, i.e., the concept that is being analyzed, the formation of clear and explicit concepts and of judgments is closely linked.

It is important to note that the predicates found in the analysed concept are interconnected with one another. And this is so because each predicate is of an ever more general and comprehensive nature and hence is ever emptier. That is, it contains increasingly fewer predicates. Consequently, the concept that is being explicated and the predicates that are found in the process are related to each other as "species" to "genera" and thus form a hierarchically interconnected system which is, according to Wolff's ontological assumptions, a reflection of the order that prevails in the universe - the Universitas Ordinata. To paraphrase Galileo, it can be said that according to Wolff the Book of Nature has been written in the Language of Logic. It should also be mentioned that the explication process - by means of which the concept has become "explicit" and hence elucidated - results in a definition.

For instance, the concept of an empirically given isosceles triangle implies that this figure is a triangle - which is a more general and comprehensive concept than the former. But the concept of triangle in its turn contains "geometrical figure" and this predicate too is more general than triangle. Moreover, it is a "rational" rather than an empirical concept.
With this we have two judgments: (1) an isosceles triangle is a triangle and (2) a triangle is a geometrical figure, and these two premisses allow the conclusion (3) an isosceles triangle is a geometrical figure.

Remarkably enough, this simplistic logic has played an important role in the history of philosophy, since the "logical ignorantists" (Bochensky, 1962) who were educated with it include, next to Wolff, the British empiricists, Kant and Hegel.

It will be clear that at some point the elucidation process has to come to a halt. Indeed, it finds its termination when a predicate is hit upon, which does not, as was the case until then, find its ground in another predicate, but in itself.

The concept of ground is defined by Wolff as the "predicate by which the existence of other predicates can be understood". In other

words, it is the "reason" for the understanding (Vernunftgrund) of the concept that has been analysed.

Essence is practically identical to ground; it is seen as the predicate which comprises the ground or reason why the other predicates belong to the analyzed concept.

Wolffian psychology is sometimes seen as the beginning of German faculty psychology. It is never made clear however, that his psychological approach doesn't just happen to deal with a number of arbitrary faculties but that it is fundamentally a "faculty psychology" and couldn't be anything else. Bearing in mind that logic provides the Wolffian paradigm, this point can easily be clarified.

Wolff conceives of the mind as a substance, which as such is, of course, not perceptible. But in introspection the mental phenomena (representations, Vorstellungen) can be perceived. Philosophically these representations are seen as "changes of the mind-substance". Every introspectable representation may be likened to a concept, which, as we have seen, can be elucidated by explication. Although it is not easy to give a simple example since Wolffian faculty psychology is thoroughly embedded in the total philosophical system, it can be said that the analysis of the concepts of empirical psychology, i.e. introspection psychology, ultimately demonstrates their ground and essence in the concept of the mind (Seele). The mind then, may be considered the most general and comprehensive, and hence the most simple predicate of everything that can be introspected. In other words, the mind is the point where the analysis of the concepts of empirical psychology has to terminate.

Faculties are thus seen to be "possibilities of the mind" (faculty = "Vermögen", which is derived from the verb "vermögen": to be able to). Indeed, Wolff defines a faculty as "the possibility of a particular representation".

According to Wolffian philosophy, the eighteenth century armchair psychologist can, on the basis of representations which are subject to introspection and hence can be called empirical, demonstrate the ground and essence of these representations. As was mentioned earlier, the ground is also called, "reason" or in Latin, "ratio", which brings us to the topic of "Rational Psychology". Put very briefly, Wolff's volume bearing this title examines how the data of empirical psychology, i.e. the introspectable representations, are grounded or find their reason (ratio) in the mind. Rational

psychology is thus seen to be rational in the sense of non-empirical. But rational has yet another, more fundamental meaning. Not only does it signify "product of reason" but it also indicates a reasoned, i.e. a grounded and hence logically connected system. In other words, ground and essence are, in every sense of the word, "essential" to the system.

There is no denying that Wolff's writings are exceedingly dull and pedantic. Just as Wundt would do a century and a half later, a very impressive output was partly realized by continuously reworking and even merely repeating earlier writings. Yet, Wolff has been extremely influential. According to Beck,

His philosophy was the first comprehensive system to be published in Germany and was until 1750 either the source of most of the intellectual life or the target of attack. Kant praised him for having introduced the spirit of exactness and rigor into German philosophy. He was the principal author of the German philosophical (and hence also psychological) vocabulary and German in his hands became an adequate vehicle for philosophical thought (Beck, 1969, p. 261).

Ground and essence were also of eminent importance in Leibniz, a good part of whose philosophy, however, wasn't published until well after Wolff's influence had started to decline. As we know, the so-called Leibniz-Wolff system provided much of the dream content of Kant's dogmatic slumber, whereas - as is less known - the later, purely Leibnizian influence shaped important parts of Hegelian philosophy, indeed to such an extent that Belaval (1976) speaks of "une véritable parenté".

It would be a breathtaking project to trace the career of the concepts of ground and essence in Central-European philosophy and psychology. Just think of dialecticism and phenomenology, while Wundtian psychology might also be a case in point. However, in contemporary psychology, with its overwhelming Anglo-Saxon bias, they are hardly to be found. European phenomenological psychology was blotted out at the end of the 1950s and in its American variety the emphasis is not on its being a "Grundwissenschaft" but on the later Husserlian concept of the Life World.

Essence is still prominent, however, in the Cultural-Historical Movement in Soviet Psychology.

Vasily V. Davydov (b. 1930) together with P. Gal'perin belongs to the most important Soviet-psychological branches of essentialism. Both are educational psychologists. Since logic was seen to be important in Wolff and since the subject plays a larger role in Davydov than in Gal'perin, only the former will be discussed here.

Davydov (1977) builds on the work of Vygotsky. The latter criticized on dialectical grounds the view that an abstract concept would be a common feature of a number of less abstract concepts. This was the view of "logical ignorantists" such as Wolff, but the British empiricists also formed part of such a group, as Bochensky (1962) observed earlier and it is the latter who were made a butt of by Vygotsky.

It is already known that the predicates that are analysed in a concept become more and more general and empty. These concepts develop according to Vygotsky "bottum up", i.e. from the concrete to the abstract. By concrete we are to understand the initial concept before analysis has taken place. Inspired by Piaget's distinction between "spontaneous" and "non-spontaneous" concepts, Vygotsky adopted "living" and "scientific" concepts, the latter which did not, in his opinion, develop bottom up but "top down".

Although Davydov builds on Vygotsky, he believes that Vygotsky's research on the formation of scientific concepts is in various respects unclear, unfinished, and untenable. In his own work he distinguishes between "empirical" and "theoretical" concepts. The former are characterized as not transcending experience, i.e. no new knowledge relations can be discovered with them. Just as in an association-chain all elements carry the same weight, the features of the Davydovian empirical concepts are all equally important. In an empirical relation every single element is "abstract", i.e. independent or as the dialectical term goes: unmediated.

For instance, a number can be thought of as a feature that has been abstracted from a set of objects, just as colour or form; in this case the number ten is identified with sets containing ten elements; 'ten' is simply connected with ten objects, just as redness is identified with red objects.

In theoretical thinking, however, a number is conceived of as a "model" by means of which the necessary and universal, and hence "essential" relations of a knowledge structure are represented. In the case of the example, a number expresses the relation between an

quantity (length, weight, content, etc.) and a measure. Thus the model of the concept of number is "quantity divided by measure". As such, it provides us with the universally valid or essential viewpoint for the understanding and the practical application of the concept of number.

It will be clear that the model is not an empirical feature but a rational or theoretical construct. As mentioned before, Davydov identifies this construct with the essential relations determining systems of knowledge such as mathematics and linguistics - on whose teaching he has done much research - or physics and chemistry. The model enables us to "ascend from the abstract to the concrete", as it is put in dialectics. That is, in theoretical thinking the concrete - e.g. the initial problem of understanding the concept of number - can be theoretically reconstructed by means of the model or essence.

Essence then, is the "germ cell", the genetical basis of this reconstruction, the result of which is the concrete becoming an explicit, elucidated and hence intelligible system. It is by means of the essence of the number-concept that Davydov's students have at their disposal the necessary, universally valid knowledge to rationally determine what the concept of number signifies and how it is used in solving arithmetical problems. Since in theoretical concepts "the essential or general dominates the particular", these concepts make it possible to transcend the given. Theoretical concepts reflect parts of the world in such a way as to render them intelligible as systems of interconnected concepts of theories, which is the reason why according to Davydov in education much more attention should be paid to theoretical concepts.

There is much to be disputed about the Davydovian viewpoint. Not every educational psychologist in the Soviet Union is prepared to accept his ideas. Some object that the difference between empirical and theoretical concepts is exaggerated. Others reproach him for not having developed a method for finding the essence of a given problem. This author is far from certain that Davydov's view of concept learning has to be hailed as dialectical. After all, much of it reminds one of the classical rationalism of Wolff, and Kant, and also Wundt, while similar ideas may be found in Ernst Cassirer. Moreover, in his work on teaching schemes for mathematicians Davydov relies heavily on the French Bourbaki-group of mathematicians. However, all this is not our concern here, since the purpose of this section of

the paper is to demonstrate that the concept of essence can still be found to play a role of some importance in contemporary Central-European psychology.

Contemporary Essentialism

At first sight Davydov seems to hold a rather different view than Wolff's definitional use of essence. Clearly, in his conception a dynamic emphasis can be noticed on the theoretical reconstruction of the problem to be solved and the practical application of the resulting model, elements which were notoriously lacking in eighteenth century thinking.

Davydov's starting-point in Vygotsky and his general dialectical orientation allow me to say that until now ground and essence have been approached from a historical angle. Thus, a reasonable question to ask at this point would be about the possible relevance of these concepts. Should they be looked upon as stuffy and even near-occult relics from a remote past, or might they perhaps still be of some use to psychology - notably attempts at integrating the discipline?

In the following, a tentative "yes" to this question will be upheld. The argument will proceed in two stages. Firstly, a contemporary interpretation of the Husserlian view of essence will be introduced. Among other things, this interpretation will serve to further clarify the foundational significance of ground and essence. Secondly, an example will be presented of what in this author's opinion may be called contemporary essentialism - an essentialism in disguise to be sure, but one that was stimulated by D.N. Robinson's (1979) concern about the lack of conceptual integration of psychology.

Husserl's Essence.

In a recent paper, the philospher De Boer (1985) made an attempt at solving certain problems that have persistently plagued phenomenology - notably the question of the ontological status of essence. Against the positivist dictum that knowledge is to be grounded in experience, De Boer notes, Husserl argued that the experience of essence should also be acknowledged. In maintaining this however Husserl practically conceived of essence as an empirical object. Hence it can be said, according to De Boer, that Husserl argued in defense of an alternative ontology but in doing so stuck to the positivist one.

The reinterpretation of essence that we are interested in finds its starting-point in Heidegger. In Heidegger's view, essence is not to be thought of as an object but as a kind of experience. The particular kind of experience he has in mind, however, is not of a perceptual nature but is seen as an awareness of mental activity, that is, the activity in which knowledge domains are opened up. Experiencing or "intuiting" essence entails a reflection on our modes of experience.

To some extent this conception falls in line with Kantian philosophy, which, starting out at empirical knowledge, tried to work its way back to the conditions of this knowledge. But whereas in Kant these fundamental or "transcendental" conditions are thought to be outside the realm of experience, in Heidegger they can be known intuitively. In this view, with which De Boer concurs, it is possible for us to reflect on the various ways in which we disclose regions of reality or, as Husserl put it, "ontological regions".

De Boer's next step consists of linking this basically Heideggerian view with the philosophy of rules. Essence as a fundamental way of staking out an ontological region is interpreted in terms of "rules". These rules may be likened to the rules of a game, as Wittgenstein would have it, or to the rules that, in hermeneutical terms, govern the various sorts of human practice. Two main categories of rules should be distinguished at two different levels. In this connection, a few words on a distinction made by Brentano may be in order here. Brentano - in important respects Husserl's forerunner and teacher - distinguished between the content and the activity of consciousness. By doing so he created a difference of level between the two that may also be conceived of as a difference between some kind of fundamental "ground level" and the more superficial "figures" that depend on the former for their existence.

The two categories of rules that were mentioned are (1) constituting rules and (2) internal rules. The rules that are fundamental to the game of chess provide an example of the first category since they set the very possibility of that game. It is possible of course, to use a pawn as a knight but at the cost of having finished playing chess. Internal rules on the other hand, pertain to the actions that are possible once the game has been constituted, e.g. rules concerning the opening. Constituting rules are always implied by internal rules. As indicated before, they are found at a fundamental level -

at a deeper level in any case than the internal rules that are dependent on them.

With this general figure-ground metaphor in mind we should be in the position to grasp the gist of De Boer's interpretation of essence. In his view, essence may be conceived of as the set of constituting rules or the categorial framework, that is, the rules or characteristics that "define" and in that sense "found" object-domains. Seen in this light, essence may be likened to a field or region (cf. Husserl's search for ontological regions) within which scientific practice may make the particulars of empirical knowledge appear. The field itself, however, is outside the reach of empirical research; it is the object of the philosophical discipline of ontology.

In view of what was said in an earlier part of this paper, it should be pointed out that De Boer's interpretation of essence as the definition of an object-domain is different from the Wolffian and the Davydovian conceptions. True enough, in Wolff essence is also seen as a definition but the difference is found in its being a "real definition", that is, a definition of an object - not an object-domain. Although less clear in Davydov, the latter's "germ cell" should in this author's opinion, be assigned a place in the same category.

Robinson's Essence.

Having surveyed a number of Systems of Modern psychology, D.N. Robinson (1979) felt struck by the "absence of a coherent and general system of psychology" (p. 271). Assumptions on which to build a much needed integration of the discipline seem nowhere to be found. In his opinion, "several of the more enduring assumptions of modern psychology may have to be abandoned or significantly modified. The first step in a conceptual integration is surgical; one must cut away distracting, unnecessary, or invalid assumptions before attempting to unite the few that are essential, plausible, and significant" (p. 272).

The remainder of Robinson's final chapter on conceptual integration is devoted to just this. Among the casualties of this cutting process are assumptions such as mechanism, and Darwinism. "When these distractions, errors, and nonessentials are peeled away, we are left with a core of assumptions likely to be required by any systematic

psychology" (p. 280). At the end of the chapter these assumptions are found to make up what Robinson calls, "a short list of 'must' for some future systematic psychology. Much interesting work has been done in defiance of this list, and much more will be done by those with lists of their own. Yet it is difficult for me to conceive of a general theory of psychology as long as the tired assumptions prevail and some of the foregoing ones remain neglected" (p. 286). Obviously, these assumptions are "essential" to Robinson.

In view of the foregoing, it may be concluded that the author, who would probably be appalled at being called an old-fashioned essentialist, is well on the way towards defining the object of psychology. For instance, in connection with the problem of the place of animal research in psychology Robinson writes that the answer to the question "what will qualify as a psychological function", is that the function in question must depend minimally upon (a) some degree of awareness on the organism's part, (b) the potential influences of prior experience, (c) the possibility of alternative outcomes, and (d) what I will here refer to only as room for error. Stated in negative terms, I am suggesting that the adjective 'psychological' not be applied to events, outcomes, processes, and functions able to run their courses at the level of tissue, organs, decerebrate preparations, neuromuscular junctions, and the like" (p. 287).

It should be recalled that if we are to speak of a definition as essential in the sense referred to in this paper it should define an object-domain. This seems to be the case in the quotation given above where Robinson tries - implicitly - to define the object of psychology as a field of investigation.

In an earlier paper (Rappard, 1984), Gergen's (1982, ch. 5) "metatheoretical bases" - the social constitution and historical embeddedness of knowledge, theory as agency, the valuational foundation of knowledge, and research as vivification of theory - were interpreted as "essential predicates" for sociorationalism. In view of the above, however, this seems wrong since these bases do not obviously pertain to the object of psychology but to (Gergen's view of) the nature of social-scientific knowledge, theory, and research.

It should be pointed out that Robinson's "musts" do not just fall from the sky but result from serious historical and theoretical work. This concurs with De Boer (1985, p. 56) according to whom intuiting essence does not entail that things are immediately clear.

In his opinion, the word "intuition" should therefore be replaced by "interpretation". Conceived thus, getting to know essence requires hard thinking and research. "Essence can be argued", as De Boer puts it.

Finally, it is important to note that Robinson drew up his list of "musts" in the interests of systematizing psychology. As has been argued before, the concepts of ground and essence have always been linked to "system". In Wolff the term grounded or rational does not primarily signify "product of reason", but rather it indicates "reasoned", i.e., grounded and hence logically connected. The same can be found in Davydov according to whom theoretical concepts reflect object-domains in such a way as to render them intelligible as systems of interconnected concepts, that is, theories. De Boer finally points out that Husserlian essence is arrived at by means of a process of explication and hence entails system. In other words, whether conceived of statically as in Wolff or Husserl, or dynamically as in the dialectical psychology of Davydov, essence is seen as the "ground" on which can be built integration, structure, and system.

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HISTORICAL TRENDS IN SOCIAL THEORY USING BIOLOGICAL CATEGORIES AND LAWS
(Some philosophical considerations)

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Summary

Although using the same basic paradigm the history of Sociobiological theories shows that by them different pictures of social phenomena and development are produced. This could be explained by the presence and change of importance of "external" and "internal" factors taking part in their formulation.

The result achieved in different sociobiological theories by their common claim of being "objective", is examined.

The "objectivity" of the theories in question is compared with the scientific understanding of truth and the development of the process of knowledge.

Looking backwards over the path of all social theories explaining the structure and development of society by means of biological categories and laws, I cannot help thinking that their common direction follows the common tendency in the development of scientific knowledge.

To make my position clear let me briefly make a survey of these theories as well as bring an outlook on the tendency of the development of scientific knowledge.

We gain knowledge of all kinds of objects, first examining them as a whole, then dividing the whole into parts and studying their properties and lastly trying to understand all the existing connections between these parts, as well as between the whole object examined (and of their parts) and all sorts of other objects (and their parts). By this procedure we learn not only details of the structure of the object but also how it developed, what its history is, its present condition in the world and what the tendencies of its future development are.

This dialectical procedure of gaining knowledge is well presented by F. Engels. He pointed out that the dialectical thinking of the

Greeks resulted from their immediate contemplation of the whole picture of natural phenomena but that this was not adequate to explain the details of their structure. And for gaining knowledge of these details it was necessary to cut them off from their natural and historical connections and to examine each one separately.[1] The result of this separate viewing of the phenomena in isolation from all other phenomena, was the metaphysical way of thinking, characteristic of the 17th and 18th centuries. But with the accumulation of factual knowledge in natural sciences a moment comes when the necessity for their theoretical generalization becomes imminent. And then, there is no other way of gaining a clear view of the picture, except by turning away from metaphysical thinking and returning towards dialectical thinking.[2]

Likewise in the history of sociology, one can see first in the face of Herbert Spencer's **Principles of Sociology**[3] a picture of the whole structure of society. Spencer also sees the dynamic side of social development. And he did so using biological categories and laws. Then, with the development and differentiation in natural sciences reductionism flourishes. Many theories, interpreting different parts of human nature manifested in society, were developed. In them, biological categories and laws were no longer used to explain the social as a whole but only different psychological, behavioural, ethical, biological characteristics of its members. We are not going to list all works, schools and ideas, which could be attributed to reductive sociobiological theories. To name but a few: in psychology - the behaviourist school, the ideas of Mac Dougall, William James's pragmatic views; in ethology - the earlier works of Konrad Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen, but also the works of some writers, popularizing some ethological ideas, such as Robert Ardrey; in genetics - C. Darlington's. And after the 1970s general theories of the development of man and society, can be recognized in the works of some biologists.[4]

Therefore in the history of social theories using biological categories and laws, the object studied was first seized and presented in theory as a whole, then different parts of it were examined and lastly, new synthetising theories arose.

Logically the questions arise: how are these theories related to the development of natural sciences and especially to biology, and how are they related to the development of social sciences? Can these

"internal" relations alone explain their origin or is it necessary to look for some other "external" causes as well?

In answering this question it becomes clear that the resemblance pointed out between the tendency of the development of scientific knowledge and that of sociobiological theories is false. One understands that all these theories cannot transcend the basic paradigm of presenting an abstract man only in his natural, but not his social history and thus equipped with some ethical laws drawn from his biological nature.

Then why is it that, by applying the basic paradigm, the aim of which is by biologizing social phenomena, to prove that whatever is, is right or just natural, different pictures are produced? In the early theories - a picture of the whole society (holistic theory); in subsequent theories - reductive social theories, in contemporary theories, a holistic picture again.

This could be explained by the fact that the "internal" factors were always present - in the reductive as well as in the holistic theories.

It is well known that at the time Spencer forwarded his theory physics and biology were in a crisis and the need for their theoretical synthetizing was apparent. He did so on the basis of his attitude towards different sciences and his understanding of the meaning of philosophy.[5] He stated that true theoretical knowledge could not be reached in concrete sciences but only in his philosophy of biology, psychology, etc. By making some laws and categories in physics and biology his starting point (Spencer's 'persistance of force' drawn from the principle of the conservation of energy; his understanding of universal evolution based on biology; Lamarck's principles for inheritance of acquired characteristics) he then mechanically transfered them into his metatheoretical scheme from which he deducted his general theory of social statics and social dynamics.[6]

Spencer's metatheoretical scheme could be defined with two basic principles. The first is structure-functional with the help of which he determines the structure (statics) of society, of organisms, etc., in his philosophies - of biology, sociology. The second principle refers to the regularities of the universal evolution therefore with it he determines the dynamics of the particular systems examined. From his understanding of the universal evolution, given in his metatheoretical scheme[7], he also tried to deduct the phenomena of

organic evolution. But the real result of Spencer's theory was that he based his theory of universal evolution on organic evolution as the measure of biology appears in Spencer's scheme as affecting all - including inorganic nature and society. As we know, the crisis of biology was in due course overcome from "inside" by Darwin (as so was the crisis of physics).

Nowadays, we often speak of "a crisis" in biological and social sciences. The need for theoretical generalization in them is obvious. E. Wilson profited by this situation and provided a "Synthesis"[8] from "inside". Therefore in his scheme the measure of sociology turned out to be universal and he spread it over the whole of organic life.[9]

What should be stressed here is that in the making of global social theories based on biological categories and laws, "external" factors were of greater importance.

"Spencer would have been the last to deny the primacy of ethical and political considerations in the formulation of his thought",[10] Hofstadter wrote. This can be seen in the following statement written by Spencer in the preface of his **Data of Ethics**:

> "My ultimate purpose, lying behind all proximate purposes has been that of finding for the principles of right and wrong, in conduct at large, a scientific basis."[11]

Now compare Spencer's revelation with that of Edward Wilson:

> "... science may soon be in a position to investigate the very origin and meaning of human values, from which all ethical pronouncements and much of political practice flow."[12]

And that of Jacques Monod's:

> in "... science ... its profounder message ... is the demand for a thorough revision of ethical premises ..."[13].

But if "external" factors gave the "foreground" in the making of holistic sociobiological theories (in Spencer's time and nowadays) and the "internal" - their "background"[14], then in the reductive theories which sprang up in between, the "foreground" and "background" changed positions.

Three high points can be distinguished in the formulation of reductive sociobiological theories: one in psychology, (actually

social psychology), the second in genetics, and the third in ethology.

The question is: how can the importance of the "internal" factors be evaluated and what should our position be towards the claims of reductive theories to solve some difficult problems of social sciences?

It is reasonable first to say that in their endeavour to understand and objectively explain some awkward and difficult questions the scientists (ethologists, psychologists, genetists) who believed that some general conclusions for social sciences could be drawn from their biological premises of investigation have often forged ahead new scientific and philosophical ideas which deepened the knowledge of their proper sciences.

To give but some examples: the raising of the importance of the principle of objectivity in psychology had some positive consequences. It liberated psychologists from all kinds of anthropomorphism in their investigations of the behaviour of animals (c.q. C.W. Morgan, Wundt and others).

In ethology this brought the development of a new approach in contrast with other contemporary psychologists, who tended "to concentrate on a few phenomena observed in a handful of species which were kept in impoverished environments, to formulate theories claimed to be general, and to proceed deductively by testing these theories experimentally."[15] For example, Lorenz proposed to examine the behaviour of animals in their proper surroundings and so on. The essential is, as R. Hinde points out that "the opening up of new problems, and of new approaches to old ones, the clash of convergent theoretical perspectives, lead to progress in research".[16]

But this same insistence on objectivity proposed by scientists turned out to be the subjective source of their metaphysics once they tried to formulate social, philosophical and ethical conclusions from the data of their narrow field of investigation.

How do they prove that their conclusions are scientific? By telling us that they have been objective and therefore they have taken into account all the criteria needed for reaching true knowledge. If we choose any other way (not the objective way) in our investigations we will be subject to subjectivism and therefore our conclusions will be unscientific, they state.

But first, the principle of objectivity is not the unique criteria of reaching true knowledge. And second, the act of choosing this principle as the only one necessary for reaching true knowledge, leads to subjectivism by itself. This can be seen by discovering what these scientists really meant by stating their objectivity.

Desmond Morris's statement, for example, is that the only way of reaching the objective truth about man - his nature, his history and present situation - is by "zoologically" considering the behaviour of the "naked ape".[17] But Monod does not share the same belief. For him "objectivity obliges us to recognize the teleonomic character of living organisms".[18] For E.Wilson "the only way forward to study the human nature is ... to integrate the natural sciences with the social sciences and humanities."[19] For R.Dawkins - the only objective, scientific basis is "to consider man as a survival machine - a robot vehicle blindly programmed to preserve ... genes."[20] For some ethologits like K.Lorenz it is by investigating goose, fish and other lower animals and extrapolating the results in humans that we can objectively understand our nature. For the behaviourist Skinner ... but is it necessary to continue this ennumeration? The pluralistic understanding of objectivity is obvious.

Three conclusions can be drawn.

First. The principle of objectivity is promoted not only by advocates of reductive sociobiological theories but also by advocates of holistic ones. This explains how and why in the end all holistic theories tend to be reductive as well.

Second. The truth is not only objective but it is also concrete, historical, and practice is the most important criteria of the truth. The recognition of these "additional" principles of true knowledge, however, means that for understanding man - his nature, history and present situation, some additional considerations have to be taken into account namely man's classs position, his social surrounding and all other human "things" studied in sociology and in historical materialism.

But the advocates of social biology claim that their acknowledgement will mean discarding the absolute principle of objectivity. Because how can we insist on being objective if we propose two truths for democracy, for liberty, for choice in behaviour, etc.? On the other hand, there are not two truths about our genetic construction, biochemical processes in our organisms, our functions of feeding,

growing, sex, etc. Therefore, only by studying the biological aspect of the human existance can we reach the objective truth of "what it means to be human at all". And "naturally" the advocates of social biology include in this general biological human nature - all socially conditioned and historically limited characteristics of man.

Third. We are told that there are objective reasons for this subjective choice of objectivity. Considering the three pinnacles of the appearance of reductive theories - in psychology, ethology and genetics, it is easily seen that it really coincides with the early emergence of these sciences. There really are difficulties at the beginning and the history of sciences is much more instructive in this respect.

But we cannot agree with Wilson's statement that the only correct way in the future development of sciences studying adjacent levels of the development of matter, is their integration and therefore that the unifying of social and biological sciences is justified.[21]

In fact, the future Wilson is speaking about refers to those moments in the development of each science when so many empirical facts have been accumulated that the moment has come to arrange them systematically according to their internal connections. And at the same time it is also inevitable for the different fields of knowledge to be placed in their right connections. But with all this the natural sciences come to their theoretical ground ...[22] and the theoretical generalization, as we have explained at the beginning of the discussion, cannot be properly achieved without dialectical thinking.

What Wilson cannot understand is that theoretical generalization is not identical with the integration of different sciences (say, chemistry and biology, in biochemistry), that to integrate two adjacent field of study does not yet mean their theoretical generalization.

A theoretical generalization which rejected the reality of matter was once made by Machists and their mistakes were analyzed in details by Lenin in his **Materialism and Empiriocriticism**. There he contrasts the dialectical understanding of truth with the metaphysical (which admits only absolute truths) and relativistic (agnostic) ones. When we speak of truth philosophically, Lenin points out, we do not have in mind the truth of facts, but the process of knowledge,

the deepening of knowledge. He points out that each truth is historically limited and therefore is relative but at the same time in each truth there is a grain of the absolute. Therefore the knowledge of objective truth is reached not spontaneously and not entirely but only gradually, approximately, relatively. But in relative truths an element of the absolute is inevitably present. Thus the absolute truth is formed from the sum of the relative truths and there is no impassable limit between the absolute and relative truths.[23]

What Wilson tried to do was to make some theoretical generalizations of some facts from biological science but not of the process of knowledge as it is obvious he is not aware of its presence in sociology, human history and all the other 'humanities' which he is eager to include in his **Sociobiology - the New Synthesis**. Nevertheless he tried to draw some philosophical conclusions from that. The aim of Wilson's philosophical investigation is to reach the absolute truth of how 'things' emerged in this world. First, there is the question "Why there is something instead of nothing?" His answer is that "Deity can still be sought in the origin of the ultimate units of matter".[24] Second, there is the question "What is man's ultimate nature?" In the search for an answer and before reaching his final conclusion, now Wilson proves to be 'clever' enough to warn us that knowledge is neither relative nor absolute, because all knowledge has no goal in its development. Knowledge, he tell us, is constructed of ideas and their change depends on the evolutionary process. They were but devices for survival and so was religion, politics and sociality itself.

> "The human mind is a device for survival and reproduction, and reason is just one of its various techniques ... the intellect was not constructed to understand atoms ... but to promote the survival of human genes",[25] Wilson writes.

Sociobiologists force us to believe that social matter, social facts, do not exist, that the social is only a function of biological matter and, more precisely, is but a manifestation of natural selection.

> "The gist of this [sociobiological] approach is the expansion of the existence of the various characteristics of organisms, especially sociality, in terms of their functions - that is, in terms of the benefits they confer on their bearers which cause them to reproduce more successfully than would alternate characteristics ... there is reason to hope that the more precisely defined expectations conserning the relationship between behaviour and

> individual level, or lower level, selection associated with sociobiology will allow more decisive empirical testing with human data..."[26]

First, sociobiologists reject the existence of social matter, of any human social facts and social worlds. Second, they reject the social human development by attributing the social function to a kind of natural selection. Therefore, they prove the existence of only one essence - the biological, whose basic movement is directed towards its reservation, its survival. The metaphysics of such thinking is that all things have one common unchangeable essence. This is also the antidialectical way of thinking: that nothing can change.

These sociobiologists claim, however, that there is change which, in the organic world, is effected by natural selection. But we, humans can do nothing here. Perhaps we will be able to change our genes (nature, behaviour, social worlds, they mean) in future, having understood our biological essence. But even that is uncertain because there is the great danger of deterioration in the results of the natural process of selection, which include our world as a tiny part.[27]

The human side of this theory is sheer fantasy if only because all practice is just absent from it and practice is the real source of all knowledge and theory.

Social changes not due to natural selection do exist and practice is their real proof. By moving inside the 'picture' of our social worlds (say by making revolution, or moving from working towards middle-class situations), we could change the 'picture' and therefore the social structure (and not the biological structure) and, we could change our view of the picture, therefore our social attitudes, functions, which have nothing to do with natural selection.

By subjectively choosing some facts from biology, contemporary sociobiologists draw philosophical conclusions from them. Their final conclusion is not the rejection of all matter, but only of a part of it - the social part. But by doing this they reject the dialectical nature of the whole of matter.

If some new qualities are revealed in the animal world and if they bear some resemblance to the human world, this does not prove that human social facts do not exist, that the human world is simply a part of the animal world and is submitted only to its laws. We

share much in common with animals, but to understand the human social facts and functions, one has to search for the differencies and not the common features shared with the animal world.

Marx and Engels were the first to explain the character of these differences. The basic difference between the human and animal communities consists in the fact that while animals collect, humans produce. This unique but cardinal difference by itself makes impossible the simple transfer of the laws from the animal world towards the human societies.[28]

If Spencer's biological evolutionism helped him to reveal the existence of a social structure and social dynamics (though he presented them quite subjectively), the new sociobiological thinking rejects the objective existence of the social completely. As we see, different pictures of the 'whole' are arrived at when the generalization is made from 'outside' or from 'inside'. So the difference in the final results of the two theories after applying the basic paradigm, is not very great although Spencer's theory is optimistic while that of modern sociobiologists is sceptic.

Notes

1. Engels (1970, p. 38).
2. Engels (1950, p. 50).
3. Spencer (1876-97).
4. E.g., Monod (1979); Wilson (1980); Dawkins (1978).
5. "Knowledge of the lowest kind is un-unified knowledge; Science is partially-unified knowledge; Philosophy is completely-unified Knowledge". Spencer (1900, p. 136).
6. See Spencer (1900); Spencer (1876-97); Spencer (1878-83).
7. "Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant disspation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherant homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation". Spencer (1900, p. 407).
8. Wilson (1980).
9. One can see this in the following statements: "Socialization becomes increasingly prominent as one moves upward phylogenetically into more intelligent species, and it reaches its maximum influence in the higher primates ..." Wilson (1980, p. 10); "Social behaviour, like all other forms of biological response, is a set of devices for tracking changes in the environment". Op.cit., p. 74; "one of the functions of Sociobiology, then, is to reformulate the foundations of the social sciences in a way that draws these subjects into the Modern Synthesis' Op,cit., p.4.
10. Hofstadter (1955, p. 39-40).
11. Spencer (1890, p. VII).
12. Wilson (1978, p. 5).
13. Monod (1979, p. 159).

14. The idea of comparing 'external' and 'internal' factors to 'foreground' and 'background' of a picture is drawn from Oldroyd (1984).
15. Tinbergen (1963, p. 411).
16. Hinde (1982, p. 15).
17. Morris (1968, pp. 10-15).
18. Monod (1979, p. 31).
19. Wilson (1978, p. 6).
20. Dawkins (1978, p. X).
21. Wilson (1978, p. 7-13).
22. Engels (1950, p. 47).
23. Lenin (1969, p. 118-135).
24. Wilson (1978, p. 1).
25. Wilson (1978, p. 2).
26. Tiger (1979, p. 507-508).
27. "In time ... techniques may become available for altering gene complexes by molecular engineering and rapid selection through cloning ... The human species can change its own nature ... New patterns of sociality could be installed in bits and pieces. Perhaps there is something already present in our nature that will prevent us from ever making such changes. In any case, and fortunately, this ... belongs to later generations". Wilson (1978, p. 208).
28. Engels (1965, p. 303).

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WO ICH WAR, IST "ES" GEWORDEN. KRITISCHE ANMERKUNGEN ZUR GESCHICHTE EINES PSYCHOANALYTISCHEN BEGRIFFS

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Summary
The paper presents a critical review of the term "Es", which is important in psychoanalytic theory. The discussion of Descartes' "Cogito" during the centuries by Kant, Lichtenberg, Nietzsche and others finally led to the term "Es" in psychoanalysis. It is proposed to use this term in a metaphoric way and not as a substitute for something, which is "within" the soul.

Der Titel meines Vortrags paraphrasiert jenes berühmte Wort Freuds, das am Ende der 31. Vorlesung über Psychoanalyse steht: "Wo Es war, soll Ich werden" (Freud 1933, p. 86). Damit ist das Ziel der psychoanalytischen Therapie in allgemeinster Form umschrieben: Wo unerkannte - von der Vernunft nicht erkannte, nicht eingesehene, nicht reflektierte - Leidenschaften waren, selbst- oder fremdschädigend wirkten, soll, nach Abschluss des therapeutischen Prozesses, die Vernunft herrschen. Zu diesem Zweck ist es notwendig, an die Stelle einer primären Organisation des seelischen Geschehens, die von den Leidenschaften, von den Affekten, von den Wünschen, von den Phantasien, vom Primärprozess und vom Lustprinzip beherrscht wird, eine höhere psychische Organisation zu setzen, also das Ich, das dem Sekundärprozess und dem Realitätsprinzip folgt, selbst Ausdruck einer einheitlichen Organisation ist. Durch die Organisation des Ich wird eine eingeschränkte, gesteuerte Wunscherfüllung möglich, die archaische Impulshandlungen, die den psychischen Organismus und/oder die soziale Gemeinschaft gefährden, ausser Kraft setzt. Latent bleibt das primäre System zwar erhalten (es entäussert sich hinfort zum Beispiel in Gestalt der Träume), aber das Handeln folgt im Idealfalle hinfort der regulierenden Kraft des Ichs. Im therapeutischen Sinne bedeutet dies, dass die Abwehr archaischer Triebwünsche hinfort nicht mehr aufgrund rigider Über-Ich-Verbote oder aufgrund von Symptomen und Symptomhandlungen erfolgt, sondern mit Hilfe eines Ichs, das die innere und äussere Realität beachtet, um modifizierte Formen der Wunscherfüllung zu ermöglichen. Das Ich ist demnach Ausdruck eines

Umwandlungs- und Erziehungsprozesses, Resultat einer "Kulturarbeit", die der der "Trockenlegung der Zuydersee" (Freud 1933, p. 86) entspricht. Das Ich wird zum Damm, der gegen das Meer der Wünsche errichtet wird, einem System der Kanalisation (der Wünsche) vergleichbar, wodurch sich das feste Land der einheitlichen Persönlichkeit vom scheinbaren Chaos der Leidenschaften abgrenzt. Das Ich ist somit zugleich Ergebnis wie Ausdruck von "Kultur", ein Stück umgewandelte "Natur".

Ich will an dieser Stelle weder auf die Frage eingehen, mit Hilfe welcher Mittel das von Freud angestrebte Therapieziel zu erreichen wäre (das nur nachholen soll, was eine geglückte Erziehung ohnehin erreicht hätte) noch will ich die politischen und ökonomischen Bedingungen reflektieren, die dem Natur- und Kulturverständnis Freuds unterliegen. Ich will vielmehr den Diskurs skizzieren, der - ausgehend vom Begriff des Ich bei Descartes - zum psychoanalytischen Es-Begriff geführt hat. Dabei wird sich zeigen, dass die Kritik am Ich des Descartes, am Cogito (ich denke), zur Bildung des Es-Begriffs geführt hat, der seinerseits auf ein "es denkt" (anstelle des "ich denke") verweist. Das vernünftige Ich des Descartes ist selbst ein Stück "Land", ein Standpunkt, von dem aus das "Meer" der Leidenschaften betrachtet wird, eine letzte Gewissheit, die sich ergibt, indem sich Vernunft selbstreflexiv mit dem Leidenschaften (Passions de l'Ame) auseinandersetzt, die als Gegenstand der Reflexion, als Objekt, das Subjekt begründen, indem sich dieses zu seinen Leidenschaften in Beziehung setzt. Die vernünftige, einsichtsvolle, selbstreflexive Beziehung zwischen Vernunft und Körper[1] konstituiert bei Descartes das Ich. Der Körper an sich (das "Ding" an sich) wird zum Körper für mich, indem ich mich vernünftig, einsichtig zu mir selbst in Beziehung setze, indem ich mir meinen Körper, meine Leidenschaften, aneigne. Das Ich des Descartes begründet sich durch den Zweifel an allem, was Nicht-Ich ist, wobei als letzte Gewissheit allen Zweifelns eben jenes zweifelnde, raisonierende Ich zurückbleibt. Das Ich (oder die Vernunft) braucht einen Gegenstand, auf den es sich beziehen kann, um sich zu konstituieren. Dieser Gegenstand aber ist die Unvernunft der Leidenschaften, der sich zugleich mit dem Ich konstituiert. Psychoanalytisch oder "modern" gesprochen: Mit dem Ich entsteht das Es, zumindest im Sinne eines Reflexionsgegenstandes.[2]

In seiner Schrift über **Die Leidenschaften der Seele** (1649 - zit.n. Ausgabe 1984) schreibt Descartes, die "Hauptwirkung der

Leidenschaften" bestehe darin, die Seele anzuregen, "die Dinge zu wollen, zu denen ihre (der menschen - B.N.) Körper sie veranlassen" (Art. 40), so dass etwa das Gefühl der Furcht das Fliehen-Wollen (und die Entsprechung, die Handlung des Fliehens) verursache. Die Leidenschaften, der Körper und das Wollen (oder Wünschen) sind demnach eng miteinander verbunden. Damit verbunden ist auch der Gedanke, dass sich die Seele leidend dem "Tun" des Körpers gegenüber verhalte.[3] Der Körper erscheint als das Zentrum der Aktivität, wie später bei Freud der "trieb" als Äquivalent einer somatischen Erregung zum Ausgangspunkt des (psychologischen) Wunsches wird. Sehen wir uns hingegen das Ich genauer an, das Descartes in den **Meditationen über die Grundlagen der Philosophie** (1641 - zit.n. Ausgabe 1960) beschreibt, so erkennen wir, dass es sich hierbei um das Äquivalent der Einsicht in all das handelt, was am Ende doch im Körper wurzelt, zumal auch das Wollen als ein Gegenstand beschrieben wird, der sowohl durch die Leidenschaften bedingt ist wie durch die Selbstreflexion das Ich begründen hilft.

Ich, ein denkendes Wesen, entsteht bei Descartes, indem Ich sich auf all das bezieht, was zunächst unbewusst ist. Erst durch eine solche reflexive Beziehung entstehen Bewusstsein und Selbstbewusstsein. Das, worauf sich das Denken beziehen kann, umfasst aber die Leidenschaften, den Körper, das Wollen, die Träume. Mit Descartes gesprochen: "Ein denkendes Wesen! Was heisst das? Nun, - ein Wesen, das zweifelt, einsieht, bejaht, verneint, will, nicht will und das sich auch etwas bildlich vorstellt und empfindet" (1960, p. 25). Die Leidenschaften selbst werden als eine besondere Klasse vom Empfindungen bezeichnet.[4] Fassen wir zusammen, so liesse sich sagen: Das denkende Wesen des Descartes entsteht, indem es sich seine Erlebniswelt selbstreflexiv aneignet und deren **Wahrheit** anerkennt. Die Erschliessung der Subjektivität wird somit zur Begründung des Subjekts. Der Freudsche Satz, von dem wir ausgegangen sind - "Wo Es war, soll Ich werden" - ist demnach, wenngleich unter anderen (nichttherapeutischen) Prämissen, bereits Programm des Descartes.

Sehen wir uns allerdings die **Meditationen** noch genauer an, so bemerken wir, dass die Aneignung der Subjektivität - und damit die Begründung des Ichs und der Vernunft - zugleich auf einem Prozess der Ausgrenzung und Ausschliessung beruht, der sich auf einen wichtigen Gegenstand der möglichen Selbstreflexion bezieht: auf den Traum. Erst

mit der Ausgrenzung des Traumes wird die scharfe Trennung zwischen dem Wach- und dem Traum-Denken möglich, wobei seit Descartes (und später für alle Bewusstseins-philosophien) die Zurückweisung des Traum-Denkens als eines vom Wach-Denken qualitativ verschiedenen, in die Ordnung des vernünftigen Diskurses nicht mehr aufnehmbaren Denkens zum Kennzeichen eben der abendländischen Rationalität wird.

Zunächst heisst es bei Descartes noch, "dass Wachsein und Träumen niemals durch sichere Kennzeichen unterschieden werden können" (1960, p. 17). Dann allerdings beginnt Descartes eine Argumentation, die ihn am Ende ein sicheres Kriterium finden lässt, mit Hilfe dessen Traum- und Wachdenken doch noch voneinander abgegrenzt werden können. Descartes schreibt - und darin gipfeln seine **Meditationen** -, dass zwischen Traum und Wachen "der sehr grosse Unterschied ist, dass meine Träume sich niemals mit allen übrigen Erlebnissen durch das Gedächtnis so verbinden, wie das, was mir im Wachen begegnet ... Begegnet mir aber etwas, wovon ich deutlich bemerke, woher, wo und wann es kommt, und vermag ich seine Wahrnehmung ohne jede Unterbrechung mit dem gesamten übrigen Leben zu verknüpfen, so bin ich ganz gewiss, dass es mir nicht im Traum, sondern im Wachen begegnet ist" (1960, p. 80).

Dieses Zitat, das sich am Ende der **Meditationen** findet, wird nun für den späteren Diskurs, für die Kritik an der Bewusstseinsphilosophie, ausserordentlich wichtig. Das Kriterium der Unverbundenheit des Traum-Inhalts mit den Inhalten des Wachdenkens führt etwa Schopenhauer zur Gleichsetzung des Traumes mit dem Wahn und zu einer ersten Begründung des Wahnsinns als des Ergebnisses eines zerrissenen Denkens, das den Zusammenhang aller Erinnerungen nicht mehr garantieren kann.[5] Dem Traum folgen der Wahn, der Wahnsinn und die Psychose, die dem Wach-Denken gegenüberstehen, insgesamt jenen Bereich kennzeichnen, der später (psychoanalytisch) als das Es imponiert. Auch bei Freud kehrt die Analogie zwischen Psychose und Traum wieder, wobei schliesslich noch die Verliebtheit als das von Freud so bezeichnete Normalvorbild der Psychose, als Ausdruck einer Entgrenzung, in diese Reihe aufgenommen wird. Am Ende sind nicht nur Traum und Vernunft, sondern auch Verliebtheit und Vernunft Gegensätze.

Damit werden dann die Leidenschaften, die Vernunft sich selbstreflexiv erschliessen könnte, wieder zu einer Gefahr für das Ich, für die Vernunft - besonders die sexuellen Leidenschaften. Bekanntlich entwickelt Freud in seiner ersten Trieb-Theorie die Dialektik

zwischen Sexualität und Selbsterhaltung, wobei die Sexual-Triebe zu einer ständigen Gefährdung für die Selbst-Erhaltung erklärt werden. Überwältigt der "Trieb" das Ich, so ist die Psychose das Resultat. Andererseits versucht Freud durch die Deutung des Traumes eben jene Grenze, die Descartes errichtet hat, wieder zu überschreiten, indem er behauptet, dass alles, was im Traum erscheine, auch eine Verbindung mit dem Wach-Denken habe, wobei diese Verbindung allerdings erst wieder durch eine komplizierte Technik der Rekonstruktion hergestellt werden muss. Rekonstruiert wird dabei allerdings nicht nur der Zusammenhang, der das aus der vernünftigen Denk-Organisation ausgeschlossene "Denken" zurückholen soll, sondern auch dieses primäre Denken selbst. Bekanntlich hat Freud in der **Traumdeutung** (1900) eben dies versucht: Er wollte die primäre - vom Wach-Denken verschiedene - Denk-Organisation (ausgezeichnet durch den Primärprozess) wieder rekapitulieren, um deren Resultate als Vorstufen des Wach-Denkens erkennbar werden zu lassen. Das Ziel der psychoanalytischen Technik - zu der das Deuten der Träume wesentlich gehört - besteht ja gerade darin, wenn möglich das Traum-Denken "ohne jede Unterbrechung mit dem gesamten übrigen Leben zu verknüpfen", um noch einmal Descartes (1960, p. 80) zu zitieren.

Das Deuten der Träume, der Symptome, der Fehlhandlungen, der primären affektiven Daten - kurz: des "Unbewussten" - soll, Freud zufolge, die Lücken auffüllen, die im Bewusstsein entstanden sind, weil das individuelle wie das kollektive Gedächtnis sich bei der Ausformung einer besonderen Rationalität geweigert haben, das Traum-Denken in den Zusammenhang dieser Form der Vernunft zu integrieren, die wir als die "moderne" Vernunft bezeichnen wollen, wie sie sich seit Descartes organisiert hat. Der grosse Gegensatz zwischen der Bewusstseinsphilosophie einerseits und den Philosophien des Unbewussten andererseits, zu denen in erster Linie Schopenhauer und Nietzsche zu rechnen wären, sollte mit Hilfe der "Analyse" wieder überwunden werden. Eben dies war Freuds Anliegen, der damit eine "andere" Aufklärung initiierte, eine die traditionelle Aufklärung überwindende Form der Aufklärung (vgl. Böhme, 1986). Die Rekonstruktion des affektiv-kognitiven Zusammenhangs, die Synthese, wird damit zum eigentlichen Ziel der Analyse. Psycho-Analyse intendiert im individuellen wie im kollektiven Sinne die Rekonstruktion der psychischen Organisation, des Bewusstseins, des Ich, der Vernunft, wobei gerade auch das wieder zurückgeholt werden soll, was in einem ersten Schritt

ausgegrenzt werden musste, um Rationalität im Sinne des Descartes zu ermöglichen.

Freud ist nicht der erste, sondern der letzte Denker in einer Reihe von Autoren, die das Ich, die Vernunft, das Cogito im Sinne Descartes' in Frage stellen, um es zu überwinden. Im Grunde beginnt die Kritik am "ich denke" bereits mit Kant.[6] Im **Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde** (Moritz 1783 ff.) lesen wir am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts, "**was in uns denkt**", sei, wie Moritz schreibt, noch etwas anderes als die Vernunft, die sich auf Wach-Denken gründet. Und um das, was in uns denkt, näher kennenzulernen, empfiehlt Moritz das Studium der Träume, also gerade des Gegenstandes, den Descartes aus der logischen Ordnung des Denkens ausgliedern wollte. Moritz schreibt "Der Weise macht den Traum zum Gegenstand seiner Betrachtungen, um die Natur des Wesens zu erforschen, was in ihm denkt, und träumt; um durch den Unterschied zwischen Traum und Wahrheit die Wahrheit selbst auf festere Stützen zu stellen, um dem Gange der Phantasie und dem Gange des wohlgeordneten Denkens bis in seine verborgensten Schlussfwinkel nachzuspähen" (zt.n. Goldmann, 1985, p. 116). Hatte Descartes den "Schlussfwinkel", in dem das Traum-Denken verborgen liegt, gerade verriegeln wollen, um das Wach-Denken umso sicherer jedem Zweifel zu entziehen, um das "wohlgeordnete Denken" nicht zu gefährden, so will Moritz, psychoanalytisch gesprochen, die Regression. Er sucht nach einem Weg zurück - vom Wach-Denken zum Traum-Denken -, um eine Verbindung wiederzugewinnen, die zerrissen worden ist. Dabei allerdings bezweifelt er den Satz "ich denke", um ihn durch den Satz "es denkt in mir" zu ersetzen. An die Stelle des Ich tritt - zunächst noch vorsichtig - das Es. Die Determination des rationalen Denkens durch "Kräfte" jenseits der logischen Ordnung der Vernunft wird erkennbar.

Nach Moritz ist es vor allem Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, der das Ich des Descartes kritisiert. Bei ihm lesen wir: "Es denkt, sollte man sagen, so wie man sagt, es blitzt. Zu sagen coito, ist schon zuviel, sobald man es durch Ich denke übersetzt" (Lichtenberg, Aph. K 76). Kant, Moritz, Lichtenberg - später Feuerbach, von Hartmann, Weininger, Nietzsche, Groddeck und auch Freud - variieren, mit teilweise unterschiedlicher Intention (vgl. Nitzschke 1983, 1985a) das Cogito des Descartes. Dessen letzte Gewissheit - das Ich, das bei allem Zweifel als unbezweifelbar erkannt worden ist - wird nun zunehmend weiteren Zweifeln ausgesetzt, mithin auch die Vernunft, die

sich auf die Gewissheit des Ich beruft. Im Verlauf dieses Diskurses, an dem auch noch andere Autoren teilnehmen[7], zeichnen sich nun zwei Linien ab, wobei ich die eine als die kritische, die andere als die vitalistisch-mystische bezeichnen möchte. Die kritische Linie führt zu Nietzsche, der sich in vieler Hinsicht auf Schopenhauer beruft, wenn er das Ich oder die Vernunft, wie sie von Descartes gesetzt worden sind, "zersetzt", um endlich eine Welt vielfältiger Beziehungen ohne Subjekt, ohne Täter zurückzubehalten. Die vitalistisch-mystische Linie reicht über Eduard von Hartmann (1869) bis zu Groddeck (1909), von dem Freud (1923) den Begriff des Es übernimmt. Eduard von Hartmann verfestigt als erster das "es denkt" zum Begriff des "Es", um dann das Es, beziehungsweise das metaphysich Unbewusste als eine Art Homunkulus der Seele zurückzubehalten, als einen Täter, der - an Stelle des Ich - im Inneren der Seele alles reguliert, was irgend von Bedeutung für das menschliche Leben sein könnte. In dieser Form gewinnt dann das Es auch bei Groddeck seine mystisch, bisweilen gar okkult anmutende Qualität.

Anders als von Hartmann und Groddeck geht Nietzsche auf die Debatte um das "ich denke, es denkt" ein, wobei die Vernunft zwar kritisiert, aber nicht durch eine undurchschaubare Metaphysik à la von Hartmann ersetzt wird. Nietzsche greift den bekannten Lichtenberg-Aphorismus, den ich zitiert habe, mit folgenden Worten auf, um ihn mitsamt der Gewissheit des Descartes der Kritik zu unterziehen: "Es denkt: aber dass dieses 'es' gerade jenes alte berühmte 'Ich" sei, ist, milde geredet, nur eine Annahme, eine Behauptung, vor allem keine 'unmittelbare Gewissheit'. Zuletzt ist schon mit diesem 'es denkt' zu viel getan: schon dieses 'es' enthält eine Auslegung des Vorgangs und gehört nicht zum Vorgang selbst. Man schliesst hier nach der grammatischen Gewohnheit 'Denken ist eine Tätigkeit, zu jeder Tätigkeit gehört einer, der tätig ist, folglich-' ... vielleicht gewöhnt man sich eines Tages noch daran, auch seitens der Logiker ohne jenes kleine 'es' (zu dem sich das ehrliche alte Ich verflüchtigt hat) auszukommen" (Nietzsche 1886, Aph. 17).[8]

Ich interpretiere: Nietzsche verwirft jede Subjekt- oder Täter-Mythologie, heisse der "Täter", der da denkt, nun Ich oder Es. Wie Schopenhauer nur eine Welt unendlicher Wechselwirkungsprozesse, eine Welt endloser Beziehungen ohne absolut Erstes und ohne utopisch Letztes anerkennt, so polemisiert auch Nietzsche gegen jede Metaphysik (vor allem auch gegen den Begriff des "Unbewussten", wie er von

Eduard von Hartmann verwendet worden ist), die an die Stelle der Vernunft im tradierten Sinne eine "hörere" oder "tiefere" Vernunft im Sinne der vis vitalis setzen möchte. Nietzsche verwirft mit der Vernunft des Descartes, die sich einer Ausgrenzung des scheinbar Irrationalen verdankt, zugleich jede Behauptung einer "anderen" Vernunft, die nicht im Leib, im Körper, in der Physis des Menschen verankert wäre. Die Vernunft des Leibes, die Nietzsche anerkennt (vgl. Schipperges, 1985), wäre aber der Gegenstand einer philosophisch aufgeklärten Physiologie, wie Schopenhauer sie als die Utopie einer möglichen Selbst-Erkenntnis entworfen hat. Was Nietzsche - wie später auch Freud - will, das ist die Wiederaneignung dessen, was Descartes ausgrenzen musste, um zu seinem Begriff der Vernunft zu gelangen. Der "Leib" ist bei Nietzsche aber nichts anderes als ein endloses "Begehren": ein Wunsch nach dem Leib des Anderen (vgl. Nitzschke 1985b). Durch diesen Wunsch konstituieren sich die Beziehungen zwischen den Menschen wie auch die Beziehungen, die ein Mensch zu sich selbst eingehen kann.

Während also Nietzsche, den Lichtenberg-Aphorismus aufgreifend, die darin enthaltene Kritik an Descartes akzeptiert, ist er nicht bereit, an die Stelle des Ich ein Es zu setzen. Dass wir zum Begriff des Denkens (als eines Prozesses) einen "Täter" hinzunehmen (müssen), liegt - nach Auffassung Nietzsches - an der Gewohnheit, an der Grammatik der Sprache, die noch den einfachsten Satz aus Subjekt und Prädikat bildet. Wie Lichtenberg zu sagen, "es blitzt", um zu diesem Vorgang noch den "Blitz" als Gegenstand oder als Täter hinzuzunehmen, ist ein Trugschluss, den die Grammatik nahelegt. Entsprechend argumentiert Nietzsche gegen das kleine "es", das bei von Hartmann (1869) schliesslich zum grossen "Es", zum allgewaltigen Täter der Seele wird. Der Blitz ist kein Gegenstand, der seine eigene Erscheinung herbeiführt, vielmehr nur eine Wiederholung, eine Benennung des Vorgangs des Blitzens. Entsprechend verhält es sich, nach Auffassung Nietzsches, wenn man den Prozess des Denkens analysiert, für den weder die Annahme eines Ich noch die eines Es nötig ist.

Groddeck - ein Anhänger Freuds - beschreibt in seinem Buch vom Es (1923) das Es ganz im Gegensatz zur Kritik Nietzsches und ganz in Übereinstimmung mit der Tradition, die auf Eduard von Harmann zurückgeführt werden kann.[9] Freud hat die Es-Mythologie Groddecks zwar zurückgewiesen, da sie den selbstreflexiven Zugang zur primären Affektwelt eher verstellt als ermöglicht, indem sie

substantialisiert, was in Form von Eigenerfahrung gerade aufzulösen wäre, doch auch in den Texten Freuds finden sich immer wieder Formulierungen[10], die das Es wie einen Homunkulus der Seele, wie einen Täter erscheinen lassen. Die verdinglichende Auffassung psychoanalytischer Begriffe - hier dargestellt am Beispiel des Es-Begriffs - führt jedoch wiederum zum Gegenteil dessen, was psychoanalytische Erfahrung eigentlich ermöglichen will: Erfahrung eines Universums vom Begriff befreiter affektiver Beziehungen. Die Kritik an solchen psychoanalytischen Affirmationen ist allerdings in jüngster Zeit von Psychoanalytikern selbst geleistet worden (vgl. Schafer 1982).[11]

Ich komme zum Schluss. Ich habe versucht, in Kürze eine Denktradition nachzuzeichnen, die von Descartes bis zu Freud führt und in deren Verlauf der psychoanalytische Begriff des Es sich herausgebildet hat, ein Begriff, der sich in kritischer Auseinandersetzung mit dem Cogito des Descartes etablierte, um am Ende möglicherweise ebenso dogmatisch zu werden wie der Begriff des Ich, der durch die "es denkt"-Debatte infrage gestellt worden ist. Gegen die Gefahr einer neuen Affirmation wäre an die metaphorische Redeweise Freuds zu erinnern, die - nicht vergegenständlicht - hilft, Affektwelten aufzuschliessen, die jenseits jeden Begriffs liegen. Werden allerdings die Metaphern Freuds - zu denen sicherlich auch das Es zu rechnen ist - wieder vergegenständlicht, so entstehen Schein-Wesen und Pseudo-Gegenständlichkeiten, die gerade das verhindern, was Anliegen psychoanalytischer und selbstreflexiver Bemühungen zu sein hätte: Erfahrung des Körpers, wie er sich darstellt, wenn Vernunft vorübergehend (nicht dauerhaft) auf Herrschaft verzichtet. Ein vernünftiger Gebrauch der Vernunft schliesst die Erfahrungen wieder auf, die zum jeweiligen Begriff geführt haben, heisse er nun Ich oder Es. Jenseits der Begriffe aber liegt der Affekt, der Wunsch - liegen die Leidenschaften, die sich als "befreite" keinem Begriff unterwerfen.

Anmerkungen

1. Es gibt bei Descartes Formulierungen, die das Ich als "ganzes Ich" (1960, p. 73) unter Einbeziehung des Körpers definieren, wie auch Freud das Ich ursprünglich als ein Körper-Ich anspricht. So schreibt Descartes etwa über "mein(en) Körper oder vielmehr mein ganzes Ich, sofern es aus Körper und Geist zusammengesetzt ist" (1960, p. 73). - Auch die Einheit von Körper und Seele wird von Descartes nicht bestritten; sie zerfällt nur für den erkennenden Geist - für den Philosophen - in zwei Stücke, die allerdings durch eine nachfolgende Denkbewegung wieder zu

einem Ganzen zusammenzufügen wären. In einem Brief an die Prinzessin Elisabeth von der Pfalz schreibt er beispielsweise: "Die Dinge, die zur Vereinigung der Seele und des Körpers gehören, erkennt man durch den blossen Verstand allein nur dunkel, ja selbst durch den von der Einbildung unterstützten Verstand; aber man erkennt sie sehr klar durch die Sinne. Daher kommt es, dass Leute, die niemals philosophieren und sich lediglich ihrer Sinne bedienen, gar nicht daran zweifeln, dass die Seele den Körper bewegt und dass der Körper auf die Seele einwirkt; sie betrachten vielmehr das eine und das andere als eine einzige Sache, das heisst, sie begreifen beider Vereinigung, denn die Vereinigung begreifen, die zwischen zwei Sachen besteht, heisst, sie als eine einzige Sache begreifen". Eben dies, so führt Descartes weiter aus, sei auch die Aufgabe des Philosophen, die "die Vereinigung von Seele und Leib" wieder zu "begreifen" (zit.n. Specht 1980, p. 119) hätte. Wenn auch res cogitans und res extensa zwei verschiedene Denk-Kategorien sind, so bezweifelt Descartes die empirische Einheit des Menschen als einer Einheit von "Seele" und Körper nicht. Besonders deutlich geht dies aus einer anderen Briefstelle hervor, wenn Descartes bemerkt, die "Seele" habe die "Kraft", um "den Körper zu bewegen", wie der Körper" die "Kraft" besitze, "auf die Seele zu wirken, indem er deren Gefühle und Leidenschaften verursacht" (1949, p. 265).

2. Dies gilt zumindest dann, wenn man das Es mit den Leidenschaften gleichsetzt und wenn man die Ethik der sogenannten Rationalisten genauer betrachtet. Hammacher bemerkt in der "Einleitung" zu Descartes' Die Leidenschaften der Seele, dass "wissenschaftliche Rationalität" nicht "schlechthin mit 'Rationalität' gleichzusetzen" sei, "wie es im Gegenwartsdenken selbstverständlich geschieht, liesse sich schon äusserlich daraus entnehmen, dass die eigentlichen Denker des Rationalismus wie Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz ... ihre Ethik durchweg auf eine Einsicht in die menschlichen Emotionen oder Affekte ... aufbauten. Die Geschichte dieser Ethik auf der Grundlage einer Affektenlehre ist noch nicht geschrieben worden ..." (1984, p. XVI). Einsicht wird später auch bei Freud zum zentralen Begriff einer vernünftigen Wieder-Aneigung der Leidenschaften, die mit Hilfe der Einsicht teils zu kontrollieren, teils in modifizierter Form zu befriedigen wären. Ich folgere aus diesem Sachverhalt: Wenn sich die Vernunft (und damit auch das Ich des Descartes, das sich auf Vernunft gründet) als autonomes Vermögen konstituiert, so schafft sie damit zugleich die Leidenschaften (die Emotionen, Affekte, später das Es) als einen Erkenntnisgegenstand. Sie stellt sich den Leidenschaften gegenüber, in die sie dann Einsicht gewinnen will, um endlich selbstreflexiv den - zunächst zerrissenen - Zusammenhang wieder herzustellen. Nietzsche wird allerdings später bestreiten, dass es je eine von den Leidenschaften getrennte Vernunft gegeben habe; für ihn ist Vernunft vielmehr das Resultat einer spezifischen Leidenschaft: des Willens zur Macht. Schopenhauer und Freud hingegen kennen noch eine Vernunft, die sich von den Leidenschaften emanzipieren kann, wenn sie auch vielfältige (unbewusste) Abhängigkeiten der Vernunft von den Leidenschaften beschreiben.

3. Descartes schreibt in Die Leidenschaften der Seele: "Jedoch, um zu beginnen, stelle ich fest, dass alles, was geschieht oder sich ereignet, allgemein von den Philosophen ein Leiden genannt wird in Hinsicht auf dasjenige, dem es geschieht, und ein Tun in Hinsicht auf dasjenige, das macht, dass es geschieht; dergestalt

dass, obgleich das Tätige und das Leidende oft sehr unterschiedlich sind, das Tun und das Leiden nicht aufhören immer ein und dieselbe Sache zu sein, die diese zwei Namen hat aufgrund der zwei verschiedenen Gegenstände, auf die man sie beziehen kann" (Art. 1 - 1984, p. 5). Sodann präzisiert Descartes seine Äusserung: 'Darauf erwäge ich, dass wir keinen Gegenstand bemerken können, der unmittelbar in bezug auf unsere Seele tätig ist, als den Körper, mit dem sie verbunden ist, und dass wir folglich denken müssen, was in ihr ein Leiden ist, gewöhnlich in ihm ein Tun ist" (Art. 2 - 1984, p. 5). - Aktivität (Tun) und Passivität (Leiden) wären also die Pole eines Prozesses, der zugleich Körper und Seele umfasst. In dieser Hinsicht erschiene in der Seele passiv das Tun des Körpers, womit sich ein entsprechender somato-psychischer Zusammenhang ergäbe. Insoweit wiederum die Leidenschaften der Seele auf den Körper zurückwirken, ergäbe sich ein psycho-somatischer Zusammenhang. Sozialpsychologisch interpretiert, also erweitert gefasst, wäre das Tun des Einen das Leiden des Anderen (umd umgekehrt). - Auch Kant meint, wir könnten uns selbst nur erkennen, insofern wir uns "leidend verhalten" (zit.n. Böhme 1986, p. 768) uns selbst gegenüber.

4. Die "Definition der Leidenschaften der Seele" lautet in Descartes' Worten: "Nachdem wir in Betracht gezogen haben, wodurch sich die Leidenschaften der Seele von allen anderen Gedanken unterscheiden, scheint es mir angemessen, sie allgemein zu definieren als Wahrnehmungen oder Empfindungen oder Emotionen der Seele, die ihr in besonderer Weise zugehören ..." (Art. 27 - 1984, p. 47).

5. Im 2. Band der Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (1844) schreibt Schopenhauer, die "eigentliche Gesundheit des Geistes" bestehe "in der vollkommenen Rückerinnerung" (1972, p. 456). - Im Falle des Wahnsinns ist diese Rückerinnerung nicht mehr gegeben (wie auch im Falle des Traumes, der Argumentation Descartes' folgend). Schopenhauer bemerkt weiter, die "Darstellung der Entstehung des Wahnsinns wird fasslicher werden, wenn man sich erinnert, wie ungern wir an Dinge denken, welche unser Interesse, unseren Stolz oder unsere Wünsche stark verletzen, wie leicht wir dagegen unbewusst davon wieder abspringen oder abschleichen ... In jenem Widerstreben des Willens, das ihm Widrige in die Beleuchtung des Intellekts kommen zu lassen, liegt die Stelle, an welcher der Wahnsinn auf den Geist einbrechen kann. Jeder widrige neue Vorfall nämlich muss vom Intellekt assimiliert werden, d.h. im System der sich auf unseren Willen und sein Interesse beziehenden Wahrheiten eine Stelle erhalten, was immer Befriedigenderes er auch zu verdrängen haben mag ... Erreicht hingegen, in einem einzelnen Fall, das Widerstreben und Sträuben des Willens wider die Annahme einer Erkenntnis den Grad, dass jene Operation [der Assimilierung oder Synthetisierung der Erfahrung und damit der Erinnerungsmöglichkeit - B.N.] nicht rein durchgeführt wird; werden demnach dem Intellekt gewisse Vorfälle oder Umstände völlig unterschlagen, weil der Wille ihren Anblick nicht ertragen kann; wird alsdann, des notwendigen Zusammenhangs wegen, die dadurch entstandene Lücke beliebig ausgefüllt; - so ist der Wahnsinn da" (1972, p. 457 f.). - Diese Äusserung Schopenhauers wird sowohl von Nietzsche wie von Freud bestätigt. Bei Nietzche lesen wir: " 'Das habe ich getan' - sagt mein Gedächtnis. 'Das kann icht nicht getan haben' - sagt mein Stolz und bleibt unerbittlich. Endlich gibt das Gedächtnis nach" (1886, Aph. 68). Unter dem Einfluss des Stolzes, der die narzisstische Kränkung nicht hinnehmen

will, entstehen Gedächtnis- und Bewusstseinslücken, die dann willkürlich aufgefüllt werden. Bei Freud heisst es hierzu: "Das Ich reisst sich von der unerträglichen Vorstellung los, diese hängt aber untrennbar mit einem Stück der Realität zusammen, und indem das Ich diese Leistung vollbringt, hat es sich auch von der Realität ganz oder teilweise losgelöst. Letzteres ist nach meiner Meinung die Bedingung, unter der eigenen Vorstellungen halluzinatorische Lebhaftigkeit zuerkannt wird, und somit befindet sich die Person nach glücklich gelungener Abwehr in halluzinatorischer Verworrenheit" (1894, p. 73). Das Ersetzen einer realitätsgerechten Erinnerung durch eine wunschgemässe Vorstellung wird hier also für die Verworrenheit verantwortlich gemacht; die Abwehroperation führt sekundär zu einer weitreichenderen psychischen Schädigung als es die Anerkennung der Realität hätte tun können.

6. Eine deutliche Kritik am Begriff 'Ich', der auch nicht durch ein 'Es' zu ersetzen sei, formuliert Kant im zweiten Band der **Kritik der reinen Vernunft** (1781): "Hierauf beziehen sich nun vier Paralogismen einer transzendentalen Seelenlehre, welche fälschlich für eine Wissenschaft der reinen Vernunft, von der Natur unseres denkenden Wesens, gehalten wird. Zum Grunde derselben können wir aber nichts anderes legen, als die einfache und für sich selbst an Inhalt gänzlich leere Vorstellung: Ich, von der man nicht einmal sagen kann, dass sie ein Begriff sei, sondern ein blosses Bewusstsein, das alle Begriffe begleitet. Durch dieses Ich, oder Er, oder Es (das Ding), welches denket, wird nun nichts weiter, als ein transzendentales Subjekt der Gedanken vorgestellt = x, welches nur durch die Gedanken, die seine Prädikate sind, erkannt wird, und wovon wir, abgesondert, niemals den mindesten Begriff haben können; um welches wir uns daher in einem beständigen Zirkel herumdrehen, indem wir uns seiner Vorstellung jederzeit schon bedienen müssen, um irgendetwas von ihm zu urteilen ..." (1976, p. 344). Mit anderen Worten: Was in uns denkt - wie immer es auch benannt sein möge -, bleibt, der konkreten Gedanken entledigt, gänzlich unbekannt. Es sei denn, so will ich hinzufügen, wir liessen uns auf eine regressive Erfahrung und Selbstbeobachtung ein und verfolgten die "fertigen" Gedanken zurück zum ursprünglichen, "primären" Denken in Gestalt von Bildern und primitiv-traumhaften Körper-Wahrnehmungen, aus denen sich möglicherweise Gedanken "zusammensetzen". Das aber hiesse - der Körper denkt ...

7. So heisst es zum Beispiel bei F.W.J. von Schelling: "Es denkt in mir, es wird in mir gedacht, ist das reine Faktum, gleich wie ich auch mit gleicher Berechtigung sage: Ich träume, und: Es träumte mir" (zit.n. Böhme 1986, p. 769). Auch hier wird wiederum, gewiss nicht zufällig, das primäre Denken in enger Beziehung zum Traum angesprochen. - Der Ethnologe Bastian formuliert im 19. Jahrhundert, "was in uns denkt, ist der Wachstumsprozess psychologischer Tätigkeit" (1884, p. XII). Hier wird also vorsichtig ein Prozess, eine Tätigkeit, kein Gegenstand, kein Wesen angesprochen, wenn es um den Ursprung des Denkens geht. Eine andere Äusserung Bastians (1868) - "'dass nicht wir denken sondern dass es in uns denkt, ist demjenigen klar, der aufmerksam auf das zu sein gewohnt ist, was in uns vorgeht' - greift von Hartmann auf, um dann in eigenen Worten hinzuzusetzen: "Dieses 'Es' liegt aber ... im Unbewussten'" (1876, I, p. 34 f.). - Reinhardt Pester (Greifswald/DDR) verdanke ich den Hinweis auf eine Stelle bei Lotze, die einmal mehr belegt, dass die Debatte um "ich denke/es denkt" im 19. Jahrhundert lebhaft

geführt worden ist. Lotze schreibt: "Im allgemeinen wird es klar sein, dass das logische Denken nichts anderes ist als eine kritische Erläuterung oder Bearbeitung des gewöhnlichen Vorstellungsverlaufes. Geleugnet kann allerdings nicht werden, dass vielleicht die grössere Masse dessen, was wir gewöhnlich Denken nennen, nur an jenem Faden des psychologischen Mechanismus abläuft; da wo wir von Begriffen, Urteilen, Schlüssen sprechen, die uns unbewusst die Lücken zwischen aufeinander folgenden Gedanken aufgefüllt haben, da haben in der Regel nicht wir gedacht, sondern es ist in uns gedacht worden ..." (1843, p. 20). - Bekanntlich hat Freud versucht, den von Lotze gemeinten Mechanismus des Vorstellungsablaufs mit Hilfe der Methode der freien Assoziation so zu verändern, dass ein Denken sichtbar werden kann, das nicht absichtlich, nicht bewusst geordnet, nicht vernünftig gestaltet erscheint, sondern gleichsam in seiner ursprünglicheren Gestalt auftaucht. Die Methode der freien Assoziation will "es" denken lassen, um ein "ich" denke vorübergehend mit seiner Basis zu konfrontieren - mit der Basis unwillkürlicher Gedanken. - In Nietzsches Vernunftkritik wird wiederum das Ich als Substanz (als Täter, als Subjekt) infrage gestellt, als Fiktion denunziert. Nietzsche bezeichnet das vernünftig-geordnete Denken denn auch als einen Ausdruck des Willens zur Macht, als einen der Selbsterhaltung nützlichen Zweck, der allerdings keineswegs die "Wahrheit" der sinnlich-emotionalen Realität, der Ordnung der Sensationen und Empfindungen jenseits der Vernunft (und jenseits von Gut und Böse) wiedergibt (vgl. Engelmann 1984). Dass Freud mit der Philosophie Nietzsches - und mit dessen Vernunftkritik, die zugleich Moralkritik ist - bereits während seiner Studentenzeit vertraut war, kann aufgrund der Forschungen von Venturelli (1984) nicht mehr länger bestritten werden. Allerdings muss Venturellis Hinweis, Freud habe von Nietzsche den Terminus Es übernommen (1984, p. 478, Anm. 68), zurückgewiesen werden, da Nietzsche diesen Terminus ausdrücklich streicht (vgl. Nitzschke 1987), das "Es" sowenig wie das "Ich" (im späteren Sinne der Psychoanalyse) anerkennt.

8. In den nachgelassenen Fragmenten Nietzsches finden sich zwei Stellen, an denen die Entwicklung dieses Passus' nachvollzogen werden kann. Zwischen April und Juni 1885 schreibt Nietzsche nieder: "**Die umgekehrte Zeitordnung.** Die 'Aussenwelt' wirkt auf uns: die Wirkung wird ins Gehirn telegraphiert, dort zurechtgelegt, ausgestaltet und auf seine Ursache zurückgeführt: dann wird die Ursache **projiziert** und **nun erst kommt uns das Faktum zum Bewusstsein.** Das heisst die Erscheinungswelt **erscheint** uns erst als Ursache, nachdem 'sie' gewirkt hat und die Wirkung verarbeitet worden ist. Das heisst **wir kehren beständig die Ordnung des Geschehenden um.** - Während 'ich' sehe, sieht es bereits etwas Anderes ..." (1980, XI, p. 437).
Dann aber folgt die Kritik am 'es' (niedergeschrieben zwischen August und September 1885) nach: "Seien wir vorsichtiger als Cartesius, welcher in dem Fallstrick der Worte hängen blieb. Cogito ist freilich nur Ein Wort: aber es bedeutet etwas Vielfaches: manches ist vielfach und wir greifen derb drauf los, im guten Glauben, dass es Eins sei. In jenem berühmten cogito steckt 1) es denkt 2) und ich glaube, dass ich es bin, der da denkt, 3) aber auch angenommen, dass dieser zweite Punkt in der Schwebe bliebe, als Sache des Glaubens, so enthält auch jenes erste 'es denkt' noch einen Glauben: nämlich, dass 'denken' eine Tätigkeit sei, zu der ein Subjekt, zum mindesten ein 'es'

gedacht werden müsse - und weiter bedeutet das ergo sum nichts! Aber das ist der Glaube an die Grammatik, da werden schon 'Dinge' und deren 'Tätigkeiten' gesetzt, und wir sind fern von der unmittelbaren Gewissheit. Lassen wir also auch jenes problematische 'es' weg ..." (1980, XI, p. 639 f.). - Es ist hier klar zu erkennen, dass Nietzsche zwar die Kritik am Ich oder Cogito des Descartes teilt, keinesfalls aber das Ich durch ein unbekanntes, verdinglichtes oder metaphysisch überhöhtes Es ersetzt wissen will, wie dies durch von Hartmann und später u.a. durch Groddeck geschah.

9. Groddeck schreibt zum Beispiel, der "Mensch" werde "vom Unbekannten gelebt". "In" dem Menschen sei "ein Es, irgendein wunderbares, das alles, was er tut und was mit ihm geschieht, regelt" (1961, p. 18). Damit wird die Kritik am Ich oder Cogito, die zur Auflösung fester Grössen (Dinge, Substanzen, Täter usw.) geführt hatte und das Denken als Prozess und die Realität als endloses Geflecht von Beziehungen und Wechselwirkungsverhältnissen erkennen liess, wieder zurückgenommen und gar ins Gegenteil verkehrt. Ein Homunkulus der Seele entsteht, begleitet von einem Agnostizismus, der mit dunkler Rede Weisheiten verkündet.

10. Aus der Fülle möglicher Beispiele greife ich nur eins heraus, wobei das Es in diesem Falle als ein Wesen erscheint, von dem "Eigenschaften anzugeben" (Freud 1933, p. 81) sind. Wer aber Eigenschaften hat, kann auch Tätigkeiten ausüben und ist selbst ein Täter. - Liest man hingegen Freuds Äusserungen über das Es als metaphorische Umschreibungen, die eine bestimmte - regressive - Eigenerfahrung deutlich werden lassen sollen, dann allerdings erscheint das Es nicht als ein Wesen, sondern als ein sprachlicher Fixpunkt, mit dessen Hilfe emotionale Prozesse umschrieben werden, die sich unter bestimmten Bedingungen erleben lassen. In diesem Sinne verstehe ich Freuds Rede, etwa wenn er - vorsichtig - schreibt: "Wir nähern uns dem Es mit Vergleichen, nennen es ein Chaos, einen Kessel voll brodelnder Erregungen. Wir stellen uns vor, es sei am Ende gegen das Somatische offen, nehme da die Triebbedürfnisse in sich auf, die in ihm ihren psychischen Ausdruck finden, wir können aber nicht sagen, in welchem Substrat. Von den Trieben her erfüllt es sich mit Energie, aber es hat keine Organisation, bringt keinen Gesamtwillen auf, nur das Bestreben, den Triebbedürfnissen unter Einhaltung des Lustprinzips Befriedigung zu schaffen. Für die Vorgänge im Es gelten die logischen Denkgesetze nicht, vor allem nicht der Satz des Widerspruchs ... Es gibt im Es nichts, was man der Negation gleichstellen könnte, auch nimmt man mit Überraschung die Ausnahme von dem Satz der Philosophen wahr, dass Raum und Zeit notwendige Formen unserer seelischen Akte seien. Im Es findet sich nichts, was der Zeitvorstellung entspricht, keine Anerkennung eines zeitlichen Ablaufs und, was höchst merkwürdig ist und seiner Würdigung im philosophischen Denken wartet, keine Veränderung des seelischen Vorgangs durch den Zeitablauf. Wunschregungen, die das Es nie überschritten haben, aber auch Eindrücke, die durch Verdrängung ins Es versenkt worden sind, sind vertuell unsterblich, verhalten sich nach Dezennien, als ob sie neu vorgefallen wären. Als Vergangenheit erkannt, entwertet und ihrer Energiebesetzung beraubt können sie erst werden, wenn sie durch die analytische Arbeit bewusst geworden sind, und darauf beruht nicht zum kleinsten Teil die therapeutische Wirkung der analytischen Behandlung" (1933, p. 80 f). - Mit dieser letzten Bemerkung Freuds wäre wieder an die Äusserungen anzuschliessen, die ich als Einleitung

zu der vorliegenden Arbeit formuliert habe, als ich über die Ziele der Psychoanalyse als Therapie sprach.

11. Schafer kritisiert nicht nur den Begriff des Es im Sinne einer Verdinglichung, sondern die psychoanalytische Metapsychologie insgesamt. Er schreibt zum Beispiel: "Die Attraktivität der Metapsychologie rührt nicht allein von ihrer Eigenschaft als eine geregelte Sprache her, sondern auch von ihrer Übereinstimmung mit der archaischen, körperhaften Sprache der Kindheit" (1982, p. 17 f). Und an anderer Stelle wird der verdinglichende Sprachgebrauch noch einmal ausdrücklich zurückgewiesen: "Durch diese traditionellen Personifizierungen oder anthropomorphen Denkformen haben wir (Psychoanalytiker - B.N.) die Begriffswesen wie Menschen miteinander verkehren lassen - das Ich mit dem Es ... " (1982, 28). Wenn Schafer allerdings wegen des falschen Gebrauchs der Begriffe diese selbst abschaffen will, anstatt sie als Beschreibungen infantiler, körpernaher, primärprozesshafter Eigenerfahrung unter der Bedingung der Regression zu verstehen, so schüttet er - um im Bilde zu bleiben - das Kind mit dem Bade aus. Ich schliesse mich seiner Kritik am falschen, verdinglichenden Sprachgebrauch zwar an, aber nicht seinen Folgerungen, die auf eine Abschaffung der metapsychologischen Konzepte und Begriffe abzielen, letztlich die Psychoanalyse aus einer Psychologie des Unbewussten in eine Bewusstseinspsychologie zurückverwandeln wollen. Was hingegen - Schafer widersprechend - zu leisten wäre, ist dies: Die metaphorische und metapsychologische Sprache Freuds selbst zu deuten; und die Erfahrung zu definieren, unter der eine körperhafte Eigenwahrnehmung zustande kommt, die sich in dieser Sprache ausdrückt. Ich habe dies an anderer Stelle (Nitzschke 1985b) zu leisten versucht.

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THE EARLY RECEPTION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS: VICISSITUDES OF A SCIENCE OF INTERPRETATION

Sybe Terwee
Leiden

> Psychoanalysis derives nothing but disadvantages from its middle position between medicine and philosophy.
> S. Freud, 1925.

Summary

This paper surveys a number of evaluations of the psychoanalytic research-programme given during Freud's lifetime, both within and without the psychiatric field. It is argued that a central reason for criticism or rejection consisted in an ambiguity in Freud's theories. Freud pretended to be a natural scientist, but actually, according to the authors reviewed, his conclusions were largely based on clever, but non-objective, interpretations. He was a crypto-hermeneutician. It follows that these critics must be regarded as precursors of the modern 'hermeneutical conception of psychoanalysis', which is generally believed to have started with the work of Ricoeur (1965) and Habermas (1968).

Freud's own view on the reception of his ideas has always been that they were received in an atmosphere of hostility. Psychoanalysis was either ignored or rejected. After a period of splendid isolation, from 1904 on he recruited a small but growing group of followers who formed his only point of security in a hostile world. Later they were to form the psychoanalytic movement. Freud tended to think of late nineteenth century Sexual Morality and antisemitism as the main causes of the rejection of psychoanalysis by the medical world and the lay public. Ernest Jones, his disciple and influential biographer, did little to correct this picture of the birth and early development of psychoanalysis.

We know better today. Historical research (Decker (1977), Sulloway (1979)) has created a more complicated view on the early reception of psychoanalysis. The psychiatrical world was not so uniformly hostile as Freud and Jones liked to suggest. Freud had the illogical expectation that the entire medical world would immediately recognize the truths he offered, without paying attention to the more problematic assumptions he had made. Indeed a fair amount of criticism was leveled against early psychoanalysis.

In this paper, I will not enter the discussion of the balance between the number of uncomprehending reactions and the number of positive evaluations of psychoanalysis. My concern is with the nature of the critical remarks made by members of the psychiatric establishment and intellectuals capable of understanding what was going on, without being members of the psychoanalytic movement. Strictly speaking, this last clause is unnecessary, since it was impossible to be an analyst and have critical ideas on psychoanalysis both at the same time.

Criticism had to come from outsiders. But outsiders could not be trusted by definition - the argument being, that if they would be capable of the least understanding of psychoanalysis, they would be psychoanalysts themselves. As an example, let me refer to some articles written by the German psychiatrists Aschaffenburg (1906) and Hoche (1910). Ernest Jones has not a good word to say about these opponents (1955, p. 124) and if we believe him, their articles contained nothing but vigorous attacks, moral indignation and deep misunderstandings of psychoanalysis. Anyone who takes the trouble to read Aschaffenburg, though, will see that his paper consists of perfectly reasonable arguments and objections, and is by no means radically opposed to psychoanalysis or Freud personally. Jung, who wrote a reply to Aschaffenburg when he was still a zealous disciple of Freud (Jung 1906), characterized 'the attack' as 'very moderate and careful criticism'. There is one point in these articles which is especially interesting in the present context: both Hoche and Aschaffenburg speak of Freud's 'art of interpretation' (Deutekunst) which shows the marks of genius but is also frequently arbitrary. They doubt that his explanations form the only possibilities of interpretation.

I will start from this very assumption - one might call it, hermeneutically speaking, a prejudice or a prejudgement (Vorurteil) - that is to say, that psychoanalysis is an interpretative discipline, aiming to understand meaning in human life. This hermeneutical conception of psychoanalysis has become common among philosophers and analysts during the past decades.(1) There is a continuing discussion between the hermeneutical conception and the traditional selfunderstanding of psychoanalysis, which holds that it is an empirical-analytical science, capable of providing deductive-nomological explanations (Terwee, in press).

Now, it is interesting to see that this modern discussion is foreshadowed by several reactions towards Freud's work given during his lifetime. These reactions could not lead to actual debates, however, because of the closed character of the psychoanalytic movement at the time and the

immunization strategies used by Freud and his followers. Let us turn, firstly, to the reactions Freud received from his psychiatric colleagues.

Freud's reception in psychiatry

Ernest Jones has provided an overview of the opposition the psychoanalytical movement had to endure in the years before the first world war (Jones 1955, ch. 4). He indicates a great difficulty in describing this opposition: a large part of it could not find its way into print, it was 'simply unprintable'. Without denying the existence and extent of miscellaneous non-scientific resistances against psychoanalysis, I will restrict myself here to the scientific literature in medical, psychiatric and psychological journals. I hope to show that the nature of the criticism these journals contain was not adequately understood by Jones or Freud. Precisely the ambiguous hermeneutical character of psychoanalysis, if one wishes to use modern terminology, turns out to be a central feature in the criticism. I will make reference to seven of the most interesting papers which aimed to evaluate Freud's work. Each of them is mentioned by Jones in the chapter referred to earlier. The authors are remarkably unanimous in their opinions regarding which parts of Freud's theory are valuable and which not. Almost all of them provide informative oversights of Freud's already complex ideas.(2) Their aim is to evaluate these ideas with reasonable criteria, usually drawn from medical science, sometimes from philosophy.(3) Aschaffenburg (1906) and Hoche (1910) are the most polemical critics. As psychiatrists, they wish to make a stand against psychoanalysis, without however feeling the need to descend to ad hominem attacks.(4) Several authors make a sharp distinction between the writings of Freud and those of his followers.(5) The followers are regarded as mere believers, members of a sect, who have no original contribution to make themselves. Their attitudes are rejected as being arrogant and ridiculous. Quite on the contrary, Freud is esteemed highly and in between various criticisms his qualities and his valuable ideas are made explicit.(6) It would be hard to point to any signs suggestive of antisemitism or a puritan, sexual morality.(7) Talking to young girls about intimate sexual matters is not regarded as a matter of good taste, nor is it considered necessary. But there is no principal reason against it if it were necessary for an effective therapy, as Aschaffenburg puts it.(8) Having summed up these more general issues, I can turn now to the central target of the criticism.

Most authors make it clear that the main point of disagreement lies in the interpretations Freud gives of symptoms, dreams and behavior. The

interpretations of the disciples are considered simply ridiculous and not worth serious attention[9]. Both the arbitrariness of single interpretations and the method of interpretation give rise to scepticism. Kronfeld is the most lucid critic of Freud's method of interpretation (1911, p. 235-248).[10] Free association may help a doctor to deepen his understanding of a patient's personality, but it could lead to any interpretation. Where should one stop the chain of associations? Could not any interpretation be confirmed when the doctor can make his choice from a multitude of associations? Is the choice of an interpretation not ultimately dependent upon the individual doctor? Does Freud not come up with sometimes very wild interpretations, without the least evidence that they might or must be true? Most authors take the affirmative answer to these questions.[11]

It is interesting to see that several authors acknowledge both positive and negative aspects in the work of interpretation. Positive, to their mind, is the attention to the psychological life of patients, to the individual biography, which results in idiographic knowledge.[12] Freud's view that his interpretations are explanations or etiological causal relations is regarded as untenable. Freud suggests that his interpretations are scientific because they are backed by a reconstruction of the etiology of symptoms. This argument is shown to be circular.[13]

The second main controversial point is the universal character of sexuality. Both the change of meaning in the concept, as well as the idea that interpretations have to refer to sexual wishes, is regarded as speculative.[14]

What may be concluded from this overview? First, the articles reviewed corroborate the thesis brought forward by Decker (1977) and Sulloway (1979), that Freud's reception was much less hostile than Jones suggested.[15]

Second, no evidence is found for the belief that psychoanalysis was not accepted because of non-scientific and/or unreasonable motives such as mentioned by Freud (1924) and Jones (1955, Ch. 4).

Third, the real reasons for the rejection of psychoanalysis as a real scientific discipline are different from what is generally believed. Freud is criticized for his method of interpretation, and for the arbitrariness of many of his interpretations. I disagree with Decker when she says that the "ultimate rejection" of psychoanalysis had to do with "the failure of most German doctors to understand" it (1971, p. 481). The articles quoted are thorough evaluations of psychoanalysis and contain no major misunderstandings as seen from a present-day viewpoint.[16]

It seems, in conclusion, that the psychiatric community recognized the importance of Freud's work in the years before 1914. His theories were seen as important contributions to the understanding of individual psychological factors in connection to neurosis. The bone of contention was the status of these insights. Freud tried to sell them as scientific explanations which could provide insight in the etiology of symptoms. The scientific forum could not accept this idea.

Why was Freud so uncompromising in defending his new theory as a natural science? Apparently he didn't believe that a merely interpretative discipline would be treated with respect within medical science. His own philosophical thinking was built upon a firm distinction between the methods of the natural sciences and the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften). Though the latter could be relevant for psychoanalysis, they used entirely different methods than those created by Freud, who was proud that he developed his insights from careful observation. To him, the latter claim could only be made by a natural scientist. According to Freud, his discoveries meant a revolution within medicine, without questioning the methodological foundations of the discipline. Let us try to elucidate the nature of the Freudian revolution by distinguishing between four different claims made by Freud.

(a) Psychological phenomena form a legitimate object for scientific study.
(b) There are unconscious psychological phenomena.
(c) Studying the unconscious of an individual is only possible by interpreting speech, action, dreams, symptoms, etc.
(d) The techniques of interpretation guarantee objective, scientific results.

Freud's view, as described in **The Resistances to Psychoanalysis**, was that the psychiatric forum could not accept (a) and (b) because of the revolutionary character of these assumptions. 'They (the contemporary generation of physicians) had been brought up to respect only anatomical, physical and chemical factors. They were not prepared for taking psychical ones into account and therefore met them with indifference and antipathy. They obviously had doubts whether psychical events allowed of any exact scientific treatment whatever' (1925e, p. 215).

I hope that the above survey has shown that this explanation is not supported by existing evidence. Psychiatrists and philosophers were ready to accept the premises (a) and (b), although they were regarded as new and revolutionary. They were even prepared to accept the necessity of interpretation -(c)- but remained sceptical about the scientific character and

objectivity of the interpretations given and the techniques used, point (d). Freud could not provide satisfying answers to the questions raised about these matters. He evaded discussion by explaining criticisms away as 'resistances'. This attitude towards legitimate critical questions directed to his theory was enthusiastically imitated by his followers, and may be the main cause of much irritation in scientific quarters. Opponents rightly felt that there was not much point in discussing matters with psychoanalysts. The psychoanalytic framework developed in isolation.
Let us see now whether the critical points raised so far found any resonance outside the field of psychiatry.

Criticisms: Karl Kraus, Karl Popper, Arthur Schnitzler

The journalist and critic Karl Kraus (1874-1936) seems to stand in the shadow of many of his better known fellow citizens. But it has frequently been pointed out how he exerted an enormous influence, in his time, through his lectures and his journal **Die Fackel**.(17) He embodied the moral ideals of many intellectuals - among them Wittgenstein and Popper, and up to a certain time, Freud. For some time, Kraus stood sympathetic to Freud.(18) When followers of Freud started psychoanalyzing living artists, however, Kraus grew suspicious of psychoanalysis, and the final break was caused by Fritz Wittels when he tried to analyse the 'Fackel-Neurosis' in a meeting of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society in 1910. Kraus was enraged when he came to hear about this lecture, and **Die Fackel** was filled with biting aphorisms on psychoanalysis.(19)
In the present context, we may try to understand Kraus' reaction as follows. Kraus rejected the use which was made of psychoanalysis as a rhetorical instrument. By presenting psychoanalysis as a scientific method, every interpretation made by an analyst gained a pseudo-objectivity which made it look superior to all other possible interpretations. Psychoanalysis, as a method of interpretation, sought to deny its own subjective nature by postulating a determinism of free associations and law-governed instincts. Human reality seemed to be reducible to natural processes by way of objective analysis.

A sample of Kraus' aphorisms may illustrate his ideas. 'God made man out of dust. The analyst reduces him to it' (Szasz 1977, p. 105). 'Psychoanalysis is a passion, not a science. It lacks the steady hand of the investigator (...) Psychoanalysis is, in fact, an act of revenge through which the analyst's inferiority is transformed into superiority. (...) There is only one justification for the existence of psychoanalysis: it is

useful for unmasking psychoanalysis' (Szasz, p. 106; Stekel, 1913, p. 641). 'Psychoanalysis is the mental illness, for which it claims to be the cure', was Kraus' much-quoted conclusion. I will not go into the question whether this criticism concerns the uses made of psychoanalytic method, or whether it pertains to the essence of psychoanalytic theory. If one reads psychoanalytic 'explanations' of artists made at the time, one can scarcely avoid the conclusion that the arrogance and feelings of superiority in the first generation of analysts were rightly attacked by Kraus.

Much the same criticism was formulated by Karl Popper in a lecture delivered in 1953.(20) He explains how he came to his new criterion of demarcation between science and pseudo-science in 1919. The problem took the simple form, 'what is wrong with Marxism, psychoanalysis and (Adlerian) individual psychology'? (Popper 1963, p. 34). The answer is also surprisingly simple. In half a page Freud and Adler are dealt with. The mistake of Freudian analysts was to trust in the verification of their theories by 'clinical observations'. Instead, they should have been on the watch for falsifications, according to Popper (ibid, p. 35). Apparently, Popper criticizes the uncritical attitude of analysts, but it is implied that there is something wrong with their theories, which seem to consist of dubious techniques of interpretation, designed to evade falsification. Freud is not quoted, nor are any of his theories mentioned in particular.

I am not concerned with the adequacy of this criticism here. Adolf Grünbaum (1984) has presented a convincing rebuttal of Popper's views.(21) Important in the present context is their enormous influence, which must be ascribed, in my opinion, to their partial truth. As shown earlier, the analytic community (later on, communities) had a strong tendency to protect itself against criticism from outside. This formed one reason why psychoanalysis was not accepted in scientific circles. Another reason was the Freudian art of interpretation, which disturbed many colleagues, as we have seen. Herein laid the kernel of truth in Popper's criticism. Whatever one may think of the value of interpretations of meaning, speaking from a deductive-nomological point of view they only provide ad-hoc explanations. Possibilities of prediction are almost non-existent.

We may conclude that Popper touched a weak spot in psychoanalysis. He could avail himself of strict deductive-nomological standards, because Freud regarded his theory as a natural science. But seen from that angle it foundered.

Arthur Schnitzler (1862-1931) was trained as a medical doctor, but turned to a literary career early in his life. His interest in psychoanalysis began in the days of his medical practice, when he was experimenting with hypnosis. A number of his aphorisms on psychoanalysis, stemming from the period 1904-26, have been published in 1976. Freud felt they shared many insights in human life and spoke of Schnitzler as his Doppelgänger.(22) Schnitzler had intuitively grasped what he, the scientist, had only been able to discover with hard labour.

In Freud's work we encounter a tension between heredity and environment as factors explaining neuroses. He made a switch from environmental factors towards constitution coupled with fantasy when he abandoned the seduction theory and developed the libido theory. But he never settled on either side, and was unable to present a satisfactory solution for the dilemma.(23)

In Schnitzler's novels the same tension becomes apparent. In the **Traumnovelle**, Fridolin and Albertine lead a happy married life, when the husband spends a night away from home. His adventures, instigated by feelings of lust and aggression, are reflected by his wife in her dreams. Though not acted out in reality, her wishes are equally promiscuous and aggressive as Fridolin's, and the couple starts thinking about their married life. Are they as happy and secure as they thought they were? Suddenly they are faced with a crossroads. One way leads to a monotonous marriage, with at best contentment but no real happiness: the real wishes must remain unsatisfied. Bourgeois life proves to be a facade, it offers security and respectability, while real feelings have to be denied. The other way is more passionate, but unreigning the passions is not without dangers. Not only are lust and aggression difficult to reconcile with bourgeois conventions, Fridolin and Albertine have good reason to fear for their marriage when they examine their wishes. They seem unable to control the chaos of feelings in themselves. The novel ends with their choosing marriage. Or should one say, instead of speaking of a choice, that they are caught in the daily grind again?

Kenneth Segar (1973) has interpreted the **Traumnovelle** as consisting of two distinct poetic structures, 'one expressing man's freedom to achieve a moral triumph over the powers of darkness, the other contradictorily showing the ultimately determined nature of character' (p. 123). We can view the characters from the perspective of freedom, where they experience a fairy-tale of chaos and lust, but also from the perspective of psychological naturalism. 'A chain of psychological determination is a different,

but equally valid view of how the sober physician and paterfamilias comes to involve himself in a sexual orgy' (p. 125). And finally, is not the ethical decision to stay within the confines of marriage (as traditionally understood) determined by cravings for security and fear of chaos?

The duality appears in other novels with a different emphasis. In **Frau Bertha Garlan** we meet a widow who is content but not happy in her dull life until she gradually becomes captured by fantasies about a lover from her youth. Again, the story ends with disillusion: the ideals are not fulfilled in reality, Bertha ends by pondering about the injustice done to women both by nature (she fears for pregnancy) and morality. Bourgeois morality proves to be persistent, at least in Viennese social life which Schnitzler describes so well.(24)

Schnitzler analyzes the problems inherent in this duality in his aphorisms on psychoanalysis. When psychoanalysis views man as determined by universal laws of development, it is no longer able to understand individual developments. For these are dependent on a certain freedom from general mechanisms. 'Precisely because of the fact that psychoanalysis generalizes its theories, e.g. the oedipus complex, it sacrifices their importance. If it really were the fate of every human being to love his mother and to hate his father, then this circumstance would be a phenomenon of human development like any other, like getting teeth, puberty, etc. -- and becomes uninteresting' (Schnitzler 1976, p. 278). If such phenomena occurred only in abnormal cases, they could explain certain individual features, not when they are universal. Also, the process of interpretation is tricky: 'Using the mechanisms of reversal, displacement and sublimation, (psychoanalysis) changes the limits of interpretation (Deutungsgrenzen) so much into the arbitrary, that any control becomes impossible, and any explanation could be replaced by its exact opposite. Also, the fact that psychoanalysis transgresses so soon into the unconscious is a sign of its weakness. It feels that the conscious could interfere, or sometimes even falsify its statements' (ibid). Psychoanalysis is caught in a dilemma. When it presupposes the determination of psychical processes - which is perfectly reasonable, even necessary, from a scientific point of view - it cannot explain such processes in individuals by recourse to general laws. It is inevitable to study the personal history and the idiographic circumstances. Then it is not difficult to understand and to provide interpretations, even less so when one may recur to unconscious motives. But here the logic of explanation loses its grip. Freud is so immersed in the subjective, individual uses of freedom that he succumbs to his own subjectivity. There is no

natural end to interpreting. We may conclude that Schnitzler shared Kraus' and Popper's concern with the use of psychoanalysis as an explanatory science, where it really only has to offer possibilities of interpretation. The latter are interesting enough: 'Psychoanalysis is seducive for both doctor and patient'.(25)

This section has reviewed three positions critical to Freud. Kraus spoke from an ethical point of view. Is it permissable to conflate scientific knowledge with esthetic judgments? No, was the answer, psychoanalysis creates an ideology, it uses science as rhetoric: this is dangerous in public life. Popper pointed to the dangerous effects of an immunization against criticism within science. Being able to understand everything means that one explains nothing. The attitude of analysts, both within scientific discourse and towards their patients, is in danger of becoming uncritical and untestable. This is intolerable within the scientific realm. Schnitzler focused on an anthropological problem: how can we approach man if he is both determined and responsible? In literature, the two points of view seem to be reconcilable, but in psychoanalysis, it is virtually impossible: for psychoanalysis deals with individual life.

These are basically negative contributions. Problems are pointed out, problems that seem to touch the foundations of psychoanalysis. Let us now turn to some more positive bearings on the problem.

Hermeneutical concepts found in A.A. Grünbaum and Ludwig Wittgenstein

The most sophisticated early expression of the hermeneutical character of psychoanalysis, combined with a critique of its claims to universality, is found in the work of A.A. Grünbaum. Abraham Anton Grünbaum was born in Odessa in 1885. He was trained as a philosopher and an experimental psychologist in Leipzig, where he worked with Wundt, and in Würzburg, where he wrote his dissertation under Külpe. Between World Wars I and II he held positions at the Dutch Universities of Utrecht and Amsterdam.(26) He died in 1932. Grünbaum was one of the few psychologists who were more than superficially acquainted with psychoanalysis. A paper on the psychoanalysis of dreaming, written in 1915, testifies both to his insight in and his critical attitude towards Freud's **Interpretation of Dreams**. He points out that the correspondence between dreamwork and dreaminterpretation contains a circularity, and makes clear that interpretations of dreams may be convincing, but always leave open the possibility of other interpretations. The method of free association gives a way to decipher meanings, but also a

way to attach new meanings to dreams or other phenomena under consideration. One does not know where to stop the chain of associations and start the process of interpretation. These cautionary remarks on interpretative work are further amplified in a contribution to a reader dedicated to the impact of psychoanalysis on science and society, which appeared in 1928. Here Grünbaum claims that psychoanalysis is not a natural science, as Freud claims, but an entirely different kind of knowledge. Psychoanalysis must not try to be accepted by traditional forms of thinking: it must emphasize its revolutionary character in a thorough analysis of its own foundations. It is understandable that Freud looked upon the natural sciences as the ideal of knowledge; but in his actual work he created a different kind of knowledge which might be called a technosophy instead of technology (scientia). Psychoanalysis is a tèchne in the sense that it is based upon practical experiences and involves practical capacities: the necessity of a learning-analysis is a thing peculiar to psychoanalytic theory. Apart from that, analytical thinking results in idiographic knowledge, valid in an individual case, and difficult to generalize. And lastly, analytic knowledge transforms its object; it not only perfoms a mirror-function or delivers accurate descriptions, but it constitutes reality.(27)

This so called 'ontological significance' of psychoanalytic thought forms a convincing argument for the adequacy of Grünbaum's epistemological evaluation. For how could a theory which has, according to many, only dubious value as a scientific construction, exert such an enormous influence on culture and society in our century?

The last question was also posed by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). Like Schnitzler and Grünbaum, he had been struck by the seductiveness of psychoanalysis, and as with Kraus, the easy use analysts sometimes made of Freud's insights was repulsive to him.(28) The basic idea, ascribed by Wittgenstein to Breuer, is alright: 'Freud's idea: In madness the lock is not destroyed, only altered; the old key can no longer unlock it, but it could be opened by a differently constructed key' (Wittgenstein 1977; diary remark from 1938). Problems arise when we ask for the nature of such a key and expect the wrong results in its use. 'In a way having oneself psychoanalysed is like eating from the tree of knowledge. The knowledge acquired sets us (new) ethical problems; but contributes nothing to their solution' (1939). 'Freud has performed a disservice with his fantastical pseudo-explanations (precisely because they are brilliant). (Now any ass has these pictures available to use in 'explaining' symptoms of illness.)'(1946)(29)

Freud's explanations are brilliant, but they are not real explanations. Had they been real explanations, then 'any ass' could have subsumed new phenomena under the laws discovered; but this is not the case. 'What is intriguing about a dream is not its causal connection with events in my life, etc., but rather the impression it gives of being a fragment of a story -- a very vivid fragment to be sure -- the rest of which remains obscure'(1948). Freud claimed he offered something more than puzzle-solving strategies: his was an explanatory theory of dreaming, including techniques for the interpretation of dreams. He presented certain hypotheses as general laws or universal functions. Wittgenstein (1948) counters: 'I think it might be regarded as a basic law of natural history that wherever something in nature "has a function", "serves a purpose", the same thing can also be found in circumstances where it serves no purpose and is even "dysfunctional". If dreams sometimes protect sleep, you can count on their sometimes disturbing it; if dream hallucination sometimes serves a plausible purpose (of imaginary wish fulfillment), count on it doing the opposite as well. There is no "dynamic theory of dreams".'

Wittgenstein suggests that we may interpret dreams like stories. He has no objections against interpretations as such. Freud was brilliant in this art of interpretation. What Wittgenstein dismisses is Freud's claim that his interpretations are on one level with causal explanations and his tendency to hypothesize universal laws in the psychological domain. When his followers start using the 'techniques' and 'scientific hypotheses' they are misled about the nature of Freud's work. An interpretative discipline poses as a natural science.

Conclusions

The psychoanalytic research programme was criticized earlier in its first stage from different angles for its ambiguous character: it claimed to be an empirical-analytical science, but actually it was a hermeneutical enterprise. Due to the closed character of the psychoanalytic movement, the research programme could not absorb arguments of this form and until well after World War II the authority of Freud in all matters was almost never questioned. Within the past decades, however, a more liberal attitude towards theoretical matters became possible within the movement, with the curious result that many analysts implicitly and probably unconsciously seem to agree with arguments that were formulated by 'The Opposition' 60 years ago.(30)

How are we to evaluate the onset of this 'liberalization'? I feel it is the only way to avoid petrification of psychoanalytic theory. It forms an impetus to new developments and makes it possible for psychoanalysis to absorb insights from other disciplines. Yet, why did this development take place so late? Could it have occurred within Freud's lifetime, if he had wished so? Or would it have been too great a danger for the unity of the movement and the disciplinary matrix? I must leave the answers to these questions open here.

One could speculate, however, that there is a meaningful relation between the hermeneutic character of psychoanalysis on the one hand and the vast influences it has exerted on Western society and culture on the other. Psychoanalysis demolished old, dead metaphors and has opened up new viewpoints.(31) Using this terminology, it is only another step to view psychoanalysis as an example of what Gergen (1982) has called 'generative theory'. The question posed to such modern conceptions of psychological theoretizing seems to be the same as the one which bothered Freud and his critics: 'If it is no science, what else may it be?'

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Notes

1. Cf. Terwee (in press); Carveth (1984).
   For critical reactions towards the hermeneutical conception of psychoanalysis, cf. Grünbaum (1984), Strenger (1986).
2. The development of Freud's discoveries is reviewed in length by Schultz (1909; 31 pages), Mittenzwey (1912a, hundreds of pages, comments included), Isserlin (1910, 12 pp.), Kronfeld (1911, 57pp.), and Friedländer (1907b, 13 pages mixed with criticism).
3. Aschaffenburg (Prof.Dr.med.,Köln), Hoche, (Prof.Dr.med., Freiburg i.Br.), Friedländer (Privatklinik Hohe Mark, bei Frankfurt a.M.), and Isserlin publish their articles in medical journals; Mittenzwey (München) in the **Zeitschrift für Pathopsychologie**, Friedländer in the **Journal für Psychologie und Neurologie**, and Kronfeld (Dr.med., Assistent der psychiatrischen Klinik der Universität Heidelberg) in the **Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie**.
4. Even Aschaffenburg (1906) is relatively balanced in his judgment (1906, 1798), as Jung admitted in his reply (1906, 2301).
   Hoche (1910) is more vigorous and polemical.
5. Freud is respected, his followers generally taken less serious.
   Cf. Hoche (1910, 1009); Kronfeld (1912, 134); Mittenzwey (1912a, 696).
6. Aschaffenburg (1906, 1796-7); Friedländer (1907b, 212); Isserlin (1910, 65, 80); Kronfeld (1911, 133).
7. Aschaffenburg's ideas on masturbation leave a more enlighted impression in the modern reader's mind than Freud's 1906, (1793-95).
8. Aschaffenburg (1906, 1797).
9. 'Schon Freud kann man diesen Vorwurf (einen Mangel an Geschmack beim 'Deutungsspiel') nicht ersparen, er wird allerdings weit übertroffen durch einzelne seiner Adepten. Man lese nur, was Stekel sich an Traumdeutungen ... geleistet hat' (Isserlin 1910, 74-75).
10. According to Kronfeld, Freud is able to explain everything. 'Das Deutungsverfahren selber ist eine Art von Kombinationsraten; seine Richtigkeitsmassstäbe, seine Methodik sind nirgendwo wissenschaftlich entwickelt' (1911, 243). Isserlin is a second author who explicitly deals with Freud's method of interpretation (1910, 66-76).
11. Mittenzwey (1912, 676); Aschaffenburg (1906, 1796); Friedländer (1907b, 211).
12. Isserlin (1910, 79); Kronfeld (1912, 132).
13. Mittenzwey (1912, 686).
14. The universality of the sexual origins of the neuroses is questioned by Aschaffenburg: he points to therapeutic suggestion which might account for such observations (1906, 1797). Jung is careful to reply that the sexual etiology of hysteria is a hypothesis which might be falsified by certain cases in the future - but has anybody shown us such cases up to now? he asks rhetorically (Jung 1906, 2301).
15. Decker (1977, 1, 321); Decker (1971).
    Sulloway (1979, Ch.13).
16. Decker (1977), Ch. 6 is more cautious.
    Decker's research covers the period before 1908.
17. A complete reissue of **Die Fackel** has appeared at the Munich publisher's 2001. Cf. Kraus (n.y.), Schick (1965), Janik & Toulmin (1973).
18. Cf. Freud's letter to Kraus, 12-1-1906 (Freud 1960a).

19. Kraus (1913a), (1913b), Stekel (1913), Wittels (1967); Szasz (1977, 101-151) presents a selection of Kraus' writings on psychoanalysis, psychology and forensic psychiatry in English translation. I quote his translations. Cf. the **Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society** (Wittels 1967).
20. In Popper (1963, 33-65). A few pages in this paper are all Popper has ever written on the subject of psychoanalysis, apart from a brief reply to his critics in Popper (1974, Volume II).
21. Grünbaum (1984, Ch.1, 11); cf. Terwee (in press).
22. Freud (1960a), letter to Schnitzler 14-5-1922. Cf. Urban (1978).
23. For Freud's abandonment of the seduction-theory, cf. Miller (1984), Masson (1985), Terwee (1983), and Schusdek (1966).
24. Bolkosky (1986) points to the attention Schnitzler gave to the position of women in Viennese society.
25. The translations from Schnitzler's (1976) aphorisms are my own (S.T).
26. Cf. Terwee (in press).
27. Grünbaum (1928) thus gave a first formulation of a hermeneutic conception of psychoanalysis. One could summarize his paper in the following statement: Freud is a crypto-hermeneutician. (Contra F. Sulloway 1979: Freud is a crypto-biologist).
28. Wittgenstein's notes on psychoanalysis are not part of a systematic study of Freud. They are scattered in the collection of aphorisms **Culture and Value** (1977) and are written in the period 1931-1951. Rush Rhees has recorded conversations on Freud with Wittgenstein (Barrett 1966, 41-52). He quotes Wittgenstein as saying: 'to learn from Freud you have to be critical; and psychoanalysis generally prevents this' (41). Cf. Terwee 1980.
29. I've changed Peter Winch' translation here.
30. These statements need a more elaborate argumentation. The more liberal attitude may be concluded from modern reaction to Freud's casehistories. Analysts from various orientations like Krohn & Krohn (1983), Lewin (1973), Sand (1983), the contributors to Kanzer & Glenn (1980), and Kohon (1984) feel free to comment on Freud's technical errors, theoretical deficiencies and arbitrary interpretations. This was not usual, even impossible, in the older literature. Cf. Terwee (1983). So it seems that criticisms from outsiders, once they are formulated in analytic terms and made fruitful for the formulation of alternative models, are sometimes acceptable. There are also examples where hostile criticism from outsiders is consistently disregarded in the analytic community. This happened with Schatzman's (1973) critique of the Schreber Case (Cf. Israels 1980).
31. Cf. Grünbaum (1928), Carveth (1984), Gergen (1982), Hekman (1984).

SHOOTING FREUD: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ON FILM

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> To us he is no more a person
> Now but a whole climate of opinion
> Under whom we conduct our differing
> lives
>
> W.H. Auden
> "In Memory of Sigmund Freud"

Summary

Movies are often neglected or scorned as a resource in historical research, particulary the history of science. Though a mass of psychological work exists on the impact of the cinema, a meagre handful of studies have begun to explore images, representations and myths of psychology in the cinema. This is in fact the first full-length study devoted to this topic. The general aim here is to show some of the challenges and possibilities of films as historical material, to provide a thumbnail sketch of the development of screen images of the psychologist/psychoanalyst, and to offer a detailed treatment of the 1962 film **Freud**. This movie has been gathering dust for the past 20 years, but it deserves better. The wealth of talent which went into its making - such figures as Jean-Paul Sartre, John Huston, and Montgomery Clift played a part - resulted in a genuinely exciting and innovative look at the founding, and the founder, of psychoanalysis.

In his famous biography, Ernest Jones turns aside from his central theme at one point to relate a curious episode involving psychoanalysis and Hollywood, in the persons of Freud and the celebrated producer Samuel Goldwyn. Like many others in the film industry, Goldwyn was fascinated with the challenge of exploiting the association between psychoanalysis and sex on screen but although he approached "the greatest love specialist in the world" with an offer of $100,000 for his co-operation in making a movie. Freud declined and even refused to see him. To some degree, Freud's antagonism sprang from his distaste for America and its values, which he contemptuously

dismissed as a blend of crude behaviorism, materialism and consumerism and saw epitomised in the figure of Goldwyn, whose reputation for vulgarity had preceded his arrival in Europe.[1] But for the most part Freud remained deeply sceptical that the theories of psychoanalysis could ever by properly expressed on the silver screen, even when the attempt was made by two close acquaintances Hanns Sachs and Karl Abraham[2].

Some aspects of Freud's reaction to Goldwyn have continued to sour the relationship between psychoanalysis and the cinema. Psychoanalysts have resisted the cinematic popularisation of their work for a mass audience, but this has not stemmed the steady outpouring of motion pictures depicting psychoanalytic themes, ideas and figures. On the contrary, it may even have encouraged the flow. From the earliest days of the cinema, the discreet charm of lunatics, asylums and psychiatrists has proved irresistable to directors and audiences alike. Pioneer movies first fell under the spell and made merry with the mindless and their minders, but one must be wary of drawing hurried conclusions from silent films; in contemplating them, it is all too easy to find more significance than they can reasonably bear. As classic films like **The Maniac Chase** (1903) and **The scaped Lunatic** (1904) reveal, character and situation were then ofteen subordinated to plot, and plot to the service of the final, climactic chase - the lunatic fleeing form a straitjacket with his mad doctor and attendants in hot pursuit.

In early commercial sound features, however, some recognisable types of psychiatrists begin to emerge, suggesting something of the mounting popular interest in psychoanalysis (particularly in the United States), but also of the increasing ambivalence of the analyst's role in society and culture. Though perhaps not as frequent a visitor to the screen as in the era of silent movies, the psychiatrist begins to assume a greater prominence through the thirties. In some movies, he appears as the typical, and helpless, man-about-town cast adrift in a world of unreason like Fred Astaire in **Carefree** (1938) or Fritz Feld in **Bringing up Baby** (1938). In others, he assumes a more menacing guise: **Mr. Deeds Goes to Town** (1936), for example, projects the archetype of the European looking and sounding psychiatrist in the pay of political forces and prey to personal greed.[3] And in still other films, the psychiatrist appears as wise, logical and powerful. In **Blind Alley** (1939), to cite a familiar

instance, psychoanalyst Ralph Bellamy manages to wield his knowledge of Freud to disarm and destroy a gangster, when pleading and even violence have failed. This recourse to knowledge as power may represent a dubious ethical commitment to the uses of science, but such moral considerations weighed little in the minds of film-makers conjuring with the magic of psychoanalysis.

During the war, the profession itself was accorded a high profile. Psychiatry, in effect, went public. It served the allied war effort by screening, testing, treating and then rehabilitating those who served in the armed forces, and this more visible presence was noticeable on screen. Portraits of the psychiatrist become correspondingly more unified, or at least, more sympathetic. Typical in this respect was the presentation of psychiatry in **The Cat People** (1942) an **Now, Voyager** (1942) - even Kurt Weill's musical rendition, **Lady in the Dark** (1944) offered audiences a glowing image of the profession at work and at play. From this point on, with few exceptions, psychiatrists began to be given steadily more considerate, and at times even romanticised, roles.

Casting an eye over the films produced from the turn of the century to the late forties tempts the historian to an early summary, but at this early stage in research, it is best to attempt to elucidate some general themes of interest or patterns of sympathy and hostility. Indeed, one is struck first and foremost by a contrast between the attitudes of the cinema during the post-war period and those it has embodied since the sixties. The portayals of psychiatry and its practitioners over the past two decades suggest that the cinema has come to adopt a far more critical, even antagonistic, stance than during the twenty preceding years. Brian de Palma's memorable film **Dressed to Kill** (1980), for example, presents a notoriously savage story of a New York analyst who, dressing up in women's clothing, stalks the streets of Manhattan attacking and murdering his female victims. This film may well be the logical, and violent, terminus in a 20-year development, during which psychiatrists have been increasingly depicted as irrelevant, repressive, or even punitive. One is reminded in this respect of such productions as **A Fine Madness** (1966), **A Woman under the Influence** (1974), **The Bell Jar** (1978) and most memorably, **One Flew over the Cuckoo's Nest** (1975). Over this same period, psychoanalysts have frequently been presented for comic effect and as quite incapable of dealing with

their own or their patients' problems - in the films of Woody Allen, they are both. Elsewhere the practitioner is blatantly portrayed as inadequate or parodied as sex-crazy, for example in 10 (1979), **The President's Analyst** (1967) and **What's New Pussycat?** (1965).

One of the difficulties of conducting historical research with films is that the memory can easily play tricks and perhaps smooth into consensus what are in fact rough contrasts. It is not unlikely that historians of psychology, recollecting recent movies more vividly than those produced in the forties and fifties, will think that Hollywood has always been as openly contemptuous or mocking of psychoanalysts as it has over the past twenty years. This, coupled with a remembrance of Freud's suspicion of the movies may have discouraged some from looking closely or seriously at the film as a valid, informative historical resource. The brief outline presented above will have helped to indicate the wide variety of different and distinct approaches to psychiatry and psychoanalysis in movies. Certainly, life for the Hollywood screen analyst has not always been as tough as might appear from **Dressed to Kill**. There was a time, indeed, when life was exceptionally sweet, when Hollywood studios took such themes seriously, treated them sensitively, and as a consequence produced 'psychiatric' movies of great accomplishment.

Once we recall the immediate, direct and widespread impact of the cinema screen as a source of images during this period, the overall importance of such films as **Shadow on the Wall** (1950), **Knock on Wood** (1954), **The Cobweb** (1955), and **Fear Strikes Out** (1957) becomes easier to appraise. The sympathetic, not to say idealised, portraits offered there of the psychoanalyst were further polished for public consumption in subsequent years, in such films as **Suddenly Last Summer** (1959), **Splendor in the Grass** (1961) and **The Mark** (1961). Much of the terminology of Freudian analysis was introduced quietly and with evident effect: it quickly became familiar and fashionable, particularly to a public excited by reports of Alfred Kinsey's sexological research (itself the inspiration for a popular quasi-scientific film in 1962, **The Chapman Report**), and enthralled by Dr. Spock's **Commonsense Book of Baby and Child Care** (1946), a hugely successful work which embodied, and considerably simplified, many psychoanalytic insights.[4]

So far as film-makers were concerned, the development of movies dealing with psychoanalysis and psychiatry through the fifties

suggested that the time might be ripe for a frontal assault on the historical figure lurking (albeit unwillingly) behind these subjects. The public had been offered, and had enthusiastically welcomed, a mass of films engaging with Freudian themes. At the highest levels of Universal Studios in Hollywood, the decision was taken to commission a full length, realistic and sympathetic portrait of Freud's life and work.[5] It is so that film, **Freud** (1962), that the remainder of this study will be devoted. By tracing its genesis and production, then considering its values and the impact it made on cinema audiences, it is hoped that the historian of science may be in a better position to appreciate the possible interest of movies as a historical resource and to consider some viable avenues to pursue that interest in the future.

Sartre's Freud Scenario

The genesis of **Freud** went back to 1943 when John Huston directed the documentary **Let there be Light**, about soldiers who had suffered nervous breakdowns during battles. The film followed their rehabilitation and return to normal life, playing particular attention to the role of psychiatrists and other professionals who had been involved in counselling during the war. Huston, who at the start of filming had only a superficial acquaintance with the writings of Freud, Jung and Adler, quickly immersed himself in psychoanalytic texts; the use of hypnosis struck him, he recounted, with all the force of a "religious experience".[6] Experimenting on patients, with notable success, Huston plunged deeper into psychiatric theory and practice and, following discussions with doctors and interviews with patients, resolved to make a film of the life and work of Freud. Fifteen years later that project was set in motion when, in a bold move, Huston asked the philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre to write a scenario dealing particularly with the period in Freud's career when through contact with hypnosis he founded psychoanalysis. A bold move indeed, since Huston believed at the time that Sartre was "a communist and an anti-Freudian".[7] But Sartre undertook the commission, perhaps because it came with a promise of $ 25,000 on completion. The acceptance of this contract may seem as surprising as Huston's original offer, for the existentialist Sartre might have been expected to reject the very concept of the unconscious in favour of his notions of individual responsibility and bad faith. But Sartre's relationship to Freudian

thinking was complex, idiosyncratic and subject to many shifts from the period of L'Etre et le Neant (1943), through Les Mots (1964), to his study of Flaubert, L'Idiot de la Famille (1971-72). Sartre's views on self-deception, articulated as mauvaise foi, were at the outset surely too abstract and metaphysical to be convincing. It may be, then, that Sartre yielded to Huston's offer in the course of confronting problems in his own philosophical psychology. There is not the space here to treat the subject in any detail, but it is worth noting that Sartre's writing of the screenplay formed a decisive stage in his evolving view of psychoanalysis and, contrariwise, the screenplay itself incorporated some novel Sartrean insights.[8]

Preparing to write the autobiography Les Mots, Sartre began the painful scrutineering task of self-analysis; his earlier relation to Freudian thinking seems to have been conditioned by the difficulties he encountered squaring up to his own childhood. In the process of dredging his own memory, Sartre was led to find the roots of his own supposed lack of superego in the early death of his father. As a result, when Sartre came to script Freud, it was the father-son bond which structured his approach. The core of the scenario witnesses Freud grappling with the figure of his father and then traversing with his teachers and colleagues - Meynert, Breuer, Fliess - the itinerary of attachment, rejection and rupture.[9] In each relationship, as it forms, develops, then crumbles, Father-figures assume predominance: the castrating Father, the seducing Father, and then when Freud finally gives up the seduction theory, the desired Father. By the end of the screenplay, folllowing the death of his parental father, Freud himself takes up the vacated role, He becomes the Father of Psychoanalysis. [10]

If this represents the overarching structure of Sartre's scenario, there are many other themes figuring beneath and within. Drawing on his earlier concerns with individual and with those pivotal moments when subjects frame their life projects, Sartre tries to grasp just how a person and his labour are produced by given forces at a given moment in history. For example, to show how Flaubert came to choose to be a 'bourgeois' writer rather than a doctor, to write Madame Bovary (1856-57), Rather than some other form of literature, like the Goncourts' books. In his Critique de la Raison Dialectique (1950), Sartre seeks to add a hierarchy of mediations to Marxist social theory and to incorporate psychoanalysis into the theory of

history. The film scenario in somewhat similar fashion provides Sartre with an opportunity to exercise on a biographical theme his critique both of Marx, who depicted personality as a function of class location, and of Freud who saw it as the outcome of the Oedipus complex.[11]

Certainly, Freud's discovery of psychoanalysis is pictured, with great effect, as the outcome of a relentless drive to settle his own inner conflicts; to cure himself. Psychoanalysis, in sum, is the product of Freud's long activity against himself. He is a driven man, possessed by personal demons, tormented by a brooding neurosis. But it is a neurosis which, Sartre shows (and himself recognises) engenders creation. A polymorphous creative illness is at its peak in the crucial years covered by the film.[12] But, as Pontalis has argued, Freud's neurosis is a private creation, "devoid of meaning for its author because written in a language for which he has no key (and how is one to open a strong-box when the key is inside?)".[13]

In writing the script, Sartre himself changed position in important ways as he finally came to acknowledge the importance of repression, the unconscious, and the Oedipus complex. It would be an overstatement to portray this as a wholesale renunciation of earlier views. More accurately, one may detect Sartre here shifting his explanatory emphasis: he continues to stress the social determination of culture, but finds in psychoanalysis the key to what particular individuals make from their circumstances. The individual, in other words, comes to represent a complex entity: a universal category of circumstances, but also a singular factor.[14] To write a screenplay about that multivalent individual 'Freud' would therefore necessitate immersing him within - and against - those determining circumstances common to all in equivalent time and space. Sartre's totalising ambition to hold in grasp the universal-singular man consequently results in an enormous tableau bustling with figures - Freud the Jew, Freud the neurotic, Freud the father of psychoanalysis, Freud the son, Freud the sexual subject, and so on.[15]

Focusing on the years 1885-1890, when Freud was at a crucial stage of his development - about to marry, about to leave neurology, about to theorize the unconscious - Sartre's first draft was intricate, taut, and theatrically brilliant. Extensive too, and at some 300 pages (according to Huston), or 2000 pages (according to another critic), considered too long for use as it stood.[16] Huston and Sartre

spent days in Ireland attempting to trim and restructure the manuscript, but each man found disappointment in the other. Sartre, shown Huston's Let there be Light, thought it "mediocre and propagandist", and reported with surprise and dismay that Huston seemed unwilling to accept the existence of the unconscious. Huston, for his part, found Sartre overbearing and intellectually secretive. Though they parted with the agreement that Sartre would return Huston a shortened and amended script, what finally appeared, to Huston's nonsurprise, was an even longer draft. It was apparent to Huston that Sartre 's participation in the project had effectively come to an end.[17]

Meanwhile, Universal Pictures, worried by the expanding bulk of the script and perturbed by possible censorship problems the film might encounter, requested Huston to clear a streamlined scenario with the powerful Catholic Church of New York. This done (with some notable difficulty on Huston's part, since the Catholic authorities judged Freud's philosophy immoral), a second writer was brought in to try shaping the script for production. Charles Kaufman, who had co-written Let there be Light with Huston, failed however to grasp the novelty of the project and, to Huston's disappointment, began writing a story modelled on the Hollywood biographical pictures of the thirties. Huston had in mind something quite different: "a motion picture which would dramatize the experiments that led to [Freud's] discoveries.... as a kind of thriller, a mystery of a special sort".[18]

Beyond Biography

The film would, Huston hoped, "breathe brimstone", rather than present a bland, chronological and heroic portrait of the scientist.[19] In this respect, Huston followed closely Freud's own expressed injunction against the "task of idealization" with which he felt so many biographers tackled their work:

> "They obliterate the individual features of their subject's physiognomy; they smoothe over the traces of his life's struggle with internal and external resistances, and they tolerate in him no vestige of human weakness or imperfection. Thus, they represent us with what is in fact a cold, strange, ideal figure, instead of a human being to whom we might feel ourselves instantly related".[20]

In some desperation, Huston set to work writing himself, with the help of Wolfgang Reinhardt, his collaborator on Juarez (1939), who

possessed an exceptional grasp of psychoanalytic history and theory. Scripting together, then separately, with Reinhardt consulting Sartre in Paris and Huston bringing in Dr. David Stafford-Clark, a leading British psychiatrist to give expert counsel, the screenplay gradually took its final form. As it grew shorter, the project drifted further from the original scenario, so much so that Sartre relinquished all responsibility for the final product and demanded that his name be removed from the credits. The end result was that only a portion of Sartre's original insights and conceptions was retained.[21] One might say that the final screenplay stands to the original scenario as the manifest dream content stands to the latent dream thought: condensed, distorted, conventionalised.

So far as casting was concerned, Huston had only one choice for the male lead - Montgomery Clift, a brilliant, if temperamental and difficult actor, who had starred in Huston's previous film **The Misfits** (1960). One of Sartre's most innovative ideas had been to telescope some dozen or so of Freud's case studies into a single, decisive, one. This was a feature retained by Huston, and the composite character of Cecily Koertner (roughly equivalent to Anna O) proved a more difficult role to fill. Sartre had conceived Marilyn Monroe for the part, and anyone recollecting her play opposite Clift in **The Misfits** must have been disappointed that she never rejoined him on screen. Instead, Susannah York, a 19 year-old relative unknown, was cast. After some notable difficulties shooting the film on location in Munich and Vienna, Huston finally returned to Universal Studios with a picture two hours and twenty minutes long. Some previews to invited audiences led to major cutting, as did reaction from studio executives who considered that some scenes were morally offensive and would provoke organised reaction. The final editing eliminated some scenes which, if the director's descriptions are accurate, were vital to the logic and structure of the film.

One such depicted a girl under hypnosis recounting in her father's presence his real (and later confessed) sexual assaults upon her. Withdrawn from the final print on studio orders, this was in context a crucial element in the film's development. It was an important piece of evidence supporting Freud's seduction theory and served additionally to convince him that other accounts, rendered under hypnosis, had as much basis in fact as did this one. Freud later came to recognise that, with a few exceptions, his patients had

not been reminiscing actual seductions. Instead of suffering from painful memories, they were the victims of a fantasy rooted in the struggle to recreate an independent identity. This crucial theoretical move on Freud's part, detailed in his extraordinary (and only recently published) correspondence with Fliess over the years 1887-1904, was made painfully and equivocally.[22] The much publicised claim that Freud totally abandoned the seduction theory must, however, be treated as spurious since he continued throughout his life to draw a distinction between incestuous seductions and fantasies about such seductions.[23] Yet, **Freud** too conveys an incorrect impression for without the example of a real seduction, an unbelievably smooth path to the discovery of the Oedipus complex is laid out.

Other cuts contributed to the same general impression by making Freud appear more assured and clear-sighted than he was. Some scenes depicted Meynert warning Freud not to transgress the institutional powers and to be cautious in his announcements of new theories and ideas. These deleted, it looks as if Meynert's advice issues from professional jealousy. In like fashion, a scene explaining the basis for Charcot's use of hypnosis was withdrawn with the effect of making Freud's teacher seem a charlatan.

When **Freud** finally appeared, trimmed and truncated, in 1962 the reviews greeting it were excellent; "brilliant", "gripping", and "utterly engrossing" were some of the epiphets used to describe it in American film magazines.[24] Yet, set against this great critical acclaim, audience reaction was somewhat disappointing: so much so that when the movie crossed the Atlantic it was given a new and lurid title by Universal - **Freud: the Secret Passion**. This move would seem to have been prompted by two considerations: the first to highlight the element of sex in the film, the second to dispel any preconceptions that it was a dull and objective biographical feature.

So far as any erotic aspects of the film were concerned, these had actually been very underplayed by Huston, always careful to avoid sexual explicitness in his productions. The result, as one critic noted, was that the character in **Freud** "though living on the edge of a volcano, don't even smoulder a little".[25] The relationship of the film to earlier 'biopics' is a more interesting and involved one and repays somewhat closer study. A number of reviewers felt that **Freud** remained too austerely biographical, even though it was known that Huston had made efforts to break from this mould.[26] It is clear that

the parallel, if it can indeed be drawn, does not appear at the superficial level; after all, Freud is neither born nor dies in the film, and there is no attempt made, as in earlier cinematic biographies, to encapsulate a life's achievement and contribution. Trimmed, and perhaps thinned, as it was to fit into already existing notions of clear characterisation and causality, it has nevertheless to be said that **Freud** breaks the biographical unity of psychological motivation preserved in many other films. The emphasis on childhood, for example, so much a feature of earlier Freud-inspired features and so powerful in determining adult development in such films as **Spellbound**, **Guest in the House** (1944), and most famously **Citizen Kane** (1941) is not sustained in **Freud**. But perhaps what reviewers were alluding to was another feature common to the biopics: their narrative of discovery rather than development. In the thirties, there had been a powerful tendency to treat scientific discovery as a 'Eureka syndrome', a sudden and unexpected moment which decisively changes the course of history.[27]

To some degree, one can find the syndrome manifest in Edward G. Robinson's discovery of a cure for syphilis in **Dr. Ehrlich's Magic Bullet** (1940) or Greer Garson's discovery of radium in **Madame Curie** (1944). And it is true that, though nothing as blatant occurs in **Freud**, one can nevertheless detect in it distant echoes of the theme. "Interesting case, dear?", asks Martha Freud at one point in the film; "Yes", replies Sigmund thoughtfully, "my patient seems to be in love with her father, jealous of her ... by God! I've got it." If not striking quite the same note as earlier forms, this comes perilously close to revelation-by-handsight.

What prevents **Freud** veering completely into an earlier generic format is in some measure its emphasis not so much on Freud's search for truth as on those false leads, wrong turns and fruitless hypotheses which formed part of his, and any other, scientific investigation. That said, the centrality of Freud's self-analysis in the film's account of the abandonment of the seduction theory and the discovery of infantile sexuality tends to legitimate the myth of Freud as scientific hero, as well as the innovativeness of psychoanalytic techniques. Freud himself considered his self-analysis an invaluable stage forward in his intellectual development, and this notion was supported by numerous studies of psychoanalysis published during the fifties, particularly Jones' biography.[28] Moreover, in

Sartre's scenario and to a slightly lesser extent in the finished product, the portrayal of the hostile prejudiced reception accorded Freud's work not only bolsters Freud's heroic stature and the revolutionary nature of his discoveries but, in a more subtle way, reinforces the theory of repression and resistance.[29] Nevertheless, there are in the film some genuine - and circumspect - touches which quietly point to the elements of serendipity in science. One such is the moment when Freud places himself behind and out of vision of his female patient on the couch, as an instinctive aid to free association. Thus was born the archetypal image of the analyst at work. Yet such a discontinuist, anti-teleological approach produces some difficulties. Too little emphasis on clean breaks and forward assaults on truth, coupled with discreet signals to the complexity and ambivalence of scientific advance, can make an accurate but solemn and over-intellectualised film. High seriousness, as some sections of the press revealed by their comments, was not universally welcomed.[30] Moreover, many of the allusions in **Freud** were of a literary, even anti-filmic, kind.[31] Some sequences were bridged by similarities which cannot be grasped in that brief moment between shots. At one point, the work "key" on the sound-track is immediately followed by a dissolve to a key turning in a lock. At another, Freud's wife pulls back the bedroom curtains to let in the dawn just when Freud has solved his problem; any viewer unaware of that English expression 'the solution dawned on him' would surely have missed the point. Furthermore, what are we to make of those scenes which seem to suggest allusions, yet are so vague that they only seem open to misreading? During one of Freud's lectures, a member of his medical audience gets up, walks down the lecture aisle, halts before the rostrum on which Freud stands, and spits in disgust. The man is the identical of Karl Marx, or at least of the stock photographs of him. The similarity is arresting, but barring the accidental resemblance, what could be intended by it? Those who resist psychoanalysis are communists? Marxists are anti-Freudian? Freud was antagonistic to Marx?

Perhaps my own analysis at this point probes too deeply; yet, it could be claimed that Huston's film invites this level of examination. Put another way, perhaps as Freud intimated, his was a conquest of depth which lies at a level beyond the camera.[32] That in itself might put into question the wisdom of Huston's venture (though not

the excellence of **Freud**'s screenplay). And we may add that psychoanalysis lends itself less readily even than other pursuits depicted in those famous biopics to dramatic presentation or filmic necessity. Psychoanalysis takes time and inches forward little by little. Naturally, any synoptic account needs to foreshorten, but one wonders whether Sartre was not on the right lines with his vision of the grandeur of even this small segment of Freud's career. Told in 1961 that his draft scenario would make a ten-hour film, he allegedly snapped - "So make a ten-hour film!"[33]

In an interview with the English critic Kenneth Tynan, Sartre put the point differently. Speaking about his work for **Freud**, he commented:

> "Except in construction, the final script has little resemblance to what I wrote. The fault is partly mine, and partly Freud's. My scenario would have been impossible to shoot; it would have lasted seven or eight hours. As you know, one can make a film four hours long if it has to do with Ben Hur, but a Texas audience won't sit through four hours of complexes."[34]

That Freud presented special problems for the scriptwriter is something we have already discussed, but it remains to consider some of the additional ways Huston and his team grappled with these to produce a film which ran barely two hours. This done, we shall be in a position to turn to Sartre's next point concerning audience reaction.

Though Huston was anxious not to reproduce the biographical motif in his work, he was not averse to adapting the storyline to that other popular genre, the detective story. In essence, this suited the Freudian melodrama far better than recourse to those straightforward tales of discovery and fame presented through the thirties. This was recognised and admired by many reviewers of **Freud**, some of whom found in the figure of the psychoanalyst "nosing his way from clue to clue" a distant echo of Sherlock Holmes.[35] As the **Daily Worker** put it: "the Watsonian patient supplies the clues, Sherlock Freud develops the theory, and the bad old villain Oedipus is brought sternly to justice in the end".[36] The comment is tongue-in-cheek of course, but it contains a good measure of truth. It is difficult to see the film without sensing that the psychoanalyst, in playing the part of the detective, consigns to the patient the role of the witness who will not talk.[37]

Effective though it may be, the analogy works perhaps better in earlier films portraying the psychiatrist at work. In a movie like **Blind Alley** (1939), the parallel is explicit: an escaped killer takes refuge in the home of a psychiatrist who explores his subconscious and tames him. Here, by showing to the gangster that in the act of murder he was unconsciously repeating the Oedipal gesture which had killed his own father, the psychiatrist acts both as the detective and the policeman chasing a subject. But in **Freud**, the detective is at once the subject and the object of analysis - the hunter and the hunted.

Other generic models and throwbacks to film history can no doubt be retrieved from a close scrutiny of **Freud** (some of the dream sequences recall German expressionist work of the twinties, for example), but what is most striking is how effectively Huston handles his medium to reproduce and yet begin to subvert the detective genre, to bypass yet to some degree incorporate the biographical genre. The foregoing discussion may well have raised in the reader's mind the spectre of realism, so prominent in assessment of **Freud**. After all, if there is validity to that conventional equation which has all artifice eroding realism, it would seem that Huston's film, through its deployment of a large array of diverse and artificial techniques, would ensure a defiantly non-realistic portrayal of Freud's life and work from 1885 to 1890.

Freud: Parady or Paradigm?

But how should we judge the realism or non-realism of **Freud**? According to its script (whose script)? Against the historical facts (which facts)? or by recourse to certain conventions of realism? In truth, there appear to be great difficulties in adopting a genre and then seeking to measure the fit a particular work has to it. Yet, notwithstanding the critic's caution, the historian needs to recognise the fierce debate that occurred concerning the truthfulness of the portrayal in **Freud**, it being assumed that it was intended to be an accurate biography. As biography it was felt that it could properly be judged according to the historical record rather than to conventions of biographical narrative. Even before the film was completed, Huston encountered problems with Freuds's family who wrote asking him to terminate the project, and informed the press that no

authorisation had been granted for the film either by Sigmund Freud Copyright, or by the heirs of Freud's biographer Ernest Jones.[38]

In the mind of the objectors, particularly Anna Freud and Edward L. Bernays (daughter and nephew of Sigmund), the movie failed "to convey the truth about Freud and his work".[39] Before it was ever screened, Freud's two children, Anna and Ernest, claimed that no film could ever portray the scientific or historical truth about psychoanalysis, this protest recalling - and possibly deriving from - Freud's own disbelief in the possibility of his theories being presented on film. Once it appeared, Ernest Freud requested that a disclaimer be included at the start of the film:

> "No person portrayed in this films bears a true resemblance to any person of the same name, associated with the late Sigmund Freud and the facts as shown in the picture are not a true representation of the facts that actually occurred in the life of Sigmund Freud."[40]

The disclaimer was never introduced into the picture. Nevertheless, it is most interesting in illustrating the ease with which some critics of the film fell into judging it according to "true resemblance", "facts", and "true representation". If a resemblance between historical figure and actor is to be the standard of realism, then **Freud** must be judged to come closer to that standard than any of the earlier biographical pictures. One has only to consider the efforts Huston made to achieve this level of verisimilitude. The similarity in visual appearance between various characters and their historical counterparts is one of the most striking features of the film. The resemblance of Susan Kohner to Martha Freud, Fernand Ledoux to Charcot, and Eric Portman to Theodore Meynert is almost uncanny. Great efforts also went into choosing authentic locations in Vienna and the lecture theatre in which Charcot demonstrates hysterical symptoms is an impressively faithful reconstruction based on the famous lithograph of Charcot impassively holding forth to his entranced audience which Freud brought back from Paris and hung in his consulting room in Vienna and later in London.[41] If realism and authenticity are the outcome of photographic resemblance, then Huston's film can lay just claim to them. But **Freud** does not rest at accuracy of detail and incident. The composite patient Cecily Koertner is, arguably, accurate only in spirit. Naturally, such a figurative compression leads to a loss of depth since Cecily is used to

provide a 'fictitious' springboard for a wide range of findings in the film. Much of Freud's acceptance of the seduction theory is made to seem based solely in Cecily's testimony, with the effect that Freud's credulity, judged by many the key to his personality, is not explored.[42] A certain level of Freud's mental makeup is, therefore, ignored. Another dimension which is not accorded due emphasis is the intense emotional life Freud led during those crucial years - the screenplay itself is more concerned with abstractions than with characters, and Montgomery Clift's performance can easily appear to convey a rather dessicated presence.

Clift-as-Freud illustrates as well as any other aspect of the movie how great a distance separates the immediate realism of visual similarity and the more different realism which emerges at a deeper level. Clift certainly possessed a good many of the superficial features necessary to the screen psychoanalyst: he had the right demeanour and physical presence, and grew a beard especially to make his match. Yet, the performance he gives is unexpected in not following the pattern set by earlier films. Clift's psychiatrist is not mature, reassuring and paternal, but instead neurotic, jittery and curmudgeonly. To the critic expecting the authentic culmination of a trend of screen analysts inaugurated in the forties, Clift was bound to seem alien and disappointing. To many practicing psychiatrists and what **Variety** termed, "a large segment of the head-shrinking camp", this was a **Freud** disappointingly at odds with the homely myths spun through the previous years by the medium.[43] Some critics could not understand what emotions were intended to be conveyed by Clift's eyes: were they dark and searing, or frightened and unsure? Were they saying: "Don't cross me" or "Don't hit me"?[44]

In truth (and here perhaps lies the authenticity of the performance) they were saying both things - and more. Freud here was at once the 'convincing scientist' and the 'neurotic', the one following, as Sartre recognised, from the other. Critics, though, were perplexed by the way this portrait of the psychoanalyst took symbols and recognised images only to deepen, extend and finally subvert them.[45] When one reviewer complained of Clift's "Mosaic appearance" ("who knows? - he may even be acting behind that busy beard"), little could he have guessed the unintended truth of the remark.[46] By adding together the perceptions of different reviewers, one can indeed begin to piece together Sartre's universal-singular man.

Turning finally to viewers' reactions, Sartre's remark that "a Texas audience won't sit through four hours of complexes", is an apposite reminder of Huston's intentions in making **Freud**. He had, it will be recalled, undergone something akin to a "conversation experience" in first coming into contact with psychiatric theory and practice, particularly with the use of hypnosis. Knowing the impact of a direct and powerful acquaintance with this and other techniques from his work on **Let there be Light**, Huston's objective was in part to reproduce this effect on the audience witnessing the film. He conceived that they too would undergo a conversion experience. To a degree then, the realism of the film was to rest and be judged by the impact it had on viewers.

Above all, Huston wanted his film to be a mirror in which his audience could peer and probe itself, rather than a screen which they could observe from a safe distance. Huston, perhaps fulfilling the prophesy of Horkheimer and Adorno, that movies would carry out the purgation of the emotions Aristotle once attributed to tragedy, hoped viewers of **Freud** would undergo a kind of catharsis.[47] As he said while shooting the film in Munich, "it is a reminder of all unpleasant memories carefully forgotten. **Freud** is the image leading [the viewers] down into the hell of their own secret repressions."[48] If, as I have suggested, the film took this kind of audience reaction as a measure of its authenticity, then all the artifice and construction - from the symbolism, through the dream sequences, to the development of a unique three-plane photography by Douglas Slocombe - can be seen as serving to produce decisive reality effects.

Film: The message and the medium

I hope this many-faceted approach to **Freud** has helped to suggest some of the ways in which film can both mirror and transform the realities on which it is premissed. Not all movies were launched, as John Huston launched **Freud**, to soften and stir audiences as tragedy had in the ancient past. Producers and directors have always tended to overrate the impact of their work, and though there is little relevant research available, what does exist suggests that the cinema of the fifties and sixties generally reinforced existing attitudes rather than introducing new ones.[49] To make a stronger case for **Freud**, to see it as the effector of psychological changes in movie audiences, would be difficult - perhaps impossible - to do. It would

certainly take me beyond the modest objectives of this study, and quite possibly beyond the historical evidence available. To recognise any potential historians of science from turning to it as a possible resource. After all, would we place more explanatory demands on film than we conventionally place on written archives?

The question of audience impact retains a particularly troublesome character in relation to purportedly 'realist' film. It should be clear from my treatment of the issue that the "reality effect" of **Freud** was the result of some well-planned filmic devices.[50] 'Realism', the dominant aesthetic since the war (indeed, until the validity of representational relations came to be questioned by some continental directors in the early sixties), was the result of the Hollywood manufacturing industry in full swing. Moreover, and perhaps more startingly, it has recently been suggested that, through some 'mechanisms of identification', audience reactions to 'realist' films may also have been manufactured. What mechanisms may have been used, and how effective these were, are questions now under debate but if they contributed to the overall power of movies then Huston's ambitions should perhaps be taken more seriously and adopted as one starting point for further analysis of the interaction of film and viewer.[51] For the moment, this relationship may be suggested at another level, by a specific example along with a broader illustration.

The general historical survey which opened this study that the cinematic figure of the psychoanalyst acquired increasing presence, power and prestige during the fifties. By showing some of the early roots and revealing the long history of psychoanalysis, **Freud** would no doubt have continued this trend. Freud himself had expressed fears that psychoanalysis would become a medical specialism in America and would as a consequence lose its popularity.[52] On the first count he was proved right, but psychoanalysis managed to remain authoritative and at the same time become fully "domesticated".[53] It is surely plausible to assign Hollywood 'psychiatric' movies in general and **Freud** in particular a determining role in bringing about this unforeseen and unlikely conjunction.

To some degree, psychoanalysis acquired its authority by association with medicine and the natural sciences. The dominion of the latter over the American population was at this time enormous and largely unquestioned. It is worth recalling in this respect that

Stanley Milgram's famous experiments, carried out in the early sixties, did not simply measure levels of conformity and obedience. Milgram showed that over 60 per cent of his sample were prepared, under instruction from a 'scientist', to administer shocks of 450 volts to subjects in a laboratory setting; once similar orders came from a 'layperson', the number dropped to around 20 per cent. Here, strikingly demonstrated, was an indication of the power and reach of scientific authority during the period **Freud** was being screened.[54]

Approximately a decade before Milgram's work, a survey of American attitudes and beliefs revealed how effectively some of the themes of the 'psychiatric' movies of the period had penetrated the public mind.[55] The myth of madmen acting out the part of Napoleon, so much a staple of early mad-films, had by the fifties fallen from public favour, as it had from the cinema screens. Instead, the majority of those questioned recognised that the category of 'mental illness' spanned a large range, with normality and insanity at opposite extremes. As one might expect, perceptions of psychiatrists and psychoanalysts were extremely high: as a professional group, they were pictured as decisive, commanding and authoritative. Many respondents described the work of psychiatric experts in a language borrowed from Freud, or at least from Freud-via-Hollywood. Hypnosis was judged one of the most effective instruments in the analysts' medical kit - surely an idea which must have come from films of the fifties. Indeed, although one must be wary of placing too much credibility on survey work of this kind, it does appear that a very close family resemblance existed at this time between the images, attitudes and themes depicted in movies and those expressed by members of the American public. It would be interesting to have available some follow-up studies of public opinion, for these would reveal the impact of **Freud**. For example, in the fifties only a very small fraction of those questioned believed that "psychiatrists need to be a bit mentally unbalanced themselves in order to work with their patients"; did this fraction increase as the result of Montgomery Clift's notably neurotic portrayal of the founder of psychoanalysis?

Unfortunately, this is a type of question which may never be answered by empirical data, for appropriate surveys were never undertaken in the sixties. To return to the problem of the interaction between viewer and film, it appears then that we are left with an unenviable choice: we can engage in purely theoretical studies of

films or base claims concerning audience impact from the flimsy empirical evidence available. Neither approach alone is satisfactory to the historian of science, yet it remains difficult at this early stage in research to sketch a better path to follow. The particular example above of images of scientific and psychoanalytic authority may suggest further lines of investigation.

Freud without doubt brought into wider public circulation the language of the clinic and the couch. But it did more besides introducing new terms or diffusing older ones. Such notions as 'ego', 'guilt', 'ambivalence', 'unconscious', and 'schizophrenia' had been used in films before the fifties. However, they had been used differently: increasingly during the post-war period, such terms began to take on a cinematic life of their own. They were no longer introduced to spice up a script but instead to serve as the focal points in film narrative; so much so that they came to stand as trademarks of a particular kind of production and even replace proper character portrayal, To splash 'Mystery of the Unconscious', or 'Passions of the Soul' across a fifties cinema poster gave a signal to the overall psychological extent of the film being advertised; to refer to 'guilt' or 'fixation' during the screenplay was not infrequently the only concession given to its psychological depth.[58] Thus, the Hollywood appropriation of psychoanalytic vocabulary began to work against psychoanalysis itself as categories were adopted, then absorbed, then refracted by the screen. The Oedipus complex revealed by Professor Bellamy in **Blind Alley** bears little formal resemblance to the one uncovered in **Freud**, still less to that discovered by Freud himself. To trace the historical development of scientific language in films in this way may well provide a useful entry point to larger-scale changes in the relations between the cinema and its subject matter.

It would be unfortunate to bring this study to an end with such an example of Hollywood's more simple-minded appropriation of psychoanalysis. This would bring us too close to endorsing Freud's own warning about American values in general and Hollywood values in particular - a warning, it should be remembered, which sprang from ignorance coupled with prejudice. To come to a more appropriate evaluation, further research is, of course, required. At present, as a recent bibliography demonstrates, whereas hundreds of psychological and psychoanalytic studies of film have been undertaken, barely a handful of articles have appeared treating psychology and

psychoanalysis in film, and these have all been occasional, brief contributions.[57] Misconceptions, inadequate surveys, faulty references, and prejudgments understandably abound. To mu knowledge, only one historian of science has ventured into film studies but, although Nathan Reingold's short piece on **The Beginning or the End** (1947) is well-crafted, it makes little effort to contextualise the film. As a result, it states that when faced with the problem of presenting difficult, cerebral material on screen, Hollywood had inevitably veered "from factual accuracy in the interest of entertainment".[58]

I hope that the arguments and evidence presented in this article have shown the problems with this statement. For one thing, the notion of "factual accuracy" is one which needs careful analysis if it is to be used sensibly to speak about movies; for another, the particular example of **Freud** shows that in at least one case film-makers were not swayed in tackling complex issues by entertainment values alone.

There are those, perhaps, who continue to feel that the film does not merit serious historical attention. Can this be because something as enjoyable to watch cannot be worthy of study? Or are historians still distant heirs to the Puritan distrust of the image? It may be so, but more likely that the values which inspire the production of movies are thought equivalent to those which conspire to produce low grade journalism and the comic strip. Some may still harbour memories of the influential critic I.A. Richards' castigation of "bad literature, bad art, and the cinema" and his depiction of film as "a medium that lends itself to crude rather than to sensitive handling".[59] To such people, and to those who may have been swayed by Freud's early rejection of Samuel Goldwyn, the film historian can only respond by providing analyses of films that are serious, intelligent and important. It is hoped that the study of **Freud** presented above will be a first contribution to that response.

Notes

1. "America", Freud once joked, "is a mistake, a gigantic mistake, it is true, but none the less a mistake"; see Jones (1953-57, II, p. 67).
2. Jones (1953-57, III, pp. 121-22); see also Clark (1980, pp. 461-63).
3. That such portrayals did much to foster racial stereotypes on screen is clear from Kracauer (1949) and Rosenberg and White (1957, pp. 257-77).

4. On Spock, see Bettelheim (1984, p. 20).
5. See Holland (1959).
6. See Huston (1980, p. 125). For additional detail, Benayoun's interview with Huston is useful: Benayoun (1965).
7. Huston (1980, p. 294).
8. Before he began the screenplay Sartre immersed himself in psychoanalytic literature: "I not only re-read Freud's books but also consulted commentaries, criticism and so forth"; interview in Schilpp (1981, p. 12).
9. The above lines are based on J.B. Pontalis' preface to Sartre (1985).
10. For examples to illustrate the foregoing argument, see Sartre (1985, pp. 99, 131, 359, 370, 530 and 539).
11. In **Question de la Méthode** (1960) Sartre notes, "Valéry is a petit-bourgeois intellectual, no doubt about it. But not every petit-bourgeois intellectual is Valéry." (Sartre, 1968, p. 56).
12. On Freud's inner sufferings during the late 1880s, see Ellenberger (1970, pp. 445-50).
13. Sartre (1985, p. XII).
14. This may indeed be an insolubly contradictory notion, as Sève (1975, p. 12) has suggested.
15. See Sartre (1985, pp. 273, 381 and 530) for examples.
16. See Huston (1980, p. 294), and Bosworth (1980, p. 362) for the estimates.
17. Sartre to Simone de Beauvoir, October 1959 in Sartre (1983, II, p. 361); and Huston (1980, pp. 395-98).
18. Huston quoted in Bosworth (1980, p. 362).
19. Huston (1980, p. 294).
20. Freud (1947, p. 112).
21. See on this Sartre's interview in Tynan (1967, pp. 302-12).
22. See Masson (1985).
23. See Masson (1984).
24. Quotations from **Motion Picture Herald**, 26-12-1961 (p. 721); **Hollywood Reporter**, 13-12-1961; and **Film Daily**, 13-12-1962.
25. **Films and Filming**, October 1963, 23.
26. For this criticism, see **Financial Times**, 30-8-1963; **Hollywood Reporter**, 13-12-1962; **Films in Review**, January 1963, 44; and **Filmblätter**, 6-7-1963 (p. 549). Huston himself admitted that some scenes were weak in this respect: the opening shots of Freud with his mother were, he said, "reminiscent of the old biographical pictures" (Huston, 1980, p. 290).
27. See on this Huston (1982) and Price (1967).
28. See Freud (1954, p. 214); Anxieu (1959, pp. 59-65); Natenberg (1955, pp. 117-47) and Jones (1953-57, I, chapter XIV).
29. On this see Sulloway (1980, p. 494); Jones (1953-57, I, pp. 360-61); and Ellenberger (1970, pp.783-86, 792-93).
30. See adverse comments in **Times**, 29-8-1963; **Films and Filming**, October 1963, 22; the **Sunday Times**, dubbed **Freud** "a kind of Buddenbrooks for the underfives" (1-9-1963). To many reviewers, one of the drawbacks of the seriousness of the film was that this would unnecessarily restrict its audience, e.g. to the adult, educated and "discerning" (See **Daily Cinema**, 28-9-1963; **Kinematograph**, 29-8-1963).
31. This literariness is present in Sartre original scenario: see Sartre (1985, pp. 84 and 266) for examples.
32. Simon (1967, pp. 45-46).
33. Sartre quoted in **Variety**, 1-11-1961.
34. See Tynan (1967, p. 306).

35. See, for examples, **Evening Standard**, 29-8-1963; **Financial Times**, 30-8-1963; **Times**, 28-12-1962; quotation from **Sunday Telegraph**, 1-9-1963. An interesting attempt to trace the detective-thriller theme in some Hollywood psychiatric films of the forties is Marc Vernet (1975).
36. **Daily Worker**, 31-9-1963; and **Time**, 29-8-1963.
37. The notion of Holmes as an archetypal scientist comes down to us with Arthur Conan Doyle's own approval; see for example his **A Study in Scarlet**, chapter 2. That the idea still lives on may be seen from Aicken (1984, p. 6) and Shepherd (1985).
38. See **Variety**, 1-11-1961; **Screen**, 10-11-1961; **Evening Standard**, 22-3-1961.
39. See **Guardian**, 28-8-1963.
40. **Variety**, 24-4-1963.
41. The lithograph is reproduced in Jones (1953-57, I, p. 228) and described in Freud, Freud and Grubrich-Simitis (1985, pp. 114-15).
42. Jones sees Freud's credulity as a key feature of his personality; see Jones (1953-57, II, pp. 150-56 and 477-79) for examples.
43. **Variety**, 1-11-1961.
44. For different readings, see **Evening Standard**, 29-8-1963; **Positif**, 264, 1983; and **Sunday Telegraph**, 1-6-963.
45. See Simon (1967, p. 45); Macdonald (1963); and **Spectator**, 6-9-1963.
46. **Time**, 28-12-1962.
47. See Horkheimer and Adorno (1973, p. 144).
48. Huston quoted in **Daily Express**, 7-12-1961.
49. See Handel (1950); Mayer (1948); Klapper (1960); and Fearing (1947).
50. The term 'reality effect' comes from Marthes (1968, pp. 141-48).
51. See, for example, McCabe (1985).
52. See Matthews (1967): Roazen (1976, pp. 372-88); Hale (1978); and Freud (1950, pp. 78-79).
53. The term comes from the American psychologist Ernest Hilgard, quoted in Mannoni (1971, p.182).
54. Milgram (1974); the emphasis on the scientific nature of the authority being tested is brought out by Narnes (1985, pp. 72-89).
55. Nunnally (1961); Nunnally (1957); and Taylor (1957).
56. See Dworkin (1954).
57. See Keill (1982, I. pp. 665-94).
58. Reingold (1984).
59. Richards quoted in Stevenson and Debrix (1969, p. 30).

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TOTALITY AND STRATIFORM LOGIC AS METHOD IN SOCIAL SCIENCE

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Summary

In this paper recent developments in the methodology of science, and especially the most important concepts, "totality" and "stratiform logic" are discussed. The author compares the Marxist interpretation of both concepts with those of some other schools, especially L. von Bartalanffy. He also characterizes the former in the unity of its three aspects, i.e., ontological, epistemological and theory-constituting. He emphasizes, through characterizing the logical construction of K. Marx' The Capital, that the third aspect is crucial, especially for scientific cognition of objective social reality as an organic whole.

The concept "totality", starting with the Marxist point of view in the field of philosophy and theory of science, has an important meaning and plays a fundamental role in the methodology of social sciences. It is in intimate interrelation with the other categories in the following aspects:

I) totality as an essential attribute of objective reality itself - one in the ontological aspect;

II) totality as a methodological attitude for analyzing objective reality and as a field of the scientific cognition, which ensures obtaining its objective truth - one in the epistemological aspect;

III) totality as a so-called logical field or logical frame which, in the theoretically systematizing reflection or spiritual reproduction of the objective reality in consciousness, ensures its truth - one in the logical or theory-constituting aspect.

The first aspect is concerned with the materialist ontological ground of scientific cognition. Here the totality can be determined as the unity, the regularity and systematic character of the real objective

world which exists independently of human consciousness, forms itself and develops as an organic whole. This determination of totality is world-view in character and opposes subjectivism (idealism) and agnosticism. Moreover, totality includes relative independent sub-totalities in itself, such as living and social organisms, which are in intimate interrelation with each other and together form a stratiform organism.

The second aspect is concerned with the possibility of full cognition, as the reflection of the first aspect in the methodological attitude; reflecting more and more comprehensively and actively the objective reality, deepening the scientific cognition gradually into the social and historical processes, overcoming partiality, one-sidedness, superficiality, ignorance, etc. of the metaphysical cognition of the objective world and approaching continually to absolute truth.

The third aspect is concerned with the constitution of theory about the objective reality as a systematic whole, where the field of totality, also reflecting the first aspect of totality, ensures consistently the necessary progression of the dialectical cognition, as descending (reductive abstraction) from the immediate phenomenon to the simplest and the most general notion, and ascending (self-differentiating structual genesis) from the most abstract to the most concrete strata as a spiritual reproduction of the objective reality.

This inseparable unity of the three aspects of the concept totality is, however, not always firmly established, even in Marxist philosophy and the theory of science. Moreover, its necessary logical role in the third aspect is not yet generally acknowledged.

Among the so-called "Western Marxists", as M. Jay[1] indicates, the concept totality seems to be concerned almost one-sidedly in the subjective matter, neglecting its fundamental relation with the objective reality as a reflection.

As to the concept "stratiform logic", which means not only the formal-logical expression of hierarchic order or structure, but that of a very dynamic process, reproducing spiritually the organic whole of the objective reality through immanent self-differentiating logic, which proceeds dialectically as a structural-genetic process with phased qualitative changes from the abstract to the concrete.

In these two or more decades, reflecting the conspicuous development of the scientific and technological revolution, some new scientific trends have become more influential as so-called "cross-sectional sciences" or "general scientific methodologies". Moreover, as they really succeeded in many technological fields, it seems to be indisputable that they have universal adequacy as an absolute methodology of sience and even as a world view. We speak here of cybernetics, general system theory, structuralism, etc.. The categories such as "system", "totality", "structure", "hierarchy", "homeostasis", "mechanism and organism", are also often discussed. A. Agh[2] and S.M. Orudzhew [3] point out that the Marxist system theory as a totality theory has also succeeded in being revived, owing to this revolution. Additionally, G. Redelow[4] complains that the catch-word "totality" is missing from the dictionaries of philosophy in the G.D.R. (also in Japan!).

On the other hand, the timely publication of the new edition of the **Collective Works of Marx and Engels (MEGA)** has enabled us to follow every stage in the entire history of establishing the theoretical system of **The Capital** by K. Marx, especially through manuscripts written in 1857-1858, 1861-1863, 1863-1865, etc.. Consequently, some essays trying to settle totality and stratiform logic as the most important concepts in the methodology of Marxist economics have appeared. These trends are also being followed in the field of establishing the economic theory of socialism and communism[5].

Here we would like to investigate some aspects of these trends more closely and evaluate them from the Marxist point of view. This will also inevitably lead to some new viewpoints on the Marxist methodology of social science itself.

L. von Bertalanffy[6], using the concept "totality" or "wholeness" almost as a synonym of "system", puts his general theory of systems on the pedigree of organicism, as opposed to the concepts "sum", "independent elements", etc. of mechanism or physicism in the field of biology. It aims to restore the right of putting concepts such as "order", organization", "teleology" and "wholism" in the theory, opposing the world view of mechanism and atomism. At the same time, it includes the concept of "hierarchic order", from static structure (atom, molecule, etc.) through animals to social-cultural systems.

These ideas can be highly appreciated, excepting, of course, the somewhat idealistic or positivistic background, as a result of the

great progress concerning the scientific cognition of the objective reality as material unity, although it is yet a rough vision including a mere intuitive insight into the world. Moreover, together with the recent development of cybernetics and information theory, Bertalanffy's ideas develop and succeed in the various applied technical fields, in the pragmatic sense, using mathematical instruments and models of feedback loop or non-linear functional systems. These trends in technical development might thus have not only the title of cross-sectional science or general scientific methodology, but also that of a new world outlook, regardless of Bertalanffy's temporary limitation[7]. However, there seems to be a contradiction between the methodology of these trends as a certain development of mechanism and that of the original vision of a wholistic system.

The general system theory, as well as cybernetics, has the conception of "isomorphism", as its fundamental method of generalization. Of course, it is one of the important methods of approach in analyzing the objects. Practically, this is often very useful to cognize them uniformly, and to apply the results in various technical fields. Nevertheless, this method cannot always be identified with the way of cognizing the very essence of the organic object. From the Marxist point of view, it can be said that the method of generalizing phenomenal commonness, abstracted from the forms or functions of the organic objects (isomorphic abstractions), can certainly analytically abstract and reflect a partial, superficial or formal attribute in most cases, but that it does not always represent the essence of them. This results because this method ignores the rest of the totality of the objective organic reality and thus becomes a dead (mechanical) abstraction.

The general system theory by L. Bertalanffy, and cybernetics by N. Wiener[8], brought about three ways of reaction on the Marxist side of philosophy and methodology of science; fully positive, fully negative, and partially positive. For example, G. Klaus[9] and A. Kosing[10] accept almost the whole idea, because of the mechanical evidence of its logic and systematic inclusiveness (especially that of cybernetics); W.G. Afanasiyew[11] and T. Sugihara[12] deny, to the contrary, Bertalanffy's organicism itself as positivism or as a synthetic method based on half-way analysis from the similar viewpoint of mechanicism; J. Zeleny[13] estimates its wide applicability and rationality, but at the same time points out its methodological limit, the

deficiency of the more comprehensive principle of development, from the viewpoint of the materialist theory of reflection and the dialectico-materialist rationality. G. Kröber[14] criticizes, through examining structuralism, the simple absolutization of a method into a philosophy or world view, although recognizing its utility as a category.

Under these somewhat confusing circumstances, W.P. Kuzimin[15] correctly aims, first of all, to reconfirm the concepts and meaning of "system", "totality", "social organism", etc.. In the Marxist classics, instead of applying the extrapolational interpretation from the viewpoint of systems approach. He emphasizes that K. Marx is the founder of the theory of social systems which he based upon dialectical and historical materialism, in which the systems approach would be located only as an aspect of the methodology. M. Leske[16] follows the concept totality through the immanent development of classical German philosophy to Marxism, and witnesses the latter's historical and substantial priority; J. Pursova[17] compares organic models with mechanical ones in the field of philosophy and natural sciences (interested in nature as a whole), and shows that they should be united to the dialectical materialism through the both-sided criticism; B.G. Yudin[18] pays special attention to the methodological function of the concept totality in scientific epistemology; C. Warnke[19] understands the totality as a dialectically comprehended social whole, including contradictions of inner components, instead of their abstract identity or static harmony. All these views characterize the totality, from the dialectico-materialist point of view, as the material unity of the objective reality and its reflection to the methodological aspect of its analysis. In other words, we can find in their opinions recent levels of accomplishment, which may be regarded as nearly common among them, on the first and second of the three aspects which are mentioned above. However they lack ideas on the third, of which we would like to examine further.

Here we must add: Although Bertalanffy refers to Marx as one of the origins of the system's conception[20], he does not comprehend the whole idea and methodology of Marx, especially the dialectico-materialist essence, mentioned above, while he himself remains in the disintegration between mathematical mechanicism and "philosophy" of system.

The organic body, in general, has its own history of genesis and death. It develops by itself, changes by itself, proliferates by itself and reproduces itself according to its own inner laws. Above all, the concept of reproduction, which K. Marx systematically establishes and anlyzes in his principal work, **The Capital**, is the fundamental category determining field, movement, development, periodical explosion and destruction in the situation of which the social system exists and proceeds as totality.

The reproduction is, indeed, a type of cyclical movements which, of course, include interaction among elements of the society, even cybernetic processes. Most important and essential, however, is to reproduce its premises by itself, and moreover, its structures, relations and developments, etc.. O. Lange[21] ingeniously deals with Marx' theory of reproduction as a cybernetic process, and G. Klaus[22] finds more variable examples of cybernetics in K. Marx' **The Capital**, but only as a function of the elements of the society, not as the reproduction of its elements nor of its structural social relation. The circuit itself is a given but not reproduceable premise. The necessity of reproducing its mechanism and structure would have to be explained out of the cybernetic circuit.

The central problem is to explain how his organic whole arises and forms itself. To explain this, the following two ways may be considered: historical and logical. K. Marx, of course, knew these and formed respective analogies with phylogeny and ontogeny in the field of biology. But the latter corresponds, in the field of Marxist economics, to the logicogenetic or structural-genetic explanation of reproduction.

Under this problem setting, the systematic methodology has to be inevitably the dialectical one for Marx, i.e. abstraction by descending, and logical development, as well as spiritual reconstitution, of the objective reality by ascending. Here we would like to explain this in detail, with reference to the above mentioned third aspect of the concept of totality [23].

T.E. Tikhanova [24], one of the few scholars who investigates the third aspect of totality, together with the others, understands correctly the inseparable relation between the field of totality and the ascending method of the whole system of K. Marx' **The Capital**. She emphasizes the process of ascending as self-differentiating of the given totality [25], but failes to settle the beginning category of

commodity (world of commodities) as totality (as the beginning of ascending from abstract totality to concrete one), because of simply identifying the logical and the historical without any precise distinction between them.

The premise of the ascending construction for the whole system of economic theory is, first of all, the field of totality as a logical frame, even in the very beginning category of the system, that is, commodity. However, it is not a single unit or simple 'sum' of units, as ordinarily understood, but a whole by itself. In other words, the world of commodities has also in itself the relations of whole reproduction despite the most reduced and rarefied abstractness. This is characterized as abstract generality, not in the sense of mere extent (like the furthest in a concentric circle contrasted with the smaller ones as a part), but of vertical depth. If we compare the stratum of the abstract generality with that of the concrete generality, the former is just like the bottom stratum of a cylinder, and the cylinder symbolizes, here, the consequent total field of the dynamic and stratiform process itself, of ascending logic from the beginning (bottom) to the end (top). Since this cylindrical process itself is the figure of spiritual reconstitution of the objective reality, it should be finally incorporated through 'Aufhebung' into the uppermost stratum as a complete sphere of the concrete generality. And the very totality, as the field of logic, ensures the necessity of the logical self-development (transition) of categories from one stratum to another.

Thus, to restore the entire theoretical figure of the object from abstract to concrete, the ascending logical process has to be, at the same time, a stratiform process, which is not a mere hierarchic nor static structure of the elements, but has a structural-genetic relation between one stratum of categories and another. This goes up gradually according to the necessary movement of self-differentiation within the field of totality, caused by the inner contradiction of the simplest category, i.e. commodity. The commodity in this sense is already a crystal of the whole social relation, based on the entire division of labour and the universal establishment of private ownership on private labour, and not a single commodity isolated from these total relations. K. Marx defines, under the field of totality, division of labour, exchange, circulation, capital, reproduction of capital, whole process of capitalist production

etc. in every corresponding stratum, which includes also self-reproducing cyclical movement as a whole [26]. Thus, these processes form, in the constantly ascending field of totality, the strata consisting of universality, particularity and individuality [27], followed by subordinate strata between them.

For example, the category surplus-value is a reductive abstraction from the more concrete categories of industrial and commercial profit, interest, ground-rent, etc., determined under the more fundamental relation between capital in general and the working class as a whole, i.e. in the stratum of universality of capital. Then, those categories are logically restored by differentiation of surplus-value on the way of ascending (structural-genetic development of the category capital from universality through particularity to individuality), together with self-differentiation of capital as a whole into industrial, commercial and banking ones, etc. (as the stratum of the individuality of capital).

In the same way, the category money is differentiated from commodities through the movement of the forms of value and the movement itself is also nothing but the logical process of self-differentiation of the world of commodities, which forms the field of totality. Then the whole world consists of commodities, money and their developing relations, which necessarily lead it upto the category of capital.

The scheme of reproduction by two departments of production can be determined only under the conditions of logical establishment of these departments (as the stratum of the particularity of capital) by self-differentiation of universal capital.

In every case, the consequent ascending logic by self-differentiation is not always explicitly described by Marx, because, at the same time, he aimed at making his book easier for "non-dialectical" readers and, therefore, he uses many other methods of explanation, such as analytical, illustrative, historical, etc.. But we can thus follow his original thought and method of pure ascending logic to restore the whole system of capitalism.

Of course, we should still be more discreet in generalizing the concept of totality, in the case of **The Capital**, without verifying its logical necessity in every organic object. It must also be taken into consideration that most of the real organic bodies are "open" ones. Therefore, they are only relative totalities which keep the

outer logical relations between themselves and their circumstances, other than inner relations of the organic body itself. However, there is an urgency and necessity to work out the methodology of social sciences that analyzes and explains the social system as an organic whole, inheriting the dialectico-materialist conception of K. Marx, which is incomplete without the concept of totality and stratiform logic.

Notes

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2. Agh, A. (1977).
3. Orudzhew, S.M. (1979).p.7.
4. Redelow, G. (1981).
5. Tikhanova, T.E. (1983).
6. Bertalanffy, L. von (1968). Japanese edition. p.2., 34, 64-65 etc.
7. Bertalanffy. Ibid., p.20-21.
8. Wiener, N. (1948).
9. Klaus, G. (1926b).
10. Kosing, A. (1967).
11. Afanasyew, W.G. (1962).
12. Sugihara, T. (1977).
13. Zelený, J. (1975).
14. Kröber, G. (1968).
15. Kuzimin, W.P. (1980), p.14.
16. Leske, M. (1978).
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18. Yudin, B.G. (1970) (1986).
19. Warnke, C. (1977), p.22.
20. Bertalanffy, L. von (1968). Japanese edition, p.8, 195 etc.; Bertalanffy (1975), p.74.
21. Lange, O. (1965).
22. Klaus, G. (1962a).
23. See for more detail: Hayasaka, K. (1986).
24. Tikhanova, T.E. (1983), p.14-18.
25. Tikhanova, Ibid., p.28.
26. Marx, K. (1953), p.25, 103, 111, 139, 208, 387, 513, 880, 908, 909, 911, 936; Marx, L. (1963), Vol. II, p.352, 431.
27. Iwasaki, C., Miyahara, S. (1976), p.487-514) and Mankowsky, L.A. (1971), also pay attention to these categories of stratiform logic. The latter especially explains the whole system of K. Marx' **The Capital** by utilizing these categories. However, his understanding is in reverse (individuality - particularity - universality) because he lacks the concept totality as a field. See also Hayasaka, K. (1986).

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EVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGY: PREHISTORY, VARIETIES AND INSTITUTIONALISATION

Atanas Danailov
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Summary

For 100 years there have been attempts at a synthesis between biology (evolutionary theory) and epistemology. The first wave came to nothing but in the beginning of the 1940s Konrad Lorenz made the first efforts to reanimate these attempts. But he failed, because the sciences were not ready for the synthesis Lorenz strove for. Thirty years later Lorenz - already known all over the world - started a second attempt and succeeded: the process of institutionalisation of Evolutionary Epistemology had begun.

The term "Evolutionary Epistemology" (EE) covers a wide field of hypotheses and investigations. One of the most eminent representative of this research program, Gerhard Vollmer, distinguished between two meanings of EE:[1]

1. EE as a biological theory, which concerns the phylogenetic evolution of our "organs of knowledge" (Erkenntnisorgane) and cognitive structures and interpretates this evolution as a process of adaption in the Darwinian sense. The main thesis of EE in this connection is:

> "Our cognitive device is a result of biological evolution. Our subjective cognitive structures match with the objective structures of the world because they originated by adaption to this world. And they are partially isomorphic to this world because otherwise we could not have survived."[2]

This thesis can be illustrated by the often cited statement of Simpson:

> "... the monkey who did not have a realistic perception of the tree branch he jumped for was soon a dead monkey - and therefore did not become one of our ancestors."[3]

2. EE as a diachronic philosophy of science, which deals with the "dynamics of scientific theories" in the manner of Popper[4] and

Toulmin[5], i.e. with the historical succession of scientific theories and its explanation as an analogue of biological evolution.[6]

In spite of the numerous publications in the field of EE in the last ten years, there is no history of EE. Its representatives limit themselves to enumerating the names of some predecessors without classifying them in groups according to the above definitions of EE, but according to their spheres of investigation (philosophy, physics, biology, psychology, anthropology, linguistics).[7]

The aim of this paper is threefold:

1. To show the existence of a whole branch of epistemology like modern EE at the turn of the century;
2. To prove the necessity of specifying the characteristics of the evolutionary approach in different fields of science by citing some historical episodes;
3. To discuss the role of Konrad Lorenz over the institutionalisation of EE as a research program.

1. Some examples at the turn of the century

a). L. Stein writes in his book **An der Wende der Jahrhunderts**

> "Die Entstehung der Anschauungen und Begriffe im menschlichen Gehirn ... haben wir uns genau so zu erklären, wie die aller übrigen Funktionen und Fertigkeiten, Neigungen und Talente des menschlichen Organismus: durch Selektion und Vererbung"[8]

b). In 1905 the Danish philosopher Harald Höffding published his book **Moderne Philosophen** (Contemporary philosophers).[9] According to him the most important philosophical manifestations of the previous 25 years[10] could be divided into three groups: 1. the systematic direction, 2. biological epistemology (erkenntnis-theoretisch-biologische Richtung), 3. the philosophy of evaluation (Wertungsphilosophie). Biological epistemology considers thinking as a special form of life which follows "the most general laws of life".[11] Among the representatives of this direction mentioned by Höffding, Mach is the closest one to modern EE.

c). The eminent historian of philosophy Wilhelm Windelband considers the possibility of the intellectual progress of man being conducted by natural selection.[12] But more important for our thesis is this sentence, added by Windelband:

> "In der Tat ist diese Erklärungsweise vielfach von denjenigen Theorien versucht worden, welche ... die Tatsache 'apriorischer' Bestimmungen für das individuelle Bewusstsein anerkennen, aber sie durch 'Erwerbung' im Leben der Gattung entwicklungsgeschichtlich erklären wollen."[13]

This is exactly the position adopted by Konrad Lorenz and his disciples![14]

d). In 1910 a book by O. Schwabe appeared, entitled **The biological direction in modern epistemology.**[15] He presents among others also the theories of Mach and Simmel, both mentioned by Vollmer as predecessors of EE.

e). In the second edition of Eisler's famous **Dictionary of philosophical terms** is to be found the term "biologische Erkenntnistheorie" (biological epistemology) and in the abridged version of the same work is written:

> "**Biologismus** heisst diejenige Richtung der Erkenntnistheorie, die das Erkennen als biologischen Vorgang auffasst, als einen Akt der Lebenserhaltung oder Lebenssteigerung."[17]

And under the term "Erkenntnis" one can find the following sentence:

> "Nach **Spencer, Lewes, Ribot, Simmel, Potonié, L. Stein** u.a. spielen biologische Faktoren (Auslese) eine Rolle in der Entwicklung der E."[18]

These examples show that at the turn of the century there was a well established branch of epistemology, dealing with the same questions as modern EE. The essential difference between them lies in the amount of scientific knowledge and the level of scientific theories handled by both: EE has at its disposal the synthetic theory of evolution, modern psychology, the psychophysiology of perception, psycholinguistics etc., while the "biological epistemology" of 100 years ago was based exclusively on the theory of Darwin.

2. Characteristics of the evolutionary approach

As mentioned earlier, Vollmer distinguishes between two meanings of EE. But the history of science and philosophy shows the existence of at least three evolutionary approaches to different fields of investigation:

1. EE in its proper sense, i.e. the attempt to explain our subjective cognitive structures in terms of evolutionary theory. Important

representatives of this approach, not mentioned by Vollmer, are Lewes[19] and Stein[20].

2. EE as an attempt to explain the growth of scientific knowledge, using an analogy to biological evolution. Early predecessors of this approach, elaborated in the main by Toulmin, are Boltzmann[21] and Mach.[22]

3. Mach applies the idea of adaption not only to the growth of scientific knowledge, but also to the **individual** process of thinking. His main thesis is that thoughts adapt to the facts because of the biological fitness of knowledge and cognitive functions.[23]

At this point the Russian biologist Timiriasew (1843-1920) should be mentioned. In his lecture "The creativity of man and the creativity of nature"[24] from 1891, he elaborated the hypothesis that

> "there is a reciprocal similarity between the process of creativity of man and process of creativity of nature".[25]

This similarity exists because of the same principle acting in both cases: that of selection.[26] Timiriasew supports his hypothesis with some examples from science and art and mentions the names of Newton, Faraday, Rousseau, Flaubert, Byron, Tolstoi, Mozart and Schumann, who have described the struggle between several ideas during the process of problem solving.

It is obvious that Timiriasew supports an idea which is similar to Mach's. But because his lecture was held 3 years before the publication of Mach's "Popular lectures", Timiriasew whould be considered the co-founder of the **evolutionary psychology of thinking**.

Hence, we can characterise three fields of investigation of knowledge, in each one of which evolutionary theory has been used: **Evolutionary epistemology**, which tries to explain the matching of our subjective cognitive structures with the objective structures of the world; **Evolutionary philosophy of science**, which deals with the growth of scientific knowledge; **Evolutionary psychology of thinking**, which investigates the mechanisms of selection in the processes of individual thinking. The last two fields use an analogy of biological evolution, while the first one applies evolutionary theory itself to psychic phenomena.

3. Konrad Lorenz

After the First World War, "biological epistemology" lost its influence and in the twenties and thirties it did not play any role in

philosophical discussions. The year 1940 marks the turning point: the biologist Konrad Lorenz accepted an appointment to the University of Königsberg, Eastern Prussia. He got the chair once occupied by Immanuel Kant. One year later he published the paper "Kants Lehre vom Apriorischen im Lichte gegenwärtiger Biologie"[27], which is usually considered to be the first basic paper on EE. In this article Lorenz elaborated the following idea:

> "Unsere vor jeder individuellen Erfahrung festliegenden Anschauungsformen und Kategorien passen aus ganz denselben Gründen auf die Aussenwelt, aus denen der Huf des Pferdes schon vor seiner Geburt auf den Steppenboden, die Flosse des Fisches, schon ehe er dem Ei entschlüpft, ins Wasser passt".[28]

And Lorenz explains it:

> "Das reale Verhältnis zwischen dem An sich der Dinge und der speziellen 'apriorischen Form' ihrer Erscheinung ist unserer Meinung dadurch gegeben, dass diese Form in der Jahrtausende währenden Entwicklungsgeschichte der Menschheit in der Auseinandersetzung mit den täglich begegnenden Gesetzlichkeiten des An sich Seienden als eine Anpassung an diese entstanden ist, die unserem Denken angeborenermassen eine der Realität der Aussenwelt weitgehend entsprechende Strukturierung verliehen hat".[29]

Lorenz is conscious of the fact that this is a radical new interpretation of Kant's idea of a priori knowledge. That is the reason for his warning on the second page:

> "Wenn man ... die angeborenen Reaktionsweisen von untermenschlichen Organismen kennt, so liegt die Hypothese ungemein nahe, dass das 'Apriorische' auf stammesgeschichtlich gewordenem, erblichen Differenzierungen des Zentralnervensystems beruht, die eben gattungsmässig erworben sind und die erblichen Dispositionen, in gewissen Formen zu denken, bestimmen. Man muss sich klar darüber sein, dass diese Auffassung des 'Apriorischen' als Organ die Zerstörung seines Begriffes bedeutet: Etwas in stammesgeschichtlicher Anpassung an die Gesetze der natürlichen Aussenwelt Entstandenes ist in gewissem Sinne a posteriori entstanden, wenn auch auf einem durchaus anderen Wege als dem der Abstraktion oder der Deduktion aus vorangegangener Erfahrung".[30]

We have already seen that this idea is by no means new. But Lorenz doesn't mention any of the representatives of "biological epistemology" from the turn of the century. Of course, one can imagine that Lorenz didn't know this work. But it is difficult to accept that the ideas of such neokantians as Schultz[31], Windelband[32], Riehl[33],

Vorländer[34] and Simmel[35] on the relationship between selection and knowledge were entirely unknown to Lorenz, since the neokantian Kurt Leider was his colleague at Königsberg.[36] And is it possible for Konrad Lorenz - holding the university chair, formerly occupied by Kant, and being a member of the society of neokantians - not to have read the **Präludien** of Wilhelm Windelband, one of the basic works of the founder of the "Süddeutsche Schule"?[37]

It is difficult to prove the opposite. Nevertheless, we would like to formulate the hypothesis that being a biologist and successor of Kant, Lorenz was fascinated by the idea of uniting evolutionary theory and epistemology, and that he tried to continue earlier efforts in this direction.

However, Lorenz' 32-pages-article about Kant's **a priori** remained unappreciated, and two years later he published the voluminous study "Die angeborenen Formen möglicher Erfahrung".[38] But this paper shared the same fate of the first one and for the next 30 years Lorenz has not undertaken further attempts to establish a biological epistemology.[39]

Stimulated by the works of Campbell[40] and Corti[41] in 1973 he published his famous book **Die Rückseite des Spiegels**[42]. Its subtitle is "Versuch einer Naturgeschichte des menschlichen Erkennens". In this work Lorenz gives a detailed explanation of his ideas from the early 1940s. The basic idea is just the same, even the formulations have not changed: for Lorenz there is no doubt that

> "die Kategorien und Anschauungsformen des menschlichen Erkenntnisapparates ganz selbstverständlich etwas im Laufe der Stammesgeschichte Gewordenes sind, das auf die Gegebenheiten der aussersubjektiven Wirklichkeit in analoger Weiser und aus analogen Gründen 'passt' wie der Pferdehuf auf den Steppenboden oder die Fischflosse ins Wasser".[43]

Die Rückseite des Spiegels, written by that Konrad Lorenz who had meanwhile became a winner of Nobel Prize and was well known all over the world, soon turns out to be a bestseller. With this book Lorenz succeeds in reviving biological epistemology, which has been called EE since Campbell's time.[44]

At the end of the 1970s the "Altenberger Kreis" appeared. Besides Lorenz, Rupert Riedl and others, it also includes a professional philosopher: Erhart Oeser. This is the first step in the institutionalisation of the new direction. In 1982 the 7th International Wittgenstein Symposium dedicated a whole session to EE[45], but

the culmination of this movement was an international symposium on EE, held in Vienna in April 1986. The opening lecture was reserved for Konrad Lorenz. His theme once more: "The apriori-problem".[46]

The process of institutionalisation of EE, however, was accompanied by increasing critiques, mainly from philosophers.[47] The most serious objections come from Wolfgang Stegmüller.[48] His targets are the following: 1. the non-philosophical use of the terms "knowledge" (Erkenntnis) and "theory" in EE; 2. the philosophical position of "hypothetical realism", which is seen rather as a metaphysical realism and 3. the understanding of "a priori" in the framework of EE. Stegmüller calls it the "Cartesian re-interpretation" of Kant's a priori.

Gerhard Vollmer has given detailed - although no final - answers to the various critiques of EE.[49] Thus it is more than likely that the discussion on a "biological" theory of knowledge will continue.

Notes

1. Vollmer (1983a).
2. Vollmer (1984, p. 75).
3. Simpson (1963, p. 84).
4. Popper (1972).
5. Toulmin (1967).
6. Richards (1981).
7. Vollmer (1983b, pp. 177/178).
8. Stein (1900, p. 24).
9. Höffding (1905).
10. ibid., p. 4.
11. ibid.
12. Windelband (1907, p. 294).
13. ibid., pp. 294/295.
14. see Lorenz (1941), Vollmer (1983b).
15. Schwabe (1910).
16. Eisler (1904).
17. Müller-Freienfels (1922, p. 107).
18. ibid., p. 193.
19. Lewes (1874-1880).
20. Stein (1900).
21. Boltzmann (1905).
22. Mach (1905).
23. Mach (1894).
24. Timiriasew (1943).
25. ibid., p. 172.
26. ibid., p. 167.
27. Lorenz (1941).
28. ibid., p. 99.
29. ibid., p. 98.
30. ibid., pp. 95/96.
31. Schultz (1899 and 1907).
32. Windelband (1907).

33. Riehl (1902).
34. Vorländer (1903).
35. Simmerl (1895).
36. see Lorenz (1977, p. 30).
37. In the **Präludien** is published Windelbands paper "Normen und Naturgesetze", see notes 12 and 13.
38. Lorenz (1943).
39. Lorenz' paper "Gestaltwahrnehmung als Quelle wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis" from 1959 cannot be considered a similar attempt, although there is a paragraph "Erkenntnistheoretische Erwägungen", which contains the ideas, elaborated in Lorenz (1941) and Lorenz (1943).
40. Campbell (1974).
41. Corti (1962).
42. Lorenz (1973).
43. Lorenz (1977, p. 57).
44. see Campbell (1974).
45. see Engels (1983) and Weingartner/Czermak (1983).
46. The papers of this symposium will be published by Paul Parey Verlag, Berlin und Hamburg.
47. cf. Spaemann/Löw (1981), Spaemann/Koslowski/Löw (1984).
48. Stegmüller (1984).
49. Vollmer (1985, S. 268-323).

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HISTORY, IDEOLOGY AND SCHIZOPHRENIA

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Summary

Whereas textbooks present an almost unanimous view that what we term 'schizophrenia' is a disorder with a major genetic component, a review of the informing literature leads to the conclusion that such views are founded as much on belief as reality. The implications are far-reaching as 'genertic theory' provides the chief rationale for the continuing hunt for biochemical solutions and our illness conceptualisations of what to many seems a disorder of conduct.

An understanding of the way in which the belief has arisen requires a consideration of the issues in the framework of the sociology of knowledge. Buss (1979) holds that the researcher and his theories are tied to specific values, beliefs and ideologies. Sarason's (1981) view that psychology and psychiatry have been quintessentially studies of individual organisms unrelated to history, structure and unverbalised views of the world order are of particular relevance in this context.

It is suggested that the debate concerning the aetiology of mental disorder, and schizophrenia in particular, has little relevance to the actual evidence. To explain this seeming paradox it is necessary to consider the implications of both biological and competence-fostering models. Albee (1982) points out that the latter is more likely to favour an egalitarian political and moral philosophy, and is threatening to those who accept a defect model.

It would follow that the continuation of the nature-nurture debate will be fruitless unless it is within a framework which acknowledges the role of ideology and the relevance of socio-historical studies.

It is some years since I began to consider in detail one of the most important and influential papers in the history of psychiatry. It was a report which played a significant role in determining the way in which schizophrenia is conceptualised and therefore the manner in which persons termed "schizophrenic" are treated (I use the word "treated" in both its general sense and also its more specific medical meaning).

The research I am referring to was published by Kallmann in 1946 and seemed to show that a genetic explanation of schizophrenia led to the only possible understanding of the strange conduct which could now be better comprehended in terms of faulty biological functioning. Socio-psychological understanding of the disorder could now be dismissed as the product of over-imaginative minds not schooled in scientific thinking. Kallmann's research, based as it was upon a massive population of schizophrenic twins, appeared to leave no doubt that this was so. Prior to this time the largest sample had been about 40, but Kallmann managed to locate almost 1000. Perhaps partly because of behavioral sciences' pre-occupation with sample size, and partly because the results were so dramatic, the findings have probably been referred to more extensively than any other in psychiatry genetics. After this Kallmann was to become a leading figure in American and world psychiatry, and later the president of the American Society for Human Genetics.

As in other areas of psychological functioning genetic explanations have far-reaching consequences. They tend to reinforce notions of biological determinism and reductionism. What some have considered to be the potentially understandable conduct of disturbed individuals is now regarded as the inevitable consequence of distorted genetic programming. Furthermore research which aims to elicit biological foundations of schizophrenia is lent further support, and correspondingly research with other orientations tends to be neglected. A genetic aetiology tends to support the medical model of schizophrenia and of disorders of conduct generally, and this in turn has important ramifications for the professions which are awarded the responsibility for dealing with, or "treating", deviancy. Perhaps most importantly genetic explanations of deviancy tend to dampen further considerations of the concept of deviancy itself. For instance, it might sound paradoxical to question the concept of schizophrenia if there is strong evidence for its genetic origin.

Having investigated Kallmann's research and the background of his beliefs I reported my findings (1984). My conclusions were that Kallmann's results were distorted to fit an ideology and were willingly accepted by a scientific community which found that the results supported its own purposes. I also suggested that other accepted notions may benefit from a similar analysis, and that students of the human and social sciences should be encouraged to be more critical of the presentation of material and more aware of the socio-historical trends in their disciplines. (I should explain that I am using the term "ideology" as employed by Rose et al (1984) as the ruling ideas of a particular society at a particular time. They are ideas that express the "naturalness" of any existing order and help maintain it).

I can refer only briefly here to Kallmann's findings. He claimed that the concordance rates for schizophrenia were 86% for identical twins (MZ) but only 15% for fraternal twins (DZ). Such findings indicate a high hereditability for the disorder. However very few details of methodology were presented, and it was only after 20 years that important details were presented by others, after Kallmann's death. It was now revealed that the concordance rates were originally 50% and 6% respectively. However as the same rsearcher dealt with both critical variables, zygosity and diagnoses, both far from objective measures, we have a situation ripe for observer bias. My further readings led me to believe that it would indeed by surprising if distortion had not emanated from such bias.

Kallmann had carried out his earlier work in Germany up until 1936. He worked with Rüdin, who had long dominated psychiatry and psychiatry genetics in Germany, and who was reponsible for the 1933 Sterilization Laws. Rüdin was the main proponent of racial and mental hygiene, and was editor of the journal **Archive for Racial and Social Biology**, which he used to write articles which praised Hitler's policies, particularly with respect to eugenics. It is clear from Kallmann's writings that he, too, was deeply committed to eugenic psychiatry (Marshall, 1985a and 1985b). Such thinking provided the scientific rationale for the fate of many of those in Germany's mental hospitals. It would perhaps be informative at this point to consider some of Kallmann's sentiments. Writing 10 years before the publication of his twin study he already seems to have no doubts whatsoever about the genetic origin of schizophrenia:

> "Cases which present a schizophrenic picture clinically, but lack the hereditary predisposition, must be excluded from the disease groups of "genuine" schizophrenics and differentiated as "schizophreniform" psychoses of exogenous origin" (1938).

In other words, although a person may appear mad it's not schizophrenia if it's not in his or her genes. And yet this is the very problem which Kallmann sought to address in his later twin study.

Some other quotations from Kallmann's work also provide us with reservations about his notions of schizophrenia and his eugenic aims:

> "Even the faithful believer in the predominance of individual liberty, theoretically opposed to every eugenic measure on behalf of society as a whole will admit that mankind would be much happier without these numerous adventurers, fanatics, and pseudo-saviors of the world who are found again and again to come from the schizophrenia genotype." (1938)

At other points Kallmann refers to these supposedly ill people as "maladjusted cranks", "asocial eccentrics", "the lowest type of criminal offender", "criminal adventurers", "schizoid eccentrics", and "other members of the lunatic fringe". He advocates voluntary sterilization, but his genetic beliefs led him to believe that the real danger is in our midst - the carrier of the gene who does not himself show serious signs of impairment, although it is likely that his offspring would. For such individuals Kallmann has a different solution:

> "Compulsory sterilization could then be confined to absolutely incorrigible schizophrenics who do not need hospitalisation and who may be expected to propagate even out of wedlock, and against medical advice." (1938)

During my investigation of Kallmann I inevitably became increasingly aware of the need to consider his research in a socio-historical framework. Furthermore, the unquestioned acceptance of Kallmann's work by the main body of psychiatry requires some explanation. Psychiatry, as an emerging section of medicine, had little scientific justification for the methods it employed to treat those suffering from mental disorders. Its main methods consisted of inducing convulsions by either chemical or electrical means, or the administration of drugs which had been developed for physical disorders. Such actions were based only on the assumption, a belief with little or no foundation, that eventually it would be shown that mental disorders,

and especially schizophrenia, were, just like known physical disorders, caused by biological disturbances. Kallmann published his results at a time when some justification had to be provided for the treatment methods. If a syndrome is inheritable it is likely to have biochemical origins. We begin to witness, from the mid-1940s, an expanding range of physiological theories of schizophrenia, usually associated with current developments in mainstream biochemistry. Typically such theories have been greeted with excited hopes of a "breakthrough" only for another theory to emerge after more extensive investigations have proved fruitless. Yet the search goes on partly because of the genetic evidence.

Of course there is a great deal of post-Kallmann evidence which seems to suggest that the genetic theory is largely proven - that it is simply a matter of working out the exact mode of transmission. However if the more recent evidence is closely scrutinised there is cause to doubt this confident assertion. I will briefly discuss the work of four teams of authors who have made detailed studies of the evidence.

The most quoted evidence supporting the genetic theory comes from the Danish adoption studies, carried out by mainly American psychiatrists. These studies have had enormous impact and they are referred to as examples of carefully carried out, extensive research. Yet Rose et al, in their recent book, "Not in your Genes", review the studies and conclude that the weaknesses are so obvious that it is difficult to understand how distinguished scientists could have regarded them as eliminating all the artefacts which beset family and twin studies of nature and nurture. Another evaluation of the Danish studies by Lidz and Blatt (1983) arrives at a rather similar conclusion, and two American psychologists describe them as being of small value (Sarbin and Mancuso, 1980).

A team of French authors (Cassou et al 1980) also seriously question the conclusions of the Danish studies, but their detailed review of genetic studies in schizophrenia goes further. They examine not only the studies but, more importantly from the point of view of my thesis, they also consider recent reviews by authors who are considered authoritative in their respective disciplines. Cassou and his colleagues' findings raise some very disturbing doubts. They find that the reviews, which are, after all, moulders of intellectual opinion, are unanimous in stating, or giving to understand, that the

importance of genetic factors has been convincingly demonstrated. An uninformed reader, relying solely upon the evidence summarised in the reviews, could scarcely avoid coming to the same conclusions. As the studies are widely dispersed and highly technical, the great majority of readers will only be aware of the original studies via the review articles.

The French group summarised as follows:

> "After a meticulous and exhaustive re-evaluation, we therefore conclude that there is no evidence for a genetic effect in the schizophrenic process".

And yet amongst the reviews of original papers there exists a consensus that the genetic case is proven. Cassou et al assert that the process through which a consensus is reached within academic circles, on multidisciplinary issues of great social importance, is in itself a serious issue, and the very existence of such contradictions shows the potential danger of relying on expert opinion in matters of social importance.

There are examples of the introduction of statistical techniques which serve to increase the hereditability figures, and we have pointed to this already (Marshall and Pettitt, 1985). Relevant as such analyses might be they do not explain why there seems to be such a discrepancy between actual evidence and belief. It would appear that similar processes account for this as explain why Kallmann's rather more obvious distortions were accepted. Here we would need to consider some aspects of the sociology of scientific knowledge, a discipline hardly known to psychiatry, and largely ignored by psychology. Psychology, or at least Western psychology, is presented with little regard to its history. Perhaps the most articulate critic of psychology's wilful neglect of its history comes from Sarason, in "**Psychology Misdirected**" (1981). What he says could be equally, if not more extensively, applied to psychiatry: that it has been quintessentially a study of the individual organism unrelated to the history, structure and unverbalised world views of the social order. He feels that psychologists have mistakenly assumed that their theories are substantially independent of their relationships to the social order. This highlights the need for what Stromberg (1968) terms intellectual history: "The interaction of historically important ideas with the social milieu from which they emerge and which they in turn influence".

When what we accept as knowledge is considered in this way then what has been regarded as accepted wisdom may perhaps be largely a reflection of those thoughts of the wider community - particularly the thoughts of the ascendant groups. J.D. Bernal, scientist and historian of science, leaves us with little doubt that science is far from the objective, uncontaminated discipline of our fantasies:

> "Often enough the ideas which statesmen and divines think they have taken from the latest phase of scientific thought are just the ideas of their time and class reflected in the minds of scientists subjected to the same social influences". (1965)

It would be possible to trace the development of some European thinking from the 19th century illustrating Bernal's point specifically in relation to beliefs about heredity, which then found their reflection in science (Marshall, 1985a). It is not then so surprising that Kallmann was imbued with the prevailing beliefs in German psychiatry about genetic tainting or "degeneracy" which vaguely linked mental defect, epilepsy, alcoholism, criminality and insanity as the result of "poor heredity". Yet this was only a scientific formulation which can be traced to non-scientific thinking of the mid-nineteenth century. Perhaps one of the most prominent myths of the last century was the inheritance of delicate, weak or raw nerves, and next the myth of "the degenerate". Degeneracy was seen as passed from one tainted generation to the next, with each generation growing progressively worse - the alcoholic father was likely to have a prostitute daughter or a criminal, even idiot, son. No doubt such myths served to obscure the real causes, particularly in Britain, of social degeneration resulting from the degrading economic system and extremes of exploitation of the time.

Such a discussion may to some seem a long way from schizophrenia, but I find it impossible to consider what many hold to be a social construct without considering the wider social and historical subject matter. This point has been considered in detail elsewhere (Marshall 1986). I am also reassured that I may be heading in the right direction when I consider the massive support which the pharmaceutical industry lends to work on the genetic nature of schizophrenia and related research.

Buss (1975) is one of the few psychologists to advocate that we take seriously a historically and sociologically oriented view of

knowledge. His main point is that psychology as practised by professional academicians occurs in a social context - psychology is tied to the infrastructure of a society or socially-defined groups. "Facts", he says, "are embedded in a particular framework which in turn rests upon certain epistemic and metaphysical presuppositions. In short there is an intimate relationship between statements of value and statements of fact. So the particular researcher and his or her theories are tied to specific values, beliefs and ideologies".

Thus I would suggest that evidence concerning both schizophrenia and the genetic influence cannot legitimately be considered in isolation from the history of psychiatry and of eugenics. I would extend this to an appreciation of social history and to some understanding of the zeitgeist in which research is carried out. In the case of schizophrenia one would also need to consider the underlying philosophy of biological determinism, which is a form of reductionism. If human actions are the inevitable consequences of the biochemical properties of cells which make up the individual, then the disordered brain is seen as the cause of an unacceptable interaction of individuals and organisations. Attention is now focussed upon molecular impropriety to the exclusion of the wider society.

Perhaps one of the most dominant themes in our society which science reinforces, and is readily subscribed to in mental health professionals, is that "psychological distress" or "psychiatric illness" is something which inhabits individual people. Smail (1984) asserts that we individualize distress when paying lip-service to social factors in the genesis of abnormality, and also obscure the individual's reality by denying his experience; any attempt to understand human nature through even a commonsense appraisal of people's experience is rejected in favour of theoretical positions which invoke psycho-biological mechanisms of one kind or another. I am not advocating the end of genetic research, but that indirect findings and speculative explanations should not be used as though they were facts to justify ineffective and sometimes damaging treatments, clinical inaction, or "genetic counselling". As Karon et al (1981) point out, even if we accept the studies of genetics of schizophrenia at face value they do not show that schizophrenia is inherited, or that there is some known gene for schizophrenia. It can only suggest some unknown inherited factor or factors that tend to increase the frequency of the disorder. If we assume that

schizophrenia consists of extreme methods of adaptation, part of the potentialities of all human beings, then anything which makes life adjustment more difficult is going to increase the rate of the disorder (Karon et al, 1981). It is known, for example that the rate of schizophrenia amongst poorest economic groups in America is about twelve times what it is amongst the highest socioeconomic groups.

Finally I would like to mention the ideas of a distinguished American psychologist, George Albee (1982). He describes how he has had the whole "scientific" process reversed: instead of facts being useful as the building blocks of theories, rather it is more accurate to say that people, and especially social scientists, select theories that are consistent with their personal values, attitudes, and prejudices and then go out into the world, or into the laboratory, to seek facts which validate their beliefs about the world and about human nature, neglecting or denying observations that contradict their personal prejudices. He concludes that scientists' explanations of group differences are based as much on their political values and unconscious needs as on objective data. With reference to the emphasis upon genetic determination Albee points to the powerful influence of Calvinism with its concepts of predestination and dualism, especially the concept of "unchangeable man" which is rooted in Calvin's doctrine. The ideological path was from Calvinism to social Darwinism which emphasised the elimination of the unfit for the improvement of the species.

To Albee it seems that certain models used to explain mental and emotional problems as caused by genetic or constitutional factors support the system. In his view one of the powerful sources of support of the defect model, or taint theory, as an explanation for deviance, is the protection it offers to those power forces that control and exploit the world's human and natural resources. Taint theory, holds Albee, rationalizes the enslavement of people, the exploitation of the third world, and the subjugation of women, a subtle process that portrays all of these groups as naturally inferior and therefore beyond empathy or help. The old Calvinism is discernible in the ideology.

Albee claims that there are three interwoven advantages to the taint or illness model, to explain "mental illness". First, social forces are not held responsible for individual pathology because "it" is an individual, internal organic defect; second, there is no need,

no reason, for social change as a form of primary prevention of psychopathology because social forces are not involved in creating "mental illness"; and third, there is no point in trying to treat social failures and misfits because they are largely incurable - they can be drugged or surgically altered, so as to pose less of a threat to the social order, but they are doomed. So psychiatry, Albee concludes, insofar as it supports taint theory, supports the Establishment.

Albee goes on to deal with the truism that all behaviour must have organic origins, and the inductive leap that abnormal behaviour must have its origins in abnormal organic processes. It would be foolish to deny that all behaviour involves objective and measurable organic processes, but the critical question is whether behaviour called abnormal may not really be normal behaviour in response to peculiar and idiosyncratic personal history and environment. So the really critical argument has nothing to do with the question of whether all behaviour is rooted in organic processes. Rather the question is whether behaviour called abnormal must be accounted for by abnormal organic processes or by rigid genetic determinism.

To Albee an alternative to the immutable defect model is the position that emphasises the maximisation of competence and coping skills, the enhancement of self-esteem, and the building of support networks as preventive strategies. He points to a rich supply of evidence which suggests that improving social support systems and reducing social stress is the effective way to reduce psychopathology. Such an approach follows from the demonstration of the link between stress and susceptibility to physical illness and emotional disorder: high risk accompanies the experience of poverty, estrangement, unemployment, low social status, and powerlessness.

But Albee argues that a competence-fostering model is inclined to favour an egalitarian political and moral philosophy, and is threatening to those who accept a defect model. A competency model, he says, is anticategorical and antielitist. Albee provides an example of the opposition to such a model from the official journal of the American Psychiatric Association. In criticising the notion of preventative work the authors make the bold statement that "there is no evidence that it is possible to strengthen "mental health" and thereby increase resistance to mental illness by general preventative activities ... mental illness is probably in large part genetically

determined and it is probably therefore not preventable, at most only modifiable. Even that it can be modified is questioned by many and there is little hard evidence one way or the other". (Lamb and Zusman, 1979).

Albee's theme is that each of us brings bias to our examination of human problems, that we have biases that distort the way we view them, and the ways we interpret data. I have attempted to illustrate this with Kallmann's work, and with more recent evidence which has become interwoven in the fabric of "knowledge" concerning schizophrenia. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that what we unquestionably accept as knowledge is that which is oft-repeated by authoritative sources, and that these sources are subject to influences which derive not so much from empirical evidence as from the dominant ideas in the wider society. This implies a need to study the processes through which knowledge is accumulated and disseminated, and to analyse the relationship between scientific disciplines and the societal interests. Such an analysis could hardly be complete without a socio-historical framework which seeks to unravel the connections between values and science. Whilst such approaches detract from the attractions of a belief in a "factual" science, they may allow us to go a little further in our attempts to untangle myth and reality.

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EXPERIMENTATION COMPARATIVE SUR TROIS DEMARCHES D'INTERESTIMATION PSYCHO-SOCIALE DANS LEUR APPLICATION A L'ENCADREMENT: GODIN, 1872

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Summary

Comparative experimentation: three approaches to mutual psycho-social evaluation and their application in management: Godin, 1872.

As part of the social experimentation movement whose main proponent was Charles Fourier, J.-B.A. Godin (1817-1888), a follower of Fourier, set up a large industrial plant in the north of France. Between 1867 and 1872 he carried out a number of experiments involving his employees in mutual evaluation. He asked them to evaluate each others' performance as a basis for the calculation of bonuses and even for the introduction of a new salary system.

Godin's main purpose was to give workers responsibility and to develop a system of organisation that today would be called self-management. This study is based on original documents relating to one of the experiments and to the analysis of results carried out at the time.

The experiments were conducted in three phases and were based on three different methods of evaluation: attribution of rank-order (R), sums of money (S) or points (P). The workers concerned judged each other in two ways in each of the three phases: 1) evaluation of other members of their work-groups and 2) evaluation of all other workers in their own category. The results of the experiments are thus two-fold: they give 1) workers' ratings of their immediate colleagues and 2) ratings of these workers by those outside their work-group.

Analysis of the experiment in its context, and of the correlation of the resulting rank orders, gives insight into processes of hierarchical inversion (B,P) or of levelling (S), based on the different points of view expressed.

The analysis reveals an increasingly conflictual structure in the company: the conflict leads to a crisis in which workers reject the responsibilities that have been given them and in which cliques emerge in the company's board of management.
The conflict resulted in Godin dissolving the board. Despite the difficulties associated with performance evaluation by popular jury, Godin was later able, no less, to transfer the company's capital to its workers. However, he had perhaps relied in the meantime on behavioural measurement of performance. The self-experimental approach, with all its paradoxes, played an important part in this outcome.

0. Introduction

0.1. Le fondateur

Jean-Baptiste André Godin (1817-1888) est un industriel, ancien ouvrier autodidacte, fondateur d'une importante industrie dans la métallurgie. Fouriériste critique, il a appartenu au groupe de la Démocratie Pacifique, aux côtés de Victor Considerant, qui l'entraine à engager une forte contribution dans une expérience communautaire en 1854 au Texas (1857; Savardan, 1858). Il ne pardonne pas l'échec à ce dernier et essaie dans son usine à Guise (dans le nord de la France) une transformation orientée vers une coopération véritablement autogestionnaire. Si l'expérimentalisme social de Fourier (J. Prudhommeaux, 1919; Pagès, 1958, 1968, 1987) est presque démoniaque, en ce sens qu'il veut par ses plans précipiter l'évolution de la société pour réaliser à la fois un dispositif psycho-socialement fondé et donner corps à une image idéale (voire onirique) de la société, l'expérimentalisme de Godin qui s'en inspire dans l'ensemble et dans d'innombrables détails, est directement pratique. Pour lui, parvenir au changement des structures en place ne peut se faire d'un seul coup mais lentement et graduellement. Il faut passer par un travail expérimental réel: observer, tenter des essais, corriger les erreurs, éprouver des hypothèses.

0.2. Hypothèses de fondation

Godin n'est guère écrivain et le sait, tout en se sentant irrésistiblement inspiré par une source plus forte que lui, qui guide sa plume, ce dont témoigne une religieuse pléthore de majuscules. Mais le théorie révélée par fragments à travers ses écrits (notamment son

ouvrage principal, 1871) est plus complexe en fait que toute autre quoique expliquée de façon bien plus simple, quelquefois naive et loin de la technicité apparente d'une philosophie scolastique dynamisée par le romantisme allemand (Marx, 1845-46).

Il n'y a pas de doute cependant que sa théorie repose d'abord sur deux notions hiérarchisées touchant les "solutions sociales" à réaliser et les conditions auxquelles elles satisfont: 1) le principe (minimal) d'une substituabilité de processus collectifs à des opérations individuelles pour obtenir des résultats équivalents (socio-équivalence); 2) le principe (décisif) d'une socioprévalence fondamentale ou supériorité de l'association: "ce que les ressources isolées ne permettent pas d'accomplir devient possible lorsque ces ressources sont réunies" (o.c.). Cette socioprévalence était au coeur des idées de Fourier (1835-36). Elle avait été réanalysée par P.J. Proudhon (1840) proprement dans les termes d'un gestalisme psychosocial avant la lettre, ceux d'une systergie, ou synergie systémique collective, pour résumer d'un mot une orientation incoordonnée mais profonde. Elle condense la pensée que Godin appelle lui-même socialiste: "l'amélioration du sort des classes ourvrières n'aura rien de réel tant qu'il ne leur sera pas accordé les Equivalents de la Richesse, ou, si l'on veut, des avantages analogues à ceux que la fortune accorde; armé de cette boussole, on peut marcher constamment..." (o.c.). L'extension de la socioéquivalence suppose la systergie.

Mais la systergie pose la question du pouvoir et de la souveraineté gestionnaire. Il ne fait aucun doute pour Godin après Considerant (1841) qu'elle réside dans le principe généralisé de l'électivité des pouvoirs (id., 1874). Dans "l'association intégrale" de travail et de vie qu'il s'efforce de constituer sous le nom de Familistère, toutes les responsabilités sont électives et il prépare la dévolution élective de la sienne propre, celle du "fondateur"; donc son propre déssaisissement et celui de sa famille. Pour comprendre le sens de ses projets, il suffit de voir comment il entend préparer les enfants des "sociétaires" à ce "régime", en instituant dans les écoles qu'il a créées des élections hebdomadaires de moniteurs parmi les enfants, dès le "bambinat", c'est-à-dire de 4 à 6 ans, suivant un système de monidorat didactique mutuel très fouriériste (Pagès, 1987). Par ailleurs il amorce immédiatement ce que nous appellerons le responsabilisation progressive des adultes en

instituant des conseils de supervision. Et il prévoit là encore des cadences électorales rapides, caractéristiques d'un démocratisme véritablement fébrile, typique, disons-le, des ambiances révolutionaires, où le souci du contrôle par le mandants est prédominant: les responsables adultes devront retourner annuellement devant le corps électoral de son association.

L'hypothèse fondamentale de Godin est donc claire: le moyen universel d'organiser la systergie, socioéquivalent de l'intention du fondateur, repose elle-même sur ce qu'il nomme la "science de l'homme". C'est l'association coopérative à gestion élective, combinant l'appropriation sociétaire du capital et la contribution du travail au lieu de les opposer, tout en dégageant et en rémunérant les capacités (le talent) et notamment en constituant ce que nous appelons l'encadrement, au coeur du noyau de l'association. C'est sur ce fond d'hypothèses mises en pratique que toute l'oeuvre de Godin peut être comprise et spécialement sa contribution scientifique qui est notre objet. Pour Godin, cette opération de recherche fait partie d'un système complexe destiné à transformer la structure de la société globale par la réalisation d'un prototype socio-économique et sociopolitique intégral, quoique local, et destiné à un role exemplaire. C'est ici que Godin s'attaque à la difficulté fondamentale qui n'a cessé d'opposer globalistes et localistes, étatistes et "entrepreneurs", aussi bien parmi les révolutionnaires que chez les réformateurs: c'est un problème d'oeuf et de poule: la réussite locale suppose un milieu global favorable; la propitiation effective du milieu global dépend d'initiatives minoritaires. L'oeuf initiative précède la poule milieu. Godin, comme plus tard Lenine (1902) a une théorie et une pratique de l'amorçage: ce n'est pas la même. Celle de Godin procède de l'expérimentalisme social.

1. Réalisation fondatrice: le familistère

1.1. "L'architecture sociale" et socialisatrice

Pour rendre les hommes capables de changer leur vie, il faut avant tout changer leur "milieu". Comme il n'est pas possible de changer rapidement le macromilieu global, il faut procéder par nidation et préparer le micromilieu. Le choix d'échelle est ici capital (Pagès, 1986-87). Cette idée écologique et écotechnique est chez Godin essentielle: il faut donc réaliser d'abord "l'architecture sociale", c'est-à-dire un nouvel urbanisme à la fois entrepreneurial,

résidentiel et culturel. C'est le "Palais social", oeuvre et condition du socioéquivalent de la richesse privée, qui sera le milieu, cadre expérimental, laboratoire de découverte et d'invention technique et sociale permanente. Le Familistère, approximation limitée du Phalanstère planifié par Fourier (1829) est construit en 1860. C'est un habitat inédit à cette date. Il se distingue de tous les autres essais d'habitat ouvrier, - générateurs de cellules alignées à la suite, identiques et séparées -, par le fait qu'il constitue un ensemble "systergique" justement, conçu comme un tout organisé. Ainsi s'amorce l'habitat associatif, plein d'innovations architecturales fouriéristes: galeries et vastes cours couvertes, spécialisation et groupement des fonctions ménagères, puéricoles et culturelles...; ou personnelles à Godin: ventilation souterraine et régulation thermique, vide-ordures par canalisations verticales, matelas de son pour bébés... En 1871 il héberge 900 personnes et s'étend sur 18 hectares, le Palais avec ses jardins occupe 6 hectares (1871, p. 440). Dans cet espace par lui-même socialisant, il introduit les innovations sociales qui s'y inscrivent, et qui constituent des écarts à l'égard des normes extérieures courantes. Et d'abord en puériculture et pédagogie. Contre le courant qui plus tard aura raison de Paul Robin malgré le soutien de Ferdinand Buisson et de ce qui sera l'entourage en partie libertaire de Jules Ferry (Raynaud, Ambauves, 1978), il réalise la mixité des sexes à l'école et toutes sortes d'expériences didactiques. Robin en parlera dans le Dictionnaire pédagogique (Buisson, 1882-87) dont le secrétaire général ne sera autre que James Guillaume, éminent représentant du courant anti-autoritaire dans l'Internationale ouvrière avant sa dissolution par Marx (1876).

Encore en rapport avec le sexe, il introduira le vote et la parité représentative des femmes dans la communauté. Afin d'avancer leur émancipation ménagère, il crée un restaurant communautaire; il organise un pouponnat (crêche) et un bambinat (école maternelle), contribuant en même temps à l'étude de modèles d'éducation. Nous en avons vu les aspects de formation précoce ou régime électif. Dans le même esprit, il favorise le vote des jeunes à partir de 16 ans. Il n'attaque pas pour autant la famille, malgré les sources fouriéristes de sa pédagogie, mais assure l'acceptation du concubinage au Familistère, instituant ainsi un libéralisme sexuel fort loin du "Nouveau monde amoureux" (1807), mais cependant audacieux à l'époque.

En matière de religion, il ne rejette pas les croyances courantes ni le déisme, mais bien l'Eglise établie en tant que machinerie du pouvoir politique impérial de Napoléon III. Il n'y a pas de chapelle dans ce Palais Social. Le théâtre assume une large part des fonctions festives et philosophique traditionnellement dévolues à l'Eglise. Chaque cour couverte intérieure est d'ailleurs une sorte de théâtre permanent où se déroulent des cérémoniaux quotidiens (mouvements ordonnés des enfants) et des manifestations plus solennelles dont les représentations dramatiques ou les concerts au lieu des messes. Le théâtre est un lieu de rencontre privilégié substitué à l'Eglise comme les conférences instructives, éthiques et civiques le sont aux sermons. Ces innovations sont comme des mises en train, à travers lesquelles Godin lutte pour transférer la gestion et la propriété des biens au personnel qu'il veut rendre "sociétaire" (actionnaire et donc associé). Mais l'organisation associative n'intègre encore que très peu le travail manufacturier. C'est précisément cette intégration qu'il prépare par des expérimentations visant des réalisations graduelles.

1.2. La souveraineté et la votation

Pour Godin il en va de la gestion sociale comme de toute autre activité. Il faut bien comprendre qu'il ne s'agit pas ici d'un "précurseur", grand pour son âge, des amendements à large diffusion qu'ont tenté Mayo et d'autres à l'usine Hawthorne par exemple (Mayo, 1945, cf. Sarin, 1983). Godin a posé en principe la socioprévalence. Il est vrai que la prévalence du scrutin souverain sur la décision d'un fondateur éclairé par "la science" ne sera réelle - et Godin le pense ainsi - qu'après effets de milieu et d'éducation. Mais ces effets ne peuvent eux-mêmes être produits que par l'exercice effectif anticipé de la délégation élective et des décisions par scrutin. Tel est le mécanisme d'amorçage à l'égard des fonctions de délibération, de décision, d'encadrement et de distribution des rôles les plus importants.

En ce qui concerne l'habitat, Godin établit un système de suffrages qui met en place un "conseil du Familistère", constitué de douze hommes et de douze femmes. Dans le cadre de l'usine, des comités représentatifs pour les différentes tâches sont désignés. Leur rôle est de "préparer les décisions à prendre, faire exécuter

les décisions prises" (2-12-1871, Marie Moret, 1897-1910, vol. 2, p. 434).

2. L'Experience d'interestimation

2.1. Le moment historique

Nous sommes au début de 1872. La France vient de traverser une crise très grave. La guerre franco-prussienne déclarée par Napoléon III (juillet 1870), contre l'avis des partis de l'opposition, a entrainé la débandade du Second Empire et une défaite écrasante. L'armée allemande a assiégé Paris qui n'acceptait pas l'armistice. Un mouvement révolutionnaire est né: la Commune (mars 1871). Les Communards ont lutté, - contre l'occupation militaire de Paris par le pouvoir officiel, installé à Versailles et dirigé par Thiers -, jusqu'à la semaine sanglante (du 22 au 28 mai 1871) qui laisse dans les ruines de Paris 20 à 30.000 morts et s'achève par près de 40.000 arrestations: c'est aussi le massacre du socialisme français (proudhoniens, blanquistes...) et la portée nationale et internationale en sera énorme.

Godin n'est certes pas un révolutionnaire violent, et ce n'est pas un Communard. Il est très certainement dans l'opposition à Thiers, mais il n'est pas dans un groupe politique organisé et encadré. Socialiste humanitaire, il n'est pas politicien et semble parfois isolé à l'Assemblée où il prépare des projets de lois sociales. Il avait été élu maire de Guise en 1871, il a été élu à la députation (8 février 1871). Son rôle à l'Assemblée Nationale le retient plusieurs mois de l'année à Paris (à 200 kilomètres de son usine). C'est dire l'intérêt qu'il attache à une intervention parlementaire centrale, conjuguée à son action microcosmique et appuyée sur elle. Godin agit à plusieurs échelles (dont l'échelle internationale n'est pas la moindre).

Il vient de finir la rédaction de "Solutions sociales", dont la lecture nous permet de le cerner dans son rôle national comme défenseur des vaincus sociaux. Citons-le, sans omettre ses majuscules éthiques: "Au nom du Droit, du Devoir et de la Justice, Pitié pour les victimes innocentes que les malheurs de la guerre civile vont réduire à la misère la plus affreuse; Miséricorde pour les égardés qui ont cru défendre le Droit et la Liberté; Clémence pour ceux qui ont cru agir au nom de la défense des Principes méconnus" (Godin, 1871). Déplorant la guerre, la débâcle et bien sûr la guerre civile,

il n'y voit qu'un inutile gaspillage de force, de vie et de puissance économique: "Les chassepots, les mitrailleuses, les canons et tous les engins de guerre, n'ont servi qu'à épuiser les mitrailleuses, les canons et tous les engins de guerre, n'ont servi qu'à épuiser les richesses de la France" (o.c.). Homme pratique, il se plait à reconvertir en investissements imaginaires de confort, de bien-être et de progrès le budget de guerre et de répression: écoles, voies ferrées et habitations.

2.2. Le système de jugement élaboré par les jugés: esquisse d'auto-expérimentation par l'autogestion

Avant son départ pour Paris, qui signifie une mobilité de son échelle d'action, Godin avait désigné pour le remplacer dans ses fonctions de Directeur de l'organisation créée, un Conseil d'Administration de huit membres, en plus des comités responsables dans les différents ateliers de production. Il prépare ainsi la direction collégiale et ses expérimentations sur les interestimations mutuelles y sont totalement liées. Il tente de mesurer le climat de son entreprise et l'acceptation de l'institution qui lui est subrogée.

C'est dans cette intention que Godin relance une recherche déjà largement abordée pendant les premiers mois de 1870. Il avait essayé un procédé d'interestimation des travailleurs en leur demandant d'imaginer par eux-mêmes un système à cet effet. Les tableaux d'information de l'entreprise affichaient le texte qui suit: "J'ai l'honneur de prévenir Messieurs les employés à la comptabilité qu'une somme de 400 francs sera à répartir, chaque mois, entre eux, depuis le premier janvier de cette année. Une somme proportionnelle sera affectée aux employés des ateliers" (Marie Moret, o.c., p. 297-98).

Trois remarques s'imposent ici: 1) Le chiffre 400 correspond à 10% des salaires des groupes Comptabilité et Economat réunis. Le montant des primes qui seront attribuées correspondra à 10% des salaires de chaque groupe. 2) Godin semble adresser sa demande de recherche de méthodes aux employés du groupe Comptabilité et uniquement à eux, constituant par là un sommet hiérarchique. Mais il revient très vite sur cette sélection et les projets qui lui sont proposés viennent de plusieurs groupes: des réclamations avaient sans doute été formulées, mais nous n'en avons aucune preuve. 3) Sans vouloir faire une réelle analyse des mots, il nous faut remarquer le prétexte d'aspect presque naïf invoqué par Godin afin de se libérer

de la tâche: une raison de santé. Il ne faut pas interpréter cela comme une fuite devant ses responsabilités mais comme un moyen simple de placer les employés devant des fonctions spécifiques nouvelles et de faire appel à leur imagination pour remodeler l'organisation. En d'autres termes, cette clause ressemble beaucoup à ce que nous appelons l'affabulation expérimentale. Elle est en même temps inductive d'un sentiment très fondamental dans l'autogestion: le chef n'est pas invulnérable et il importe donc qu'il ne soit pas irremplaçable. Autrement dit, véridique ou non, (et elle peut l'être), "l'affabulation" va dans un sens congruent avec les mobiles de participation expérimentale et avec les objectifs généraux de cette expérimentation.

Sa demande reçoit sept réponses. Les projets qui lui sont proposés (F.F.G.P.) sont très différents les uns des autres dans leurs détails de fonctionnement, mais on peut saisir parmi eux plusieurs idées-forces très similaires. 1) Ils manifestent une évidente fascination par le chiffre avec lequel ils croient pouvoir tout résoudre. 2) Leurs projets de calculs sont à la fois naïfs et complexes. 3) Gênés d'avoir à noter des gens qu'ils ne connaissent pas forcément très bien (ou qu'ils connaissent trop bien, parfois), ils imaginent des formulations methématiques qui proposent un flou compensateur chiffré comme pour concrétiser et numériser de simples impressions. 4) L'un d'eux arrive à distinguer "le certain, le probable et l'indéterminé". Il attribue à ces trois jugements des valeurs différentes, que nous appellerions coëfficients. (Nous réservons à une autre publication l'analyse de ces documents).

2.3. Conditions générales

En 1872, le système des jugements mutuels a quelque peu changé depuis 1870, mais il reste lors de cette expérimentation un scrutin d'intercote de valeurs par les membres du personnel, toujours une anticipation, à ce titre, de ce que Moreno (1934) appellera sociométrie. Les critères de cotation sont constants. Une échelle de mérites est déjà metérialisée du simple fait de la hiérarchie des postes et des salaires. Mais il ne faut pas oublier que dans la triade fouriériste "capital-travail-talent", Godin ne veut agir à ce moment que sur les deux derniers termes. D'autre part, si l'on voyait dans l'intercotation un simple procédé de validation comme on dit s'agissant de tests, il faudrait se demander ce que Godin pouvait souhaiter

valider. Ses décisions antérieures par rapport au jugement collectif ou le jugement collectif par rapport à ses décisions antérieures? Les expérimentations précédentes l'ont déjà informé des discordances entre les deux estimations. On peut penser qu'il fait une sorte d'expérimentation longitudinale en même temps que des essais de procédure, et qu'il considère l'intercotation comme une mesure de la socioéquivalence du jugement du personnel par rapport au jugement patronal. En même temps, il esquisse une démarche de dessaisissement. Il maintient l'enjeu, qui est la répartition d'une somme d'argent entre les meilleurs employés et les meilleurs ouvriers parmi ceux que Marie Moret, collaboratrice puis femme de Godin, appelle "les travailleurs de la main" (1897-1910).

Tout en schématisant, notons que:

a) un élément constant de ces votes est la dissociation entre les travailleurs résidant (au Familistère) et ceux qui vivent en dehors. Les premiers sont électeurs et éligibles, les seconds ne sont qu'éligibles. C'est l'esquisse d'un privilège des "familistériens" reposant sur l'attente dilatoire de l'effet de milieu, mais anticipant sur une discrimination d'avenir entre sociétaire et non sociétaires.

b) la catégorisation des ouvriers par "groupes de travail" n'a rien à voir avec les "séries passionnelles" de Fourier liées à la psychotypologie individuelle et aux rotations organisées. Tout en gardant au plaisir et à l'attrait un rôle régulateur et donc organisateur et pédagogique énorme, Godin récuse explicitement cette psychotypologie dans la distribution du travail. Il l'écrit à E. Howland, fouriériste états-unien (11-1-1872, Marie Moret, 1897-1910, vol 2, p. 429): "Fourier a trop pensé et trop dit que l'organisation du travail devait résulter du fait naturel de la série: c'est là une erreur". On ne saurait plus clairement rejeter une sorte de caractérologie innéiste (de fait "naturel") rattachée à une hypothèse théodicienne d'harmonie préétablie des "attractions proportionnelles aux destinées", c'est-à-dire de deux distributions: celle des goûts (et aptitudes) et celle des fonctions sociales normales. Cette théorie comporte, on le voit, un fixisme psycho-professionnel que Godin repoussait (bien plus nettement que de nombreux psychologues de l'orientation professionnelle). Il est vrai que si Godin a largement changé de psychologie en rupture avec Fourier, il est peut-être en outre passé des "passions" aux besoins sous couleur de "phrénologie" (1871), troquant alors un innéisme contre un autre. Il aurait donc

perdu en optimisme hédoniste, lâchant les désirs pour ces passions "nécessiteuses" et plutôt tristes que sont les besoins et le sens du devoir qui les modère. Mais il n'a pourtant perdu ni le sens de l'amour ni celui de la fête et du luxe populaire. C'est, dans sa pensée, un domaine à explorer.

Du concept des séries, Godin ne garde en fait que le cadre des catégories et des groupes de travailleurs. A partir de cette distinction, les votants peuvent s'exprimer doublement. Dans un premier temps, ils jugent les individus appartenant à leur groupe de travail; dans un second temps, ils jugent l'ensemble des travailleurs appartenant à leur catégorie. (Il existe deux catégories globales: celle des ouvriers et celle des employés). Et c'est à partir de ce double scrutin que les personnes reconnues valeureuses sont désignées.

2.4. Les trois scrutins de 1872

La série de jugements ne concerne pas les ouvriers, mais seulement les employés, et cela pour deux raisons. Godin veut expérimenter plusieurs types de scrutin sur un nombre limité d'individus (48) pour appliquer le résultat optimal par la suite, à l'ensemble du personnel. C'est déjà la démarche de l'échantillonnage ou du sondage, tout à fait dans l'esprit fouriériste (Pellarin, 1874) qui a contribué ainsi

1) au développement de la quantification statistique (Quételet, 1871),

2) et à la conjonction de la statistique et de l'expérimentation, signe précoce des temps,

3) à la quantification de renseignements réputés d'essence "qualitative" (cp. G.T. Fechner, 1860).

Les spéculations de Godin sur une sorte de science-religion de la Vie (1871) ne sont d'ailleurs pas sans analogie avec celles de Fechner (1851).

Alors que ses employés imaginent "une réorganisation de leur travail pour parvenir à le mettre aux pièces" c'est-à-dire à introduire déjà, dans un domaine inhabituel, une actométrie ou mesure des actes (M. Moret, t. II, p. 439), Godin interroge de façon chiffrée les impressions et les sentiments des travailleurs. Il fait appel à leur subjectivité tout en leur demandant la plus grande objectivité. Il en fait des contributeurs à leur propre analyse expérimentale,

dans l'esprit même d'une auto-expérimentation psycho-sociale associée à une formation à la coopération.

Trois critères de jugement sont retenus: l'exactitude et le bon travail, la capacité et l'intelligence, la loyauté et la justice dans les relations de travail. Ces critères sont repris dans les deux moments du vote: le vote des groupes et celui de l'ensemble des employés. Et cela lors des trois scrutins que l'on peut distinguer grossièrement ainsi: en février, le système demande une classification du personnel (système ordinal), en mars on leur demande de s'attribuer des salaires (système quantificatif monétaire), en juin ce sont des points qui sont à répartir (système quantificatif des points). Telles sont des modalités d'une variable quasi-expérimentale. Elle est appliquée longitudinalement certes et avec des effets d'ordre en toute rigueur incontrôlables. La réflexion sur les effets d'ordre sera bien postérieure et la méthode longitudinale les pose toujours.

On ne traitera pas ici des jugements portés sur l'ensemble des employés. On se limitera à ceux qui concernent 8 d'entre eux, constituant le Conseil d'Administration.

2.5. Février: scrutin par rangs

Les employés participants sont 48, répartis en 8 groupes. Les 8 personnes constituant le groupe Conseil d'administration ont, à cause d'une erreur des organisateurs (ces mêmes personnes sans doute), voté trois fois: en tant que membres de l'ensemble des employés, en tant que membres de leur groupe de travail et en tant que membres du Conseil d'administration. Elles ont également été jugées trois fois par les trois ensembles. Cette erreur entraînera la décision d'annuler ce scrutin quant aux enjeux. Heureuse erreur qui ajoute une variable différentielle aux données et qui nous permet de situer les 8 dirigeants à travers trois cadres de référence en nous donnant d'eux trois images (Tableau 1).

Nous avons dit quelles pouvaient être les hypothèses de Godin. Dans le cas favorable, l'intervalidation du jugement patronal et de l'élection, la coorélation entre les rangs salariaux, représentatifs du classement patronal, les rangs intraconseil, les rangs intragroupe et les rangs d'ensemble serait parfaite.

Tableau 1. Classement des administrateurs à trois images

Membres du groupe	salaires	rangs établis sur les salaires	groupes de travail	Classements résultant des votes: du Conseil d'administration (8) — exactitude et bon travail	capacité et intelligence	loyauté et justice	moyenne classement	du groupe de travail — exactitude et bon travail	capacité et intelligence	loyauté et justice	moyenne classement	classement sur 8 à partir valeur fractions	de l'ensemble (48) — exactitude et bon travail	capacité et intelligence	loyauté et justice	moyenne, classement sur 48 (*)	classement sur 8
Barbet (B)	7 200	1	modèles	2	1	2	1	3/5	2/5	5/5	4/5	7	40	16	47	37	8
Denisart (Dt)	4 800	2,5	comptabilité	1	2	7	3	2/5	1/5	1/5	1/5	4	1	4	7	3	3
Deplanque (De)	2 400	7,5	correspond.	3	5	6	4	5/6	4/6	3/6	4/6	6	16	8	16	12	6
Grebel (G)	4 200	4	études	4	3	1	2	2/7	1/7	1/7	1/7	2	10	6	4	4	4
Lefer (Lr)	3 000	5,5	études	7	8	8	8	6/7	3/7	7/7	6/7	8	18	15	40	21	7
Loisy (Ly)	4 800	2,5	fabrication	5	7	5	6	3/12	1/12	1/12	1/12	1	3	1	3	1	1
Moine (M)	2 400	7,5	fabrication	6	4	4	5	4/12	2/12	2/12	2/12	3	12	7	6	7	5
Thiébault (T)	3 000	5,5	correspond.	8	6	3	7	2/6	1/6	2/6	2/6	5	5	3	1	2	2

(*) Classification faite par eux à partir du total des rangs obtenus ci-contre.

Tableau établi à partir de plusieurs documents conservés aux Archives du Fonds Fourier-Godin-Prudhommeaux, Laboratoire de Psychologie sociale (F.F.G.P.)

Le tableau qui précède rassemble les informations chiffrées que nous détenons sur les membres du Conseil d'Administration. Comparent les différents classements qui en résultent, nous en avons tiré un certain nombre de coefficients de corrélation par rang (r de Spearman).

Tableau 2. Corrélations entre classements

Variables	r	p
Importance du salaire/rang intraconseil	0,56	<0,20
Importance du salaire/rang intra-groupe	0,13	
Importance du salaire/rang d'ensemble	0,19	
Rang intraconseil/rang intragroupe	0,12	
Rang intraconseil/rang d'ensemble	-0,28	
Rang intragroupe/rang d'ensemble	0,77	<0,05

Sur un plan mathématique, ces coefficients ne sont pas tous significatifs, mais ils livrent peut-être quelques informations dont la structure d'ensemble ne paraît pas quelconque.

1). Les jugements portés sur les individus par leurs collègues immédiats dans leur groupe de travail et par l'ensemble des employés appartenant à tous les groupes sont assez voisins (r=0,77). On peut supposer ici que l'image du travailleur au sein de sa cellule de base est assez forte pour se maintenir à l'extérieur. Les échos, les paroles des ateliers véhiculent des profils et les fixent.

2). La hiérarchie des salaires est en corrélation sensible avec les rangs estimés au sein du Conseil d'Administration (r=0,56). En tant que membre du Conseil, les individus ne se jugent pas mutuellement sans rapport avec leur statut officiel et leur place dans la hiérarchie.

3). Le salaire ne correspond pas à l'image de l'individu dans le groupe de travail qui semble le juger autrement (r=0,13).

4). La hiérarchie des profils des membres du Conseil est en corrélation négative, ou tout au plus nulle, (r=-0,285) avec celle qui leur est attribuée par l'ensemble des travailleurs. Un statut fort au sein du Conseil n'entraîne pas son équivalent pour la totalité des employés.

Quelques exemples de discordance sautent aux yeux. Pour le salaire le plus élevé (B), seul le classement intraconseil est en accord avec sa position hiérarchique. Sur 48 employés, il est l'avant-dernier pour la "loyauté et la justice", dans le dernier quintile pour "l'exacitude et la qualité du travail"; il a la 16è place pour la "capacité et l'intelligence"; la dernière dans le classement des conseillers par l'ensemble. Le message est ici vigoureux et radicalement contestataire à l'égard de celui qu'on peut supposer avoir été un appui essentiel pour Godin.

Deux autres administrateurs, sur huit, sont également contestés (De et Lr). Classés par l'ensemble des employés, ils sont respectivement 12è en 21è; classés par le groupe de travail, ils sont 4è sur 6 et 6è sur 7. Seul Lr est mal classé partout. A l'opposé, Ly, antépénultième au sein du groupe Conseil, se trouve être premier de son groupe de travail, et premier également sur les 48 employés. T, second dans son groupe de travail et second pour l'ensemble des employés, est l'avant-dernier du groupe Conseil.

Sur ces prémisses se dessine une structure de crise, virtuelle ou latente, révélée par ce qui était une sorte de sondage sur la délégabilité du pouvoir. Et cette crise porte avant tout sur la loyauté et l'équité de l'administrateur le plus favorisé, c'est-à-dire sur des rapports d'autorité, même si des effets probables de halo se retrouvent sur d'autres critères.

Godin aurait pu simplement soustraire les votes surnuméraires des administrateurs dans des calculs qu'il ne paraît pas avoir faits. Tout au plus aurait-il pu objecter que le fait d'avoir à classer les gros salariés a pu créer chez les subordonnés des effets de contraste et d'ancrage importants. Il a préféré en annuler l'effet sans qu'on en comprenne bien la raison, sinon peut-être un décontenancement devant le message du personnel, et le désir d'en vérifier le sens par un autre mode de scrutin.

2.6. Mars-avril: scrutin par primes

Les employés n'ont plus à se classer, mais doivent se répartir une somme d'argent correspondant à la masse de leurs salaires et à partir de laquelle des primes leurs seront attribuées. Les groupes de la première phase ont été remaniés pour parvenir à une meilleure homogénéité, au moins numérique. Les 42 personnes employés de l'usine sont réparties en cinq groupes de 8 à 9 personnes. Les 15 du Familistère

constituent deux groupes: celui des hommes (6 personnes), celui des femmes (9). La procédure mise en place impose une fourchette entre une somme minimale et une somme maximale. Ces sommes varient d'un groupe à l'autre et sont calculées en fonction de la moyenne des salaires dans chaque groupe. Les membres du groupe Conseil d'Administration votent à l'intérieur de ce groupe et n'appartiennent plus, pour le scrutin, à leur groupe de travail.

Tableau 3. Salaires effectifs, minima et maxima attribuables

Groupe	salaires totaux	salaire moyen	minimum demandé	maximum demandé	effectifs
Conseil d'Administration	31.800	3.975	2.000	7.000	8
Comptabilité correspondance	14.700	1.633	1.000	2.700	9
Expédition et quizaine	11.400	1.266	900	2.400	9
Etudes et modèles	16.000	2.000	1.200	3.000	8
Fabrication	14.040	1.755	1.200	2.400	8

L'opération est une sorte de redistribution des salaires qui, étant fort inégaux, peuvent être un facteur de conflit et de contestation. Le système proposé, qu'il faut considérer comme un échange de messages entre la direction et le personnel, à travers les scrutins, permet aux travailleurs (ou du moins pourrait leur donner l'illusion) d'avoir leur mot à dire pour un rééquilibrage fondamental des rémunérations. Mais Godin souhaite signifier qu'il y a des limites à l'élasticité des classements. En se sens l'invitation à la répartition des salaires et fictive. Désirant limiter les effets de la spontanéité des votants, les organisateurs mettent en place une censure. Ils demandent aux résultats du vote d'indiquer, en supposant intangible la hiérarchie en place, de simples modulations de primes. Le scrutin précédent n'est pas effacé par là. Mais réponse lui est donnée par une norme qui, elle aussi, se veut responsabilisante.

Tableau 4. Attributions des salaires votées

Membres du groupe	Salaire effectif	Rang salarial	Répartition des 31 800 fr. au sein du Conseil d'Administration (8 suffrages)		Francs attribués par l'ensemble des employés (48 suffrages)		Classement relatif sur 48
			m	rangs	m	rangs	
B	7 200	1	5 114	2	3 758	3	3
Dt	4 800	2,5	5 528	1	4 748	1	1
De	2 400	7,5	3 014	7	2 500	9	8
G	4 200	4	3 914	4	3 548	4	4
Lr	3 000	5,5	3 400	5	2 871	5	6
Ly	4 800	2,5	4 870	3	4 146	2	2
M	2 400	7,5	3 128	6	2 742	7	7
T	3 000	5,5	2 828	8	3 173	6	5
Totaux	31 800		31 796		27 480(*)		

La répartition des francs au sein du Conseil d'Administration découle des suffrages exprimés par les 8 membres du Conseil - ils sont classés sur 8 - le total de 31.800 francs était prédéterminé.

(*) Ici le total pour les membres du Conseil n'était pas prédéterminé. La différence entre les deux totaux (> 4.000 fr.) est significative. Il s'exprime ici une demande de salaire plus égalitaire.

(Etabli à partir de documents du F.F.G.P.)

Naturellement, l'opération parvient à son but. Les coefficients de corrélation conformes aux hypothèses sont inscrits dans le procédé et donc dans les résultats (Tableau 5).

Tableau 5.

Variables	r
Importance du salaire/rang intraconseil	0,85
Importance du salaire/rang d'ensemble	0,89
Rang intraconseil/rang d'ensemble	0,87

(Ces coefficients sont significatifs au seuil .01)

La spontanéité, sans doute en partie festive et ostentatoire, a été rectifiée, la structure conflictuelle masquée par cette contention des suffrages; une norme est imposée pour maintenir dans les résultats du vote une reproduction suffisamment conforme de l'institution existante. Il n'empêche que le mode de scrutin tend à confirmer, malgré les défauts de comparabilité, les résultats précédents. Trois éléments sont à relever dans ces résultats:

1). B, bien qu'il tienne le troisième rang dans la cotation par l'ensemble des employés, est en baisse dans le Conseil et voit son salaire diminué presque de moitié.

2). Les sommes attribuées aux membres du Conseil par l'ensemble des employés sont presque toutes inférieures à celles qui leur étaient attribuées par eux-mêmes.

3). Une seule d'entre elles est supérieure: celle de T, le dernier du classement par les membres du Conseil. Même la cote intraconseil de B est en baisse et, dans le vote d'ensemble, les seules baisses de rang pour les administrateurs concernent les trois défavorisés du premier scrutin, surtout B.

En outre la quantification monétaire permet de constater 1) un certain égalitarisme des rémunérations marqué par une chute de dispersion à l'intérieur même du conseil; 2) Un même égalitarisme de la part de l'ensemble avec, en outre, un égalitarisme supplémentaire, autocentré, tendant à abaisser légèrement mais globalement le salaire des cadres (B étant spécialement rogné). Le deuxième scrutin diminue sans l'effacer le relief des premiers résultats et c'est pour faire apparaître, justement parce que la contrainte d'une fourchette par salaire isole le paramètre de dispersion entre salaires, des

tendances niveleuses plus globales, et sans doute à plus long terme. Godin savait assez manier les données comptables pour ne pas s'y tromper, même sans calculs élaborés.

Il n'en a pas moins recouru à un contrôle par une troisième méthode, soucieux qu'il était sans doute de la convergence des procédures et de leurs divergences, dans l'élaboration d'une sorte de métrologie du jugement démocratique.

Godin était soucieux aussi d'explorer et de responsabiliser, à travers l'introduction ou non de clauses normatives, les réaction catégorielles dans leurs excursions spontanée.

2.7. Juin: scrutin par points

Comme il va déjà de soi dans cet esprit expérimental, Godin s'est posé la question de l'effet propre de l'argent comme unité de mesure (ressentie comme cardinale après la première phase ordinale). Il introduit alors, après les rangs et les francs, une deuxième mesure cardinale sans valeur propre: les points, désirant évidemment expérimenter sur l'effet métrique ou docimologique (en omettant certes les diverses précautions du ceteris paribus).

Tableau 6. Attributions de points votées.

Membres du groupe	Répartition des points au sein du Conseil d'Administration					Points attribués par l'ensemble des employés (48)				
	trav.	capac.	loy.	T	cl.	trav.	capac.	loy.	T	cl. moyen
B	94	99	98	291	1	495	616	457	1 568	26
Dt	39	40	36	115	4	724	712	596	2 032	5
De	69	84	65	218	3	524	501	472	1 497	34
G	72	77	65	214	5	606	690	620	1 916	8
Lr	35	33	36	104	8	550	631	558	1739	17
Ly	38	37	36	111	7	717	710	657	2 084	2
M	66	82	65	213	6	622	724	598	1 944	7
T	71	86	74	231	2	661	704	693	2 058	3

(Etabli à partir de documents du F.F.G.P.)

Les coefficients de corrélation (Spearman) que l'on peut tirer du tableau 6 sont très faibles: salaire/score intraconseil: r = 0,23

salaire/score d'ensemble : r = 0,24

score intraconseil/score d'ensemble : r =-0,26.

Ces chiffres peu significatifs nous incitent à une analyse plus limitée et plus détaillée des résultats. Un élément important est à signaler avant celle-ci. Les abstentions sont certes peu nombreuses le jour de ce scrutin pour l'ensemble des employés (7). Mais pour le groupe Conseil d'Administration, qui nous intéresse ici, seuls sont présents 5 votants sur 8. Parmi les trois absents, nous avons la certitude de trouver B et Lr. Or l'un comme l'autre sont parmi les trois plus mal notés par l'ensemble des travailleurs.Les trois plus mal classés de février obtiennent encore ici de très mauvais scores et places (17è, 26è et 34è, sur 48) et c'est leur loyauté qui est jugée au plus bas.

Quelques indications sur le contenu des bulletins de vote des membres du Conseil sont utiles à une analyse de la crise qui émerge du scrutin. Les bulletins anonymes numérotés 2, 4 et 6 notent de la même manière la totalité du groupe: ils attribuent des zéros à quatre de ses membres (Dt, Lr, Ly, T) et des notes 20 ou proches aux autres (De, G, M). Les votants 3 et 5 agissent de manière analogue en attribuant des zéros ou proches à ceux qui ont obtenu ci-dessus des notes fortes (De, G, M) et des notes fortes à ceux qui ont reçu des notes faibles (Dt, Lr, Ly, T). La tactique classique d'utilisation maximale de la dispersion disponible dans un barême pour maximiser l'effet de ses notes est, ici, connue et utilisée. C'est une technique agonale. Il n'est pas surprenant, du coup, que les corrélations s'exténuent. Les points sont encore plus légers à manoeuvrer que l'argent.

Il semble bien que l'action de Godin, socioexpérimentateur et initiateur d'une autoexpérimentation organisationnelle, ait été un peu celle d'un apprenti-sorcier. A ses interventions exploratrices et formatrices, interprétées comme message, et à la publicité de leurs résultats, sans doute ressentie comme analyse, il a reçu des réponses et des ripostes très remarquables, du type des "antiemprises" qu'une théorie de l'emprise analytique (Pagès, Lemoine, 1979) peut désormais nous permetre de "prévoir", avec plus de cent ans de retard. A cet égard, B est à la fois le bouc émissaire de la contre-emprise analytique et, très logiquement, le résistant principal et le plus stable à la politique auto-expérimentale du "patron". De fait il s'agit manifestement, au delà du jeu ordinaire des cliques, d'une réaction de boycott, sinon de sabotage qui s'exerce partiellement à partir des troupes vers le sommet et accentue les forces disruptives de ce

noyau, qu'est le Conseil, où les plus puissants reçoivent le plus de coups, puisqu'ils sont systématiquement désavoués. La cote en Conseil vaut décote d'ensemble.

En revanche, seul des "conseillers", B reçoit des notes fortes de la totalité des votants du Conseil. Or il faut ajouter à son propos qu'il s'était, dès février 1870, et dès les cotations autres que de "travail" du 1er scrutin de 72, refusé à participer à ce type de scrutin et rappeler qu'il était aussi le membre du Conseil le plus mal noté (hormis De) par l'ensemble des employés hors Conseil; il avait été coté bas dès 1870.

Les bulletins nous permettent de voir se dessiner deux clans ou cliques en opposition. Les cliques sont De, G, M contre Dt, Lr, Ly en T, sous hypothèse de vote auto-favorable et B se tenant à l'écart. Si nous appelons popularité le succès auprès de l'ensemble de la catégorie et distinction la cote intraconseil, le trio est relativement moins populaire aux trois scrutins et cela dès le premier "tour"; et plus distingué (quoique par ailleurs moins rémunéré) que le quatuor. L'interaction paraît forte entre "troupe" et encadrement et l'accord est difficile entre popularité et distinction, B marquant, à cet égard, un sommet de dissociation. L'ancienneté dans la maison et la compétition au noyau des groupes de travail ont pu jouer dans le genèse des cliques.

Ce qui est sûr, c'est que l'autoexpérimentation, poursuivie depuis 1870 en dépit de l'opposition manifeste de la "vedette" et peut-être "bras droit" du patron, B, aboutit à un quasi-éclatement de ce qui est sans doute le noyau de l'entreprise: Godin, très rapidement, devant les données, dissout ce Conseil qu'il ne remplacera pas aussitôt.

3. Conclusion

L'épilogue tendrait à confirmer ce qui a pu être le décontenancement de Godin, mais non pas son découragement. Certes il a été absent la plupart du temps pendant les expérimentations. Mais il est peu imaginable qu'il ne les ait pas suivies à chaque étape et qu'il n'en ait pas aperçu la signification très précise, en termes de personnes et de sous-groupes, grâce à une sécurisation numérique qui était ici la figure objective de ses difficultés et de l'insécurité de son projet. Et il est évident qu'il savait lire les chiffres.

Recevait-il des comptes-rendus objectifs de ses résultats? Son travail à la Chambre des Députés lui laissait-il loisir pour s'y intéresser? A supposer même que la crise interne ne lui soit pas apparue par l'analyse des chiffre, il pouvait l'avoir déjà détectée, et il la percevait clairement dans la correspondance qu'il recevait. Des lettres qu'il écrit à plusieurs membres du Conseil l'attestent: "Vous vous laissez entraîner, comme tous vos collègues à cet esprit de supposition [...]. Ne vous arrêtez pas aux cancans et aux taquineries [...]. Combien je désirerais vous voir animés d'un plus grand amour du prochain [...]" (Lettre à Ly, 15 mai). "La tolérance est une des belles vertus humaines. Nous avons tout à gagner à la pratiquer [...]. Croyez-vous qu'il vous soit impossible de vous tromper [faire erreur] vous-même?" (à Dt, 19 mai). "Chacun fait tout de son côté pour empêcher l'entente" (à Ly, 26 mai). Certes Godin réagit à la réaction par le conseil éthique du conciliateur, arbitre et pacificateur des conflits. Devant ces constats "pessimistes" ("chacun fait tout" contre l'entente) sur les capacités d'autogestion collective et sa riposte traditionnelle, on pourrait penser que l'apprenti-sorcier est désarmé (décontenancé). L'effort de progression autogestionnaire, y compris dans ses aspects expérimentaux précis, a induit des résistances aigués à la fois dans la troupe et dans l'encadrement. Elle y a suscité ou révélé des propensions immédiates à inversion hiérarchique. Elle y a déclenché des éclatements conflictuels en cliques dans le noyau dirigeant, tandis que se nouaient, spontanément ou non, des connivences dans la troupe. Quand l'inversion est bloquée se révèle un fond égalitaire, niveleur et compétitif à la fois, à travers un jeu complexe de catégorisations inégalitaires imposées. La robustesse de ces processus à travers divers procédés métriques ou docimologiques a pu être éprouvée.

L'inlassable curiosité de Godin a été coûteuse, mais probablement éclairante pour lui, et sans doute même à moyen terme, formatrice. En effet, aussi bizarre que cela paraisse, Godin n'a par retiré de ces expérimentations une leçon d'abandon: il a poursuivi peu après sa démarche graduelle de déssaisissement de sa propriété industrielle au bénéfice des travailleurs; en dépit de ce qu'il avait appris des aléas et des fluctuations de l'autogestion (Pagès, 1963), au cours de ses années d'expérimentation longitudinale. Là est le paradoxe extraordinaire de cet expérimentaliste social audacieux et persévérant qu'il ne lâche pas sa tâche de déssaisissement de

propriété au bénéfice de travailleurs qui en refusent les responsabilités et les disciplines, et qu'il réussira dans cette tâche, créant pour cent ans une considérable coopérative de production. Il est vrai que, dès ce moment, une orientation de Godin se dessine vers une sorte de psychométrie ou actométrie objective des actes et donc des capacités professionnelles (Pagès, 1968), autre procédé docimologique ou métrique, comportemental cette fois et non plus opinionnelle. C'est ainsi qu'à travers l'effort scientifique et technique de Godin, justice objective et démocratie gestionnaire sont devenues les deux pôles d'une pratique conflictuelle, qui dégage d'emblée à foison les concepts naissants d'une psychologie sociale à travers une démarche qui est aussi celle de l'autoexpérimentation sociale, avec déjà ses difficultés caractéristiques: elles ne sont pas la moindre des découvertes de Godin, ni même, aujourd'hui encore, la moins futuriste.

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

Bulletin de Vote

Pour servir à une répartition prochaine

1er Groupe – Conseil d'Administration.

31 800 f sont à répartir comme appointements annuels entre les huit personnes inscrites

Le Maximum ne pourra dépasser 7 000 f

Le Minimum ne pourra dépendre au dessus de 2 000 f

MM.	Barbet	4000
	Dénisart	6000
	Deplanque	2400
	Grebel	5,000
	Lefer	3000
	Loisy	4800
	Moine	3000
	Thiébault	3600
	f^ces	31 800 f

N.B. L'addition de la répartition devra reproduire 31 800 francs

Bulletin de vote anonyme de l'un des membres du Conseil d'Administration. 2ème moment des scrutins : une somme d'argent est à répartir.

ZUR STELLUNG HERMANN LOTZES IN DER PSYCHOLOGIEGESCHICHTE DES 19. JAHRHUNDERTS

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Summary

The subject of the essay is Rudolph Hermann Lotze (1817-1881), a German physician and philosopher of the mid-nineteenth century. His influence on the new psychology was fundamental. Lotze's pathology, physiology and medical psychology applied the idea of lawful regulation in detail to the various problem areas. Anticipations of modern ideas of flowing equilibria, biological information processing, and self-organization are quite remarkable here. Lotze's essay on 'instinct' (1844) already illustrated his attempt to come to terms with the levels of organized motion, from internal secretions to volitional activity.

Lotze's 'physical-mental mechanism' served to emancipate psychology from the categorial nets of both physiology and physics, setting the stage for it to take on the disciplinary status of an individual science. Another recognized achievement of Lotze (1852), his model of spatial perception, built on this physical-mental mechanism. Recognizing that soul cannot be represented spatially, nor the dimensions of sensation reduced to quality and intensity, he constructed a motor theory of the location index. Lotze fashioned concepts and methods appropriate to the subject matter of the mental states, knowing that the explanatory model of physics is inadequate for psychology.

Rudolph Hermann Lotze (1817-1881) gehört zu den herausragenden Gelehrten des 19. Jahrhunderts. Das Wort dieses deutschen Philosophen hatte bei Vertretern vieler Fachgebiete und im akademischen Leben des In- und Auslandes Gewicht. Sein Werk war stets umstritten und hat widersprüchlich gewirkt; es verkörpert in eigentümlicher Weise Umwälzungen und Komplikationen einer ganzen historischen Periode der Wissenschaft und der Philosophie, die bis in die Gegenwart hineinreichen.[1]

Wer heute versucht, Lotzes Platz in der Geschichte der Psychologie zu bestimmen, bekommt es sehr schnell mit einer Reihe von Fragen zu tun, die allgemeiner und wissenschaftstheoretischer Natur sind. Welche Stellung nimmt die Psychologie im System der Wissenschaften ein, wie hat sich diese in der Geschichte gewandelt? Wann ist die neuere Psychologie eigentlich entstanden? Wie hat sich Neues auf diesem Gebiet vom Althergebrachten abgelöst, inwiefern sind die vergangenen Lösungen der Probleme in den jeweils gegenwärtigen aufgehoben? Die Antworten auf diese und ähnliche Fragen werden unterschiedlich ausfallen, oft auch kontrovers; sie können aus der Perspektive der Philosophie anders lauten als aus der des modernen psychologischen Forschungsprozesses - was nicht heisst, dass sie sich prinzipiell widersprechen müssen.

Bemerkenswert ist die Feststellung, dass in der Geschichte der Psychologie "nicht selten (...) Modernes und Altertümliches in der Zeitfolge miteinander vertauscht" sind (Klemm 1911, S. 7). Der heutige Leser fühlt sich beim Studium der Arbeiten Lotzes nicht selten in eine derart paradoxe Situation versetzt, die ihn zwingt, traditionelle und innovative Momente des Denkens zu entflechten.

Die wissenschaftliche Laufbahn des studierten Mediziners begann in einer Zeit als die experimentelle Psychologie im Sinne Wundts noch in weiter Ferne lag; im Jahr seines Todes war Leipzig ein anerkanntes Zentrum psychologischer Forschungsarbeit. In der ersten Periode seines Schaffens, die bis zum Anfang der 1850er Jahre reicht, bearbeitete Lotze parallel grundlegende Werke auf den Gebieten der Philosophie und der Theorie der Medizin. Dazu gehören v.a. eine **Metaphysik** (1841) und eine **Logik** (1843) sowie Werke zur Pathologie (1842-1848), Physiologie (1851) und Psychologie (1852). Für R. Wagners **Handwörterbuch der Physiologie** (1842-1853) verfasste er programmatische Abhandlungen zu **Leben. Lebenskraft** (1843), **Instinct** (1844) und **Seele und Seelenleben** (1846). Lotze begründete den Mechanismus als kausal erklärende Theorie für Biologie und Psychologie. Er bekämpfte erfolgreich die Idee der Lebenskraft und erkannte bereits 1842 die Bedeutung der selbsstätigen Regulation im Organismus durch einen nervösen Mechanismus heilsamer Rückwirkung (Rothschuh 1972, Canguilhem 1974, Tembrock 1982).

Lotzes frühe Schriften zur Metaphysik und Logik fügten sich in einen fundamentalen Umbruch in der Kategorienlehre ein, der um die Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts deutlich zutage trat. Die philosophische

Kategorienreflexion strebte nun nicht mehr nach möglichst geschlossenen Systemen von universaler Gültigkeit und Vollständigkeit, sondern orientierte sich direkt oder indirekt an den Methoden, Resultaten und Grundlagenproblemen der Erfahrungswissenschaften (Oehler 1984, S. 206ff). So wurde z.B. die alte Kategorie des Zweckes mehr und mehr ins naturwissenschaftliche Systemverständnis einbezogen. Lotzes Pathologie, Physiologie und Psychologie waren ein Ausdruck des Durchbruchs der naturwissenschaftlichen Methode und dementsprechender Erklärungsmodelle in Biologie und Medizin. Komplementär zum Mechanismus-Konzept war es unabdingbar geworden, die Erscheinungen und Abläufe in der organischen Natur als Struktur- und Funktionssysteme zu betrachten. In diesem Zusammenhang erfolgte bereits in den 1840er Jahren einen Rehabilitation der Teleologie, wodurch - parallel zur "Mechanisierung" der Wissenschaften vom Leben - der rationelle Kern des aristotelischen "telos" hervortrat.

Lotze beschritt nicht den Weg, der in die vitalistische und neovitalistische Teleologie des 19. bzw. des 20. Jahrhunderts geführt hat. Er betrachtete teleologische Vorstellungen ähnlich wie Kant als Methoden eines heuristisch effektiven Denkstils, der hilft, das Organisationsgefüge lebender Systeme nicht "konstitutiv" sondern "regulativ" zu erschliessen. Lotzes Mechanismusgedanke war nicht mechanistisch; er verdeutlicht dialektische Beziehungen von Zufall und Notwendigkeit, von Naturgesetz und Bedingungen im Systemzusammenhang physiologischer und psychologischer Prozesse.

In einer Reihe miteinander konkurrierender philosophischer Richtungen und Schulen war in den Jahren von 1830 bis 1848 unter Rückgriff auf die Aufklärung die Psychologie wieder als eine grundlegende Wissenschaft behandelt worden. Uneinigkeit herrschte darüber, wozu sie denn nun gehören soll: zur Philosophie oder zur Naturwissenschaft oder zur Medizin? Im Mittelpunkt derartiger Erörterungen standen die Namen Herbart, Beneke und Fries. Daneben wirkten die von der romantischen Naturphilosophie herkommenden Denker, v.a. G.H. Schubert und C.G. Carus. Selbst Hegel-Schüler profilierten sich mit Schriften zur Psychologie, so K. Rosenkranz, J.E. Erdman, K.L. Michelet, später auch J. Schaller. L. George ging von Hegel und Schleiermacher aus. Besonders wirksam wurden die Herbartianer, insbesondere Th. Waitz und M.W. Drobisch.

Die "Neue Psychologie" beruht auf Entwicklungslinien, die im Vorfeld der Wundtschen wissenschaftspolitischen Leistung - der

Leipziger Institutsgründung von 1879 - aus verschiedenen Wissenschaftsgebieten hervorgegangen sind (Sprung/Sprung 1980, Jarosevskij 1977). Neben den philosophischen Konzeptionen waren es besonders die neuen Entdeckungen und Modellvorstellungen der Naturwissenschaften und der Medizin, die das psychologische Denken voranbrachten. Sinnesphysiologie, Neuroanatomie, Neurophysiologie sind hier ebenso zu erwähnen wie die Psychiatrie oder die Pathologie; es wurde versucht, die psychischen Erscheinungen mit veränderten Methoden und Theorien zu erfassen. Die Unterscheidung zwischen der "neuen" und der "alten" Psychologie war niemals streng und eindeutig zu treffen (Turner 1982, S. 150). Im zweiten Drittel des 19. Jahrhunderts haben insbesondere Fechner, Lotze und später auch Brentano auf jeweils eigene Art versucht, den Fortschritt der naturwissenschaftlichen und medizinischen Gebiete mit dem philosophischen Denken aus Vergangenheit und Gegenwart sinnvoll zu verknüpfen. Diese Gelehrten lassen sich keiner der eben erwähnten philosophischen Richtungen zuordnen; sie rezipierten schöpferisch und phantasievoll ein weitgespanntes Spektrum von Denkansätzen aus der Geschichte der Philosophie und der anderen Wissenschaften, um eine Psychologie neuen Typus zu begründen.

Psychologiegeschichtlich verdient Lotzes Artikel **Instinct** (1844) besondere Aufmerksamkeit. Lotze hatte seinen Mechanismusbegriff zunächst im Sinne einer allgemeinen Physiologie entworfen und übertrug ihn dann auf die vergleichende Betrachtung der Handlungs- und Verhaltensweisen von Tieren und Menschen. Er kritisierte Herbarts Erklärung des Zustandekommens willkürlicher Bewegungen durch Assoziationsbildung und setzte an deren Stelle den Mechanismus der Reflexbewegung. Zeitlebens hat sich Lotze mit Leibniz beschäftigt, dem "Entdecker des Unbewussten" in der Psychologie (Holz 1983, S. 117). Ausdrücklich zitierte er im Artikel **Instinct** den Hamburger Philosophen und deistischen Theologen Reimarus. Die Mechanismen entlasten im Verständnis Lotzes den Menschen und geben den höheren geistigen Leistungen Raum, sich zu vervollkommnen.

> "Das Instinctartige erscheint daher in der menschlichen Seele nicht vernichtet, sondern nur einen Schritt weiter zurückgedrängt" (Lotze 1844, S. 239)[2].

Lotzes Auffassung vom Instinkt folgt aus seiner Kritik der Lebenskraft und seinem Verständnis biologischer Selbstregulationsmechanismen. Verwunderlich ist, dass ausgerechnet der Artikel **Instinct** in der zeitgenössischen Tierpsychologie keine Beachtung fand, obwohl er

anregende Überlegungen und Hypothesen für eine Theorie dieser Phänomene enthält. Könnte die gewachsene disziplinäre Arbeitsteilung zwischen Human- und Tierpsychologie die Ursache gewesen sein? Aufmerksamkeit verdienen die Hinweise Lotzes auf J.H.F. Autenrieth (1836), der einmal schrieb:

> "Der berühmte Nordamericaner Franklin nennt den Menschen treffend und kurz - ein werkzeugmachendes Thier! Dadurch eben unterscheidet sich der Mensch von den eigentlichen Thieren" (S. 314).

In dieser Traditionslinie steht und schreibt Lotze. Von hier aus gehen die Wege seines Denkens und Forschens und münden 1858 im zweiten Band des **Mikrokosmus** in bemerkenswerte Einsichten über den Einfluss des Werkzeuggebrauchs auf die Genese der menschlichen Sinnlichkeit und des Intellekts (Lotze 1858, S. 195ff). Lotze knüpft hier unverkennbar an die Aufklärung, insbesondere an Herder an. Dabei gelingt es ihm in der für ihn typischen Argumentationsweise, Probleme aufzuwerfen, die detailliert erst von der Psychologie und den Verhaltenswissenschaften des 20. Jahrhunderts erforscht werden können.

Zweifelsohne hat sich das wissenschaftliche Verständnis des Instinktgeschehens im Lichte der Darwinschen Lehre und in deren weiteren Ausgestaltung grundlegend gewandelt. Anlässlich des Erscheinens des ersten Bandes der **Kleinen Schriften von Hermann Lotze** im Jahre 1886 hiess es, dass der Artikel **Instinct** noch mancherlei Anregungen geben könne. Zwar habe die darwinistische Herleitung des Instinktes "die Aufgabe der beschreibenden Analyse augenblicklich in den Hintergrund gedrängt", sie "aber natürlich nicht im mindesten beseitigt" (Stumpf 1886, S. 627). Das ist sicher auch heute überlegenswert, vielleicht sogar deswegen, weil die modernen Verhaltenswissenschaften auf den Instinktbegriff im Grunde ganz verzichten können (Tembrock 1977, S. 259). Sowohl das Auftreten neuer als auch das Verschwinden alter Begriffe verdienen die Aufmerksamkeit des Wissenschafthistorikers, beides kann von aktuellem Interesse sein.

Die **Medizinische Psychologie oder Physiologie der Seele** (Lotze 1852) war noch nach fast dreissig Jahren dasjenige Werk, das ihm in der Wissenschaftsgeschichte "eine ehrenvolle Stelle sichert" (Ribot 1881, S. 63). Als "Physiologie der Seele" bildete diese Konzeption einen bemerkenswerten Kontrast zur "Psychologie ohne Seele", wie sie F.A. Lange später als Forschungsprogramm proklamierte (Hiebsch 1979, S. 23f). Breiten Raum widmete Lotze der Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel,

wobei klar wird, dass der wissenschaftliche Streit um desen Philosophie auch Triebkräfte zur Entfaltung mehrerer Wissenschaftsdisziplinen freizusetzen vermochte. Diese Vorgänge gehören zu den noch wenig untersuchten Ursprüngen der neuen Psychologie im 19. Jahrhundert. Lotze ging es darum, ähnlich wie J. Müller und H. v. Helmholtz, Psychologie als "Psycho-Physiologie" zu konstituieren (Sprung/Sprung 1980, S. 25). Er hatte eine motorische Lokalzeichentheorie konzipiert. Sein spezifischer Beitrag zur Theoriebildung besteht in der Annahme der reflexartigen Natur der Augenbewegung, die zur Entstehung der Lokalzeichen führt; sie ergab sich zwingend aus seinem Mechanismus-Konzept der Lebensvorgänge (Scheerer 1984, S. 78ff). Den Prozess der Raumwahrnehmung beschreibt Lotze als spezifische Tätigkeit, als Rekonstruktion äusserer Objekte im Bewusstsein. Somit erweist sich die Lokalzeichentheorie als erstaunlicher psychophysiologischer Erklärungsversuch der dreidimensionalen Metrik des phänomenalen Raums (Sprung/Sprung 1985, S. 10).

Lotzes Überlegungen stehen am Beginn des Aufschwungs einzelwissenschaftlicher Forschungen zur Wahrnehmungstheorie und vermitteln einen Eindruck von den Geburtswehen einer neuen Psychologie, die sich aus dem Kategoriennetz der Physiologie und der Physik zu lösen sucht und nach disziplinärer Selbstverständigung strebt. Seine originellen theoretischen Leistungen dürften wenig verständlich werden, wollte man sie allein im Lichte der Empirismus-Nativismus-Kontroverse betrachten. Lotze fasste "Bewusstsein" nicht als "ruhenden Spiegel", sondern als Tätigkeit (Lotze 1852, S. 372) auf. Diese Ansicht entstand 1846 in **Seele und Seelenleben** und erschien 1852 in weiterenwickelter Gestalt. Lotze hat damit eine Errungenschaft der klassischen deutschen Philosophie in die Neubegründung der Psychologie als wissenschaftstheoretische Leitlinie eingebracht. Es sei daran erinnert, dass K. Marx in den **Thesen über Feuerbach** bemerkt, es sei der Hauptmangel alles bisherigen Materialismus, die tätige Seite des Gegenstandes, der Wirklichkeit, der Sinnlichkeit nicht entwickelt zu haben (Marx 1845, S. 5). Lotze ging es um ein hinreichendes Verständnis der tätigen, der aktiven Seite, die sich an allen psychischen Erscheinungen beobachten lässt. Er analysierte sie ausgehend von den Empfindungen, über Wahrnehmungsvorgänge, Vorstellungsabläufe, Gefühle bis zum Gedächtnis und zu den beziehenden Tätigkeitsweisen der Aufmerksamkeit.

Davon sind klar Prozesse zu unterscheiden, die völlig anderer Natur sind; viel zu häufig hätten "die bekannten Fragen nach dem Grunde dieses interpretirenden Hinaussetzens und Objectivirens der Wahrnehmungen sich zwischen die rein topologische Erklärung des geometrischen Weltbildes eingedrängt" (Lotze 1852, S. 326). In der Psychologie und in der Philosophie ist diese prinzipielle Abgrenzung, wie sie Lotze hier trifft, auch später lange nicht immer berücksichtigt worden. Das hat zu unfruchtbaren Debatten geführt, in denen Raumwahrnehmung und Raumbegriff oft miteinander verwechselt wurden. Wird erstere in einem psychophysiologischen Prozess ausgebildet, so ist der letztere das Prdukt einer immensen Abstraktionsleistung in der intellektuellen Entwicklung der menschlichen Gesellschaft. Lotze verstand seine "Physiologie der Seele" als Kritik am zeitgenössischen Materialismus, der zu Lösung jener psychologischen Fragen keine akzeptableren Lösungen anzubieten hatte (Klix 1979, S. 86f). Beachtung verdient darüberhinaus Lotzes Auseinandersetzung mit der Phrenologie und der Kranioskopie; sein Tätigkeitsmodell des Psychischen war auch den Lehren Herbarts und der Herbartianer überlegen.

Was macht Lotze heute interessant? Es sind wohl weniger die jeweiligen Theorien und Methoden des Untersuchens und Darstellens, die oft hoffnungslos veraltet sind. Die Geschichte der Wissenschaften dürfte sich kaum in der Beschreibung der erfolgreichen Lösungen der Probleme erschöpfen, sie schliesst ebenso die gescheiterten Forschungsprogramme, die überwundenen, die einseitigen Vorstellungen, Theorien, Versuche und Methoden ein (Hörz/Wessel 1983, S. 63). Lotzes Lokalzeichentheorie der Sinneswahrnehmung hat zweifelsohne der Kritik nicht standgehalten. Verständlicherweise wird man von einem entwickelteren Niveau der disziplinären Forschung diese Auffassung "für unzutreffend und für wesentlich zusammenhanglos halten" (Hall 1914, S. 42) können; und W. Dilthey kann sich nicht genug darüber wundern, dass Lotzes "windige Theorie der Lokalzeichen" überhaupt jemals einen ernsthaft denkenden Menschen beschäftigt haben soll (Rothacker 1923, S. 137). Eine vergleichende Betrachtung ihrer heuristischen Wirkung sowie ihrer kritischen Fortbildung über H. v. Helmholtz, W. Wundt, C. Stumpf u.a. gibt allerdings einen aufschlussreichen Einblick in den wechselvollen, widersprüchlichen Verlauf der neueren Psychologie ausgehend von ihren verschiedenen Ursprüngen aus anderen Wissenschaften und im Zusammenspiel mit ihnen (Ackerknecht 1904, Stumpf 1873).

Auf den Wegen des Denkens und Forschens von Hermann Lotze finden sich in jeder Periode seines Schaffens Motive, Hypothesen und Modellvorstellungen, die in der Psychologie des 19. Jahrhunderts und heute in vielfältiger, oft stark abgewandelter Form zum Tragen kommen. Oft scheinen sie bei näherem Studium Antizipationen späterer Auffassungen und Entwicklungslinien dieser Wissenschaft zu sein. Es bleibt die Frage, ob Lotze Vorläufer und Wegbereiter der neuen Psychologie war oder doch mehr ein Aussenseiter und Sonderling. In seinem Werk und Wirken verbinden sich durchaus derartig ambivalente Züge. Es sei dazu keine abschliessende Antwort versucht, handelt es sich doch um die generelle Frage nach der Funktion der Philosophie in der Wissenschaftsentwicklung, die für diese Zeit und die verschiedenen Disziplinen weiter zu klären sein wird (Verwey 1985, Wahrig-Schmidt 1985).

H. v. Helmholtz und E. du Bois-Reymond haben Lotze gelesen und geschätzt. W. Wundts, C. Stumpfs und G.E. Müllers psychologisches Schaffen ist ohne Lotze schwer vorstellbar. M. Lazarus und H. Steinthal - die Begründer der Völkerpsychologie - haben Lotzes Werk vielfältige Anregungen entnommen, sie standen insbesondere zum **Mikrokosmus** in einem produktiv-kritischen Verhältnis (Woodward 1982, Sprung-/Sprung 1985). Lotzes Psycho-Physiologie is keineswegs blosse Vorstufe der experimentellen Psychologie im Sinne Wundts, noch weniger kann dies für Brentanos Aktpsychologie, die funktionale Psychologie, Behaviorismus, Gestaltpsychologie oder gar die Psychoanalyse behauptet werden. Lotze ist vielmehr ein wichtiger Vermittler zwischen der Vergangenheit, der Vorgeschichte und der eigentlichen Geschichte der Psychologie als Einzelwissenschaft; er hat die in verschiedenen Forschungsgebieten vorliegenden Theorien und Modellvorstellungen zur Erklärung psychischer Vorgänge auf eigentümliche Weise verbunden. Dazu kommt, dass Lotzes Beitrag zur Psychologie deutlicher hervortritt, wenn man auch sein Wirken auf andere Wissenschaftsdisziplinen und den geistig-kulturellen Gesamtzusammenhang seines Schaffens, das sich vom Biedermeier und Vormärz bis zur Bismarckzeit erstreckt, in betracht zieht.

Anknüpfend an Herders **Ideen** und A. v. Humboldts **Kosmos** versuchte Lotze, der Komplexität der Beziehungen zwischen Mensch und Natur als physiologischer, historischer und globaler Problematik nachzuspüren sowie den Einfluss der Technik, der Grossstädte, der zunehmenden beruflichen Arbeitsteilung und der Wissenschaft auf die Lebens- und Empfindungsweisen von Menschen und Völkern weltandschaulich zu

bewältigen. Ein Grund für die breite Wirksamkeit der drei Bände des **Mikrokosmus**, die 1856, 1858 en 1864 herauskamen, war das Bestreben Lotzes, den ästhetischen und religiösen Bedürfnissen des Gemüts und den Ergebnissen moderner Wissenschaft gerecht zu werden.

Es ist auch schwierig, den Beitrag Lotzes zur modernen Logik einzuschätzen - in den letzten Jahren ist darüber kontrovers debattiert worden (Sluga 1980, Dummett 1981). Lotze vertrat Ansichten, die ein breites Spektrum möglicher Interpretationen und Weiterbildungen boten; sein gesamtes Werk enthält Keime des kommenden Methodenstreits und der Differenzen zwischen den psychologischen und den logischen Theorien. Lotzes Psychologie hat das musiktheoretische Schaffen von E. Hanslick beeinflusst, jener wiederum die ästhetischen Ansichten des Philosophen (Lotze 1868, Hanslick 1982). In beträchtlichem Masse hat Lotze auf mehrere Generationen von Wissenschaftlern gewirkt, nicht nur in Deutschland, sondern auch in Frankreich, in England, in Ländern Nordeuropas und in den USA. Seinen anregenden Einfluss auf die eigene wissenschaftliche Arbeit - die Herausforderung zu streitbarer Kritik eingeschlossen - bekannten u.a. auch W. Roux, der Begründer der Entwicklungsmechanik, der Anatom und Embryologe W. His, der Sprachwissenschaftler und Religionshistoriker F.A. Müller, der Biologe O. Hertwig, der Begründer der Mengenlehre G. Cantor. Der Anatom Rauber entwarf - abgeleitet von Lotzes Mechanismusauffassung - seine Modellversuche am Gummischlauch über die Hirnentwicklung. F. Redtenbacher, der hervorragende Förderer der technischen Mechanik und der Maschinenbauwissenschaft, versuchte unter dem Einfluss von Lotzes Philosophie Naturvorgänge auf allgemein gültige mechanische Prinzipien zurückzuführen (Kovacs/Wollgast 1984, S. 90).

W. James ist von Lotze beeinflusst (Stumpf 1927, S. 205ff., Woodward 1983, S. XIff). Angeregt durch W. James und anknüpfend an Lotzes Ansätze zu einer Theorie kognitiver Entwicklung hat J.M. Baldwin 1895 sein Modell der "ideo-motor-action" entworfen und später eine "genetic logic" ausgearbeitet, die mit in J. Piagets "épistémologie génétique" eingeflossen ist. Werden die Forschungen zum "englischen und amerikanischen 'New Materialism' bzw. 'Realism' der Jahrhundertwende und des ersten Jahrzehnts" (Sandkühler 1984, S. 117) als ein offenes Feld umrissen, dann dürfte auch die spezifische Lotze-Rezeption über den Pragmatismus von Interesse sein.

Wer bei Lotze darauf aus ist, einen Vorrat geschliffener, gut zitierbarer und eindeutiger Lehrsätze zu finden, wird schnell

enttäuscht sein. Der Leser seiner Schriften sieht sich oft in ein wahres Labyrinth von Argumentationsfolgen versetzt, dem schwer wieder zu entrinnen ist. Lotzes Denken und Forschen waren höchst unkonventionell. Er war kein Systemkonstrukteur. Lotze forderte vom Hörer bzw. Leser, dass er mit ihm "gewissermassen dialogisch den Wald der Probleme durchwandere" (Pfleiderer 1882, S. 80). Lotze war stets bestrebt, alternative Strategien des Denkens und Untersuchens probeweise durchzuspielen, um Leser oder Hörer zu befähigen, sich selbst ein Urteil über die aufgeworfenen Fragen zu bilden. Er ist nicht selten missverstanden worden, weil Argumente, die er im Verlaufe der Erörterung vortrug, als eigene Lehrmeinungen ausgegeben wurden. Nicht ganz unberechtigt ist vom "Schwierigkeitenmacher" Lotze (Ziegler 1899, S. 624) gesprochen worden.

Seine Untersuchungsweise ist allerdings Bedürfnissen in der Forschungsarbeit entgegengekommen. Wissenschaftliche Dispute sind unfruchtbar, wenn sie im Aufeinanderprallen unvereinbarer Positionen enden.

> "Wer den Gegner im ehrlichen Kampfe besiegen will, darf sich keine 'Stropuppe zurechtmachen', um dann leichtes Spiel dawider zu haben, sondern muss sich absichtlich, und wäre es sogar mit eigenen Zuschüssen, die gesammelte Kraft seiner Anschauung vor Augen halten. Diese Objektivität lässt Lotze in vollstem Masse walten" (Kronheim 1910, S. 117).

Was die Methode seines Untersuchens und Argumentierens betrifft, so ist sie im 20. Jahrhundert nicht ungewöhnlich. Wenn A.N. Whitehead einmal die Vorgehensweise von B. Russell als "Platonischen Ein-Mann-Dialog" bezeichnete (Langhammer 1984, S. 49), dann ist das ein treffender Ausdruck, der sich auch gut zur Charakteristik von Lotzes Denken und Forschen eignet. Dieser Vergleich dürfte nich allzuweit hergeholt sein, wenn man berücksichtigt, dass Lotzes Werke im anglo-amerikanischen Sprachraum besonders intensiv rezipiert worden sind: "I call the period 1880-1920 therefore 'the Lotzean periode'" (Kuntz 1971, S. 49).

Gegen Ende seines Lebens ist Lotze noch einmal auf die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Psychologie zu sprechen gekommen. Sie kann "mit Sicherheit ein paar Schritte in der Entwicklungsgeschichte unserer Empfindungen tun". Mit Sicherheit ist es der Psychologie möglich, ein paar Prinzipien festzustellen "über die Wege der Assoziation und der Reproduktion unserer Vorstellungen im Gedächtnis". Es

fehlen ihr "fast ganz Beobachtungen über den Verlauf, in dem von den ersten Tagen der Kindheit an, die einzelnen Funktionen unseres Intellektes einander folgen" (Lotze 1880, S. CX). Dieser letzte negative Befund verweist auf eine ganze kommende Forschungsrichtung. K. v. Vierordts **Physiologie des Kindesalters** - erschienen 1881, im Todesjahr Lotzes - und W. Preyers **Seele des Kindes** von 1882 markieren wesentliche Ausgangspunkte der systematischen psychologischen Entwicklungsforschung des Kindesalters (Eckardt/Bringmann/Sprung 1985). Diese überwand eine Vorgehensweise, derzufolge man ausgehend von unserem Wissen über "die vollentwickelte Vernunft" nach einem Wege "tappt (...), wie sich ihre allmähliche Entwicklung mit Wahrscheinlichkeit vorstellen lasse". Die mehr oder weniger anspruchsvollen Hypothesen, die meist nicht mehr als unausgesprochene Lieblingsmeinungen darstellten, würden dann "mit merkwürdiger Zuversicht als Schätze eines vorurteilslosen Empirismus feilgeboten" (Lotze 1880, S. CXI). Erst die empirische Kinderpsychologie vermochte mit ihren Ergebnissen der Gewohnheit zu begegnen, im Kinde nichts anderes als einen kleinen Erwachsenen zu sehen, dem nur noch ein gewisses Quantum Vernunft fehle.

Lotze gehört zu einem Wissenschaftserbe, das uns überliefert ist und dem wir uns in seiner ganzen Kompliziertheit und Widersprüchlichkeit zu stellen haben.

Notes

1. Vgl. Pester (1985). Zur Biographie und zum Schaffen Lotzes sind v.a. zu berücksichtigen: Wentscher (1913), Rehnisch (1881), Stumpf (1917), Kuntz (1971).
2. Vgl. dazu Weckowicz/Liebel-Weckowicz (1982), S. 147.

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ZUM VERHÄLTNIS VON AUFKLÄRUNG, PSYCHOLOGIE UND GESCHICHTE IN DEUTSCHLAND ZUR ZEIT DER FRANZÖSISCHEN REVOLUTION

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Summary

The writings of three philosophers of Göttingen university - Feder, Hissmann and Meiners - are conceived as a research program, which used empirical psychology and history for the reformation society. It is shown how Feder's attempt at linking a special (differential) psychology with the history of mankind leads Hissmann to a physiological psychology, which stressed the structure and the function of the nervous system for explaining interindividual differences. Meiners, while defending the empirical and practical orientation against Kant's critique, arrived at a much broader, hence problematic concept of inborn differences in sensation, cognition and sympathetic feeling. His legitimization of social and ethic inequalities and his claim to the leading role of the middle class is analysed in this context.

Unter dem Einfluss der englischen und französischen Empiristen erfolgt in Deutschland eine Loslösung von Wolffs dogmatischem System und eine programmatische Orientierung der Psychologie auf die praktischen Aufgaben von Erziehung und Aufklärung, die fundiert werden soll in einer auf physiologische und geschichtswissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse bezogenen Theoriebildung. An dieser neuorientierung der Psychologie arbeiteten zur Zeit der französischen Revolution auch drei Göttinger Philosophen, Johann Georg Heinrich Feder (1740-1821), Michael Hissmann (1752-1784) und besonders Christoph Meiners (1747-1810).

Obgleich sie in traditioneller Philosophiegeschichte als Vielschreiber, Eklektiker, systemlose Skeptiker und bedeutungslose Popularphilosophen gelten, wurden ihre Forschungen für die Herausbildung einer auf Erfahrung gegründeten Psychologie wichtig. Ich möchte daher einer Skizze ihrer Forschungschwerpunkte geben und anschliessend Aspekte ihrer Arbeiten vorstellen und deren Zusammenhang aufzeigen: 1. am Beispiel Hissmanns die Bemühungen um eine Fibernpsychologie, die die neue Bedeutung der physiologischen

Orientierung deutlich macht, 2. an der Auseinandersetzung mit der Kant'schen Erkenntniskritik die Verteidigung der Möglichkeit empirischer und praktisch orientierter Wissenschaft und 3. an Meiners' Formulierung der Verhältnisses von Aufklärungsmaximen und empirischer Ungleichheit der Menschen den Versuch, das Aufklärungsprogramm der Realität anzumessen.

Feder, bekannt durch sein Werk **Der neue Emil** (1768-74), in dem er seine Rezeption von Rousseau und Erfahrungen als Erzieher verarbeitete, wurde 1768 als Professor der Philosophie von Coburg nach Göttingen berufen und verkündete in seiner Antrittsvorlesung die Ablösung des philosophischen durch ein psychologisches Zeitalter. Feder, hier nur als Initiator vorgestellt, entwickelte ein Forschungsprogramm, an dem auch seine Schüler und Kollegen Hissmann und Meiners weiterarbeiteten. In seiner **Praktischen Philosophie** (1776) und seinem - analog zu Locke's **Untersuchungen über den menschlichen Willen** (1779-1793) thematisiert er das gegenüber der Erkenntnis bisher vernachlässigte Gebiet menschlichen Handelns und fordert die Ausarbeitung einer Spezialpsychologie, welche die Verschiedenheit der menschlichen Gemüter behandelt und durch Vergleich der Partikulargeschichten von Menschen und Völkern mit Hilfe der psychologischen Grundlehren zu einer Geschichte der menschheit vordringt. Feder machte 1777 als erster Smith's **Wealth of Nations** in Deutschland durch eine ausführliche Rezension in den **Göttinger gelehrten Anzeigen** bekannt und charakterisierte es weitsichtig als ein klassisches Werk. Weniger erfolgreich versuchte er sich als Kantkritiker, wozu er u.a. zusammen mit Meiners die Zeitschrift **Philosophische Bibliothek** (1788-1799) herausgab.

Hissmann, ab 1782 Professor der Philosophie und bereits mit 32 Jahren 1784 gestorben, widmete sich hauptsächlich der Psychologie und vertrat in seinen **Psychologischen Versuchen** (1777), seiner **Geschichte der Lehre von der Assoziation der Ideen** (1777b), den **Briefen über Gegenstände der Philosophie** (1778) und dem von ihm herausgegebenen **Magazin für die Philosophie und ihre Geschichte** (1778-83) am entschiedensten in Deutschland die Positionen von Locke, Bonnet, Helvetius, Hartley, Search, Priestly und Condillac, dessen Schrift über den Ursprung der menschlichen Erkenntnis er u.a. übersetzte (1780). Nach Dessoir (1902, 211) ist Hissmann ein genialer und einflussreicher Vertreter materialistischer Psychologie in Deutschland. Die Breite seiner philosophischen und historischen Interessen und

Kenntnisse belegen Abhandlungen über angeborene Begriffe, den Hauptzweck der dramatischen Poesie, die **Anleitung zur Kenntnis der auserlesenen Literatur in allen Teilen der Philosophie** (1778b), die Übersetzung der ersten fünf Bände von de Lisle's **Histoire universelle** (1781ff), eine Leibniz-Biographie, sowie die anonym erschienenen **Untersuchungen über den Stand der Natur** (1780). Das Interesse am Zustand der Menschen vor den bürgerlichen Gesellschaften teilt er mit Meiners (vgl. 1788, 2, 692-713).

Meiners lehrte ab 1772 Psychologie, Ästhetik und Geschichte der Philosophie und der Religionen in Göttingen. Obwohl er in seiner anonym erschienenen **Revision der Philosophie** (1772) die Begründing aller Philosophie auf Psychologie forderte und einen **Abriss der Psychologie** (1773), einen **Grundriss der Seelenlehre** (1778) und **Untersuchungen über die Denkkräfte und die Wellenkräfte des Menschen** (1806) herausgab, gilt sein Hauptinteresse der von Feder angeregten der **Geschichte der Menschheit** (1786)[1]. Unter Geschichte der Menschheit versteht er im Gegensatz zur politischen Geschichte und Universalhistorie eine Wissenschaft, welche ohne Rücksicht auf chronologische und räumliche Ordnungen und historische Bedeutung die allmähliche Verbreitung der Menschen und ihre ursprünglichen körperlichen und seelischen Anlagen, dann die verschiedenen Grade der Kultur, die Gewohnheiten und Sitten, Erziehungs- und Gesellungsformen, Meinungen und Kenntnisse in allen Völkern, auch die von unaufgeklärten und halbkultivierten Völkern, beschreibt und vergleicht, dh. herausarbeitet, was der Mensch als Ganzes war und jetzt noch ist, was er tat und litt.[2] Seine vielfältigen und vielbändigen Schriften zur Geschichte der Religionen (1774, 1785, 1806), des Luxus' (1781), der Wissenschaften (1781, 1787), der Weltweisheit (1786), des weiblichen Geschlechts (1788), der Ungleichheit der Stände (1792), der Denkart (1782), der Ethik (1801), der Sitten, Verfassungen und Gesetze, der Gewerbe und des Handels (1793), der Schulen und Universitäten (1801, 1802, 1808) in verschiedenen Zeiten und Ländern sowie seine Länder - und Reisebeschreibungen (1784, 1789, 1791) und Lebensbeschreibungen berühmter Männer (1795) lassen sich diesem Hauptinteresse unterordnen, ebenso die 160 Aufsätze völkerpsychologischen, vergleichend anthropologischen und kulturgeschichtlichen Inhalts, die er in dem von ihm mit dem Historiker und Staatsmann Ludwig Timotheus v. Spittler (1792-1810) herausgegebenen **Göttingischen historischen Magazin** 1787-1791 veröffentlichte.[3]

Hissmanns Bemühungen um eine Fibernpsychologie

Hatte Meiners 1772 gefordert, allen philosophischen Disziplinen eine Psychologie nach Bonnet's Muster zugrundezulegen, präzisiert Hissmann die Reichweite der Psychologie als Lehre vom menschlichen Verstand und Willenslehre, die sich mit der praktischen Philosophie überschneidet und in allen praktischen Fächern von Nutzen ist. Die Physiologie, die Kenntnis vom Bau des Körpers und der Ökonomie des tierischen Leben, ist für ihn die wichtigste Hilfswissenschaft, denn

> "ohne physiologische Kenntnisse sind psychologische vielleicht gar nicht möglich; wenigstens gewinnt die Psychologie durch die Beihilfe der Physiologie an Brauchbarkeit unendlich" (1778b, 150). "Die Sammlung dieser Tatsachen, behutsame Folgerungen aus denselben würden alles bisherige Gewäsch an Vorzügen und Brauchbarkeit unendlich überwiegen" (1777, 22).

Seit Philosophen die Beobachtungen der Ärzte benutzen und die Ärzte anfangen zu philosophieren[4], revolutionieren sich die Hauptlehren der Psychologie zur Auffassung der Seele als Materie bzw der Modifizierbarkeit ihrer Organe durch physische Ursachen. "Ist die menschliche Seele Materie: so müssen wir notwendig eine neue Psychologie haben, die nur der physiologische und anatomische Psycholog schreiben kann" (1777, 11), sagt er deutlicher in seinen anonym erschienenen **Psychologischen Versuchen**. Die "Hypothese des Materialismus", die Vorstellung einer unzertrennlichen, aus materiellen Atomen, zusammengesetzten Einheit, gilt ihm plausibler und besser durch die Erfahrung abgesichert als die Annahme der Seele als eines gar nicht zu denkenden und keiner Erfahrung entsprechenden einfachen, unausgedehten, immateriellen, rein geistigen Wesens, das die Seelenkräfte und die ungeheuren Menge der Ideen in sich schliessen soll[5].

> "Nach den Erfahrungen, auf die ich mich stütze, glaube ich daher annehmen zu müssen, dass unserem Gehirn die Kraft zu denken zugeschrieben werden müsse. Man kann dem ohngeachtet den Ausdruck Seele und Seelenkräfte immer beibehalten, wenn man unter den letzteren nichts als Anspannung der Gehirnorganen, der intellektuellen Fibern versteht, deren verschiedene Modifikationen und Dispositionen verschiedene Begriffe und Ideen sind" (1777, 252).

Hissmann fasst das Nervensystem als empfindungsfähige Einheit auf, in der die Bewegung und Veränderung der Verbundenen Nerven und Gehirnfibern der Grund aller Seelenkräfte und die Ursache der Seelenoperationen sind, und ohne die keine Ideenassoziationen und folglich kein

vernünftiger Produkt des menschlichen Geistes möglich ist. Neben den Assoziationsgesetzen der Ideen nimmt er ein für die Assoziation der inneren Empfindungen und Leidenschaften gültigers "Gesetz der physischen Verbindung unserer inneren Organe" an (1777b, 86)[6]. Nach seinen Analysen beruhen die Fähigkeits- und Geschicklichkeitsunterschiede von Tieren und Menschen weder auf dem Volumen noch der Gehirnmasse oder deren Verhältnis zum Körpergewicht, sondern auf seiner spezifischen Schwere aufgrund innerer Reichhaltigkeit, die sich durch geistige Arbeit erhöht, und auf der Anzahl der Hirnwindungen (1777, 23; 1778, 76). Genauer bestimmen die grössere Empfindlichkeit der Nerven und die Lebhaftigkeit der wahrgenommenen Eigenschaften der Dinge den Grad der Gelehrigkeit; letztlich "laufen Güte des Charakters, Verstand und Herz auf die Eigenschaften der Nerven- und Gehirnfibern hinaus" (152), wobei es allerdings von der Erziehung abhängt, ob der Mensch Bösewicht oder Weltbürger wird. Weil der gesunde Mensch eine natürliche, harmonische Einheit auf der Basis nervaler Verknüpfungen ist, ein sensorium commune, leidet er, wenn eines seiner Glieder leidet, oder er Leiden anderer Geschöpfe wahrnimmt. In Meiners' sehr ähnlicher und in ihren sozialen Implikationen deutlicheren Theorie der inneren Organisation, der Empfindlichkeit und Sympathie[7], das sei aber vorwegnehmend angedeutet, liegt der Schlüssel zum Verständnis seiner Begründung gesellschaftlicher Ungleichheit.

Durch Tetens (1777) erfährt die Entwicklung einer mechanischen - nicht mechanistischen - und materialistischen Positionen nahestehenden Psychologie eine erste Korrektur. Tetens schätzt zwar Bonnet, meint aber, man habe den Wert der neuen Methode übertrieben und die Beobachtung der Seelenbeschaffenheiten vernachlässigt, die erst Aussagen über Gehirnprozesse ermöglichen. Die Untersuchung der Seele kann daher nicht mit Physiologie anfangen, sondern nur endigen. Der in der Folgezeit vorsichtigere Umgang mit dem fibernpsychologischen Ansatz hat aber nicht nur methodische Gründe. Er ist ideologisch brisant und für die komplexeren, praktisch bedeutsameren Phänomene schwer durchführbar.

Meiners Auseinandersetzung mit Kant

Die vor allen von Feder (z.B. 1787) geführte Auseinandersetzung mit Kant über den Substanz-, Raum- und Kausalitätsbegriff[8] soll nicht dargestellt werden. Hier interessieren die prinzipliellen

Differenzen hinsichtlich der gesellschaftlichen Funktion von Wissenschaft, wobei es weniger um erkenntnistheoretische Fragen geht als um die Verteidigung der Möglichkeit, praktisch wirksam zu werden.

Zum Verständnis dieser Auseinandersetzung ist ein Rückgriff auf Meiners' **Revision der Philosophie** von 1772 nötig, in der er seine Wissenschaftsauffassung expliziert. Kriterium für den Wert von Wissenschaft ist nicht die Zahl der neuen Ideen oder Wahrheiten, sondern es sind jene Sätze, von denen die Geschichte zeigt, dass sie vielen Menschen Nutzen oder Vergnügen verschafft haben. Für das praktische Ziel der Menschenverbesserung sind ihm die Zerstörung verjährter Vorurteile und der zweckmässige Vortrag alter, aber ungenutzter Wahrheiten wichtiger als die das Volk der Wissenschaft entfremdende Modephilosophie ohne praktischen Nutzen; der philosophische Erfinder, sagt er, verhält sich zum Menschenverbesserer, wie der Eroberer zum Gesetzgeber.

Die Zielgruppe, über die Philosophie wirken soll, ist die Klasse der an Zahl geringen Mittelstands-Personen zwischen dem Hofmann und Gelehrten und dem dienstbaren, zu drückenden Arbeiten gezwungenen grossen Haufen, der nicht anders kann als glauben. Diese Klasse hat nämlich mit dem niedrigsten Teil des menslichen Geschlechts an meisten Umgang, wird am ehesten nachgeahmt und kann so Toleranz, Menschlichkeit und die Kunst vermitteln, jeden Stand zu seinem und anderer Vergnügen am besten zu nutzen.

Aber nicht jede Art von Philosophie ist für diese Aufgabe geeignet. In Anlehnung an den dem Materialismus nahestehenden englischen Pantheisten John Toland unterscheidet Meiners esoterische und exoterische Philosophie und macht deutlich, welche Art von Philosophie gesellschaftlich wirksam werden kann und soll. Die esoterische, skeptische Philosophie enthält "Lehren, die von dem jedesmaligen theologischen System und den allgemein aufgenommenen Meinungen, nach welchem jedes Zeitalter sein praktisches Leben einrichtet, zu weit entfernt sind, als dass sie ohne gefährliche Erschütterungen allgemein bekannt gemacht werden dürften" (91f). Dagegen ist der an Nützlichkeit interessierte "exoterische Philosoph verpflichtet, sich in dem Vortrage seiner Grundsätze nach der öffentlichen Religion, dem Zustand der Gelehrsamkeit und nach dem allgemeinen Urteil, worauf man Sitte und Tugend gründet, einzurichten" (132). Meiners lässt keinen Zweifel an der Unmöglichkeit, frei zu denken, solange die Religion die fast einzige Lehrerin des Volkes und das Modell ist, nach dem die

übrigen Wissenschaften geformt werden. Daher ist für den Philosophen die

> "beste Art zu reformieren, wenn er sich ohne Geräusche ankündigt, wohl überlegt, ob das Zeitalter für diese oder jene Veränderung weit genug sei und die gehörige Rezeptivität habe und alsdann seine Ideen als ganz bekannte und bisher schon geglaubte Sachen in die Masse der Modeerscheinungen einmischt" (122).

Meiners sieht zwei zu verbindende "Kommunikationslinien, in denen sich der philosophische Geist durch alle Glieder des Staates bewegt". Es sind dies einerseits die Geschichte der Menschheit, welche die Kluft zwischen den allgemeinen Lehren der Philosophie und den besonderen Fakten der Geschichte schliessen soll, andererseits die schönen Künste, wobei der Theorie der Empfindungen und ihrer praktischen Anwendung eine zentrale Bedeutung zukommt, weil sie sich nicht nur mit gleichgültigen Eindrücken und deren Verwandlung in Ideen, sondern mit angenehmen Sensationen und deren Verhältnis zu Vergnügen und Glückseligkeit beschäftigt und damit viele Menschen ansprechbar macht. Bildung der Geistes und die lange vernachlässigte Besserung des Herzens bilden für Meiners in aufklärungs- bzw erziehungspraktischer Hinsicht eine Einheit, aber ihre wissenschaftliche Behandlung sollte getrennt erfolgen, denn "viele schwache Personen schlucken schon manche philosophische Idee glatt hinunter, wenn sie mit einer ästhetischen Brühe gewürzt ist oder in angenehmer Gesellschaft der Geschichte erscheint" (143).
Meiners Trennung in Exoterik und Esoterik macht deutlich, was er einem grösseren Publikum zumuten möchte. Die Psychologie gehört nicht dazu. Empirische Psychologie ist daher für ihn und auch Hissmann (vgl. 1777) esoterische Logik, dh. die Lehre von den Ideen, den daraus entstehenden Kräften, der Sprache und der Zuverlässigkeit der natürlichen Organe, der Wahrheit und der Erkenntnisgrenzen. Der eigentlichen, exoterischen Logik dagegen fällt die Aufgabe zu, deren nützliche Erkenntnisse, Regelwissen, in Abhängigkeit von den historischen Bedingungen zu verbreiten. Nun zu seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Kant.

In der Vorrede zum **Grundriss der Seelenlehre** (1786) beklagt Meiners eine problematische Wende im philosophischen Geist der Nation durch Kants kritik der reinen Vernunft. Entgegen seinen Erwartungen, dass diese Schrift durch die Dunkelheit der Sprache keinen Eindruck machen und keinen Schaden stiften würde, findet er viele junge Leute

verwirrt und die nützlicheren Wissenschaften vernachlässigt. Anstössig ist ihm, dass Kant die reine Vernunft als Quelle aller Erkenntnis annimmt, diese gar an manchen Stellen für so unzuverlässig erklärt wie sonst die Erfahrung und dass er von den Wahrheiten der natürlichen Religion und der Sittenlehre als von blossen Hypothesen spricht. Am meisten aber empört ihn, dass Kant, obwohl er selbst die Frage aufwirft, ob das allgemeine Beste durch solche Zweifel nicht leiden könne, sich in weiteren auf die Frage reduziert, wieweit es die Vernunft in ihrer von allen Interessen abstrahierenden Spekulation bringen könne. Dagegen führt er Hume's Warnung vor übertriebenem Skeptizismus an, dessen allgemeine Verbreitung das menschliche Leben zugrunde richten und alle Tätigkeit beenden würde. Meiners will der populären Philosophie wegen ihres Nutzens den Vorrang gegenüber der spekulativen lassen, da sie mehr in den Plan des Lebens passt, Herz und Neigungen bildet und den Wandel ordnet. Daher bittet er Kant, wenigstens die am Gemeinwohl orientierten Beweggründe seiner Kritik zu würdigen. Er halte es, wie schon Leibniz, für besser, die Mitmenschen nur langsam durch sanfte Mittel von ihren Irrtümern zu überzeugen, statt durch modische, die Leiden-schaften aufpeitschende Schriften zu der allgemeinen Revolution vorzubereiten, durch die Europa bedroht wird.

Zum Verhältnis von Aufklärung und Ungleichheit der Menschen

Auf der Basis von Meiners' Wissenschafsverständnis will ich nun seine nach der französischen Revolution formulierte Konzeption des Verhältnisses von Aufklärung und Ungleichheit der Menschen darstellen. Dabei wird sich zeigen, wie die pädagogische Intention der Anleitung zum Vernunftgebrauch, die ohne Rücksicht auf verhandene Ungleichheit der Vorstellungen nicht auskommt, sich konkret in den "unaufgelösten" Hierarchievorstellungen des Verfassers verfängt.

In seiner Schrift **Über wahre, unzeitige und falsche Aufklärung und deren Wirkungen** (1794) bestimmt Meiners Aufklärung als jene schönen und nützlichen Kenntnisse, wodurch der menschliche Geist gebildet oder das Herz der Menschen veredelt wird. Im engeren Sinne

> "wahre Aufklärung in einer solchen Kenntnis der Natur und ihres Urhebers, ... des Menschen und seiner Verhältnisse, wodurch diejenigen, welche sie besitzen, gegen Aberglauben und Schwärmerei, ebensowohl als gegen Unglaube, gegen Despotismus, wie gegen Anarchie und Zügellosigkeit bewahrt oder davon befreit und über ihre wahre Bestimmung und

Glückseligkeit, über ihre Pflichten und Rechte unterrichtet werden" (5f).

Eine Nation gilt ihm schon dann als aufgeklärt, wenn der grösste Teil der Volkes, die Jugend, der grössere Teil der höheren Stände und die wohlhabenderen Kaufleute, Fabrikanten, Handwerker und Landleute frei von Schwärmerei und Aberglauben sind und durch ihr Beispiel die niedrigsten Volksklassen so beeinflüssen, dass die abergläubischen Vorstellungen Sagencharakter erhalten und kaum noch wirksam werden.

Die Frage, ob wahre Aufklärung schaden oder zu weit getrieben werden kann, verneint er entschieden. Nützliche Kenntnisse können niemals gemeinschädlich werden, Vervollkommnung kann nie zu weit gehen, und Aufklärung und Sittlichkeit können nicht in einem Widerspruchsverhältnis stehen. Der aufgeklärte Mensch strebt nach Sittlichkeit, Tugend, Wahrheit, vernünftiger Freiheit und nicht zu gewaltsamen Revolutionen, noch ist er durch andere verführbar. Es ist wider die Natur des Menschen, sagt er, dass wahre Aufklärung jemals den Sitten schaden könnte und eben deswegen wider alle Geschichte und Erfahrung, dass sie ihnen jemals geschadet hat.

Feinde der Aufklärung sind nach Meiners jene, die von den Anmassungen profitieren, die nur rechtmässig genannt werden, weil sie längere Zeit gedauert haben oder geduldet worden sind, sowie diejenigen, die wahre mit falscher und unzeitiger Aufklärung verwechseln.

Falsche Aufklärung vermitteln jene Lehrsätze, durch die Aberglauben und Schwärmerei vielleicht gehemmt, aber der Glaube an Gott, die Unsterblichkeit und wahre Tugend zerstört oder geschwächt, blinde Natur zur Schöpferin und Regiererin der Welt erhoben, die Bestimmung des Menschen auf das irdische Leben beschränkt, Eigennutz zur einzigen Triebfeder des Handelns gemacht, Glückseligkeit im selbstsüchtigen Genuss und bloss sinnlichem Vergnügen gesehen und das Recht des Stärkeren zum höchsten Naturrecht erklärt werden.

Unzeitige Aufklärung geht von richtigen und an sich nützlichen Kenntnissen aus, die aber dem Alter, Stand oder Geschlecht von Personen oder ihrer Fassungskraft und ihrer ganzen Bestimmung widersprechend oder unangemessen sind und deshalb missverstanden und missbraucht werden oder die Betreffenden von ihren Geschäften abhalten und mit ihrer Lage unzufrieden machen. So ist es falsch, Kinder mit religiöser Dogmatik, Frauen mit Wissenschaft und Bauern mit Ideen der Volkssouveränität und Gleichheit bekannt zu machen oder dem

grossen Haufen das, was die Religion der Vollkommeneren ausmacht, auf einmal mitteilen zu wollen.

Das sicherste Mittel gegen falsche und unzeitige Aufklärung ist die Beförderung oder nur das Nichtbehindern der wahren Aufklärung durch "Gestattung der höchsten unschädlichen Freiheit im Reden, Lesen und Schreiben" (93); ungeeignet sind Verbote und Strafen, wie jeder Menschenkenner und Geschichtsforscher weiss.[9]

In seiner **Geschichte der Ungleichheit der Stände** (1792) setzt sich Meiners mit der Frage auseinander, inwiefern die Menschen einander von Natur gleich sind, und warum trotz der vorausgesetzten Gleichheit und Menschenrechte in allen Völkern, insbesondere aber in den entwickelsten, eine Ungleichheit der Stände und Rechte entstanden ist. Ausgangspunkt ist das Naturrecht, des interessanterweise psychologisch begründet, aber dann sogleich den herrschenden Verhältnissen angepasst wird:

> "So wie die Fähigkeit, Recht und Unrecht zu leiden mit der Empfindlichkeit anfängt und aufhört, so entsteht und verschwindet die Fähigkeit, Recht und Unrecht zu tun, ganz allein mit der Vernunft" (4). "Wenn die Natur gewollt hätte, so würde sie alle Völker und Menschen mit den selbigen äusseren und inneren Vorzügen ausgerüstet haben. Nun lehren aber Erfahrung und Geschichte ... dass die Bewohner verschiedener Erdteile nicht in gleichem Grade vollständige Menschen sind. Es ist also nichts natürlicher, dass die Rechte von Völkern oder Menschenrassen ihren Vorzügen entsprechen ... dass diejenigen Nationen die meisten Rechte geniessen, welche die meisten Vollkommenheiten besitzen" (10f).

Selbst innerhalb einer Nation gibt es so gross ursprüngliche Verschiedenheiten der Individuen, dass dadurch in allen Zeiten un Zuständen Ungleichheit der Rechte erzeugt werden musste. Die Gesetze der Geschichte zeigen, dass mit der Entwicklung zu grossen Gesellschaften und der ungleichen Vervollkommnung der Individuen und Nationen die Ungleichheit der Menschen und der Rechte und die Unterschiede von Volksklassen und Rangordnungen zunehmen, wenngleich die Vorrechte einzelner Stände abnehmen. Diese mit Kultur und Erziehung noch wachsenden Unterschiede machen alle Bemühungen von Gleichheitsschwärmern vergeblich.

Allgemein soll gelten, dass Menschen nur insofern gleiche Rechte haben, als sie einander gleich sind oder gleiche angeborene oder erworbene Vorzüge besitzen. Aus der Menschenpflicht, niemand Unrecht zu tun, und aus dem angeborenen Menschenrecht, kein Unrecht leiden zu

dürfen, ergibt sich nicht, dass alle Menschen von Natur gleich frei sind:

> "Nur diejenigen Menschen haben ein angeborenes Recht auf Freiheit, welche, sich selbst überlassen, mehr gutes geniessen und tun, als wenn sie vom Willen anderer abhängen" (18).

Gehorsam kann so zur natürlichen Pflicht und Herrschaft ein natürliches Recht werden, das sich aber auf dem Vermögen gründet, andere, die man zum Gehorsam zwingt, glücklicher und besser zu machen, als sie sich selbst überlassen geworden wären.

Adel, als auf erblichen Vorzügen gegründetes erbliches Vorrecht, hat seinen Grund in der allgemeinen Erfahrung, dass die Vorzüge am meisten durch die Natur oder das Blut der Eltern, vorzüglich der Väter, bestimmt sind. Reichtum war nicht Ursache, sondern Folge des natürlichen Adels.

> "Nimmt man dem Adel seine .... Vorrechte mit Gewalt, so tut man ebenso sehr Unrecht, als wenn man jedem anderen Bürger sein Vermögen nähme" (591).

Nachdem Meiners so die Vorherrschaft der Europäer, die gesellschaftlichen Ungleichheiten, insbesonders die Vorrechte des Adels, auf der Grundlage ethnischer und interindividueller Differenzen gerechtfertigt hat, behandelt er deren Grenzen, davon ausgehend, dass "erbliche Vorrechte nur dann gültig und natürlich sind, wenn sie auf erbliche höhere Verzüge gegründet sind" (600). Vorrecht können gemeinschädlich werden, wenn gewisse Stände, Geschlechter und Menschen diese durch Geburt geniessen, obwohl sie nicht mehr oder gar weniger angeborene und erworbene Vorzüge besitzen als andere. Die ohne Verdienst genossenen Vorrechte der Aristokratie und Oligarchie haben zur natürlichen Folge, dass die Triebfedern und Kräfte abgetötet oder geschwächt wurden, woraus sich der Ab- und Aufstieg einzelner Geschlechter und Staaten erklärt. Entscheidend für die Gegenwart ist, dass die ursprünglichen Vorzüge des Adels, wie Schönheit, Stärke, Tapferkeit und Erfahrung in den Waffen, nun überholt sind:

> "Jetzt besteht der wahre Adel des Menschen ... in einem grossen, tätigen und gebildeten Geist, der zu den wichtigsten Ämtern und Arbeiten vorzüglich fähig macht, und in einer erhabenen Seele, die sich weder durch Eigennutz, ... Leidenschaften, noch durch Gefahren und Schwierigkeiten von gemeinnützigen Unternehmungen weglocken oder wegschrecken lässt. Diese Vollkommenheiten erben viel seltener fort, als

> diejenigen Vorzüge, welch den ersten Adel bildeten und werden durch die heutige Erziehung viel weniger entwickelt" (603f).

Da nun die Erziehung im Bürgertum besser, der Antrieb zu frühem und anhaltendem Fleiss und vor allem die Tüchtigkeit zu nützlichen Arbeiten grösser ist, so ist nichts so sehr überholt und grundlos als das fast ausschliessliche Vorrecht des Adels auf die höchsten militärischen und bürgerlichen Ehrenstellen, seine Steuerfreiheit, Leibeigenschafts- und Gerichtsbarkeitsrechte. Denn selbst der Adel wird nicht behaupten, dass er mehr Genie besitzt als das Bürgertum. Der Adel würde vor dem Verfall bewahrt werden, wenn Geburt nicht mehr Verdienst ersetzt, er seine Kräfte ernsthafter bilden und anstrengen müsste, und

> "man ihn in die Notwendigkeit setzte, sich mit eben dem Eifer nützlichte Kenntnisse, Fähigkeiten und bürgerliche und häussliche Tugenden erwerben, womit es die vom dritten Stand tun" (603). "Der deutsche Adel wird um desto mehr an schädlichen Vorrechten verlieren und desto mehr an Kenntnissen, Tugenden und Vermögen gewinnen, je mehr er gegen den dritten Stand in das Verhältnis kommt, in welchen es der Adel und die Gemeinen in England sind" (639).

Dies ist auch das bereits in der Vorrede artikulierte Credo seiner wissenschaftslichen und politischen Bemühungen:

> "Alle meine historischen und philosophischen Untersuchungen haben mich bisher auf das Resultat zurück gebracht, dass die englische Verfassung unter allen Verfassungen die vollkommenste unter allen Regierungsformen für grosse Völker sei, dass die übrigen Nationen Europens sich nicht eher zu dem Wohlstande der Britten erheben werden, als bis Fürsten, Adel, und Gemeine in solche Verhältnisse kommen als in welchen sie in England gegeneinander stehen, und dass alle europäischen Völker sich unaufhaltsam dieser Verfassung um desto mehr nähern werden, je mehr sie an Aufkärung, Betriebsamkeit und innerem Reichtum wachsen werden" (V).

Wissenschaft und Herrschaftanspruch

Feders Programm, in praktischer Absicht eine differentielle Psychologie mit der Geschichte der Menschheit zu verbinden, führt in Hissmanns fibernpsychologischer Konzeption, von zwischenartlichen Differenzen ausgehend zur Annahme einer Abhängigkeit interindividueller psychicher Unterschiede von spezifischen Eigenschaften des Nervensystems, welche die Bedeutung der Erziehung und Lebensumstände auf die moralische Formierung eingrenzen. Meiners, der am konsequentesten die

Relevanz empirischer Psychologie in Verbindung mit seiner Geschichte der Menschheit vertritt und die historisch bestimmten Grenzen "wahrer", d.h. ständisch relativierter Aufklärung präzisiert, geht einen entscheidenden Schritt weiter in der Legitimierung erscheinender Unterschiede zwischen und innerhalb von Völkern als natürlichen. In seinen späteren Arbeiten, z.B. den **Untersuchungen über die Verschiedenheiten der Menschennaturen** (1811-15), verkommen die Ansätze zu einer differentiellen und kulturvergleichenden Psychologie zu einer mit angeborenen Unterschieden in verschiedenen Menschenstämmen und Rassen operierenden Anthropologie, wie sie anfangs des 19. Jahrhunderts auch in Frankreich und England allgemein wird.[10] Dies verwundert, da er in früheren Schriften, ähnlich wie Hissmann, von der Bildbarkeit der psychichen Organisation des Menschen ausgeht, die Überwindung der Beliebigkeit der Menschenbilder durch die Beobachtung des werdenden Individuums fordert[11] und auch die Schriften von Miller, Fergusson etc. kennt, in denen der Zusammenhang von Klima, Produktions- und Lebensweise für die Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten der Individuen thematisiert wird. Plausibler als die Annahme, es handle sich hier um seine exoterische Position, dort um seine esoterische, erscheint mir, dass mit der Durchsetzung bürgerlicher Verhältnisse Meiners zunehmend das Problem der Neudefinition gesellschaftlicher Unterschiede sieht. Die Argumentationsbasis hierfür liefert ihm die Geschichte der Menschheit in ihrem doppelten Verhältnis zu Psychologie und Aufklärung; einerseits soll diese ergiebigste Quelle der Menschenkenntnis sein, Vorurteile, eingeschliffene Meinungen und Gewohnheitssysteme in der eigenen Nation aufweichen und einseitige oder zu allgemeine Behauptungen der menschenverbessernden Philosophie korrigieren, anderseits aber soll diese Quelle selbst durch psychologische Grundlehren fundiert sein. Die psychologischen Grundlehren, auf die Meiners sich zentral bezieht, enthalten in seiner Fassung aber bereits den Massstab der Differenzierung: der Mensch ist um so vollkommener und bildungfähiger, je grösser seine natürliche Anpassungsfähigkeit, seine angeborene Empfindlichkeit und seine sympathetischen Gefühle sind und je weniger ausgeprägt seine grobe Sinnlichkeit. In ihren sozial entfalteten Formen sind dies die bürgerlichen Tugenden der Genuss- und Handlungsfähigkeit in den Grenzen der Mässigkeit und sittlich-sozialen Verantwortlichkeit, die dann selbstverständlich den Europäer vom Wilden und den Bürger vom Bauern und

Adligen unterscheiden und so den Anspruch auf Herrschaft gegenüber der restlichen Gesellschaft und anderen Völkern legitimieren.

Anmerkungen

1. Dieses Interesse teilte er mit seinem Schul- und Studienfreund Dietrich Tiedemann, der seinen früh gefassten Plan, eine Geschichte der Menschheit zu schreiben nicht verwirklicht, aber dazu umfangreiche handschriftliche Ausarbeitungen hinterlassen hat.
2. Im Gegensatz zu Herders idealem Entwurf in seinen **Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte** (1784-1791), in dem die Vorgeschichte der Menschheit bis in die geschichtliche Zeit hinein überdehnt und Geschichte als teleologische Erziehungsprozess zur Humanität verstanden wird, ist Meiners' Ansatz stärker an der neueren Geschichte und am Kulturvergleich in dem Versuch orientiert, die Gründe für Aufstieg und Niedergang bestimmter Teile der Menschheit zu identifizieren, um so Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten für die Gegenwart aufzeigen zu können. Seine Auffassung von Geschichte der Menschheit sieht er insbesondere durch Iselin, Home und Falconer vorbereitet.
3. Das Magazin will durch Untersuchungen der Herausgeber aus der Geschichte der Menschheit und durch Kritik und Dokumentation aktueller Entwicklungen "der Mängel und Missbräuche so wenige machen, als es in unseren menschlichen Einrichtungen nur möglich ist" (1, 1787, 4).
4. Indirekt ist hier auf Melchior A. Weickart: **Der philosophische Arzt.** Frankfurt: Andreä 1773-1775, 2 Bde., verwiesen, der sich ebenfalls stark an Bonnet, Haller und Unzer orientierte.
5. Ganz ähnlich argumentiert der Philanthrop Karl Spazier in seiner Streitschrift **Antiphädon** von 1785, die in der verspäteten deutschen Aufklärung mit einer Flut antimaterialistischer Schriften durch ihren konsequenten Materialismus und Atheismus eine Sonderstellung einnimmt, aber unbeachtet geblieben ist. Sieht Spazier in dem Aberglauben an die Unsterblichkeit eine Ablenkung der Menschheit von der verpflichtenden Gegenwart, eine Fortschritt behindernde Fessel, so will Hissmann die Fragen, was ich bin und was ich dereinst sein werde, lediglich getrennt behandelt und begründet wissen, da die von dogmatischen Theologen geforderte Verbindung der Seelenforscher zur Abkehr von Beobachtbarem zwingt, um nicht "bei ihrem heftigen Durchbruch der Menschenliebe verbrannt zu werden". In ethisch-sittlicher Hinsicht besteht allerdings auch für Hissmann keine Notwendigkeit zum Glauben an die Unsterblichkeit: "Tugend ist mir für sich liebenswürdig. Sie flösst mir Gefühl zur Rechtschaffenheit ein, ehe ich noch meine Vorteile mit algebraischer Genauigkeit berechne. So muss ein Weltbürger fühlen und denken. Hinsicht auf ewige Strafe und Lohn fesselt und macht Sklaven" (1777, 13).
6. Zu diesem, nach Hissmann erst in neuerer Zeit durch philosophische Verallgemeinerung der Beobachtungen des Historikers ermöglichten Gesetz haben Malebranche und Meiners (1772, 38) Vorformen geliefert. Wenn Hissmann sagt "Was die Newtonsche Attraktion in der Körperwelt ist, das ist die Ideenassoziation in der Geisterwelt" (1778b, 228), so ist dies nicht blosse Analogie, sondern Gewissheit über allgemeine Gesetze innerhalb einer einheitlichen Naturtheorie. Daher seine Verwunderung, "dass man im Reiche der Ideen die Attraktion und ihre Gesetze lange vorher bemerkte, ehe man in der Körperwelt diese

Eigenschaften wahrnahm. Wären die alten Physiker ebenso aufmerksam gewesen wie die alten Psychologen, so hätte Newton unmöglich der erste Entdecker dieser mächtigen Triebfedern der Natur sein können, die die ungeheuren Weltkörper in ihren ewigen Gleisen erhalten, (wo doch) eine frühere Bemerkung der Anziehungskraft in der körperlichen Natur weit notwendiger gewesen wäre, als die Bemerkung derselbigen in der Seelenlehre" (1777b, 6f).

7. Thematisch sind folgende Aufsätze Meiners' im Göttingischen historischen Magazin: - **Über die grosse Verschiedenheit der Biegsamkeit und Unbiegsamkeit, der Härte und Weichheit der verschiedenen Stämme und Racen der Menschen**, 1, 1787, 210-246, wo er in der grösseren Anpassungsfähigkeit und Empfindlichkeit die Grundlage für die Überlegenheit der keltischen (europäischen) Völker identifiziert.
   - **Über die sympathetische Reizbarkeit und einige daraus zu erklärenden Erscheinungen in den schwächeren Völkern**, 2, 1788, 40-56, wo er Sympathie allgemein bestimmt als natürliche Anziehungskraft zwischen leblosen oder lebenden und empfindenden Teilen, spezieller als eine Stimmung oder Beweglichkeit dieser Teile in Menschen und Tieren, durch die sinnliche Wahrnehmung oder Vorstellung von Bewegung und Empfindung anderer Wesen in ähnliche Bewegungen oder Rührungen versetzt zu werden. Von der sympathetischen Reizbarkeit, als natürlicher Disposition zur Mitbewegung, grenzt er die angeborene sympathetische Empfindlichkeit durch den Anblick oder die Vorstellung empfindender Wesen affiziert zu werden als unabhängig davon existierend ab, und ordnet diese der vollkommeneren, jene dem Rest der Menschheit zu. In Adam Smith's "Theory of moral sentiments" ist Sympathie Mitgefühl mit jeder Art von Affekt, aber nach den Beispielen ist die unwillkürliche Mitbewegung eingeschlossen.
   - **Über die Sinnlichkeit und deren verschiedenen Stufen und Zweige**, 4, 1789, 586-606, wo er Sinnlichkeit als jenen mit den Tieren gemeinsamen körperliche und psychische Entwicklung hemmt. Daher sind Menschen und Völker um so glücklicher organisiert, bzw haben bessere Anlagen, je feiner und lebhafter ihre Sinne, Seelenkräfte, das natürliche Mifgefühl und die daraus entspringenden geselligen und wohlwollenden Regungen sind. Sie sind um so mehr gebildet, je mehr diese geweckt und geübt sind und durch diese Veredelung ihrer Natur imstande sind, sich selbst und andere Menschen, den Wert von Freuden und Schmerzen, von Gütern und Übeln richtig zu schätzen, Empfindungen und Begierden zu mässigen und zu beherrschen und endlich fähig zu werden, dem Menschen eigentümliche Freuden zu geniessen und die Glückseligkeit anderer Menschen zu fördern. Entartung durch übermässigen Genuss und unnatürliche Reize führt zur Vernachlässigung der Künste, Wissenschaften und bürgerlichen Tugenden, zu Unterdrückung, Grausamkeit oder zur Duldung knechtischer Demütigungen, wie etwa in den Kolonien zu beobachten.
8. Kants scharfe Replik auf Feder in den Prolegomena zu einer jeden zukünftigen Metaphysik hat diesen relativ isoliert; nur noch F.H. Jacobi stand ihm noch zur Seite.
9. Die Freiheit der Presse, als das Recht freier Menschen, ihre Gedanken über alle Gegenstände wissenschaftlicher Untersuchung, selbst über Verfassungen und Verwaltungen und deren Gebrechen, drucken zu lassen, darf nach Meiners aber die Ruhe des Staates nicht verletzen und kann nur in den Mass erweitert werden, wie die Verfassung vervollkommnet wird. Bis dahin sei es die Pflicht

aller guten Schriftsteller, einen Teil ihrer natürlichen Rechte aufzuopfern.

10. Auf seine 30-jährigen Bemühungen um die Geschichte der menschheit zurückblickend, schreibt Meiners: "Die ersten glücklichen Erfolge wurden durch den Ausbruch der französischen Revolution gehemmt. Die Urheber der Revolution verkündeten als Grundsätze der Freiheit: dass alle Menschen einander von Natur gleich und alle Brüder seien; dass die Unterschiede der Bewohner verschiedener Erdteile und Länder bloss von den Verschiedenheit der Verfassung und anderer moralischer Ursachen herrührten: dass man Ungleichheit der Stände und Rechte, am allermeisten aber jede Art von Knechtschaft, als mit der natürlichen Freiheit und Gleichheit streitend, selbst mit Gewalt zu vertilgen suchen müsse u.s.w. Diese angebildeten Grundsätze fanden bei der Jugend, bei dem grössten Teile der Journalisten und modischen Schriftsteller nur zu viel Eingang. Man hörte nicht mehr, wenn ich bewies, dass die Neger, die Amerikaner u.s.w. von Natur unter den Europäern stünden, man entbrannte vor Unwillen darüber, dass ich die Rechte des Adels verteidigte, und mich sogar gegen eine plötzliche Aufhebung der Knechtschaft der Neger erklärte. Unter den modischen Schriftstellern war keiner in seinen Angriffen auf mich heftiger und seichter als der jungere Foster ... Nun sprechen die besten englischen und französischen Reisebeschreiber seit fünf und mehr Jahren ebenfalls von ursprünglichen Verschiedenheiten und Menschenarten. Neuere Forschungen lassen mich daran zweifeln, ob die sogenannten physischen Ursachen so viel über den Menschen vermöchten, als ich bisher mit den meisten Naturforschern angenommen hatte" (1811, XVIIIff).

11. In seiner ersten Schrift über die Natürlichkeit der Neigungen sagt er: "Jeder ergreift den Menschen, wie er ihn antrifft ... Dieser bildet ein schönes Ganzes ... und findet da einen Gott, wo er den Menschen suchte. Ein anderer ... sucht den Menschen in der entkräfteten und erniedrigten Natur des Hottentotten und Irokesen und stürzt ihn ohne Mitleid von seinem ursprünglichen Adel eines denkenden Wesens in die verworfene Klasse eines bloss fühlenden Geschöpfes ... Diesen Widersprüchen würde vielleicht noch einigermassen abgeholfen worden sein, wenn man das werdende Individuum des Menschen aufmerksamer beobachtet hätte; allein auch dies ist bisher ein frommer Wunsch geblieben" (1769, 191). Entschieden wendet sich Meiners hier gegen die Annahme, dass Ideen und Neigungen des Individuums und der Völker angeboren und unveränderlich sind.

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BESONDERHEITEN DER ANWENDUNG DER PSYCHOLOGIE IN DER INDUSTRIE UNGARNS ZWISCHEN DEN ZWEI WELTKRIEGEN

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Summary

Some Specific Applications of Psychology in the Hungarian Industry between the Two World Wars.

The economic conditions and political situation in Hungary were rather unfavourable after the first World War: along with the one percent annual growth in industrial production, unemployment was quite high. The application of psychology was geared less with attempting to solve these economic problems than in aiming to tackle the workers' discontent (manifested itself in strikes and demonstrations) off by different social political measures (social insurance, worktime regulation, etc.).

One of the specific applications of psychology in the Hungarian industry between the two World Wars was its social political roots - its aim was not to increase the efficiency of production but to prevent accidents, protect the workers' health or emply a contented and physically and mentally balanced labour force by way of fruitful vocational guidance. Implementation of the above aims was intended to be achieved by the methods of pedology and differential psychology, though measures of psychotechnology were well known. This is another of the specific applications of psychology in Hungary at the time. As at the end of the twenties the need for ability-testing apprentices was codified in order to prevent accidents and protect their health. Laboratories for vocational guidance and psychotechnology operated in several institutes and industrial companies as well as in transport services beside the National Institute for Social Insurance. In addition to the psychotechnological measures, Rossolimo's and W. Stern's methods of differential psychology and different methods of pedology were used in these laboratories.

Die Besonderheiten der anfänglichen industriellen Anwendung der Psychologie in Ungarn - die sozialpolitische Veranlassung und einer

differenzialpsychologischen Methodologie - zeigen, dass die praktische Verwendbarkeit einer Wissenschaft nicht nur von ihrem allgemeinen Entwicklungsgrad, sondern auch von den gesellschaftlichen, ökonomischen und kulturellen Umständen ihrer Zeit bestimmt wird.

Die Anwendung der Ergebnisse der Psychologie erfolgte im allgemeinen zuerst in der klinischen Praxis und pädagogischen Tätigkeit, und erst als sich später Ansprüche vergleichbaren Charakters in der Industrie herausbildeten, wurde ihre Anwendung auch dort bekannt. Aufgrund der Fachliteratur darf diese Tatsache als ein in den industriellen Ländern allgemein verbreitetes Modell betrachtet werden[1,2], weil der Unterricht und die Heiltätigkeit eher begann als die Arbeit auf industriellem Gebiet.

Der Grad der Organisiertheit der ungarischen Industrie war vor dem ersten Weltkrieg noch sehr niedrig, was zur Folge hatte, dass man mit der Arbeitskraft verschwenderisch umging. Die spezialisierte Entwicklung der Arbeitskraft, ihre Erhaltung und Konditionierung hatte sich weder auf gesellschaftlicher noch auf betrieblicher Ebene angezeigt. Man vertrat die Meinung, dass die sparsame Verwendung der Arbeitskraft unnötig sei. Auch nach dem ersten Weltkrieg war Ungarn noch nicht fähig das Niveau der entwickelten Industriestaaten zu erreichen. Von den acht Millionen Einwohnern des Landes waren kaum 500.000 Fabrikarbeiter, und die Hälfte der Einwohner fand in der Landwirtschaft ihre Beschäftigung. Aus diesen bescheidenen Angaben geht schon hervor, dass die kaum 1%-ige Erhöhung der industriellen Produktion pro Jahr einen beträchtlichen wirtschaftlichen Aufschwung nicht ergeben konnte[3]. Die massenhaft auftretende Arbeitslosigkeit konnte nur zur Zeit der Kriegskonjunktur, am Ende der 30er Jahre erheblich gesenkt werden.

Was kann die Psychologie unter solchen Umständen in der Industrie anfangen? Ist die Psychologie in der Industrie überhaupt notwendig? Solange die Produktion über Reserven verfügt, deren entsprechende Ausnützung eine genügende Entwicklungsmöglichkeit in sich trägt (z.B. Organisation, technische Entwicklung, Rekonstruktion usw.), kann der Anspruch auf die Verwendung der Psychologie nur sehr bescheiden auftreten.

Sozialpolitik und angewandte Psychologie

Obwohl die Industrie und das wirtschaftliche Leben nicht unmittelbar den Anspruch hatte, dem Menschen, dem Werktätigen sich zuzuwenden,

wurde doch diese Forderung von Seite der Sozialpolitik und der sie regierenden Staatsmacht her desto stärker erhoben.

Die Regierungen und die leitenden Politiker bemerkten die kümmerliche Lage der arbeitenden Klassen - manchmal sehr klar, manchmal aber nur verschwommen, eingeengt. Sie sahen hinter dem sich verschärfenden Klassenkampf der Arbeiter, die sich anspannenden Gefahren und strebten deshalb bewusst danach, mit gewissen Zugeständnissen, meistens mit sozialpolitischen Verfügungen (Arbeitsversicherung, Arbeitszeitregulierung usw.) die Forderungen der Arbeiterbewegung zu entkräften.

Dieses Arsenal der Sozialpolitik wurde in Ungarn in den 20er Jahren mit einer neuen Waffe, mit der Psychologie bereichert. Die Psychologie war damit keine unmittelbare Hilfe der Industrie, sondern sie schaltete sich vielmehr als Transmission der Sozialpolitik, indirekt in den Kreislauf der gesellschaftlichen Produktion ein. So waren die Fähigkeitsuntersuchungen nicht vom Gesichtspunkt der Wirksamkeit der Produktion her wichtig, sondern im Interesse der Vorbeugung der Unfälle und Krankheiten, das aber eine hygienische und daher eine sozialpolitische Aufgabe ist.

Einem ungarischen Wirtschaftsideologen aus der Zeit zwischen den zwei Weltkriegen zufolge, ist die Sozialpolitik durch die gleichzeitige Ablehnung des passiven liberalen Staates und des Sozialismus entstanden. Die erste Äusserung des aktiven Staates ist die Sozialpolitik, deren Hauptcharakterzug in der "Vermittlung von Klassenunterschieden" zu sehen ist. "Das bedeutet, dass diese Politik neben dem Erkennen der schädlichen Wirkung der Klassengegensätze zugleich um deren Abschwächung bemüht war"[4]. Die Klassenunterschiede entstehen dieser Ideologie nach nicht aus den verschiedenen Eigentumsverhältnissen, sondern aus dem Unterschied zwischen den einzelnen Menschen, der sich somit auch durch sozialpolitische massnahmen verringern lassen musste. Das soll heissen, nicht durch karitative Bemühungen, oder Humanismus, sondern durch institutionelle Abhilfe.

Derartige Abhilfe wünschte man durch die Liquidierung der Arbeitslosigkeit zu erreichen, wobei eine besondere Hilfe von der Berufsberatung erwartet wurde.

"Weil die vernünftige Nutzung der Arbeitskraft in gesellschaftlicher und ökonomischer Hinsicht zu sehen ist, erfolgt die Berufswahl nicht nur im individuellen, sondern zugleich auch im gemeinschaftlichen Interesse. Deshalb muss die Berufswahl und Berufsberatung eine

staatliche Aufgabe und einen Gegenstand der Fürsorge darstellen"[5] - sagte ein führender Beamter der Arbeitskräftelenkung. Wenn der angemessene Einsatz der Arbeitskraft eine staatliche Aufgabe ist, muss die Berufsberatung ebenfalls ein staatlich gelenkter Prozess sein. Sozialpolitische Gesetze legten im Jahre 1928 fest (1928. 40. Gesetzartikel, 99), dass die jungen Lehrlinge der Industrie im Interesse ihrer Berufswahl an einer psychotechnischen Untersuchung teilnehmen müssen[6]. Die gesetzliche Verfügung der psychotechnischen Untersuchungen hatte zur Folge, dass in Ungarn Institutionen ins Leben gerufen wurden, die solche Aufgaben verrichteten, und dadurch die Entwicklung der Theorie der angewandten Psychologie beschläunigt werden konnte.

Angewandte psychologische Institutionen in der wirtschaftlichen Praxis

Eines der grössten Untersuchungslaboratorien war eine s.g. Fähigkeitsuntersuchungs-Station, die im Rahmen der Gesellschaftsversicherung funktionierte. Hier wurden jährlich mehrere Tausende von Jugendlichen geprüft. Anfangs benützte man noch traditionelle psychotechnische Methoden, aber Ende der 30er Jahre zunehmend persönlichkeitspsychologische Verfahren. Wichtige Unterstützung bekam die Berufsberatungstätigkeit durch die Arbeit des Psychologischen Laboratoriums des Pädagogischen Seminars der Hauptstadt (es war eine weiterbildungs-Stelle der Budapester Pädagogen), und vom Kinderpsychologischen Institut, das der Vorgänger des heutigen Psychologischen Instituts der Ungarischen Akademie der Wissenschaften war.

Zahlreiche Grossbetriebe riefen eigene psychotechnische Laboratorien ins Leben, deren Aufgabe in der Auswahl der eigenen Jungarbeiter bestand. Ein Beispiel dazu bildete auf dem Gebiet des Verkehrswesens das Psychotechnische Laboratorium der Budapester Verkehrs-Aktiengesellschaft.

Die Kodifizierung der psychotechnischen Untersuchungen bedeutete leider nicht die weitläufige Ausbreitung dieser Tätigkeit. Obzwar die Kodifizierung darauf hinweist, dass die Psychologie - besser gesagt die angewandte Psychologie, in unserem Fall die Psychotechnik - einen bedeutenden Einfluss in der Legislatur und bei den regierungsseitigen Organen hatte, das ist nur zum Teil wahr. Die Gesetzvorbereiter kannten die Vorteile der Anwendung der Psychologie, besonders die Zusammenhänge der Arbeitskraftökonomie mit der Berufswahl - wie

bereit erwähnt - welche Thematik einen reichen Niederschlag in Beratungen und Studiensammlungen der 1920er Jahre fand, wo Minister und Staatsmänner ihre Anschauungen äusserten und Meinungen von Fachleuten und Psychologen sich anhörten.

Die Psychologie hat ihre Wirkung aber nur mittelbar ausgeübt, weil nur wenige dieses Fach vertraten. Zwischen den zwei Weltkriegen gab es in Ungarn keine Psychologenbildung. Ein Teil unserer Psychologen haben ihr Diplom im Ausland - die meisten in Deutschland - besorgt, ein anderer Teil hat neben Ausübung seiner medizinischen und pädagogischen Laufbahn, oder abwechselnd damit seine psychologische Arbeit verrichtet. Die routineartigen psychotechnischen Untersuchungen und ihre Auswertung haben im allgemeinen Personen mit einer Lehrerausbildung, vielmehr Techniker, aber keine Absolventen einer Universität verrichtet. Die Persönlichkeitsuntersuchungen und ihre Auswertung haben aber immer solche Personen vollzogen, die die entsprechenden Erfahrungen und ein Universitätsdiplom besassen und diese Arbeit als Psychologen verrichteten.

Nach den bisherigen Forschungen[7] realisierte sich die praktische Anwendung der Psychologie aussen den erwähnten Institutionen bei 10-15 ungarländischen Grossbetrieben mit Hilfe der psychotechnischen Laboratorien. Diese Laboratorien haben die sich zur Aufnahme gemeldeten Jungmänner nicht ununterbrochen, d.h. das ganze Jahr hindurch untersucht, sondern besonders der Aufnahme der Lehrlingsschule entsprechend in der Zeitspanne nach der Beendigung der Schulausbildung und Anfang des Betriebsunterrichtes. Indessen wurden sie auch in die Unfall-Vorbereitung bzw. in die Betriebsarbeit eingeführt, die der psychotechnischen Arbeit nahestand.

Die Ausbreitung der psychotechnischen Untersuchungen auf die wichtigsten industriellen Betriebe des Landes konnte wegen des Mangels an den Bedingungen (rückständige Industrie, wenige Psychologen) nicht vollzogen werden, obzwar die gesetzlichen Möglichkeiten das erlaubt hätten.

Psychotechnik und Pedologie

Eine weitere Frage ist nun: Über welche theoretische Zielsetzung und methodisches Arsenal verfügten diese psychologischen und psychotechnischen Werkstätte? Aufgrund der bisherigen Forschungen darf behauptet werden, dass in ihrem methodischen Repertoire nicht nur das reine psychotechnische Methodenarsenal eine Rolle spielte.

Eine Besonderheit der industriellen Anwendung der Psychologie in Ungarn war die sozialpolitische Veranlassung, die andere aber die Kinderforschung, die Pedologie, mit deren Prinzipen und Methoden die Untersuchung vollzogen wurde. Nämlich von besonderer Wichtigkeit war dabei die zu prüfende Person, die Beratung der Bewerbers, die Untersuchung seiner Persönlichkeit.

Neben den gut bekannten psychotechnischen Vorstellungen und Verfahren von Moede, Lipmann, Piorkowski spielten die Ansichten des Deutschen Stern und des Russen Rossolimo eine grosse Rolle.

Bei den in die Fähigkeitsuntersuchungen eingesetzten Tests, besonders bei ihrer Auswertung und Ergebniszusammenfassung, stützten sich die Pedologen auf die Theorie des russischen Wissenschaftslers Grigorij Iwanowitsch Rossolino. Er war der Direktor der Moskauer Psychiatrischen Klinik und bearbeitete Methoden, die in erster Linie die Erkenntnis der kranken Persönlichkeit, die quantitative Bewertung der Elemente des seelischen Lebens, die Rekonstruktion des individuellen Profils der Persönlichkeit erzielten. In seinem Hauptwerk **Psychologische Profile**[8] entfaltete er seine Methoden, deren Wesen darin besteht, dass etwa 11 psychologische Prozesse (Aufmerksamkeit, Erinnerung, Wille, Rezeptivität usw.) derart untersucht werden, dass der Zustand eines jeden seelischen Prozesses durch 10 Aufgaben überprüft wird. Die Aufgaben werden den Lösungen gemäss mit Zensuren bewertet. Die Endsumme der richtigen Antworten trug er punktweise auf ein Graphikon, deren Verbindungslinie das "psychologische Profil" des Individuums ergab. Mit dieser Methode ist nicht nur der Grad der geistigen Rückständigkeit diagnostizierbar, sondern auch die psychische Natur der Krankheit, sogar die Persönlichkeitstypen.

Die ungarischen Pedologen betonten aufgrund der Sternschen Prinzipien die Untersuchung und Erkenntnis der Ganzheit der Persönlichkeit, der Individualität. László Nagy, der Leiter der ungarischen Pedologen schreibt über die Erkenntnis der Persönlichkeit folgendes:

> "Den Entwicklungsgrad der Fähigkeiten und die Intensität ihres Funktionierens kann nur in Quantitäten ausgedrückt werden. Der Schwerpunkt der Persönlichkeitsprüfung basiert aber nicht auf diesen, sondern auf qualitativen Beobachtungen. Mit ihrer Hilfe bekommen wir einen tieferen Einblick in die Struktur der Persönlichkeit, in ihre Einheit, Gleichgewichtsregulation, leitende Motiven, Willenszielsetzungen, Unregelmässigkeiten, Rückständigkeiten, erblichen und erworbenen Eigenschaften"[9].

Die ungarischen Pedologen gingen bei der Erkenntnis der Persönlichkeit von einer Richtung der Sternschen Differenzialpsychologie, von der Psychographie aus. Das ist jene Methode der Persönlichkeitsforschung, die die Verschiedenartigkeit und Vielfältigkeit der Zeichen eines Individuums zum Ausgangspunkt nimmt, und in deren Erkenntnis zur Beschreibung der Persönlichkeit, zum Psychogramm gelangt.

Das Ergebnis der Eignungsprüfung, die Zusammenfassung der Befunde und das Vorschlagen einer Berufseignung erfolgen gemäss des Vortrags von László Nagy auf dem Utrechter Psychotechnischen Kongress 1928, folgendermassen:

> "Mit der Zusammenstellung des psychologischen Profils ist der Prozess der Persönlichkeitsprüfung aber noch lange nicht beendet. Das psychische Profil enthält die quantitativen Daten der Fähigkeiten, auf deren qualitative Spezifika kann daraus höchstens gefolgert werden. Das psychische Profil ist normalerweise, aber nicht notwendigerweise, nach einem wissenschaftlichen System zusammengestellt, es fehlt darin jedoch das Leben, das Zusammenwirken der Motive des seelischen Lebens. Aus dem psychologischen Profil bekommt weder der Psychologe, noch der Arzt, der Pädagoge, der Richter, nach meiner Meinung sogar nicht einmal der Fabrikbesitzer jene Informationen, die er benötigt. Notwendig wäre eine Zusammenstellung eines umfassendes Bildes, das sowohl den theoretischen, als auch den praktischen Erwartungen entspricht. Diesem Ziel dient das seelische Bild, das Psychogramm[10]".

Letztendlich lässt sich feststellen, dass die Pedologen zu einer Kritik der Psychotechnik gelangen, indem sie die Ungeeignetheit dieser Methoden zur Erkenntnis der Persönlichkeit weder des Kindes, noch im allgemeinen der Arbeiter hervorheben, obwohl einige Verfahren und Instrumente dem Psychologen, dem Pedologen bedeutende Unterstützung bei der Erfassung des Psychikums geben. Eine wichtige Waffentat der ungarischen pedologischen Bewegung und der Berufspsychologie war, dass sie die Psychotechnik und insbesondere ihre Methodologie im Interesse der Erkenntnis der Ganzheit der Persönlichkeit abwies. Zwar stehen diese Gesichtspunkte von den ökonomischen und Unternehmensinteressen fern, wahrscheinlich kreuzen sie sich überhaupt nicht, aber in der Psychologie und in der modernen Berufsberatung halfen sie zu der Erkenntnis der Persönlichkeit. Diese Gedanken widerspiegelt der Vortrag von László Nagy, den er auf der bereits erwähnten internationalen Beratung gehalten hat.

> "Eigentlich waren es die Messungen, die die pädagogische Psychologie in das Übertreiben der analytischen Verfahren stiess. Die messenden Psychologen, die sich heute stolz Psychotechniker nennen, haben ohne Zweifel wertvolle Ergebnisse in der praktischen Pädagogik (Fähigkeitsuntersuchung) und in der Berufswahl-Untersuchungen erreicht, aber die schweren pädagogischen und anderen praktischen Probleme konnten sie damit nicht lösen[11]".

Der damalige Sekretär der Ungarischen Psychologischen Gesellschaft, Andor Juhasz lenkte auf dem 5. Internationalen Psychotechnischen Kongress die Aufmerksamkeit in ähnlicher Weise auf die Probleme der industriellen Anwendung der Psychotechnik. In seinem Vortrag **Die Krise der Psychotechnik** klagte er die Psychotechnik an - und das nicht unbegründet - dass ihr Ideal die verschiedenen Instrumente, die zahlenmässigen Formeln sind, ihr Endziel aber Leistungsmessungen und deren Ausdruck in mathematischen Werten.

> "Es sieht so aus, als wenn man vollkommen vergessen hätte, dass die Psychotechnik auch die Psychologie etwas angeht, und sie keine reine Technik ist ... Die psychischen Reaktionen hat man vom Subjekt getrennt und genauso objektiv auf Gegenstände angewendet, wie der Ingenieur die objektiven physischen Gesetze z.B. die Maschinen übertrug[12]".

Für eine industrielle Anwendung der Psychologie waren die Bedingungen in Ungarn noch nicht reif genug, die Methoden und Prinzipien ihrer Verwendung unseren Vorfahren jedoch schon bekannt. Sie verwendeten die Psychotechnik nicht nur in der industriellen Praxis, sondern vielmehr auf dem Gebiet der Pedologie, im Interesse der psychologischen Erkenntnis des Kindes. Diese Methodologie hat ihre Ansprüche aber nicht befriedigt, und blieb aufgrund des Gesagten vor allem im Erkennen des Kindes weit hinter ihren Erwartungen zurück.

Die Pedologen kritisierten die Psychotechnik wegen ihrer Starrheit, Übermechanisiertheit, Zerstückelung usw. und wandten sie nur mit Vorbehalten in der industriellen Praxis an. Die von László Nagy geprägte pedologische Richtung der ungarischen berufspsychologischen Konzeption hat aber von Anfang an die Erkenntnis des Persönlichkeitsganzen im Blick, und benützte die Methodologie und das Instrumentarium der Psychotechnik hilfsweise im Interesse der Erschliessung der Fähigkeiten des Kindes.

Noten

1. Jaeger, S. - Staeuble I. (1981, p. 53-94).
2. Lück, E.H., Miller, R., Rechtien, W. (1984, p. 171-177; 231-235).

3. Berend, T.I., Ránki, Gy. (1972, p. 80).
4. Heller, F. (1939, p. 73).
5. Balogh, A. (1926, p. 27-28).
6. Törvenyek gyüjtemenye (Gesetzsammlung) (1928, p. 925).
7. Kiss, Gy. (1983, p. 28-39).
8. Rossolimo, G.I. (1926, p. 6-39).
9. Nagy, L. (1929, p. 196).
10. Nagy, L. (1929, p. 197).
11. Nagy, L. (1929, p. 196).
12. Juhasz, A. (1929, p. 141).

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DIE FRÜHE VÖLKERPSYCHOLOGIE - WEGBEREITER ODER HEMMNIS FÜR DIE ENTSTEHUNG EINER WISSENSCHAFTLICHEN SOZIAL- UND ENTWICKLUNGSPSYCHOLOGIE?

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Summary.
The role of early Folk Psychology in connection with the origins of a scientific Social or Developmental Psychology is examined under three aspects: first, the relationship between programmatic declarations and real research topics second, the scientific-historical effects of early Folk Psychology; and third, the scientific and socio-economic context of this field. We found that both inner reasons given in the theoretical and methodological approach and concrete socio-historical conditions or intentions prevented a thematic extension to a scientific Social or Developmental Psychology. The so-called "public interests" in Germany in the third quarter of the 19th century directed the attention of early Folk Psychology to a general discussion of economically, politically and ideologically important problems rather than on special scientific topics of Social or Developmental Psychology.

Fragestellung

In diversen Lehr- und Handbüchern und sonstigen Gesamtdarstellungen sowohl der Sozialpsychologie als auch der Entwicklungspsychologie wird in disziplinhistorischen Erörterungen (sofern diese überhaupt angestellt werden, was leider nicht allzu häufig vorkommt) Bezug genommen auf die Völkerpsychologie. Der Stellenwert, der dabei der Völkerpsychologie im Entstehungsprozess einer wissenschaftlichen Sozial- bzw. Entwicklungspsychologie zugewiesen wird, ist reichlich ambivalent. Beginnen wir mit zwei Beispielen von historischen Reminiszenzen zur Sozialpsychologie. G.W. Allport (1968) hält die Völkerpsychologie für eine von sieben Varianten von Group-Mind-Konzeptionen, die versuchten, die sich aus der Interaktion von Individuen ergebende "gemeinsame Art zu denken, zu fühlen und zu wollen" ("a common manner of thinking, feeling, and willing") theoretisch auf den Begriff zu bringen. Insofern wäre in der Völkerpsychologie in der Tat sozialpsychologisches Gedankengut vorweggenommen. Unter methodischem

Gesichtspunkt dagegen kommt Allport zu dem Urteil: "... it is not surprising that little progress was made in developing a social psychology as distinct from traditional ethnology. In spite of programmatic fanfare, psychological analysis did not advance" (p. 49).

Ähnlich charakterisieren Hiebsch und Vorwerg (1972) die Völkerpsychologie als eine der "Wurzeln" der Sozialpsychologie, bemängeln aber zugleich, dass sie nur Programm blieb und auf empirische Untersuchungen verzichtete. In historischen Rückblenden zur Entwicklungspsychologie wird ebenfalls auf die Völkerpsychologie verwiesen. Schmidt (1970) etwa erwähnt die Völkerpsychologie im Zusammenhang mit den Auswirkungen des Darwinismus und meint, dass in ihr der Entwicklungsgedanke zum Tragen komme; allerdings sei es der "Entwick-gedanke in romantisch-idealistischer Form" (S. 31).

Die Beispiele für Hinweise auf die Völkerpsychologie in einschlägigen Publikationen liessen sich fortführen. Der allgemeine Tenor der Bezugnahmen läuft in etwa auf die pauschale Feststellung hinaus, dass die Fragestellungen der Völkerpsychologie für die Herausbildung eines Problembewusstseins für die Gegenstandsfelder der Sozialpsychologie und der Entwicklungspsychologie durchaus von Belang waren, dass aber ihr methodologisch-methodischer Ansatz nicht gestattete, diese Fragestellungen einer befriedigenden Antwort zuzuführen. Im übrigen sind die Aussagen über Wert und Unwert, fördernde oder hemmende Rolle der Völkerpsychologie bei der Etablierung einer wissenschaftlichen Sozial- bzw. Entwicklungspsychologie reichlich unbestimmt.

Angesichts dieser Unbestimmtheit ist es für den Psychologiehistoriker naheliegend, die mögliche Beziehung der frühen Völkerpsychologie zur Entstehung einer wissenschaftlichen Sozial- und Entwicklungspsychologie einer diferenzierteren Analyse zu unterziehen.

Die Beziehung der frühen Völkerpsychologie zur Entstehung einer wissenschaftlichen Sozial- und Entwicklungspsychologie

Die Analyse soll folgende Aspekte umfassen:

1). Darstellung des programmatischen Selbstverständnisses und der realen Untersuchungsfelder der Völkerpsychologie sowie des Verhältnisses zwischen Programm und Realisierung,

2). wirkungsgeschichtliche Recherchen,

3). beleuchtung der allgemein-wissenschaftshistorischen und sozialhistorischen Kontextbedingungen.

1. Programm und Untersuchungsfelder der frühen Völkerpsychologie

Die Völkerpsychologie Lazarus-Steinthalscher Prägung wurde als erster Entwurf 1851[1], als Programm mit systematischem Anspruch 1859 vorgestellt (Lazarus und Steinthal, 1860). Der Prozess der theoretischen Positionsbestimmung dauerte bis etwa 1865 an [2]. Die wesentlichen inhaltlichen Positionen der frühen Völkerpsychologie lassen sich in folgenden Aussagen zusammenfassen:

a). Der Mensch ist ein gesellschaftliches Wesen und wird als solches durch die "Gesamtheit" determiniert.

> "Die Psychologie lehrt, dass der Mensch durchaus und seinem Wesen nach gesellschaftlich ist; d.h. dass er zum gesellschaftlichen Leben bestimmt ist, weil er nur im Zusammenhange mit seines Gleichen das werden und das leisten kann, was er soll; so sein und wirken kann, wie er zu sein und zu wirken durch sein eigenstes Wesen bestimmt ist. Auch ist thatsächlich kein Mensch das, was er ist, rein aus sich geworden, sondern unter dem Einfluss der Gesellschaft, in der er lebt" (Lazarus und Steinthal, 1860, S. 3).

b). Als Determinationsfaktor, der die Gesellschaftlichkeit des Individuums bewirkt, fungiert der "Volksgeist".

> Der Volksgeist wird definiert als "das allen Einzelnen Gemeinsame der inneren Thätigkeit", an anderer Stelle als "das, was die blosse Vielheit der Individuen erst zu einem Volke macht, ... das Band, das Princip, die Idee des Volkes" (ebda., S. 29). Gelegentlich werden synonym die Begriffe "objectiver Geist" oder "objectiver Geist des Volkes" verwendet. Er wird als etwas Überindividuelles gedacht, das gegenüber dem Individual-psychischen eine eigene Qualität bildet.

c). Als wesentliche Form menschlicher Gemeinschaft gilt das Volk.

> "Für jeden Einzelnen [sei] diejenige Gemeinschaft, welche eben ein Volk bildt, sowohl die jederzeit historisch gegebene als auch im Unterschied zu allen freien Culturgesellschaften die absolut nothwendige und im Vergleich zu ihnen die allerwesentlichste" (ebda., S. 5). Das entscheidende Kriterium für die Zugehörigkeit eines Individuums zu einem Volke ist das subjektive Dafürhalten. "Der Begriff Volk beruht auf der subjectiven Ansicht der Glieder des Volkes selbst von sich selbst, von ihrer Gleichheit und Zusammengehörigkeit" (ebda., S. 34 f.).

Einführung des Experiments in die Psychologie ausgingen. So könnten ja auch Lazarus und Steinthal potentiell trotz des Fehlens einer echten psychologischen Orientierung in ihrem Programma dennoch produktive Einflüsse auf die Herausbildung einer wissenschaftlichen Psychologie, insbesondere Sozial- und Entwicklungspsychologie, ausgeübt haben. Wirkungsgeschichtliche Recherchen sind insofern angezeigt. Wir verzichten darauf, möglichen Einflüsse der frühen Völkerpsychologie auf Sprachwissenschaft, Ethnologie, Kultur- und Sittengeschichte usw. in ihrer Zeit nachzugehen. Auf dem Gebiet der Psychologie ist es in erster Linie Wilhelm Wundt, der die Lazarus-Steinthalsche Konzeption nicht nur rezipierte, sondern an vielen Punkten umgestaltete und in sein Gesamtsystem der Psychologie integrierte. Das, was wir bei Lazarus/Steinthal vermissten, eine im echten Sinne psychologische Profilierung der Völkerpsychologie, müsste doch - so vermutet man berechtigterweise - bei Wundt, der sich so entscheidende Verdienste um die theoretische und empirische Begründung der Psychologie als Einzelwissenschaft erworben hat, nicht mehr als Mangel zu konstatieren sein. In der Tat unternimmt Wundt den ernsthaften Versuch, der Völkerpsychologie eine genuin psychologische Ausrichtung zu geben. Bereits in seiner ersten Konzeption einer Völkerpsychologie in den **Vorlesungen** von 1863 betont er in Abgrenzung zu Lazarus und Steinthal, er stehe "auf dem Boden der individuellen oder, wie wir besser sagen, der allgemeinen Psychologie". Die Völkerpsychologie biete "nur besondere Anwendungen" der "allgemeinen Gesetze des psychischen Geschehens", die "ethnologische Untersuchung" werde dabei lediglich als "unentbehrliches Hilfsmittel" hinzugezogen (Wundt, 1863, Bd. II, S. 452). Die Absage an geschichtsphilosophische und global-geschichtliche Ambitionen korrespondiert mit einer betont allgemeinpsychologischen Orientierung. Von den Resultaten der Völkerpsychologie seien "Rückschlüsse auf das geistige Leben des einzelnen" zu ziehen; beispielsweise könne von der Untersuchung der Sprache her "ein helles Licht auf die psychologische Gesetzmässigkeit des individuellen Denkens" geworfen werden (Wundt, 1886, S. 20f). Fragt man allerdings nach den konkreten wissenschaftlichen Resultaten, die Wundt mit Hilfe der Völkerpsychologie bei der Aufklärung psychologischer Gesetzmässigkeiten, z.B. der sozialen Regulation oder der Genese psychischer Prozesse, erzielt hat, wird es schwerfallen, etwas Greifbares auszumachen. Bereits zu Wundt's Lebzeiten wurde dies offensichtlich. Der Sprachwissenschaftler H.

Paul etwa bemerkte: "Fragen wir: welches sind die psychologischen Gesetze, die Wundt aus seiner Betrachtung der Sprache abgeleitet hat? Ich muss gestehen, dass ich vergebens danach gesucht habe" (Paul, 1910, S. 371). Paul gibt als Grund für das Scheitern der Wundtschen Versuche, psychologische Gesetze aufzufinden, folgendes an: "Das Problem, welches für mich im Mittelpunkt der Wechselwirkung steht, die Frage, wie sich die Wechselwirkung der Individuen untereinander vollzieht, ist für Wundt überhaupt kein Problem" (Paul, 1920, S. Vf). Ähnliches, was hier für die sozialpsychologische Problematik gesagt wird, liesse sich für die entwicklungspsychologische anführen. Die Ankündigung Wundt's, die Völkerpsychologie führe "den Weg einer wahren Psychogenese" (Wundt, 1912, S. 4), entpuppt sich als Versuch, eine Abfolge verschiedener Perioden der Menschheitsgeschichte zu rekonstruieren. De facto haben wir es also eher mit einem geistesgeschichtlichen Entwurf als mit einem empirisch-entwicklungspsychologischen Programm zu tun.

Hinsichtlich der Erschliessung einer genuin sozial- bzw. entwicklungspsychologischen Problematik für eine empirisch-wissenschaftliche Analyse ist Wundt gegenüber Lazarus und Steinthal letztlich keinen Schritt vorangekommen. Folglich wird man auch von einer wirkungsgeschichtlichen Analyse der Lazarus-Steinthalschen Konzeption her die Frage, ob die Völkerpsychologie tatsächlich als Wurzel, Quelle, Wegbereiter oder dergleichen einer wissenschaftlichen Sozial- bzw. Entwicklungspsychologie in Betracht zu ziehen ist, verneinend beantworten müssen.

3. Wissenschaftshistorische und sozialhistorische Kontextbedingungen der frühen Völkerpsychologie

Trotz des bislang negativen Fazits bleibt unbestritten, dass bei Lazarus/Steinthal (wie auch später bei Wundt) Gedanken geäussert wurden, die potentiell dazu geeignet waren, zu einem sozial- bzw. entwicklungspsychologischen Forschungsprogramm weiterentwickelt zu werden. Bezüglich der sozialpsychologischen Problematik erinnern wir nochmals an das explizit formulierte Vorhaben, "diejenigen Gesetze zu entdecken, welche zur Anwendung kommen, wo immer Viele als eine Einheit zusammen leben und wirken", und bezüglich der entwicklungspsychologischen Problematik ist zu bedenken, dass mit dem Wissen um die Geschichtlichkeit des Menschen und mit dem Anspruch auf eine kausale Erklärung der historischen Entwicklung mittels sogenannter

psychologischer Gesetze natürlich auch immer das Moment der Gewordenheit der psychischen Funktionen selbst mit im Blickfeld liegt. Bei der Frage, warum die solcherart gegebenen Erkenntnis- und Entwicklungs möglichkeiten der frühen Völkerpsychologie nicht in ein konkretes sozial- bzw. entwicklungspsychologisches Forschungsprogramm einmündeten, werden wir auf die Erkenntnis- und Entwicklungs beschränkungen verwiesen, die der Überführung von der Möglichkeit in die Wirklichkeit im Wege standen. In diesem Zusammenhang bedürfen die wissenschaftshistorischen und die konkret-sozialhistorischen Kontextbedingungen der frühen Völkerpsychologie der Erörterung. Natürlich gibt es eine Reihe von gewissermassen konzeptionsimmanenten Hindernissen, die den Zugang zu einer methodologisch tragfähigen sozial- oder entwicklungspsychologischen Untersuchung versperrten. Eines dieser Hindernisse wurde bereits angedeutet: die Unmöglichkeit, von den Objektivationen interindividueller Wechselwirkung (Sprache, Mythen usw.) auf die dieser Wechselwirkung zugrundeliegenden psychischen Regulationsmechnismen zu schliessen. Mit anderen Worten: Von der (historisch-vergleichenden) Analyse der Interaktions folgen konnten keine gesicherten Schlüsse über die psychischen Prozesse, die die Beziehungen der Interaktionspartner regulieren, abgeleitet werden. Ebenso konnten von spekulativ ausgedachten sog. psychologischen Gesetzen her, die angeblich dem historischen Geschehen seine kausale Erklärung geben sollten, keine gesicherten Erkenntnisse über die Genese der psychischen Funktionen gewonnen werden. Selbstverständlich wird man bei der Diskussion über das Verhältnis von Erkenntnismöglichkeiten und realer Erkenntnisentwicklung darauf hinweisen müssen, dass die Psychologie um 1860 noch kein hinreichend entwickeltes einzelwissenschaftlich-empirisches Profil aufwies und von daher auch keine einzelwissenschaftlich-psychologische Forschungspraxis zu erwarten war. Aber die Berufung auf diese wissenschaftsimmanenten Beschränkungen ist nicht ausreichend, um die tatsächliche Unergiebigkeit der Völkerpsychologie hinsichtlich der Ausarbeitung eines genuin sozial- bzw. entwicklungspsychologischen Forschungsprogramm zu begreifen. Es ist zu prüfen, ob durch die Einbeziehung übergreifender Gesichtspunkte tieferliegende Gründe für diese Unergiebigkeit eruiert werden können. In erster Linie rekurrieren wir dabei auf die konkret-historischen Kontextbedingungen, in denen die Völkerpsychologie entstand und sich etablierte, insbesondere ihre ideologischen Verflechtungen mit den ökonomischen und

politischen Aspirationen der deutschen Bourgeoisie im 3. Viertel des 19. Jahrhunderts. Im wesentlichen sind es zwei Punkte, auf die in diesem Zusammenhang aufmerksam zu machen ist:

1. Die Behauptung der Determination des Individuums durch die "Gesamtheit", die Bestimmung des Volksgeistes als wesentlichem Determinationsfaktor sowie die Akzentuierung eines subjektivistisch-voluntaristischen Volksbegriffes stehen in einem engen Zusammenhang mit den Bestrebungen zur Gründung eines deutschen Nationalstaates und der breiten Ausbildung eines deutschen Nationalbewusstseins.

> Die Völkerpsychologie bekennt sich ausdrücklich zu der Aufgabe, zum Bewusstwerden des eigenen Nationalgeistes unter den Deutschen beizutragen.
> "Aber es wird hoffentlich eine Zeit kommen, da wir unseres eigenen Besitzthums, des eigenen Nationalgeistes uns bewusst werden und ihn zum Mittelpunkt unserer Gedanken wieder erheben... Diese Zeit herbeizuführen wird eine wissenschaftlich strenge psychologische Betrachtung des deutschen Nationallebens und seiner Geschichte gewiss nicht wenig beitragen" (Lazarus und Steinthal, 1860, S. 66). Die damit ausgewiesene "praktische Seite" der Völkerpsychologie wird bereits im Erstentwurf von 1851 (s. Anm. 1) erwähnt. Dieser Entwurf aber knüpft chronologisch und inhaltlich direkt an ein praktisch-politisches Traktat Lazarus' mit dem Titel **Die sittliche Berechtigung Preussens in Deutschland** (1850) an[5]. In dieser Abhandlung ist u.a. die Rede vom **Geist der deutschen Nation**, der in einzigartiger Weise im preussischen Staat verkörpert sei. Preussen wird als "Staat der Intelligenz", "ächt nationalsittliche macht", "der deutscheste, ja der reindeutsche Staat" glorifiziert (Lazarus, 1850, zitiert nach Belke, 1971, S. 58ff). Nationalgefühl wird bedenkenlos mit Fürstenliebe und Staatstreue verquickt.[6] In diesem Sinne wird 1851 der Völkerpsychologie die "praktische" Aufgabe gestellt, "uns die Gesetze [zu] zeigen, nach denen eine wahre und echte Nationalbildung und Nationalbeziehung einzurichten ist" (Lazarus, 1851, S. 126). Es erübrigt sich die Feststellung, dass von einer derartigen Programmatik nicht im entferntesten ein Zugang zu einer einzelwissenschaftlichen Sozialpsychologie eröffnet werden konnte.

2. Der Versuch, in der Geschichte wirksam werdende psychologische Gesetze auffinden zu wollen, erfüllte objektiv die ideologische Funktion, die Bestrebungen der deutschen Bourgeoisie nach politischer und ökonomischer Vormachtstellung zu unterstützen.

> So wird etwa der machtsanspruch der Bourgeoisie gegenüber den feudalbürokratischen Kräften des Junkertums unter anderem dadurch ideologisch zu rechtfertigen versucht, dass von dem geschichtsbestimmenden Wirken des objektiven bzw.

> Volksgeistes behauptet wird, er sei nicht an durch Geburt ererbte Privilegien gebunden, sondern werde durch die aktive Tätigkeit seiner Träger bestimmt. Man werde "zugestehen müssen, dass die Entfaltung eines kräftigen und gedeihlichen Lebens da unmöglich ist, wo in breiten Schichten der überlieferte Beruf an Geschlechter, die That an die Geburt gekettet ist. Die Natur scheint feste Regeln gesetzt zu haben, nach denen im Grossen und Ganzen die innere, geistige Fortpflanzung frei bleiben muss von den Banden der leiblichen" (Lazarus, 1862, S. 446). Auf der anderen Seite wird die potentielle Bedrohung des Machtanspruchs der Bourgeoisie durch das aufkommende Proletariat unter Zuhilfenahme massenpsychologischer Vorstellungen reflektiert: "Die Massen gerathen zuweilen in eine ungezügelte Bewegung, überrennen ihre Führer, entwickeln eine gedankenlose Gewalt ... Die Massen also, unfähig der positiven Gedankenarbeit, ohne Klarheit über das Ziel, ohne Bewusstsein über den Weg, vollziehen eine schlechthin verneinende und vernichtende Bewegung" (ebda., S. 431). Mit "Massen" sind in erster Linie Lohnarbeiter, der sog. "vierte Stand" gemeint.

Das von gesamtgesellschaftlichen Bedingungen bestimmte sog. "öffentliche Interesse" war nicht dazu angetan, die Aufmerksamkeit der frühen Völkerpsychologie auf die einzelwissenschaftliche Gewinnung von im engeren Sinne sozial- und entwicklungspsychologischen Erkenntnissen zu lenken, sondern orientierte sie auf die theoretische Reflexion von ökonomisch, politisch und ideologisch brisanten Themen ihrer Zeit, der Periode zwischen der bürgerlich-demokratischen Revolution von 1848/49 und der Reichsgründung als "Revolution von oben" 1871.

Schlussbetrachtung

Unter den skizzierten Umständen muss es fraglich bleiben, ob die frühe Völkerpsychologie als authentische Wegbereiterin, Wurzel, Quelle der Sozialpsychologie oder der Entwicklungspsychologie gelten kann. Es liegt der Verdacht nahe, dass Autoren von Lehrbüchern der Sozial- bzw. Entwicklungspsychologie, die aus ihrer fachspezifischen Perspektive in bestimmten Aussagen der frühen Völkerpsychologie sozial- bzw. entwicklungspsychologisch relevante Problemstellungen erkennen, diese Aussagen im nachhinein zu realen historischen Anknüpfungspunkten für die spätere Begründung einer einzelwissenschaftlichen Sozial- bzw. Entwicklungspsychologie umfunktionieren. Dabei wird einzig und allein aus der chronologischen Priorität eine angeblich authentische Entwicklungslinie abgeleitet, ohne die Berechtigung bzw. Richtigkeit dieser Ableitung durch wissenschaftshistorische Fakten zu

überprüfen. Gemeinhin pflegen wir dieses Vorgehen mit dem Etikett "Präsentismus" zu versehen. Der Wissenschaftshistoriker sollte allerdings den möglichen "präsentistischen" Neigungen seines "rezenten" Fachwissenschaftler-Kollegen nicht eine unproduktiven "Antiquarismus" entgegensetzen oder überhaupt die Position einer kleinlichen, sich esoterisch-arrogant gebenden Besserwisserei einnehmen, sondern sein historisches Detailwissen in die Kooperation mit dem Fachwissenschaftler einbringen. Wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Untersuchung als l'art pour l'art - Unternehmen ist ebenso verhängnisvoll wie die Ignoranz der heuristischen Funktion, die die wissenschaftshistorische Analyse für den Prozess der Erkenntnisgewinnung in der Gegenwart erfüllen kann, durch den Fachwissenschaftler.

Noten

1. Bereits als 27-jähriger entwarf Lazarus das vorläufige Programm einer künftigen Völkerpsychologie in dem Aufsatz **Über den Begriff und die Möglichkeit einer Völkerpsychologie** in Prutz' **Deutsches Museum**, Jg. 1, 1851.
2. Vgl. Lazarus, M. (1862, 1865a, 1865b); ferner Steinthal, H. (1864). **Philologie, Geschichte und Psychologie in ihren gegenseitigen Beziehungen**. Berlin.
3. In der Rezeption der Völkerpsychologie gegen Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts spielt die enge Beziehung zur Geschichtsphilosophie (und Soziologie) oder gar die Kennzeichnung als geschichtsphilosophische Strömung eine wichtige Rolle. Vgl.
   - Barth, P. (1897) **Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie**. Leipzig.
   - Goldfriedrich, J. (1902) **Die historische Ideenlehre in Deutschland. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften, vornehmlich der Geschichtswissenschaft und ihrer Methoden im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert**. Berlin.
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4. Lazarus, M. (1868) Zur Lehre von den Sinnestäuschungen. ZVS.5, 113-152.
   - Meyer, J.B. (1878). Das Wesen der Einbildungskraft. ZVS. 10, 26-41.
   - Meyer, J.B. (1878) Genie und Talent. Eine psychologische Untersuchung. ZVS. 10, 269-302.
5. In einem Brief an seinen Braunschweiger Gymnasiallehrer, G.Th.A. Krüger, vom 8-12-1850 bedauert Lazarus, dass seine erste gedruckte Publikation ("Die sittliche Berechtigung...") keine "strengwissenschaftliche" habe sein können. Dennoch sei diese Schrift "nicht bloss eine politische Tagespflanze". Er wolle aber in Kürze eine "mehr wissenschaftliche Form" seines

Gedankens erarbeiten (zitiert nach Belke, 1971, S. 58). Damit ist zweifelsohne der Aufsatz "Über den Begriff und die Möglichkeit einer Völkerpsychologie" gemeint, der mit der Datumsangabe 15-6-1851 erschien. Der von Lazarus selbst im o.g. Brief bestätigte Zusammenhang zwischen beiden Abhandlungen ist für das Verständnis der historisch-konkreten Bedingungen für die Begründung der Völkerpsychologie von grosser Bedeutung. Belke (1971, S. XLVII) meint, Lazarus habe "zuerst angewandt" (1850), "dann begrifflich definiert" (1851 und 1859/60).

6. In Preussen seien "das Nationalgefühl und die Fürstenliebe zur einen und untheilbaren Kraft des Patriotismus zusammengeschmolzen (Lazarus, 1850, S. 20, zit. nach Belke, 1971). Die "innige Treue und Anhänglichkeit an den Fürsten" und "der willige Gehorsam gegen ihn" werden als hohe sittliche Werte gepriesen.

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THE DOG THAT DID NOT BARK
THE UNACKNOWLEDGED INFLUENCE OF MARX ON PIAGET

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Summary

In this paper it is contended that the work of Jean Piaget has made possible a reconciliation between the empiricist and the Hegelian approaches (the empiricist approach being based on definitions which reflect the sensory distinctiveness of the identities at issue and the Hegelian approach being based on definitions which reflect the relational properties of the identities at issue). It is further contended that this reconciliation between logically distinct bases of definition was only possible for Piaget because he made use of a form of the dialectic developed by Marx.

The central concepts used by Piaget to make possible this resolution between the empiricist and Hegelian approaches is that of an 'adaptation', or point of rest, which was the resultatnt of an 'equilibriation' (or resolution) of the biological - dialectical - processes of 'assimilation' and 'accommodation'. These assumptions make possible the reconciliation of the Hegelian and empiricist positions since they show us how the relational (Hegelian) process could underline the distinctive, empiricist self-awareness. (Piaget's resulting 'constancies' and 'conservations' - the very bases of empiricism - being due to the antecedent, Hegelian, relational processes of assimilation and accommodation). It is here further contended that this resolution by Piaget could hardly have been possible had it not been for the influence of Marx. Marx, too, envisaged a dialectic resulting in a synthesis - albeit that the dialectic and its resolution was a social rather than an individual scale. Still, it is somewhat odd that Piaget never appears to have recognised his debt.

There is a short story entitled, **The Dog that did not Bark** in which my namesake, Sherlock, reveals his usual unusual powers of inference by pointing out the possibility of nothing rather than something happening (in the story the fact that the dog did not bark led

Sherlock Holmes to identify the killer). In this paper, too, I shall be concerned with nothing, rather than something, happening.

More particularly I shall be concerned with the silence of a major epistemologist over his indebtedness to one of his antecedents - an indebtedness the more remarkable in that the antecedent had outlined what was no less than the logical equivalent to his own approach. The epistemologist I am referring to is Jean Piaget and the antecedent was Karl Marx. Piaget was indebted to Marx for his approach and - it would appear - did not recognise his debt. The indebtedness - and silence - is the more remarkable in that the issue which I am concerned with has been the central issue in the theory of knowledge or 'epistemology'.

The Hegelian and the Empiricist Approach

I shall begin by contrasting the empiricist with the Hegelian approach. The empiricist approach prides itself on the self-evidence, and, hence, independence of the identities it takes to be the basis of knowledge (by 'identity' I am referring to anything which can be referred to on its own). The identities that empiricism acknowledges are self-evident (and, hence, self-justifying) because such identities present themselves as such to our senses. Thus when Galileo saw with his newly invented telescope that Jupiter had moons - and that these moons moved - he exploded the Aristotelian assumption - an assumption adopted by the Catholic Church - that there were only seven moving bodies in the skies. This may not appear to us as of being of any great moment, but it was; not only because it refuted the established cosmology which put the earth at the centre of the universe but also, and more importantly in a way, because it pitted elementary perception, shared by the most stupid and unbelieving of unregenerates, against the aesthetic compellingness of Aristotle and, given faith, the logical compellingness of Thomas Aquinas (it was Aquinas who had largely integrated Aristotelian assumptions into Catholic orthodoxy). At the end of the day the stupid and the unregenerate won - that is, Galileo won (despite his being personally persecuted), and he won because he could demonstrate what no one could finally deny, the evidence of their own eyes.

This approach, as already noted, is self-justifying (in that the evidence of the senses proclaim themselves and will not be denied) and insists on the distinctiveness of the identities it deals with;

any lack of distinctiveness is deplored - the mortal sin of this approach being circularity: either the circularity which is the consequence of the definition of one term contaminating the definition of another, or, even worse, the circularity which is the consequence of the observer himself contaminating the observed; empiricists must passively observe the interrelatedness of separately defined identities.

Such, very briefly, has been the empiricist approach, an approach where the brilliance of its success at a practical level can only be matched by its blatant failings at the theoretical or logical level. Of all its critics I shall here confine myself to the most important, namely Hegel. Hegel challenged empiricism at its very root - namely the basis of its definitions; he questioned the possibility of any independent definition of identities, whether it be the independence of identities in science (which concerns the independence of identity from identity) or in the theory of knowledge (which concerns the independence of the identity with the observer); all, Hegel argued, was necessarily interrelated and so could not in any final sense be considered on its own. He argued this because he did not base his definitions on the evidence of the senses, but, quite differently, on the relationships identities had with other identities. This derivation of definitions through comparisons he called 'the dialectic'. As an example of a definition through a dialectic we can consider a cup of tea. A cup of tea, of course, is a cup of tea - we can point to it. This would satisfy the empiricists, but not Hegel. For Hegel this is only the 'thesis'; as well as the thesis a full definition also demands an 'antithesis' - how can we define a cup of tea without also considering what a cup of tea is not (after all, if the world only consisted of cups of tea they would not have the same standing as they would if the world also allowed the existence of, say, cups of coffee); but now we must go even further for, having posited both thesis and anti-thesis we must now bring in the 'synthesis' - the fusion of the thesis and antithesis - namely, a cup of tea implies both what it is and what it is not. Thus the definition of a cup of tea is not restricted, as with the empiricists (and has to be restricted from the empiricists' point of view, for otherwise the definition is not clean but, circularly, implies other definitions); but not only brings in the antithesis but the synthesis as well, a synthesis of both what a cup of tea is and what a cup of

tea is not. From this vantage point it can readily be shown that the definition of a cup of tea - or anything else - must necessarily embrace the whole of existence; it even embraces in the final event the knower - that is the knower knowing he knows the cup of tea.

All this is anathema to the empiricist - definitions which are relational and depend upon comparisons of the object defined with other objects ultimately extend to the whole of existence (after all the number of things a cup of tea is not is infinite) and so, ultimately, everything must imply everything else and nothing is clear cut - or refutable. Hegel introduced a necessary fusion (and hence confusion) of everything with everything else.

The Marxist Approach

Now the burden of this paper is that Piaget has provided us with the possibility of a logical reconciliation of the empiricist against the Hegelian bases of definitions. This, of course, is logically nonsense -one cannot, by definition, integrate that which excludes (the restricted, empirical definition) with that which embraces (the relational, Hegelian definition); logically nonsense or not, though, he did indeed do so - and did so by borrowing heavily from one of Hegel's chief followers - Marx.

Marx recast the Hegelian definitional dialectic in historical terms. (Hegel, too, had a philosophy of history but it can be ignored for purposes of this paper). Marx envisaged societies in what he called 'infrastructural' and 'superstructural' terms. The infrastructure had the properties of the dialectic - a dialectic implicit in the economic order of that society - and the superstructure embraced the absolutes - most particularly the religious, philosophical, economic and aesthetic absolutes - of that society. Now the crucial point about Marx is this - that superstructural beliefs and values were, for him, no more than a reflection of the dialectical relationships of the infrastructure of a particular society. Thus, it may have been a 'self-evident' truth in 1776 AD that all men were created equal - but it was not a self-evident truth in 1776 BC since this 'superstructural' assumption was the consequence of different economic infrastructures. Again, religion is the opiate of the people - because religion is, at the moment, but the reflection of a particular infrastructure - that of capitalism. One day all this will change, the implications implicit in the economic infrastructure will

be resolved into a final, enduring 'synthesis (known as 'socialism' or 'communism') which will reflect a society freed from further economic change.

On the face of it Marxism looks a most unlikely source for an escape from the nihilistic relativism implicit in the Hegelian approach. If anything, indeed, it would appear to expand it to the absolutes which are currently - in our degenerate pre-synthesis days - believed in. Thus, as noted, religion is not true, but a reflection of underlying forces; this attack on religion may not appear that offensive to some, but suppose it was not religion but philosophy which was called in issue? How would any philosopher like to be told that Hume - or Kant - were not true but a mere reflection of the society in which they lived?

Even with this briefest sketch the Marxist position can be seen to be unsatisfactory - and that on two related counts. In the first place the provenance of a belief may be - whatever Marx may say - irrelevant to that belief. Thus it is quite possible to argue that Hume is a reflection of 18th century scepticism - but this does not make Hume wrong: any more than it would make Berkeley wrong if a psychoanalyst were to argue (and someone indeed has done so) that Berkeley's rejection of the substantive state of matter was inspired by certain unresolved conflicts in Berkeley's unconscious?

The other reason Marx's approach is unsatisfactory is simply that Marx can be hoist with his own petard - the arguments used by Marx against believing what someone says can clearly be applied to Marx himself. Marx was a 19th century bourgeois philosopher if ever there was one[1]; and we all know what Marx thought of 19th century bourgeois philosophers.

The Piagetian Resolution

Such, very briefly, is the Marxist thesis. On the face of it it must be difficult to see how such a self-defeating approach (after all, Marx, as we have just seen, could produce excellent reasons why Marx should not be believed) could be of any use to anybody. But it can be - provided we invert its emphasis and see the synthesis, not as something which may be achieved in the future, but, rather as something which has already been achieved in the past.

And this is what Piaget did. Piaget took the empiricist's self-evident, independent and non-circular fact and saw it, not on

its own terms (the moons of Jupiter telling us of the moons of Jupiter) but as relected in synthesis that had already been achieved, synthesis due to an earlier relationship - or dialectic - with the environment.

The similarity between Piaget and Marx should now be evident: with both Marx and Piaget the dialectic underlies the synthesis. The difference between the two - and it is not a difference in logic - lies in the nature of the dialectic and the nature of the synthesis. With Piaget the dialectic is not played out in the economic infrastructure of society (as with Marx) but is biological - the biological activities of assimilation and accommodation lying at the base of awareness. Again, the subsequent synthesis is not, as with Marx, the arrival of the socialist state where all will be free, but the conservations and constancies of awareness - in other words, the very independent, non-circular facts on which the empiricist bases his theory of knowledge.

Thus, what the empiricist sees and takes for granted is considered an synthesis - a synthesis 'constructed' (Piaget calls his theory of knowledge 'constructivism') by an underlying dialectic of two separate processes, one of which, accommodation (modifying one's presumptions and behaviour in the light of the external inevitable), the empiricist would accept, and the other, assimilation (the modification of external reality by the knower), which the empiricist would either regard as self-contradictory (how can there be any antecedent to the self-evident basis of the known - namely the sensorily self-evident?) or noxious (since it results in the contamination of the known by the activity of the knower).

To which, of course, Piaget could retort that empiricism is not without its theoretical difficulties (not to say contradictions) itself. Be this as it may, though, I regard the Piagetian replacement of empiricism by constructivism (a constructivism which matures into a structuralism) - a replacement that involves far more than just giving us a basis for the sensorily self-evident (Piaget's equilibrations extend to the furthest ranges of abstract thought) - as a landmark in the history of the theory of knowledge. All this, of course, is beyong the scope of this brief paper.[2] The only point I would like to stress here is that this movement from empiricism to constructivism would have been impossible if Piaget had not accepted the notion of a dialectic - or interrelationship - of the organism

with the environment as underlying his approach, a dialectic he must surely have drawn from the Marxist-Hegelian tradition. It is curious that he never - to my knowledge - acknowledged it.[3]

Notes

1. After his early years of great poverty in London (from 1850 to about 1864) Marx was eventually able (from 1867 onwards), through help from Engels, the bequests of relatives and money he was able to earn through his journalism, to live in a comfortable middle class house at the foot of Hampstead Heath, complete with maidservant (by whom Marx had a son). Much of his late life was spent traveling for his health.
2. The arguments advanced in this paper have been published at rather greater length in **Sociological Forum**, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1986. (See Roger Homes, 'The Knower and the Known', pp. 610-631).
3. In the **Etudes Sociologiques** (Geneva: Droz) Piaget several times states that he is close to Marx (on such facts that the development of consciousness reflects and follows the development of action, or that action is simultaneously an adoption to and assimilation of the object etc.); however this work was published when Piaget was already 69 years old - and does not refer to the origins of Piaget's thinking.

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PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY WITHOUT ENTITIES
(AGAINST THE SUBJECTIVISM IN HISTORY)

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Summary

Already from the time of Thucydides historians believed that the main purpose of their investigations is to discover "the real cause" of the facts and events which are the object of analysis. They, however, often met the embarrassing situation in which every historian has his own "real cause". All this stimulated philosophers to look for objective methods for solving this "historical" (in any sense) paradox; but in their efforts they sank ever deeper in the historical subjectivism. And this is a consequence of the fact that they continued to follow the methodology of the "point of view", according to which historical facts can be interpreted, only from a given point of view based on some entity. But, whereas for the historians this entity were some very important historical facts (in their opinion), for philosophers of history these were such abstract "essences" as the "libido", the "natural attitude", the objects of consciousness, the game as such, etc.

In this paper, I offer an alternative philosophy of history, without entities. I begin my analysis by looking for the "genus" to which history belongs, and decide that historical knowledge is a part of that class of knowledge of the facts resulting from some acquired ability (by training). All facts of this class can be assessed objectively thanks to the commensuration of their "logical multiplicity" (this term is borrowed from Wittgenstein). The objective historical knowledge compares and assesses its facts by their commensuration, and then arranges them in an objective picture which actually is the objective history without entities.

The subject of this investigation is the principle of historical knowledge, and these concern questions like: what kind of knowledge is it, what is its aim, its data, is an objective historical

knowledge possible, etc. The method of our investigation will be conceptual analysis.

It is obvious that there is no sharp boundary between historical and scientific knowledge. a) Because the former, like every science, tries to discover the causes of the facts which it investigates, to classify them as more or less important with the aim of finding the way among the events that will happen in the future, i.e., to help the people to make predictions; b) Although the two types of knowledge seem "prima facie" to be very different, they have similar methods of investigation, and experience the same difficulties in carrying out: for both it is necessary to possess a good "acumen" for revealing the right causes among these facts, a good intuition to find their way among these facts, an acumen that is out of reach of formal logic.

On the other hand, however, historical knowledge is obviously different from both descriptive natural sciences: geography, biology, i.e., from "natural history", and from the theoretical sciences. For whereas natural history merely orders its facts one to another, the social history emphasizes one of its facts at the expense of others. But historical knowledge is different, also from physics: whereas the latter gives a knowledge which is accepted, it predicts with a great degree of certainty the "behaviour" of the physical facts, it is widely accepted that historical knowledge could not attain such precision.

It is true that these are such obvious differences between history and science, that it is impossible to argue against. We could only object against the conclusions drawn from them, viz., that history and science differentiate radically from one another because of their "intuition", of the way they investigate and assess facts. In this paper I will try to present arguments against this very belief.

In our analysis, firstly, we should find the difference between the intuition of historical knowledge and that of other kinds of knowledge. And let us, for this purpose, first of all try to set out what kinds of facts, except the political one, are accessible to historical investigation. These obviously are the facts of art, philosophy, culture (in O. Spengler's sense). It is true a history of physics and history of biology exist, but they undoubtedly don't occupy such a central place in the body of biology and physics in

general as history of philosophy in general, or history of arts in art criticism. And that is why the term "natural history" is practically out of use nowadays.

The most obvious cause for this is that the progress in art and in philosophy, in different cultures, is not so indisputable as the progress in natural sciences, where every new result may improve our ability to change reality[1]. Often it is senseless to say, for instance, that a work of art or philosophical theory, is better developed, or that it refutes or makes an anachronism of the work of art of the theory which earlier have been considered as a masterpiece or as true.

The next step in our analysis is to put forward the question: for which human actions can it be said having achieved progress of this type? And with this question we hope to reveal the real "differentia specifica" of historical knowledge which is the purpose of our investigation.

It seems clear (and even more so for art and culture than for philosophy), that these activities belong to the class of actions or abilities acquired by training[2], like skiing, riding a bicycle, foreign languages, reading, etc. And it is more obvious for art and culture, because these can be considered as "extensions" of such abilities, or of the totality of such abilities. The same is relevant for social history, for the actions which we accomplish in society are actually based upon certain kinds of skills. The fact that philosophy has such a kind of progress could, on the contrary, help to define the subject-matter of philosophy by asking the question: if philosophy has such a kind of progress, what kind of ability then is at the bottom of this knowledge? It seems to me that the right answer heer is that it is the ability of the human mind to find its way among "prima facie" equally relevant facts from different kinds, and to point to the most important one among them. So the aim of the philosophical training is evidently the cultivation of a purely intellectual ability.

It should also be mentioned (indeed, only mentioned) here that there are many studies ("sciences") which are not called 'history', but whose aim is actually similar to that of history: the comparing, juxtaposing one to another of different kinds of complex skills of a given sphere of experience. Such studies are for instance the theory

of literature, art criticism, aesthetics in general, and even psychology, sociology and ethics. True, their purpose is not the description of past events with the intention to attain the capability to make predictions of the future, but the juxtaposition of the facts resulting from some acquired ability has as its purpose a theory of this kind of ability. This fact, for its part, explains why some philosophers, say, Hegel, Collingwood, Lakatos, are so firm in their insistence of the identity of logic and history.

A characteristic feature of actions based on some ability is that they can be accomplished as a game, and even they necessarily have at their bottom an element of a game, in the sense of free action arising from everyday-life. And this is so, because the ability creates a new kind of action and ultimately, a new entity which is independent of the practice, and the game is nothing other than an action independent of the practice. This fact determines the key role of the game in human society, and not the mysterious predetermination of human actions in general from the game, as is argued by J. Huizinga in his chef d'oeuvre **Homo ludens**.[3]

Another characteristic feature of these actions is that, as a rule, they are subject to valuation. And as much as we are used to connect the valuation with the aesthetic facts, it will be convenient for our analysis (for the same of brevity) to call the facts resulting from a trained ability "aesthetic" facts, and our theory "aesthetic" theory or even "theory of action".

But what is most characteristic of these kinds of action is that they are inaccessible to measurement; their assessment seems always subjective and relative, and the aim people set to reach on any kind of ability unclear. This belief can be met, both in everyday-life and in theoretical reasoning. Let us take, for instance, a quotation from the eighteenth century author Edmund Burke, according to whom "beauty is no idea belonging to mensuration; nor has it anything to do with calculation and geometry".[4]

I, however, believe that the abilities not only are "mysterious", but they also possess characteristics that can be measured physically. This, first of all, is suggested by the fact that every ability could be attained by a given amount of training, in which the person acquiring a new ability has a clearly formulated aim to achieve. So the "mysterious" and difficult action for assessment is reached by atomic and strictly differentiated acts of training, which

can be measured physically. Secondly, this (historical) atomism of receiving a given ability is embodied (logically) in the same ability, and thus gives us a possibility to measure two abilities of one and the same kind, to assess objectively which one of them is better mastered, which action based on them is better accomplished. (Actually, it seems that every valuation and every judgement in general is possible, only on the grounds of the logical intuition which takes part in the assessment and without which the latter is impossible).

The measurement of two abilities of the same kind by two different agents is carried out by comparing their "multiplicity"; the ability which possesses a more developed multiplicity looks better mastered or more "progressive". It could be put this way: the action, mastered on some ability, builds up a picture, which is physically measurable, and which could be measured exactly. And I deny the subjectivity of the aesthetical and historical valuation, relying only upon the multiplicity or the picture of the historical, aesthetical, etc. facts.

In order to better explain the concepts "multiplicity" and "picture" of "aesthetic" or historical facts, I'll refer to some well-known ideas of L. Wittgenstein. In his works these concepts are interconnected at that the essence and function of the picture is more or less dependent upon its multiplicity. That is why, in spite of his conception of the picture changing considerably in the second periods of his philosophical development, the concept of multiplicity remains unchanged. In the **Tractatus**, for example, the picture is actually a structure, whose components hang on to one another "like the members of a chain". At that "dass sich die Elemente des Bildes in bestimmter Art und Weise zu einander verhalten stelle vor, dass sich die Sachen so zu einander verhalten".[5] A little further, Wittgenstein calls the structure of the picture, and of the fact which it pictures a "logische (mathematische) Mannigfaltigkeit".[6] It is clear that, as long as the order of the components of the structure or the multiplicity of the picture is logical (mathematical), it can be measured exactly.

It is true that the explicit theory of multiplicity in the **Tractatus** does not clearly show the connection of this notion with the results of the "aesthetic" actions. In fact, in 1914 the "picture theory" is formulated, first of all, to secure the connection between proposition and reality. A deeper analysis of the picture theory of

the **Tractatus**, however, shows that it is in fact connected with to his "theory of the mystical", according to which the aesthetic pictures demonstrate their characteristics immediately without discourse (that is why every proposition about these characteristics is senseless), and with his theory of the tautological character of the logical formulae, whose comprehension is also based upon a certain kind of intuition which makes any discourse superficial.[7] This explains why, according to the early Wittgenstein, the aesthetic "pictures" can be compared only thanks to their logical (mathematical) multiplicity. And for the late Wittgenstein, in which the picture theory is developed far more comprehensively, this is far more clear. Actually, in spite of the fact that he did not work out this problem in detail, he repeatedly stated from 1914 till 1950 that the problems of aesthetics, of art (not to mention the language mastering and thinking in general) are srikingly similar to that of mathematics and logic. See in this connection, say, par. 527 of **Philosophische Untersuchungen**: "Das Verstehen eines Satzes der Sprache ist dem Verstehen eines Themas in der Musik viel verwandter, als man etwa glaubt".[8]

Here, it can be mentioned that the term "multiplicity" is not used so often in the late Wittgenstein, e.g., it can not be met in **Philosophische Untersuchungen**. However, we must make a distinction between the term "multiplicity" and the theory of multiplicity. The latter plays a very important role in his (especially later) philosophy.

It seems that the most important characteristic of the "aesthetic" facts is that they can be compared and assessed only by virtue of their multiplicity, they can be only explained by some form of theory of "logical intuition". If we return again to Wittgenstein, we shall see such a theory laid down as follows: "Wir ja in einer entsprechenden Notation die formalen Eigenschaften der Sätze durch das blosse Ansehen dieser Sätze erkennen können".[9], i.e., the logical pictures are also sensuous pictures, and the latter, for their part, are recognizable by their logical features. And, in the same way, we recognize the logical picture in the sensuous one, and we also recognize the logical picture in the aesthetical one.

And to end with Wittgenstein's contribution to the theory of multiplicity, let us pay attention to the fact that it was developed in the analysis of one single type of ability: having command of a

language. But just because this theory is created in order to explain the function of certain types of ability, it is well fitted to explain the ability in general. And this shows also that Wittgenstein's solution of the problem of assessment of "aesthetic" and historical facts on the grounds of their multiplicity, is only one of the many possible ways of its explanation. In fact, Wittgenstein's theory of multiplicity is only one of the possible ways of analyzing the objectivity of the assessment of the "aesthetical facts" .

The fact that at the bottom of the historical study lies the comparison of different logical forms of "aesthetic" facts, is the main source of the illusion that the only aim of historical knowledge is the unveiling and describing of the chain of causation. Historians are constantly obsessed by the idea of causation, just because they see (although they do not appear to be aware of this) that in the "aesthetic" facts there is an immutable and physically measurable "hard structure" (Wittgenstein's expression), which determines "the behaviour" of these facts. On the other hand, many art critics, for example, also feel that the beauty in a given work of art is such only by virtue of some geometrical structure. Here, it can be remembered that already Aristotle stated that "le beau suppose certaines conditions d'étendue et d'ordonnance".[10]

Now we must proceed to the analysis of the theory of multiplicity. A really difficult question connected with it, is whether the assessment of "aesthetic" (historical) facts is performed only on the grounds of their logical multiplicity, or is it accomplished also by virtue of some other characteristics of these facts - say (and this seems to be the most serious candidate for an alternative - on the grounds of the style in which it is performed? This doubt can, of course, be justified, although it emerges only because we can compare the logical multiplicity of facts that are accomplished in one and the same style. Thus, we disregard the possibility of existence of other styles, and when we meet some other style, it seems to us as something "mystical" that cannot be measured physically, of which no science could give an exact judgement; and all this has misled philosophers of history to believe that historical facts are in principle unaccessible to exact analysis.

But actually, the style is not something different from the unanalyzed and unknown logical form, logical multiplicity, which we now, at this moment, cannot analyze, but which, like all other forms,

could be analyzed and compared with other forms from the same style. And this conception also explains how a given person can master a new, unknown (for him) style.

Actually, it seems that the two opposite ways of seeing "aesthetic" facts, according to the style in which they are performed, are not strictly different from one another. Since we already have had an opportunity to be convinced of this, the creation and assessment of a given work of art is decomplished by a logical intuition; on the other hand, however, in creation and assessment of any scientific theory, it is impossible to free ourselves from "aesthetic" suggestions. And this was shown clearly in recent years in the works of T. Kuhn and P. Feyerabend. The aim of the philosophers of history is to show that this mixing up is illegal. We can, of course, make history by an artistic means, but we must be clear about this, and not believe (and conventional historians do believe this), that we make a science. And such mixed studies are in their turn "aesthetic" and historical facts which also need a scientific explanation, and which depend on the intellectual vogue (we will return to this point in a while).

An important question concerning multiplicity of the "aesthetic" facts is what is their status: how it changes, is it given once forever, etc. It seems at first sight that the logical multiplicity of - say - given historical facts has no constant value. When we obtain more data about this fact, we could see in it a different multiplicity. This state of affairs, however, is hardly to be used as an argument against the objectivity of the "aesthetic" facts, since the addition of new data actually introduces a new object of investigation. But given "aesthetic" or historical fact has a permanent and constant logical multiplicity.

Another difficulty: when certain facts are given, everyone of the "spectators" has his personal comprehension and interprets them in his personal way. And now, how is it possible to speak of an objectivity of "aesthetic" and historical investigation?

This argument of "point of view", however, seems to be shakeable (yet) before its formulation, since the "aesthetic" or historical facts assessed from people with different taste are one and the same after all, and this state of affairs determines, in principle, their one and the same judgement of them. Because "the body of texts" - to chose them as an example of an object of judgement - "that we try to

understand, sets a limit to the possible interpretations to which we may submit it".[11] There are, of course, differences in the judgements of different persons, but they are only a manifestation of their different 'Lebensformen' (Wittgenstein's term). But such manifestations are, in principle, inadmissable in science.

In this connection it is especially important to differentiate between a creation of "aesthetic" facts, and commenting upon such. There is real evidence that the type of "aesthetic" relativism which now occupy us, is due to a mixture of these two concepts. Since the appearance of the commentator's style of thinking in his judgement of a given "aesthetic" fact, witnesses his invasion in a foreign sphere of action: from that of commenting to that of creating. And this mistake is common to all historians creating entities with the intention of explaining the "aesthetic" facts. But the creation of entities in the analysis of these facts, is at the bottom of the subjectivism in history.

But what kind of entities are they? Already at the time of Thucydides, historians believed that the main purpose of their investigations was to discover "the real cause"[12] of the historical events with the aim of enabling people to find their way in future political events. In the modern times this tendency develops further, and nowadays they try to outdo each other in finding a more speculative definition of given "aesthetic" or historical facts. Take, for example, the analysis of M. Foucault of some intellectual facts of the sixteenth century: "Et tout comme l'interprétation du XVIe siècle, superposant une sémiologie à une herméneutique, était essentiellement une connaissance de la similitude, de même, la mise en ordre par le moyen des signes constitue tous les savoirs empiriques comme savoir de l'identité et de la différence".[13] Here it is easy to see how history now is turned to a mixture of historical data, and speculations on them with the noble intention of giving them a new light. And already historians are not embarassed by the fact they they have no immediate touch with immediate facts, but with their "logical constructions". They openly declare this.[14]

But even graver is the situation in philosophy of history, which now "swarms" with theories making their aim to discover "the ultimate cause" of the historical events or of given "aesthetic" facts. For such a cause they now declare the 'libido' (Freud), now the game (Huizinga), now the objects of consciousness and their content

(Husserl), now the "natural attitude" (Schütz). The French structuralists go even further - they not only seek for the cause, but for the logic that determines the "aesthetic" and historical facts. Thus, Claude Lévi-Strauss asserts that thanks to his analyses: "On atteint ainsi des structures relativement simples, dont les transformations engendrent des mythes de divers types. Par ce biais, l'antropologie collabore modestment à l'élaboration de cette logique concrète qui semble être un des soucis majeurs de la pensée moderne, et qui nous rapproche, plus qu'elle ne nous éloigne, de formes de pensée en apparence très étrangères a la notre".[15]

My principal objection against the (let us call it so) "entitological" history and "aesthetics" is that they give a very low level of certainty to their theories, a level unacceptable for any scientific investigation. And this is the reason why people have am impression that history differs from science because of the special nature of its judgements. Although the logical scheme of the structuralists to take them as an example may be true in some respects, it could not be absolutely true; and that is so, because the structuralist's theory, like any other theory, represents only a given point of view for seeing the facts (here it can be remembered that 'theoria' in Ancient Greek means something like "looking at", "viewing", "beholding"), a given 'Lebensform'. And as long as the point of view is never the only point of view - at any rate that connected with historical and "aesthetic" facts, as long as it is always connected with one of these facts, - historical theory is always subject to falsification.

But worst of all is the fact that historians falsely comprehend the facts seen from this point of view. They accept them as absolutely true and consider that this point of view refutes all others. In other words, they turn the truths obtained through a given point of view into entities. The theorist supposes that theory is a given fact or a given entity which presents a model or paradigm for ordering any given group of historical or "aesthetic" facts. Theory, in their opinion, is a kind of entity of very high intensity. Therefore, many other facts can be inferred from it. They believe that historical investigation requires the construction of a new fact or entity, different from the facts of reality.

Thus, the chief aim of historians turns out to be not the discovery of new data, but new points of view, new forms, paradigms,

schemes of disposing the facts, new pictures, and what is worse, this picture is considered by them as a fact or entity. It should be noted also that, when he begins his investigation, the historian already carries this picture in his head and only projects it on the historical facts on hand.

The theoretical historical investigation has as its purpose the taxonomy of the historical facts which, however, (and we already mentioned this at the beginning of this paper) differs from the taxonomy of the facts of natural history; since as long as the objects described from the historical investigation, are the result of some ability, their descriptions very often do not proceed as a description of facts as such, and they do not look for their logical picture which lies at the bottom. All this is a consequence of the intrusive idea that the "aesthetic" states of affairs have enigmatic properties that are difficult to describe. The consequence of this situation is that their taxonomy also adopts an enigmatic characteristic, and turns (to use the terminology of Jacob Burckhardt) to "Kunstwerk", but nevertheless, claims to be a science (we already hinted at this a little earlier). And what is more, history from a point of view is doomed to be "Kunstwerk".

Of course, it could not be said (like Wittgenstein and J. Wisdom) that these theories are traps, whirlpools into which all positive efforts for correct understanding of historical facts, disappear. They are no traps really, but usually hindrances, and although they hinder, they have also a positive role for understanding the historical facts. And it must be mentioned also, that the usefulness of the historical theories is due to the fact that they throw a new and brighter light upon the historical facts, as long as we behold them from a new and higher point of view.

Furthermore, often historians, philosophers and other "aesthetes" try themselves to build "aesthetic" explanations without entities, and thus they criticize the theoretical history as such. Take, for instance, one of the most influential French structuralists, Tzv. Todorov, who at the end of one of his essays on Henry James, for example, draws the conclusion that the logical scheme of the novel in fact cannot unveil its secret:

> "Si le secret de Henry James, l'image dans la tapis de son oeuvre, le fil qui relie les perles que sont les nouvelles isolées, est précisément l'existence d'un secret, comment se fait il qu'aujourd'hui nous pouvons nommer le secret,

> rendre l'absence présente? Ne trahissons -nous pas par là le précepte jamesien fondamental, qui consiste en cette affirmation de l'absence, en cette affirmation de l'absence, en cette impossibilité de désigner la vérité par son nom? Mais la critique, elle aussi (celle-ci y comprise), a toujours obéi à la même loi: elle est recherche de la vérité, non sa révélation, quête du trésor plutôt que le trésor lui-même; car le trésor ne peut être qu'absent".[16]

Another example of criticism of entities in explanation of "aesthetic" facts can be found in analytic philosophy in which voices can be heard, say, for an elimination of the "ghost in the machine" (Ryle), or can be met in a theory of intentionality of some of the "aesthetic" actions, without use of entities. A good example of the latter is the criticism of John Searle against "the traditional cognitive view", according to which the instructions of the ski-instructor, are internalized in the person taught. On his view, however, these rules remain irrelevant, and do not participate in the unconscious intentional contents. "They fade into the background" of the faculties of the men taught".[17]

In contrast to the explanation of the historical and "aesthetic" facts with the help of entities, I propose an explanation, based upon comparison of the logical multiplicity of the historical facts, and which orders them according to this comparison and assessment made according to their progressiveness. In my opinion, every historical investigation, like every analysis of facts resulting from some acquired ability, must be a picture, "Bild", not theory. One should be aware of the fact that it is an investigation without theory, without construction of new entities or facts, and that its chief purpose, is to present a picture of the facts which it analyzes, built on the grounds of the comparison of their logical multiplicity. The first step in this analysis is the comparison and assessment of different facts, according to their multiplicity. Thus, we assess one picture as more beautiful than another, thanks to the fact that its multiplicity is more developed; we assess (to mention Searle's example) that this skier wields his skis better than others, thanks to the fact that the multiplicity of his skiing is better developed than the skiing of all other skiers taking part in the competition, etc.

The next step is a very simple and purely formal one: arrangement of the previously analyzed facts, according to their real place in the historical process, or merely in the "aesthetic" structure,

and the creation of a picture of the historical event. This way, the historian will give a maximum clear picture, not only determining a "sub specie" of one of these facts, but "sub specie aeterni". And here I use the phrase "maximum clear picture" in order to show that after the measurement of the historical facts, no unclear points, no white fields, no "depths" of the historical problems remain, which we must expect to be solved by the next generation of historians (always from some other one, but not from us, and not at this moment).

It can be said also, that thanks to this investigation, "the atoms" of the historical and "aesthetic" reality will be found in the sense of unanalyzable and unfalsifyable truths about this reality. These atoms will be at the bottom of the certainty of the historical science, and thanks to these it will be at last possible to give such a historical knowledge, which would not prove to be false when new facts will appear. Indeed, the historian will proceed to search for new data, and when he discovers such, the fact analyzed will change. But on every level of his knowledge of the fact he will be able to make it an objective picture.

The full explanation of (the philosophy of) history without entities is, indeed, possible only in a concrete historical investigation. In this paper, it is true, most of the arguments were only hinted but not proved or grounded theoretically. But our task here was only to lay down the main tenets of the historical investigation without entities.

Notes

1. On different kinds of progress, see Moody (1986, pp.35-6).
2. For my understanding of "ability", see the article "Fähigkeit" in G. Clauss et al. (1981).
3. See for more detail: Huizinga (1938).
4. Burke (1756, p.93).
5. Wittgenstein (1921, 2.15, p.38).
6. Ibidem (4.04, p.70).
7. For more details of such an interpretation of Tractatus see Milkov (1983).
8. Wittgenstein (1953).
9. Wittgenstein (1921, 6.122, p.160).
10. Aristote (Vii, V, p.18).
11. Kristeller (1985, p.623).
12. Thucydid (I, 23, p.16).
13. Foucault (1966, p.71).
14. See e.g., the statement of Neveux (1986, p.51): "L'historien élabore ainsi peu à peu prix de retouches plus ou moins profondes et de liaisons nouvellement decouverts, des systems relationnels toujours modifiables et sans cesse en expansion. Le savoir historique est donc à un moment donné, l'état de

connaissance à ce moment donné du champ relationel unissant les éléments historiques.

15. Lévi-Strauss (1973, p.83).
16. Todorov (1971, pp.184-5).
17. See Searle (1983, p.150).

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COMMENTS ON THE SUBJECT MATTER OF CONVENTIONAL HISTORIES OF PSYCHOLOGY

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Summary

How do history of psychology textbooks conceptualize the subject matter which they describe? This paper raises questions about the conventional practice whereby writers assume that psychology has a continuous subject from Ancient Greece to the late twentieth century. It questions the coherence of history which assumes that there is a trans-historical subject, 'psychology'. It suggests that the only reasoned definition of the scope of a history of psychology is a social one, and that it is therefore meaningful to refer to psychology as a subject only where and when it has existence as a distinct discipline. Textbook histories of psychology provide a structured, evaluative version of general intellectual history. By contrast, 'the history of psychology' should be a project that understands the diverse schools and methods found in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and this is in fact what one finds in recent 'professional' history of psychology. The paper explores a few of the difficulties faced by a wider conception of 'the history of psychology', and it implies instead a more reflective engagement with the purpose of historical writing.

This paper develops out of an invitation to review an apparently straightforward book with the title, **History of Psychology**.[1] There are many books with similar titles in the English language, catering for this common part of the psychology curriculum of North-American colleges and universities. The huge numbers of students taking psychology create a profitable market for such texts. While these texts may well satisfy their intended audience, the students, they can also prompt some more theoretical questions, questions about the cogency of the project in the first place. I will draw attention to one question in particular (though it raises many sub-issues, few of which can be addressed here): what is the subject of the history of psychology, if it has a subject at all? What is it these texts assume

they are talking about? And can we reasonably accept these assumptions once we have made them clear?

In arguing about 'the subject' of the history of psychology, this could involve reference to: (1) the history of psychology as an area of study (or perhaps discipline); (2) the objects that this history studies (i.e. its subject matter); (3) the subject that does the writing (i.e. the authorial self). As the use of the one word suggests, the three relevant meanings of 'the subject' are interrelated. The prime focus in this paper is on meaning (2) but, as the nebulous and elusive nature of the history of psychology's subject matter becomes clear, so the existence of something corresponding to meaning (1) will be questioned. No doubt these conclusions have implications for meaning (3), but that will be left for others to consider.

The problems of 'the history of psychology'

It is not difficult to show in functionalist terms how textbook histories of psychology make the particular values of psychology, as a scientific community, constitutive of the subject of psychology's history. Two related values are especially evident, but I will concentrate on the second. The first is present in texts committed to exemplifying continuity between powerful symbols of scientific advance (e.g. Galileo) and the current development of psychology.[2] I will observe only that the result for history writing of this first value, that there has been a unique line of scientific advance, has now been subject to much criticism, even by psychologists themselves, often in the form of critiques of so-called 'presentist' methods. These criticisms have been instrumental in freeing historians from subservience to the interests of scientific communities and in importing the standards of argument and evidence common in academic history. The result is a growing body of properly historical work, or 'professional' history, in the history of the psychological - and other human - sciences.[3] However, the substitution of historical for presentist methods cannot in itself provide an answer to questions about the subject of historical research. Indeed, there is a danger of substituting the unreflective conventions of one academic community, the historians, for another, the psychologists, with little advance in a deeper understanding. As I will go on to suggest, there are real decisions to be made about the choice of subject matter and

in these decisions we must return to an open consideration of current purposes and values. But this 'return to the present', if it is not to be a regression, will have to be critical and not presentist (in the sense in which general histories of psychology structure the past as a prelude to the present).

The second type of value in history of psychology texts is embodied in the assumption that the subject of psychology is universal, that is, that there has always been a real subject potentially accessible to scientific knowing. 'History of psychology' revolves around this real and universal subject. The textbook writers understand of course that different cultures and civilizations describe this subject in a multitude of different ways, but they assume that there is an underlying identity in what this description is about. In practice, this results in the history of psychology becoming general intellectual history, in which writers link modern psychology with the wisdom of the ancients. Thus standard texts begin with accounts of Pre-Socratic philosophy and work through Aristotelian empiricism, Christian theology, and Renaissance humanism into the modern period. Embedded in this approach is the presupposition that psychology has for its subject a continuous tradition of describing what it really is to be human. From this point of view, psychology must be considered a central (if not the central) tradition of civilised culture. I want to comment tentatively on the assumptions underlying this second value.

I will start by asking three questions. The first is to ask whether the question of this paper, 'does the history of psychology have a subject?' is equivalent to the question 'does psychology have a subject?'[4] In other words, if we were able to define the subject of a distinct discipline, psychology, wouldn't this automatically provide us with the subject matter of its history? In response, we may observe empirically that twentieth-century psychology is marked by division as to its concepts, subjects, and methodology and that we are unlikely to make easy progress by seeking here for a single definition which would help us decide the subject of psychology's history.[5] Some of the most interesting work in the history of the twentieth-century human sciences addresses precisely this diversity and relates it to divergent national and cultural settings. More theoretically, we may also observe that, while there are psychologists committed to establishing a unified, theoretical psychology,

there are others who judge this aim unnecessary to scientific progress or even unrealisable in principle. Clearly there are no ready guides for the history of psychology to be found here.

A second question if whether this problem of finding the subject of a would-be history is common on the history of other sciences. At first glance, we might expect not, since many modern physical science disciplines, biochemistry for example, do have unified subject matters which serve to define the scope of their histories. Nevertheless, historians of science certainly puzzle about how they should describe historical periods before their chosen topic becomes a separate area of knowing in the modern period.[6] A currently attractive response treats the transition to the modern period as a process of dscipline formation.

It is important to note that much of the most substantial recent work in the history of psychology is concerned with discipline formation. Work on the origins of the psychology discipline shows, however, that one discipline did not form in one set of historical circumstances. It shows rather that modern psychology is a cluster of would-be disciplines. We cannot therefore talk with any precision about 'the birth' of the discipline. What originated with Wundt in the 1870s was not the same as the practices in the new American psychology departments of the 1880s. Differential psychology in France of Britain in the decade after 1900 was a quite different occupation to experimentation in Göttingen of Würzburg. Further, it has been argued, in spite of Wundt's 'founder' status for psychologists, that there is no properly distinct German professional discipline of psychology until the 1930s. Even discipline history, then, provides to straightforward answer to the question about the subject of psychology's history.

The third question is entirely general, though it arises with special force in the human sciences. To mention 'the subject' is to allude to the current attack on the view that there could be 'a subject', in the sense of a rational self or in the sense of a permanent, universal subject matter of knowledge. This raises so many disputed matters that it is possible here only to put the problem on record. But the existence of the debates ought at least to warn writers of 'the history of psychology' that their house may be without foundations.

General histories of psychology, then, when they presuppose a continuity of subject across the ages, do not confront the profound difficulties of their enterprise. This very general criticism also has a more specific form. Histories of psychology regularly begin with 'the philosophical antecedents of psychology'. But how do these histories decide what to include? It is clear in fact that they possess no rational criteria of inclusion and exclusion. How much ancient and medieval thought belongs in a history of psychology? Given that undergraduates in the English-speaking world are almost totally ignorant of the history of ideas or philosophy, we should perhaps be grateful that the history of psychology provides a general education! But this function is no answer to the demand for a rational account of what might constitute the history of ancient or medieval psychology. In practice, the writers in this tradition do adopt criteria of inclusion and exclusion (as indeed they must), but their criteria are either opportunistic or evaluative following narrow social conventions. They include, on the whole, what other writers in the same tradition of writing include. Thus it is common to include mention of Aristotle's **De Memoria**; by contrast, it is uncommon, to say the least, to discuss the Athenian concept of the slave. Nevertheless, it is not abvious that it is rational or historical to treat one and not the other as a proper subject for the history of psychology.

Intellectual history has paid considerable attention to such problems, utilizing concepts such as that of 'the context' of the text or of 'authorial intention'.[7] It should no longer be defensible to treat Aristotle's account of memory as excisable from the whole corpus of his writings on human activity in order to effect direct comparison with modern theories. Most notoriously, a conventional description of Artistotle as the first associationist is surely not history, however much it may flatter a modern psychologist's sensibility.

The same point can be made with a different example. Much of the vast literature on David Hume, Adam Smith and other major figures of the Scottish Enlightenment, treats them as practising epistemology, social psychology, economics and other modern occupations. But Hume's descriptions of innate human sociability or Smith's of the moral sentiments were intended to characterize the conditions for disinterested political judgment, economic wealth, moral propriety, and

individual virtue.[8] My question is, does all this belong to the history of psychology or not? To put the question this way, however, doesn't sound like a very profitable exercise. If we answer 'yes', then the history of psychology must become the whole of intellectual history. If we answer 'no', then there is no history of psychology as such in the Enlightenment. By contrast, the answer may be, that we should not be looking for 'the history of psychology' in the Enlightenment in the first place.

The social nature of psychology

We have to go outside the textbook histories of psychology to find historical writing on psychology which has a possible rational basis for its choice of subject matter. I refer first to what we may call the new professional history, researching the differentiation of experimental psychology in Germany, North America and elsewhere, the twentieth-century history of intellectual schools of psychology, institutions and occupational groups, biographies of Wundt or Cattell, or the application of psychological techniques in education, commerce or the hospital. What I want to draw attention to is the fact that this new history of psychology is at work precisely in that area where psychology is, or is becoming, a differentiated discipline or occupational area. What psychology is, is clear in these histories: it is what is embodied in the activity of the practitioners of the discipline or occupation. In other words, psychology has a social reality since the generation of Wundt or James which provides the historian with the parameters of a subject.[9] The subject of modern psychology is defined by the activity of doing psychology, not by a rationally-grounded subject matter, such as a common core of mutually consistent propositions. Thus the successful development of professional history of psychology is going ahead just where psychology is a clearly defined subject, by virtue of being a socially specific phenomenon. Historians of modern psychology tacitly answer the question about what they should be studying with a social definition of the subject.

However, if we define the subject of the history of psychology in social terms, the history of psychology is the history of a discipline or group of disciplines developing in piecemeal and diverse ways from the second half of the nineteenth century. It appears to follow that there can be no history of psychology as such

in the earlier periods. The historian of psychology may quite legitimately search in earlier periods in order to trace traditions of thought, the social background of individuals or institutions, cultural values, or economic and political circumstances, that become part of a later psychology. But this is then historical research for a purpose that is defined by the later discipline or disciplines. The subject of the historical research is created in retrospect by the purposes that the historian has.

A historical concern with tracing back the origins of psychology will be relatively unproblematical for the recent past. Thus it makes sense to survey a tradition of post-Kantian writers to provide a context for the research intentions of Fechner or Wundt in the 1860s.[10] Similarly, we can except that it is part of the understanding of psychological argument in Bain or Spencer to elucidate an associationist tradition stemming from Hartley.[11] Nevertheless, this working backwards, so to speak, in order to constitute the subject rapidly becomes a highly questionable practice. The reference to Hartley offers a good example of the problems. In many histories of psychology he is the founder of systematic associationism as an integral part of a Christian theism and shows that it is Christian or ethical apologetics that structures his account of human capacities.[12] Is it possible, then, to conclude that Hartley was writing about what later psychologists were writing about?

The tenuous nature of reconstructions of a tradition of psychology possessing a continuous subject matter comes to a head in relation to the seventeenth century. Certainly it is no coincidence that the so-called history of psychology for this period is in disarray. There has been, and it looks set to continue, a learned debate about the relative continuity and discontinuity between medieval-Aristotelian ways of thought and that of the new mechanized world view. A large body of opinion holds that the categories in which the subject matter of knowledge can be expressed underwent wholesale change. The most forceful restatement of this is given by Rorty, in his argument for the seventeenth-century construction of the category of 'the mental'.[13] But we do not have to decide the issue in any firm way to realise the superficiality of presupposing a continuity of psychological subject before and after 'the mechanization of the world picture'.[14] If such terms as 'the mental' (and we might add, 'the self')[15] are traceable to specific historical circumstances, then it

seems unreflective in the extreme to write the history of psychology beginning with the ancients.

In taking my starting point in textbooks, I have of course taken an easy target. With justice, a critic might want to point to a lot of other work which is more contextual in its methods and more reflective about its subject. I have already distinguished one body of work which certainly is contextual - the recent studies of discipline formation (such as that by John O'Donnell on the United States, Alex Kozulin on the Soviet Union, and Ulfried Geuter on interwar Germany).[16] There is also some highly stimulating work concerning itself with historical conditions in which a certain kind of historical knowledge becomes possible: Nikolas Rose's description of British differential psychology emerging in educational and medical practice is an important example.[17]

There is also a wealth of historiographically sophisticated work in earlier periods. But what is immediately noticeable about such studies is that, with a few exceptions, their interest lies with eschewing modern divisions in knowledge and experience. I alluded earlier to Nicholas Phillipson's studies of Smith and Hume as civic moralists. Or, to take another example, recent work on physiognomy and phrenology assumes that these are subjects as much in the province of the history of art, of polite manners, or of education, as of protopsychology. Foucault's study, **Les mots et les choses**, was a powerful influence on this rethinking of the relations between different subject areas in the past.[18]

I have talked as if it were obvious that psychology, meaning the dsciplinary subject, originated in the last part of the nineteenth century. This may not be correct. In the first place, we should recall a point made earlier, that there is no one discipline with no one point of origin, and that there is therefore little reason to restrict the discussion to a particular point of time. But, in addition, there are two frameworks of thought which might suggest the constitution of a subject as psychology before the late nineteenth century.

The first framework is familiar from the history of ideas. It suggests that psychology became possible as a subject once the logic of the principle of the continuity or uniformity of nature brought human beings into identity with the natural world, and hence brought human beings under the scope of scientific explanation. This step,

conceptualizing human beings as natural objects, was confirmed, with the seal of empirical authority, in the work of Darwin. But many stages of the naturalization of human existence occurred earlier, perhaps above all in the Lockean and Enlightenment tradition that subsumed the formation of the mind's content and the production of conduct under natural law. Similarly, as writers substituted physical analogies for mental acts (such as the contiguous association of ideas for the imagination), so psychology as a scientific subject became possible. I would suggest, however, that these arguments depend upon a conception of psychology which derives from its later social existence, and depend upon the historian projecting the conception back into earlier settings.

The second framework, expressing it very loosely, is a Marxian one. Briefly, if human nature is historically constituted through the forms of labour, then, it can be argued, it follows that the possible subjects of knowing are similarly constituted. In particular, the establishment of the bourgeois system of economic power, accompanied by specific state formations, created conditions of possibility for new divisions of learning and new bodies of practical knowledge. In a rare study along these lines, Siegfried Jaeger and Irmingard Staeuble describe the formation of psychology as a subject in relation to the social nature of the German states in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.[19] As this suggests, there is great scope, though enormous theoretical and methodological difficulties, for exploring further the socially specific derivation of a subject matter that we would call 'psychological'.

Enough has perhaps been said to indicate my conclusion: 'the history of psychology' must be abandoned. What we have, and all that we will have, are **histories** written for different purposes. It does not seem possible to conceptualize a continuous and unitary subject to set the tasks of a single history. This is not a claim against doing history, but an argument that the construal of what history is about is in principle open-ended. There is no Archimedian point outside doing 'the history of psychology' from which to derive criteria of a subject. To take the argument further would require discussion of philosophical problems which are themselves the subject of an extensive and contentious literature. All that I hope to have done in this brief paper is bring an agenda of problems for future

work into the open.[20] Writing history is a much more problematical activity than 'histories of psychology' would have us believe.

Notes

1. Hothersall (1984).
2. E.g., Watson (1979).
3. E.g., Ash and Geuter (1985); Woodward and Ash (1982).
4. Cf. Canguilhem (1958).
5. On this diversity, see: Buxton (1985); Koch and Leary (1985).
6. E.g., Kohler (1982).
7. Two influential articles were: Dunn (1968); Skinner (1969). For the more recent 'narrative turn' in historiography, see White (1984).
8. Phillipson (1979) and (1983).
9. On the social nature of psychology, see especially Danziger (1984).
10. Leary (1978) and (1980).
11. Young (1973).
12. Marsh (1959); Verhave (1973).
13. Rorty (1980, pp. 45-61). Cf. Straker (1985).
14. Dijksterhuis (1969).
15. Tomaselli (1984).
16. O'Donnell (1986); Kozulin (1984); Geuter (1985).
17. Rose (1985).
18. Foucault (1970). For a useful summary of Anglo-American reactions to Foucault: Hoy (1986).
19. Jaeger and Staeuble (1978).
20. An extended and more rigorous version of this paper will appear as Smith (1988).

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A CASE HISTORY BETWEEN INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM: SEX AND FAMILY HISTORY'S BEARING ON PSYCHOANALYSIS

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Summary

Traditional answers to the question why sex was so important in Freud's early work all point to the central role played by the emerging field of sexology in the formative phase of psychoanalysis. It is proposed here that Freud used sexology because it provided a new means of regulating sexuality through the modernization of control. This modernization placed inner dynamics at the center of such regulation providing an alternative to the regulatory power of decaying rituals that no longer provided cultural controls for sexual behavior. Both the history of sexuality and family history have documented this deritualization process, which also had consequences for the approach to sexual deviance; Masson's interpretation of Freud's renunciation of the seduction theory is reevalutated in this light. It is concluded that the history of psychoanalysis is the history of a science shaped by two independent chains of events, one within the science the other within the lager culture. The interaction of these two developments was largely responsible for the fate of this new science of the mind.

When dealing with the historical roots of psychoanalysis the question is often raised why sex was so important in Freud's new science of the mind (Van Hoorn, 1984).

Four lines of reasoning which can be documented by original and secondary sources, are commonly adopted when attempting to answer this question.

1. One can point out that sexuality involves the body-part of the mind-body problem. Freud always hesitated to speculate about the mind as such, but because he strongly felt the pressures of either romantic, occultist or symbolistic accounts of the mind's riddles, he

forced himself and others to be materialistic (Bulhof, 1983); sex was an article of faith which provided a "bulwark against the mud of occultism" (Jung, 1963, 149). His materialism was couched in 19th century biogenetic terms, adding a blend of Lamarckianism, and Haecklian 'Naturphilosophie' (Sulloway, 1979; Van Hoorn, 1980).

2. A second line of reasoning refers to the involvement of body and sex/gender in child-rearing. It is quite evident that since a dissociation from the parents which is based on language and reasoning is not within the reach of an infant; emotional ties and their developments are a primordial fact in infancy. What happens to the child in early childhood cannot be counteracted by thinking it over and putting it all in context, thus relativizing its impact. This cognitive skill does not turn up until later in life. Nevertheless, what adults do to the child, he or she experiences and somehow interpretes and the child reacts to the way it is treated. With this obvious fact in mind, Freud emphasized (on theoretical grounds) a form of childish awareness which centered around body attributes and body sensations.[1] With respect to the body attributes: Freud assumed that children search for a rationale behind the differential treatment of boys and girls by adults. For this difference is clearly felt. No other body parts except for the sex organs, provide a clue as to the reasons behind those differences. Children therefore have their own 'theory' about why boys and girls face different requirements. In one way or another, this theory involves sex characteristics. Freud went as far as to conceptualize this developmental peculiarity in the minds of youngsters in **sexological** terms. Penis envy, castration complex, but also Freud's doctrine of infantile preoccupation with sex (as an undifferentiated emotional trigger of or response to adult care) all fit into this usage of sexology.

With respect to the body sensations, the same line of thinking applies; the only things accessible to the child once it gets involved with adults are body sensations. Freud's choice for pleasure and pain is not just a utilitarian stance; it is brought on by the workings of the body as an autonomous **sensorium** structuring meaning, especially interpersonal meaning. Again, the language of sexology was chosen as a vehicle for further articulation of the body's impact on development.

3. The third line of reasoning involves psychoanalysis' main interest: neurotic behavior as it is related to pair bonding and the provision of a well-balanced educational climate for the young. The interest of late 1800's psychiatrists in the triangle father-mother-child set the stage for Freud's preoccupation with this topic. There is some similarity, however, with the second line of reasoning referred to above: one way to theorize about pair bonding and upbringing is by focussing on sexuality and using sexological terminology. Sexuality forms an integral part of, and is functionally organized around, the procreative practises of a society. What aspects of this web of interrelations are emphasized depends on the further conceptualization of this vital domain. Here again the emerging field of sexology provided a conceptual stronghold. The science of sexual pathology had already introduced many novel terms that are at present exclusively associated with Freudian theory. The frequently addressed problem of sexology was: What conditions 'proper' carnal desire? Indeed, a multitude of things could interfere with the development of a proper sexual inclination.
It isn't coincidental that around the 1870s a new science emerged around the problem of the development and direction of sexual desire (Simon and Gagnon, 1986: 101). The issue of homosexuality received the highest priority. Freud followed the sexological developments of his time by trying to come to grips with the phenomena of pair bonding, parental love, family life, mate selection and the neurotic behaviors associated with them.

4. The fourth line of reasoning explaining Freud's emphasis on sex focusses on the moral impact of Freud's work. Psychoanalysis explicitly deals with social order or which sexual conduct is the backbone. Since an enlightened view of morality takes that into account, Freud applied sexological concepts to a moral reasoning (Buelens, 1971; McCarthy, 1981; Rieff, 1959).

Several secondary sources have pointed to the fact that one or more of these four lines of reasoning can be documented in Freud's own writings (Buelens, 1971; Ellenberger, 1970; Kern, 1973; Pratt, 1958; Steward, 1969; Sulloway, 1979). Some analyse the sources from an internalistic point of view which stresses the developments within the science of psychoanalysis itself and within its neighbouring

disciplines; others emphasize an externalistic point of view in which more attention is paid to developments in the social context. Sulloway is a good example of the former. Arguing for a proper weighting of the biogenetic legacy in Freud's thinking about sex, he emphasizes Freud's exchange with Fliess on this topic and views it as an autonomous scientific dispute. No major political or cultural event interfered with, or enhanced, the emergence of the Freudian id out of the Fliessian precursor. The results of this exchange were 'discoveries', which in one way or another internally determined the development of Freud's thinking. At the junction psychoanalysis currently stands, Sulloway contends, it is only necessary to remove the hero construction which has obscured the actual development of Freud's thinking. Once these hero construction layers are removed, the scientific quality at the time of Freud's dealing with sexuality becomes visible. A valuable offshoot of Sulloway's internalistic approach is the detailed picture he presents of all the things Freud included in his theorizing. Much of what actually antidated Freud became associated with his name.

There are, of course, externalistic accounts of Freud's emphasis on sex, wich follow the (very) same four lines of reasoning but reinterprete the causal factors by relating the primary Freudian sources to the spirit of the time. Victorian morality can be emphasized, for example, either to accentuate Freud's departure from it, or to emphasize the limits he constructed for its reform (McCarthy, 1981). Others point to Freud's endorsement of semitic philosophical anthropology in which spirituality is generally symbolized in palpable, earthly and bodily things (Miller, 1981). Those who stress the broader cultural context as constitutive of Freud's emphasis on sex, generally focus on philosophers who in their writings on various subjects paved the way for psychoanalysis. Ellenberger (1970) provides us with a good example of this type of account. He presents psychoanalysis as one of the many healing systems that have been conditioned by socio-economic, political and cultural events. Sexuality receives special attention in his book in a short section on "sexual psychology and pathology 1880-1900". Ellenberger also points to love as being "naturally a prime concern of men and women. No wonder that the spirit of the time was permeated by refined eroticism" (ibid, p. 256). Resuming this theme in the sexual pathology section of his book, Ellenberger presents the scientific interest in

sex as an enlightenment strategy. In that regard he anticipated Foucault's critique of the repression model. The Fin de Siècle was not a period of sexual obscurantism. Sex was a frequently discussed topic; it attracted public attention and conflicting schools of thought developed around the subject. Their development was by no means governed by prejudice alone.

Ellenberger, in his externalistic account, makes no attempt to qualify the various beliefs of the experts at that time. He ends his exposé about sexuality with an unqualified statement:

> "From the foregoing it can be seen that by the year 1900 sexual psychology and psychopathology had already been in full development for twenty years and had made numerous contributions that tended to be synthesized in the new science of sexology" (ibid, p. 303).

Regarding the four lines of reasoning and the examples given of the internalistic or externalistic accounts of Freud's emphasis on sex, we can conclude that the emergent science of sexology is weighed down by the full burden of the way this science is used in psychoanalysis. We can therefore rightfully ask: What had this field to offer that Freud found so attractive?

The history of sexuality

In the historical accounts of what happened to sex in the Western world psychoanalysis is held responsible for the predominance of the drive concept. Yet, the science of sex existed already quite some time before Freud started to write about sexuality (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 291-303; Sulloway, 1979, p. 277-309). Within the confines of this paper, we can only give a limited account of how psychoanalysis has influenced the present day understanding of sex. Due to psychoanalytic interpretations, sex became a 'Trieb', a 'drive' or 'libido'. Conceptualized this way sex was (and still is) taken for granted and accepted as a fact of nature. As such it was placed inside the person and described as a powerful emotion. As soon as that happened, the vicissitudes of this emotion became the object of a science which claimed to be its 'discoverer' and 'explorer'. The lives of children, adults and perverts, for example, were screened for clues to the drive's fate. Sexology's bearing on Freudian thinking is generally described in this way. Historical research, however, requires a deeper probing into the subject matter. The cultural history of sex is undeniably also something that took place outside, or apart from

the science of sex and its reception in psychoanalytic theories. Why not look for a firmer basis from which to judge Freud's enterprise so that we can come to grips with the problem of sex in the history of sex itself?

Sexuality has been historically studied under various headings. Predominant are the family history and the history of sex and marriage approaches of the seventies. According to Bullough (1972): "Historians have been exceedingly reluctant to deal with such a delicate topic". In his short analysis of the history of sexuality he points to the fact that in the early days of modern history writing about sex, historians often used it to explain history instead of making it a subject of historical analysis in its own right. Von Ranke, Toynbee, but also historically interested sociologists like Sorokin, called attention to sexuality's debasing influence on civilization. Their 'sexosophy'[2] and moralism were obvious. The more enlightened historians of the seventies rejected the negative outlook that was characteristic of their predecessors: sexuality became something positive. Once the debasing function of sexuality was refuted, there was an opportunity to become more sensitive to its other functions. Compared to the early grand theories of civilization, the modest approach of modern historians who were ready to deal with specialized fields such as courtship, mate selection, family life etc., made it possible to benefit from a more refined and functional view of sex. Through historical research we now know to what extent sexuality is historically intertwined with a large variety of institutions and provisions in our culture: courtship, family planning, motherhood, eugenics, hygiene, dimorphism, sex roles, gender, identity, etc. Disentangling these relationships is a modern scientific enterprise that was unheard of in Freud's days. Although the interest of most sex historians has mainly been directed towards changing sentiments or attitudes towards sex, Flandrin's early work (Flandrin, 1977, 1979) shows another often neglected aspect of sex. No historical account of psychoanalysis' interest in sex should ignore it.

Flandrin starts with the question whether it is really necessary to choose between 'eroticization' and 'effective repression' to explain the evolution of sexuality. Taking roughly the period between 1750 and 1850 as the time span in which a major change in sexual behavior took place, and making the behavior of the young his target,

Flandrin points out that there was an interaction between repression and eroticization:

1. Ethically, sex was restricted to marriage. This applied to both men and women but with a greater emphasis on women.
2. Demographically, marriage in the West occurred later in life than among any other people in the world. Therefore, the young had sexual desires they could not legitimately satisfy. There was a pervasive demand for abstinence that heightened sexual sensitivity.

These two processes were accompanied by the deterioration of the major institutions that regulated carnal desire and its function in courtship and pair bonding. The high incidence of rape and prostitution in urban areas can be seen as symptoms of this breakdown. Rural areas lagged behind in this respect but here, too, traditional courtship patterns were under attack. Traditional courtship was characterized by practises that followed a restrictive ritual providing a cultural framework for the emotions pertaining to sex. Flandrin argues that the breakdown, interestingly enough, was hastened by the implementation of rules and regulations of church and secular officials alike. The reason for the intervention from these quarters was that traditional rituals by themselves, in their wavering and decaying state, no longer possessed sufficient persuasive power to arrange marriages. For example, pregnancy incurred through a **maraichinage** - a courtship ritual in which boys frequented girls by turns and stayed with them during the night - no longer automatically proved that the man was responsible and guilty. The law tried to prohibit marriages with such a fortuitous bondage.

Flandrin restricts himself to the clearly describable rituals of courtship. The deritualization in this domain can be documented best. But what Flandrin has shown has an impact beyond the domain of courting behavior and points to an important aspect of the sexual emotion that has wider implications for its understanding. Due to a view of emotion that stresses inner experience and concentrates on bodily sensations and reactions, historians and social scientists alike have tended to neglect the outer arrangements that provide illiciting and sustaining conditions of feeling and emotion as a source of orderly conduct. Flandrin has provided a grimpse of this neglected aspect.

It is, of course, safe to confine oneself to existing and documented rituals. However, by extracting from the notion of ritual those elements that make a ritual into what it is, and by describing the impact of these elements on experience and behavior, some interesting suggestions pertaining to the regulation of the sexual emotion follow. One important suggestion is to reconstruct in what way all sorts of sexual behavior, including the 'dark' sex[3], were embedded in outer arrangements of stylized and conventionalized manners. There is no reason to limit ritualization of sex, and for that reason its counterpart, deritualization, to courtship behavior. To these outer arrangements belonged as well the ways in which - to give only one example - unquestioned paternal authority, male dominance, and the subjugation of women created a context that set up women for sexual advances by men. The things mentioned represent, of course, only a rough sketch of this context. To identify more precisely the various components of this context and to determine how they structure emotional (sexual) experience is not easy; the more so if one assumes that these emotions form a sustaining part of the set up. Although the existence of this type of ritalization and its counterpart, deritualization, is an important and interesting empirical problem, it would go beyond the scope of this paper to expound on this subject any further. We want to limit ourselves to arguing that the history of sexuality has shaped the history of psychoanalysis. To complete this theoretical argument, we shall start out by putting the historical question: 'Why sex in psychoanalysis?' into a new perspective.

The Masson case

The new perspective to be presented here is the outcome of a careful evaluation of the recent controversies surrounding Masson's book **The assault on truth** (Masson, 1984).

Masson accused Freud of intellectual cowardice for abandoning on false grounds his seduction theory of neuroses in which actual sexual assaults were held responsible for the neurotic behavior of women. Freud replaced this early environmentalistic conception of the causation of neuroses by a conception in which fantasized traumatic sexual events played a predominant role. He grounded the importance of fantasy scientifically in general characteristics of human sexual development. Masson takes this as a pivotal point in psychoanalytic theory construction which turned the entire Freudian enterprise into

an ill-founded one. The psychoanalytic community did not appreciate Masson's suggestion, of course.

The question why Freud renounced the seduction theory is important. Critics of Masson have pointed out that in actual psychoanalytic practise the therapist always deals with reality as much as he deals with fantasy. Yet, they consider the latter as being Freud's most important 'discovery'. The difference, after all, between psychoanalysis and the vice squad is that the former takes the sensibilities and life history of the offender and the victim into account no matter how severely the damage, whereas the latter only tries to pass judgement on the offender. Abstaining from judicial practise and analysing the dynamics of the victim's experiences (or of the offender, if he is handed over to the analyst) is essential in psychoanalytic work. So it is necessary to consider the possibility that in cases of sexual offences - however innocent or severe - the alleged victim will add experiences and events to the actual ones, amplify these, or even invent them on the basis of, perhaps, innocent provocations.

However, the fundamental question Masson calls attention to is whether stating the problem of sexual offence in terms of inner dynamics is a defensible move and, second, why this interiorisation needs to be linked to sexological reasoning, as Freud did. If we decide against this restatement and interiorization, then Freud's postulation of the dynamics of sex, and the importance attributed to his stance in the ongoing articulation of Western sexuality, needs to be reconsidered.

According to Masson, Freud wasn't totally convinced of the falsity of what he called the 'father-etiology' of neuroses. He cites letters to Fliess not included in the Bonaparte-Freud-Kriss selection (Bonaparte, et al, 1954) to prove that Freud entertained doubts (Masson, 1985, the letters of December 12th and 22nd 1897). Notwithstanding these doubts, the ultimate conclusion was recorded in the **Three essays** and it settled the issue in the following manner:

> "Sex has become a powerful internal drive with its own dynamics, including an intrinsic tendency to perversion" (italics added).

Consequently, the environment is manageably reduced to eliciting stimuli in the shape of, for example, overprotective love and care,

superfluous attention, and unbalanced emotional involvement of the parent.

Back to the history of sex

Let us return for a moment to the history of sexuality and take up the suggestion of the existence of a deritualization process which should not be ignored in the analysis of the regulation and control of sex. Let me elaborate on one example by which some of Masson's reinterpretations of the history of psychoanalysis can be used.

In the rural climate of intact and unquestioned patriarchal authority, incestuous sexual assaults were generally not attributed to sexual cravings or urges on the part of the father. A man of such stature was not thought to have such cravings. He had the power and authority to demand certain forms of sexual gratification. Even if the victim did not consider these demands to be legitimate, she saw them as customary, nevertheless, and the ritualisation of emotion occurred.

It is important to realize that Id-like functions such as sexual desire are part of conventionalized and scripted behavior patterns which transcend individual needs as is true, for instance, for hunger as well. Therefore, the quality of desire can change. Returning to our example, after paternal authority and its supporting structures had come under attack, the attribution of sexual advances to individual cravings became more likely. Because it is true that for the working through of the incestuous experience on the part of the victim it is of crucial significance whether selfish sexual needs, or self-evident and customary paternal practises, however painful, form the causal basis of this experience. In the latter case, the painful event is perceived as being forced upon the victim, therefore serving to preserve a certain balance in the relationship (except in evidently criminal or otherwise damaging incidents). In the former case, the relationship is severely disturbed, causing sometimes a far-reaching psychological damage. In other words, if we are dealing with self-evident paternal practice, supported by unquestioned authority, the more or less intact ritualization of the participants' emotions provides for a firm frame of reference to interprete sexual experience. Thus, ritualization is a constitutive component of emotion and feeling. Riding horseback in a nice suit, living in a huge mansion and being formally acknowledged as the owner of the surrounding land

once provided a context for ritualization. The willingness on the part of the serfs to subjugate was entailed by these patterned signs of dominance. Thus the expression of submissive feelings was ritualistically organized. In this way emotions and feelings were a source of equilibrium and order[4].

The truthfully recorded incidence of sexual assaults or incest in the past[5] probably points to the breakdown of common frames of reference for deviant sexual behavior. It is, of course, difficult after so many years to trace precisely what kind of behavior took place and what kind of experiences were involved. If accounts of incest and sexual assaults were met with disbelief because of the fact that the available stories would imply such a high incidence rate that they could not be true, it could still be true that the stories pointed to real complaints about sexual interaction involving a free floating, predominantly male emotion outside a context of ritualization; an emotion women and children could no longer deal with simply because the overarching framework that used to neutralize its impact had lost its legitimacy.

Contemporary historians have learned from anthropology. They have learned to appreciate the significance of the encoding of rituals and ritualized behavior patterns which provide cultural frameworks for emotion and feeling, typically used as sources of order. These cultural frames are not merely 'internalized' frames of reference which are there to be used for the reflexive structuring of experience. They exist in a fashion much closer to the body and are only accessible to the individual mind once some of its workings are laid bare. This has lead to the reassessment of historical changes in the attitudes and sentiments towards sex. If one looks at the multitude of evidence showing that the sexual emotion - even in its perverted form - was cut loose from traditional provisions for its expression, acceptance and enactment, one reaches the same conclusion as Flandrin. He noted that in the rapidly growing modern cities of the 1800s, for a variety of reasons, there were no longer such means of control and regulation. Let us now turn to the impact this had on psychoanalysis' preoccupation with sex.

The historical question of "Why sex in psychoanalysis?" revisited

Sooner or later, early sexologists always introduced the problem of perversion into their work. Their books always listed a multitude of

cases; Kraft-Ebing added to the list with each new edition of his books. These cases were meant to show that there were quite a few exceptions to the standard expression of sex. The listings demonstrate the deritualization of sex. In trying to answer the question why there were so many exeptions, sexologists, interestingly enough, came up with **biological** answers, conditioned by the internal polemics of science at that time. Sulloway rightfully points out that the biogenetic concept of the '**libido sexualis**', constructed on the basis of mainly American medical sources, provided a powerful alternative to moralistic or atavistic interpretations of psychopathology and sexual deviance.

On the other hand, it is important to note that this biological solution fits into the ongoing deritualization process. The sexual emotion, which had already been cut loose from its formative base, i.e. shared rituals, was conceptualized as a **Trieb**. The healthy sexual instinct was then broken down into evolutionary components, and each component was perceived to be vulnerable to disruptions in the course of its development. Sexual development along sadistic lines, bisexual lines or along a more feminine masochistic line, for example, were among the possibilities; they all represented developmental aberrations. Sexology became the new science to deal with these various routes. This science became the battleground for understanding sex. What this nascent, mainly medical, science had to say about sexual conduct and its development and regulation became much more important (after all, it was deemed to be an enlightenment enterprise) than the sexosophy-and-morality-ridden meddlesomeness of priests, educators, law enforcers, etc. In retrospect we can point out that the early sexologists overlooked that sex was in essence a social interaction process structured by preset arrangements determining who may approach who in what manner or fashion. The biogenetic evolutionary coining of sexology did not provide answers to changes in the public and private spheres of life pertaining to these preset arrangements.

The ignorance with respect to the interactive aspect of sex can easily be demonstrated in the area of childhood sexuality. Outside the conservative forensic-psychiatric circles, some early sexologists expended a considerable investment of energy in showing that precocious sexual activity wasn't a source of perversion (Dessoir, 1897; Moll, 1897; Ellis and Symonds, 1897). Their main focus was mutual

masturbation among age mates, and early seduction practises by adults. The desired party often experienced the events with ambiguous feelings of thrill and distaste, while the seducer him/herself also tended to be hardly convinced about the righteousness of the deed. Because of the benign nature of the cases, moral indignation on the part of the researcher was limited to discouraging these acts without necessarily associating them with disasterous pathologies - a rather friendly stance which is understandable given that some of the early sexologists themselves knew from personal experience the innocent passions that could be involved. In so far as childhood sexuality proved pathological, it was linked to biogenetically abandoned erotogenic zones such as the anus or the mouth. Freud even postulated the existence of organic repression, i.e. a phyletic mechanism counteracting certain sexual experiences one fortuitously could run into but were too intimidating to be dealt with consciously.

One can learn from these approaches to children's sexuality that sexual 'theory' either limited itself to a stocktaking of benign or somewhat problematic behavioral manifestations of sexual drive components that didn't go beyond the researcher's own appreciative competence, or remained in line with Darwinian naturalistic thinking. There was no way to deal scientifically with the communicative, symbolic or interactive aspects of sex. Indeed, what practical value could it have? Changing interactive modes of sexual behavior is much more difficult than theorizing about its so called 'dynamics'.

Psychoanalysis: a case of history between internalism and externalism.

Was Freud's being drawn into the above-mentioned issues the result of a force internal to psychological science and its neighboring disciplines; a force so strong and so pervasive that it totally dominated the field of investigation by leaving no room for close research into the simple question what actually did happen between father and daughter, mother and son, men and women, children and adults and among children themselves? Or is it possible that Freud, as no other sexologist, realized that transforming sexuality into something that belonged to the competence of the biological and psychological sciences was necessary in order to put a halt to its deregulation? Perhaps there was no way of stopping and changing the deritualization

process, for sex had already become something everybody was involved in on his/her own terms. Thus a counterforce had to be invented.

Freud's earlier attempt in his seduction theory of neuroses to select a few areas of deviant practise, that were of general importance and that affected the lives of women in particular, failed because of the unwillingness of the scientific community to apply psychiatric understanding and therapeutic intervention again in a partly outdated direction (Sulloway, 1979, p. 454-455). Furthermore, who was actually interested, after having gone through a sexological reeducation so to speak, in the real life events of sex? Wasn't sex the last bastion of superstition? Could real-life attitudes be changed? What to tell the father who in fact did sell out his daughter, as is now claimed in the Dora case? And what, if Swales (1982a) is right, could Freud do with his own love for Minna and his subsequent unfaithfulness to Martha? Didn't there exist an enlightenment view of these passions that exempted them from being harmful, no matter what the women involved really were experiencing? What could be accomplished by emphasizing factual experience in sexual matters? All this implies that Freud and his movement somehow accommodated to, and acted in accordance with, outer pressures in society and culture pertaining to sex. He did this by using scientific ideas containing biological and psychological elements and in so doing conformed to expectations regarding science in general. In the sexual domain, science seemed a good candidate to take over the regulative impact of tradition, ritual, custom and so on. This shift took place without any thorough examination of the workings of the regulative forces of the past. Tradition, ritual and custom which belong to culture as a behavior regulating system were neglected. In order to accomplish this take-over sex had to be turned into an inner force. Psychoanalysis succeeded in doing just that. It has ubiquitously influenced our thinking about sex, even to such a degree that it inspired historians of sex to use psychoanalysis as an hermeneutic device. They still tend not to realize that psychoanalysis itself is an offshoot of the developments in the history of sex[6].

We can, therefore, conclude that psychoanalysis is an historical product of a psychology which is continuously in a state of suspension between internalistic and externalistic forces. What is crucial in this view of the history of psychoanalysis is that external forces and internal ones developed relatively independent of each other.

Yet, at certain points in time, under rather specific circumstances which may have included such things as rapid urbanization, or economically conditioned changes in family life, but also the decay of certain rituals, the two chains of forces became intertwined. The positive reception of psychoanalysis, and the subsequent propaganda and dominance of mental health institutions in many countries[7], indicate that Freud's commitment to a biogenetic conception of sex and reasoning was a good gamble. After the choice for biogenetic conceptualizations was made, the developmental impetus, internal to the biological and evolutionary sciences, could exert its influence. External forces in the wider culture were in turn responsible for the widespread deployment of sex, now located in the human interior and under the spell of familial forces. It should be noted in passing that Freud paid considerable attention to these familial forces. So Freud cannot be accused of having been totaly oblivious to the social environment. The conceptual choice for biogenetics itself was also determined by the deritualisation process in the area of sex, but as Masson (1984) and also Swales (1982b) have suggested, personal circumstances might have hightened Freud's sensitivity.

The biogenetic view has since entrenched itself in our thinking about sex and still continues to shape therapeutic practise. What is left fallow, however, is sex as it is experienced, involving men, women and children looking for a proper stylization. Freud wasn't just a product of his era. He was also and foremost an obedient but highly intelligent member of the scientific community at that time. He was as much involved in the intricacies of sex as any other mortal during this period. Yet it was quite obvious to him, as it was to any other scientist concerned with social life, that one could make a better living by engaging in a science that was accorded high status than by pioneering the forces he knew, as no other were at work in his area of interest. At least, that is suggested by the recurrent search in psychoanalysis for scientific status. Scientists were becoming an aloof breed of humans. What was the use of trying to learn what goes on in day to day sexual conduct, stigmatize people who don't fit the standards and running the risk of accusing members of your own class? The bourgeous appetite for higher culture tends to forget the coarse forces at its own base. By attributing those forces by scientific detour to the biological nature all people share, obvious violation of the norm could be interpreted as the drive's

strength which forces itself upon some, but not all members of the higher strata. This shielded the rules and regulations of sexual conduct of the upper class from criticism. Indecent sexual behavior thus had noting to do with the existing conventions that played an important role in the maintenance of the status quo.

We are now familiar with psychology's most valuable gold mine: the personal problems of individuals. It appears that Freud was the first to realize that an organizing framework was needed based on science. Was another trajectory possible, as Masson for example implies? Probably not. But did psychoanalysis provide us with a permanent solution? Up till now psychoanalysis has had a strong effect on the social regulation of sex. However, the more we learn from sex history how peculiarly sex is organized in our culture, the more we see that this science of the unconscious should be rendered obsolete by a psychology that studies people whose competences are the result of workings of their cultural contexts that can be scientifically analyzed.

Conclusion

The main conclusion to be drawn from this conjoining of internal and external forces in shaping Freudian sexual theory is not very surprising: psychoanalytic sexual theory is scientifically outdated. The early alliance between psychoanalysis and sexology was a scientific enterprise that, once it is placed in proper historical perspective, loses its value for the present. It has undoubtedly entailed a powerful attempt to regulate sexual life. Psychoanalytic emphasis on the inner dynamics and forces of sex, at the expense of research into the shaping of sexual interaction, has left us with concepts and ideas that have lost their impact. We all realize that sex does not wholly reside in the human interior. It is part and parcel of human interaction.

There is a clue to the official judgement that Freud himself passed on the sex issue in psychoanalysis. It is well known that ultimately power and aggression became the cultural forces that worried him the most and not sex. His publications in the thirties are primarily concerned with the spiritually motivated conditions for the shift from power over others to power over oneself, a shift he deemed more necessary for our survival than the regulation of sex (Uleyn, 1985).

Where does this leave us as far as sexuality is concerned? We have come to realize to what extent power is intertwined with the domain of sex. As a biopsychological force, however, with the dynamics psychoanalysis claims to have 'discovered', sex is rendered obsolete. As a social force that this very same science helped to shape, sex is still with us as an enigma.

Notes

1. Bowlby has criticized Freud's adoption of a psychical energy model (Bowlby, 1969: 15-33). He clearly did not recognize Freud's biogenetic leanings, otherwise he would have seen that Freud did not formulate his ideas in terms analogous to those of physics and chemistry current in the second half of the nineteenth century (Parisi, 1987). He in fact used an instinctive behavioral model in which he adopted an ethological-evolutionary perspective, just as Bowlby himself does. In this model emotional bonds which are organized around sexuality have a prominent place. Freud hac neglected the interactive and informative mode of this organization and indeed concentrated (too) extensively on the drive aspect as such.
2. This notion stems from Money. He distinguishes between 'sexosophy' and sexology; the former being all sorts of views and indispensable working hypotheses on sex uncontrolled by scientific knowledge. The latter is a well known subdiscipline of the medical and social sciences. The lack of knowledge, Money contends, is not a moral issue alone. Often the enlightening facts, for example about hormones or embryological arrests of development, simply were not available. Therefore all sorts of speculations, often of practical value, could flourish. See: J. Money (1983).
3. By 'dark sex' - a word we would like to introduce here - we mean 'perversions', the sex in brothels, in cruising areas, or assaults within the family and between members for whom sex was prohibited. There is no reason to assume these variants aren't subjected to stylization or ritualization. Dark sex can be contrasted with the sex that could be engaged in without risking a negative label. Let us call this 'decent' sex.
4. The considerations given here should by no means be taken as a justification of serfdom or sexual assaults in the past, simply because they are part of prevailing customs. It is not implied that this submission or these customary assaults were no ethical problem. The ethical question needs to be separated from the attempt to understand these practises.
5. Gramsci, in referring to the regions Abruzzo and Basilicata in southern Italy recalls in his prison papers an investigation that found a 30% incidence of incest among the families of these regions. See: A. Gramsci, 1971: 295.
6. The work of Peter Gay (1984 and 1986) is a good example of this naivety.
7. See the series: Freud und die Folge (2) for a detailed account of the reception history: D. Eicke (Ed.) (1977).

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A LEAN HARVEST: DUTCH SOCIAL SCIENCE AND IMMIGRATION FROM INDONESIA 1945 - 1963

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Summary

Due to the immigration of 225.000 people from Indonesia between 1945 and 1963, Holland slowly developed the traits of a multi-ethnic society. In dire contrast with Anglosaxon social science, hardly any attention was paid to the immigration issue by Dutch social scientists. From a contextualist point of view this paper addresses the question why the crop was poor in social science. A major reason is found in the organizational structure of social science in Holland. The ties between government bodies and social scientists were strong. Government policy was oriented towards emigration from overcrowded Holland. Research on prejudice, discrimination and other problems that a multi-ethnic society had to cope with did not fit in this policy. Because of the close relationship between government and social science an entire field of study was neglected, so social science could not exert its critical function in the field of ethnic studies.

For some decades now, racism has been one of the major problems in Western European society. In modern Anglosaxon psychology, race relations constitute an important field of study. With its roots in the 1920's, the psychology of prejudice grew rapidly in the 1940's and 1950's: **The Authoritarian Personality** was published in 1950 and G.W. Allport's classic **The Psychology of Prejudice** appeared four years later. In this period American psychologists, and social scientists in general, showed great concern for the social problems of the American 'melting-pot'.[1]

In Holland, during the 1940's and 1950's, social changes caused a development towards a multi-cultural society.[2] The decolonization of the Dutch Indies brought 255,000 people from Indonesia to Holland. However, in contrast with the Anglosaxon interest in ethnic studies all through the fifties, Dutch social science paid little attention

to this vast change in society, and it was completely ignored by Dutch psychologists.[3]

In the following pages a general description will be given of some important trends in the relation between social change and Dutch social science. These historical phenomena will be interpreted from a contextualist point of view. In describing the history of the social sciences from a contextualist perspective, it is in my opinion fruitful to distinguish three levels of description:

1. an external level, i.e. the social and cultural context in which the social sciences develop.
2. an internal level, i.e. theories from the social sciences about the issue at hand.
3. an institutional level, i.e. the way social science is organized (e.g. financial structures).

The third level should be considered as the link between the external and the internal level.

A contextualist interpretation focusses upon the interrelations between the levels. So, in discussing immigration and the ways this issue was handled by social science, attention will be given both to the organizational structure of social science and to theories about immigration. But first I will concentrate upon the external level in offering a bird's eye view of mass immigration from Indonesia.

1. 1945 - 1963, the Repatriation from Indonesia.

From 1945 on, thousands of people migrated from the Dutch Indies to Holland. Up to 1963 one can distinguish four distinct groups. The first 'wave' of people returned to their 'mother country' immediately after the liberation from the Japanese occupying forces. They were white people of Dutch origin, so called 'totoks', who had been interned in Japanese camps during the war, and now returned home to recover from their injuries.

Decolonization brought about mass immigration into Holland. The Republic of Indonesia was proclaimed in 1945, but it took the Dutch government four years of warfare against the nationalists, euphemistically called police actions, before it officially acknowledged the Republic (in 1949).[4] During the Bersiap period (bersiap means 'be

prepared!') of the late forties, many former government officials and colonial clerks fled to Holland. They were mainly half-bloods of mixed Indonesian and Dutch ancestry, also called Indos. But it is important to note that a large number of the former government officials preferred to stay in Indonesia and tried to adapt to the new circumstances in the Republic.

In 1949, these Indo-officials were made to choose between leaving Indonesia and adopting Indonesian nationality. At this point, it is necessary to specify that many of those who opted for Indonesian nationality in 1949 and tried to make a living under the new nationalist government changed their minds in the late fifties and decided to seek refuge in Holland after all. By then, due to the New Guinea issue, tensions between Jakarta and The Hague had increased tremendously, resulting in growing hostility to former Dutch civil servants.[5] In Holland, these people who regretted their choice in favour of the Indonesian nationality, were known as 'regretters'.

Yet another issue, and a very special one, is the question of the demobilization of the former Colonial Army. In 1951 a conflict arose about a large contingent of soldiers from Amboina, or the South-Moluccans as they are called nowadays. The Moluccan soldiers wanted to be demobilized in their home country but Jakarta ardently opposed to this wish, because of the Moluccan struggle for independency. After a laborious legal battle, the Indonesian and Dutch governments agreed to sending the soldiers to Holland on a temporary basis. To their astonishment, the Moluccan soldiers were dismissed from the army as soon as they sat foot on Dutch soil. The confusing result was that they had gained a temporary settlement in Holland, but had lost their military status.

From 1945 up to 1963, about 255,000 people from the former Dutch colony had settled in Holland. From 1963 on the number of immigrants from Indonesia decreased sharply, so one cannot speak any more about 'waves' of people coming to Holland. The consequences of the repatriation were far from rosy for the immigrants, especially for people of mixed ancestry who were born and raised in the Dutch Indies. They came to a country that was politically safe, but which had a climate that contrasted sharply with Indonesia's. The climate not only required a different way of clothing, but a different way of nourishment and housing as well.

The repatriates, especially the Indos, fell back considerably in social status. Their mid-level qualification could not be honoured with a job in Holland.[6] Their new housing situation stood in dire contrast with the Indonesian setting: on arrival in Holland they had to settle in small guest-houses with hardly any room for the family. Later on the Dutch government decided to allocate 5% of public housing projects to repatriates.

Concerning the Moluccan soldiers, the blow to their status was even more severe. Because of their demobilization they lost an important part of their social identity. One can only guess about the consequences for their personal identity. In my opinion, the Dutch government may have had the law on its side, but, speaking in socio-psychological terms, it had taken the wrong decision.

The Receiving Society.

The Dutch self-image of a tolerant nation prevailed in the post-war years as well. This image was based on evidence from Dutch collective history. An example that is often mentioned is the open-door policy during the 16th and 17th centuries. Jewish refugees from the Iberian peninsula and from Middle and Eastern Europe were welcomed in the Republic. By the end of the 17th century French Protestants, the so-called Hugenots, were favorably received as well.[7] One has to wonder whether Holland still could be considered a tolerant nation in the years after the Second World War. It is important to note that in this period emigration was officially encouraged: Holland was over-crowded, which caused problems in housing and the allocation of jobs. Therefore, many people left for New Zealand or Canada. Immigration from Indonesia was in contrast with the prevailing ideology and Dutch people, more or less openly, expressed hostility as a result.

We do not have much information about public opinion on these issues. Two small-scale polls were conducted in 1955 and 1961. The 1955 poll, carried out in the city of Rotterdam, with 123 respondents, was aimed at surveying opinions about Indos.[8] The results yielded an anthology of stereotypes such as 'the indolent man from the East, who lives in a large government paid house' and so on. The same image emerges from the 1961 survey. This time the researchers wanted to gather opinions about the so called 'regretters'. In this even smaller survey with only 59 respondents a striking fact was the public's almost total ignorance about the background of the

'regretters'. And again, many stereotypes were in play. The respondents were not very eager to accept the Indos as equals. In the interviews, overpopulation was often brought up as a reason for this negative attitude.[9]

In a way, one can say that public opinion is reflected in the press, and the press can have some influence on the opinion of the people. The image of the Indonesian immigrant in Dutch media was far from positive.[10] The stereotypes were negative once more. Positive remarks solely concerned the beauty of the Indonesian women.

A relevant question is whether these stereotypes were accompanied by discrimination. In the opinion of the then Minister of Social Affairs, Mrs. Klompé, Holland did not experience the racial troubles that Britain had been experiencing. However, a survey of the Indos showed that a third of the respondents had been experiencing discrimination: they were called such names as 'Negro' or 'blackie' or were made to 'clean' their chairs on buses as they left them.[11] Similar facts were reported in a newspaper interview with Indos: they were accused of living on government money and abused in other ways.[12]

Many Indos experienced an implicit kind of hostility in Dutch society. The Dutch showed a stunning lack of interest in the predicament of the Dutch Indonesians. A striking example, often mentioned by the Indos was the contrast between the exuberant festivities in celebration of the liberation from the Nazis and the absolute disregard of the liberation from the Japanese.

So far, I have tried to shed some light on significant social changes and their interrelated psycho-social aspects. Because of the lack of scientific interest in many of these issues, I cannot be very precise about most of them. In the next section, I will briefly review the scientific studies that were published in this period.

2. Dutch social science 1945 - 1963.

Most of the immigrants from Indonesia arrived in Holland during a relatively short period. In social science, the immigration was studied on a small scale. I have already mentioned the two surveys, conducted in 1955 and 1961. In 1957, the sociologist Ellemers published his theoretical article 'Immigration problems: a sociological and social-psychological approach'. The author reviewed foreign studies in order to gather, among other things, the concepts

necessary for migration studies, and he described the sociological aspects of "adjustment" to a new way of life. In this survey the psychological level was given little prominence: Ellemers hypothesized quite superficially about the psychological aspects of "adjustment".

The most significant publications were two studies executed by order of the Ministry of Social Affairs: in 1957 a study on repatriation was published and in 1959 a report on the Amboinese appeared.

The first one, **The Repatriation from Indonesia** (1957) by Kraak, Ploeger and Kho consists for the most part of a survey of the social situation of the repatriates. From a psychological point of view the "adjustment attitudes", as Kraak et al. call them, are interesting. Kraak et al. nominate 10 groups, of each of which they paint a portrait.[13] Let me give some examples of these portraits. The largest group (26 % of the population) is the one they call the "realists". These people are aware of the fact that they have to assimilate into Dutch society. These young families are in a relatively favourable condition and they show some rational distance to their own situation. The "unsatisfied" (16 %) do not have a new perspective for their future. They are full of resentment against the Dutch government and they experience a lot of hostility in Dutch society. Among the smaller groups are the so called "adjusters" (8 %), people who emphasize they are well adjusted, in contrast with other repatriates who isolate themselves.

Kraak et al. conclude that most of the repatriates have a paradoxical attitude towards Holland. On the one hand they are glad to be safe in Holland after the insecure Bersiap period in Indonesia, but on the other hand they do not like dealing with a country with a nasty climate and a petit-bourgeois mentality that is unfriendly towards other cultural values. As a result the repatriates and the 'native' Dutch do not have much contact with each other.[14]

Amboinese in the Netherlands (1959) is the second government report by social scientists. The government committee, under the presidency of Mrs. Verweij-Jonker, a sociologist, describe the situation of the Moluccan soldiers and their families in Holland. Their report is based upon existing statistical records, the committee themselves do not make empirical scientific research. Verweij-Jonker et al. are optimistic about the integration of the Moluccan people into Dutch society. They recommend not forcing complete

assimilation, because of the importance attached to group-structures within Moluccan culture. The Moluccans must be allowed to stay in their own groups. The committee are convinced that the forced demilitarization caused a lasting mental instability in many South-Moluccans.

At the end of their report the committee recommend research into the situation of Moluccan adolescents, into Moluccan cultural values and into the intergroup relations between the Moluccans and the Dutch. [15]

As this bird's eye view shows, Dutch psychology as such did not pay any public attention to the immigration issue. In social science, mainly in sociology, the crop is poor: two small-scale surveys, a small article and two government reports. Now I will consider some reasons for this lean harvest.

3. Why such a lean harvest?

In general, social science is concerned with social problems. When we confine ourselves to the Anglosaxon situation in the 1940's and 1950's this general statement holds true for the field of interethnic problems. In the same period Dutch social science did not pay much attention to the vast changes that immigration brought about. So perhaps there were no problems. This is corroborated by a government report published in 1969: **From the East to the West: the story of the repatriation from 1945 to 1966**. The author, Mrs. Wassenaar-Jellesma, states that the gigantic immigration has caused some problems, but looking backwards concludes that the operation has been executed "noiselessly".[16] In my opinion this view must be judged too optimistic. As has been noted earlier, both the surveys and the newspapers show a negative stereotype of the Indos and a negative attitude towards them. The stereotypes and attitudes have an important psychological dimension: as a psychologist one may wonder if the stereotype is accompanied by discrimination, or if the Indos develop psychosocial defence strategies against those stereotypes. Such research was not undertaken between 1945 and 1963, so perhaps Dutch psychology was not adequately equipped to conduct such investigations.

However, this is not the case either: in the 1950's, Dutch psychologists such as Duijker and Frijda were working in the allied field of national character and national stereotypes.[17] And a further

point of note is the attention given by psychologists to the emigration from Holland. Characteristics of Overseas Migrants by Bijer and others, published in 1961, is an example.[18] Earlier, we noted Ellemers article (1957) that offered some socio-psychological concepts for immigration studies. Thus, it is not very likely that the lack of attention can be explained at the level of psychology as a science.

In my opinion a reasonable answer to the question that heads this section can be found at the level of science as an institution. The immigration caused (psychological) problems for the immigrants as well as Dutch society in general. However, the problems were not construed as such, either by the government or by the general public.[19] Since World War Two the relation between the government and social science in Holland has been close. In the field of migration studies, the link between science and the state is almost complete. During the repatriation the largest and most important publications were ordered and financed by the government, and this situation has not changed much since. In Holland, the number of independent scholars working in the field of ethnic studies is still small.

In the postwar decades government policy was oriented towards emigration: overcrowded Holland could not offer jobs and houses to everybody, so emigration was stimulated both in ideological and financial aspects.

The arrival of 255,000 people from Indonesia could not be welcomed, because it was in flat contradiction with official emigration policy. The first wave, which came immediately after liberation from the Japanese, was still received rather positively.[20] But later waves were looked at sceptically, even negatively. In government reports one finds statements that the half-blooded Indos will cause a lot of trouble: they were born and raised in Indonesia and thus adhered to a different set of values, a different way of working and so on.[21] In Indonesia, Dutch officials seem to have discouraged migration to Holland up to the mid-1950's.[22]

Dutch government seemed to anticipate a temporary stay of the Indos in Holland. In a way this policy is supported by the fact that many Indos did indeed emigrate from Holland to warmer countries. In the case of the Moluccans the policy of temporality is evident. It took the government at least until 1978 to acknowledge that returning

to a Free Republic of the South-Moluccans was an unrealizable dream-wish of the Moluccan leaders.

Government policy was oriented towards a temporary stay of the immigrants. This policy does not fit research into e.g. interethnic relations, into prejudice and into facilitating the integration. So at the institutional level we find a likely reason for the lean interest of Dutch social science in the repatriation issue. Policy-oriented science will not survey themes that are in contradiction with government policy.

I would like to conclude this paper with an evaluative remark. Historical developments in Dutch society and in Dutch social science show how important it is for social scientists to work as 'independents' on social problems; or, phrased otherwise, how bad it is when the ties between government and social science are too close. In a situation where government orders what subjects are to be studied, an entire field of study can be neglected, as the case of Holland shows. This can be, and in Holland it was, a severe blow to the critical function social science has to exert.

Notes

1. Samelson (1978) describes the important shift in American psychology from racist psychology in the first decades of this century (up to the mid-1920's) to the peak in studies of prejudice in the post-World War Two period.
2. Multi-ethnicity was officially acknowledged by the end of 1970's. In 1979 The Scientific Council of the Government noted that, as a result of the decoloniation of Indonesia (1949) and Surinam (1975), and of the international migration of labour from the 1960's onward, Holland had become a multi-ethnic society. Dutch government expressed the same opinion in 1980 in their official reaction to the Council's report.
3. Between 1945 and 1963 two scientific periodicals were published in Holland: **Acta psychologica** and **Nederlands tijdschrift voor psychologie en haar grensgebieden** both first appearing in 1946. In these periodicals no articles about the immigration issue are published. In this period, psychological books on this subject are not published either.
4. Up to the present, in Holland, among the general public little is known about these 'police actions'. In schools little attention is given to this black page in Dutch colonial history.
5. In 1957 Indonesia declared war on Holland.
6. This loss of status is evident in the first years after repatriation. What happens after, say, ten years, is not known.
7. The history of 'newcomers' in Holland from the sixteenth century up to present day is eloquently described by Lucassen and Penninx (1985).

8. This survey was executed by order of a Rotterdam church community's department of social work. Cf. Cottaar & Willems 1984, 135-140.
9. This survey was executed by order of NASSI, a national committee that supported the Indonesian regretters.
10. Cottaar & Willems analysed 295 newspaper articles, published in the beginning of 1958 (1984, 106-116). Kraak et al. also give examples of an unfavorable image (1957, 140-142).
11. In researching discrimination in ordinary life there is a general problem concerning self-reports. E.g. a minority group's member can feel discriminated by someone. While in fact this someone is rude to everybody.
12. Interview in the weekly magazine **Vrij Nederland**, 12-7-1958.
13. Kraak et al. 1957, 168-172.
14. Kraak et al. 1957, 173.
15. Ambonezen in Nederland 1959, 110.
16. Wassenaar-Jellesma 1969, IX-X.
17. Duijker speaks on the international symposium about national characteristics and stereotypes, held in Bruxelles 1957: **Acta Psychologica** vol. XV, 1959, 527-557.
National character and national stereotypes by Duijker and Frijda is published in 1960.
18. Another important example is Frijda's **Emigranten - niet-emigranten** (1960).
19. On the contrary, in the media the Dutch self-image of a tolerant society seems to have been dominant. See, e.g. Cottaar & Willems' analysis (1984) and Ellemers & Vaillant (1985).
20. As van Amersfoort notes (1974, p.96) government-policy changed in 1949 towards assimilation of the repatriates. But one has to realize that this policy is oriented towards the first 'wave' of immigrants. In my opinion this policy is not continued in the case of the half-blooded immigrants of the next waves.
21. The report of a committee that studied the Indo-European question in Indonesia is quite explicit about these matters (**Verslag van de commissie ter bestudering van het Indo-Europese vraagstuk in Indonesië**, 30-7-1952, p.34).
See Cottaar & Willems 1984, pp. 145-148 as well.
22. Cottaar & Willems 1984, p. 145.

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RESULTATE UND PROBLEME BEI DER BILDUNG NATIONALER SOZIOLOGISCHER TRADITIONEN

Nikolai Genov

Summary

The last fourty years will remain in the history of sociology as the period of the major breakthrough in the cognitive and professional institutionalization of the discipline. National sociological communities have been established in many countries not belonging to the traditional centres of sociological theorizing and research. Are there sufficient positive prospects to successfully connecting this process of building national sociological traditions with the ongoing internationalization of sociology? The author's answer is a cautious 'yes' based on the analysis of original reports on the achievements and problems of sociology in 13 countries, practically covering the main regions and trends in world sociology after the Second World War. The reports have been prepared by native scholars within the framework of an international comparative project.

Die Bedeutung der Tradition für die Soziologie besteht kaum allein in der Tatsache, dass sie einen unentbehrlichen Teilbereich der soziologischen Forschung darstellt. Und noch weniger ist sie nur in der Beständigkeit der Hauptthemen verwurzelt, die in der Soziologie seit Jahrhunderten diskutiert werden, wie E. Shils behauptet[1]. Die wichtigste Ursache der engen Verbindung zwischen Soziologie und Tradition besteht in der existentiellen Verknüpfung der soziologischen Erkentnis und der soziologischen Institutionen mit ihrem sozialen Milieu - und das ist vor allem ihr nationales Milieu. Deshalb sind die modernen Versuche einer Rekonstruktion der Geschichte der soziologischen Ideen und Institutionen gerade auf die bildung und Entwicklung nationaler soziologischer Traditionen wie auf die Wechselwirkung unter diesen konzentriert.[2]

Die Probleme, die von Leistungen und Spannungen beim Aufbau nationaler soziologischer Traditionen verursacht sind, erweisen ihre Aktualität nicht allein wegen ihrer zentralen Stellung in der Erforschung der Soziologiegeschichte. Während der letzten Jahrzehnte verwandelten sie sich in einen eigenartigen Mittelpunkt prinzipieller Diskussionen des gegenwärtigen Standes und der Perspektiven der

Soziologie. Die Hauptursache dafür ist die rapide Institutionalisierung der Disziplin in Ländern und Regionen, die zu den traditionsreichen Zentren der soziologischen Forschung nicht gehören. Diese Tendenz zur Bildung und Festigung vieler verschiedener Traditionen in der Soziologie verursacht eine Reihe von theoretischen, methodologischen, ideologischen und organisatorischen Spannungen und Widersprüchen, die eine weitreichende Analyse brauchen. Wie hoch sind zum Beispiel die Chancen für Bildung nationaler soziologischer Gemeinschaften, die ihre wissenschaftliche Kriterien am Weltstandard anknüpfen, in Ländern, die keine langjährige wissenschaftliche Tradition und keine ausreichende finanzielle Mittel für moderne Forschung besitzen? Diese und viele ähnliche Fragen sind zu verschiedenen Gelegenheiten schon gestellt worden.[3] Eine vielversprechende Perspektive, diese Fragen überzeugend zu beantworten, wird durch die Analyse von authentischen berichten über die Entwicklung nationaler soziologischer Traditionen in einer Reihe von Ländern eröffnet. Diese Ländern sind praktisch repräsentativ für die fundamentalen theoretischen, institutionellen und ideologischen Tendenzen in der gegenwärtigen Soziologie.[4]

Nach der weit verbreiteten Auffassung der Tradition verwirklicht sich die Traditionalisierung in Handlungen, in denen Gegenstände wie Denk- und Verhaltensmuster von Generation zu Generation überreicht werden. Den Kern dieser Prozesse bilden Ideen, was bei den Intellektuellen Traditionen besonders offensichtlich ist.[5] Das soziologische Herangehen an die Traditionen unterstreicht aber auch den Sachverhalt, dass die soziale Substanz der Tradition vor allem die **sozialen Verhältnisse in und zwischen Generationen** ausmachen.[6] Im konkreten Kontext richtet das die Aufmerksamkeit auf zwei Bereiche. Erstens, auf die sozialen Verhältnisse, die verschiedene Aspekte der Soziologie als kognitiven Komplex, Forschungsaktivität und soziale Institution mit ihrem sozialen Milieu verbinden. Zweitens, auf die internen sozialen Verhältnisse in der Wissenschaftorganisation selbst. Die Reproduktion der beiden Typen von sozialen Verhältnissen in ihrer Wechselwirkung charakterisiert die Besonderheiten in der geistigen und institutionellen Entwicklung der nationalen Traditionen in der Soziologie in einer objektiven Weise.

Obwohl diese Sachverhalte ganz offensichtlich scheinen, waren sie bis vor kurzem kein Gegenstand systematischer Reflexion. Im Jahre 1937 konnte sich zum beispiel T. Parsons noch leisten, die

vielseitige soziokulturelle Determination der Entwicklung der soziologischen Ideen einfach zu vernachlässigen und seine Aufmerksamkeit ausschliesslich auf "an 'immanent' development within the body of social theory and knowledge of empirical fact"[7] zu richten. Die Ursachen dieser internalistischen Selbsteinschränkung der Parsonsschen Forschungsinteresses liegen nicht allein in seiner selektiven wissenschaftlichen Strategie. In diesem historischen Moment, wie R.K. Merton berichtet, ist die Wissenschaftssoziologie noch ganz am Anfang ihrer Entwicklung.[8] Der Soziologie der Soziologie steht noch ein paar jahrzehnte Entstehungsperiode bevor. Erst im Verlaufe der Diskussion zur "Krise der Soziologie" in den 70-er Jahren wurden z.B. die Zusammenhänge zwischen den Leitideen der Parsonsschen Analyse der bedeutendsten theoretischen Traditionen in der europäischen Soziologie und dem soziokulturellen Kontext seiner nationalen Gesellschaft näher untersucht. Es wurde klar, dass sogar sein ausgesprochenes Interesse nach abstrakten konzeptuellen Schemata in Wirklichtkeit eine Reaktion auf den in der amerikanischen Gesellschaft wie in der amerikanischen Soziologie vorherrschenden Empirismus und Pragmatismus darstellt. Expliziert wurde auch die Verbindung seiner Arbeiten zur wert-normativen Integration der sozialen Systeme mit den brennenden sozialen Problemen, zu denen F.D. Roosevelt's New Deal die passenden organisationellen Lösungen anbieten sollte.

Nach der Blosslegung von Tatsachen dieser Art ist es nicht mehr möglich, an die gegenwärtige Lage der Soziologie wie an eine rein intellektuelle Tätigkeit heranzugehen. Es ist heute eindeutig klar, dass die Ausrichtung und der spezifische Inhalt der soziologischen Forschungsarbeit durch komplexe Determinanten bestimmt werden. Sie schliessen die zu erforschenden soziale Phänomene wie die eigene Entwicklungslogik der soziologischen Ideen, aber auch den breiten soziokulturellen Kontext wie die unmittelbare soziale Organisation der Wissenschaft und sogar die persönlichen Idiosynkrasien der führenden Soziologen ein. Mehr noch, es wurde auch behauptet, dass der Kern der beruflichen Situationsbestimmung der Soziologen vor allem durch diese sozialen Umstände determiniert wird. Und es steht ausser Zweifel, dass diese Umstände von Universität zu Universität und noch mehr von Land zu Land sehr verschieden sind.

Das breite Spektrum sozialer Bedingungen, die die nationalen Besonderheiten in der Soziologieentwicklung bestimmen, zeigte sich besonders eindrucksvoll im Verlaufe der letzten vier Jahrzehnte.

Diese Periode wird in der Geschichte der Disziplin bestimmt entscheidend für ihre Institutionalisierung im Weltmassstab bleiben. Sogar in einem Land wie Grossbritannien mit seinem ökonomischen, politischen und intellektuellen Traditionen und Potenzen, wurde eine moderne soziologische Assoziation erst im Jahre 1951 gegründet und eine breite Soziologieausbildung erst in den 60-er und 70-er Jahren eingeführt. Aus verschiedenen Gründen begann die institutionelle Entwicklung der Soziologie mit gewisser Verspätung auch in den meisten europäischen sozialistischen Ländern. Die Berichte zeigen viele Ähnlichkeiten und Verschiedenheiten in der Entwicklung neuer nationaler soziologischer Gemeinschaften in Australien, Kanada, Kolumbien, Indien, Nigeria usw. Obwohl alle diese Länder wesentlich verschieden in vielen anderen Hinsichten sind, sie haben auch das gemeinsame Merkmal relativ neuentwickelte nationale soziologische Traditionen zu haben.[9]

Trotz des Bewusstwerdens dieser entscheidenden Rolle, die die sozialen Faktoren bei der Entwicklung der Soziologie im nationalen Kontext spielen, fehlt es an einem allgemein akzeptierten begrifflichen Apparat zur Erforschung der gegebenen Tatbestände. Es steht ausser Zweifel, dass den Kern dieses Begriffsapparats der Gesellschaftsbegriff bilden sollte. Es besteht jedoch keine einheitliche Auffassung seines Inhalts. Trotzdem ist es fast unwidersprochen akzeptiert, dass die gegenwärtigen nationalen Gesellschaften verhältnismässig eindeutig durch den Stand ihrer produktions-technischen Entwicklung, durch ihre ökonomische und politische Organisation wie durch ihre Kultur identifiziert werden können. Deshalb folgen die wesentlichsten Kanäle der sozialen Determination der Soziologie im bestimmten nationalen Kontext höchstwahrscheinlich diesen grundlegenden Charakteristika des Gesellschaftssystems. Zu denen müsste man auch den Einfluss der nationalen wissenschaftlichen Gemeinschaft hinzufügen.[10]

Der Einfluss der unterschiedlichen Stufen der produktions-technischen Entwicklung in den einzelnen Ländern auf die Forschungsorientierung und Institutionalisierung der Soziologie kann eindeutig in jedem Bericht zur Entwicklung nationaler soziologischer Traditionen entdeckt werden. Die beruflichen Aufgaben der amerikanischen Soziologen, von denen viele bei grossen Industrie- und Handelsfirmen tätig sind, unterscheiden sich beträchtlich von den kognitiven und praktischen Aufgaben der Soziologen in Indien oder in Nigerien, die mit

Problemen von Gesellschaften mit überwiegend landwirtschaftliche Produktion konfrontiert sind. Die technische Ausrüstung der Forschung in den Industrienationen ist auch ein wesentlicher Faktor der Arbeitsteilung unter den Soziologen - besonders auf dem Gebiet der empirischen Untersuchungen.

Ein wesentlicher Faktor der Unterschiede zwischen den nationalen soziologischen Gemeinschaften ist die ökonomische Organisation der jeweiligen Gesellschaft. Sowohl vom erkenntnismässigen als auch vom praktischen Standpunkt aus ist das starke Interesse der ungarischen Soziologen an Problemen der ökonomischen Entscheidungsfindung bestimmt durch einen anderen konkret-historischen Inhalt als die gleichen Forschungsinteressen der französischen Soziologen. Nicht weniger wichtig ist aber auch der Sachverhalt, dass die soziologische Information immer mehr zu einem Tauschwert wird, der von zahlungskräftigen Kunden bezogen werden kann. Deshalb sind die allgemeine ökonomische Entwicklung eines Landes, die Grösse der finanziellen Mittel für Forschung wie die Art und Weise ihrer Verteilung unter wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen ausgesprochen lebenswichtig für die Bildung und Entwicklung stabiler nationaler Traditionen in der Soziologie. Viele der Besonderheiten der amerikanischen Soziologie werden zum Beispiel erst dann verständlich, wenn man die Rolle verschiedener Stiftungen in die Interpretation einbezieht. Anderseits bilden die ständigen ökonomischen Schwierigkeiten der Soziologen aus den weniger entwickelten Ländern die Hauptursache des Fehlens systematischer Untersuchungen sogar zu den wichtigsten sozialen Problemen dieser Länder.

Die Tatsache, dass die soziologische Erkenntnis zu einer wichtigen ökonomischen und sozial-technologischen Ressource wird, erweist sich als entscheidend für die wachsende Teilnahme politischer Faktoren bei der Bestimmung der Erkenntnisinhalts und der Organisationsformen der Soziologie unter verschiedenen nationalen Bedingungen. Wie die Wissenschaft überhaupt, so wird auch die Soziologie zum Gegenstand staatlicher Wissenschaftspolitik und in vielen Fällen ist das die entscheidende Determination des Zustands der nationalen soziologischen Gemeinschaft. Ein typisches Beispiel dafür sind die Änderungen und Spannungen in der britischen Soziologie, die durch die Wissenschaftspolitik der konservativen Regierung und speziell durch die Finanzierung der Sozialwissenschaften im Laufe dieses Jahrzehnts entstanden sind. Charakteristisch sind auch die Unterschiede in den

soziologischen Traditionen, die durch die sehr verschiedenen politischen Entwicklungsrichtungen der BRD und der DDR verursacht worden sind.

Die technologischen, ökonomischen und politischen Bedingungen üben ihren Einfluss auf die Soziologie sowohl direkt als auch durch die kognitiven und wert-normativen Elemente der kulturellen Situation aus. Die Untersuchung der kanadischen Soziologie zeigt viele Erscheinungsformen des Einflusses der ethnischen Kultur bei der Bildung verschiedener Tendenzen in der nationalen soziologischen Tradition. Die Besonderheiten in der theoretischen wie in der institutionellen Entwicklung der sowjetischen Soziologie können auch nur durch eine Analyse ihrer wert-normativen Struktur verstanden werden.

Und schliesslich, der unmittelbare soziale Determinationsfaktor der soziologischen Forschungsarbeit ist das kollektive Subjekt der wissenschaftlichen Gemeinschaft. Die weitere Analyse erreicht sicherlich die ökonomischen, politischen und ideologischen Bindungen der wissenschaftlichen Gemeinschaft an dem breiteren sozialen Kontext der soziologischen Forschung. Die Entwicklung der Soziologie in Australien oder in Kanada bestärkt aber die Hypothese, dass sogar bei sonst hoch entwickelten Gesellschaften eine nationale soziologische Forschergemeinschaft zumindest zeitweise fehlen kann.

Die meisten von den erwähnten Beispiele sind typisch für die Probleme bei der Bildung und Festigung der Soziologie in Ländern, deren soziologische Forschergemeinschaften sich mit einer gewissen Verspätung an die internationale wissenschaftliche Gemeinschaft anschliessen. Die Bildung nationaler soziologischer Traditionen in diesen Ländern ist in der Tat ein Bemühen, an die sozialen Probleme der nationalen Gesellschaft mit solchen theoretischen Modellen und methodischen Mitteln heranzugehen, die dem Forschungsgegenstand adäquat sind und deswegen verschieden von den Modellen und Methoden anderer soziologischer Gemeinschaften sein können. Es besteht aber kein Zweifel daran, dass bestimmte Resultate bei der Bildung nationaler soziologischer Traditionen auch durch Adaptation schon bekannter kognitiver und institutioneller Muster erreicht werden können. Die langfristigen Spannungen in der australischen oder in der kanadischen Soziologie zeigen aber eindeutig, dass dieser Weg nur beschränkt gangbar ist. Die Entwicklung der Soziologie sogar in solchen Ländern wie Frankreich, BRD oder Grossbritannien ist deswegen in der diskutierten Periode sehr stark dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass viele Kräfte

in der Überwindung des Einflusses anderer Traditionen und in der Bildung einheimischer Theoriemodelle investiert worden sind.

Das auf diese Weise angesprochene Problem ist von fundamentaler Bedeutung für die Soziologie in vielen Ländern und das nicht nur aus wissenschaftsinternen Überlegungen heraus. In ihm kozentrieren sich auch eine Reihe von komplizierten politischen und ideologischen Spannungen und Konflikten. Die Kontinuität in der kulturellen Entwicklung in diesen Ländern und die Effektivität bei der Anwendung soziologischer Erkenntnisse in der Lösung praktischer Probleme wird so auf die Bewährungsprobe gestellt. Das charakteristischste Beispiel für die Komplexität dieser Problematik bietet zweifellos die Entwicklung der Soziologie in Latein-amerika. In fast allen soziologischen Gemeinschaften in diesem Kontinent wird die Entwicklung nationaler Traditionen in den Begriffen der 'dependence theory' interpretiert. Es wird sowohl die ökonomische und politische als auch die wissenschaftliche Abhängigkeit von den entwickelten Ländern unterstrichen. Sogar das weit diskutierte Beispiel des 'action research' in der kolumbianischen Soziologie lässt sich in diesem Zusammenhang nicht zuletzt als eine spezifische Reaktion auf die importierten professionellen Muster verstehen - im konkreten Fall als eine Reaktion auf die Idee und Praxis der 'wertfreien Soziologie'. Das Problem hier wie in vielen ähnlichen Fällen besteht vor allem darin, solche theoretischen, methodischen und organisatorischen Muster in der nationalen Tradition zu entwickeln, die nicht nur den nationalen Besonderheiten adäquat sind, sondern auch eine gleichberechtigte Teilnahme der jeweiligen nationalen Tradition in der internationalen soziologischen Gemeinschaft sichern.

In einer Reihe von Fällen wie in der australischen oder in der bulgarischen Soziologie scheint dieses Ideal der Bildung einer stabilen nationalen soziologischen Tradition trotz der gewissen Verspätung erfolgreich realisiert zu sein. Eine breite kognitive wie praktische Bedeutung hat zum Beispiel das in der bulgarischen Soziologie entwickelte theoretische Modell des Gesellschaftssystems oder der australische Beitrage zur Erforschung der Zusammenhänge zwischen den Änderungen auf dem Gebiet der Wirtschaft und der Entwicklung der nationalen Gesellschaft.[11] Es gibt aber auch viele Beispiele für Hindernisse in der Entwicklung nationaler soziologischer Traditionen. Die meisten Ländern, für die die Bildung nationaler soziologischer Tradition eine aktuelle Aufgabe darstellt, verfügen über keine

stabile wissenschaftliche Tradition und haben keine zahlreiche und kompetente wissenschaftliche Gemeinschaft. Es mangelt dort an finanziellen Mitteln zu Forschungszwecken. Der Informationsaustausch der einheimischen Soziologen mit der internationalen soziologischen Gemeinschaft wird durch sprachliche und organisatorische Barrieren erschwert. Diese Hindernisse beim Aufbau einer nationalen soziologischen Tradition reflektieren die in der entsprechenden soziologischen Forschergemeinschaft akzeptierten wissenschaftlichen Kriterien und auf diese Weise die kognitive und praktische Effektivität der Soziologie im gegebenen nationalen Kontext.

Dieses Problem der Kriterien wissenschaftlicher Leistung in der Soziologie überschreitet aber den Rahmen der einzelnen nationalen Forschergemeinschaften. Verglichen mit anderen Wissenschaften wird die angelsächsische Soziologie nach 1960 ausgesprochen kritisch charakterisiert: "Weakly bounded groups pursuing a variety of goals with a variety of procedures. Little co-ordination of results or problems. Low extent of division of labour across research sites".[12] Die Vielzahl von Untersuchungen auf dem Gebiet der Soziologie der Soziologie hat allerdings deutlich gemacht, dass die Ursache dieses Zustands nicht einfach im Mangel wissenschaftlicher Einstimmigkeit unter den Soziologen liegt. Sowohl im nationalen als auch im internationalen Kontext ist die Soziologie mit verschiedenen und widersprüchlichen Interessen einzelner sozialer Gruppen eng verbunden. Die Probleme der kognitiven under der professionellen Institutionalisierung der Soziologie in den einzelnen Ländern wie auf internationaler Ebene lassen sich nicht sinnvoll ausserhalb dieser sozialen Determination diskutieren.

Um das Bild der Schwierigkeiten und Widersprüche bei der Bildung nationaler soziologischer Traditionen zu vervollkommnen, ist es notwendig, auch die desorientierende Wirkung des Gegenstandes der soziologischen Forschung zumindest zu erwähnen. Die soziale Wirklichkeit ist nicht bloss unterschiedlich unter den einzelnen nationalen Bedingungen. Sie entwickelt sich auch sehr unterschiedlich in den verschiedenen Regionen und Perioden. Das macht die Versuche verständlich, nicht einfach nationale soziologische Traditionen zu entwickeln, sondern auch die Unvergleichbarkeit der unter verschiedenen nationalen Bedingungen gewonnenen Forschungsresultate zu beweisen. Dieser methodologische Relativismus wird oft auf die Ebene einer prinzipiellen historischen Interpretation der soziologischen

Forschung erhoben. Die kurze Formel dieser methodologischen Position lautet, dass die Soziologie einzig und Allein an unikalen Erkenntnissen und an unikalen sozialen Ereignissen interessiert sei. Eben das Bestreben, die nationalen Traditionen in der Soziologie zu entwickeln und zu festigen, erscheint als die bestmögliche Gelegenheit, solche nominalistische methodologische Forschungsprogramme in der Soziologie zu verbreiten. Ihre Behauptung würde aber ein endgültiger Abschied von der Idee einer internationale Wissenschaft der Soziologie bedeuten.

In der Tat, verglichen mit der Situation in der modernen Physik oder Biologie, wo klar bestimmte wissenschaftliche Ziele unter den Bedingungen einer hohen formalen und informellen Koordination auf internationaler Ebene verfolgt werden, erscheint die Internationalisierung der Soziologie sehr beschränkt. Es wäre jedoch falsch, die weite Verbreitung schwächerer Formen von international akzeptierten kognitiven und institutionellen Muster in der Soziologie zu unterschätzen. Es steht ausser Zweifel, dass auf den internationalen Treffen der Soziologen viele Forschungsgebiete mit Hilfe von Begriffen besprochen werden, die für die meisten Diskussionsteilnehmer aus verschiedenen Ländern verständlich sind. Die empirische Basis dieser Abhandlung zeigt eindeutig, dass die Hauptgebiete der Diskussionen auf internationaler Ebene auch in allen analysierten nationalen soziologischen Traditionen mehr oder weniger vertreten sind. Das ist ein sicheres Zeichen dafür, dass es beständige und allgemeine Themen gibt, die die kognitive und die berufliche Identität der soziologischen Forschung charakterisieren. Ausser Zweifel ist auch die Existenz von allgemein akzeptierten Methoden, die in den einzelnen Untersuchungen der sozialen Schichtung und Mobilität, der Familie, des Industriebetriebs oder der Freizeit angewendet werden.

Es wäre aber auch falsch, die erreichte Stufe und Qualität der Internationalisierung der Soziologie zu überschätzen. In Wirklichkeit ist der weit überwiegende Teil der soziologischen Untersuchungen in einigen wenigen nationalen Traditionen konzentriert. Das lässt sich eindeutig aufgrund der nationalen Berichte dokumentieren. Deshalb ist es kaum übertrieben, in den Kategorien der 'dependence theory' zu behaupten, dass in der gegenwärtigen Weltsoziologie "the great majority of professional messages originate in the centre and are imposed upon the periphery without a return flow"[13]. Diese Abhängigkeit wird aber in einer ansteigenden Proportion durch die rasche

Entwicklung nationaler sociologischer Traditionen in den Ländern an der "Peripherie" relativiert. Mehr noch, sogar in der in ihrer Selbstbezogenheit manchmal extremen amerikanischen Soziologie wurden im Laufe der letzten Jahre auch Ideen verbreitet, die eindeutig aus anderen nationalen Traditionen hervorgegangen sind[14]. In diesem Kontext steht die Perspektive einer balancierten Entwicklung nationaler soziologischer Traditionen und der Internationalisierung der Soziologie nicht unbedingt pessimistisch aus. Es ist jedoch immer noch eine offene Frage, wie diese Balance optimal in der Praxis verwirklicht werden sollte.

Eine vielversprechende Antwort besteht sicherlich darin, dass es notwendig wäre, mehr und auf einer höheren qualitative Ebene vergleichende und kumulative Untersuchungen durchzuführen, die explizit oder implizit von einem universellen kategorialen Rahmen geleitet werden. Das ist der sicherste Weg, um die bedeutenden Unterschiede oder auch die Unvergleichbarkeit der Untersuchungen in den einzelnen nationalen soziologischen Traditionen zu überwinden. Auf diese Weise lassen sich auch hohe und universelle Kriterien wissenschaftlicher Leistung aufstellen, verbreiten und anwenden, insofern das von den bestehenden Widersprüchen auf nationaler wie auf internationaler Ebene erlaubt wird. Die davon abgeleitete Stärkung der wissenschaftlichen und beruflichen Positionen der Soziologie wird sie auch praktisch wertvoller machen. Selbstverständlich sind das schwierige Aufgaben. Ihre Unterschätzung würde aber mit einer inflationären Entwicklung der Soziologie gleichbedeutend sein.

Anmerkungen.

1. Shils (1981, p. 140).
2. S. Lepenies (1981, Teil 6, 7).
3. Genov (1983); Gareau (1985).
4. Die empirische Basis der folgenden Analysen bilden vor allem die Berichte über die Entwicklung nationaler soziologischer Traditionen in Australien, Kanada, Kolumbien, BRD, Frankreich, DDR, Ungarn, Indien, Nigeria, Grossbritannien, USA und UdSSR, die im Rahmen eines vergleichenden internationalen Projektes angefertigt wurden. Der Autor stützt sich auch auf die eigene Erfahrung und Forschung zur Entwicklung der bulgarischen nationalen soziologischen Tradition.
5. Nisbet (1966).
6. Plahov (1982, p. 36).
7. Parsons (1967, p. 5).
8. Merton (1973, p. 173).
9. Der Ausdruck "nationale soziologische Tradition" lässt sich mit einem "starken" Begriff eines beträchtlichen Beitrags zur Entwicklung der Weltsoziologie verbinden. Im Rahmen des Artikels

wird ein "schwacher" Begriff gebraucht, in dem die nationale Tradition einfach als die Besonderheit der theoretischen wie die institutionellen Entwicklung der Soziologie in einem bestimmten nationalen soziokulturellen Kontext verstanden wird.

10. Siehe ausführlicher dazu Genov (1986, Ch. II).
11. Siehe Austin (1984); Dobriyanov, Stavrov, Genov (1978).
12. Whitley (1984, p. 91).
13. Gareau (1985, p. 122).
14. Turner (1986, p. VII)/

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THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY IN ISRAEL[1]

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Historical background

The development of psychology in Israel reflects the interplay of the more general historical forces - political, social, economic, and ideological in - this country. We therefore offer here some brief general background notes.

Israel's preindependence period was shaped by a relatively small group of idealistically oriented people who came to Israel from prerevolutionary Russia with a socialistic and to some extent Marxist-oriented ideology. Their major aims were the establishment of a Jewish state and the shaping of a new type of Jew, both in terms of his general way of life and in terms of his occupational preferences. The synthesis of these aims produced such social structures as labor (or union) owned enterprises, cooperatives, and the Kibbutz. The social climate at that time distinctly emphasized social involvement and personal commitment to the well-being of everyone. People, and the youth in particular, were expected to minimize and even suppress personal needs in order to dedicate themselves to the achievement of national goals.

Drastic changes followed the establishment of the State of Israel in the late 1940s. One of the most salient was in terms of population growth. During the first few years of its existence its population doubled, and since its statehood 38 years ago, it has miltiplied no less than sixfold. This population expansion has created a challenge and raised serious problems, especially in the field of human behavior and adjustment. Moreover, in the 1950s, hundreds of thousands of survivors of the Holocaust found their way to Israel, physically impaired, depressed and discouraged, struggling to regain their personal pride and dignity. At the same time,

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1 An extended version of this paper can be found in Ben-Ari, R., & Amir, Y. (1986). Psychology in a developing society: The case of Israel. **Annual Review of Psychology**, 37, 17-41.

persecution of the Jews in the Moslem countries led to massive emigration from these depressed areas.

A second change following Israel's early statehood was a switch from social emphasis on idealistic group goals to an orientation geared toward the satisfaction of personal needs. This change probably could be attributed to differences in the make-up of the population during these periods as well as the establishment of the State. It was probably enhanced by the State's taking over many personal and social functions like welfare and education, which reduced the feelings of personal responsibility and encouraged an attitude of "let the government take care of it".

Development of Psychology

Embryonic Stages

The earliest real influence of psychology came from psychoanalysis. In the early 1930s, a group of German psychoanalysts arrived in Israel under the leadership of Max Eitingon, one of Freud's earliest and most loyal disciplines. Eitingon had first come in 1910 to start a practice, but he found the population quite unprepared for such a revolutionary idea as psychoanalysis. On his return in the 1930s, he found a much more receptive environment. By 1933 he was able to establish the Palestine Psychoanalytic Society, which was accepted a year later as a "component society" of the International Psychoanalytical Association.

Already in the 1930s - psychoanalytic thinking and to a lesser degree psychoanalytic practice had made inroads in Israeli society. The newly founded Medical School in Jerusalem included psychoanalytic teaching in its curriculum. More impressive was the influence it was having on kibbutz thinking and living, especially with regard to its influence on child-rearing and education. Early in the 1930s, S. Golan, a graduate of the Psychoanalytic Institute in Berlin and a creator of kibbutz educational ideology, listed five principles for collective education. Four of them related to socialist directives, the fifth to psychoanalytic considerations regarding child development and the upbringing of kibbutz children. His concept of the children's home, still influencing many practices and organizational aspects of Israel's education, is a synthesis between psychoanalytic and socialist theories.

A quite different orientation in psychology also started at that time. Psychometric testing and the attendant educational counseling and vocational guidance began to find their place in the educational system. There were two main purposes for the testing program in the schools: the testing of retarded children and the testing of children who would be discontinuing their studies after graduation from elementary school in order to move into apprenticeship and employment. Initially these functions were performed by professional individuals in the 1940s, but later institutes were established for these purposes in the three main geographical centers of Israel. These institutes were public services, administered by the municipalities or the workers' unions.

Up to the late 1940s, then, psychology in this country was hardly visible. Some embryonic signs of a future appearance could be detected, but the bells of birth had not rung out as yet. It was only after Israel gained its independence in 1948 that a new era began for psychology.

Coming of age

Mass immigration into Israel in the early 1950s increased the need for psychological help and guidance tremendously. At first this assistance could not be provided because psychology in Israel was not yet ready for such a task. The demand for psychological work outstripped the supply of professional manpower available. Where were the psychologists to come from? Attempts were made to attract prominent psychologists from abroad to join The Hebrew University. John Cohen from England and Gregory Fazran and David Rapoport from the U.S. came to Jerusalem but only for short periods. Even so, the psychology community expanded slowly as Israelis who had gone abroad to study psychology returned and psychologists from abroad immigrated to Israel.

In 1957 the first department of psychology was opened in Jerusalem, and a year later a department of psychology was also opened at Bar-Ilan University. Another sign of growth was the Israel psychological Association (IPA), which started functioning in 1957 with an initial membership of 170, including its single section of clinical psychology.

By the end of the 1950s, the 200 psychologists in Israel were concentrated in three occupational areas: (1) clinical psychologists

working in hospitals and mental health clinics; (2) educational psychologists working in child guidance centers connected with the school system and dealing with the adjustment of children in schools; (3) psychologists in the newly established university departments of psychology. Though small in scope, this last group had a tremendous influence on the development of present-day psychology in Israel.

Psychological services in both clinical and educational fields spread rapidly in the 1960s. Educational psychologists established their own sections in the IPA, followed shortly by social and industrial psychologists who also increased in number and in activity during that period. Tel Aviv and Haifa universities opened psychology departments in 1966, and within a few years they were offering MA and PhD degrees in psychology. The number of applicants grew to such an extent that psychometric and personality techniques were brought into play for the purpose of selecting the most promising students. This made a high level of studies possible and raised the prestige of the profession. Psychology became one of the "hottest" fields of study in Israel, a status it still holds to date.

In the 1970s, clinical and educational psychology services spread out all over the country, and teaching and research at the universities covered all fields of scientific psychology with emphasis on the applied and socially relevant. Psychological research also continued outside the university in public institutes like Louis Guttman's Institute for Applied Social Research, the Hadassah Institute for Vocational Guidance, the Institute for the study of Education in the Kibbutz, and the Henrietta Szold Institute for Research in the Behavioral Sciences, which also publishes a scientific journal in Hebrew concentrating on psychological research. The IPA became one of the most active professional organizations in Israel and succeeded in having a licensing law for psychologists passed in the Knesset (Israel's House of Representatives) in 1977.

As a result of continuous military activities, a need arose for rehabilitation psychology to assist maimed soldiers to adjust to the new conditions of their lives. Thus, a fourth section was established in the IPA.

Industry has come to realize that with industrial psychology production can be improved through better selection and understanding of the workers and creating an atmosphere of "team" spirit in the factory. Many Israelis who had studied industrial psychology in the

U.S. came home armed with new technological, psychologica, and human relations approaches, and they spurred others to do professional work in this area. A growing number of psychologists produced research for industry, the army, and other work settings. Industrial psychologists decided against having a separate section of their own in IPA, preferring to be in the same section with the social and occupational psychologists.

Three developments are taking place in the 1960s: (1) At the Haifa Institute of Technology (Technion), a graduate program in industrial psychology has been approved. At the Ben-Gurion University in Be'er Sheva, the main city in the southern part of Israel, a graduate program in psychology has been implemented though it has not yet been finally accredited. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that before long all six universities in Israel will offer graduate training in psychology and advanced degrees will be given. (2) A fifth section was established in IPA, that of developmental psychology, and a sixth, health psychology, is presently applying and will probably be approved soon. (3) Israel has become a center for international congresses in psychology. These include congresses in clinical psychology, school psychology, child psychology, mental health, and on specific topics in treatment techniques, adjustment to stress, etc.

At present there are more than 2,000 licensed psychologists in the country.

Society and Psychology

In retrospect, two quite different and even contradictory periods can be observed in this country - one lasting until the late 1940s and the other starting in the 1950s. The standstill of psychology during the first period is especially surprising in terms of the type of people living in the country at that time. These were intellectually superior and culturally sophisticated people who probably were quite familiar with new cultural, philosophical, scientific, and political developments in Europe where psychology had emerged and developed as a new science. Why should these people almost completely ignore psychology? Why should the kibbutz movement be the only exception? Yet later on, when most of Israel's inhabitants were immigrants from Middle-Eastern countries - where psychology was and to a large extent still is nonexistent - and physically and mentally broken refugees

from Nazi-occupied Europe or postwar refugee camps - many of whom had been unexposed or unaware of educational, cultural, and scientific events for at least ten years of their lives - why only then did psychology come surprisingly and startlingly to life?

The reasons for the psychological growth following statehood would seem to be intrinsically tied to the wide society in terms of its needs, orientation, and ensuing cultural, political, and social expectations. In this light, it is not surprising that during the pre-State period psychology had little chance in either its scientific-academic or its treatment-oriented aspects. Academically speaking, the general cultural milieu was not particularly inclined toward universities in general or advanced training in particular. The consensus was that science and universities should take a back seat to the achievement of national and social goals. The importance of the treatment or guidance aspects of psychology was also minimized. People were expected to solve their own "little" individual problems so that society would not waste precious time and effort on them.

Why, then, did psychology bloom in the early kibbutz movement of the 1930s? Winnik's (1977) analysis can provide some insight into the phenomenon. He states that:

> The pioneers of the new settlement were attracted, first of all, by the revolutionary aspects of Freud's theory, and they considered him one of history's revolutionaires, like Marx and other groundbreakers of our times. Historical materialism and "Das Kapital" guided them in laying the concrete foundations for the new Israeli society, but in Freud they saw their mentor in everything relating to the psychological structure of the society to be built. In this approach, the pioneers are close to the "leftist" circle around Freud who considered psychoanalysis and Marxism two sides of the same coin, namely, the social revolution. In the eyes of the pioneers, the importance of Freud's work lay mainly in his attempt to illuminate the unconscious, to throw new light on the obscure and irrational in man ... if, in the U.S., the circle through which Freud's ideas were disseminated were composed mainly of writers, poets, college teachers, art and theater critics - in Palestine they were the kibbutzim (p. 91).

Thus, in one specific area, psychological theory had a decisive influence as early as the 1930s. The kibbutz, the collective type of settlement in Israel, has always comprised a small percentage of the country's population. Still, its cultural influence on society was much stronger than its numerical representation, partly because of the elitist nature of its membership and its leadership. This

phenomenon is weakening lately, but was very salient in the earlier days of Israel. At that time the kibbutz made a most interesting and important experiment in the attempt to use psychoanalytic knowledge for the attainment of improved educational methods, healthy emotional development in children, and better human relationships in general. Educational leaders of the kibbutz believed that coeducation, conducted on scientific lines in the collective framework of living, would help produce a better type of human being, and thus a better humanity in general. At an earlier stage the kibbutz movement rejected Freud's theory, considering it a bourgeois ideology; but later they accepted its principles, even quite orthodoxly, and for a long time tried to find a synthesis between Marxist ideology and Freudian psychological principles. Only much later, in the late 1960s and the 1970s, did the psychological principles of kibbutz education become more eclectic rather than psychoanalytically oriented.

The mass immigration following the establishment of the State of Israel produced major difficulties in the personal adjustment of the newcomers and, consequently, negative group phenomena emerged related to ethnicity, social class, disadvantaged groups, etc. Thus, the need arose for some psychological help to adults and their children and for the involvement in group and community problems. Consequently, clinical, educational and later on social psychology flourished.

Interestingly enough, the necessity to deal with many people who were in need of help drove applied psychology into a certain dilemma. Although psychologists at that time preferred individual treatment, because of their emphasis on traditional professional training, it became quite clear that this approach could not satisfy the needs of the many potential clients or the expectations of their public employer and society. These needs required different approaches. Thus, one could find a trend coward "group" techniques such as group and family therapy, community involvement, and work with intermediary agents such as teachers, social workers, and other community agents rather than with the individual client. Though the inclination for a direct client relationship still exists, a strong trend toward group-oriented procedures is evident. Psychologists are quite aware of the fact that the "individual" approach may give them more personal satisfacton, but it is only through "social" orientation that the public's expectation of psychological work can be satisfied.

State of Psychology in Society

In this section, we shall try to evaluate the status of Israeli psychology. Two point of view will be considered: (1) scientific contributions; (2) what people in Israel feel about psychology and how they regard psychologists.

Scientific contributions

Two types of measures seem to be indicative of scientific contributions, namely, the number of papers published and the number of citations received. Studies have demonstrated a positive relationship between the number of citations a paper received in other papers and various other measures of its quality (Narin, 1976). On the other hand, it was found that the number of scientific papers produced by a country is not a particularly good predictor of quality of the country's science, and the inference is generally drawn that citation rates are the best indication of scientific quality, impact or utility.

Qualitative cross-cultural studies of scientific contributions in general and of psychology in particular are almost nonexistent. Only two such studies could be found for psychology which also include data for Israel. Corrigan and Narin (1982) compared 22 countries and larger geographic regions on a number of citation indexes. The comparisons were made on publication data for the 1970s generated from the Science Citation Index (SCI) in nine scientific fields, one of the psychology. The analyses showed that in terms of number of papers in psychology, Israel rated tenth. If the size of the population or the number of psychologists in the country had been taken into account, the rank would be higher, either third of fourth out of 22. The rank of Israel on the average quality rating across the ten indexes developed in the study is fifth and on the index of the top 1% of cited papers, it is first (Table 10, page 57). In their summary, the authors indicate that two countries are especially interesting in the quantitative vs. qualitative aspects of their papers. These are Sweden and Israel. Both countries rank average in terms of the number of papers, but high in their overall quality.

An additional item of information on the contribution of Israeli psychologists to psychological research is available in regard to cross-cultural psychology. Lonner (1980) analyzed the citizenship of all the authors who published papers in the Journal of Cross-Cultural

Psychology from 1970 to 1979. He found that the number of contributions by Israeli psychologists ranked second, preceded only by the U.S. and closely followed by Canada.

The findings can give some indication regarding the involvement of Israeli psychologists in research and their contribution to the advancement of knowledge in this field. Based on that, it seems fair to conclude that their standing in this area is relatively high.

Status in Own Country

Two types of data may serve as indicators for gauging the status of psychology (and probably of psychologists as well) in Israel. One refers to studies on the relative professional status of psychologists compared with other professions, and the other one is the demand for psychologists or psychological services in different areas. On both accounts psychology rated quite high.

A number of studies have been carried out in recent years trying to determine the professional status hierarchy in the eyes of Israel's society (Samuel & Yuchtman-Yaar, 1979; Kraus, 1981). In general, the picture looks quite similar to what has been found in North America and Europe: Scientists are at the top, followed by professionals and top managers, the white-collared professions, blue-collared and semiskilled workers, and finally nonskilled laborers. Among the professionals, psychologists are in all studies in Israel among the highest, coming after physicians and lawyers.

As to the work demand for psychologists of psychological services, this is quite high in spite of the present depressed economy. In the areas of industrial and rehabilitation psychology, the demand for psychological employees clearly overbalances the supply. This is also true for psychological services in the schools, especially in areas outside the major metropolitan centers. For clinical psychologists, especially those who have recently completed their studies, the picture is a bit more difficult. The clinical field seems to have reached a certain level of saturation. Still, with regard to services required in private practice, they are definitely on the rise. In other more restricted areas of job demand and supply, such as occupational or social psychology, ergonomics, and in the military, there is also a substantial demand for psychological services.

The extremely high number of applicants for psychology at the universities may also be considered an indication of the profession's

prestige in the community. As already indicated, the ratio of student applications to the capacity of the psychology department to accept them is very high. In evaluating this fact one should take into account that the number of students in psychology is quite high as compared with other fields of study. Psychology departments are among the largest in all Israeli universities.

Finally, there is the Law of Psychologists. Many professions have tried throughout the years to apply pressure on the legislative authorities to pass laws protecting their professions from "professional parasites" and only a few have succeeded. For such action to be taken, it would appear that the profession must have achieved a certain status equivalent to those that have already had such protective laws passed, i.e., physicians and lawyers. We still must consider how psychologists achieved this status.

How was Status Achieved?

The final part of this paper is relatively speculative. It is based on interviews with many psychologists, some of whom started their psychological careers in Israel as many as 40 or 50 years ago and have been closely following the development of psychology ever since. Some of their thinking on the subject as well as that of the authors is presented here.

A combination of reasons is probably responsible for the high status attained by psychology in this country. First, there was the tremendous need to deal with the personal adjustment problems of a psychologically difficult immigrant population and their offspring. This problem originated in the 1950s, but has not yet been solved for a part of that population or for their offspring. In addition, there is a strong commitment in society, which has major political implications, to advance these subpopulations and solve their social, psychological, and economic problems in one way or another. All these lead to pressure for additional services, including psychological ones.

Fortunately for psychology, the need for the expansion of services was not accompanied by a reduction in the quality of psychological work. In the early 1950s, psychological services could still be performed by nonpsychologists or psychologists of lesser training. This practice changed categorically at the latter part of the decade

when high-level requirements were set up for psychological practice comparable only to that of physicians and lawyers.

These high professional standards generated certain social processes. First, psychology became more prestigious and respected in the public eye. As a consequence, more and more youngsters showed interest in the study of psychology. However, these students could not study psychology because it was only in the late 1950s that the first departments were established. When these departments were opened, the number of applicants far exceeded the number that could be accepted. In turn, only those of the highest scholastic achievement and mental abilities were accepted. Many of those rejected tried again to be accepted, thereby increasing the number of applicants for the following year. This process has permitted the continuous high-level selection up to the present time. As it turned out, there were years, when the rejection rate of some departments of psychology reached 14 out of 15 applicants. There can be little doubt that the difficulty in being accepted at the university further increased the demand for psychological studies and the commitment of those accepted to psychology both as a subject of study and a profession. All this took place concurrently with the high demand for psychological work in the labor market and the rising prestige of psychology in the community.

Undoubtedly this high demand for services, followed by high demand for studying psychology which enabled the selection of highly screened students for the BA level and later for additional screening at the graduate level, produced a higher-than-average professional in psychology who turned out high quality work both in its applied and scientific aspects. This, in turn, stabilized the already high prestige level of psychology in society and may even have increased it.

Today psychology in Israel is among the most desirable professions. For a long time, the typical Israeli mother would prefer her son or daughter to become a doctor or at least a lawyer, but now the psychologist has also joined this exclusive club. If this is the case, who are we to question the reliability of the mothers' judgement?

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DIE INDUSTRIESOZIOLOGIE IN BULGARIEN
ENTWICKLUNGSGESCHICHTE ALS ERKLÄRUNGSVARIABELE FÜR GEGENWÄRTIGE PROBLEME

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Summary

Nowadays in Bulgaria there is a relatively small professional group of industrial sociologists who are faced with serious problems in their professional careers. The explanation of these problems is usually reduced to some superficial factors, such as lack of interest in and understanding of sociology on the side of industrial managers, unclear statute of the sociologist in the organizational structure of the enterprise, lack of commitment on the side of the sociologists, etc.

The paper argues that these phenomena are only a manifestation of a deeper conflict between the pretention of industrial sociology to become practically useful, on the one hand, and its actually reached level of scientific and theoretical development, practical research abilities, and forms of institutionalization, on the other hand.

An attempt is made to explain this conflict by tracing back facts and events, marking the historical development of the sociological tradition in Bulgaria. Two main lines of analysis are followed - development of sociological knowledge (teaching, research and publications) and sociological institutions in general, and progress in industrial sociology as a sub-area. A major thesis in the paper is that the conflict revealed is typical not only of Bulgaria, but of various other countries with developed sociological tradition.

In den Industriebetrieben Bulgariens arbeiten gegenwärtig über 200 Soziologen. 1983 Waren es ca. 130, ein Jahr zuvor nur 55-60. Schon die ersten "Betriebssoziologen" Anfang der 70-er Jahre hatten grosse Probleme in ihrem beruflichen Leben. Ein ausgeprägter Rollenkonflikt, schlechte Kommunikation mit den Industriemanagern, niedrige soziale

Effektivität, Berufsunzufriedenheit waren und sind immer noch charakteristisch für ihre berufliche Lage.

Wo sind die Ursachen für diese Situation zu suchen? In der gegenwärtigen Diskussion in Bulgarien beschränken sich die meisten Antworten auf die Analyse oberflächlicher Erscheinungen - so etwa des fehlenden Verständnisses und Interesses für Soziologie bei den Industriemanagern, des unklaren Statuts des Soziologen in der hierarchischen Struktur des Betriebes, der ungenügenden Praxis-Ausbildung der Soziologen, ihrer schwachen Motivation für berufliche Karriere in der Industrie usw.

Dieser Aufsatz versucht die gegenwärtige Probleme der Industriesoziologie in Bulgarien aus einer anderen Perspektive zu erklären - der der historischen Entwicklung, sowohl der konkreten bulgarischen Gesellschaft, als auch der Soziologie in Bulgarien. Zunächst aber, sind diese Probleme typisch nur für die bulgarische Industriesoziologie?

Die Ambition und auch die Versuche der Industriesoziologie sich im ausseruniversitären Bereich zu institutionalisieren bringen wahrscheinlich am deutlichsten den Anspruch der Soziologie insgesamt zum Ausdruck, praxiswirksam zu werden. Die Professionalisierung der Soziologie, d.h. das Wahrnehmen einer gesellschaftlichen Funktion nach "berufspraktischer Anwendung"[1] kann in den letzten fünfunddreissig Jahren in fast allen Ländern verfolgt werden, in denen sich eine mehr oder weniger entwickelte soziologische Tradition entfaltete. Ende der 60-er Jahre zeichnete sich dieser Prozess in einer Breite ab, die dem damaligen Presidenten der Internationalen Soziologischen Assoziation Anlass zur folgenden Feststellung gab:

> "(...) wir beobachten in verschiedenen Ländern die Herausbildung eines neuen Berufes - den der nicht-akademischen Soziologen, die in der Industrie, im Gesundheitswesen und auch in verschiedenen Behörden des Sozialwesens arbeiten".[2]

Am frühesten setzte diese Entwicklung in den USA ein, wo bereits Ende der 50-er Jahre etwa jeder vierte Soziologe in nicht-akademischen Einrichtungen hauptberuflich tätig war.[3] In Westeuropa betrug die "Verspätung" etwa zehn Jahre. Über die Situation in der BRD schreibt Holzer, dass Ende der 60-er Jahre den besonders klar zutage getretenen Erwartungen an die gesellschaftlichen Funktionen der Soziologie

"zumindest teilweise entsprochen (wurde) (...) durch Einrichtung kommerzieller und nicht-kommerzieller Arbeitsmöglichkeiten ausserhalb der Hochschulen."[4]

Ein weiteres Beispiel. Für die Niederlande fand Westerdiep in seiner Untersuchung über "Jobs of sociologists" im Jahre 1968 auch einen betrachlichen Anteil von Soziologen im ausseruniversitären Bereich: "University education - 26,4%; Other research - 11,7%; Other education - 7,7%; Government - 20,4%; Public services - 20,9%; Production industries - 12,6%; Remaining and unknown - 0,3% (N=794).[5]

Diese Übersicht könnte fortgesetzt werden auch für andere westeuropäische Länder.[6] Von den osteuropäischen Ländern waren die DDR und besonders Polen die ersten, in denen die Soziologie, insbesondere die Industriesoziologie einen direkten Zugang zur gesellschaftlichen Praxis fand. Der erste Soziologe in einem Industriebetrieb in Polen begann seine Arbeit im Jahre 1959. Im Dezember 1966 waren es etwa 70, im Juli 1971 - 187, im März 1973 - 250. Nach unvollständigen Angaben erreichte die Anzahl der in Industriebetrieben eingestellten Soziologen in Polen Anfang 1978 bereits 540 und der Bedarf der Betriebe betrug aber einige Tausend.[7]

Die quantitative Zunahme der nicht-akademisch eingestellten Soziologen erwies sich aber als ein schlechter Indikator zur Einschätzung des Professionalisierungsgrades sowie der Perspektive der Soziologie. Zehn Jahre nach seiner optimistischen Einschätzung von "increasing demand for sociological services"[8] sah John W. Riley "little evidence for a growing enthusiasm for non-academic employment among sociologists" und auch "no proportional increase of nonacademic job opportunities for sociologists" in den USA.[9]

Es ist aber nicht so sehr die Möglichkeit nach quantitativer Ausbreitung, als vielmehr die wissenschaftliche Entwicklung der Soziologie selbst, die den Kern ihres Professionalisierungsproblems ausmacht. Am deutlichsten wird dieses Problem in Rahmen der Soziologie-Diskussion in der BRD expliziert. So kommt Horst Holzer zur Schlussfolgerung, dass die Soziologie in der Bundessrepublik Deutschland "zu Beginn der siebziger Jahre in einen Zustand der "Überlastung"(geriet) - und zwar nicht nur, weil "die Erkenntnisbestände der Soziologie und die Strukturen ihrer Entwicklung und Vermittlung der gesellschaftlichen Nachfrage nach Soziologie niet gerecht wurden" (F. Neidhardt). Überlastung ergab sich auch, weil die Disziplin gleichzeitig Strategien zur Befriedigung der Nachfrage und zur

erkenntnislogischen, theoretischen und forschungspraktischen (Selbst) Klärung ihres eigenen wissenschaftlichen Tuns entwickeln und realisieren musste."[10]

Wenn hier das Professionalisierungsproblem der Soziologie in diesem relativ breiten geographischen Rahmen behandelt wird, so nur um einen Vergleich mit der Entwicklung in Bulgarien zu ermöglichen und Grund für die These zu verschaffen: Wenn auch unter anderen gesellschaftlichen Verhältnissen, in einer anderen Kultur, unter anderen wissenschaftlichen Ausgangsbedingungen und bei einem anderen Verlauf des Institutionalisierungsprozesses, so leidet auch die gegenwärtige bulgarische Industriesoziologie unter dem Widerspruch zwischen ihrem Anspruch nach Praxiswirksamkeit, einerseits, und ihrem aktuell erreichten wissenschaftlich-theoretischen und methodischen Niveau, ihren Institutionalisierungsformen und den damit verbundenen forschungspraktischen und sozialtechnologischen Fähigkeiten, andererseits.

Soziologie als akademisches Lehrfach kann in Bulgarien auf eine lange Tradition zurückblicken. Wenn auch nicht als Hauptfach, so wurden doch Vorlesungen in Soziologie an der Juristischen Fakultät der Sofioter Universität schon Ende des 19.Jahrhunderts gehalten. Einen umfassenderen Vorlesungskursus in allgemeiner Soziologie wurde seit Anfang dieses Jahrhunderts an der militärischen Hochschule in Sofia gelesen.[11] Zur Entwicklung bedeutender originaler soziologischer Theorien kam es allerdings nicht. Es wurden verschiedene westeuropäische und auch russische philosophische und soziologische Richtungen vertreten. Die Soziologie blieb eine hochabstrakte akademische Disziplin. Die bedeutsamsten Versuche praxisbezogener empirischer Forschung wurden von marxistisch orientierten politischen Funktionären und Forschern unternommen. Diese Befragungen hatten als Hauptgegenstand die Arbeits- und Lebensbedingungen verschiedener Berufsgruppen der sich formierenden, noch zahlemässig kleinen Arbeiterklasse. Einige Soziologie-Historiker in Bulgarien neigen dazu, diese Enquetes als die ersten empirischen industriesoziologischen Untersuchungen zu betrachten.[12] Ich teile diese Auffassung nicht, da die genannten Befragungen meist keinen expliziten theoretischen Ausgangspunkt (noch weniger - einen industriesoziologischen) hatten.

Zusammenfassend, für die Entwicklung der bulgarischen Soziologie bis 1945 ist charakteristisch, dass sich, erstens, verschiedene

ideologische Strömungen herausbilden, und dass, zweitens, die wissenschaftliche Suche sich haptsächlich auf dem Niveau der Gegenstandsbestimmung bewegt. Von einer Arbeits- oder Industriesoziologie kann keine Rede sein, was auch der weitgehend fehlenden Industrie und den dementsprechend fehlenden gesellschaftlichen Erfordernissen nach solchem Wissen entspricht.

Die 50-er Jahre gehen in die Geschichte der marxistischen Gesellschaftswissenschaft in den sozialistischen Ländern als ein Abbruch in der Entwicklung der marxistischen Soziologie ein. Mit der Gründung des Instituts für Soziologie und soziologische Forschung im Jahre 1947 ergaben sich zwar in Bulgarien günstige institutionelle Ausgangsbedingungen für die Entwicklung einer praxisorientierten marxistischen Soziologie, die an die Tradition der marxistischen fundierten empirischen Sozialforschung der Vorkriegsperiode hätte anknüpfen können (zumal auch der Direktor des Instituts eine der Hauptfiguren dieser empirischen Sozialforschung war). Doch die sich ausbreitenden dogmatischen Einstellungen gegenüber der Soziologie führten dazu, dass das Institut keine wesentliche wissenschaftlichen Tätigkeit entwickeln konnte und bald darauf aufgelöst wurde.[13]

Die wiedergeburt einer marxistischen Soziologie in den sozialistischen Ländern wurde indiziert mit dem Erscheinen des Artikels **Die soziologische Gesetze** des deutschen Wissenschaftlers J. Kuczynski.[14] Ideentheoretisch ist diese Wiedergeburt in Bulgarien schon einige Jahre frühre im Werden begriffen. Das Buch von Sh. Oschavkov **Der historische Materialismus und die Soziologie**, das in den Jahren 1954-55 geschrieben und im Mai 1955 besprochen und für den Druck übergeben worden ist, musste drei Jahre warten, bis es 1958 erschien. Aufbauend auf Ideen des bulgarischen marxistischen Theoretikers T. Pavlov, entwickelte Oschavkov die Konzeption einer Soziologie als eine theoretische, allgemeinste nichtphilosophische Wissenschaft von der Gesellschaft.[15]

Kurz darauf setzte auch der Prozess der allmählichen Institutionalisierung der Soziologie in Bulgarien ein. Mitte 1959 wurde die Bulgarische Soziologische Gesellschaft gegründet und noch im selben Jahr wurde sie kollektives Mitglied der Internationalen Soziologischen Assoziation. Durch parteipolitische Beschlüsse wurde Ende der 60-er jahre dieser Prozess beschleunigt. 1968 Wurden das Institut für Soziologie an der Akademie der Wissenschaften und die soziologische Zeitschrift gegründet.

Die 60-er Jahre setzten auch den Anfang der empirischen soziologischen Forschungen. Es wurden zwei grossangelegte representatieve empirische Untersuchungen durchgeführt - die Untersuchung der Religiösität der bulgarischen Bevölkerung (1962) und die sogenannte "Untersuchung der Stadt und des Dorfes" (1968). Die letztere folgte der mit Anspruch nach originellem bulgarischem Beitrag in der soziologischen Theorie entwickelten Konzeption von der Gesellschaft als ein soziologisches System.

Das Bild der Neuformierung der Soziologie in Bulgarien wäre unvollständig, liessen wir unbeachtet die Frage nach der Rekrutierung der Soziologen-Gemeinschaft selbst. Unter den Bedingungen einer fehlenden akademischen soziologischen Tradition nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg - der Lehrstuhl für Soziologie an der Sofioter Universität wurde erst 1974 gegründet, die ersten Vorlesungen in ökonomischer Soziologie an der Hochschule für Ökonomie wurden 1968 gehalten - rekrutierten sich die ersten Soziologen aus den Reihen der Philosophen, Historiker, Juristen, Ökonomen. Das blieb natürlich nicht ohne Folgen für die methodologische und theoretische Orientierung der Disziplin.

Die exogene, "amateurhafte"[16] Neuformierung des Faches, bei der die Philosophen die Hauptrolle spielten, bestimmte massgebend die Richtungen seiner weiteren Entwicklung. Die theoretischen Forschungen bewegten sich, mindestens bis Ende der 70-er Jahre, auf einer höchstabstrakten makrosoziologischen Ebene. Das theoretische Hauptinteresse galt der Erfassung, dem Begreifen der Gesellschaft als Ganzen.

Zeitlich fast parallel dazu entwickelten sich und breiteten sich immer weiter aus, vor allem in der Industrie, empirische Untersuchungen, meistens in Form von schriftlichen Befragungen. Diese zweite Entwicklungslinie wurde teilweise von heranreifenden gesellschaftlichen Bedürfnissen nach Erkenntnissen über konkrete soziale Prozesse und Erscheinungen in den Betrieben, teilweise aber auch von einer "Soziologie-Modewelle" unter den Industrie-Managern (hauptsächlich unter Betriebsdirektoren) getragen. Unter den Bedingungen fehlender theoretisch-methodologischer Erkenntnisgrundlagen und akademisch vorbereiteter Fachleute mussten sich aber diese sogenannten "industrie- oder betriebs-soziologischen empirischen Forschungen" zwangsläufig in einem theoretischen Vakuum bewegen.

Der These von der fehlenden theoretischen Begründung der empirischen industriesoziologischen Forschung könnte natürlich

widersprochen werden (und wird auch oft widersprochen) mit den durchaus legitimen Argument, das theoretische Gebilde der Industriesoziologie könne entwickelt und ausgebaut werden durch die theoretische Aufbereitung des angesammelten empirischen Datenmaterials. Das Problematische an diesem Argument konkret für die Entwicklung der bulgarischen Industiesoziologie liegt aber darin, dass die dafür notwendigen wissenschaftlich-institutionellen Voraussetzungen auch erst mit grosser Verspätung geschaffen wurden. Eine Abteilung für Arbeitssoziologie am Institut für Soziologie wurde erst Ende der 70-er Jahre gegründet. Erst Anfang der 80-er Jahre erschienen die ersten theoretischen und systematischen (teilweise Übersetzungen aus dem Polnischen, Russischen, Tschechischen) industriesoziologischen Arbeiten. Die erste monographische empirische Untersuchung eines Industriebetriebes, die explizite Ansprüche auf industriesoziologische theoretische Fundierung stellt, wurde 1976 durchgeführt.[17] Das darin entwickelte systematische Herangehen an den Industriebetrieb ist aber weit entfernt von den Bedürfnissen der industriellen Praxis nach schnellen Lösungen konkreter sozialer Prozesse.

Schliesslich wurde die Disziplin Arbeitssoziologie auch erst Ende der 70-er Jahre in die akademische Lehre eingeführt, und auch nur im Lehrprogramm der Studenten, die als "Diplom-Soziologen" abschliessen. Erst seit 1984 wird im Rahmen der Soziologen-Ausbildung an der Sofioter Universität ein berufspraktisch orientiertes Ausbildungsprofil für Industriesoziologen angeboten.

Das obenbeschriebene Bild konstituiert aber nur die eine Seite des Professionalisierungskonfliktes in der bulgarischen Industriesoziologie. Denn zum Konflikt kommt es bei der Begegnung zwischen der Industriesoziologie und den an sie gerichteten gesellschaftlichen Erfordernissen.

Die ursprüngliche Soziologie-Euphorie Ende der 60-er Jahre führte zu einem "Boom" in dem Einstellen von Soziologen v.a. in grossen Industriebetrieben. In einigen Betrieben wurden sogar sogenannte Labors für empirische soziologische Forschungen gegründet; in manchen Betrieben wurden diese interdisziplinär angelegt - als kooperative Gruppen von Soziologen, Psychologen und Physiologen. Es wurde ein neuer Beruf geboren - der des Betriebssoziologen.

Nur, waren die sogenannten "Betriebssoziologen" Professionelle? Freilich nicht. Unter dem erreichten wissenschaftlichen Entwicklungsstand der Soziologie konnten sie es auch gar nicht sein. Die daraus

resultierenden Folgen liessen nicht lange auf sich warten. Anfang der 70-er Jahre wurden nicht wenige Planstellen für Soziologen in den Industriebetrieben "wegrationalisiert". Die ursprünglichen Übererwartungen der Industriemanager an die Industriesoziologie kehrten in Enttäuschung und Misstrauen um.

Der Institutionalisierungsprozess der Industriesoziologie im darauffolgendem Zeitraum, etwa bis Anfang der 80-er Jahre könnte als "Positionskampf" qualifiziert werden. Wo die Soziologen Fuss gefasst hatten, wurden die Positionen auch meistens gehalten - einige Soziologen gingen, an ihrer Stelle kamen andere. Neue Planstellen wurden aber kaum geschaffen.

Viele Probleme in der beruflichen Etablierung der Betriebssoziologen ergaben sich natürlich auch aus der Unbestimmtheit ihres Statuts in der Organisations- und Leitungsstruktur des Betriebes, aus der Inkompetenz der Leiter sie berufsgerecht einzusetzen. Meines Erachtens waren das aber nur Oberflächenerscheinungen zweier grundlegender Wirkungsfaktoren: zum einen, die Unentwickeltheit der Industriesoziologie als Wissenschaft und daraus folgend - ihre Unfähigkeit praxiswirksam zu werden. Zum anderen, das "soziale Problem" in der Industrie war noch nicht zum Problem geworden, d.h. die soziologischen Erkenntnisse waren noch nicht unabdingbar zum effektiven Leiten.

Diese Lage hat in den letzten Jahren begonnen sich zu ändern und wird sich auch in den nächsten Jahren weiter in die Richtung ändern, dass das Funktionieren des Industriebetriebes in zunehmenden Masse von dem Grad der Beherschung der sozialen Prozesse in ihm abhängig sein wird. Grund für eine solche Prognose ist in den Prozessen, die sich gegenwärtig in Bulgarien vollziehen, zu sehen: der Demokratisierung der Arbeitsverhälltnisse, der Dezentralisierung der wirtschaftlichen Leitung, den Anstrengungen zur Modernisierung der Produktion durch verstärkte technisch-technologische Innovation, der Orientierung auf einen Übergang zu intensiver Entwicklung usw.

Wird die bulgarische Industriesoziologie in der Lage sein, diesen neuen gesellschaftlichen Erfordernissen gerecht zu werden? Die positieve Antwort auf diese für sie Existenzfrage setzt nicht zuletzt voraus, dass Schlussfolgerungen aus der bisherigen Entwicklung zu ziehen sind.

Anmerkungen

1. F. Neidhardt verwendet diesen Ausdruck in Lepsius (1976, S.427).
2. Sczepanski (1970, S.15).
3. Vgl. dazu John W. Riley in Lazarsfeld (1968, S.789).
4. Holzer (1982, S.14).
5. zitiert in Izerman (1980, S.363).
6. siehe z.B. über die Lage in der Schweiz Weber (1980) und in Grossbritanien die Beiträge im Heft 2 von **The Sociological Review** (1981).
7. Vgl. Jedrzycki (1979).
8. J.W. Riley in Lazarsfeld (1968, S.790).
9. Riley (1978, S.219).
10. Holzer (1982, S.16).
11. ausführlicher dazu siehe Stawrov (1976).
12. z.B. Karaiwanowa (1979).
13. Diese Periode in der Entwicklung der marxistischen Gesellschaftswissenschaften in Bulgarien ist bis heute noch weitgehend unerforscht. Einige Bemerkungen dazu findet man bei Stawrov (1982).
14. Kuczynski (1957).
15. Vgl. dazu die Redaktionsbemerkungen zum Artikel von Steiner (1984, S.104).
16. Qualifizierung von Himmelstrand (1978, S.9).
17. Vgl. Michailov (1978).

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THE MAIN PARADIGMS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

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Summary

This study tries to demonstrate that three paradigms, the mechanical, the biological, and the humanistic, exist as the general approaches in the behavioral and social sciences. Though these paradigms are obvious in psychology, deep and profound research can discover them in such fields as epistemology, sociology, and the theory of organizations. On the one hand, these three paradigms followed each other in the course of history, but on the other hand, they seem to be archetypes of reasoning which coexist and determine interrelated but different directions in the sciences in question.

History and theory

In our days, when psychology and the behavioral sciences still badly need a commonly accepted general theory, studying the history of these disciplines has considerable purpose. This is not only because this could lead to the required theory[1], but because the historical survey itself is able to integrate facts and theses of all the sciences. It is thus able, at least in part, to fulfil the task and function of theories. Teaching psychology at the Budapest University of Economic Sciences I always observe how fruitful the historical frame of reference is for students, as they can see the proper logical place of almost every psychological problem by this means. That is why I do not neglect the historical aspect of our science, even if I am interested first of all in the contemporary state of affairs in psychology. The historical view-point for me is rather an aid than an aim.

The main scientific paradigms

Working on a historical approach to psychology in Hungary, we also came to the conclusion that paradigms in the sciences could be divided into three kinds. These are: mechanical, biological, and humanistic[2]. I said, "in the sciences" as this division is valid not only for the behavioral sciences, or psychology, where it has been established by C. Sanders and H.V. Rappard[3]. The very fact that

different psychologists from different places have independently reached similar results, proves the truth of these results. The difference between the two sources - if I am not mistaken - is that while Sanders and Rappard concentrated above all on the essence of these paradigms and on their application first of all in psychology, we approved interest in the application of the paradigms in the realm of the different social sciences. A more or less complete picture can already be drawn by adding up the efforts from both sides, though this picture still remains sketchy. Accordingly, my purpose in this short paper is to outline some of our new results in the field in question. My survey will be very brief because of the limited space.

The philosophical period and scientism

To summarize: the whole history of the social sciences can be subdivided into two phases. The first of them was the impact of philosophy on social thinking. This phase lasted till the beginning of our century. From then on a new type of influence appeared on the scene: sciences from below began to influence the different social disciplines[4], first, "the science of matter", physics[5] and then, "the science of life", biology. These two cases illustrate the generalization of a particular way of thinking from the lower levels of knowledge onto its higher levels. But one need not think that the philosophical period and scientism are two independent alternatives. They are rather two theologically conditioned worldviews. Here I do not want to go into details. Let me mention only one example so as to show to what extent we are obliged to ancient forms of human reasoning: Galileo and Newton really were true sons of the Church as they believed in the simplicity of matter, and that is why they worked out relatively simple explanatory models for physical phenomena. The theory of the simplicity of matter was then inherited by the entire tradition of physics.

The mechanical paradigm in the social sciences

Looking over the application of the main scientific paradigms, I will touch only the following social disciplines: epistemology, sociology, theory of organizations and psychology.

a). Epistemology. The mechanical paradigm first appeared in physics and gave rise to the general deterministic epistemology characteristic of this field. Though it is true that twentieth-

century physics has formed its new statistical and dialectical model by the Bohrian revolution[6], nevertheless the deterministic mode of thinking has remained the ideal model and the main standard for other sciences for a long time.

b). Sociology. There are some views of society that came almost directly from the mechanical paradigm. Here I am thinking of the so-called "ideal" societies, conceived in the spirit of Utopianism. The founding fathers of the sociological theories of this kind believed in the possibility of totally problemless forms of human coexistence, where everything is planned, settled and arranged beforehand. According to some writers these societies can be called rational or scientific societies.

c). Theories of organizations. Organizations in which every problem is or can be solved by the establishment of general rules must be called mechanical. Thus so-called bureaucratic organizations constitute a part of the set of mechanical organizations. Buraucracy, in Weber's understanding, is the form of rational organization. Notice that "mechanical" and "rational" are synonyms in most of the scientific uses of these terms. Furthermore, most industrial organizations are also mechanical. The general line of development in this sort of organization leads to the disappearance of individual, exceptional facts, and, by just this development, the source of innovation disappears from these organizations.

d). Psychology. The mechanical paradigm in psychology shows itself in the old man-machine theory. This theory prescribes the discovery of several mechanisms at work within personality, mechanisms which produce physiological and psychological effects. One can understand things if and only if one is able to construct them, says the wisdom of the Renaissance[7]. This thesis leads to the problem of modelling in psychology. It is also very interesting to note that the non-statistical notion of psychological health - which always expresses the supposed essence of human personality - here requires the totally problemless, machinelike functioning of the personality. Recently an American psychologist, F.F. Flach[8], revised the mechanical notion, widespread in psychology, of psychological health. I suppose that it is just because of this notion that psychological illness and creativity are identified in a number of writings.

The biological paradigm in the social sciences

a). Epistemology. The biological paradigm also has its own long history[9]. Here we are interested only in the fact that the systems theory of Bertalanffy and his followers can be regarded as the epistemological sub-theory of Biologism[10]. The new contribution that systems theory makes to our way of scientific thinking is the acceptance of teleology. While mechanical determinism accepted mostly the possibility of less developed factors influencing more developed ones, teleology, on the contrary, omplies the pull effect of higher-level systems or phenomena on partial ones. So systems theory is a more complete way of explanation than the "old" mechanical determinism.

b). Sociology. There are several sociologists who try to base their sociological reasoning on systems theory[11]. I myself do not contribute to this attempt because it is clear from biology that to be a plant or to be a society (in the wide sense of this word) were two alternative directions taken by the first living matter with more than one cell. Some living matter went in the direction of plants, applying, so-to-speak, systems structures. Others formed "societies" of cells, the leading principle of which was and is the relative independence of the constituents. Speaking briefly, while the archetype of plants is system, the archetype of societies is freedom. I think it must be clear that these two "forms of life" are stratified on each other in the world of living matter. This is why we can speak of the societies of plants and animals, as well as human beings.

c). Theories of organizations. Burns and Stalker proposed a kind of organization called organic.[12] This kind of organization works on the basis of biological principles, e.g. it strives to achieve adaptation, uses the means of responsibility distribution without function distribution, and so on. Why, then, did organic organization appear among XXth century organizations? Simply because mechanical-bureaucratic organizations are able to repeat their inner process without any modification. So, if the outer world changes, mechanical organizations must inevitably crash. Several years ago some organizers joined the "biological movement" in the sciences to solve this problem.

d). Psychology. From my point of view, any psychological theory that shares biological reductionism is eventually biological psychology. The greater part of Freudian psychology thus belongs to the

family of biological psychology though it is true that the problem of Freudianism is not a simple one. As we shall see, Freud's results can be in some respect be regarded as humanistic ones. Here I would like to point to the fact that, before the Second World War, the so-called Budapest school of psychologists[13] successfully worked on the problem of human instincts. It is well known that S. Freud himself stressed this task for psychology. Is there then any scientific psychology which does not use biological reductionism as the final wisdom? I think there is not. I think scientific psychology can be defined as a great effort to explain our psyche from our body.

The humanistic paradigm in the social sciences

Humanism in the social sciences is, paradoxically, a relatively new movement. Indeed our age is the time for the formation and spreading of the biological paradigm in science and industry.[14] But humanism belongs to the future. W. Overton is not right when he says that "... the organismic program forms the conceptual base for the generation of humanistic theories among others. Humanistic theories do not stand as a separate category"[15]. H.C.J. Duijker stood much nearer to reality when he stated: "Perhaps the humanistic approaches are aimed at the fundamental level of [psychological] reality. But they lack clear concepts and their level of formalization is not different noticeably from that of common language ... But, presenting themselves scientific, they promise more than they can give"[16]. "For the time being" - we can add. Duijker's opinion holds true not only for psychology but for the whole of social science as well. A clear task follows from this, namely, that we must work on humanistic approaches.[17]

a). Epistemology. I propose to work out an epistemological conception, the main concept of which would be the concept of problem-structure, that is, the confrontation of reality with values. Though we know very little now about the structure and spreading of such confrontations, it is possible to inquire into it because we once again accept the value aspect of life. As is well known, this aspect was eliminated from the social sciences for a long time. But nowadays reality itself is regarded by some authors as a value concept,[18] and they are perfectly right.

b). Sociology. In the realm of sociology the theory of the open society mostly expresses the humanistic approach. The notion of an

open society is very near to the notion of a creative society[19]. Let me repeat here that freedom, that is free problem solving, corresponds to the archetype of society, where problems and not blind rules determine the social forms of activity. I would like to propose an empirical method for establishing which actual societies are open or creative: we simply have to observe the direction of emigration movements in history. For example, when Huguenots began to leave France and migrate to Germany in the sixteenth century one would suspect that the French empire was soon to lose its first place in Europe and that, on the contrary, Germany was about to enter its period of growth.

c). Theories of organizations. In recent years a new type of organization has proved to be successful[20]. It is a very interesting and in some respects "unorganized organization" where any idea gets support and opportunity to demonstrate its vital force. The originators of this organization argue that precisely the diversity of aspects, ideas and processes helps survival in such a complicated world as ours in the twentieth century. The present author also supports this kind of organization in this writings on creative teams.[21] One could think that we speak of a totally anarchic organization here, but this is not the case. Such a free organization is able to work well if and only if the inner culture of its employees is on a high level. This organization operates first of all by the inner psychic organization of people instead of their outer control. Inner culture and outer freedom - perhaps this is the main principle of humanism.

d). Psychology. Today we already speak of humanistic psychology. The term "humanistic" is at its clearest when applied in psychology. Without going into details, I will only mention that here, first of all, this term means the end of reductionism and the beginning of the explanation of human personality by its own forces, that is neither from above nor from below... S. Freud contributed much in this respect because he helped to free human personality from psychological suppression, enabling us to observe the open, problematic character of human personality again. Freudianism was the third step in the development of the theory and practice of freedom. The first step was the political freedom of nations, the second step was the juristic freedom of the single person, and the third step was the inner psychological freedom of personality. Of course not all parts of the

world are on the same level from this point of view. But the general direction of development is the same for the whole of mankind.

Notes

1. This point is stressed by a Hungarian psychologist, György Kiss. Personal Communication.
2. I. Magyari-Beck, 1985.
3. C. Sanders and H.V. Rappard, 1985.
4. W. Dilthey, 1883.
5. Today we already know that physics is not simply "the science of matter" as was believed at first.
6. W. Heisenberg, 1971; T. Toró, 1982.
7. P. Rossi, 1962, 1971.
8. F.F. Flach, 1978.
9. E.g. Darwin in science, H. Bergson and F. Nietzsche in philosophy, T. de Chardin in phyilosophy and theology. As for F. Nietzsche, his writings cannot be easily identified from this respect because he expressed his essentially biological ideas in terms of ethics and aesthetics.
10. See also C. Sanders and H.V. Rappard, 1985, p. 249.
11. E.g. a Hungarian sociologist, J. Farkas, too, 1984.
12. In e.g. F. de P. Hanika, 1965.
13. First of all S. Ferenczi, 1932 and J. Herman, 1943.
14. ...biological industry...
15. W.F. Overton, 1985, p. 288.
16. H.C.J. Duijker, 1985, p. 276.
17. The theories of decision-making do so and sometimes their level of formalization is fairly high.
18. C. Sanders and H.V. Rappard, 1985, p. 220.
19. I. Magyari-Beck, 1981.
20. L. Ledó, personal communication.
21. I. Magyari-Beck, 1984.

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MUSS DER HISTORIOGRAPH ZUM VERSUCHSLEITER WERDEN? - SHERIF'S (1935) "A STUDY OF SOME SOCIAL FACTORS IN PERCEPTION" NACH 50 JAHREN

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Summary

While the mainstream of recent psychology consist of experiments, historiography of psychology is hardly interested in them as historical objects. Therefore, an early experiment is selected and treated historiographically in keeping with some of the functions of historiography elaborated by Krämer (1985). It is argued, that interpretative processing of an experiment for historical reasons presupposes the check of its validation. If inspection indicates threats to the validity claims of the experimenter, the historiographer may find it necessary to carry out an experiment by himself in order to satisfy his critical inferences.

Examination of the validity claims in Sherif's 1935 study on the formation of norms reveals a threat to the validity of his statistical conclusions, and a lack of control in the latency of the autokinetic phenomena, a variable necessarily connected with the experimental setting, and as a consequence unintended differences in the implementation of treatments.

Follow-up studies yield different results when data are treated in a statistically adequate form by means of time series analysis and when the latency variable is controlled.

In conclusion it must, however, be said that it seems too early to answer the question of whether the historiographer should take the role of the experimenter after detecting flaws in the validity claims of an earlier experiment.

1. Einleitung

In der Psychologiegeschichtsschreibung steht gegenwärtig die Frage nach geeigneten Methoden und Modellen im Vordergrund (z.B. Petzold, 1985 und Gundlach, 1986). Daneben sollte aber nicht die Reflexion über Funktionen der Historiographie vernachlässigt werden, da sie zumindest gleichrangige Beachtung verdient. Deshalb geht diese - einen wissenschaftsgeschichtlichen Gegenstand behandelnde - Arbeit

von der Voraussetzung aus, dass derzeit historische Bemühungen im Rahmen der Psychologie auss ihrem prozeduralen Ansatz auch ihr(e) Ziel(e) explizit machen sollten.
Es spricht einiges dafür, dass durch vermehrte Verdeutlichung historiographischer Erkenntnisziele und Methoden in der Psychologie auch dort am ehesten Wissensbestände anderer historischer Wissenschaften fruchtbar gemacht werden können, in denen Ziel- und Methodenfragen bereits auf eine längere Tradition zurückblicken. Dazu zählen z.B. die allgemeine Geschichte sowie die Geschichten der Philosophie und der Naturwissenschaften.

Im Rahmen dieser Arbeit können Ziele psychologisch-historiographischer Bemühungen allerdings nicht auf der allgemeinen Ebene übergeordneter Erkenntnisinteressen angesprochen werden. Sie werden vielmehr konkreter in Form unmittelbarerer Funktionen historischen Wissens für den Wissenschaftsprozess thematisiert.
Dieser Konkretion von Zielen entspricht interessanterweise eine Konkretisierung des historischen Objekts. Wesentliche Teile der psychologischen Wissenschaftsgeschichte (i.S. von res gestae) werden bereits seit längerem von empirischen bzw. experimentellen Untersuchungen geschrieben. Umfassende theoretische Aussagensysteme haben an Relevanz für die aktuelle Forschung verloren (vgl. schon Lewin, 1927, S. 376 f.). Dennoch scheint es, dass man sich Einzeluntersuchungen als elementaren geschichtlichen Einheiten noch kaum gesondert unter wissenschaftshistoriographischem Gesichtspunkt zugewandt hat.
Im Zentrum der folgenden Betrachtungen werden somit Funktionen einer historiographischen Aufarbeitung einer experimentellen Untersuchung stehen.

2. Funktionen von Wissenschaftshistorie

Für die Hinwendung zur Frage nach dem "Wozu" ist es - wie Krämer (1985) gezeigt hat - angemessen, zunächst einmal historische Inhalte und zudem deren Vermittlungs- bzw. Rezeptionsprozesse zu unterscheiden. Eine vorübergehende Ausblendung von Gegenstand und Rezeption lässt eine Reihe von Funktionen und Leistungen der Fachhistorie deutlich werden.
Auf diesem Hintergrund entwickelt Krämer (a.a.O.) in Orientierung an der Philosophie als einer Theorienhistorie fünf Funktionsklassen von Wissenschaftsgeschichte im allgemeinen bzw. Disziplingeschichte im besonderen. Während die Übertragung dieser Funktionsklassen auf

psychologische Theorien weniger problematisch erscheint, sind bei ihrer Nutzbarmachung für den starken Empirieanteil, von dem die neuere Psychologie geprägt wird, vor allem die Besonderheiten experimentell gewonnener Erkenntnisse zu berücksichtigen.
Der von Wissenschaftshistorie erschlossene Zugang zu Vergangenem lässt sich im einzelnen wie folgt nutzbar machen:

Eine erste Funktion besteht in weitgehend ungezielter Informationsleistung durch Erschliessung historischer Dokumente. Erfüllt wird sie beispielsweise von Texteditionen oder von objektiven komprimierenden Gesamtdarstellungen.
Eine zweite Funktion ist gegeben, wenn historische Information hermeneutisch, d.h. im Sinne von interpretativ, aufgearbeitet und sodann in eine aktuelle Position aufgenommen wird. Als Beispiel hierfür sei Ekehammar's (1974) Interpretation von Lewin's Verhaltensgleichung, Verhalten = f (Person, Umwelt), im Sinne einer interaktionistischen Auffassung gewertet.
Drittens ist eine heuristische Funktion herauszuheben, die vorliegt, wenn auf historische Information in Gestalt von Methodiken, Terminologien u.ä.m. zurückgegriffen wird, um diese als aktuelle Forschungsmittel einzusetzen.
Als Beispiel dafür sei die Wiederaufnahme des praktischen Syllogismus von Aristoteles durch v. Wright (1974) zur Erklärung intentionalen Verhaltens angeführt.
In einer vierten Funktion kann ein aktueller Argumentationsstrang unter genetischer Perspektive mit Vorgeschichte verbunden werden, um sein Verständnis zu vertiefen.
Eysenck's (1970) Bemühen, die Temperamentslehren von Galen, Kant und Wundt als Früh- oder Vorformen von Teilen seiner Persönlichkeitstheorie aufzuweisen, liesse sich als Beispiel für diese Funktion erwähnen.
Schliesslich ist fünftens auf eine wahrheits- bzw. geltungsrelevante Funktion historischer Information hinzuweisen: jede aktuelle Aussage oder Aussagensystem befindet sich in Übereinstimmung oder Widerspruch zu früheren.

Ob diese Funktionen in jeder Hinsicht vollständig trennscharfe Klassen bilden, kann hier ebensowenig weiterverfolgt werden wie die Geltungsfrage für Theorien, die durch Hervorhebung des Konsenskriteriums gewiss eine nur vorläufige und zugleich problematische Antwort erhält.

Bezüglich des Empirieanteils der Psychologie ist jedoch darauf zu verweisen, dass sich für ihn die Geltungsfrage in spezifischer Weise stellt und zu beantworten ist. Nach welchen Gesichtspunkten sie im einzelnen zu formulieren wäre, wird im Mittelpunkt der folgenden Betrachtungen stehen. Wie bereits erwähnt, wird dazu ein historisches Objekt aus dem Anfangsstadium der experimentellen Sozialpsychologie, eine Untersuchung von Sherif aus dem Jahre 1935, herangezogen. Sie gehört nicht nur zu den bekannteren Experimenten der Kleingruppenforschung (vgl. Sader, 1976, S. 41), sondern zählt auch zu den sog. klassischen Beiträgen zur empirischen Sozialpsychologie (vgl. Hollander & Hunt, 1972).
Interessanterweise ist an sie die Geltungsfrage bislang noch kaum gestellt worden. Im Gegenteil. Sherif selbst hat diese Arbeit als eine valide induktive Basis für allgemeinere theoretische Aussagen bezüglich sozialer Bezugssysteme über einen Zeitraum von rd. 35 Jahren wiederholt herangezogen (vgl. Sherif, 1936; 1948; 1958; 1969). Auch in neueren Lehrbüchern der Sozialpsychologie (z.B. Irle, 1975) und zusammenfassende Darstellungen der Kleingruppenforschung (z.B. Schneider, 1985) wird sie referiert. Legte man weitgehenden Konsens als Kriterium für die Geltung der Sherifschen Befunde an, so wäre diese nahezu über jeden Zweifel erhaben. Versteht man sich jedoch darauf, die Sherifsche Primärstudie als eine mehrschichtige annahmegeleitete herstellende Realisation (vgl. Holzkamp, 1964) kritisch zu rekonstruieren und nach der jeweiligen Begründetheit der einzelnen Schritte und mithin ihrer Geltungsfähigkeit zu fragen, dann ergibt sich ein anderes Bild.

3. Methodische Mittel und Funktionen

Im folgenden kann natürlich nicht auf alle underschiedlichen epistemisch-historischen Zwecksetzungen, die daraus erwachsenen Funktionen sowie die ihnen angemessenen Methoden en gleicher Ausführlichkeit eingegangen werden, zumal als historisches Objekt eine empirische Untersuchung und nicht eine Theorie ausgewählt worden ist.
Die Schwerpunkte werden daher auf den Funktionen
- der ungezielten Informationsleistung

- der hermeneutischen[1] Aufarbeitung sowie
- der Geltungsfrage

liegen.

Für diese Funktionen liessen sich vor allem folgende methodische Mittel näher in Betracht ziehen:

Ungezielte Informationsleistung setzt umfassendes Studium der Quelle(en) voraus, damit ein - zumeist komprimiertes - möglichst objektives historisches Narrativ entstehen kann.

Obgleich hermeneutische Aufarbeitung von vornherein relativ viele prozedurale Freiheitsgrade offen lässt, wird die Herstellung logisch konsistenter Ableitungszusammenhänge, die von den Resultaten einer Primäruntersuchung ausgehen, als hauptsächliches methodisches Mittel einsetzbar sein.

Die geltungsrelevante Funktion von Historie ist in sich vergleichsweise komplex und kann deshalb hier nur ausschnitthaft angesprochen werden. Bei empirisch-experimentellen Untersuchungen hat deren systemtranszendenter Geltungsanspruch und mithin dessen Absicherung im Vordergrund zu stehen. Er ist insbesondere mit den im Rahmen der Theorie psychologischen Experimentierens entwickelten Gütekriterien analysierbar. Sollte das Ergebnis der Analyse - wie im vorliegenden Fall - erneut einen systemtranszendenten Geltungsanspruch beinhalten, wäre dieser durch empirische Realisationshandlungen zu prüfen. Möglich sind grundsätzlich aber auch Reanalysen anhand der Urliste einer Originaluntersuchung, Reanalysen von Replikationen oder Metaanalysen.

Ist das historische Objekt, an das die Geltungsfrage gerichtet wird, kein Experiment sondern eine Theorie, wären zunächst vom Theoriebegriff herzuleitende Kriterien systemimmanenter Geltung anzulegen.

Im folgenden sollen die soeben erläuterten methodischen Mittel im Dienste der sie bestimmenden Funktionen anhand der historiographischen Bearbeitung der von Sherif vor 50 Jahren veröffentlichten Untersuchung zur Anwendung kommen.

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1 Es sei nochmals darauf verwiesen, dass mit dem Ausdruck hermeneutisch kein Philosophem angesprochen wird.

4. Funktionen einer wissenschaftsgeschichtlichen Bearbeitung des Sherifschen Experiments aus dem Jahre 1935

4.1. Ungezielte Informationsleistung

Setzt man die o.e. methodischen Mittel für die hier in Frage stehende Funktion von Disziplinhistoriographie ein, kann beispielsweise folgendes resultieren:

1935 ist - nach 2½ jährigen Vorstudien und zusätzlicher halbjähriger Datenerhebung an der Columbia Universität - in nr. 187 der **Archives of Psychology** von dem in der Türkei geborenen M. Sherif die Untersuchung "A study of some social factors in perception" erschienen.

Explizites Ziel dieser nachdrücklich in die Sozialpsychologie eingewiesenen Arbeit ist es, einige der sozialen Faktoren zu isolieren, welche am Hervorbringen differentieller Wahrnehmungsprozesse von Individuen in ein und derselben Reizsituation beteiligt sind (Sherif, 1935, S. 5).

Eine zentrale Rolle bei der innerorganismischen Vermittlung der von sozialen Faktoren mitbestimmten Wahrnehmungstatbestände wird Bezugspunkten, Bezugsrahmen, Standards oder Normen zugeschrieben. Im natürlichen sozialen Lebensfeld wirken sie sich verschiedenenorts in Form von Konventionen, Moden und Werten, im psychologischen - insbesondere psychophysikalischen - Experiment in Form von Anhaltspunkten, Verankerung, Verankerungspunkt oder Bezugspunkten unmittelbar auf Wahrnehmungsgegebenheiten aus (Sherif, 1935, S. 5 und passim).

Die hierin zum Ausdruck kommende Generalität führt zu der Annahme, dass Bezugspunkte für alle diejenigen psychologischen Phänomene fruchtbar gemacht werden könnten, bei denen Dinge in "relationaler Weise" erlebt werden (Sherif, 1935, S. 16).

Allen bisherigen Beobachtungen der Wirkungsweise von bezugspunkten im Feld oder im Labor lagen distinkte Ereignisklassen bzw. Reizserien im Rahmen einer globaleren, ihrerseits auch strukturierten und insoweit objektiven und stabilen sowie Vergleichsmöglichkeiten bietenden Situation zugrunde. Sherif dagegen beabsichtigt, den Aufbau von Bezugspunkten in einem Wahrnehmungsfeld zu untersuchen, das keinerlei über den Reiz hinausgehende, externe situative Merkmale bietet, auf die vergleichend Bezug genommen werden könnte.

Hierzu eignet sich in besonderem Masse das autokinetische Phänomen, die Tatsache nämlich, dass ein schwacher stationärer Lichtpunkt vor

einem homogenen schwarzen Hintergrund bereits nach kurzer Zeit sich zu bewegen beginnt.
Einzelheiten des Versuchsplanes können Abb. 1 entnommen werden.

Versuchsdurchführung und Auswertung ergeben, dass

- Einzelpersonen jeweils einen individuellen, internen Bezugspunkt ausbilden und
- dieser eine gewisse zeitliche Stabilität besitzt.

Dy- und Triaden bilden jeweils einen gruppenspezifischen Bezugspunkt aus, der in nachfolgenden Einzelversuchen weitgehend beibehalten wird. Umgekehrt geben Vpn, die zunächst einen Einzelversuch durchlaufen haben, die dort aufgebauten Individualnormen in einem späteren Gruppenversuch zugunsten eines gemeinsamen Gruppenstandards auf (sog. Trichter-Effekt). Die Konvergenz der Normen nach dem Einzelversuch ist jedoch nicht so gross wie die nach dem Gruppenversuch. Die Nachbefragung stützt einerseits die vermutete anfängliche Orientierungslosigkeit, andererseits die Ausbildung eines subjektiven Bezugspunktes und einer charakteristischen Streuweite um diesen.
Die Konvergenz der Bezugspunkte in Gruppen ohne vorangehenden Einzelversuch wird ebenso einem spezifischen Gruppeneinfluss zugeschrieben wie die Beibehaltung einer Gruppennorm im nachfolgenden Einzelversuch.

Die zweite Gruppe von Untersuchungen mit dem autokinetischen Phänomen, bei der eine bestimmte Bewegungsrichtung des Lichtpunktes als unabhängige Variable eingeführt wird, dient vor allem

- dem Nachweis der Instabilität bzw. Unstrukturiertheit der experimentellen Situation sowie
- ihrer wahrnehmungsmässigen Strukturierbarkeit.

Die abschliessenden Versuche sollen in Ergänzung der Befunde mit dem autokinetischen Phänomen anhand von lebensechtem sinnvollen Material die Wirkungsweise von Bezugspunkten demonstrieren. Sherif's zusammenfassende Primärinterpretation geht dahin, experimentell die Beteiligung sozialpsychologischer Faktoren am Zustandekommen von Standards oder Normen nachgewiesen zu haben, die sich unmittelbar in Wahrnehmungsverhalten geltend machen.

4.2. Hermeneutische Aufarbeitung und Geltung

Eine hermeneutische, d.h. hier eine interpretative Aufarbeitung der Befunde etwa im Rahmen eines Sammelreferats, einer Geschichte der

Abb. 1: Versuchsplan der SHERIFschen Erstuntersuchung von 1935

Untersuchungsform		experimentelle Situation: autokinetisches Phänomen		Prosatext
	individuell	Range Experiment Teil I: (eine Sitzung), 19 Vpn Range Experiment Teil II (drei Sitzungen je Vpn), 4 Vpn	Exp. 1 (ohne Richtungswechsel) Exp. 2 und Exp. 3 (mit Richtungswechsel je Vp) 36 Vpn	Präferenzreihe von Autoren ohne Text Präferenzreihe von Text mit Autoren 228 Vpn
	Gruppen zu 2 bzw. 3 Vpn	Stichprobe I: 1. 2. 3. 4. individ. Versuch Gr. Vs. Gr. Vs. Gr. Vs. 40 Vpn Stichprobe II: 1. 2. 3. 4. Gruppenversuch Gr. Vs. Gr. Vs. ind. Vs.	———	(Zusammenfassung gemäß Ergebnis der Nachbefragung zwecks statistischer Auswertung)
	Nachbefragung	bez. Urteilsverhalten	bez. Bewegungsrichtung	bez. des Versuchs, den Einfluß eines Autorennamens auf ein Präferenzurteil auszuschließen
	abhängige Variable	Entfernungsschätzung	Bewegungsrichtung	Präferenzurteil

Sozialpsychologie oder eine Theorie über soziale Normen bzw. über soziale Bedingungen der Wahrnehmung könnte an der vom Autor vorgenommenen Primärinterpretation ansetzen.

Ein solches Vorgehen erscheint jedoch solange problematisch, wie nicht wesentlichte Momente der Geltungsbegründung im Rahmen der Ursprungsuntersuchung kritisch gewürdigt werden. Hermeneutische Aufarbeitung erweist sich somit als ein der Geltungsprüfung nachgeordneter Schritt.

Zur nachträglichen Prüfung der Geltungsbegründung einer empirischen Untersuchung als ein aussagefähiges historisches Objekt können vor allem die o.a. Gütekriterien aus der Theorie des psychologischen Experiments herangezogen werden: das Kriterium der internen Gültigkeit, der Validität der statistischen Folgerung, der theoretischen Gültigkeit sowie der externen Gültigkeit (z.B. Cook & Campbell, 1979; Neale & Liebert, 1980).

Prioritäten zwischen den Validitätsarten sollten nicht ohne Berücksichtigung von Art und Schwerpunkt einer Untersuchung gesetzt werden. Wenn es in der Sherifschen Erstuntersuchung insbesondere auf den tatsächlichen Nachweis des experimentellen Aufbaus von Bezugsstandards ankommt, wäre zunächst danach zu fragen, ob die Bildung von Bezugspunkten im Laufe der wiederholten entfernungsmässigen Beurteilung der autokinetischen Phänomens zweifelsfrei nachgewiesen wurde. Hierzu gehören u.a. die Fragen, wie es um die statistische Absicherung der Resultate bestellt ist und ob die Realisierung der Versuchsbedingungen sowie die tatsächliche Versuchsdurchführung das Auftreten von unerwünschten Störfaktoren ausschliessen.

Sherif hat Normenbildung mit Hilfe des Medians indiziert. Ein Median lässt sich jedoch auf jeden Datensatz, der Häufigkeiten enthält, anwenden. Zudem ist dieser deskriptive Kennwert für zeitliche Veränderungen innerhalb einer Urteilsreihe nicht sensitiv, sondern nur für Häufigkeiten.

Wenn also Normbildung von der Bestimmung des Medians abhängig gemacht wird, dann ist eine zufallskritische Prüfung, ob Normbildung im Verlauf einer Urteilsreihe überhaupt stattgefunden hat, gar nicht erfolgt.

Insoweit wären aufgrund eines inadäquaten Auswertungsverfahrens keine statistisch validen Folgerungen gezogen worden und somit der Nachweis für den behaupteten Effekt der Normbildung nicht geführt.

Eine vergleichende Betrachtung der Untersuchungssituation im Einzelversuch und Gruppenversuch zeigt, dass zwischen beiden im Rahmen der Treatment-Implementierung Unterschiede bestehen, welche sich im Hinblick auf unerwünschte zusätzliche systematische Varianz bzw. Fehlervarianz auswirken können.

Im Einzelversuch kann jede Vp den Lichtpunkt solange betrachten, bis er sich zu bewegen beginnt und sodann dem V1 durch Knopfdruck das verabredete Signal geben, woraufhin der Lichtpunkt 2 sec. später abgeschaltet wird.

Im Gruppenversuch betrachten 2 oder 3 Vp gleichzeitig einen Lichtpunkt. Kann aber bei diesem Versuchsaufbau jede Vp wie im Einzelversuch für sich den Lichtpunkt solange betrachten bis die Scheinbewegung beginnt und danach dann noch 2 sec. die Bewegung sehen? Das dürfte nur selten - wenn überhaupt - der Fall sein:

Die Bewegungszeit von 2 sec. für jede Vp ist nur dann annähernd gewährleistet, wenn die Zeiten von der Einschaltung des Lichtpunktes bis zum Beginn seiner Scheinbewegung interindividuell annähernd gleich sind. Bei grösseren Unterschieden zwischen den Latenzzeiten von Gruppenmitgliedern könnte eine Vp mit kurzer Latenzzeit für das autokinetische Phänomen dem V1 rasch das Signal geben, der Lichtpunkt bewege sich, woraufhin dieser nach 2 sec. abgeschaltet wird und alle Vpn ihr Schätzurteil abzugeben haben.

Eine Vp mit interindividuell ausgesprochen langer Latenzzeit für das autokinetische Phänomen könnte unter diesen Umständen noch gar keine Schweinbewegung wahrgenommen haben. Gleichwohl wäre sie aber gehalten, ein Schätzurteil über eine Bewegung abzugeben.

Im Einzelversuch dagegen könnte diese Situation für eine Vp kaum entstehen, da dort der V1 immer bis zum Ende ihrer Latenzzeit auf ihr Signal warten muss und dann erst für die Vp regelmässig die Bewegungszeit von 2 sec. beginnt.

An dieser Stelle braucht nicht näher untersucht zu werden, ob sich die Heterogenität der Versuchsbedingungen zwischen Einzel- und Gruppenversuch als ein zum Treatment zusätzlicher systematischer Faktor auswirkt oder eher in Richtung auf Erhöhung der Fehlervarianz und mithin die interne Gültigkeit des Gruppenversuchs direkt oder mittelbar gefährdet.

Ebenso kann hier unerörtert bleiben, ob die theoretische Validität etwa dadurch beeinträchtigt wird, dass Vpn mit langer Latenzzeit durch die veränderten Versuchsbedingungen im Einzel- und

Gruppenversuch zur Bildung von Hypothesen über Sinn und Zweck der Untersuchung angeregt werden, die am Untersuchungsziel des V1 vorbeigehen und sich ihrerseits im Urteilsverhalten niederschlagen. Im vorliegenden Zusammenhang der Geltungsprüfung einer empirischen Untersuchung zwecks ihrer hermeneutischen Aufarbeitung im Rahmen weiter gesteckter historiographischer Erkenntnisbemühungen dürften die vorgetragenen Einwände bereits dafür ausreichen, von der Primärinterpretation des Autors ausgehende Folgerungen und Ableitungen zurückzustellen bis empirische Resultate bezüglich der kritisierten Punkte vorliegen.

Muss also der Historiograph, wenn er erhebliche Zweifel an der Geltungsbegründung einer empirischen Untersuchung hat, die Rolle des Empirikers übernehmen und eine Nachuntersuchung durchführen, um die Tragfähigkeit seiner kritischen Einwände an der Widerständigkeit der Realität zu überprüfen?

Häufig wird Zurückhaltung bei der hermeneutischen Aufarbeitung im Sinne der Primärinterpretation oder Veröffentlichung der Einwände adäquat sein. Andererseits lassen sich auch, wie im vorliegenden Fall, Situationen vorstellen, in denen der Stellenwert (s.S.3) des historischen Objekts eine empirische Nachuntersuchung nahelegt.

5. Nachfolgeuntersuchungen zu Sherif's Primärstudie von 1935

Die beiden Hauptergebnisse der Geltungsanalyse der Primärstudie

- die zufallskritische Prüfung bzw. Absicherung von Normbildung sowie
- die Messung und ggf. Berücksichtigung der Latenzzeit des autokinetischen Phänomens

wurden in einen nach den Sherifschen Angaben hergestellten Versuchsaufbau und Versuchsplan eingebracht. Die Latenzzeit war sehr einfach zu messen als die Zeit vom Einschalten des Lichtpunktes bis zum Signal der Vp, wonach der Lichtpunkt sich zu bewegen beginnt. Zur zufallskritischen Prüfung und Absicherung von Normbildung wurden die von den Vpn abgegebenen Schätzurteile über die Entfernung, welche der Lichtpunkt jeweils während der Bewegungszeit von 2 sec. zurücklegt, zeitreihenanalytisch ausgewertet. Zeitreihenanalytische Verfahren gestatten bekanntlich, die interne Abhängigkeit zwischen seriellen Daten zu beseitigen und sodann anhand der bereinigten Urteilsreihen statistische Prüfverfahren durchzuführen.

Bezüglich der Latenzzeit des autokinetischen Phänomens seien hier exemplarisch die Streuweiten der Mittelwerten (24,6 sec. bis 0,77 sec.; 45 Vpn, pro Vp 75 Messungen) vorgelegt. Dieses Merkmal zeigt - wie bereits Adams (1912) feststellte - eine beträchtliche intra- und interindividuelle Variabilität. Somit erscheint es unverzichtbar, diese Variable im Gruppenversuch - unter den von Sherif hergestellten Bedingungen - systematisch zu berücksichtigen, um ihren möglichen Einfluss auf die abhängige Variable - das Schätzurteil - zu kontrollieren.

Die zeitreihenanalytische Auswertung der Urteilsreihen in einem Einzelversuch ergibt, dass von 20 Vpn lediglich 4 eine Norm aufbauen.

Tab. 1: individuelle ARIMA-Modelle

ARIMA Modell	Anzahl der Vpn	ARIMA Modell	Anzahl der Vpn
(0, 1, 0)	2	(1, 0, 0)	8
(0, 1, 1)	1	(0, 0, 1)	1
(1, 1, 0)	2	(2, 0, 0)	1
(2, 1, 1)	1	(0, 0, 0)	3
(2, 1, 0)	1		

Tab. 2: F-Test zur Feststellung von Normbildung

Vp	F	df_1, df_2	$F_{crit.}$; 0,05
23	15,00	51/15	2,18
4	2,67	53/17	2,08
26	12,10	53/17	2,08
5	5,18	53/17	2,08

Die Anwendung des Sherifschen Auswertungsverfahrens liefert erwartungsgemäss, dass alle Vpn einen ihrem Median entsprechenden Bezugspunkt aufbauen.
In dem dem Einzelversuch nachfolgenden Gruppenversuch wird die Latenzzeit des autokinetischen Phänomens dadurch kontrolliert, dass jedem Gruppenmitglied ein gesonderter Lichtpunkt dargeboten erhält. Mit der Angabe der Schätzurteile wird solange zugewartet, bis jede Vpn nach uneingeschränkter Latenz eine zwei Sekunden dauernde Scheinbewegung wahrgenommen hat.

Die zeitreihenanalytische Auswertung des Urteilsverhaltens im Einzel- und Gruppenversuch ergibt, dass sich bei 11 von 24 Vpn der Gruppenversuch im Sinne einer signifikanten Intervention auswirkt. Die Art der Intervention lässt sich allerdings nicht - wie nach der Primärstudie erwartet werden könnte - generell als ein Trichter-Effekt beschreiben, da eine unterschiedliche Anzahl von Zu- und Abnahmen der mittleren Schätzurteile feststellbar ist.

Auch nach dem Sherifschen Auswertungsverfahren zeigt sich übrigens ein Trichter-Effekt nur in wenigen Fällen.
Bezüglich Normbildung lassen sich 12 Vpn nachweisen, die im Gruppenversuch eine Norm aufbauen. 2 Dyaden finden sich, in denen sich beide Vpn normativ verhalten.

Zusammenfassend kann festgehalten werden, dass

- die Latenzzeit als eine relevante Variabele zu berücksichtigen ist und
- der Aufbau von Standards im Rahmen des Sherifschen settings weder im Einzel- noch im Gruppenversuch ein universelles Phänomen darstellt.

Nach zufallskritischer Prüfung der Urteilsverhaltens zeigt sich, dass nur ein Teil der Vpn zu einem Verhalten neigt, das sich im Sinne von Sherif mit dem Aufbau eines Bezugspunkts erklären liesse. Normbildung anhand der Sherif-Technik mithin erweist sich als ein differentielles Phänomen, für dessen weitere Erhellung explikative Konstrukte aus der Persönlichkeitspsychologie heranzuziehen wären. In weiteren Nachfolgeuntersuchungen hat sich vor allem das Merkmal Extraversion/Introversion sensu Eysenck bewährt, während das gleichfalls in die Untersuchung eingeführte Merkmal der Direktivität/Nicht-Direktivität sensu Bastine kaum eine Rolle zu spielen scheint (vgl. Brauns, 1983).

6. Zusammenfassung

Die Berücksichtigung von Erkenntniszielen im Sinne speziellerer Funktionen der Psychologiehistoriographie führt zu einer Zuordnung weitgehend funktionsspezifischer methodischer Mittel. Dieser Ansatz, der sich insbesondere durch seine zielgeleitete Methodenauswahl von der Diskussion isolierter historiographischer Methoden unterscheidet, wird anhand eines konkreten historischen Objekts, einem frühen sozialpsychologischen Experiment, implementiert.

Beabsichtigt der Wissenschaftshistoriker lediglich ungezielte Informationsleistung über ein derartiges historisches Objekt, kommt es dabei vor allem auf objektive, komprimierte Beschreibung an.

In hermeneutischer Zielrichtung jedoch, wenn der Historiograph sich anschickt, aus experimentellen Forschungsergebnissen weitergehende Folgerungen zu ziehen, tritt die Geltungsprüfung seiner empirisch fundierten Prämissen in den Vordergrund. Dazu bieten sich für einen ersten Analyseschritt die im Rahmen der experimentellen Methodelehre entwickelten Gütekriterien psychologischer Empirie an, wobei sich deren Gewichtung an der Schwerpunktsetzung der Primärstudie orientieren sollte.

Die Anwendung dieser Vorüberlegungen auf das hier ausgewählte historische Objekt ergibt:

Da Sherif vor allem die Mitwirkung sozialer Faktoren - in Gestalt von Bezugspunkten, Standards oder Normen - an der Wahrnehmung experimentell nachweisen wollte, wird die Geltungsbegründung des tatsächlich geführten Nachweises hinsichtlich seiner internen Gültigkeit, insbesondere seiner Validität der statistischen Folgerungen analysiert.

Dabei erweist sich die statistische Absicherung der experimentellen Resultate für das Zielkonstrukt des Bezugspunktes als wenig aussagekräftig. Zudem divergieren - vom V1 unbeabsichtigt - die Untersuchungssituationen im Einzel- und Gruppenversuch derart, dass eine ungleiche Treatment-Implementierung ziemlich wahrscheinlich wird. Somit wäre eine von den nunmehr insoweit invalidierten Befunden ausgehende, inhaltlich weiterführende heuristische Aufarbeitung kaum vertretbar.

Um die empirische Begründetheit seiner Geltungsanalyse zu prüfen, kann der Wissenschaftshistoriker die Rolle des Experimentators einnehmen und selbst die sich aus seiner kritischen Rekonstruktion ergebenden Realisationshandlungen ausführen.

Im vorliegenden Fall ergeben Nachuntersuchungen mit der Sherif-Technik, dass mit einer adäquateren statistischen Auswertung sowie homogener Treatment-Implementierung im Einzel- und Gruppenversuch der Aufbau von sozial bedingten Bezugspunkten nicht mehr universell, sondern lediglich in Einzelfällen nachgewiesen werden kann.

Indem allerdings der Psychologiehistoriker im Zusammenhang mit dem Geltungsproblem bei der hermeneutischen Aufarbeitung historischer Objekte selbst die Rolle des Empirikers übernimmt, tritt er freilich noch weiter aus dem context of discovery in den context of justification über als es bereits im Zuge der Geltungsprüfung geschieht. Hierbei ist für ihn nicht mehr allein das Kriterium historischer Richtigkeit relevant, sondern zunehmend auch das der sachlichen Wahrheit.

Ob der Psychologiehistoriker damit den genuinen Gegenstandsbereich seiner Disziplingeschichte verlässt, muss an dieser Stelle als offenes Problem stehenbleiben.

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PERCEPTION, COGNITION, AND LANGUAGE: POINTS OF OLD AND NEW CONTROVERSIES

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Summary

The topic of mutual dependence and interpenetration of perception, cognition, and language is a question with a long history not only in the paradigm of European science, but also in India. Their functional architecture is analysed here by positing as basic the four-stage model of Navya-Nyaya which includes non-qualificative perception of gestalts, non-qualificative perception of simple qualifiers, "complex term", and "predicative statement". Their status is commented from the point of view of four theories on the subject in ancient and medieval India - of Navya-Nyaya, of the school of Dinnaga, of Mimamsa, and of the school of grammarians. As a helpful concept to resolve the antinomy of opinions between them, the notion of state-specificity of the states of consciousness[1] is employed. Two such states are identified with incommensurable structures of experience, namely the object-oriented and the subject-oriented one.

The topic of perception, cognition, and language is a problem with a long history in the human sciences. Recently this subject has attracted attention from from the point of view of such modern disciplines as psycholinguistics, cognitive psychology, and cognitive science and some of the problems discussed resemble to a large extent old controversies. There is a Roman proverb that a nation (or an individual) who does not remember its own history is condemned to repeat it. That's why it is worth investigating some ancient disputes in order to detect similarities, to avoid commiting errors more easily and to keep our eyes open to the possible complementarity or incommensurability of the approach of ancient scholars, bearing in mind their different conception of the function and aim of knowledge in human life (the latter would be the most non-trivial result of our investigation).

Perception was one of the main subjects of controversy in the history of Indian philosophy. Different schools of thought assigned radically different status to different stages of perception. Jayanta (a Nyaya logician) pointed out that what is apprehended or grasped in non-qualificative perception can hardly be established unanimously. The school of Dinnaga claims that it is "exclusive particular". Kumarila (a Mimamsa philosopher) says that it is "bare existent". The grammarian Bhartrhari claims that it is "indivisible and imperishable speech-reality". The above statements being incommensurable, this amounts to empty theorizing. Jayanta straightforwardly declares that what is grasped by our perceptual judgement was also grasped by our previous non-constructive (non-qualificative) perception. The only difference is that in the judgemental state we verbalize (implicitly or explicitly) what we see in a propositional form and this cannot be done in the prejudgemental state[2].

The opinions of different schools about the status of this non-qualificative perception were very different. For Dinnaga, Kumarila, and Jayanta this cognitive state is "psychologically the first". But according to the Navya-Nyaya school of logic, as represented by Gangesa, this is not the case. The latter thinks that this state is "logically" but not "psychologically the first" cognitive state. Gangesa holds the opinion that the awareness of an "undifferentiated whole" (gestalt) is impossible to be put as a "psychological first". The argument is that it is hardly possible for such a cognition to be registered by our apperception or reflective consciousness[3]. Gangesa does not reject entirely the idea of simple perception or awareness of an "undifferentiated whole". Psychologically, this is a possibility though it remains indistinguishable from the vague awareness of unordered data. It is questionable to what degree the "non-constructive" perception of Dinnaga should be claimed to be of "ordered particulars" or "unordered ones". There seems to be no easy way to get out of this trouble[4].

What is logically necessary is the non-qualificative perception not of an undifferentiated whole but only of a qualifier or a simple predicative element, and this may or may not form a part of our vague awareness of a gestalt. This non-qualificative perception of a qualifier is, according to Gangesa, as much untractable to being telescoped by our reflective awareness as would be the non-qualificative perception of an undifferentiated whole. But there is at least

some logical necessity in admitting the non-qualificative perception of a qualifier[5]. According to Gangesa, the existence of cognitive states in which we are able to introspect unqualified gestalts directly is less evident than the existence of states where we apprehend "simple" properties of the objects which are unanalyzable further.

The "psychological first" which is available to reflective awareness is, according to Navya-Nyaya, the cognitive state where the qualificand is qualified by the qualifier (i.e. when the tomato, for example, is recognized because of its quality "redness"). This cognitive state has the structure of a "complex term" (red tomato), i.e. it is non-predicative and non-assertive. The "inference for one's own sake" (svarthanumana) proceeds via complex terms (in internal thinking). The "inference for the sake of others" (pararthanumana) is another cognitive state, of "predicative statement", where the intentionality of a communicative situation enters and restructures the previous cognitive state of thinking for one's own sake[6]. For Indian logicians, it seems, the intentionality is by definition self-conscious, i.e. rational. Of course, a notion like "unconscious intentionality" looks like contradictio in adiecto, but one can immediately give an example of such a thing by pointing to instincts. In the model of perception and cognition of Navya-Nyaya (and in the speech act theory of J. Austin and J. Searle, and in the theory of reasoning, proposed recently by P. Johnson-Laird[7]) this problem is not treated.

The most important conclusion for us from the above analysis with two hypothetical cognitive states (non-qualificative perception of gestalts and non-qualificative perception of simple qualifiers) and two cognitive states available to reflection ("complex term" and "predicative statement") will be that each cognitive state which is possible to verbalize has a unique verbalization and that the constituent of the content of a cognitive state is generally expressed by some element of its verbalized form[8]. N. Chomsky[9] could argue that such a thesis means non-differentiation of "universal grammar" from the grammar of the particular language (Sanskrit in our case) and complete surrender to the hypothesis of language relativity. However, the idea of "universal grammar" as in-built cognitive capacity ("mental organ" in the language of N. Chomsky) is a very questionable concept. The thesis that the grammar of each particular language is

an amalgamation of the universal and particular sounds quite reasonable up to the point when we acknowledge that in universal grammar we must study those universalia which ought to be discussed by the grammar of every language, though they might not be actually present in the grammar of the language we investigate now. We are caught in an antinomy. Grammar, by definition, is the formal component of language system, yet universal grammar turns out to explain not only some basic properties of this component, but also properties which could be expressed by the lexical component of the language system. Now we are in a position to acknowledge that what we are pretending to describe is the grammar of thought processes, which will be expressed by the lexicogrammar of any language but not only by its formal component. The idea of universal grammar is stuck in the antinomy of meaning and form, pretending to mark the boundary between them, while it seems that this boundary is indeterminate. Here we have a continuity in the realization of thought into language. This is the reason why Bhartrhari scheduled the domain of grammar up to the stage of thought (pasyanti)[10]. And the structure of thought is the patterning of each cognitive state as cognitive representation in space (at least metaphorically; for discussion of the possible reality of semantic space and its modelling see the recent publications of A. Shmelyov[11] and V. Petrenko[12]) and in empirical time, several cognitive states in succession making the gestalt of a specific cognitive act.

Is this lingua mentalis the language of Aristotelian formal logic, as once was believed? Hardly so. Recently P. Johnson-Laird[13] and R. Jackendoff[14] showed this via different routes. The move toward psycho-logic, initiated by L. Vygotsky[15], J. Piaget[16], and C. Osgood[17] among many others, finds more and more support in the present context from the unsuccessful attempts to model in cognitive science the flow and constitution of meanings in an ecologically valid way (see P. Johnson-Laird's[18] and J. Anderson's[19] computer simulations which undoubtedly are positively useful for the artificial intelligence community, but for our concern can be used as negative examples). The most important conclusion which we can draw from our analysis of Nyaya psycho-logic is that the elements and relations which we are uncovering pertain to different cognitive states. They are the building blocks, constituting these states - this is their real status and nothing else. It is impossible by formal analysis

alone to get the elements, the simple qualities, as G. Lakoff and M. Johnson[20] convincingly pleaded, because they are "experiential gestalts" which depend for their constitution upon the specificity of human embodiment.

Another basic statement of Bhartrhari's theory of language becomes self-evident from the perspective which we assumed here: the meaning exists only at the level of the sentence, the meaning of the word is a construct which is the result of artificial analysis. This is so because the meaning is definitively grasped at the level of the intent (para), where all partial meanings are unified in a holistic cognitive representation. The latter could not be reduced to its parts[21].

Returning once again to the four-stage model of perception and cognition of Navya-Nyaya, the main controversy here was centered upon the status of the two hypothetical cognitive states. For the rivals of this theory, they are not hypothetical but available to direct introspection. As B. Matilal[22] points out, the main similarity between Dinnaga's "non-constructive" perception (which is the only kind of perception for him) and the "simple" perception of Prasastapada (a Vaisesika philosopher) and Kumarila can be stated as follows: both are psychological firsts and both grasp the object in the most preliminary way. But, for Dinnaga, this moment is followed by addition (yojana) or "superimposition" of fictional structurings. For Prasastapada and Kumarila, this moment is followed not by "addition" but by analysis and propositional arrangement of whatever was present already in the undifferentiated whole of the first moment.

Here two details deserve special attention. The idea about "addition" of Dinnaga, which shows that for him the basic nature of reality is the cognitive state of non-constructive perception. Also he would be inclined to accept more readily the equivalence of his non-constructive perception and non-qualificative perception of the qualifiers; the problem about the naturalness of grasping the gestalts remains open in his theory. It is not accepted, because it is against the basic tenet of this school about no-self (anatman)[23].

For Prasastapada and Kumarila, it is the cognitive state of judgemental (qualificative) perception that is basic, which becomes evident from their insistence on the naturalness of analysis. The latter uncovers what was already present in the gestalt. Here we are

caught in the controversy of objective versus subjective meaning which has a long history in European science. Recently this question was discussed by G. Lakoff and M. Johnson[24] as a part of the revision of the model-theoretic semantics and correspondence theory of truth.

We now face the question: which of the two stages of perception is more natural or basic? Gangesa, Kumarila, and Prasastapada considered as basic (via different routes) qualificative perception. But Dinnaga and Bhartrhari thought that non-qualificative perception is basic (which they interpreted in a different way). According to the answer which state is basic, we will vote for "objectivist" or "subjectivist" theory of meaning in natural language. I think that we have here a good example of two state-specific states of consciousness[25]. They are both basic for certain aspects of human experience - for functioning in the external world and for psychological well-being. They are incommensurable (up to a point) and have different relative importance at different stages of the development of the individual and society.

The most important feature of the qualificative perception seems to be its object-orientedness. The subject of this perception could be revealed only through telescoping[26] or modelling[27] the previous cognitive state in the next one. Thus it becomes clear why there seems to be no open alternative for effective self-investigation of the subject in this state-specific functioning which proceeds through modelling the previous ones theoretically ad infinitum. This is the implicit paradox of Piagetian theory of intelligence which is constructivistic (the "tower of Babel" type).

Contrasting with the previous one, the non-qualificative perception is described by Dinnaga and his followers as being "self-conscious"[28]. This cognitive state is specific, compared with qualitative perception, because here it is possible, according to this school, to reveal the subject of cognition without the telescoping regression amounting to ungraspability. The specificity of this state is its subject-orientedness. Compared with qualificative perception, it is obviously non-constructive.

Now it becomes more clear that we are dealing with state-specific sciences oriented toward investigation of state-specific states of consciousness in line with Tart's[29] proposition. Dinnaga's and Gangesa's views are clear examples of this and they are incommensurable to the degree that these states are discrete and with

incommensurable structure of experience. However, this discontinuity is "conventional" but not "ultimate"[30]. To hold the opposite would amount to N. Chomsky's epistemological preformationism. The searched for synthesis and reconciliation between them is achieved in the so-called "fifth state of consciousness"[31] which is felt subjectively as "spontaneity and peace in the midst of activity".

The strategies for achieving this conjunctio (synthesis) of different states of consciousness are (it seems) the major vehicle for the "broadening of personality" and are based not on the logic of the "tower of Babel" type, i.e. building more and more grandiose patterns of cognitive states in time by telescoping and gestalting, but by changing the structure of the actual cognitive state in its a-temporal (at least quasi-) spatial dimension. The "broadening of personality" is due to the broadening of the actual repertoire of cognitive states, potentially available to it.

The use and functions of language in these discrete states will be different. Here Dinnaga declares that language is inoperative in non-constructive perception (and this is right for its referential use). However, Bhartrhari is also right that speech (vak) is already present here implicitly. Matilal[32] seems to be inclined to interpret their statements as mutually exclusive, but we can find an interpretation, according to which they are both right. The core of the argument of Bhartrhari is based on a very broad comprehension of speech (vak). If we check his statements about the latter we will understand that the right translation for it will be "energy pattern"[33]. The speech in this sense is the "ultimate substance" which is eternal and self-same. The "energy per se" is conceptualized as Brahman, which is the productive principle. The action of "going forth and patterning itself" is conceptualized by the mythological concept of feminine Sakti, which is the principle of expansion. In reality they both could not function alone (being abstractions) but are non-duality named Sabdabrahman, non-duality of noumenal and phenomenal. Bhartrhari here speculates in line with proto-Vedantic conceptions and identifies speech (vak) as Sabdabrahman. This is the motivation of my translation of vak as "energy pattern", as expressive in general.

There is another detail which is worth mentioning in our context. Bhartrhari's differentiation between "conventional" and "ultimate substance" (ontological turn) is instructive[34], compared with

Madhyamika's gnoseological turn and corresponding "conventional" and "ultimate truth". The resemblance is hardly a matter of chance and here, it seems, lies the core of the argument of I-tsing that Bhartrhari belonged to the "errorless teaching"[35].

In the history of Indian investigations of our subject there were two main opposing currents of thought which appeared in different disguises when certain aspects of the problem were put into consideration. In contemporary context, according to the preformationist bias in cognitive psychology[36] and even more so in cognitive science, blinded by the computer metaphor, it is important to recognize the complementarity of the approach of Dinnaga and Bhartrhari to perception, cognition, and language. Especially the latter treats the subject in a manner which is unique and without precedent in the paradigm of contemporary science.

Notes

1. Tart (1972).
2. Matilal (1971, p. 80).
3. Matilal (1971, pp. 83-84).
4. See for more detail: Vetter (1964).
5. Matilal (1971, p. 88).
6. Matilal (1971, p. 95).
7. Johnson-Laird (1983).
8. Matilal (1971, p. 89).
9. Chomsky (1981).
10. Iyer (1965, par. 143).
11. Shmelyov (1983).
12. Petrenko (1983).
13. Johnson-Laird (1983).
14. Jackendoff (1983).
15. Vygotsky (1983).
16. Piaget (1958).
17. Osgood (1980).
18. Johnson-Laird (1983).
19. Anderson (1983).
20. Lakoff and Johnson (1980).
21. This is the basic idea of the second chapter of Vakyapadiya as pointed out by K. Iyer (1977).
22. Matilal (1971, p. 78).
23. Vetter (1964, pp. 14-20).
24. Lakoff and Johnson (1980).
25. Tart (1972).
26. Matilal (1971).
27. Johnson-Laird (1983).
28. Vetter (1964, pp. 72-77).
29. Tart (1972).
30. In Madhyamika sense; see for more detail: Huntington (1983).
31. Yarrow (1985).
32. Matilal (1971).
33. Iyer (1965, pars. 1, 20, 118, 124-128, 198, etc.).
34. For discussion see: Varma (1976).

35. See for more detail: Bhartrhari (1979) and Serebryakov (1983).
36. There are, however, exceptions, e.g. Hunt (1985a), Hunt (1985b).

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THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF HIPPOCRATIC DOCTRINE

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Summary

The content of this paper is based on the book **The Aphorisms of Hippocrates** by V. Nikolova and on the original works from the well known Corpus Hippocraticum. It reveals some basic concepts from the doctrine of Hippocrates explained in accordance with their social meaning. Against the background of the ideas from the preceding philosophical thought and medical practice are outlined the innovations which Hippocrates - The Father of Medicine - introduces or develops in a new way. In the first place there is the humoral theory viewed in connection with the social and physical environment, and therefore influencing the further development of the concept about the structure of human body as well as the social, political and individual characteristics of men. From the biological facts is drawn a new social analogy - Hippocratic doctrine is presented as a synthesis between the well known model of micro- and macrocosmos and the model of the structure and function of Greek Polis. In addition to that are revealed some aspects of the doctrine which lay stress on the behavioral and moral demands consistent with the art of medicine.

Hippocratic doctrine symbolizes the most glorious period of ancient medicine, as well as the foundation of a new medico-philosophical system, synthesizing a number of ideas, which had already been formulated by philosophers and physicians from different epochs and schools. Indeed it is impossible to keep distinct the various influences which acted and reacted upon one another in the spheres of philosophy and medicine; only the main tendencies can be clearly distinguished.[1]

Hippocratic science is the ripe fruit of a long period of active inquiry. It was only natural that, as the main interest shifted from cosmology to biology, philosophy should deal with medical problems -

that's why in the Coan doctrine of V BC we can observe almost all important features of the ancient science, transformed and unified according to its basic ideas some of which sound modern even today; the specific character of Hippocratic doctrine reveals popular concepts from the preceding philosophical thought and medical practice and outlines the innovations which Hippocrates introduces or develops through them.

Some of the characteristics of the philosophy and medicine in ancient Greece which later on became a basis for the Hippocratic doctrine are:

a). the understanding of the unity of macro- and microcosmos (i.e. nature and man), determined by the fact that their principles are one and the same primary elements.

b). the fact that nature and man (i.e. macro- and microcosmos) at that time are explained by the same conceptions (e.g. physics), proving a common principle of organisation.

c). the concept of diseases as material processes in the body and their connection with the natural environment.

The fundamental principle of Hippocratic physiology is the dogma that an understanding of the human body is impossible without an understanding of nature as a whole and it proves that the early Greek philosophy has a wholesome effect of the formation of medical science and brought about its liberation from mysticism and religious dogmatism.

Applying the basic concepts of Ionic philosophy in medicine, Hippocrates affirmed the identity between the living bodies and lifeless things and maintained that medicine must conform with the physical laws of nature: there is a rational element which relies upon accurate observation and accumulated experience. This rationalism concludes that disease and health depend on the environment and on the supposed constituents of the human frame.[2]

As a physician and philosopher Empedocles was the first to transfer his cosmological ideas into a medical theory: according to him the same four elements which built up the universe had to be found in the human body. This concept Empedocles had formed after an ancient mythological image depicting man as microcosmos (minute world reproducing in itself the great one - macrocosmos), and the four principles of the universe - fire, air, earth and water - corresponded to the four principles of the body - blood, bile, black bile and

lymph. According to the prevailing view Empedocles' school distinguished four types of men - sanguine, choleric, melancholic and phlegmatic. Later on this notion led to a whole system of the rational medicine in Hippocratic doctrine. Depicted in that way, the theory of Empedocles gave a new idea of the structure of the human body and appeared a predecessor to the humoral doctrine, created by the Cnidean school.

The pathology of Hippocrates built on the concept of the role of the four humours in the body and appeared an immediate continuation of the ideas of Cnidean school, which he adjusted to his own views about the nature of disease and health.[3] A common opinion taught that the harmonious mixture of the four humours in the body ensured its health, while the "monarchy" (i.e. domination) of one caused the appearance of disease - these states were called also "crasis" and "discrasis" (terms which Hippocrates affirmed). Hippocrates approved the humoral doctrine as a primary source of health (through the "crasis") or of disease (through the "discrasis") and wrote that "these (i.e. humours and their peculiarities) when mixed and compounded with one another are neither apparent, nor do they hurt a man; but when one of them is separated off and stands alone, then it is apparent and hurts a man".[4]

The principle that health is a harmonious mingling of the constituents of the body is the main position from which Hippocrates entirely changed the doctrine of disease and contributed to its proper development within a materialistic conception about the psychological and pathological processes and phenomena. The humoral concept about these and the theory of "physis" as to the nature of the sick person (considered mostly as interrelation of different humours) are the best examples for the elemental dialectical understanding about the unity of human nature in Hippocratic doctrine.

It has to be mentioned here that the term "physis", used for the first time by Homerus, is found in Hippocratic works with several different meanings which by the context can be summarized as follows: 1) peculiarities of corporeal and mental construction of man, determined by his origin, heredity and environment; 2) nature of disease; 3) character of the physical environment - peculiarities of the climate, winds, waters, etc.

As was said, the doctrine of humours probably had its origin in superficial deductions from obvious facts of physiology, but it was

strongly coloured by philosophical speculation, in particular by the doctrine of opposites - at first the opposites were not humours but "powers" and, according to Hippocrates, his predecessors "considered that it is the strength of each thing that being too powerful for the human constitution, it can't assimilate, which causes harm, and that is to be taken away".[5] The humoral pathology was not fully developed until these "powers" were substituted by fluid substances. Still, Hippocrates didn't stop at that point - to build a new theory on the already known basis thoroughly changing its essence. He connected the humoral doctrine with some ideas of his teacher Democritus, presenting the nature of man as a result of the influence of the physical and social environment. In this way the doctrine of the four basic types of human character, giving a new impetus to physiology and pathology to the treatment of man was created. In the idea of Democritus about the influence of the physical environment (nature) we can also see some traces from the Ionian nature-philosophy with its four powers - hot, cold, liquid and solid. Hippocrates associated them with the four geographical directions of the world and hence with the existence of the four types of man - sanguine, choleric, melancholic and phlegmatic. In this way man and universe were bound in one common system in an entirely new way. Some examples: in "airs, waters, places" Hippocrates defined the influence of seasons and climate on the human body by the principle of "constitution of diseases" (quite different from the modern one) and pointed out the unity of atmospheric and cosmic influence during a definite period of time (this concept is implanted in popular beliefs - certain diseases correspond to certain states of atmosphere).[6] In the same way he defined the interrelation between climate, races and social environment, affirming that these principles influence the physiological, moral and even political characteristics of different people. In brief, the Hippocratic system looks like that: North is connected with the power of cold and the humour of bile; so, the people living there have white yellowish skin, and are alert, enterprising, open-minded etc. People living in the South are under the power of heat and blood, so that they are emotional, amorous, healthy looking and lively. West is connected with the power of black bile and that's the reason why people here are of melancholic temper, while East is under the power of phlegm which makes people lazy, slow-minded, obeying tyrants and so on. According to Hippocrates, a physician on coming to

an unknown town must observe its inhabitants and their way of life in order to become informed about the diseases which threaten them, "for the risk is less when the disease is more nearly related to the patient in respect of constitution, habit, age and season, than when there is no such relationship"[7]. The theory of Democritus about the influence of the social environment, Hippocrates associated also with the various lifestyles, diet, customs and surrounding objects. These factors he defined as influencing not only the health, but the psychology of man as well - an idea he had arrived at quite differently from his predecessors or contemporaries.

Some of the examples which he gave in his works about the influence of the social customs on body and mind witness to his keenness and excellent knowledge of people[8] (acquired from numerous travels) and include the following: the Amazons used to burn their right bosoms, because it was an obstacle to the usage of the bow, their beloved weapon; or another case: among the Scythians - a barbarian tribe in North-Eastern Europe and North-Western Asia - women were of low fertility and man often impotent, especially if they belonged to the ruling class. The repeated failure in sexual intercourse convinced men that in some way they had provoked the anger of Gods and should pay for their sins by imitating women's manners, dressing and occupation. Hippocrates drew the conclusion that these troubles were the result of their idle lives (there is a saying in Latin "Mollit viros otium" meaning that idle life spoils men) and explained it from a medical point of view: fat women can't get pregnant "because the fat (i.e. epiploon, the fold of peritoneum) presses the mouth of the womb and conception is impossible until they grow thinner"[9]. The explanation about men is that riding which they misused led to atrophia of certain parts of the genitals[10]; evidence for it was that men deprived of horses were seldom impotent. Or, with other tribes these troubles appeared a reason for polygamy - the strong desire for children and the impossibility to have them or, if born, often with degenerations, weak and sickly, made men have several women in order to secure the generation. On the contrary, those people who used to wear free clothes and indulged in physical exercises (e.g. Greeks) gave birth to a lovely generation - strong and healthy, proof of which are (at least) the statues of young athletes and the fact of monogamy.

From these and other similar descriptions, it is clear that Hippocrates didn't consider disease as God's punishment, but as a material and natural phenomenon that had its physical explanation and in this way established a link between some diseases and social environment.

Another association: in "Temperaments" Hippocrates pointed out the relationship between man and universe, affirming that discrasis was influenced by airs, winds, waters and celestial bodies as well as by the habits of the individual, his nourishment, weight and temper; so that the tempers subordinated to the influence of the environment are rendered variable. Human life can be compared to the rhythm of seasons, because people change according to the phases of this cycle and the temper depends on the flow of humours in the body.[11]

Modern medicine has adopted as an unchallenged truth the basic precept of Hippocratic medicine that only nature can influence the treatment and that the only thing left for the physician is to allow nature to take its course - this is the so-called "vis medicatrix naturae" (healing power of nature). It is revealed in the next aphorism: "Do not disturb a patient either during or just after a crisis, and try no experiments, neither with purges nor with other irritants, but leave him alone"[12], "for the healthy condition of a human being", explains Hippocrates at another place, "is a nature that has naturally attained a movement, not alien but perfectly adapted, having produced it by means of breath, warmth and concoction of humours"[13].

Considering nature as an indivisible integrity, Hippocrates respectively defined man as unity of corporeal (physical) and mental functions. He explained personality by reference to what Aristotle called a physical form of causality: e.g. prior to him anger was understood as the boiling of blood near the heart - i.e. in the region of the diaphragm, because it was considered to have the functions of thinking and feeling (hence its Greek name "phrenes"); Hippocrates rejected this opinion by the statement that there was no truth in it. "I assert that the brain is an interpreter of consciousness. The diaphragm has a name[14] which is due to fortuity and habit, not to reality and nature and I don't see what is its ability for thought and intelligene"[15].

The strict rationalism, which we observe as a consciously followed line of approach, is a very important feature of Hippocratic

medicine, standing for scientific research and against superstition and hypothetical philosophy. Rejecting the divine cause of disease, Hippocrates searched and pointed out the connection between natural factors, social environment and illness, as well as the methods for its treatment. The best example of this is epilepsy (the so-called "sacred disease"). "In my opinion", writes Hippocrates, "the sacred disease is no more divine nor anymore of a disease as compared to other illnesses. It has a natural cause and its so-called sacred character and origin is due to human interception and awe at its strange character. This illness has a nature similar to others and has also its natural cause, because all the things in nature resemble each other in this respect that they can be observed through their causes"[16].

In addition to this, Hippocrates always insisted that "the examinations carried out by physicians should include the favourable factors in the lifestyle of the patient"[17] and appeared to be the first to draw attention to the individuality of the patient and the specific character of the symptoms, pointing out that the treatment should take into account the individual as well as the common. "Take the patient too into account" says one of the Hippocratic aphorisms, "and decide whether he will stand the regimen at the height of the disease; whether his strength will give out first and he will not stand the regimen, or whether the disease will give way first and abate its severity"[18], because it "doesn't follow that what works for one patient will work for another or for the same one at another time"[19]. Guided by these concepts Hippocrates concluded that "all the cases should be judged according to the symptoms, but on the basis of observations of similar cases one forms an opinion"[20]. This "opinion" later on served for a basis of another important part of the process of healing - in all diseases the physician observes given symptoms or combinations of symptoms which reveal defined future consequences and the knowledge of this general pathology was called "prognosis" and served three purposes: 1) that the physician might gain the patient's confidence, 2) that the outcome of the disease could be foreseen with relative certainty, 3) that armed with the knowledge of the impending perils, the physician could be ready for them or even prevent some of them.

For the first time in the history of science, Hippocrates paid attention to methodological questions connected with the achievement

of perfection in medical art as a profession. In his "Law" we read the following: "He who is going truly to acquire an understanding of medicine must enjoy natural ability, teaching, a suitable place, instruction from childhood, diligence and time. Now, first of all natural ability is necessary, for if nature be in opposition everything is in vain. But when nature points the way to what is best, then comes the teaching of art. Our natural ability is the soil. The views of our teacher are as it were the seeds. Learning from childhood is analogous to the seed's falling betimes upon the prepared ground. The place of instruction is as it were the nutriment that comes from the surrounding air to the things sown. Diligence is the working of the soil. Time strenghtens all these things, so that nature is perfected"[21].

The question of professional skill in Hippocratic doctrine is indivisible from the moral question, "What kind of man is the physician himself?": the appearance and behaviour of everyone who performs the art of medicine must be faultless for many people who are afraid to entrust their lives to someone who can't take proper care of himself. This is a very important point which Hippocrates ranks with scientific requests, "for some patients though conscious that their condition is perilous, recover simply through their contentment with the goodness of the physician ... For, we, physicians take lead in what is necessary for health ... preserving nature, not trying to alter it"[22]. Expressing these views on medicine - Hippocrates always calls it "art" - he draws a conclusion that remains true forever: "where there is love of man, there is also love of the art"[23].

Hippocrates bequeathed to medicine a code of professional honour - the main principles of medical ethics (the physician must be a free person, he has no right to kill and is bound to keep in secret his actions and everything that he has learned from the sick) are created with great respect for human individuality and dignity.

In connection with all that was said above we have to mention again one very important feature of Hippocratic doctrine and that is its interest in the behaviour of the physician towards his patients and colleagues (a question which had never been discussed by the science prior to him). Quite indicative of his concept is the following passage: "A physician does not violate etiquette even if, being in difficulties on occasion over a patient and in the dark through inexperience, he should urge the calling in of others, in order to

learn by consultation the truth about the case, and in order that there may be fellow-workers to afford abundant help ... Physicians who meet in consultation must never quarrel, or jeer at one another. For I will assert upon oath, a physician's reasoning should never be jealous of one another"[24]. There is nothing to be added or commented here, for the words themselves sound quite modern and necessary today. To finish, we just want to say that in ennumerating the necessary qualities (professional and human) Hippocrates outlined the portrait of the good physician in order to gain respect both for himself and for the medical profession and concluded with the following: "The good physician must not seek his profit but rather lay hold on reputation"[25].

The famous investigator of the ancient world W. Jaeger[26] points out that the leading ideas of philosophy adapted for the Hippocratic doctrine can be explained as abstract social processes, while G. Thomson adds that all that is significant in Greek philosophy and scientific thought of that time can be attributed to the revolutionized social relations and their intellectual revision. This conclusion is entirely valid for the Greek medicine of V-IV BC presented by the doctrine of Hippocrates, as the model of the social mechanism is completely transfered to the forms of the movement of matter. This means: one higher form of matter's movement, its structure and behaviour is used as a model for the lower one, for its own structure and behaviour; e.g. if we compare biological to social processes some common features are to be seen in the front line, such as the relative reticence of the system, the consistency with the environment, the phenomenon of self regulation, the activity of the system, etc. These, however, do not comprise all the important features of the biological processes.

The emphasized economic and political autonomy of each Polis draws attention to the fact that these comparatively enclosed systems differ essentially from their neighbours and the surrounding world, according to their economic and political structure[27]. Despite that, the Greek states which had a small amount of own agricultural production for themselves, relied on the surrounding world and neighbouring countries. Their dependence, however, had an active - not passive - character: the inner structure and the character of their economy turned them into manufacturers of raw material into a finished product of high value. The process of transformation is carried out

by craftsmen; raw material arrives at the workshops and is processed into a product, essentially different from its initial appearance. By one and the same tool the different materials are turned into the same thing or respectively - from the same materials into something different. It is the same with human beings and animals - in one and the same circulation (metabolism) they remake everything, but the same materials (substances) do not produce the same things. One thing, however, remains unchanged in this constant metabolism: the comparatively unchangeable process of production and the instruments which perform it. That has a paramount significance and ensures existence. In the constant interaction between the external influences, food, air, etc., metabolism and the structure of the organs which ensure the processes of transformation, remain unchanged in the body.

The work of the organism can also be compared to the work of the merchant - the continuous turnover of goods to money and its change to goods anew is similar to the qualitative change of food into corporeal humours and their transformation into the final products of metabolism.

Hippocratic medicine is based on a synthesis between the model of micro- and macrocosmos and the model of the structure and function of Polis. In this way one ancient structural notion of reality is transformed into its own opposite through the ideological results of the new social relations, through its new content. The doctrine of unity of micro- and macrocosmos is rendered concrete and rationalized through the study of the structural and functional characteristics of Polis and becomes a basis on which the first scientific medicine is built up. As an original doctrine it brings forth its own method of precise observation and analysis of facts. There is a very good explanation of this process given by A.C. Celsus, "Despite that there are many phenomena which bear no relation to the medical sciences, they help us to study them stimulating scholar's thought. In this way, the contemplation at the phenomena in the environment, may it not create the physician, makes him better prepared for the medical knowledge"[28].

As a conclusion we would like to notice that the doctrine of Hippocrates is constructed by a brilliant mind following the precept that "the discoveries of the past should serve as a basis for the discoveries of the future"[29] and without being extravagantly original

transforms the best tendencies in Greek medicine into materialistic scientific formulations.

Notes

The content of this paper is taken from Nikolova (1986). For quotations in English Jones (1962-7) is used.

1. Jones (1962, I, p. XLVI).
2. ibid. p. XIV.
3. In "Diseases", IV, 51 Hippocrates gives as the four humours bile, blood, phlegm and hydrops (i.e. waterly humour) and in "Affections", I write that the diseases are caused mainly by bile and phlegm. These differences are due to the peculiarities of Corpus Hippocraticum, which is known to contain works from different Coan authors. See: Hippocrates (1962, I-IV).
4. Ancient medicine, XIV: Hippocrates (1962, I).
5. ibid.
6. See also Aphorisms, II, 34; III, 1, 3, 19 etc.: Hippocrates (1967, IV).
7. ibid. II, 35; VII, 82 (or VIII, 1).
8. Namora (1983, p. 20).
9. Aphorisms, I, 20: Hippocrates (1967, IV).
10. See also ibid. V, 63.
11. See note 6.
12. Aphorisms, I, 20: Hippocrates (1967, IV).
13. Precepts, IX: id. (1962, I).
14. I.e. phrenes, used by Hippocrates in the Greek text.
15. The sacred disease, XX: Hippocrates (1962, II).
16. ibid. I, II.
17. Regimen, XXVIII: id. (1967, IV).
18. Aphorisms, I, 9: ibid.
19. Celsus (1835, p. 12).
20. Prognosis, I: Hippocrates (1967, IV).
21. Law, II, III: id. (1962, II).
22. Precepts, IV, VI, IX: id. (1962, I).
23. ibid. VI.
24. ibid. IX.
25. ibid. VIII.
26. Jaeger (1954) and Thomson (1959).
27. Warnke (1966, p. 212 sqq.).
28. Celsus (1835, p. 10).
29. See note 20.

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ASPEKTE ZUR GESCHICHTE DER ERFORSCHUNG UND ENTWICKLUNG HOCHBEGABTER

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Leipzig

Summary

The history of research on development of gifted children, adolescents and adults, and the realization of their potential through highly creative performances has not been given much attention by scientists so far. The article depicts some historical eras from the point of view of the connection between political development and the development of giftedness and the prime of creative performances: China during the Han-Dynasty, Athen during 5th and 4th century B.C., humanism and renaissance in Europe, the beginning of the 20th century.

The article emphasizes the social conditions for creative performances in particular fields. Social influences determine the direction of gifted persons' development and their number.

Dem grossen Interesse, das gegenwärtige aktuellen Fragen der Begabungsentwicklung gewidmet wird, steht eine auffällig geringe Aufmerksamkeit an der Geschichte dieses Forschungsfeldes gegenüber.

Es dürfte kaum zufällig sein, dass dieses geringe Niveau der Aufarbeitung historischer Erfahrungen erschreckend positiv mit dem bisher erreichten Niveau der theoretischen Fundierung der in ihrer Anzahl überwiegenden empirischen Forschungen in diesem Forschungsbereich korreliert.

Das soll nicht heissen, dass es nicht auch einige exzellente Forschungen auf einem hohen theoretischen Niveau gibt, nur sind sie in der Minderheit. Doch viele der heute diskutierten und häufig als neu entdeckt ausgegebenen Probleme finden sich schon seit den Anfängen und sind ohne diese objektive Genese des Problems nicht oder kaum umfassend erklärbar. Es geht in meinem Beitrag also um einige erste Aspekte zur Geschichte der Entwicklung der Theorie und zugleich der ntwicklung der Theorie in der Geschichte.

Das uralte gesellschaftliche Interesse an der Entwicklung, Auswahl und Förderung von Hochbegabten ergibt sich aus der Bedeutung der von ihnen zu erbringenden Leistungen für den historischen Entwicklungsprozess im weitesten Sinne. Hochbegabte Persönlichkeiten sind Initiatoren, Produzenten und Mitproduzenten der entscheidenden Entdeckungen und Erfindungen sowie der sozialen, kulturell-künstlerischen und sportlichen Höchstleistungen. Ausgehend von der konkret-historischen Determination des menschlichen Entwicklungsprozesses sowie des Verlaufs und des Standes der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis sind Fragen der Entwicklung und der Erforschung von Hochbegabungen, analog dem Begabungsproblem generell, in den jeweiligen historischen Kontext eingebettet zu sehen.

Der zentrale gesellschaftliche Ausgangspunkt liegt darin, dass von der Gesellschaft seit den Anfängen dieser Entwicklung die in ihrer eigenen Werthierarchie jeweils am höchsten geschätzten Menschen ausgewählt und besonders gefördert werden.
Das sind in der Regel jene Personen, die für die Beherrschung und Meisterung der sozialen Prozesse sowie für das Erreichen der dominanten Ziele und Ideale bzw. für die Weiter- und Höherentwicklung wie auch für die Stabilisierung der in der Gesellschaft bestehenden fundamentalen Werte und Bedürfnisse über die besten potentiellen Voraussetzungen verfügen. Allerdings gibt es in der Klassengesellschaft auch einzelne gegenläufige Tendenzen, also die Mobilisierung des Begabungspotentials gegen die herrschenden Interessen, dies trifft insbesondere für Niedergangsphasen zu. Demzufolge gab es im Verlaufe der historischen Entwicklungsprozesse quantitative und qualitative Verschiebungen der gesellschaftlichen Bedeutsamkeit sowie der Wertschätzung von Begabungsrichtungen und Begabungsgebieten.
C. Levi-Strauss hat wohl berechtigt auf die hohen schöpferischen Leistungen hingewiesen, die die Nutzung des Feuers, die Entwicklung der Kochmethoden (Siede und Kocheffekte durch Wasserdampf) und die Erfindung der Töpferei in der Urgesellschaft erforderten. Sie können mit zufällig entstandenen Resultaten - er fragt: "wo sollte zufällig gekochtes Fleisch entstanden sein, wo die für das Gefäss benötigte nichtreissende Tonmisschung" - nicht erklärt werden.[1]

Allerdings kann seiner Schlussfolgerung, dass die Dosis von Phantasie, Erfundungsgeist und schöpferischer Anstrengung "während der ganzen Menschheitsgeschichte ungefähr konstant bleibt"[2] bestimmt a priori nicht zugestimmt werden. Denn bei Phantasie und Kreativität

handelt es sich um Entwicklungsprodukte, deren Herausbildung im individuellen Lebensprozess der Persönlichkeit erfolgt, die also nicht irgendeine angeborene oder herangereifte Konstante bilden, und deshalb von gesamtgesellschaftlichen und individuellen Lebens- und Tätigkeitsbedingungen ebenso abhängig sind wie von biotischen Voraussetzungen der einzelnen Persönlichkeit.
Unseres Erachtens trifft für die Herausbildung von "Phantasie, Erfindungsgeist und schöpferischer Anstrengung" gleiches zu wie für ihre Nutzung, dass nämlich dafür "rein psychologische Faktoren nicht ausreichend (sind)".[3]

Das Auftreten schöpferisch befähigter Persönlichkeiten hängt wie auch das Durchsetzen einer Erfindung ab "von dem Zusammentreffen einer ganzen Anzahl anderer Faktoren historischer, ökonomischer und soziologischer Art".[4] Es gibt eine erstaunliche und keinesfalls zufällige Parallelität zwischen der Verschiebung von Zentren, die den sozialökonomischen, historisch-politischen Fortschritt verkörpern (im vorderasiatisch-europäischem Raum vom Zweistromland über Ägypten nach Griechenland, Rom und die weitere Verlagerung nach Norden bis zu den ersten bürgerlichen Revolutionen in England, Frankreich und den revolutionären Situationen sowie bürgerlich demokratischen und proletarischen Revolutionen) einerseits und der überzufällig häufigen Entstehung überragender schöpferischer Resultate gerade in progressiven Phasen der socialökonomischen Entwicklung in diesen Zentren. Genannt seien die Blütezeiten Athens und Roms, die Zeit der Renaissance und des Humanismus sowie der frühbürgerlichen Revolutionen von Italien bis zu den Niederlanden mit unerschiedlichen Entwicklungsverläufen. Dazu gehören weiter die Ausbreitung des Calvinismus und die bürgerliche Revolution in England mit der nachfolgenden industriellen Revolution sowie - wie Jürgen Kuczynski hier ausführte - die Jahre nach der Oktoberrevolution 1917 in der Sowjetunion. Allerdings sollen damit die Hochzeiten schöpferischer Leistungen nicht auf diese Beispiele begrenzt oder gar jede schöpferische Leistung von ihrer Einbettung in solche Umbruchphasen sozialökonomischer Entwicklungen abhängig gemacht werden.

Hierzu steht weitere detaillierte Forschungsarbeit noch aus. Das betrifft auch das bereits genannte Problem der Verschiebung von gesellschaftlicher Bedeutsamkeit und Wertschätzung bestimmter Begabungsgebiete. Diese Verschiebung erfolgt sowohl in Abhängigkeit von sozial-ökonomischen und politischen Entwicklungen als auch über den

gesamten welthistorischen Entwicklungsprozess und zwar nicht nur innerhalb unseres historisch-kulturellen Umfeldes. Sie wird zudem durch die gegenseitige Beeinflussung verschiedener Kulturen modifiziert. Die objektive Tendenz betrifft auch die jeweiligen Prozesse der Förderung bzw. der Herausbildung dieser Begabungen und nicht nur - aber auch - die Realisierung ihres Potentials in schöpferische Leistungen sowie die theoretische Reflexion dieser Prozesse.

Sagen kann man als die ältesten Quellen über das Auftreten hochbegabter Menschen ansehen. Körperliche Kräfte und Fähigkeiten stehen im Mittelpunkt der Wertschätzung, erinnert sei an den jungen Herkules, den kräftigen Theseus, den jungen Siegfried und den jungen Roland.

Sprachliche, insbesondere rhetorische, und künstlerische (Malerei, Musik, Bildhauerei, Literatur) Fähigkeiten aber auch militärische Führungsqualitäten stehen im Mittelpunkt einer hohen Bewertung und sogar einer spezifischen Förderung in den frühen Hochkulturen des Altertums. Andererseits ist die Herausbildung wissenschaftlich-technischer Begabungen trotz der genannten hohen Bedeutsamkeit schöpferischer Leistungen am Beginn der Menschwerdung des homo sapiens als beachtenswerte Quantität und Qualität ein relativ spätes Entwicklungsprodukt der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung. Das gilt trotz vereinzelter Ausnahmen in unterschiedlichen Gesellschaften, man denke etwa an Archimedes und Heron von Alexandria einerseits und die Erbauer der antiken Weltwunder sowie ausgewählter technischer Leistungen in China, Mexiko und anderen Gebieten früher Hochkulturen andererseits.

Diese späte Herausbildung insbesondere technischer Begabung ist auch durch die Geringschätzung materieller Tätigkeit in der ersten Klassengesellschaft und in der Sklavenhaltergesellschaft mit verursacht. Sie war wiederum ein spezifischer Ausdruck der Überzeugung von der Ewigkeit der bestehenden sozialökonomischen Zustände inclusive der Produktionsinstrumente und Produktionsmittel.

Die ältesten bisher sicher bekannten Zeugnisse der Förderung von Hochbegabungen sind etwa zweieinhalb Jahrtausende alt[5], die der Selektion Begabter für staatliche Positionen sollen nach anderen Quellen in China sogar bis in die Zeit um 2200 vor der Zeitrechnung zurückreichen.[6] Als einer der ersten hatte der chinesische Philosoph Konfuzius (551-479 v.u.Z.) über eine systematische Entwicklung besonders begabter Kinder nachgedacht und vorgeschlagen, sie

besonders zu fördern. Mit der Ausbreitung der von ihm geschaffenen Ju-Lehre, einer idealistischen Philosophie mit teilweise materialistischen Zügen, die unter Kaiser Han Wu-di (140-87 v.u.Z.) zur Staatsideologie erklärt worden war, setzte sich auch dieser Vorschlag durch. Überdurchschnittlich begabte Kinder wurden ausgewählt und am Hofe der Herrschers ausgebildet. Dabei wurden alle Formen Schöpferischer Phantasie, besonders das Schreiben von Gedichten und Romanen, überaus hoch bewertet. Diese Kinder sollen auch über ein gutes Gedächtnis und aussergewöhnliche logische Denkfähigkeiten verfügt haben. Sie wurden hoch geachtet und als Garanten des nationalen Reichtums angesehen. Von Interesse ist, dass bereits aus dieser Zeit Nachrichten über Vergleiche jener Kinder vorliegen, die an den Höfen speziell ausgebildet wurden mit jenen, denen von ihren Eltern eine solche Ausbildung fern vom Elternhaus untersagt wurde. Diese Vergleiche ergaben, dass letztere sich als Erwachsene nicht oder nur wenig über das Niveau ihrer Umgebung erhoben. Daraus wurde geschlussfolgert, dass sich die Begabung des einzelnen nur in Gemeinschaft mit anderen gut Befähigten sowie bei entsprechender Ausbildung und Betreuung entfalten kann und dass es keine spontane Begabungsentwicklung gibt. Dieses historisch so früh gefundene Ergebnis ist bis heute gültig. Begabte benötigen immer eine spezifische Förderung, um ihre Potenzen voll zu verwirklichen.

In dieser Zeit kam es in China zu einer Blütezeit schöpferischer Leistungen auf allen Gebieten, so in Mathematik, Astronomie, Landwirtschaftswissenschaften, Medizin, bildender Kunst und Architektur, angewandter Kunst, Literatur und mit der Erfindung des Papiers (1. Jh. u.Z.) auch hinsichtlich einer weiteren umfangreichen Vervollständigung der Schriftzeichen. Zur Zeit Wu-dis wurde das Musikinstitut Yüe-fu gegründet, das Poesie und Musik wesentlich beeinflusste. Mit der Gründung und dem Ausbau des Han-Reiches war es erst zu den ideologischen und materiellen Voraussetzungen sowie Interessen an schöpferischen Leistungen gekommen.

Nach den etwa zur gleichen Zeit entwickelten Auffassungen des griechischen Philosophen Plato (427-347 v.u.Z.) hat die Gesellschaft die Aufgabe, die "besten Naturen" zu zwingen, alles das zu erlernen, was für die Gesellschaft selbst erforderlich wäre. Platos Methode, die dafür am besten Geeigneten aufzufinden, wird von ihm selbst folgendermassen beschrieben:

> "Wir müssen sie von ihrer Jugend an aufwärts beobachten und sie Tätigkeiten verrichten lassen, in denen sie höchstwahrscheinlich vieles vergessen oder in denen sie getäuscht werden können; wer sich erinnert oder sich nicht täuschen lässt, muss ausgewählt, und, wer versagt, zurückgewiesen werden. Dies wird der Weg sein."[7]

Diese Position entstand nicht zufällig. Auch in Griechenland führte der stürmische wirtschaftliche und politische Aufschwung im 5. Jh. v.u.Z., insbesondere in der Blütezeit Athens unter Perikles, zu einer stürmischen Entwicklung der hellenischen Wissenschaft und Kultur. Das betraf insbesondere die Mathematik, die Astronomie, die Medizin, verbunden mit Namen wie Anaxagoras, Demokrit, Meton, Hippokrates, in Philosophie mit Namen wie wiederum Anaxagoras und Demokrit, aber auch Protagoras, Sokrates und Plato, einschliesslich Aristoteles, in Geschichtsschreibung, erinnert sei an Herodot, Thukydides und Xenophon, in Literatur, verbunden mit Namen wie Aischylos, Sophokles, Euripides und Artistophanes, weiterhin in der bildenden Kunst, die als eine der bedeutendsten Perioden der Kunstgeschichte gilt, obwohl nur wenig erhalten geblieben ist, und in der Architektur. Der Kampf um die eigene staatliche Identität gegen die Perser und die politische wie ökonomische Stabilisierung insbesondere Athens, schuf die ideologische und materielle Basis für die volle Entwicklung des schöpferischen Potentials einer - welthistorisch gesehen - relativ kleinen Bevölkerung, die in der menschlichen Geschichte wohl bis heute ohne Beispiel ist.

Gezielte Talentesuche - deshalb soll dies erwähnt werden - war auch eine Ursache der letzten Blüte des Osmanischen Reiches unter dem türkischen Sultan Suleiman der Prächtige (1520-1566).

In Mitteleuropa brachten Renaissance und Humanismus einen - allerdings ebenfalls nur vorübergehenden - Aufschwung theoretischer Positionen zur Förderung der Begabungen. Das gilt insbesondere für das humanistische Ideal der auf die Förderung der Einzelpersönlichkeit gerichteten humanistischen Erziehung und den Glauben an die Selbstvervollkommnung der Persönlichkeit aus eigener Kraft. Beides ist auf dem Hintergrund der von den Humanisten angestrebten Verweltlichung der Bildung sowie der von Luther verlangten und besonders von Melanchthon, dem "Praeceptor Germaniae", initiierten und organisierten Reform des bisherigen Schulwesens zu sehen. Der italienische Humanist Poggio Bracciolini schrieb gegen den Geburtsadel ein Traktat **de nobilitate** und formulierte dort:

> "Ruhm und Adel werden nicht nach fremden, sondern nach eigenen Verdiensten und nach den Taten gemessen, die das Ergebnis unseres eigenen Willens sind."[8]

Obwohl sich die Humanisten durch ihr Bildungsideal vom Volk isolierten, verdeutlichen diese Worte die von ihnen gesehene Bedeutung der Einzelpersönlichkeit, die es zu bilden und zu erziehen galt.

In den folgenden Jahrhunderten schwankten Theorie und Praxis der Bildung zwischen - modern ausgedrückt - Biologismus und Soziologismus. Trotzdem bildeten sich in diesem Spannungsfeld in Mitteleuropa bis zur Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts zahlreiche bis heute gültige Erziehungstheorieelemente und Praktische Formen der Bildung, einschliesslich einer differenzierten, an der Persönlichkeit orientierten Erziehung heraus. Allerdings gab es nur wenig praktische wirksame Überlegungen und noch weniger Forschungen zur Natur, zur Bildung und zur Entwicklung hochbegabter Persönlichkeiten.

Vor allem klaffte eine Lücke zwischen dem Hervorbringen hervorragender Wissenschaftler und Künstler bis hin zu Technikern (letztere z.B. während der Zeit der ersten industriellen Revolution in England) einerseits und der Weiterentwicklung der theoretischen Grundlagen zur Entwicklung solcher herausragender Persönlichkeiten. Bis heute ist auffällig, dass bestimmte Umbruchs- und Konsolidierungsphasen mit dem Hervortreten von herausragenden Persönlichkeiten auf den gleichen oder benachbarten Gebieten verbunden sind. Damit wird aber auch deutlich, dass in bestimmten Zeiträumen potentiell hochbegabte Personen objektiv auf Gebiete gedrängt wurden/werden, auf denen sie im Interesse des Fortschritts wirken können, wenn ihnen dies die Gesellschaft nicht in Einheit mit der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung auf allen relevanten Gebieten ermöglicht (z.B. die französischen Aufklärer, die Repräsentanten der Musik, Literatur und Philosophie in Deutschland vom Ausgang des 18. bis ins 19. Jahrhundert). An diesen Beispielen wird deutlich, dass historische Gegebenheiten und historische Entwicklungsphasen die Realisierung von Hochbegabungen in bestimmten Richtungen drängen können, was dann zum Auftreten bestimmter Begabungen in weit überzufälliger Häufigkeit in bestimmten Ländern zu bestimmten Zeiten führt.

Eine solche Erkenntnis ist auch zur Überwindung der Auffassung wichtig, dass begabte Menschen allein von Natur aus in bestimmten Richtungen und für bestimmte Gebiete begabt seien und sich auch gegen Widerstände durchsetzen würden. Das Zutreffen dieser Position müsste nämlich zu einer Gleichverteilung begabter Persönlichkeiten über Zeit

und Raum führen. Die Realität sieht aber ganz anders aus. Jede Abweichung von einer solchen Gleichverteilung muss deshalb zuerst hinsichtlich möglicher gesellschaftlicher Verursachung geprüft werden. Die relative Stagnation der Theorieentwicklung und der nach theoretischen Vorstellungen vorgenommenen Förderungsmassnahmen wurden bis weit in die zweite Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts hinein nur gelegentlich durchbrochen.

Auf zwei Ausnahmen soll nachfolgend eingegangen werden: Erstens handelt es sich um das 1575 erstmals in Spanien veröffentlichte Buch des spanischen Arztes Juan Huarte, mit dem Kurztitel **Prüfung der Köpfe zu den Wissenschaften.**[9]

Nach schnell hintereinanderfolgenden Auflagen wurde es schon 1581 in Portugal auf den "Index librorum prohibitorum" gesetzt und 1583 geriet es auf den spanischen Index verbotener Bücher des Generalinquisitors Quiraga. Nach zahlreichen Auflagen in Italien, England und Frankreich erschien es, initiiert durch die "Fruchtbringende Gesellschaft", in 1622 in Latein in Leipzig, ohne in Deutschland aber durch die Wirren des Dreissigjährigen Krieges eine grössere Bedeutung zu erlangen.

Erst 1752, 177 Jahre nach dem Erscheinen des Originals und 130 Jahre nach der ersten Veröffentlichung in Deutschland, wurde es erstmals in deutscher Sprache veröffentlicht, übersetzt und herausgegeben durch G.E. Lessing. Über den Wert dieses Buches von Huarte urteilte noch 1959 E. Schultheiss:

> "Wenn wir sein Werk mit heutigen Massstäben messen, müssen wir sagen, dass seine Auffassung von der Natur des Ingeniums und des Begriffes des Intellektes originell und bis zu einem gewissen Grade noch heute annehmbar ist."[10]

F. Watson urteilte 1905, dass das Verdients Huartes, dessen Werk eine für damalige Zeiten unvorstellbar weite Verbreitung fand und dass bis in unser Jahrhundert häufig nachgedruckt wurde, vor allem darin bestand, die Psychologie zur Grundlage der Pädagogik gemacht sowie in den pädagogischen Theorien und Methoden die Vererbung, den Charakter, das Temperament und die individuelle Charakteristik beachtet zu haben, wodurch es zu einem der "ersten Vorkämpfer des wissenschaftlichen psychologischen Studium des Kindes" gemacht habe.[11] Die theoretischen Positionen Huartes, die wiederum bis in die Antike zurückreichen, und seine praktischen Ratschläge bis hin zur Zeugung

begabter Knaben wurden für Jahrhunderte zum "Nachschlagwerk für jeden, der über dieses Stoffgebiet zu schreiben hatte".[12]

Zweitens sei an das Buch des Hallenser Pfarrers Karl Witte erinnert. Dieses Buch gibt zu Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts, einen Bericht über die Erziehung seines Sohnes zu einem früh hochbegabten Kind. Vor allem ermutigt durch Pestalozzi hat Witte diesen Bericht veröffentlicht. Er ist aber recht schnell vergessen und nur gelegentlich wiederentdeckt worden. Bekannt ist, dass nicht nur der Vater von Lord Kelvin seine beiden Söhne nach diesem Programm erzog sondern auch der Vater von Norbert Wiener seinen Sohn. Zugleich übersetzte Wieners Vater dieses Buch ins Englische.

Trotzdem kann bis zum letzten Drittel des 19. Jahrhunderts weder von einer systematischen Forschung nach einer eigentlichen Theorienbildung auf diesem Feld gesprochen worden. Einer der ersten, der sich systematisch und eindeutig von nichtreligiösen Positionen aus mit der (natur-)wissenschaftlichen Erforschung begabter Persönlichkeiten beschäftigte, war Francis Galton (1822-1911). Angeregt durch seinen Cousin Charles Darwin und dessen Buch über die Entstehung der Arten suchte er nach den Ursachen der menschlichen Genialität, setzte dazu historisch-vergleichende und soziologische Forschungsmethoden ein und schrieb das 1867 erstveröffentlichte Buch **Hereditary Genius**. In ihm räumte er im Gegensatz zur Kirche und der göttlichen Sendung der Genialität der biologischen Vererbung einen dominierenden Stellenwert ein, obwohl er selbst Einschränkungen machte, die weniger seinem Material als einem Gefühl entsprangen und die später in der Regel von denen verschwiegen wurden, die sich zu seinen wissenschaftlichen Erben zählten.

Um die Jahrhundertwende zum 20. Jahrhundert kommt es zu einem ersten engeren Bündnis zwischen den herrschenden staatlichen und ökonomischen Interessen einerseits und der Erkenntnis, dass diese zu ihrer Realisierung hochbegabter Persönlichkeiten bedürfen, die nicht zu jedem Zeitpunkt in ausreichenden Masse verfügbar zu sein schienen. Zugleich wurde deutlich, dass das Begabungspotential nicht auf jene Schichten begrenzt ist, die einen günstigen Zugang zur Aneignung von Bildung besitzen.

Erste staatlich determinierte Überlegungen zum Auffinden und zur Förderung überdurchschnittlich befähigter Kinder sind, wie aus dem Lebensbericht des deutschen Physikochemikers und Nobelpreisträgers Wilhelm Ostwald (1853-1932) hervorgeht, von der Unterrichtsverwaltung

der damaligen japanischen Regierung gestellt und an ihn herangetragen worden. "Während meiner Professorenzeit", erinnerte sich Ostwald,

> "richtete einmal einer meiner japanischen Schüler im Auftrage seiner heimischen Unterrichtsverwaltung die Frage an mich, wie man künftige ausgezeichnete Leute recht frühzeitig erkennen könne. Auf meine etwas verwunderte Gegenfrage, wozu man das wissen wolle, erhielt ich die Antwort, dass es sich um eine höchst praktische Angelegenheit handele. Es waren bedeutende Summen von der Regierung ausgewiesen, um insbesondere aus den ärmeren Schichten der Bevölkerung solche Individuen ausfindig zu machen und zu entwickeln, von denen man später erhebliche Leistungen, also auch einen entsprechenden Nutzen für ihr Vaterland erwarten können. Nun war man eben daran, die Grundsätze festzustellen, nach denen diese Summen verwendet werden sollten, und hierbei war das erwähnte Problem entstanden."13

In Europa selbst begann sich erst mit dem Beginn des ersten Weltkrieges diese Situation grundsätzlich zu verändern, denn wenige Jahre vorher war Alfred Binet (1857-1911) noch von der genau entgegengesetzten staatlichen Aufgabenstellung ausgegangen. Er sollte eine schulpolitisch praktikable Differenzierung im unteren Intelligenzbereich erreichen, was ihm mit dem Stufentests der Intelligenz auch gelang.

Für das Begabungsproblem wurde eine Konferenz proklamatisch, deren Beiträge W. Petersen unter dem programmatischen Titel "Der Aufstieg der Begabten" 1916 in Deutschland publizierte. Der deutsche Psychologe William Stern (1871-1938) hielt hier einen Vortrag, der mit der Orientierung auf die Ausarbeitung wissenschaftlich begründeter Gesellschaftsstrategien wohl als der Beginn der modernen Begabungsforschung und -förderung anzusehen ist. In ihm erklärte er

> "Wir kennen recht genau die Vorkommen aller möglichen Rohstoffe in unserem deutschen Vaterland nach Menge, Art und Verteilung und verwenden diese Kenntnisse auf Schritt und Tritt zur Sicherung und Förderung unseres materiellen Daseins. Aber von der Grösse und Art unseres Schatzes an geistigen Rohstoffen - das sind die Begabungen - wissen wir noch beschämend wenig; und doch ist diese Kenntnis nicht weniger wichtig als die der materiellen Hilfsmittel. Die weltgeschichtlichen Umwälzungen der Gegenwart haben uns plötzlig dies Bedürfnis zu Bewusstsein gebracht; denn wir wissen jetzt, dass wir Menschen-ökonomie treiben müssen. Die richtige, d.h. den Fähigkeiten entsprechende Verteilung der Menschen auf die Beruf, die Verwertung jeder Begabung an derjenigen Stelle des nationalen Schaffenprozesses, an der sie ihr Bestes leisten kann, andererseits die Verhinderung schmerzhafter Talentverkümmerungen und falscher

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Zweitens sei an das Buch des Hallenser Pfarrers Karl Witte erinnert. Dieses Buch gibt zu Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts, einen Bericht über die Erziehung seines Sohnes zu einem früh hochbegabten Kind. Vor allem ermutigt durch Pestalozzi hat Witte diesen Bericht veröffentlicht. Er ist aber recht schnell vergessen und nur gelegentlich wiederentdeckt worden. Bekannt ist, dass nicht nur der Vater von Lord Kelvin seine beiden Söhne nach diesem Programm erzog sondern auch der Vater von Norbert Wiener seinen Sohn. Zugleich übersetzte Wieners Vater dieses Buch ins Englische.

Trotzdem kann bis zum letzten Drittel des 19. Jahrhunderts weder von einer systematischen Forschung nach einer eigentlichen Theorienbildung auf diesem Feld gesprochen worden. Einer der ersten, der sich systematisch und eindeutig von nichtreligiösen Positionen aus mit der (natur-)wissenschaftlichen Erforschung begabter Persönlichkeiten beschäftigte, war Francis Galton (1822-1911). Angeregt durch seinen Cousin Charles Darwin und dessen Buch über die Entstehung der Arten suchte er nach den Ursachen der menschlichen Genialität, setzte dazu historisch-vergleichende und soziologische Forschungsmethoden ein und schrieb das 1867 erstveröffentlichte Buch **Hereditary Genius**. In ihm räumte er im Gegensatz zur Kirche und der göttlichen Sendung der Genialität der biologischen Vererbung einen dominierenden Stellenwert ein, obwohl er selbst Einschränkungen machte, die weniger seinem Material als einem Gefühl entsprangen und die später in der Regel von denen verschwiegen wurden, die sich zu seinen wissenschaftlichen Erben zählten.

Um die Jahrhundertwende zum 20. Jahrhundert kommt es zu einem ersten engeren Bündnis zwischen den herrschenden staatlichen und ökonomischen Interessen einerseits und der Erkenntnis, dass diese zu ihrer Realisierung hochbegabter Persönlichkeiten bedürfen, die nicht zu jedem Zeitpunkt in ausreichenden Masse verfügbar zu sein schienen. Zugleich wurde deutlich, dass das Begabungspotential nicht auf jene Schichten begrenzt ist, die einen günstigen Zugang zur Aneignung von Bildung besitzen.

Erste staatlich determinierte Überlegungen zum Auffinden und zur Förderung überdurchschnittlich befähigter Kinder sind, wie aus dem Lebensbericht des deutschen Physikochemikers und Nobelpreisträgers Wilhelm Ostwald (1853-1932) hervorgeht, von der Unterrichtsverwaltung

der damaligen japanischen Regierung gestellt und an ihn herangetragen worden. "Während meiner Professorenzeit", erinnerte sich Ostwald,

> "richtete einmal einer meiner japanischen Schüler im Auftrage seiner heimischen Unterrichtsverwaltung die Frage an mich, wie man künftige ausgezeichnete Leute recht frühzeitig erkennen könne. Auf meine etwas verwunderte Gegenfrage, wozu man das wissen wolle, erhielt ich die Antwort, dass es sich um eine höchst praktische Angelegenheit handele. Es waren bedeutende Summen von der Regierung ausgewiesen, um insbesondere aus den ärmeren Schichten der Bevölkerung solche Individuen ausfindig zu machen und zu entwickeln, von denen man später erhebliche Leistungen, also auch einen entsprechenden Nutzen für ihr Vaterland erwarten können. Nun war man eben daran, die Grundsätze festzustellen, nach denen diese Summen verwendet werden sollten, und hierbei war das erwähnte Problem entstanden."13

In Europa selbst begann sich erst mit dem Beginn des ersten Weltkrieges diese Situation grundsätzlich zu verändern, denn wenige Jahre vorher war Alfred Binet (1857-1911) noch von der genau entgegengesetzten staatlichen Aufgabenstellung ausgegangen. Er sollte eine schulpolitisch praktikable Differenzierung im unteren Intelligenzbereich erreichen, was ihm mit dem Stufentests der Intelligenz auch gelang.

Für das Begabungsproblem wurde eine Konferenz proklamatisch, deren Beiträge W. Petersen unter dem programmatischen Titel "Der Aufstieg der Begabten" 1916 in Deutschland publizierte. Der deutsche Psychologe William Stern (1871-1938) hielt hier einen Vortrag, der mit der Orientierung auf die Ausarbeitung wissenschaftlich begründeter Gesellschaftsstrategien wohl als der Beginn der modernen Begabungsforschung und -förderung anzusehen ist. In ihm erklärte er

> "Wir kennen recht genau die Vorkommen aller möglichen Rohstoffe in unserem deutschen Vaterland nach Menge, Art und Verteilung und verwenden diese Kenntnisse auf Schritt und Tritt zur Sicherung und Förderung unseres materiellen Daseins. Aber von der Grösse und Art unseres Schatzes an geistigen Rohstoffen - das sind die Begabungen - wissen wir noch beschämend wenig; und doch ist diese Kenntnis nicht weniger wichtig als die der materiellen Hilfsmittel. Die weltgeschichtlichen Umwälzungen der Gegenwart haben uns plötzlig dies Bedürfnis zu Bewusstsein gebracht; denn wir wissen jetzt, dass wir Menschen-Ökonomie treiben müssen. Die richtige, d.h. den Fähigkeiten entsprechende Verteilung der Menschen auf die Beruf, die Verwertung jeder Begabung an derjenigen Stelle des nationalen Schaffenprozesses, an der sie ihr Bestes leisten kann, andererseits die Verhinderung schmerzhafter Talentverkümmerungen und falscher

> Berufswahlen - diese Aufgaben machen die pädagogische Frage der Tüchtigkeitsauslese zugleich zu einer sozial-ethischen und volkswirtschaftlichen von höchster Bedeutung. Für die deutsche Wissenschaft aber ergibt sich daraus die Forderung, die Erkenntnis jenes geistigen Nationalschatzes an Begabungen in die Wege zu leiten und für die pädagogischen und Berufseignungsfragen nutzbar zu machen."[14]

Wenige Jahre später begann Lewis M. Terman seine monumentale Hochbegabtenuntersuchung in Kalifornien, deren Ergebnisse in den Bänden 2-5 des Werkes **Genetic studies of Genius** veröffentlicht wurden. Diese Forschung kann zugleich als der eigentliche Beginn der wissenschaftlichen Persönlichkeitsforschung Hochbegabter über ihre gesamte Lebensspanne angesehen werden.

Notes

1. C. Levi-Strauss (1985, S. 284-292).
2. Ebenda, S. 286.
3. Ebenda, S. 286-287.
4. Ebenda.
5. K.K. Urban (1982, S. 17-20; 1984, S. 1-3).
6. J.S. Renzulli (1985, S. 1).
7. Zitiert nach K.K. Urban (1982, S. 18).
8. Zitiert nach Geschichte der Erziehung (1960, S. 146).
9. Den Hinweis auf J. Huarte verdanke ich Dr. Siegfried Jäger.
10. E. Schultheiss (1959, S. 1449).
11. M. de Iriatre (1938, S. 195).
12. Ebenda, S. 197.
13. W. Ostwald (1919, S. 1).
14. W. Stern (1916, S. 105/106).

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EMMINENT AUTHORS IN PSYCHOLOGY
A QUANTITATIVE APPROACH THROUGH SEVEN JOURNALS

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Summary
A historical approach to scientific literature that takes the bibliometric approach as a tool for its work has great possibilities for determining the distribution of emminence among the great number of researchers that have made significant contributions to psychology. This approach needs to be directed to a cross-cultural methodology, as the significance of national trends should not be overlooked. The present paper intends to offer a brief overview of some of the possibilities included in such an approach for the historian of science.

Normal scientific progress in a field is always achieved through the cumulation of knowledge, in which new ideas are added to the previously accepted ones. This does not mean any rejection of the Kuhnian theory of revolutions in science. But, once a paradigm is established, the exploration of the field has an additive character. In this process, bibliographic references serve as an explicit nexus between old and recent works, and offer unambiguous information about those relevant authors and works that are taken as basis for research.

The study of citations in scientific papers has been considered as a valid method for determining many social dimensions of their own field. As Cronin aptly says, "metaphorically speaking, citations are frozen footprints on the landscape of scholarly achievement, footprints which bear witness to the passage of ideas" (Cronin, 1984, 25). One of these social dimensions is the stratification of scientists, and the consolidation of some groups of emminent authors in a field (Garfield, 1979; Carpintero y Peiró, 1983). As Cole et al. have suggested, "the stratification system of science operates to preserve

consensus" (Cole et al., 1978, 213)), and to maintain the paradigmatic theory around which that consensus coalesces.

Each bibliographic reference clearly establishes a common dimension to be found between two peices of work, the citing one and the cited one, and the group of references appearing in a paper give the "minimal context" that has to be taken into account for an adequate explanation of the citing work. When a network of citations constitutes a field, its core literature serving as basis for research is detected, and the paradigmatic acceptance for some ideas in the scientific community may be delineated with some accuracy.

Journals are the normal channels for disseminating scientific information. They mainly serve formal communication in science, and their editorial policies are normally guided by the interests and dominant outlooks sustained by the scientific community they are serving. As Garvey wrote, "the scientific article ... is the basic unit of the scientific journal process which provides a system for formal, public, and orderly communication among scientists" (Garvey, 1979, 69), and so it becomes central for a knowledge that has to be public and open to every man taken as a rational subject.

A study of seven psychological journals

In a previous paper, we offered some results of a study about emminent authors in American psychology, through the analysis of citations in papers published in three American journals: **American Journal of Psychology**, **Psychological Review** and **Psychological Bulletin**, since their foundation till 1945 (Carpintero et al. 1983).

Here we try to add new pieces of information in the same line, as we have broadened the area of study to other journals and countries. The added journals are the **Journal of Experimental Psychology** (also a USA journal), two British publications (**Mind**, and **British Journal of Psychology**), and the French **L'Année Psychologique** - all of them till the end of World War II.

Mind is the oldest journal included in our sample. It should be considered partly as a psychological, and partly as a philosophical publication. Founded in 1876 by the great British associationist Alexander Bain, also its owner, the journal initially focused upon the problems of the philosophy of mind, and stood quite close to the main topics worked out by the British associationists. Its first editor, the philosopher G.C. Robertson, a Bain disciple, was charged

with the task between 1876 and 1891. After that, the editor was a psychologist: it was G.F. Stout, who took care of the journal between 1892 and 1920. In the same year, the newly created "Mind Association" took ownership of the publication, and some well known psychologists as Titchener and Ward were invited to join the editorial board. In more recent times, a philosopher, G.E. Moore, edited the journal, also with the assistance of Sir F.C. Bartlett. **Mind** seems to have turned to be more a philosophical magazine after the foundation of the **British Journal of Psychology**, in 1904, but nonetheless the theoretical topics on the philosophy of mind and the basic psychological questions have not disappeared at all from its pages. It is possible to find in it many significant papers from Wundt, Cattell, Hall, Ribot, Binet, Baldwin, Titchener, McDougall, Helmholtz or James.

The **British Journal of Psychology**, as it has been said, was founded in 1904 by two well-known scientists, psychologist J. Ward and anthropologist W.H.R. Rivers. Their purpose was to give informative coverage to all the branches of scientific psychology. Among the members of its editorial board were C.S. Myers, McDougall, Sherrington and Spearman. When Myers finally succeeded Ward as editor, in 1910, with the assistance of Brown, Yule and Watt, the journal clearly turned upon the experimental questions. A few years later, the publication became the organ of the British Psychological Society (1914). Since 1924, the editorial tasks were held by Sir F.C. Bartlett. Some topics received special coverage in its pages, specially those related with the experimental and correlational study of the psychological processes, methodological questions, and some lines of applied theory to the fields of education, organizations and clinical settings. The journal mainly included works from British psychologists; among its outstanding contributors we may notice the names of Thomson, Pear, Spearmen, Myers, McDougall, Vernon, Zangwill, Thoules, Brown or Watt.

L'Année Psychologique was founded in 1894 by H. Beaunis and Alfred Binet, also helped by T. Ribot and V. Henri. It is possible to establish two clearly differentiated epochs in its history, according to its respective editors; Binet was the first one, succeeded by Piéron. Binet was mainly interested in introducing to the journal his own experimental work, done with his collaborators in his own laboratory, and also including bibliographic reviews dealing with many

different psychological topics. In this first period we may consider as outstanding authors, besides Binet himself, Bourdon, Beaunis, Simon, Larguier des Bancels, Ribot, Flournoy, Claparède and H.C. Warren. After Binet's death, Piéron took charge as editor (1913), and a new group of researchers and scientists seems to have dominated the journal: Dumas, Blondel, Guillaume, Fessard, Fraisse, Lahy, Meyerson and Zazzo. Now experimental sensory psychology, psychophysiology, comparative psychology, and applied psychology, became the main topics in its pages. Among its highly productive authors, besides its editors, were also Simon, Vaschide, Henri, Bourdon and Féré - in the first epoch -, and Durup, Fessard, Foucault or Lahy - in the last one.

We turn now to the American scene. Its oldest journal **American Journal of Psychology**, was founded in 1887 by G.S. Hall. His purpose was to make experimental laboratory research known and to broaden the communication channels for American psychology, then forced to appear in European publications like **Mind** or **Philosophische Studien**. Probably as a consequence of the appearance of a new journal, the **Psychological Review**, Hall included the names of E.B. Titchener and E.C. Sanford as editors in his enterprise, also accompanied by various foreign advisers, as Beaunis, Delboeuf, Henri, Külpe, Waller ... Titchener's influence was continuously growing, and he became the only editor of the journal, in 1920, after Dallenbach had got the property of the magazine. Five years later he gave up in that office, and four of his former disciples were charged with the editorial responsabilities: E.G. Boring, M.I. Bentley, M. Washburn and Dallenbach himself; around them there was a large editorial board, under whose influence the journal opened its pages to a large number of topics, always maintaining the experimental approach to them, and paying great attention to instrumentation and methodological questions. Among the vast list of its contributors we may refer here to some of the most prolific and well known authors: Titchener, Sanford, Hall, McGeoch, Helson, Thorndike, Stevens, Jacobson, Hunt and Fernberger.

The **Psychological Review** appeared in 1894, as a result of the growing difficulties and misunderstandings that filled the relationship between G.S. Hall and his colleagues. J. McKeen Cattell and J.M. Baldwin finally decided to establish a new journal which from its birth became the main communication channel for American

functionalism, while its rival was mainly occupied with structuralistic theories. The new publication included papers dealing with laboratory research, review articles and more theoretical works. As the years passed by, many changes took place. Cattell gave up as editor and went away, substituted by Warren, in 1904; some years later, as a result of a personal wrangle, Baldwin was forced to leave the academic stage and sold his rights on the journal to Warren. For some years, J.B. Watson acted as editor (1909-15) till the foundation of the **Journal of Experimental Psychology**, the moment in which Warren oriented the **Psychological Review** in a more theoretical and conceptual sense. Broad methodological questions, historical studies and discussions on basic issues of psychology filled the pages of the journal. When H.S. Langfeld was in charge as editor, since 1934, he was able to maintain the same policy. As a result of these efforts, the journal offered a considerable amount of work due to some of the most famous American psychologists of those years, as H. Carr, J. Angell, E.L. Thorndike, E.C. Tolman, C.L. Hull, R.S. Woodworth, E.G. Boring, L.L. Thurstone, H. Münsterberg and K. Dunlap, among others.

From **Psychological Review** two other journal sprang: the **Journal of Experimental Psychology** and the **Psychological Bulletin** both included in our study.

The **Journal of Experimental Psychology**, founded by Warren in 1916, was created to give place to the growing laboratory works, and to offer descriptions and information about new instruments for psychological research. Watson (1916-25), stressed publishing works on experimental and physiological questions. Some years later, it was sold to the American Psychological Association, and its new editor, S. Fernberger, aptly managed the journal in order to become the true organ of expression of American experimental psychology in the thirties. Specially oriented to 'hard' scientific psychology, among its outstanding authors are to be included S.H. Bartley, H. Cason, R.C. Davis, C. Ferree, C.I. Hovland, J.A. McGeoch, H. Schlossberg, E.L. Thorndike and many others.

The **Psychological Bulletin** had appeared in 1904 as the "Literary section" of the **Psychological Review**. Its aims were to offer critical reviews and detailed information of bibliographic and professional questions. Baldwin and Warren were its first editors, also helped by authors such as Judd, Watson, Meyer and Dodge. Soon after the departure of Baldwin from the group, S.I. Franz was editor for some years

(1914-23), followed by Fernberger (1924-30), Robinson (1930-34), McGeoch (1935-42) and J.E. Anderson (1942-). Detailed reviews of different fields are offered through its pages; among the topics presented, comparative and social psychology, testing, educational and child psychology and psychopathology, sensory psychology and psychophysiology, are well established. As highly productive contributors should be mentioned H.C. Warren, R.M. Ogden, H.S. Langfeld, E.G. Boring, S.I. Franz, J.A. McGeoch, among others.

It is noteworthy that these psychological journals seem to act as channels of various sorts, if we consider their different ways of treating information. In our study, some dimensions have been taken into account (see Table 1). First, all the references included in their articles were recorded, and a data file was formed with them. It clearly appears that these journals have approached scientific communication according to different lines.

There is a journal that more than doubles the following one in number of references: **Psychological Bulletin** offers 52.356 references, that is, a 41,1% of all the references included in the seven journals. There are three others that seem to be placed in a medium level: **American Journal of Psychology**, with 23.448 references (18,4%); **Psychological Review**, with 15.274 (11,99%), and **Journal of Experimental Psychology**, with 14.998 (11,77%). At a lower level we have the three remaining journals: **L'Année Psychologique**, with 7.472 references (5,86%); **British Journal of Psychology**, with 7.169 (5,62%) and **Mind** with 6.673 (5,23%).

The great volume of references in **Psychological Bulletin** is clearly a consequence of its status as a review journal. Many of its papers included an average of 40 references, which is normal for review articles offering a broad bibliographic perspective on a certain topic. The low average of references per article in **Mind** is partly due to the fact that many of its papers (more than 35%) do not include any bibliographic citation at all, which is a more common habit in philosophical authors than in scientific authors. All these data considered, it seems that the psychological published paper, as an average, includes around 10 references, a well established trait in psychological periodical literature (Carpintero, 1981). As Price rightly noted some years ago, papers with large number of references are normally dedicated to review recent literature, to be compared against the 'ex-cathedra' articles, that frequently offer the

personal opinions of well-known authors, with only a few, if any, citations at all in them (Price, 1970).

But, at the same time, these journals also present some common traits, that could be taken as indicators of a deep-level structure of scientific habits, well rooted in our scientific communities. These journals seem to concentrate their references upon a small nucleus of well-known authors, that are cited at a high rate. Here we find the previously mentioned fact of stratification in science, and the differential 'visibility' of the authors working in the field. It is well known that, when the field under study is well defined and adequate, the number of citations received in it by each author is taken as a rough indicator of the impact of his work among the scientific community working in that field.

Highly cited authors in the journals

We have taken into account for our study the 20 most cited authors in each journal, forming a final set of 103 different names. Some of them appear highly cited by two or more journals (N=23, that is, a 22,4%) (see Table 2), but the great majority seem to be restricted in their emminence to one specific journal. These data are in accordance with the findings of Lawler and Lawler (1965), among others, that have found a high degree of specificity in citations in our field. It seems that in psychology there is not a well established group of names that could be taken as the "core" tradition of the discipline, and a variety of frames of reference coexist for psychologists working on different topics, not totally separated between them.

It is interesting to see the particular trends that seem to dominate in these journals, as inferred from their most cited authors.

Now we turn to the British journal **Mind**. As we said before, it should be considered as partly psychological, and partly a philosophical one. Initially interested in the problems of the new experimental psychology, it gradually changed its editorial line centering around philosophy. Its most cited author, the philosopher Francis Herbert Bradley, nearly duplicates in number of citations the following one, the psychologist (but also philosopher) William James (253 references to the former, as compaired with 157 to the later). The journal presents as "visible" authors in the first period, besides Kant and

Hegel, some "functional classic authors", that is, living and producing authors that influence the dominant views of their contemporaries, and whose weight is well atested through the high volume of citations, evoked by their works. Among these classics we shall mention the philosophers Bradley, Schiller, Taylor, the associationists Mill, Bain, and Spencer, and English act-psychologists Ward and Stout; the only foreign psychologists to be detected here are Wundt (whose importance to philosophy should not be overlooked), and James, also a man placed between philosophy and psychology. In the second period Plato and Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Berkeley and Hume are highly visible authors, as well as contemporary philosophers like Bosanquet, Moore and Russell. The high visibility of these psychologists seem to be based on the frequent citation of some of their general handbooks. That is the case for Wundt's **Grundzüge der Physiologischen Psychologie**, James' **Principles of Psychology** and **Psychology: Briefer Course**, Stout's **Analytic Psychology** and **Text-book of Psychology**, Ward's article in the **Encyclopaedia Britannica**, and Lotze's **Medizinische Psychologie**.

As compared with **Mind**, the **British Journal of Psychology**, since its very beginnings, clearly offered an experimentalistic approach to psychological questions. Here also the national influence seems to dominate the citation trends: more than a half of the highly cited names are English-born people; foreign authors appearing here belong to a top-level rank of emminence. We find here German figures as Gestalt thinkers Koffka and Köhler, and the founder of psychoanalysis S. Freud; French experimentalist Binet, and American connexionist Thorndike (mainly through the influence of his **Educational Psychology**). Among the British psychologists we find clearly represented their correlational and factorialist tradition in the study of intelligence, by the names of Spearman, Burt, Thomson, Brown and Stephenson; the multivariate approach to the problems of intelligence and personality, with R.B. Cattell; psychometric research - Garnet and Pearson -; the systematic and more philosophical approach, represented by G.F. Stout, the experimental psychology (Titchener, McDougall, Myers, Bartlett, Watt, Pear); neuropathology (Head), or anthropology (Rivers). It appears as a strong tradition, well centered on cognitive processes, with a particularly well-suited quantitative methodology for the approach to the psychological questions.

L'Année Psychologique, offers an image of psychology built on French names and materials. Headed by Binet and Piéron, the successive editors of the journal, the list of highly cited authors includes only European figures, mainly from the French tradition, and in many cases related to psychophysiological matters. Here we find the Swiss functionalist E. Claparède, interested in educational and child psychology; C. Spearman; psychophysiologists and experimentalists such as Piéron, Bourdon, Adrian, Lapicque, Hecht, Durup, Charpentier, Kiesow, Marinesco and Müller; psychopathologists as Ribot, Janet, Feré or Broca; applied industrial psychologists, such as Joteyko and Treves, and comparative psychologists such as Bohn. Citation analysis also brings us the echoes of an old debate, about supposedly existent N-radiation, that a French physicist claimed to have discovered, against whom Piéron fought a decisive scientific battle. Far away from the conventional historical picture of the past that dominates scholarly text-books, the image that emerges from this journal is of a variety of national traditions, a fact also detected in the case of the British publications.

If we turn to American journals, the obtained image is not the same as that coming from the European ones. The **American Journal of Psychology**, founded by G. Stanley Hall in 1887, seems to present in a relevant position the work of well-known experimentalists, that could be included in one of the two following categories: the German tradition, and the Titchenerian structuralism carried out mainly in Cornell University, the center of Titchener's scientific empire.

In its pages the great significance of the European tradition to the journal is evident. Eleven of the 20 most cited authors here are European-born scientists, and eight of them are German authors. Titchener is at the head of the list, only surpassed by his master Wundt, far ahead of the rest of the authors. Here we find well represented the tradition of the experimental study of the senses (Helmholtz and Stumpf), memory (Ebbinghaus) and thinking (Külpe); Gestaltists (Köhler and Koffka) and French experimentalist (A. Binet); but it also includes the founder of psychoanalysis, Freud, whose relevance for psychology was stressed by G.S. Hall, the founder of the journal. The American group of authors includes James, Thorndike, Fernberger (highly cited for his papers on psychophysical questions), the founder of the journal G.S. Hall, and a nucleus of

authors closely related to Titchener like Washburn, Bentley, Boring, Dallenbach and Calkins.

For its part, **Psychological Bulletin** only includes well-known names pertaining to the American tradition - with the exception of Pavlov -, and a large room is given to those psychologists that have undertaken research in areas like learning, mental testing and educational psychology: Thorndike, Watson, Gates, Hull, Lashley, Peterson, McGeoch and Thurstone, Pintner, Wells, Terman, may be grouped under the heading of tests and psychometrics. There are also experimentalists like Hollingworth, Dunlap, Boring (highly cited for his work on sensory psychophysics), comparative psychologists as Yerkes and Hunter, and developmental psychologists as Lehman and Gessell. These data are well fitted with the general purpose of the journal, founded to focus on reports and reviews, and offering a critical panorama of current research carried out in various fields.

A similar picture may be obtained from the **Journal of Experimental Psychology**, also centered upon American psychology, with the inclusion of Pavlov as the only foreign name to enter in the top of the list. Here we find people dedicated to learning placed among the cited authors, in accordance with the experimental bias that has dominated the journal since its foundation in 1916: Hull, Tolman, Skinner, Lashley, Dodge, Razran, Cason, McGeoch, Hilgard, Hovland. There are also experimentalists more oriented to sensory psychology, like Ferree, and Fernberger; and towards the applied psychophysiology, such as Freeman, Travis, Bills or Darrow; neurophysiologists like Jasper (perhaps also Lashley should be placed here), or such a classic of experimental psychology as R.S. Woodworth, whose text-book is an epoch-making work.

The last journal to be considered here, **The Psychological Review**, (founded in 1894, by Baldwin and J. McKeen Cattell) seems to include among the most cited authors the names that could best serve to represent to various psychological schools that dominated the American arena in the first half of our century: structuralists, Wundt and Titchener; functionalists, James, Dewey, Baldwin and Carr, gestaltists, Köhler, Koffka and Lewin; behaviorists Watson, Hull and Tolman; conexionists, Thorndike; factorialists, Spearman, learning theorists, Dodge and Dunlap; hormic psychologists, McDougall, experimentalists Woodworth and Boring ... It could be said that this

journal gives psychology the picture that best fits with the normal account offered by historians of the discipline, from an American perspective. A parallel image could perhaps be obtained from the well-known collective works edited by Murchison on the "systems of psychology" in 1925 and 1930, respectively.

Some comments on national trends in psychology

This cursory review of the various names appearing in the different journals here puts under a new light the old question of "national psychologies". At least, it seems that, according to our data, it is possible to affirm the dominance of "domestic authors", and the limited attention paid to the foreign ones in these journals. A century ago, Ribot could speak of two existing lines in psychology, the English and the German, and he could also characterize both lines with differential traits. He mainly suggested that the English tradition appeared more oriented to the naturalistic description of the mental processes, that are taken as associative phenomena well related to antecedent conditions and to some physical consequences. The German tradition, for its part, focuses on the explanation of the psychical processes, from a psychophysiological basis. This simple picture emerges from his well-known books, **La psychologie anglaise contemporaine**, and **La psychologie allemande contemporaine**, whose titles clearly make the point. After that, the ideal of a universal science, not country-bounded in any aspect, has obscured from time to time the real consistence of national trends in research and theorizing, but, at least as referred to most visible authors in the field, we seem to be forced to admit the existence of those "national trends" in psychology. This is a fact that seems well established through our data, that show the dominance of French psychologists in **L'Année Psychologique**, of British psychologists in the **British Journal of Psychology**, and American authors in the **Psychological Bulletin** and **Journal of Experimental Psychology**. It is clear that there has also been some efforts in order to get a broader view, as those represented by the **Psychological Review**, but perhaps this should be taken as the exception rather than the normal case. It is a well-known fact that the dominant view in American text-books on the history of psychology are mainly centered upon their own past, paying only reduced attention to other national traditions. As Hebb wrote some years ago, "to a great extent, American psychology today is

psychology" (Hebb, 1960,735), and, without denying that, it is also true that this assertion must be contrasted with an adequate recognition of different national traditions in contemporary psychology. Now we will turn to the consideration of the common dimension that may be discovered under all these journals, from the citation data of their most cited authors.

First, it is noteworthy that only two men appear as highly cited in the three countries: France, Great Britain and U.S.A. These are Binet and Spearman. Both names clearly determine a line that could be characterized by mental testing and the study and measurement of intelligence and abilities in man. This fact perhaps could be thought of as indicating that an "international" psychology could be identical with these topics, that are not only of theoretical but also of practical significance in the historical development of scientific psychology.

Another interesting point is the great relevance that should be given to Thorndikian psychology, according to our data. If not in the first place by the mere number of citations received, he is the only author that appears highly cited in five of the seven journals (only excepting **Mind** and **L'Année Psychologique**). Some reasons could be taken into account for explaining this: his work greatly enforced objective research in the field of learning, and his "law of effect" has been for years a basic reference point for theoreticians and practitioners of psychology, but, at the same time, his fundamental treatises on educational psychology gave broad support to a large amount of research in that applied field. His works have received great attention from those interested in animal behavior as well as from those more oriented towards the problems of the human mind.

The names obtained from the journals certainly include those of the leaders of the main psychological schools as delineated in many historical presentations of our discipline. And, among the common names, a large representation of American psychology may be detected (12 of 23 names, 52.17% of the whole group), as compared with the names coming from other traditions (5 from Great Britain, 4 from Germany, 1 from Russia and 1 from France).

When compared with a standard of emminence, say the Annin-Boring-Watson list (Brozek & Evans, 1977), it clearly appears that there is only a partial coincidence between these two groups of names, that of the list and that coming from the study of the

journals. All the 23 common names found in the journals are included in the list (excepted Boring, one of the authors that prepared the list, and in an understandable manner was not included in it), but not all are considered as deserving the highest level of emminence. We find that 16 of them are placed in the top rank (rank 27), 1 in rank 26, 1 in 24, 1 in 22, 2 in 20 and 1 in 18.

Contrariwise, when we compare the 53 authors placed in the top rank of the mentioned list with our data, it may be seen that more than a half of that group do not appear among our 23 common visible authors, and 20 of them are not even included among the 103 most cited authors in the seven journals. This is a datum to be taken into account when dealing with problems of indicators of emminence, as it reveals that evaluations through juries are not giving the same picture as that resulting from evaluation through real presence by citation in bibliographic references.

Temporal evolution of visibility: some examples

The assessment of the impact obtained by an author or a work in a scientific field through a citation analysis is not restricted to a mere quantitative dimension. It also paves the way for a study of the temporal evolution of that impact. The changing volume of citation evoked by an author, year after year, gives interesting information not only about the 'level' or 'degree' of emminence, but also about the 'profile' of his influence across time. Some interesting cases are presented in what follows.

First of all, it is possible to study the trends of citation to Wundt's works in two similar journals, **American Journal of Psychology** and **Psychological Review**, that really seem to offer very similar profiles. In the first one he continuously received about 8 citations per year, with great peaks appearing between 1908 and 1913. These are in fact due to some review articles on Wundt's works written by E.B. Titchener and his collaborators, that introduced some artificial distortion in his profile. Since 1926, the tendency seems to decrease to an average of 2 citations per year, a fact to be related with the moment in which Titchener left the journal. In the second journal, the total number of citations received by his works is smaller than in the previous one, but here there also appears a certain stability, with an average of 3 or 4 references per year till 1930, and sporadic citations after that time. It is clear from these data that the

attention paid to Wundt in these journals seems to have risen after the moment in which the English translation of his **Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology** (1894) appeared, and turned down around 1930, with the advent of the Era of the Schools in the United States (fig. 1).

Several journals testify to the continuous influence of William James along the years. We may consider the citations he received in the **American Journal of Psychology** and in **Psychological Review** (fig. 2). In the first journal he got nearly 5 citations per year before 1930, and around 2 after that moment; a first peak appears soon after the publication of his **Principles of Psychology** (1890), and a second one after James' death (1910), with two more peaks in the 1920's clearly related to detailed studies of his works. In the other journal, the visibility of James' works seems well established over the whole period, without any decrease in the 1930's, but here also some peaks that appear are supposedly correlated with the publication of James' textbooks, and also with his death.

The growing influence of E.L. Thorndike in two journals as presented here (fig. 3) may well illustrate the rising attention paid to learning in American psychology since the advent of behaviorism. The rising influence of his work after 1898 may be observed, the year in which his **Animal Intelligence** was published, that was maintained by his three books on **Educational Psychology** (1913-14), and the flow of continuous works in the following years. In **Psychological Bulletin** we see a sharp rise of the curve around 1933-34, due to some review articles on learning published by McGeoch.

The social dimensions of scientific impact, at least when evaluated from citation tendencies, are clearly seen from the profiles of two well-known psychologists, Alfred Binet and Henri Piéron, according to the mentions they received in the pages of the journal they edited one after the other (fig. 4). Piéron not only succeeded Binet in the editorial tasks in **L'Année Psychologique**, but he also replaced him as a reference point for psychologists publishing papers in that journal, as these profiles show. Binet's star clearly declined after his death, the moment in which the influence of Piéron began to rise.

It is clear that this kind of analysis offers great possibilities for the historian of psychology, as it enables him or her to

establish the lines of rising or decreasing influence of an author, a work or a theory, upon the scientific community. This does not mean that all citations should be taken directly at face value, but it is beyond doubt that the citation trends related to an author are valid if rough indicators of his or her intellectual and scientific fate across a certain period of time in a certain scientific community, and they should be taken as such. Needless to say, the use of such indicators always demands a deeper and detailed explanation, which is only to be obtained through the direct knowledge of the authors and their works.

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TABLE 1: A STUDY OF CITATION IN 7 PSYCHOLOGICAL JOURNALS

	YEARS	NUMBER CITATIONS	ARTICLES PUBLISHED	MEAN CITED. ARTICLE	NUMBER OF CITED ARTICLE	MEAN CITED AUTHORS	NUMBER OF MOST CITED AUTHORS	MEAN CITATION TO MOST CITED AUTHORS
AJP	1887-1945	23.448	2.196	10,67	6.635	3,53	65	88,17
PB	1904-1945	52.356	1.456	35,95	15.506	3,37	248	52,8
PR	1894-1945	15.274	1.571	9,72	3.532	4,32	40	93,0
JEP	1916-1945	14.998	1.596	9,39	3.660	4,09	35	85,26
BJP	1904-1945	7.159	867	8,25	2.360	3,03	22	64,82
M	1876-1945	6.673	1.643	4,06	1.731	3,85	16	104,06
L'AP	1894-1945	7.472	566	3,20	2.806	2,66	66	29,15

TABLE 2: MOST CITED AUTHORS IN 7 PSYCHOLOGICAL JOURNALS

AUTHORS	AJP	PB	PR	JEP	BJP	MIND	L'AP	TOTAL	%
THORNDIKE	X	X	X	X	X			728	9,7
TITCHENER	X	X	X		X			783	10,4
HULL		X	X	X				464	6,1
LASHLEY		X	X	X				315	4,2
BORING	X	X	X					304	4,1
SPEARMAN			X		X		X	317	4,2
WUNDT	X		X			X		807	10,7
JAMES	X		X			X		481	6,4
KOEHLER	X		X		X		X	259	3,4
BINET	X				X			232	3,1
PAVLOV		X		X			X	183	2,2
McGEOG		X		X				257	3,4
WATSON		X	X					318	4,2
DUNLAP		X	X					188	2,5
McDOUGALL			X		X			317	4,2
KOFFKA	X		X					208	2,7
TOLMAN			X	X				252	3,3
WOODWORTH			X	X				182	2,4
DODGE			X	X				265	3,5
FERNBERGER	X			X				214	2,8
FREUD	X				X			113	1,5
WARD	X					X		133	1,7
STOUT					X	X		166	2,2

TABLE 3: MOST CITED AUTHORS IN THE JOURNALS

AJP	PR	PB	JEP	MIND	BJP	L'AP
WUNDT 593	THORNDIKE 191	THORNDIKE 228	HULL 197	BRADLEY 253	SPEARMAN 192	PIERON 289
TITCHENER 547	TITCHENER 186	WATSON 157	DODGE 175	JAMES 157	McDOUGALL 167	BINET 198
WASHBURN 261	TOLMAN 180	GATES 137	HILGARD 172	RUSSELL 148	BURT 121	CARPENTIER 64
JAMES 156	JAMES 168	THURSTONE 137	THORNDIKE 142	STOUT 121	THOMSON 77	FERE 60
BORING 153	WATSON 161	PITNER 136	McGEOGH 131	KANT 120	THORNDIKE 76	ADRIAN 41
BENTLEY 137	HULL 151	YERKES 133	HOVLAND 127	BOSANQUET 105	MEYERS 74	BOHN 41
HALL 129	McDOUGALL 150	McGEOGH 126	FREEMAN 126	PLATON 102	RIVERS 72	SPEARMAN 41
KOEHLER 118	WUNDT 125	LASHLEY 124	TRAVIS 113	WUNDT 89	BARTLETT 68	CLAPAREDE 39
FERNBERGER 110	BALDWIN 125	PETERSON 124	CASON H. 101	SCHILLER 87	BROWN W. 64	HENRI 35
DALLENBACH 108	LASHLEY 120	HOLLINGWORTH 123	RARZRAN 95	ARISTOTELES 78	PEAR 45	LAPIQUE 35
KOFFKA 107	KOEHLER 106	HUNTER 120	FERREE 93	HUME 69	STOUT 45	HECHT 34
EBBINGHAUS 105	WOORDWORTH 102	HULL 116	PAVLOV 84	BERKELEY 67	HEAD 45	KIESOW 31
STUMPF 97	LEWIN 106	DUNLAP 113	WOODWORTH 80	HEGEL 65	STEPHENS 45	BLONDLOT 26
BINET 94	KOFFKA 101	WELLS 110	DARROW CH 75	SPINOZA 63	FREUD 41	BROCA 26
THORNDIKE 91	BORING 96	LEHMAN 106	JASPER 74	TAYLOR 63	BINET 40	BOURDON 25
HELMHOLTZ 90	DODGE 90	TITCHENER 106	BILLS 74	DESCARTES 60	PEARSN 40	JANET 25
CALKINS 82	SPEARMAN 84	GESSELL 104	TOLMAN 72	SPENCER 52	GARNET 35	JOTEYKO 24
WARD 81	CARR 75	BORING 102	LASHLEY 71	MILL J.S. 48	TITCHENER 35	MUELLER G. 24
FREUD 78	DEWEY 75	TERMAN 100	FERNBERGER 63	BAIN 46	KOEHLER 35	DURUP 23
KUELPE 78	DUNLAP 75	PAVLOV 99	SKINNER 63	WARD 53	CATTELL R. 34	MARINESC. 23
					WATT 34	RIBOT 23
						TREVES 23

FIGURE 1: ANNUAL EVOLUTION OF REFERENCES TO W. WUNDT





FIGURE 2 ANNUAL EVOLUTION OF REFERENCES TO W. JAMES





FIGURE 3: ANNUAL EVOLUTION OF REFERENCES TO E.L. THORNDIKE





FIGURE 1 ANNUAL EVOLUTION OF REFERENCES TO BINET AND TO PIERON IN L'AP





AN OVERVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN HUNGARY

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Summary

The paper gives a brief overview of the historical development of social psychology in Hungary. The origins of Hungarian social psychology can be traced back to the early years of this century, when elements of a socio-psychological approach had been emerging in various fields: in sociology, in philosophy, and in psychoanalysis. Between the two world wars relevant social psychological issues were discussed in some branches of social sciences, in sociography, in legal and political theory, and in Marxist approaches to psychoanalysis. More professional social psychology started after 1945, especially in the works of Ferenc Mérei, the most influential modern Hungarian social psychologist. After 1949, however, all branches of psychology, including social psychology, were banned. A new opening for social psychology started in the sixties, when the newly emerged discipline had been modeled mainly on the current American theories and research principles and methods. The diversification of research interests, a gradual involvement of social psychologists in larger-scale social issues are relatively new developments.

The Historical Context

In the past few years there has been a considerable growth of interest in the history and sociology of psychological knowledge. Intensive studies have been published which examine the various historical and socio-cultural factors influencing the specific ways in which psychology has developed in Europe and in North America (see, e.g. Buss, 1979; Woodward and Ash, 1982). The examination of social psychology from this comparative perspective can be particularly fruitful and revealing, since scientific achievements in psychology are to a large extent determined by the historical and cultural milieu of a given society. In studying the historical and social roots and developments of social psychology, much attention has been devoted to the specific conditions which promoted the growth of social psychology in the United States as well as to the origins and

precedents of modern social psychology to be found in the intellectual life of such countries as France, Germany and Great Britain.

East European social psychology is on the margin of such interest. This is partly due to the fact that East European social psychology has emerged on the international scene only recently. Another reason for this 'marginality' is that scholars with an interest in the socio-historical problems of this discipline have - for political, linguistic and other reasons - limited access to relevant East European sources. Also, among social psychologists within East European countries, the predominant preoccupation is with the current development of the field, with relatively little interest in or attention paid to studying its roots and the various social, historical and political factors shaping its development.

In this account of Hungarian social psychology, I would like to point out some of the specific factors and conditions which characterize the development of the discipline in this country. While my emphasis is on the past, I will give a sketchy overview of the present state of Hungarian social psychology, too. While it is true that social psychology, as a separate academic discipline, is a late development (its organizational and educational basis, along with its research network began to take shape only in the sixties), it has certain long-standing traditions in the intellectual life of the country. These traditions go back to the beginning of the century.

The first discipline in which certain elements of a social psychology appeared was sociology. In the relatively liberal atmosphere of the period preceding the outbreak of the First World War, the radical, progressive intelligentsia turned to sociology, as a modern science of society, as opposed to the traditionalism and conservatism of official political and social doctrines. In their fight for a modern Hungary, they founded a Social Science Society (1900) and established the social science journal **Huszadik Század** ('Twentieth Century' - 1901) which rapidly became the center of all the new and stimulating social ideas imported from France, England and Germany. Discovering current Western social thought, they published texts by and wrote about Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, Gabriel Tarde, and Gustave Le Bon, among others. They also popularized evolutionary biology (Ch. Darwin) and the empirical psychology of the age. In the journal **Huszadik Század**, there were heated discussions on the role of psychology in explaining social phenomena:

'psychologizing' was strongly refuted by the followers of historical materialism. During this pre-war period, not only intellectual debates took place, but some empirical projects had been initiated as well. As early as 1913, responding to the call of the Chicago professor, William I. Thomas, to study the psychology of the European peasantry, Róbert Braun, a Hungarian social scientist, a member of a group of radical and progressivist social scientists, published a lengthy report on **The psychology of a village** (Braun, R., 1973). He elaborated a sociographic approach based on survey methods, similar to those applied by Marie Jahoda and her collaborators in their study of unemployment in an Austrian small town (Jahoda, Lazarsfeld, and Zeisel, 1933).

Another field where social psychological ideas evoked a response was philosophy. Modern philosophy in Hungary was born with the creation of the so-called 'Sunday Circle', founded by young neo-Kantians strongly interested in ethics, aesthetics and social philosophy. They were also influenced by outstanding figures of contemporary German thought, such as the social philosophers and 'proto-social psychologists', Georg Simmel and Max Weber. Although the most authorative figure of this circle, György Lukács (who later became the leading theoretician of modern Marxism), had few interests in and understanding of the problem of psychology, it was another member of the group, Karl Mannheim, who made - as a theoretician - significant contributions to social psychology. His fundamental ideas on the sociology of knowledge and on social psychology as a means of 'planning for democracy' (see Mannheim, 1959) had been worked out in his German, and later British, exile, but he got his fundamental intellectual impetus in his formative years in Budapest.

A third source of Hungarian social psychology can be traced back to psychoanalysis. Hungarian psychoanalysts - members of the 'Budapest school', such as Sándor Ferenczi, Mihály Bálint, Géza Róheim, Imre Hermann - are well known outside Hungary. It is important to point out, however, that Hungarian analysts were pioneering figures in the social applications of psychoanalytic insights. Freud's Hungarian disciples were closely related to the intellectual movements of the radical bourgeoisie. As a radical progressive of his age, Sándor Ferenczi drew far-reaching social and even political conclusions from Freudian doctrines. It was another Hungarian, the social philosopher, Aurél Kolnai, who did the first systematic

investigation on the relationship between sociology and psychoanalysis. His book **Psychoanalysis and Sociology** (published originally in German in 1919 and in English in 1921) recieved much attention in his time and played a significant role in later discussions on the relationship between psychoanalysis and Marxism. It is also important to mention the eminent ethnologist and psychoanalyst, Géza Róheim, whose investigations on primitive cultures had an immense influence on social and cultural anthropology (see Róheim, 1947). In his American exile, Róheim founded the series **Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences.**

One specific feature of the intellectual history of Hungary is that any of its outstanding representatives have been forced to emigrate. They have established an international reputation in exile while their native country has done everything to cast them off or to forget them. This was the fate of most of the people who did their share in developing social psychological thought in Hungary. After the failure of the revolutions in 1918-19 thousands of progressive intellectuals left the country with social sciences, suffering consequently a major setback. In het thirties, however, a new intellectual climate began to flourish, along with some interesting developments in the history of social psychology.

First, there was the sociographic movement of the Hungarian populists, which showed - however unsystematically - the significance of psychological factors in the reproduction of misery among rural population. Their explanation led, however, in some cases, to a fascist or semi-fascist racial mythology; they sometimes operated with concepts such as 'national or racial psyche'. The main target became the urban Jewish middle class, which - according to some populists - 'usurped' economic power and 'poisoned' the 'pure Hungarian blood'.

In 1935, the aforementioned Róbert Braun's son, Soma Braun, published a book entitled **Social Psychology** (Braun, S., 1935). He was a leading theorist of the Social Democratic Party of Hungary. Though he was not a professional social psychologist, his book was the first attempt in Hungary to summarize contemporary knowledge in social psychology (based on the works of McDougall, Floyd H. Allport and other American social psychologists). He also made interesting contributions to the psychology of fascism.

In the thirties, socio-psychological problems were also discussed in Marxist circles. It was the leftist Freudian who participated in these discussions most actively. They popularized psychoanalytic social psychology (Erich Fromm) and Freudo-Marxism (Wilhelm Reich, Siegfried Bernfeld, Otto Fenichel). The Reichian interpretation of the mass psychology of fascism had a particularly great influence on some leftist intellectuals. They were, however, soon declared 'deviants' and 'renegades', as the official Communist Party standpoint became more and more hostile to Freudo-Marxism and to psychoanalysis in general. The most outstanding theoretician of Hungarian Freudo-Marxism was one of the most famous poets of this age, Attila József (1905-1937), who was expelled from the Communist Party and some years later committed suicide (see Erós, 1983b). It was another Marxist, György Donáth, who wrote one of the most remarkable socio-psychological essays before the second World War in Hungary. His book - the title of which can be translated as **Social Bases of the Magical and Logical World View** (Donáth, 1940) - attempted to analyze the relationship between the structure of society and various forms of thinking and mentality, offering a Marxist interpretation of the theories of the French School (Durkheim, Lévy-Bruhl) and of the psychoanalytic theories of thinking.

Another important figure in the 'prehistory' of Hungarian social psychology was a legal and political scientist, István Bibó (1911-1978). He exerted great influence on Hungarian political thinking, primarily because, after the war, he proposed a democratic model for the development of Hungarian society, in order to avoid the extremities of both capitalism and Soviet-type socialism. In his writings, he showed a keen understanding of psychological factors in historical and social processes. He employed the concept of 'collective hysteria' in his 1942 analysis of the rise and nature of German national socialism. After the war, in 1948, he published a powerful essay on anti-semitism and the 'Jewish question' in Hungary. In this work Bibó treated 'intergroup conflicts' between Jews and non-Jews in terms of mutual experiences of each other and finds the explanation of the anti-semitism and the destruction of the Hungarian Jewish community in the historical aberrations of Hungary's modern social development and in the consequent pathologization of the national communities. A collection of his essays was published in Hungary only recently (Bibó, 1986).

Post Second World War Period

In 1945, when Hungary was liberated from German occupation, new chances for a democratic reorganization of the Hungarian society emerged. Democratically-oriented social scientists, among them psychologists, became active in contributing to the process of planning or creating a new society. Psychologists were particularly interested in two problems: in explaining Fascist mass murders and the moral degradation of large segments of the population in 1944, when Hungarian Jews were deported to German concentration camps; and in the moral and political 're-education' of the population. A leading psychoanalyst, Imre Hermann, published a book on **The Psychology of Anti-semitism** (Hermann, 1945), and the sociologist Sándor Szalai employed socio-psychological factors in his work **Social Science and Social Reality** (Szalai, 1946).

It was in this post-war period, that the 'great old man' of Hungarian psychology, Ferenc Mérei (1909-1986) embarked on his career as a social psychologist. He was the first professional social psychologist in Hungary, although the scope of his interests was much wider: child psychology, clinical psychology, psychology of literature, etc. A student of the famous child psychologist Henri Wallon in Paris before the war, Mérei, became one of the most important people in the reorganization of the Hungarian system of education after 1945. He was one of the spiritual leaders of the movement of the so-called 'people's colleges' (NEKOSZ), a militant leftist youth movement, whose main function was to select and educate talented children of poor provincial, mostly peasant families in a socialist and collectivistic spirit. Mérei's first sociopsychological studies were inspired both by the experiences of fascism and by the special problems posed by the organization of these 'people's colleges'. In his classical study on 'collective experience' (1948; published in English in 1949 under the title **Group Leadership and Institutionalization**), he began with the question: Why is it that concentration camps were possible in twentieth-century Central Europe? His study was based on a model experiment executed with groups of children between the ages of 6-10 years. The experiment showed that the leaders (even those with the greatest social skills and effectivity) cannot change directly the groups's established norms and habits. Instead, they choose indirect ways: step-by-step transformation or manipulation of the traditions of the group. Mérei suggests that the

leader may be stronger than every single member of the group, but the group as a whole is stronger than even the most powerful single leader. In this experiment (inspired, at least partly, by Kurt Lewin's experiments on group leadership), Mérei wanted to model the methods and effects of Fascist manipulation. By showing the superiority of the group as a whole to each of its constituent members, the experiment also reflected Mérei's strong ideological commitment to the contemporary ideals of socialist collectivism. In a later, related experiment Mérei demonstrated that in children's groups established pairs have a destructive effect on the cohesion of the group, that is, pairs are more likely to resist group pressure (Mérei, 1967).

After the victory of Stalinist politics in 1948/49, the movement of the people's colleges was dissolved. Mérei and his collaborators were criticized as followers of bourgeois 'paedology'.[1] For a number of years psychology was practically exiled from the scientific life of Hungary. Mérei himself lost his jobs and functions, and in the late fifties, he was imprisoned for his participation in the 1956 events, as was the aforementioned political scientist, István Bibó. After his release he was not permitted to work as a social psychologist. He subsequently became the head of the Department for Psychodiagnostics at the National Institute of Mental Health. As a clinical psychologist he made important contributions to the theory and practice of the Rorschach test. In the late sixties, he resumed his activities as a social psychologist and was, in particular, involved in research on sociometry. He revised substantially Moreno's theory and method, and published a comprehensive handbook on sociometry under the title **The Latent Network of Communities** (Mérei, 1971). He elaborated a specific method for studying young children's groups, called 'actometry'. Also, Mérei was among the first Hungarian initiators of T-groups and psychodrama. In one way or another, many Hungarian psychologists are Mérei's students. Until his death in 1986, he was a leading authority in many fields of psychology. Most of his students work in clinical psychology, individual and group psychotherapy, but he exerted immense influence on small group research, on genetic social psychology and on all branches of children's studies (educational research, child psychology, school psychology etc.). His main contribution to Hungarian psychology as a whole can be identified, however, not so much in specific research fields, but in

determining a specific view of all psychological phenomena: a strong emphasis on the micro-sociological field, the elaboration of the concept of 'sociality' and of the surplus value of the togetherness in groups, the 'collective experience'.

New aspects of his ideas and concepts were discovered recently, when - shortly before his death - his 'psychological notebooks' were started to be published (Mérei, 1985-1986). These notebooks - written during his prison term - contain his theoretical ideas as well as the description of his self-observations during 'long-term deprivation'. In the notebooks he analyzed his own dreams - from the point of view of how social contacts appear in manifest dreams.

Current Perspectives

Social psychologists from the West meeting Hungarian colleagues sometimes ask: Does social psychology exist in Hungary? Some of them show genuine surprise when they are informed that social psychology in this country is a 'legitimate' discipline. It has institutional and educational backing and there are professional social psychologists who regularly do research in this field, including the reading of Western journals and books. Less naively, Western colleagues sometimes ask: What is the basic orientation of social psychology in Hungary and to what extent does it take into account the specific features of a Central European non-capitalistic society?

While it is easy to enlighten colleagues on the existence of a social psychology in Hungary, it is more difficult to answer the second set of questions. On first sight, one might say that social psychology, as a discipline that is defined strictly in theoretical and methodological terms, is a relatively new field in Hungary. Its professionalization and institutionalization started only in the sixties, with its first research projects largely inspired by current theories and methods of the 'mainstream' social psychology. In attempting to catch up with the developments of Western, predominantly American, social psychology, many Hungarians have sympathized with the ahistorical metatheory and positivistic methodology of the 'mainstream'. They have been interested in such topics as small group research, the study of attitudes etc. - primarily on the laboratory level, and, to a lesser extent, in applied social psychology (in industry and management, education, mental health, public opinion).[2]

As a result of the above focal interests, little attention has been given to the study of larger-scale social issues. The first generation of students and cultivators of social psychology in Hungary seemed to be more aware of the current American 'mini-theories' than of the fundamental social realities of their own country. They tended to regard their discipline as something 'brand new', without precedents and domestic traditions, like a modern technology. This explains why the critical re-examination of the positivistic assumptions of social psychology in the late sixties and early seventies (which had powerful manifestations in the United States as well as in Western Europe) remained largely unechoed in Hungary. These revisions and criticisms have been rejected as 'anarchistic' or 'unscientific'. At the same time, avoiding social issues or neglecting the question of 'social relevance' has proven to be a useful way of preventing the exercise of ideological or political pressures, still active in the background against social psychology and psychology in general.

Special attention must be paid to the role of Marxism. In the sixties and seventies, the term 'Marxist social psychology' was widely used, but, in fact, its content has been hardly more than some references to the abstract principles of dialectical or historical materialism. Marxism did not really penetrate the theory and method of social psychology. There were, however, some isolated attempts, both in the East and the West, to take Marxism seriously in social psychology.[3] In Hungary, Läszlo Garai and his associates attempted to revise social psychological theory along Marxist lines, applying the principles of Soviet theoretical psychology (e.g., L.S. Vygotsky, A.N. Leontiev, inter alia - see Garai, Erós, Járó, Köcski, Veres, 1978). They also stressed the importance of socio-psychological studies on macro-sociological processes. These attempts remained, however, isolated, primarily because it turned out to be practically impossible to translate the theoretical considerations into concrete, operational terms.

This picture of Hungarian social psychology began to change in recent years. Hungarian social psychology is now on its way to reaching a more mature state. The most important new development is the diversification of research interests. On the one hand, many - particularly the younger - social psychologists are becoming more and more involved in field studies, dealing with relevant social

issues, such as social, economic and psychological deprivation, social mobility and its socio-psychological consequences; mental health, social deviance, marginality, drug addiction and alcoholism; prejudice and discrimination against minorities; the inadequacies of the educational system and of the government's social policy; the problems of the family, the poor, the elderly, youth, women, etc.[4] There is a newly discovered interest in the socio-psychological aspects of the psychical and social environment. On the other hand, some social psychologists have been doing pioneering work in the theoretical advancement of central and comprehensive topics, such as social identity (Pataki, 1982), the ideals and realities of collectivism (Hankiss, 1982), social categorization (Garai, 1982), and national consciousness (Csepeli, 1985). Furthermore, experimental social psychology has new developments, too. Within the framework of social-cognitive approach, a number of empirical researches have been initiated in the past few years. These studies have been dealing with such topics as the structure of attitudes toward historical events and agents, the organization of social knowledge, the perception and interpretation of everyday events, the structure of value orientation etc. (László, 1986). There is a whole series of high quality researches on the social psychological aspects of decision-making and risk-taking behavior (Engländer, 1985). Finally, it should be mentioned that the most recent topics attracting considerable attention among Hungarian social psychologists are psychohistory and historical social psychology.

Social psychology in Hungary is cultivated in the Institute of Psychology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, in the Institute of Psychology and of Sociology of the Lóránd Eötvös University, and - on a smaller scale - in many other research institutes, clinics, industrial companies, and university departments. So far, Hungarian social psychologists have held two national conferences (1972, 1982) and the third conference is planned to be held in 1988. They are active on the international scene, too: quite a few Hungarian social psychologists are members of the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology. The Association held its third meeting in Budapest in 1974.

To sum up, Hungarian social psychology may not be - at least in its present state - particularly stimulating for a Western audience. On closer inspection, however, those who are interested in the social

and historical development of this discipline in a broader context can encounter stimulating ideas within a newer and somewhat different frame of perspective.[5]

Notes

1. 'Paedology' - a term used originally in the Soviet Union - means 'complex study of the child'. A decade earlier, in 1936, a party resolution banned this discipline - as represented in the works of L. Vygotsky and others - in the Soviet Union.
2. For an overview of social psychological research until the end of the seventies, see Hunyady, Pataki and Vári-Szilágyi, 1978.
3. See, e.g., Nolte and Staeuble, 1972; Holzkamp, 1972; Armistead (ed.), 1974; Hiebsch and Vorwerg, 1967.
4. There are some non-Hungarian publications that are more easily available to the Western audience. See, e.g., Erós, Kovács and Lévai, 1985; Veres, 1985; Vári-Szilágyi, 1987.
5. See, also the present author's more detailed analyses of the historical problems of Hungarian psychology: Erós, 1983a, 1984.

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DUALISTISCHE ANSCHAUUNGEN IN DER BULGARISCHEN KULTUR DES MITTELALTERS: PAULIKANER UND BOGOMILEN

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Summary

This paper deals with the significance of the Paulician doctrin in Bulgaria and its influence on the Bogomils. It has been shown that Paulicians and Bogomils were the leaders of strong social movements, which influence was not limited to Bulgaria, but spreaded out via Albigenses and Cathari even up to the reformation movement in Western Europe.

In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden die dualistischen Anschauungen bzw. Lehren besprochen, die sich im Mittelalter nach der Übernahme des Christentums in Bulgarien als offizielle Religion verbreitet haben: Paulikaner- und Bogomilentum. Die paulikanische Lehre und Bewegung verbreiteten sich auf der Balkanhalbinsel und speziell in Bulgarien von der Mitte des siebenten Jahrhunderts an. Diese Bewegung ist vom benachbarten Byzanz, genauer von seinen kleinasiatischen Gebieten ausgegangen. Die Paulikaner in den Bergen Armeniens hatten sich gegen den Vernichtungskrieg von Leo dem Isaurier, Michael Kurobapates, Leon dem Armenier und der Keiserinregentin Theodora erfolgreich verteidigt. In der 2. Hälfte des 10. Jahrhunderts versuchte Johann Tzimisces sie durch Verpflanzung nach Thrakien unschädlich zu machen. Die Paulikaner gingen dann im bulgarischen Volk auf und beeinflussten die dortigen eigenständigen häretischen Gruppen, besonders die Bogomilen.[1]

Doch schon vor ihrer Verpflanzung nach Bulgarien übten die Paulikaner starken Einfluss aus: Laut Petrus Siculus[2] hatten sie in den siebziger Jahren des 9. Jahrhunderts die Absicht, spezielle Missionen nach Bulgarien zu schicken, die unter dem zum Christentum zu bekehrenden Volk "Ketzerei" zu predigen und es vom orthodoxen Glauben abzulenken hatten.

Diese historische Auskunft deutet schon den Einfluss des Paulikanertums als soziale Lehre und Volksbewegung an. Die Paulikaner gingen von dualistischen Auffassungen aus, die denen der Gnostikern, besonders der Manichäer nahestanden.[3] Ihr Dualismus ist im Unterschied zu dem der Bogomilen absolut: Die himmlische Welt und die Seele des Menschen sind Schöpfungen des "guten Gottes", die sichtbare Welt und der menschliche Körper dagegen Produkte des "bösen Geistes". Von diesem Dualismus ausgehend, lehnten sie jegliche weltliche Macht ab, erklärten sich gegen Kirche und Geistlichkeit, die für sie lediglich ein überflüssiger Stand war.[4]

Erste Informationen über die Paulikaner auf der Balkanhalbinsel stammen von dem byzantinischen Diplomaten und Schriftsteller Petrus Siculus, der seinerseits z.T. auf der Schrift "Gegen die Manichäer" des Photius fusst. Viele Jahre war Petrus Siculus Anhänger der Paulikaner, trat dann aber gegen sie auf, nachdem sie in Bulgarien aktiv geworden waren.[5] Die wissenschaftliche Forschung zum Paulikanertum begann 1829 mit Gieselers **Untersuchungen über die Geschichte der Paulikaner**[6] und hat in der umfangreichen Studie von Garsoian **The Paulician Heresy**[7] ihren vorläufigen Höhepunkt erreicht.

Die paulikanische Lehre war für die Volksmassen anziehend, da sie eine breite ideologische Plattform anbot, antifeudal ausgerichtet war und mit scharfer Kritik gegen die Kirche auftrat. Besonders attraktiv waren ihre sozialpolitischen Ansichten, die auf eine Kritik der sozialen Wirklichkeit im Byzantinischen Reich und später auch in Bulgarien hinausliefen. Die von den Paulikanern gepredigte Gleichheit von Mann und Frau fand in einer Epoche, in der die offizielle christliche Doktrin zur Stütze der feudalen Macht wurde, grossen Anklang bei der Stadt- und Landbevölkerung. In bezug auf ihre ethischen Anschauungen muss an erster Stelle auf die paulikanische Auffassung von Reichtum und Macht hingewiesen werden. Die Paulikaner erklärten sich gegen die Gewalt und die "Gottesvorherbestimmtheit" der Reichen und der Könige. Sie behaupteten, Materielles sei Produkt einer "bösen" Kraft und die Gewalt ein Werk des Teufels. Deshalb dürfe sich niemand Sklaven unterwerfen.

Die sozialpolitische Doktrin der Paulikaner geht auf gnostisch-dualistische Traditionen zurück. Das "dialektische" Wesen dieser Lehre wird von dem für die ketzerischen Richtungen des Mittelalters charakteristischen Dualismus bestimmt. Die philosophisch-soziologi-

schen Anschauungen der Paulikaner üben starken Einfluss auf die Bogomilen aus, die im Unterschied zu den Paulikanern einen gemässigten Dualismus vertreten. Der Nachklang dieses Einflusses ist weit über die Grenzen der Balkanhalbinsel hinaus zo spüren: Katharer und Albigenser in Südfrankreich und Italien sind stark vom Bogomilentum geprägt.[8]

Laut Hegel gibt es zwei Formen des Mystizismus - reinen und dialektischen. Die dualistischen Strömungen des Mittelalters zählte er zu letzterem. Für Engels predigten die Lehren und Bewegungen frühchristlichen Kommunismus, waren Vorgänger der Reformation und des utopischen Kommunismus. Es ist bezeichnend, dass das Paulikanertum erst nach der Annahme des Christentums als Staatsreligion in Bulgarian zur Bewegung wurde.

Erst nachdem nämlich Kirche und Geistlichkeit institionalisiert waren, hatte die Kritik der Paulikaner einen Adressaten. Erst nach der Gründung des bulgarischen Patriarchats wurde die Lehre der Paulikaner aktuell und wurde zum Anwalt der Unterdrückten. Besonders heftig wurden die Klöster kritisiert, die durch ihre ökonomische Unabhängigkeit die Interessen des Staates zu bedrohen begannen. Da auch Byzanz seine Macht durch die bulgarische Kirche bedroht sah, wurden die Paulikaner von einem noch vor kurzen verdammten Gegner zu einem natürlichen Verbündeten Konstantinopels. Nachdem Byzanz den Einfluss der bulgarischen Kirche zurückgedrängt und den Mönchsstand zerschlagen hat, werden die Verfolgen der Paulikaner wieder aufgenommen.

Wenn wir Paulikanertum und Bogomilentum einer vergleichenden Analyse unterziehen und in dieser Hinsicht die marxistische Literatur durchsehen, drängt sich zuerst die Einschätzung Dimiter Blagoevs auf, der in bezug auf die Bogomilen gesagt hatte:

> "Das Bogomilentum war im alten Bulgarenreich die einzige Protestbewegung von Bedeutung, die sich gegen öffentliche Einrichtungen wandte ... Es war eine gesellschaftliche Bewegung mit christlich-kommunistische Aspirationen, wie die meisten sozialen Bewegungen der Volksmassen im Mittelalter ... Sie ging aus von den kommunistischen Idealen des Urchristentums und passte sich den Stimmungen des Volkes an. Auf diese Art und Weise wurde das Bogomilentum nicht nur zu einer Gefahr für die Herrschaft der Kirche, sondern auch zu einer frühprotestantischen sozialpoli- schen Bewegung gegen die Grundpfeiler der Feudalmacht. Und das viel, viel früher als vergleichbare Bewegungen in Westeuropa."[9]

Diese Einschätzung trifft in vollem Masse auch auf das Paulikanertum zu, dessen Ideen ja von der Lehre der Bogomilen aufgenomen und weiterentwickelt wurden.[10]

In dem Blagoev die soziale Funktion dieser Bewegungen als Ideologie der unterdrückten Schichten und Klassen im Mittelalter untersucht, macht er gleichzeitig auf die Tatsache aufmerksam, dass diese Bewegungen zu den "kommunistischen Idealen" des Frühchristentums zurückgekehrt sind: Sie haben den Abgrund zwischen den religiösen Forderungen und der sozialökonomischen Willkür der herrschenden Schichten und der Kirche selbst aufgedeckt und damit den passiven Widerstand der Bauern und Bürger organisiert. Ausserdem zeigt Blagoev, dass die Klassenstruktur in Bulgarien und in Byzanz die gleiche ist, was die Verbreitung der Lehren in beiden Gebieten erklärt. Unter den Bedingungen der Naturalwirtschaft kann das gesellschaftliche Bewusstsein eben nicht höher als bis zum Ideal des Urchristentums aufsteigen. Und als Folge der Armut entstehen Christliche Gemeinden als einzige Form eines ökonomisch und sozial gleichberechtigten Lebens. Der Widerspruch zwischen den kommunistischen Idealen des Urchristentums und der offizielen Kirchendoktrin wird zum Hauptantrieb der sozialen Volksbewegung.

Die historische Forschung hat gezeigt, dass nach dem Fall Bulgariens unter das Türkenjoch (1396) das Bogomilentum sich indirekt in Form von paulikanischen Kolonien bis zur bulgarischen Renaissance gehalten hat.[11] Genau diese Tatsache ist ein weiterer Beweis für die Gemeinsamkeiten von Paulikanern und Bogomilen in Bezug auf theoretisch und ideologische Ausgangspositionen.[12]

Als "zweite" Heimat der Paulikaner und Wiege des Bogomilentums wurde Bulgarien über Katharer und Albigenser zum Ausgangspunkt sozialer Bewegungen des Mittelalters, die in der Reformation mit Martin Luther ihren Höhepunkt fanden.

Anmerkungen

1. Zur Geschichte von Paulikanern und Bogomilen vgl. besonders: Gieseler (1829), Döllinger (1890), Lombard (1879), Sharenkoff (1927), Ter-Mkrttschian (1893), Roll (1978), Garsoian (1967), Ivanov (1970), Angelov (1980).
2. Petrus Siculus (1846).
3. vgl. z.B. Ley (1971, S. 48ff.); aber auch den Artikel "Paulicians" in der Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, der Behauptet: "...the P.s themselves neither claimed non admitted any connexion with Mani and his teaching." (p. 696).
4. ebenda, S. 697.
5. ebenda.

6. Gieseler (1829).
7. Garsoian (1967).
8. vgl. Ley (1971), Roll (1978).
9. Blagoev (1906, S.71/73).
10. vgl. Garsoian (1967, p. 233).
11. Angelov (1980).
12. Garsoian (1967, 233).

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