

2009
R. Smith (2007) Being Human. (p.53)
aanvragen voor brief



**28TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN SOCIETY OF THE
HISTORY OF HUMAN SCIENCES (ESHHS)
21-25 JULY 2009, BUDAPEST, HUNGARY**

ABSTRACTS OF PAPERS PRESENTED

blow -
13.500
for info

multiple workshops over ECT
- membership

SOCIAL HISTORY OF MENTAL PHENOMENA

Régine Plas
Université Paris Descartes

The *déjà vu* Experience in the History of Mind and Brain sciences. Eternal recurrence?

The phenomenon of the *déjà vu* is a very common and very specific illusion, which was defined in 1844 by the English doctor Arthur Wigan as:

“A sudden feeling, as if the scene we have just witnessed (although, from the very nature of things it could never have been seen before) had been present to your eyes on a former occasion, when the very same speakers, seated in the very same position, uttered the same sentiments, in the same words – the postures, the expression of countenance, the gestures, the tone of voice, all seem to be remembered, and to be now attracting attention for the second time” (Wigan, 1844, p. 84).

In 1922, the French philosopher and future politician Marcel Déat commented on the interest aroused by this phenomenon and said that in view of literature already published on the topic, anyone who dared to write another page deserved to be fined. However, since then a wealth of literature has been written by philosophers, psychiatrists and psychologists about the description and explanation of this illusion (Neppe, 1983; Brown, 2004; Bodei, 2006). This recurring interest may seem unexpected in that *déjà vu* is a marginal, subjective and very fleeting phenomenon. It has been known since early antiquity: Pythagoreans saw in it an argument in favour of their belief in reincarnation of souls, Stoics as an evidence of eternal recurrence of the same, whereas Augustine considered it as fake memories sent by the Devil to deceive men.

From the last third of the 19th century up to World War I, many psychologists, neurologists and physicians have been interested in understanding the etiology and mechanisms of *déjà vu*, particularly in France: at the turn of the century an intense debate brought together the leading philosophers and psychologists of the day, such as Théodule Ribot, Pierre Janet, Henri Piéron, Henri Bergson, and many others less well known. Psychological explanations have been opposed to physiological and neurological ones. The debate culminated with the famous psychological explanation given in 1908 by Bergson, in a paper entitled “Le souvenir du présent et la fausse reconnaissance” (Memory of the present and false recognition). The problem of the *déjà vu* gave him the opportunity to develop his theory on memory, already initiated in *Matière et mémoire* (1896).

After World War I, the interest for *déjà vu* decreased but didn't completely disappear. It increased again after World War II. Many authors put forward psychodynamic explanations; some studies relied on statistical surveys on its incidence on healthy or sick populations, others on relationships between *déjà vu* experiences and varying degrees of pathological states – fatigue, anxiety, personality disorders, schizophrenia, epilepsy.... Recently, with the expansion of neurosciences, the emphasis is on the role of neurotransmitters or on the functioning of cerebral areas. Certain explanations are very reminiscent of the physiological explanations given at the end of the nineteenth century. Finally, after more than one century of psychological, psychiatric and neurological research on *déjà vu*, most authors recognise that this phenomenon keeps its mystery and remains enigmatic.

Why is *déjà vu* so fascinating for researchers? I will put forward two reasons. On the one hand, this minor phenomenon is at the point of intersection of many important and recurrent problems such as the question of the links between perception and memory; or the question of personal identity; the role of unconscious perceptions; the relationships between the subject and reality etc. On the other hand, its longevity as a problem in the history of mind and brain sciences illustrates their evolution and questions their limits.

References

- Bergson, H. (1908). "Le souvenir du présent et la fausse reconnaissance". *Revue philosophique*, LXVI, 561-593.
- Bodei, R. (2006). *La sensation de déjà vu*. Paris: Seuil, 2007.
- Brown, A. S. (2004). *The déjà vu experience*. New York: Psychology Press.
- Neppe, V. E. (1983) *The Psychology of Déjà Vu. Have I been here before?* Johannesburg: Witwaterstrand University Press.
- Wigan, A. L. (1844). *The Duality of the Mind*. London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans.

Wan Chi Wong

Department of Educational Psychology
The Chinese University of Hong Kong

The genealogy of self in Chinese culture

The nature of self has been extensively researched by philosophers, psychologists, and historians in Western culture (see, for instance, Dreyfus, 2008; Foucault, 1982/1988; Hegel, 1807/1986; Seigel, 2005; Shusterman, 2008; Sorabji, 2006). However, understanding of self in non-Western cultures is obscure or stereotypic. The proposed study will aim to actualize a genealogy of self in Chinese culture, with a view to facilitating the East-West dialogue on self. The study will be genealogical in the sense that it will take a critical stand on the origin and development of word meanings, echoing the groundbreaking works of Nietzsche (1887/1988) and Foucault (1961/1967, 1971/1977, 1975/1977, 1976/1988-1990). It will also go beyond an understanding of collective consciousness to a reconstruction of real human practices. The research will consist of three distinct but related phases. In the first phase, the development of the meanings of the words that characterize the concept of self will be examined by way of etymological and semantic analyses. In the second phase, clusters of related signs will be further identified and analyzed. The route mapped out by Benjamin (1972/1999) in his Arcades Project will serve as a methodological guide (see also Benjamin, 1950/1992; Marx, Schwarz, G., Schwarz, F., & Wizisla, 2007). The results drawn from these two phases will provide clues for tracing relevant, historically effective statements and the formation of discourses in a great variety of Chinese texts; this will constitute the Foucauldian genealogical study of the third phase.

As a microcosm of human consciousness, the development of word meanings can be analyzed on individual-, social-, and cultural-historical levels. Chinese is a well-recorded language that evolved from the Oracle Bone Inscription and Bronze Inscription through the Great-Seal Script and Small-Seal Script to the Clerical-Script and modern

scripts, and as such offers abundant resources for the analysis of changing word meanings. From our preliminary analyses, we have found that the meanings of most ancient Chinese words regarding self are related to the body or body parts (e.g., “吾” “我” “自” & “己”). Two unique phrases (“吾日三省吾身” & “吾喪我”), respectively originating from Confucianism (meaning self-examination) and Taoism (meaning the loss of self in a larger, cosmic self) in ancient China, have been identified as historically effective. Investigation into the polysyllabic expressions of self, with the aid of tools such as *Pei-wen-Yun-fu*, *Ci-tong*, and *Da-han-he Ci-dian*, reveals the dominant themes of agency and self-cultivation. Some polysyllabic words (e.g., “小我” & “大我”) widely applied throughout history further illustrate the lack of a boundary between the concepts of “self” and “other.”

Among the related signs uncovered, two appear as particularly worthy of our analysis: (1) the “Ox-herding Pictures” and their related verses, and (2) the Tai Chi Chuan. In Chinese culture, we do not witness fine-grained conceptual analysis or theoretical formulation of self. Nonetheless, we find that the process of self-awareness, self-cultivation, and self-transcendence was dealt with in a series of highly symbolic pictures and subtle verses referred to as the “Ox-herding Pictures.” Numerous versions emerged in history but the most influential ones were developed by the Zen masters Pu-ming (probably during the late Tang Dynasty) and Kuo-an (during the Song Dynasty). The metaphors of the story (e.g., the ox, the herdsman, the forgetting of the tamed ox, the forgetting of both the ox and the man, and the entering into the marketplace) symbolize the different positions of the self moving along different levels of consciousness. It is noteworthy that elements of Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism are found in these sets of pictures and their related verses. It is also interesting to note their reception in the contemporary world outside of Chinese communities. These “Ox-herding Pictures” have further been used as a meditative tool in the psychotherapeutic process (see Spiegelman & Miyuki, 1985/1987).

Tai Chi is an ancient sign in Chinese culture, though Tai Chi Chuan as a type of martial art has a recorded history of less than 500 years (see Li, S., & Li, Y., 2007; Tang, 2008; Yu, 2006). Different schools of Tai Chi Chuan developed the long series of continuous, coherent body movements. This physical exercise has become increasingly widespread and is now widely practiced in Chinese communities. A learner is first guided to gain body consciousness and move using proper form. A good practitioner will gradually become aware of the core ideas of Chinese dialectics in the process of the body movements, as these movements were designed on the basis of these ideas. The practice can be actualized as a process of self-awareness, self-cultivation, and self-transcendence. It is in essence a “bottom-up” cognitive process from the implicit level to the explicit level. In contemporary discourse, Tai Chi Chuan has been recognized as a cultural sign or a bodily cultural sign (see Yu, 2002-2008) as well as for its well-known health benefits (see Hong, 2008). In view of the fact that Tai Chi Chuan is practiced daily by many, the potential effect of the sign mediation should not be overlooked.

In his historical investigation of the idea of self in Western culture, Seigel (2005) identified three major dimensions, namely the bodily or material, the relational, and the reflective dimensions. A genealogical study of self in Chinese culture can also uncover these dimensions. Subtle differences and similarities between Western and Chinese culture are worthy of further analysis.

Bibliography

Western sources:

Benjamin, W. (1950/1992). Theses on the philosophy of history. In H. Arendt (Ed.), *Illuminations* (pp. 245-255). London: Fontana Press.

- Benjamin, W. (1972/1999). *The Arcades Project*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Dreyfus, H.L. (2008). Kierkegaard on the self. In E.F. Mooney (Ed.), *Ethics, love, and faith in Kierkegaard* (pp. 11-23). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Foucault, M. (1961/1967). *Madness and civilization: A history of insanity in the age of reason*. London: Tavistock.
- Foucault, M. (1971/1977). Nietzsche, genealogy, history. In M. Foucault, *Language, counter-memory, practice: Selected essays and interviews* (pp. 139-164) (edited with an introduction by D.F. Bouchard). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Foucault, M. (1975/1977). *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Foucault, M. (1976/1988-1990). *The history of sexuality (3 volumes)*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Foucault, M. (1982/1988). Technologies of the self. In L.H. Martin, H. Gutman, & P.H. Hutton (Eds.), *Technologies of the self: A seminar with Michel Foucault* (pp. 16-49). Boston, MA: The University of Massachusetts Press.
- Hegel, G.W.F. (1807/1986). *Phänomenologie des Geistes [Phenomenology of spirit]*. Frankfurt, Germany: Suhrkamp.
- Hong, Y. (Ed.). (2008). *Tai Chi Chuan: State of the art in international research*. Basel, Switzerland: S. Karger AG.
- Marx, U., Schwarz, G., Schwarz, F., & Wizisla, E. (Eds.). (2007). *Walter Benjamin's archive: Images, text, and signs*. London: Verso.
- Myokyo-ni (1988/1996). *Gentling the bull: The Ten Bull Pictures, a spiritual journey*. Boston, MA: Charles E. Tuttle (published in association with the Zen Centre, London).
- Nietzsche, F. (1887/1988). *Zur Genealogie der Moral [On the genealogy of morals]*. In G. Colli & M. Montinari (Hrsg.), *Friedrich Nietzsche: Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe, 5* (pp.245-412). Muenchen, Deutschland: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag.
- Seigel, J. (2005). *The idea of the self: Thought and experience in Western Europe since the seventeenth century*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Shusterman, R. (2008). *Body consciousness: A philosophy of mindfulness and somaesthetics*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Sorabji, R. (2006). *Self: Ancient and modern insights about individuality, life, and death*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Spiegelman, J.M., & Mokusen, M. (1985/1987). *Buddhism and Jungian psychology*. Phoenix, AZ: Falcon Press.

Major Chinese sources on the etymological and semantic analyses:

- (1) *Zhong-zheng Xing-yin-yi Zong-he Da-zi-dian* (中正形音義綜合大字典)
(Tracing the changes of word meanings from the Oracle Bone Inscription and Bronze Inscription through the Great-Seal Script and Small-Seal Script to the Clerical-Script and modern scripts, this dictionary will serve as a useful tool for the initial step.)
- (2) *Shuo-wen Jie-zi* (說文解字)
(Compiled during the Han Dynasty, this is regarded as an indispensable classic in the study of Chinese language. The meanings of words are discussed in relation to six ways of the genesis of Chinese words.)
- (3) *Shuo-wen Jie-zi zhu* (說文解字注)
(This is a further interpretation of *Shuo-wen Jie-zi* compiled during the Qing Dynasty.)
- (4) *Da-han-he Ci-dian* (大漢和辭典)

(Compiled by a highly acclaimed Japanese scholar, this comprehensive dictionary contains a vast collection of Chinese words that are absent from most Chinese dictionaries. The fine differentiation of a Chinese concept is well documented here.)

(5) *Jia-gu Jin-wen Ci-dian* (甲骨金文辭典)

(This is a well-researched and concise dictionary on the Oracle Bone Inscription and Bronze Inscription compiled by a contemporary Japanese scholar.)

(6) *Pei-wen Yun-fu* (佩文韻府) and *Ci-tong* (辭通)

(Compiled during the Qing Dynasty and the Republican era respectively, these are valuable tools for the analysis of polysyllabic words and their contexts.)

Major Chinese and Japanese sources on the “Ox-herding Pictures”:

普明(Pu-ming, late Tang Dynasty/1976): 牧牛圖頌。香港 佛學印書局。

[*The Oxherding with illustrations and verses*, the pictures are photocopies from a Qing Dynasty block-printed edition]

雲棲株宏(輯)(1994): 禪關策進 外十部。高雄 台灣 佛光出版社。[containing the related verses of the “Ox-herding Pictures”, Pu-ming and Kuo-an versions inclusive]

廓庵(Kuo-an, Song Dynasty): 十牛圖。[The “Ox-herding Pictures” kept in the Shokoku-ji monastery in Kyoto]

柴山全慶、直原玉青 (Zenkei Shibayama & Gyokusei Jikihara) (1967): 禪の牧牛圖。大阪 日本: 創元社。[*Zen Oxherding Pictures*]

Major Chinese sources on “Tai Chi Chuan”:

李師融、李永杰 [Li, S., & Li, Y.] (編著)(2007): 古今太極拳譜及源流闡秘。台北 台灣: 逸文武術文化有限公司。[*Explications on the origin and dissemination of old and new manuals of Tai Chi Chuan*]

唐蒙 (Tang, M.) (編著)(2007): 王宗岳太極拳經・王宗岳陰符經・戚繼光拳經。太原 中國: 山西科學技術出版社。[*Selected commentaries of Tang Meng on various manuals of martial arts*]

宋史元 (Song, S.) (編著)(1946/2008): 太極總真。太原 中國: 山西科學技術出版社。[This is a collection of valuable instructional materials on Tai Chi Chuan.]

余功保 (Yu, G..) (編著)(2002-2008): 中國太極拳名家對話錄 [共三冊: (一)隨曲就伸, (二)盈虛有象, (三)上善若水]。北京 中國: 人民體育出版社。[*Dialogues with the Chinese masters of Tai Chi Chuan*]

Irina Sirotkina

Russian Academy of Sciences

Historicising Emotions: The Case of Musical Feelings

In the paper, I attempt to contribute to the discussion about the category of emotions by concentrating on a specific kind of feelings – those experienced under the influence of music.

Intellectual historians have recently argued that the category of emotions is of a modern origin and, at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it came to replace alternative notions of sentiments, appetites, passions and affections. Thomas Dixon describes the passage from the medieval Christian notions of passions and affections – conceived as active movements or acts of the will and intellect of a substantial soul – towards the modernist notion of emotions as passive states.¹ Daniel M. Gross examines how what the philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment called “social passions” were replaced by emotions understood as a “natural expression” of an individual.² Both historians imply that the pre-modern categories of affections or social passions provide much richer accounts of human feelings than later neurophysiological, evolutionary and behaviorist descriptions of emotions.

Yet, I would like to argue, instead of being nostalgic about the pre-modern categories, one could trace their vestiges in contemporary life. This is, in particular, the case for the feelings experienced while listening to music. Musicologists claim that the theory of musical affections (*Affektenlehre*), first proposed by Baroque musicians under the influence of classical rhetoric, has repercussions in our understanding and direct experience of music. This theory was formulated between the mid-seventeenth and mid-eighteenth centuries by music theorists, Michael Praetorius, Marin Mersenne, Athanasius Kircher and Johann Mattheson, and systematised by Friedrich Wilhelm Marpurg. According to this doctrine, each musical figure corresponds to a particular affection; each music piece (for instance, an aria) contains a single affection. The theory employed the pre-modern notion of affections as voluntary movements of the soul or acts of the rational will. Music is able to “move” the listener, but only with his/her willing co-operation.

This understanding of the ways music “moves” was very different from the later so-called arousal theory, which dominated music studies throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. According to it, music arouses in the listener an involuntary emotional response not dissimilar to a knee-jerk reaction. Experimental psychologists came to identify the moments of most intense emotional response with specific musical stimuli such as appoggiaturas or enharmonic changes.³ Although the proponents of the arousal theory claim that “there is an enormous phenomenological difference between the experience of expressive music and the experience of having one’s mood altered by a drug,” they believe that, by combining sounds in one way or another, the composer manipulates the listener’s perception.⁴ This view conceives of the listener as a passive receptacle of “music” reduced to sensory stimulation.

By contrast, in the Baroque doctrine of the affections, the listener co-acts with the composer in wilfully experiencing a certain feeling in order to achieve a purifying or ennobling effect. “Music ‘moves’ not in virtue of arousing such emotions as love, anger and the rest, but in virtue of ‘moving’ the listener to moral approbation and blame”.⁵ Though in the Classical and Romantic periods the doctrine of affections lost its appeal for music theorists, the notion of musical affections became embedded in our everyday experience of music. We usually conceive of listening to music and having appropriate feelings (sometimes described as *aesthetic*) as different from reacting to other emotional events.

Twentieth-century musicologists and philosophers often criticised the reductionist psychological approach as misleading in relation to the nature of musical feelings. The composer Anton Webern (1883-1945), the philosophers, Aleksei Losev (1893-1988) and Susanne Langer (1895-1985) and others, opposed the psychologisation of music in the hands of experimentalists. In response to this psychologisation, Webern rejected completely the discourse of emotions and argued that music is about *thinking* rather than about *feelings*. Similarly, Langer claimed that “music is not the cause or the cure of feelings, but their *logical expression*”.⁶ In my view, this understanding of how music

“moves” is closer to the pre-modern category of affections. Like affections, musical feelings are not reactions caused by particular combinations of sounds. They are normative in the sense that they form and constitute our emotional experience rather than are formed by external stimulation. One can find a similar understanding of emotions in psychological writing, for instance in Lev Vygotsky’s late work on Diderot’s “Paradox of the Actor”, in which Vygotsky uses the actual term, *affections*.⁷

In sum, one can identify musical feelings – which are often voluntary, moral and social as well as intimate – with pre-modern affections or social passions. Listening to music is an active, wilful and creative process, and not at all a passive hypnotic-like state. It can be generally said that music does the work of culture: it checks the individual experience against the higher standards exemplifying social interests. In Langer’s words, music constitutes “our myth of the inner life”⁸ - given that an individual inner life is an abstraction from a wider social world, of which music is an important part.

¹ Thomas Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of A Secular Psychological Category*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

² Daniel M. Gross, *Secret History of Emotion: From Aristotle’s “Rhetoric” to Modern Brain Science*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2006.

³ John Sloboda, *Exploring the Musical Mind: Cognition, Emotion, Ability, Function*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 309.

⁴ Derek Matravers. *Art and Emotion*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998, p. 181.

⁵ Peter Kivy, ‘How Music Moves’, in *What is Music? An Introduction to the Philosophy of Music*. Ed. by Philip Alperson. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1987, p. 154

⁶ Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite and Art*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942/1996, p. 217 – 218.

⁷ L.S. Vygotsky ‘K voprosu o psikhologii tvorchestva aktiora’, in *Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 6. Moscow: Pedagogika, 1932/1994, p. 319 – 328.

⁸ Langer, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

RESEARCH AND METHOD

Zsuzsanna Vajda

Miskolc University, Hungary

Investigation of Primary Attachment in Laboratory The History of the Strange Situation

In this paper I attempt to follow the history of a very widely used assessing method of primary attachment which in the same time has continuously been a subject to debate. The matter at hand is the strange situation, which has been elaborated by Mary Ainsworth, John Bowlby's student for the assessment of the quality of infants' attachment to their mother. The well known procedure was that the infant was invited with her mother to the "laboratory" – a simple room where researchers met them. Then the mother left her child for a short time with a strange person. Researchers observed children's behaviour when the mother left and when she came back after a couple of minutes. The whole procedure took no more than 20 minutes and episodes of separation and reunification of the mother and the child observed were as short as 3-4 minutes. Initially three distinct patterns of secure base behaviour were described: secure, anxious-avoidant and anxious-resistant. Later, Main and Solomon (1990) reported on a fourth pattern: anxious-disorganized. It is not surprising that many experts of developmental psychology doubted whether it is possible to assess the infant-mother attachment during such a short meeting which in addition is completely different from everyday experiences of a children? Assumption itself according to which from a unique experience one can learn something important about mother-infant relationship contradicts commonsense. The strange situation method was contested by such honoured scholars like Urie Bronfenbrenner, Michael Rutter and Jerome Kagan. In 1984 a general debate has been initiated by a student of Ainsworth, Michael Lamb and his coauthors in the journal *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*. The authors and a group of discussants criticized the strange situation for the points mentioned above and for some other reasons. According to Karen (1994) the main researchers of strange situation were so much upset because of Lamb's action that they didn't reply to the writings published in BBS.

In fact neither influential researchers nor trivial arguments could prevent the strange situation from growing into an extraordinarily widespread and popular method. Strange situation is a good example which shows that social and sociological circumstances play an important role in the determination of what is considered to be a scientific truth.

Bibliography

Ainsworth, M. D.S. – Blehar, M. C. – Waters, E. – Wall, S. : *Patterns of Attachment. A Psychological Study of the Strange Situation*. Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, 1978

Bronfenbrenner, U. *The Ecology of Human Development*
Harvard Univ. Press, 1979

Robert Karen: *Becoming attached*. A Time Warner company, 1994

Lamb, M.E. – Thompson, R.A.,-William P. Gardner, Charnov, E. Estes, D. :
Security of infantile attachment as assayed in the „strange situation”: its study and
biological interpretation Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1984, 7. 127-171

Thompson, R. A: The Development of the Person: Social Understanding, Relationships,
Conscience, Self. In Handbook of Child Psychology, 2006, 3. vol. Ed: Nancy Eisenberg,
24-85

Jaap Bos
Utrecht University

No more autobiography?

The art of writing autobiographies came into vogue in the nineteenth century, an age preoccupied with the self (Gay, 1995). The self-narrative, typically written at the end of a life, allowed the author to indulge into a variety of activities: from self-glorification to self-justification, from the occasional act of revenge to the expression of regret, and from an exploration of inner motives to the careful evasion of anything personal. By the end of the nineteenth century, few who had risen to fame resisted the call, either from their publisher or from the people, to put their story to paper, and soon every self-respecting statesman, general or novelist would end his career with a Memoirs.

In science too, the autobiography became a respectable genre. Darwin, J.S. Mill and Freud wrote their life-story (the latter against better judgement), not just because they were asked to or believed they had something to explain to the public, but also because they were in the right position to do it. Their fields of expertise had started when they began to work, and so, as founding fathers, they may well have thought that they owed it to the public at large and their colleagues in particular to write their autobiography. Their narratives represented not just their lives and their work, but also the entire world they lived in. That their accounts could be criticized perhaps as uneven, one-sided or distorted was something they no doubt realized, but they had written them in the conviction that their narratives were necessary for full understanding of the history of their field.

During the second half twentieth century, the status of the autobiography as authorized narratives in science eroded. While grand narratives were abandoned along with the hope that an impartial history could be written, in the wake of critical theorists, readers and writers alike dismissed the autobiography as at best naïve, or worse: as deceptive constructions. At the same time, it became clear that fields of expertise had become too large, with too many players involved and too many developments taking place, for anyone to pretend that he can overlook the field and pretend to know what is going on. If today authors aspire to write their autobiography they sooner turn their life story into a literary project (Oliver Sacks' boyhood memories), because if they don't (Paul Feyerabend's autobiography) they run the risk that readers ask: where is the irony?

Does this mean that the autobiography as a genre has become impossible in science, or are there ways to write about the self in an authentic and acceptable way still? How to situate oneself as a professional in a field of knowledge, and how to account for one's work? A collection of some 25 autobiographical narratives, written in 2008-9 by Dutch professors of developmental psychology is used to answer these questions. All authors were invited to contribute a chapter to a book (Koops and Bos, in press) on the

history of developmental psychology in the Netherlands. More specifically, they were invited to write about their own development in this field, their aspirations and work and their views on the subject. The overall aim of the book is to portray the field since its commencement at university in terms of self-narratives by its leading actors. While some authors entered the field shortly after the Second World War, at a time when developmental psychology was institutionalized as a new division at the university, others have only been appointed recently. This paper explores the different styles of 'doing autobiography' and attempts to link these different styles to a changing cultural climate between ca. 1950-2000

References

- Darwin, C. (1887) *Autobiography*
- Feyerabend, P. (1995) *Killing Time. The Autobiography of Paul Feyerabend*.
- Freud, S. (1925) *An Autobiographical Study*
- Gay, P. (1995) *The Naked Heart. The Bourgeois Experience. Victoria to Freud, vol. IV*.
- Koops, W. and J. Bos (in press) *Developmental psychology in the Netherlands in autobiographies*
- Mill, J.S. (1873) *Autobiography*
- Sacks, O. (2001) Uncle Tungsten. Memories of a chemical boyhood.

Agnes Pazziani
Université de Lausanne

Methodological controversies around the use of adolescent diaries in the 1920's

The early 20th century literary and popular craze for autobiographical documents written by adolescents fuelled developmental research. At the time, each one for somewhat different reasons, William Stern, Hermine Hug-Hellmuth, Freud, Siegfried Bernfeld, Charlotte Bühler, Eduard Spranger, Nicholas-Mikhailovich Iovetz-Tereshchenko (and earlier, Stanley Hall), all saw private diaries as affording a privileged access into adolescent soul.

First, to many, other methods seemed inapplicable. The experiences of adolescence were thought to undergo a kind of amnesia that rendered them irretrievable to adult introspection. Direct observation was considered impracticable, and of little use for information on inner-life. Adolescents' answers to questionnaires might conceal or distort important information and would only give a fragmented, transient, decontextualized picture of the 'soul'. Secondly, diaries were seen as particularly suited to give valid data. In the context of adolescents' attempts to find an identity apart from the family, their need for a degree of privacy, and their emotional ups and downs, wasn't diary-writing a typical manifestation of puberty, at least in its female and bourgeois variety? If diary-writing is such a natural thing for the age, and has such a positive role in self-construction (an opinion which foreshadows the modern study of diary writing as performance), why should its productions not be trusted?

By the Forties, enthusiasm had waned, and there followed a long period of decline as recourse to personal documents—despite the lone dissenting voice of Gordon Allport—was discredited as unscientific. For some decades, a renewed interest in personal documents has been taking place under very different conditions:

[...]most of the writers on autobiography up to the end of the nineteenth century conceived of autobiographical writing as writing about an 'essential self', and as writing about a 'life', [...] that was independent of the process of constructing it. All that was necessary was to capture it, write it, put it down. [...] Today, the tide has turned completely. We have come to reject the view that a 'life' is anything in itself and to believe that it is all in the constructing, in the text, or the text making (Bruner, 2001, pp. 26-27).

Since the new view of autobiography largely applies to diaries, we may be tempted to suspect early research of being hopelessly naïve in its acceptance of diaries as trustworthy source of personal information. Aim of the paper is to argue on the basis of primary sources that in the Twenties and Thirties, methodological debates operated with a degree of sophistication that already anticipated some modern concerns. Even such a firm believer as Bühler in the immediate value of diaries as psychological data was aware of their weakness relative to controlled introspection. Valid nomothetic results would be obtained by collecting a great number of diaries, taking into account the influence of social and historical change as in *Drei Generationen im Jugendtagebuch* (1934), and carefully distinguishing raw material from interpretation. For Stern and Bernfeld diaries are to be both complemented by additional biographical information and interpreted. As a psychoanalyst, Bernfeld mistrusted the manifest meaning of diaries, which he saw, like dreams or poems, as deformed and incomplete representations of conscious and unconscious drives. He gave an astute polemical interpretation of a diary collected by Bühler and argued that absence of manifest sexual content is no proof of its inexistence. All along, a veiled debate was taking place between Bühler's team and the psychoanalysts. It revolved around the authenticity of the *Tagebuch eines halbwüchsigen Mädchens*, which recounts a girl's quest for sexual information. This famous diary had been initially praised by Freud. Bühler was able to give solid external and internal evidence that it had undergone extensive rewriting by an adult. Long before Bourdieu, narrative studies, and 'auto-fiction', Bernfeld situated diaries within literary genres and noticed their tendency to verge on literary autobiography. Their contents do not primarily reflect the writer's deepest preoccupations, but rather a normative conception of the diary as genre. This early research is inspiring as it did not just describe, but valiantly attempted to make sense of an entire person in its probes into adolescents' inner-lives, over an extended span of time and in their natural context.

References

Primary sources

- Anonymous [Hug-Hellmuth, H.]. (1919). *Tagebuch eines halbwüchsigen Mädchens*. Wien: International Psychoanalytischer Verlag.
- Anonymous [Hug-Hellmuth, H.]. (1963). *A Young Girl's Diary*, (E. Cedar & P. Cedar, Trans.). London: Unwin. (Original work published 1919).
- Bernfeld, S. (1927). Die heutige Psychologie der Pubertät: Kritik ihrer Wissenschaftlichkeit. *Imago*, 12 (1), 1-56.

-
- Bernfeld, S. (1931). *Trieb und Tradition im Jugendalter: Kulturpsychologische Studien an Tagebüchern*. Leipzig: Barth.
- Bühler, C. (1922). *Das Seelenleben des Jugendlichen : Versuch einer Analyse und Theorie der psychischen Pubertät*. Jena: Gustav Fischer.
- Bühler, C. (Ed.). (1922). *Tagebuch eines jungen Mädchens* (2nd ed.). Jena: Gustav Fischer.
- Bühler, C. (Ed.). (1925). *Zwei Knabentagebücher : Mit einer Einleitung über die Bedeutung des Tagebuchs für die Jugendpsychologie*. Jena: Gustav Fischer.
- Bühler, C. (Ed.). (1927). *Zwei Mädchentagebücher* (2nd ed.). Jena: Gustav Fischer.
- Bühler, C. (1928). *Kindheit und Jugend : Genese des Bewusstseins*. Leipzig: Hirzel.
- Bühler, C. (1929). *Das Seelenleben des Jugendlichen : Versuch einer Analyse und Theorie der psychischen Pubertät* (5th ed.). Stuttgart: Gustav Fischer.
- Bühler, C. (1932). *Jugendtagebuch und Lebenslauf : Zwei Mädchentagebücher mit einer Einleitung*. Jena: Gustav Fischer.
- Bühler, C. (Ed.). (1934). *Drei Generationen im Jugendtagebuch*. Jena: Gustav Fischer.
- Hall, G. S. (1931). *Adolescence: Its psychology and its relation to physiology, anthropology, sociology, sex, crime, religion and education*. (2 vols.). New York: Appleton (first ed. 1904).
- Hollingworth, L. S. (1933). The Adolescent child. In C. Murchison (Ed.), *A Handbook of child psychology* (pp. 882-908). Worcester (Mass.): Clark University Press
- Horney, K. (1980). *The Adolescent diaries of Karen Horney*. New York: Basic Books.
- Horney, K. (1987). *Journal d'adolescence*. (J. Etoré, Trans.). Paris: Des femmes.
- Iovetz-Tereshchenko, N. M. (1936). *Friendship-Love in adolescence*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Spranger, E. (1927). *Psychologie des Jugendalters* (8th ed.). Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer.
- Stern, W. (1925). *Anfänge der Reifezeit: Ein Knabentagebuch in psychologischer Bearbeitung*. Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer.

Studies

- Alaszewski, A. (2006). *Using Diaries for Social Research*. London: Sage Publications.
- Allport, G. W. (1942). *The use of personal documents in psychological science*. New York: Social science research council.
- Benetka, G. (1995). *Psychologie in Wien : Sozial- und Theoriegeschichte des Wiener Psychologischen Instituts 1922-1938*. Vienna: WUVUniversitätsverlag.
- Barenbaum, N. B. & Winter, D. G. (2003). Personality. In D. K. Freedheim & I. B. Weiner (Eds.), *Handbook of psychology: Vol. 1. History of psychology* (pp. 177-204). New York: Wiley.
- Bruner, J. (1990). *Acts of meaning*. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press.
- Bühling, G. (2007). *Charlotte Bühler oder Der Lebenslauf als psychologisches Problem*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
- Conner, T. S., Feldman-Barrett, L., Tugade, M. M., & Tennen, H. (2007). Idiographic personality: The theory and practice of experience sampling. In

-
- R. W. Robins, R. C. Fraley, & R. F. Krueger (Eds.), *Handbook of research methods in personality psychology* (pp. 79-96). New York: Guilford Press.
- Crowther, B. (1999). Writing as performance: Young girls' diaries. In R. Josselson & A. Lieblich (Eds.), *The narrative study of lives: Vol.6.* (pp. 197-220). London: Sage.
-
- Csikszentmihalyi, M., & Larson, R. (1984). *Being adolescent: Conflict and growth in the teenage years.* New York: Basic Books.
- DeLuzio, C. (2007). *Female adolescence in American scientific thought, 1830-1930.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Elms, A. C. (2007). Psychobiography and case study methods. In R. W. Robins, R. C. Fraley, & R. F. Krueger (Eds.), *Handbook of research methods in personality psychology* (pp. 97-113). New York: Guilford Press.
- Girard, A. (1963). *Le journal intime et la notion de personne.* Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
- Gusdorf, G. (1991). *Les écritures du moi: Lignes de vie 1.* Paris: Odile Jacob.
- Hämmerle, C. (2006). Ein Ort für Geheimnisse? Jugendtagebücher im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. In P. Eigner, C. Hämmerle, & G. Müller (Eds.), *Briefe – Tagebücher – Autobiographien: Studien und Quellen für den Unterricht* (pp. 28-45). Innsbruck: Studien Verlag.
- Hartup, W. (1999). Foreword. In W. Furman, B. B. Brown, & C. Feiring (Eds.), *The development of romantic relationships in adolescence* (pp. XI à XV). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hayes, N. (2000). *Doing psychological research: Gathering and analysing data.* Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Jackson, J. E. (1990). *Passions du sujet: Essais sur les rapports entre psychanalyse et littérature.* Paris: Mercure de France.
- Kroger, J. (2007). *Identity development : Adolescence through adulthood* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks : Sage Publications.
- Lejeune, P. (1993). *Le moi des demoiselles: Enquête sur le journal de jeune fille.* Paris: Seuil.
- Le Rider, J. (2000). *Journaux intimes viennois.* Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
- Oerter, R. (1991). Vorwort. In C. Bühler, *Das Seelenleben des Jugendlichen : Versuch einer Analyse und Theorie der psychischen Pubertät* (pp. 3-7). Stuttgart: Gustav Fischer.
- Neubauer, J. (1992). *The fin-de-siècle culture of adolescence.* New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Sosin, D. (1983). The diary as transitional object in female adolescent development. *Adolescent Psychiatry*, 11, 92-103.
- Stach, P. (1994). Das Seelenleben junger Mädchen: Zwei Tagebücher der Jahrhundertwende in der Kontroverse zwischen Psychoanalyse und Psychologie. In K. J. Bruder, G. Jüttemann, & I. Staeuble (Eds.), *Psychologie und Geschichte*, 5 (3-4) (pp. 183-207). Leverkusen: Leske & Budrich.
- Wiener, W. J., & Rosenwald, G. C. (1993). A Moment's monument: The psychology of keeping a diary. In R. Josselson & A. Lieblich (Eds.), *The narrative study of lives: Vol. 1* (pp. 30-58). London: Sage.

SOCIAL TRENDS AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

Megane Curtis
Universiteit Utrecht

Émile Durkheim and the Establishment of Sociology in the Third Republic

This paper analyzes Émile Durkheim's attempt to establish sociology as a discipline in France during the Third Republic (1870-1940) where moral, political, pedagogical, and scientific convictions were inextricable. Sociology was above all presented as a pragmatic discipline that could provide solutions to what many perceived as disorder in French society. Noting simultaneous developments in Germany throughout, it is clear that Durkheim was inspired by Germany's physical organization for research and education rather than its philosophical underpinning. The justification of sociology as a discipline (i.e. its subject matter, scope, and method), and its insertion into the existing university structure thus differs. These conclusions challenge Rüegg's thesis that the rise of the modern university can be explained by a scientific spirit (conceived in University of Berlin) that swept across Europe beginning in the 1830's.⁸ The educational reforms proposed by Durkheim, and the sociology he constructed, succeeded not primarily because of his inspirations from the natural scientific realm, but more so because the discipline was posited as a functional one that could inform 'a science of morality' which would in turn serve to establish a moral education for the nation.

⁸ Walter Rüegg, "Chapter 1: Themes." *A History of the University in Europe: Volume II: Universities in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (1800-1945)*. Rüegg, Walter (ed.) (Cambridge: 2004): 3-31.

Marlise Rijks
University of Utrecht

Max Weber and historical comparative sociology in the 1970s and 1980s

The first decades after the Second World War, sociology was characterized by a heavy focus on quantitative research, subsequently followed by a renewed interest in qualitative research in the 1970s. A striking example was the increasingly important field of comparative historical sociology. By the middle of the 1970s an "international Weber renaissance" also commenced.⁸ A lot of secondary literature on Weber was published, while in the United States Parsons' dominative interpretation of Weber lost authority.⁸ In academic journals as well, the 1970s and 1980s were decades of a Weber revival. Of all the Weber articles published in the *American journal of sociology* and the *British journal of sociology* between 1950 and the present, almost 75 percent was published in the 1970s and 1980s.⁸ The main issue of this paper is how to account for this Weber revival, and by implication how to account for the relatively small number of articles about Weber before and after these decades.

So the central problem is the reception of Weber in academic journals after the Second World War, concentrating mainly on the *American journal of sociology*. Kurt Danziger's method has served as point of departure for investigating the reception of Weber by combining quantitative with qualitative analysis.⁸ Cultural and political context,

Roger Smith
kann van Jette?

and quantitative and academic change, will be connected with the Weber revival. Qualitative research on the content of the articles will follow. Moreover, the importance of social and historical context is taken for granted, as in the "externalist" approach of studies on scientific change.

The quantitative and qualitative Weber revival, is a striking historical phenomenon in need of an explanation. The interest in numerous Weber's works reinforces the hypothesis of a genuine Weber revival in American sociology. Weber's own concept of 'elective affinity', seems to provide us with an interaction between society and academic sociology more than coincidental. Before the 1970s, Weber had been used in canonized version by American sociologists. He was generally considered a classic and hero of sociology, with most emphasis on his methodology and alleged anti-Marxism. New interpretations started to develop in the 1970s, and the connection between society, science, and the new Weber-interpretations, can be subdivided in a few themes distilled from the qualitative analysis of the articles.

Considerable interrelated changes in society and sociology took place. First, ideas about social order and its counterpart of social revolution changed. Second, 'class' became doubted as the predominant concept in sociology. Third, emphasis on particular historical circumstances grew. Fourth, after crisis and stagflation, a new admiration for capitalism and liberalism took off. Fifth, a recovered respect for religion developed. All these societal developments influenced sociology. In the articles these developments were somehow related to Weber. At this point, we come to the central point of the Weber revival: the connection between different layers of society (e.g. religion and economy, but also rationality and values) and between social theory and history.

[Under the influence of changing societal and academic contexts, sociologists urged for new methods and subjects. The rise (or rediscovery) of comparative historical sociology can be placed in this context. It combined all the themes discussed above and seemed an exciting new field in sociology. The comparative aspect was naturally, since theory could only be "tested" by the comparison of actual historical cases. The obvious founder of this methodology was Weber, and his authoritative status was well-used in legitimizing the field. Weber now performed the role of synthesizer between formerly hostile oppositions of positivism and idealism, and sociology and history. Moreover, discussion about Weber's methods and conclusions enriched historical comparative sociology. ?

Enrichment of methods, concepts and practical studies in comparative historical sociology might be the reason for decreased interest in Weber after the 1980s. The debate on Weber, within this particular field of study, might have got exhausted. With a classic thinker, exhaustion of debate seems unlikely, but we might conclude a temporary exhaustion on particular items. When new problems arise, the classics will be consulted again and new interpretations will follow naturally. Unfortunately, the small number of articles in the *American journal of sociology* after 1985 cannot provide a comprehensive analysis or explanation. An extension of qualitative analysis in other journals might be helpful. Besides, it can also be interesting to investigate what happened in the historical discipline with comparative historical sociology and the reception of Weber. Despite the limits of this investigation, it can still be useful as an interpretation of historical and disciplinary change connected to particular interpretations of a classic twentieth century thinker.

Short bibliography

Camic, Charles, "Weber and the Judaic Economic Ethic: A Comment on Fahey",
American journal of sociology (vol. 89, May 1984) 1410-1416.

Wahlverwandschaft

-
- Cohen, Ira J., "On Hechter's Interpretation of Weber", *American journal of sociology* (vol. 81, March 1976) 1160-1162.
- Connell, R. W., "Why is Classical Theory Classical?", *American journal of sociology* (vol. 102, May 1997) 1511-1557.
- Davis, Wallace M., (translation and introduction) "Anticritical Last Word on The Spirit of Capitalism, by Max Weber" *American journal of sociology* (vol 83, March 1978) 1105-1131.
- Fahey, Tony, "Max Weber's Ancient Judaism", *American journal of sociology* (vol. 88, July 1982) 62-87.
- Hechter, Michal, "Response to Cohen: Max Weber on ethnicity and ethnic change", *American journal of sociology* (vol. 81, March 1976) 1162-1168.
- Holton, R. J., "'Rational Capitalism,' and Renaissance Italy: A Critique of Cohen", *American journal of sociology* (vol. 89, July 1983) 166-180.
- Howe, Richard Herbert, "Max Weber's elective affinities: Sociology within the bounds of pure reason", *American journal of sociology* (vol 84, September 1978) 366-385.
- Kalberg, Stephen, *Max Weber's comparative historical sociology* (Cambridge 1994).
- Kalberg, Stephen, "Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History", *American journal of sociology* (vol. 85, March 1980) 1145-1179.
- Scaff, Lawrence A., "Max Weber and Robert Michels", *American journal of sociology* (vol. 86, May 1981) 1269-1286.
- Schulman, Bruce J., *The seventies. The great shift in American culture, society, and politics* (Cambridge 2002).
- Tiryakian, Edward A., "Neither Marx nor Durkheim... perhaps Weber", *American journal of sociology* (vol. 81, July 1975) 1-33.
- Weber, Max, *The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism* (Mineola and New York 2003 [originally published: New York 1958]).
- Zaret, David, "From Weber to Parsons and Schutz: The Eclipse of History in Modern Social Theory" *American journal of sociology* (vol 85, March 1980) 1180-1201.

Susanne Guski-Leinwand
Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg, Germany

**Shadows on the genesis of psychology in Germany in the 20th Century:
New results towards political efforts based on changes of “Völkerpsychologie” in
favour of the totalitarian system**

The genesis of psychology was examined in the dissertation titled “Wissenschaftsforschung zur Genese der Psychologie in Deutschland vom ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert bis Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts“. An interdisciplinary metatheoretical approach was chosen to find out the influences on psychology in Germany. The results of the dissertation show, that psychology in Germany ran through very different orientations and several periods in the first decades of the 20th Century that finally led to a hidden mix of scientific and political efforts. Psychology was instrumentated for hostile aims: Psychological theories and approaches – like the “Völkerpsychologie” of Wilhelm Wundt – were abused and turned into a “differentielle Völkerpsychologie”: This new theory and contributions under the name “Völkerpsychologie” were generated as hostile approaches against selected folks under various names (like “Nationalpsychologie” etc.), which finally supported rassist concepts for the SS and other cruel parts of the NS-System.

Petteri Pietikainen
University of Helsinki

**Idealist and empiricist psychologists in the nineteenth-century finnish academia: the
question of language, nationhood and education of the people**

Modern psychology emerged during three distinct periods of Finnish history. The first, the nascent phase, began when Finland was a Grand Duchy of Russia (1809-1917). The second wave occurred after Finland’s independence in 1917, and during the civil war that followed. Psychology as an academic discipline was established in the first five decades after independence. The breakthrough of the “modern society” and the Nordic-type of welfare state in the 1960s and the 1970s constituted the third historical period, a period that carried through to the post-industrial Finland of the twenty-first century.

In nineteenth-century Finland, intellectual life was concentrated on the handful of small urban centres, and the academic circles were also small. There was only one university in the country, and it was moved from Turku to Helsinki in 1828, about two decades after Finland had become part of the Russian empire as an autonomous Grand Duchy. At the Imperial Alexander University of Finland (University of Helsinki), natural sciences were of secondary importance, while philosophy and national Idealism reigned supreme. Such a constellation had direct bearing on the history of psychology, because psychology was officially a part of philosophy until the end of the Second World War. This meant that psychological research was mostly conducted by scholars trained in philosophy. This in turn meant that experimental psychology remained in the shadows, although there were some modest attempts to carry out psychological experiments at the end of the century. The word “philosopher” in the context of the history of psychology has often been used in a pejorative sense, and this is unfortunate. By way of comparison with

contemporary experimental psychology, the early stages of Finnish psychology were carried out during the era of the “old” science. First generations of Finnish scholars were preoccupied with questions that today’s academics may find hard to relate to, or even understand, although these questions were relevant and important for the nineteenth-century Finnish academia. In the context of Finnish psychology during the latter half of the nineteenth century, nationalistic “Finnish-mindedness” was influenced by Idealism. In the history of the Finnish nation, Idealism denoted a longing for a national unity, reconciliation of individual and collective goals and ideals, and an organic state where political as well as individual harmony would prevail. As historian Marja Jalava has observed, at that time cultural climate in Finland was “dominated by the identification with authorities, the undervaluation of individual freedom, and the violation of the rights of those defying their superiors” (Jalava 2005, p. 467). This authoritarian legacy has shaped much of modern Finland.

The first generation of psychologists lived and worked in a crucial period when “Finland found itself as a nation” (ca. 1860-1910). During these five decades, Finland was in the process of organizing its ideological foundations for today’s independent nation, (cultural) nationalism profoundly affecting politics, mentality and all forms of cultural expression, including science. Psychologists during this time had closest collegial ties to Germany, the home of scientific psychology.

In my presentation I shall discuss the seemingly extraordinary fact that among the first generations of Finnish psychologists there was a strong correlation between one’s philosophical and political outlook and one’s understanding of the essence of psychological research. Simply put: Finnish-minded nationalists adhered to the Idealist philosophical tradition and shunned experimental work, whereas psychologists who ran against this nationalist-Idealist current were methodological empiricists, Swedish-minded and liberal in their intellectual and political outlook. By way of describing this conflict within Finnish psychology, “Finnish-mindedness” was conceptualized in terms of the Idealist philosophical conception of the soul. Nationalists tried to capture the essence of the soul with the help of introspection, reflection and an edifying discourse on the “spirit of the nation”. Snellman and Rein, the two main representatives of Idealism, represented this position, and it was expressed in their teaching, which was characterized by Finnish-minded nationalism, indeterminism (free will etc.) and the cultivation of the idea of harmonious personality that unified moral, psychological and political spheres, leading to higher unity. In contrast, “Swedish-mindedness” was expressed in the emerging psychology in terms of physiological and experimental sciences, and in its adherence to the secular Enlightenment tradition. Compared to Idealist and religious Finnish Nationalists, the Swedish faction’s teaching was characterized by a more naturalistic, deterministic, and international approach to the study of the human soul. In my presentation, I shall try to give an explanation to this dichotomy between “Finnish-mindedness” and “Swedish-mindedness” in the context of the nascent discipline of psychology.

Short bibliography

Aho, Jouko (1993). *Sieluun piirretty viiva*. Oulu: Pohjoinen.

Ihanus, Juhani (2000). Psykologia. In Tommila, Päiviö (chief editor), *Suomen tieteen historia* 2. Porvoo: WSOY, 439-75.

Jalava, Marja (2005): *Minä ja maailmanhenki* [with English summary]. Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura.

Neiglick, Hjalmar (1887). Om exakta metoder i psykologien. *Finsk Tidskrift*, 269-81, 339-49.

Nupponen, Ritva (1980). Professional psychology in Finland. *Acta Psychologica Fennica* VII, 9-21.

Takala, Martti and Korkiakangas, Mikko (1981). The development of psychological science in a small country in Europe: a case study of Finland. *Acta Psychologica Fennica* VIII, 5-10.

Ruud Abma
Utrecht Universitiy

Overcoming the two cultures? About the 'science' in 'social sciences'

In 1996 the Gulbenkian Commission, chaired by Immanuel Wallerstein, issued its report *Open the Social Sciences*. It presented an overview of the social sciences as torn between the two cultures of the *sciences* on the one hand and the *humanities* on the other, a distinction made famous by C.P. Snow in the early sixties, but of course much older. The report claimed that developments within both the sciences and the humanities have led to a rapprochement between the two cultures. Implicit in this analysis is the idea that there is no fundamental cleft between the two, there are only historical differences in style and approach.

Fundamentally opposed to this idea is the Danish social scientist Bent Flyvbjerg (2001), who claims that the social sciences can never be 'sciences' in that they can produce theories in the strong sense of the word, i.e. context-independent and predictive. Instead of emulating the natural sciences and trying to create general theories, social scientists should optimize their potential for reflexive analysis of values and power.

The discussion between the two opponent parties about the different epistemological status of the social sciences, is especially relevant now that metric criteria for quality measurement in research output derived from the natural sciences are increasingly being used in the human and social sciences, as is witnessed by the proposed European Reference Index for the Humanities (ERIH).

References

- Andersen, H. et al. (2009) Journals under threat: A joint response from history of science, technology, and medicine editors, *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, Vol. 45 (1), 2-4.
- Dreyfus, H.L. & S.E. Dreyfus (1986) *Mind over machine. The power of human intuition and expertise in the era of the computer*. New York: Free Press.

-
- Flyvbjerg, B. (2001) *Making social science matter*. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press.
 - Lee, R.E. & I. Wallerstein (Eds.) (2004) *Overcoming the two cultures. Science versus the humanities in the modern world-system*. London: Paradigm Publishers Snow
 - Wallerstein, I. et al. (1996) *Open the social sciences. Report of the Gulbenkian Commission on the restructuring of the social sciences*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

RECOLLECTION, TESTIMONY AND LYING – 1909-2009 A SIMPOSIUM ON WILLIAM AND CLARA STERN

Werner Deutsch

Technical University of Braunschweig
Germany

Clara and William Stern's conception of a developmental science

When publishing their groundbreaking monograph about *Recollection, Testimony and Lying*, Clara and William Stern neither had a research organization nor any research funds to support their developmental psychological analyses. Ab initio, their research was thoroughly a private affair and took place in their own walls. During their children's first years Clara and William Stern almost day-to-day collected extensive observations about the development process their children made. All these studies were recorded in individual diaries (Stern & Stern 1900-1918). The Sterns' approach was based on the belief that psychology should primarily look at the person itself instead of exploring capacities, functions and the changes they undergo due to process of development. Only psychographic descriptions of individuals can clarify the interrelations of functions. The systematic dissociation of functions, e.g. the very different forms of recollection, permits to compare among individuals in order to comprehend and measure the course, the pace or the telos of development process.

My contribution is dedicated to showing – using the example of the monograph – how Clara and William Stern proceeded in order to get from a psychographic description of individual development as seen in their diaries to a functional way of looking at the courses of development. This analysis is only possible because the original diaries of Clara and William Stern are still available today. After a long odyssey the Harvard University transferred them as a permanent loan to the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, whose Manuscript Department of the Jewish and National Library is now in charge of storing them.

Nowadays, with today's state of developmental psychology where we examine a sample of individuals, the Sterns' way of proceeding during research might seem unusual. Our nomothetic conception of developmental science has led to a constantly growing standardization which, when capturing the development process, suppresses the spontaneity and creativity of a young person or child. The content of *Recollection, Testimony and Lying* invites us to a critical trial of a personalistic conception of developmental science that should not only be cut down to its historic meaning but be seen as showing ways into a future where nomothetic and personalistic (ideographic) approaches can coexist side by side and equally.

References

- Behrens, H. & Deutsch, W. (1991). *Die Tagebücher von Clara und William Stern*. In: H.E. Lück & R. Miller (Hrsg.) *Theorien und Methoden psychologiegeschichtlicher Forschung* (S.67-76). Göttingen, Hogrefe.
- Deutsch, W.; Wagner, A.; Burchardt, R.; Schulz, N. & Nakath, J. (2001). *Person in the language of singletons, siblings and twins*. In: M. Bowerman & S.C. Levinson (Eds.) *Language acquisition and conceptual development* (pp. 284-315). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Meyer, T. (1914). *Aus einer Kinderstube. Tagebuchblätter einer Mutter*. Leipzig, Teubner.
- Stern, C., & Stern, W. (1909). *Erinnerung, Aussage, und Lüge in der ersten Kindheit*. Leipzig: Barth.
- Stern, C., & Stern, W. (1999). *Recollection, testimony, and lying in early childhood* (J. T. Lamiell, translator). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association Books.

Michelle D. Leichtman
University of New Hampshire
USA

Clara and William Stern's Prescient Observations of Early Memory Development

Clara and William Stern's (1909/1999) volume *Erinnerung, Aussage und Lüge in der ersten Kindheit* is arresting to consider from the perspective of modern research on memory development. Much of the volume focuses on relating the richly detailed, long-term daily observations and miniature "experiments" on memory that the Sterns conducted with their own three children and those of their acquaintances beginning in infancy. The scope of the Sterns' observations and insights about children's memory is vast, covering a wide range of theoretical and applied issues that researchers have grappled with in the intervening years.

The goal of this presentation is to evaluate the Sterns' work on early memory development in the context of contemporary research. To this end, I have selected four broad research questions about memory development that I believe to be among the most important the Sterns addressed, either directly or implicitly, in their volume. These include the following: 1.) Does memory contain functionally discrete subsystems (e.g., visual, auditory, autobiographical) that develop at separate rates, or is memory development the progression of a unitary whole? 2.) What is the developmental trajectory of early event memory, and how is this related to language development? 3.) Are young children's memories more vulnerable to suggestion than those of older children and adults, and, if so, why? 4.) What are the factors that contribute to individual differences in children's memory performance?

The Sterns' concern with these questions in the first decade of the 20th century is striking, because without exception they continue to inspire empirical scrutiny and debate among contemporary developmental and cognitive psychologists. For each question, I will first describe the Sterns' perspective, highlighting some of their relevant observations and

insights. I will then briefly describe how contemporary researchers have extended the Sterns' findings, noting consistencies and discrepancies between the earlier and more recent views. The analysis will underscore the contrast between the array of sophisticated methods (e.g., *fMRI*, regression analyses, large scale randomized designs) at the disposal of contemporary researchers and the extraordinarily careful, but simple "at home" methods the Sterns employed, often with equally rich results. As an example that is pertinent to Question 2 above, the Sterns describe with compelling precision the emergence of fragmented linguistic and behavioral event memories in the second and third years of life. Rigorously controlled modern developmental studies have now confirmed the pattern they foresaw, and EEG studies, coupled with behavioral batteries, have confirmed the contribution of frontal and hippocampal development to this process, while cross-cultural studies have assisted us in understanding its parameters. On this and many other issues, the Sterns appear to have possessed a crystal ball that allowed them to peer into the next 100 years of research. It is a bittersweet truth that until very recently, the researchers who carried on the lineage of their interests in children's memory did so without access to their very useful observations.

References

Stern, C. & Stern, W. (1909/1999). *Recollection, testimony, and lying in early childhood (Erinnerung, Aussage und Lüge in der ersten Kindheit)* (Translator J. T. Lamiell). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association Books.

James T. Lamiell
Georgetown University
Washington, DC

Erinnerung, Aussage und Lüge in der ersten Kindheit by Clara and William Stern: How Was It Judged In Its Time?

William Stern (1871-1938) was among the most prominent psychologists in the world during the first four decades of the 20th century. Much of his renown resulted from his contributions to the sub-discipline then called 'child psychology,' and one of the most significant of those contributions was a monograph co-authored with wife Clara and published in 1909 under the title *Erinnerung, Aussage und Lüge in der ersten Kindheit* (*Recollection, Testimony, and Lying in Early Childhood*; Stern and Stern, 1909, 1999). Inasmuch as this year marks the one-hundredth anniversary of the publication of that work, the time seems propitious for some historical reflections on the manner in which the work was received in its own time. This is the primary objective of the present contribution.

After briefly reviewing the empirical basis for and contents of *Erinnerung, Aussage und Lüge in der ersten Kindheit* (hereafter '*Erinnerung*'), I will concentrate in the duration of my talk on reviews of the Sterns' work that were published at the time. Through the generous assistance of William Stern's biographer, the Berlin psychologist Gerald Bühring (b. 1944; see Bühring, 1996), I have secured 19 German-language reviews of *Erinnerung*. Six of those reviews were published between 1909 and 1911, and thus offer commentary specifically on the original 1909 edition of the work.

The remaining 13 reviews were published between 1931 and 1933, and thus provide critical commentary not only on the core material that appeared in the first edition (and in two unrevised editions published in 1920 and 1922), but also on new material not

introduced until the fourth edition, which was published in 1931 (Stern and Stern, 1931). That new material consisted primarily of an introductory chapter in which William Stern brought to bear on the book's empirical contents the central concepts and principles of a comprehensive system of thought – a *Weltanschauung* – that he had by then thoroughly worked out under the name of *critical personalism* (see, e.g., Stern, 1917, 2009).

In my presentation, I will examine the reviews of the first and fourth editions of *Erinnerung* with particular concern for the following questions:

1. What did reviewers single out as especially noteworthy about *Erinnerung*?
2. What about the work was identified as problematic or deficient?
3. How did reviewers of the fourth edition find the introduction of the theoretical and philosophical material to have added to – or detract from – the importance of the book's contribution?

In discussing these questions, notice will also be taken of the professional backgrounds of the authors of the reviews and of the publications in which those reviews appeared.

In their introduction to the English translation of the original edition of *Erinnerung*, contemporary scholars Stephen J. Ceci and Maggie Bruck wrote: "Much of what [the Sterns] wrote in this monograph could, with very minor stylistic changes, be inserted into any modern text on memory development without the reader detecting the slightest hint of its antiquity. ... No matter which current issue in cognitive development you choose, it is covered in ... this monograph. It is a cornucopia of ideas that remain in the forefront of developmental psychology." (Stern and Stern, 1999, p. xii) Despite this high praise, William Stern remains unknown to most contemporary developmental psychologists (cf. Kreppner, 1992; Lamiell, 2009). It is hoped that this contribution, and the larger symposium of which it would be a part, will prompt further critical reflection on this unfortunate historical development, and on the potential relevance of personalistic thinking to contemporary research on cognitive development and on psychological phenomena more generally.

References

- Bühring, G. (1996). *William Stern oder Streben nach Einheit (William Stern or the quest for unity)*. Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Peter Lang.
- Kreppner, K. (1992). William L. Stern: A neglected founder of developmental psychology. *Developmental Psychology*, 28, 539-547.
- Lamiell, J. T. (2009). Some philosophical and historical considerations relevant to William Stern's contributions to developmental psychology. *Zeitschrift für Psychologie (Journal of Psychology)*, 217, 66-72.
- Stern, C., & Stern, W. (1909). *Erinnerung, Aussage und Lüge in der ersten Kindheit (Recollection, testimony, and lying in early childhood)*. Leipzig: Barth.
- Stern, C., & Stern, W. (1931). *Erinnerung, Aussage und Lüge in der ersten Kindheit (Recollection, testimony, and lying in early childhood)*, vierte völlig umgearbeitete Auflage. Leipzig: Barth.
- Stern, C. & Stern, W. (1999). *Recollection, testimony, and lying in early childhood* (Translator J. T. Lamiell). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association Books.
- Stern, W. (1917). *Die Psychologie und der Personalismus (Psychology and personalism)*. Leipzig: Barth.
- Stern, W. (2009). *Psychology and personalism* (Translator J.T. Lamiell). *New Ideas in Psychology*, forthcoming.

Florian Kiessling
University of Salzburg
Salzburg, Austria

Taking a closer look at children's early lies: What's behind the "pseudo" in "pseudo lies"?

Building on the rich material they gained from the observation of their three children, Clara and William Stern (1909) developed straightforward criteria to distinguish between lies and what they have termed "pseudo" lies. According to the Sterns, "Lies are (1) informed false statements (2) that are made with the intention to reach a specific goal (3) by means of deceiving others" (Stern, 1971, p. 493, own translation, numeration added).

Following from this definition, statements children make based on *false memories* or in the context of *fantasy play* (not following any deceptive intention) are classified as "pseudo" rather than "real" lies. So are children's *simple denials* when accused of a misdemeanour which are interpreted as affective responses (e.g., made out of fear to be punished) rather than as intentionally false statements. Hardly observing any instances of "real" lies in their own children, most of the examples the Sterns give for this category were observed around 4 years of age. "Pseudo" lies, on the other hand, were observed more often and with an earlier onset.

The criteria the Sterns have brought forward for a lie to be "real", as well as the age-range they report in their examples, fit well into a rich body of experimental research that has linked the capacity to lie to an understanding of counterfactual situations, or to be more specific, to an understanding of the representational nature of mental states (i.e., understanding of false beliefs).

To describe one paradigm in this research used by Sodian (1991) and Peskin (1992), children had to give truthful information to a *cooperative* puppet and to misinform a *competitive* puppet in order to get into possession of a valued object. In both experiments, 4 and 5 year olds were able to flexibly do so, whereas most 3-year olds failed by truthfully informing not only the cooperative but also the competitive puppet. That this finding cannot be explained by the 3-year olds' lack of motivation or lack of understanding the competitive nature of the game becomes evident in that most children tried to *physically* stop the competitive puppet from taking the object. Therefore it seems that although younger children knew what the competitor was up to, their limited understanding of other minds kept them from doing so by deceptive means.

Whereas the Sterns criteria for "real" lies has found its validation by the experimental findings just mentioned, earlier developments have continuously been neglected as "pseudo"-phenomena by later research. However, in recent years theory of mind research has shifted towards infants understanding of other minds, suggesting that infants in their second year of life can already pass false belief tasks (e.g., Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). Alongside this general shift of the field, the status of "pseudo"-lies has recently been questioned as well. Looking for earliest instances of deception in infants, Reddy and her colleagues (e.g., 2007) have adapted criteria to define cases of so-called *tactical deception* that originate from Byrne and Whiten's research with non-human primates and are summarized as follows: "An animal is made to misinterpret a situation", "by an agent who benefits from the misinterpretation", "using a behaviour deployed tactically- that is, not in the normal and expected way for the species" (Reddy, 2007, p. 5).

Using such criteria and therefore clearly bypassing the issue of knowledge of false beliefs, Reddy and her colleagues report instances of tactical deception in children as young as 8 months of age (e.g., concealment, distraction) from single case studies and diary studies with trained parents.

In my review of the “pseudo” lies as reported by the Sterns and more recently on early tactical deception, I will take a closer look at the “pseudo” in children’s early deception ending up with a discussion of present day positions in the debate about its onset and basis.

References

- Onishi, K.H., & Baillargeon, R. (2005). Do 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs? *Science*, 308, 255–258.
- Peskin, J. (1992). Ruse and representations: On children's ability to conceal information. *Developmental Psychology*, 28, 84-89.
- Reddy, V. (2007). Getting back to the rough ground: deception and “social living”, *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B.*, 362(1480), 621-637.
- Sodian, B. (1991). The development of deception in young children. *British Journal of Developmental Psychology*, 9, 173-188.
- Stern, C., & Stern, W. (1909). *Erinnerung, Aussage, und Lüge in der ersten Kindheit*. Leipzig: Barth.
- Stern, W. (1971). *Psychologie der frühen Kindheit* (1. Aufl. 1914, 10. unveränderte Auflage). Heidelberg: Quelle & Meier.

FAMOUS PEOPLE IN PSYCHOLOGY

David E. Leary

University of Richmond, USA

RALPH WALDO EMERSON IN THE LIFE AND WORK OF WILLIAM JAMES

There has been a good deal of comment in recent years about the similarity between Ralph Waldo Emerson’s thought and that of William James. However, this commentary has focused primarily on the common pragmatic thrust in their ways of thinking, and has been advanced primarily by literary critics and philosophers, such as Richard Poirier and Stanley Cavell. No systematic treatment of the influence of Emerson on James’s overall thought – on his psychology as well as his pragmatism – has been undertaken by historians of psychology or anyone else. As a result, the historical literature provides little insight beyond the general claim that James was “Emersonian” in his basic attitudes and concerns. This is typically interpreted to mean that he cared about the individual, that he concerned himself with matters pertaining to morality and transcendence, and that he urged the opening rather than closing of the American mind. The recognition of such commonalities, though accurate, has been based, to date, on fairly shallow readings, and suggestions about actual influence in these regards has relied primarily on the fact that Emerson was a friend of James’s father and his works were well known within the James family. Much more needs to be done – serious research, not just casual reading and comparison – if the roots and development of James’s work, in relation to Emerson’s thought, are to be fully understood.

In this paper, I will present archival as well as textual evidence (based on closer and deeper reading than has been typical with regard to the relationship between Emerson and James) that shows that James was Emersonian in a much more significant sense than has been appreciated. My argument will be that James was, in essence, the kind of “American scholar” that Emerson called for in his famous 1837 Phi Beta Kappa address at Harvard. James thought for himself, but more importantly, his thought always strove to reach beyond the merely empirical to the realm of more lasting import. Not only the source but also the terminus of his “stream of thought” (a concept that he derived from Emerson) reflected the letter as well as spirit of Emerson’s work. In addition, it was through Emerson that James made some of the more significant intellectual acquaintances that shaped his early development, and it was through consideration of Emerson’s thought, late in life, that he came to appreciate the focus as well as scope – the center as well as periphery – of what he was about.

This presentation will be based on a thorough analysis of James’s diaries, notebooks, letters, lectures, unpublished manuscripts, and publications, and also on hitherto unknown copies of Emerson’s works that were owned and annotated by James. (Harvard University has a set of James’s annotated copies of Emerson’s works, which I and others have conferred, but I have recently discovered another previously unknown set of Emerson’s works, which James owned and annotated, as well as a previously unknown copy of Emerson’s collected poetry, which he also marked.)

Since James was so important in the history of psychology, this presentation will, in effect, explain why Emerson deserves a more clearly defined place in the history of psychology. From James’s first substantive publication, “Remarks on Spencer’s Definition of Mind as Correspondence” (1868), which begins and ends with explicit though unnamed Emersonian statements, to James’s exclamation that “Emerson is exquisite!” when he was preparing his address for the centennial of Emerson’s birth (1903), I will show why James admitted that “the reading of the divine Emerson, volume after volume, has done me a lot of good, and. . .has thrown a strong practical light on my own path.”

Selected References

Cavell, Stanley (2003). *Emerson’s Transcendental Etudes*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Emerson, Ralph Waldo (1904). *Collected Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson* (Edward W. Emerson, Ed., 12 vols.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

James, William (1842-1910). *William James Papers*, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, U.S.A.

James, William (1975-1988). *The Works of William James* (Frederick Burkhardt, Ed., 19 vols.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Leary, David E. (1992). William James and the Art of Human Understanding. *American Psychologist* 47: 152-160.

Lewis, R. W. B. (1991). *The Jameses: A Family Narrative*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.

Perry, Ralph Barton. *The Thought and Character of William James* (2 vols.). Boston: Little, Brown, 1935.

Poirier, Richard. *Poetry and Pragmatism*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.

Richardson, Robert D. (1995). *Emerson: The Mind on Fire*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Richardson, Robert D. (2006). *William James*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Skrupskelis, Ignas K. & Elizabeth M. Berkeley (Eds.) (1992-2004). *The Correspondence of William James* (12 vols.). Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia.

Bob Rieber

John Jay College of Criminal Justice
USA

Fechner notes

“Great men and their unexpected insights are for the most part created ex post facto as mnemonic aids for the students of history,” declared the late E.G. Boring, the preeminent historian of experimental psychology. “I have always taken great interest in these flashes of insight that have important consequences; Fechner’s insight in bed, Descartes’ dream which started analytic geometry, Newton and the apple. Wertheimer getting off the train in Frankfurt because he had the Gestalt idea, and so on....” (Boring, 1966). Of this luminous group it was Gustav Theodor Fechner, the father of psychophysics, who exerted the most influence on the author of the monumental “Experimental Psychology,” which represents the epitome of science in psychology. And no wonder: Boring traced experimental psychology to Fechner’s work, even going so far as to institute an informal celebration of Fechner’s eureka moment – his first insight into the fundamental principle of psychophysics, which later became known as the Weber-Fechner Law – on October 22, 1850 – although he noted to one of his former students: “The importance of 22 October as Fechner Day is due, when it has any importance at all, presumably to my tongue-in-cheek advertisement of it.” (Rosenzweig, 1987) But Fechner, or rather his seminal work, *Elemente der Psychophysik* (*Elements of Psychophysics*) rendered in turgid, sometimes infuriatingly complex and discursive German, also proved to be an unanticipated burden to Boring in the last decade of his life as he sought to bring the theorist’s contribution to a wider, English-speaking readership. The task, at first blush relatively straightforward, turned out to be an exhaustive, frustrating and finally incomplete undertaking that has only been realized by the belated publication of the volume that you are holding in your hands.

Márk Bérdi
Budapest Technical University

The formulation and characteristics of Ferenc Mérei's psychoanalytical views
- a social-historical approach

Ferenc Mérei's (1909-1986) relation to psychoanalysis can truly said to be paradoxical. This is so in two ways: first, in a lifespan view, Mérei's attitude towards the psychodynamic theory went through a shift from total rejection to a distinctive acceptance, and second, on a theoretical level, this sympathy was not a dogmatic approval, but rather characterized by the revelation of particular psychoanalytical principles, and the adoption of them to his very own genuine thoughts. The Mérei of the 1940's and 1950's appears to us as a supporter of the communist thoughts, and a great offender of psychoanalysis. However, after five years of political imprisonment Mérei's views on the new doctrine started to change. In his book *Psychological Diary*, a part of it written during the prison years, he gives the detailed manifest analysis of 264 dreams of his own. He did so not in a classical self-analytical style, as Freud had presented it in the *Interpretation of Dreams*, but, showing the impact of French masters, like Janet, Mérei approached his dreams in a social context. As we can learn from the *Diary*, and the careful study of his later thoughts, besides accepting the basic psychodynamic principles, not in all part had he admitted to the deterministic role of the childhood experiences, indeed he suggested that later emotions (e.g. the love felt for someone) can cathect earlier contents (memories of childhood). In a familiar manner he showed the unconscious nature of his term *indication*. Besides the *Diary*, signs of Mérei's acceptance of the psychoanalytical thoughts, and the special way he adopted them, can be found in several areas: among the persons Mérei's thoughts greatly relied on psychoanalytical authors can be found such as Lipót Szondi and Imre Hermann; as a student of Henri Wallon Mérei represents a connection between Wallon's social-based self theory and the Hungarian psychoanalysis (the Budapest School); furthermore, in Mérei's psychology of art can also be found psychoanalytical explanations, shaping the core of some of his basic terms, such as *literary indication*. In our poster we are going to present this colorful and fruitful relationship of Mérei and the psychoanalysis.

Elizabeth R. Valentine
Royal Holloway, University of London

John Carl Flügel (1884–1955): Mediator and Visionary

This paper seeks to portray something of the significance of the life and work of John Carl Flügel, whose considerable influence though recognised during his lifetime, is now partially obscured for a number of reasons, including the ephemeral nature of some of his achievements⁸ and the fact that his vision extended far beyond the narrow confines of academic psychology. Best known as author of *The psychology of clothes*, during his lifetime Flügel was perceived by himself and his contemporaries as a mediator between psychoanalysis and orthodox psychology. More recently, his wider significance as a

central figure in the reform movement in the inter-war years in Britain has begun to be appreciated.

Flügel was a mediator both personally and theoretically. Personally, his exceptional interpersonal skills meant that he was often sought as a confidant and advisor,⁸ and frequently asked to perform the role of chair in potentially conflict-ridden situations.⁸ Theoretically, he acted as a “liaison officer between psychoanalysis and academic psychology”.⁸ During the early years of the twentieth century he occupied a unique position as the only practising psycho-analyst to hold a senior academic position in England.”⁸

Flügel played key roles in both the psychoanalytic movement and the British Psychological Society. He was a founder- and lifelong member of the British Psychoanalytic Society, Secretary of the International Psychoanalytic Association and assistant editor of the *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*. Although not a member of the ‘Secret Ring’, he was an analysand, friend and close colleague of Ernest Jones. Flügel served the British Psychological Society (BPS) successively as secretary, librarian, president, and chairman of the Social Psychology Section. It is widely believed⁸ that CS Myers was the architect of the restructuring of the BPS in 1919. However, according to Jones it was the work of himself and Flügel.⁸ TH Pear attributes it to CS Myers and Flügel.⁸ The latter’s role is also confirmed by Russell.⁸

Flügel had three major, mutually inter-related interests: psychoanalysis, clothes and reform. The tension between exhibitionism and modesty in the wearing of clothes intrigued him and was used to analyse differences in attitudes to clothes, such as those between the sexes. Flügel was a member of the Men’s Dress Reform Party (MDRP). Burman has argued convincingly that the MDRP is “fairly situated with a loose cluster of progressive individuals and groups whose reform agendas of the first third of the century ranged well beyond dress.”⁸ It was tinged by eugenics and vestiges of the nineteenth century Simple Life philosophy.

Carter has drawn attention to the fact that Flügel was a leading figure in the movement for liberal reform between the two world wars, even going so far as to claim that “When the final map of that epoch is drawn there is little doubt that the perambulations of J.C. Flügel will be central to determining the questions of who, where and when”.⁸ Flügel lived through two world wars and was in his prime during the inter-war years, a period of considerable despondency. His vision is described in his contribution to the *Manifesto* of the Federation of Progressive Societies and Individuals, of which he was a vice-president: “The ‘progressive’ aims at the establishment of a world order in which science, reason and individual freedom of thought and action together with the tolerance and understanding that these imply shall take the place of blind reliance on outworn loyalties, conventions, and taboos”.⁸ He supported eugenics, birth control, and the reform of the laws on divorce and homosexuality.

Flügel was concerned to apply psychology to social and world problems. He saw an over-active super-ego as the source of individuals’ problems and psychoanalysis as the solution to social ills, by revealing hidden forces and helping to replace blind obedience to archaic rules by rationality. *Man, Morals and Society* aimed to provide “a synoptic presentation of the findings of psycho-analysis as regards the psychological factors which enable man to be a moral animal ... in short, of the doctrine of the super-ego”.⁸ *Population, psychology and peace* discussed the need for a world-population policy

and how to deal with (especially psychological) aspects of the population problem that are likely to lead to war. His Conway Memorial Lecture addressed *The moral paradox of war*, i.e. the fact that it “elicits qualities which are agreed to be of the highest moral value and induces in the belligerent populations a sort of moral fervour which is hard to bring about by any other means”.⁸ The problem is to find way of retaining as many as possible of the virtues and moral satisfactions of war, while abolishing war itself. Flügel suggests that struggle with Nature should replace struggle against fellow man.

Insofar as the problems addressed by Flügel have not yet been fully resolved, his diagnoses and suggested remedies merit attention.

Bibliography

- Burman, B. (1995) “Better and brighter clothes”. The Men’s Dress Reform Party, 1929-40. *Journal of Design History*, 8, 275-90.
- Carter, M. (2003) J. C. Flügel and the nude future. *Fashion Theory: The Journal of Dress, Body & Culture* 7, 79-101.
- De Monchaux, C. (1955) Dr John Carl Flügel, 1884—1955. *Bulletin of the British Psychological Society*, No. 27, 2.
- Flügel, J.C. (1934) A psychology for progressives – how can they become effective? In CEM Joad (ed.) *Manifesto: Being the book of the Federation of Progressive Societies and Individuals*. Allen & Unwin.
- Flügel, J.C. (1941) *The moral paradox of peace and war*. London: Watts.
- Flügel, J.C. (1945) *Man, morals and society: A psycho-analytical study*. London: Duckworth.
- Flügel, J.C. (1947) *Population, psychology and peace*. London: Watts.
- Forrester, J. (2008) 1919: Psychology and Psychoanalysis. Cambridge and London: Myers, Jones and MacCurdy. *Psychoanalysis and History* 10(1), 37-94.
- Jones, E. (1956) J. C. Flügel. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 37(2), 193-94.
- Lovie, A.D. (2001) Three steps to heaven: How the British Psychological Society gained its place in the sun. In G. Bunn, A.D. Lovie & G.D. Richards (eds) *Psychology in Britain*. Leicester: BPS
- Pear, T.H. (1956) Dr John Carl Flügel. *British Journal of Psychology*, 47, 1-4.
- Richards, G. (2004) Flügel, John Carl (1884—1955). *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.
- Russell, R.W. (1956) John Carl Flügel, 1884—1955. *American Journal of Psychology*, 69, 328-29.

SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

Gordana Jovanovic
University of Belgrade

PSYCHOLOGY AND TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE SOCIAL

Subjectivity and society have become a problem with the instauration of the modern project in ways that have no historical precedence. Needless to say, this claim does not deny reflections on mental states, human actions, polis-state or divine state in previous historical times. However, subjectivity became a principle of the self-foundation of the modern epoch, instantiated most powerfully in the idea of an autonomous, rational subject. A complementary part of the self-foundational project of modernity was the question of community which became an issue in the realms of history, and therefore an object of reflection and practice of human subjects (Yar, 2002). From this perspective, it is argued that the modern epoch is the socio-cultural birthplace of psychology as it provided social and cultural conditions and structures where reflections on subjectivity and subject's practice are inevitably implicated.

Nevertheless, the discipline of psychology is characterized in the most part of its history by a striking social amnesia. In the mainstream it adopted epistemological models of the natural science in which there are no room and no means for social ontology or specificity of social human kinds. The ignored or even repressed social returns eventually in the form of a dominantly hostile opposite to a presupposed autonomous, asocial individual. To the adopted epistemological dichotomy subject-object, which deprives the object of the qualities of subject as a self-interpreting agency (Taylor, 1985) a dichotomy of individual-society has been added. What is striking in these historical hermeneutic configurations is the fact that in times when historically disenchanted nature became a mechanical device and when community lost its underpinnings in nature and became an issue of historical fabrication by individuals and groups, psychology (whose domains are both phenomena given in an epistemically privileged position of the first person and actions of subjects in an already interpreted world) has chosen nature as legitimization source. This is a kind of historical "Ungleichzeitigkeit" (dissonance) which requires further analyses, especially with regard to its socio-political implications.

Simultaneously an increasing psychologization of social and political issues is going on in modern societies (Sennett, 1976, Bauman, 1991, Rose, 1998, Parker, 2007). This striking discrepancy between the psychological naturalizing epistemological reflexion, on the one hand, and the psychologizing social practice, on the other hand, could be described in terms which Habermas (1968) used to assess both Marx and Freud in their self-understanding of theorizing, namely as a false self-understanding.

Psychology under postmodern conditions deploys a more complicate picture. The scientific self-understanding of psychology can and I will argue is accompanied by a practice which reproduces the same lack of reflexion implicated in scientism in general. Not only individual subjectivities are fabricated, the whole societies can be and are nowadays an issue of short-term projects defined in terms of technology, including also soft technologies of imagining and re-imagining identities, constructing memories and repressing experiences, appealing to community belongingness, mobilizing fear of incommensurability, isolation and excommunication. At the beginning of the modern epoch society was introduced into the realm of history, in postmodernity a disintegrated

social has become transformed into an object of technique and technology. The modern project has foreseen a central place for human subjects and therefore an inevitable role of psychology as a discipline whose subject-matter are experiences and actions of human subjects. There are quite contradictory assessments of the modern project – an unfinished project as defended by Habermas, (1985) or a failed project as discredited by postmodern authors. It would be worth analyzing ways in which psychology is implicated in the processes of discursive transformations of the social – in the form of “disappearance of the social” in social psychology (Greenwood, 2003) or interactionist reduction of the social to interpersonal relations only or in marketing the psychologization of the social and political issues. And these forms of transformations of the social, whose immanent feature is of interpretive, discursive kind, might play the decisive role in the diagnosed failure of the modern project. An important aspect of the problem is the lack or weakness of the means that would enable to put the society as a whole on the agenda of reclaimed modern project. This would be possible only if the horizon of society would be recognized as inevitable for psychological theorizing and practice.

Bibliography

- Bauman, Z. (1991). *Modernity and ambivalence*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Danziger, K. (1990). *Constructing the subject. Historical origins of psychological research*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Greenwood, J. (2003). *Disappearance of the social in American social psychology*. West Nyack, NY.: Cambridge University Press.
- Habermas, J. (1968). *Erkenntnis und Interesse*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- Habermas, J. (1985). *Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- Parker, I. (2007). *Revolution in psychology*. London, Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press.
- Rose, N. (1998). *Inventing ourselves*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sennett, R. (1974). *The fall of public man*. New York: Alfred Knopf.
- Taylor, Ch. (1985). *Human agency and language. Philosophical papers 1*. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press.
- Yar, M. (2002). From nature to history. *History of the Human Sciences*. Vol. 15/3, 53-73.

Dennis R. Bryson
Bilkent University, Ankara

The SSRC Research Committee on Personality and Culture, 1934-1940: Knowledge for Cultural Reconstruction

The Research Committee on Personality and Culture of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) took up the mantle of liberal social engineering as it attempted to formulate an innovative framework for the social sciences during the Great Depression

years. Thus, the Research Committee embraced and elaborated a social engineering approach involving the reorientation of American culture toward human needs and “cravings” and toward cooperative rather than competitive practices during the 1930s, while simultaneously encouraging the coordination of research on the relationship of the individual to society among an array of researchers in the life sciences and social sciences.

Constituted in the fall of 1934 as the successor committee to the SSRC’s Advisory Committee on Personality and Culture, the major thrust of the Research Committee’s research endeavors was directed toward the set of processes which researchers such as Mark A. May, Leonard Doob, and Gardner Murphy dubbed “socialization.” That is, emphasis was placed on the formation of personality by means of processes, such as child rearing and education, involving the adaptation of the personality to, and its interaction with, its sociocultural settings. A key focus of the Research Committee was put on the examination and assessment of research on socialization within primitive and modern communities, as well as within families, schools, regions, and other contexts. Significantly, the Research Committee stressed the interaction of the personality with its cultural environment, not simply the imposition of culture on the personality. Moreover, the Research Committee emphasized the individuality of the personality during its course of development. Hence, for the committee, the life history approach was a major concern. Most importantly, as we have seen above, the Research Committee coupled interdisciplinary research on personality and culture with efforts aimed at cultural reconstruction.

The Research Committee made major contributions to the field of personality and culture and to related fields during the 1930s. A number of important publications resulted from the committee’s efforts, and key concepts such as personality, socialization, and culture were elaborated and their interrelationships explored. While a comprehensive theoretical framework for the study of personality and culture did not emerge from the efforts of the Research Committee, fruitful approaches to the field were formulated. The contributions of the Research Committee’s Subcommittee on Competition and Cooperation were especially notable. These included John Dollard’s critical examination of various approaches for dealing with the life histories of individuals and the effort of Margaret Mead to come to an understanding of the relationship between character formation and social structure as these were related to competition and cooperation in primitive societies. Also notable was Barbara Burks’ investigation of the personality development of children. The following publications were a direct result of the Subcommittee on Competition and Cooperation’s sponsorship: John Dollard’s *Criteria for the Life History* (1935); a volume edited by Margaret Mead, *Cooperation and Competition among Primitive Peoples* (1937); and a monograph by Mark A. May and Leonard Doob, *Competition and Cooperation*, published as Social Science Research Council Bulletin No. 25 in 1937.⁸

Notwithstanding these achievements, there were significant limitations to the personality and culture approach as elaborated by the social scientists involved with the Research Committee and with related initiatives in the field during the 1930s. Generally, the social scientists engaged in the formulation of personality and culture tended to focus on the micro-social realm of child-rearing and education practices, that is, on the development of the personality within face-to-face contexts in the family, school, and neighborhood. The emphasis was on how the young human organism was inducted into social life and formed into a personality by means of the “socialization” process. The problem with this was that by focusing on the cultural micro-practices of child training, education, and other processes of socialization, the personality and culture approach tended to neglect the overarching structures of power and domination in society—

structures which certainly had great impact on the individual. As sociologist Alex Inkeles has suggested in a critical assessment of the culture and personality approach as elaborated by American social scientists, “the difficulty [with this field] arises from the more or less exclusive emphasis on the relation of personality to culture as against its relation to the functioning of major political and socio-economic institutions.”⁸

For my paper, I will utilize archival materials that I have examined at the Social Science Research Council Archives at the Rockefeller Archive Center in Sleepy Hollow, New York.

Selected Bibliography

Burks, Barbara and Mary Cover Jones. *Personality Development in Childhood. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development*, vol. 1, no. 4. Washington, D.C.: Society for Research in Child Development, 1936.

Darnell, Regna, Judith T. Irvine, & Richard Handler, eds. *Culture, The collected works of Edward Sapir, Volume 3*. Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1999.

Dollard, John. *Criteria for the Life History*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1935.

Fisher, Donald. *Fundamental Development of the Social Sciences*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993.

Frank, Lawrence K. “Society as the Patient.” *American Journal of Sociology* 42, no. 3 (November 1936).

Inkeles, Alex. “Some Sociological Observations on Culture and Personality Studies.” In *Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture*, eds. C. Kluckhohn and H. A. Murray, 2nd edn. New York: Knopf, 1955.

Lynd, Robert S. *Knowledge for What?* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939.

May, Mark A. and Leonard Doob. *Competition and Cooperation*. Social Science Research Council Bulletin no. 25. New York: SSRC, 1937.

Mead, Margaret, ed. *Competition and Cooperation among Primitive Peoples*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1961 (originally published in 1937).

Molloy, Maureen. *On Creating a Usable Culture: Margaret Mead and the Emergence of American Cosmopolitanism*. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i, 2008.

Pandora, Katherine. *Rebels within the Ranks: Psychologists’ Critique of Scientific Authority and Democratic Realities in New Deal America*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Patterson, Thomas C. *A Social History of Anthropology in the United States*. Oxford & New York: Berg, 2001.

Ross, Dorothy. *The Origins of American Social Science*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Singer, Milton. "A Survey of Culture and Personality Theory and Research." In *Studying Personality Cross-Culturally*, ed. Bert Kaplan. Evanston & New York: Row, Peterson and Co., 1961.

Sklansky, Jeffrey. *The Soul's Economy*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002.

Stocking, George W., Jr., ed. *Malinowski, Rivers, Benedict and Others: Essays on Culture and Personality*. Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1986.

Sullivan, Gerald. "Of Feys and Culture Planners: Margaret Mead and Purposive Activity as a Value." In *Reading Benedict, Reading Mead*, eds. D. Janiewski & L. W. Banner. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004.

Sullivan, Gerald. "A Four-Fold Humanity: Margaret Mead and Psychological Types." *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 40 (2004).

Wrong, Dennis H. "The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology." *American Sociological Review* 26, no. 2 (April 1961).

Tolon, Kaya
Iowa State University, U.S.A.

Futurism as Social Criticism

This essay studies the works of 1960s and 1970s futurists as social commentary of their time. Futurists were a diverse group that spanned across a multitude of disciplines and industries. Although hard to classify, they captured the attention of business managers, military officers, and academics alike. Meetings, institutions, and societies started to surface in the 1960s most of which had global agendas and/or topics. In the words of one futurist, they shared – more than ever – the belief that decisions made during their time needed to be “guided by a broad and penetrating understanding of future options.” For the historian, publications of these forecasters have a dual value: they provide an insight into what and how futurists studied possible futures, but perhaps more importantly these documents double as a genre of social commentary of their time.

The 1967 conference *Mankind 2000* in Oslo led to the emergence of the World Futures Studies Federation, which aspired to be a global organization by diversifying its content, membership, and annual conference locations. Contributors to the flagship journal *Futures* were both diverse in their origin and the content of their articles. Advocates of futures-thinking ranged from mathematicians to politicians; from managers to academics. They included RAND Corporation mathematicians, such as Olaf Helmer who was one of the principal architects of the Delphi Method, social critics such as Alvin Toffler, and even scientists such as Edward Teller and John Von Neumann.

The beginning of détente coincided with the outlook of many futurists that were increasingly preoccupied with peace studies, and social and humanitarian crises rather than military ones. Nevertheless, the gloomy scenarios in which the two superpowers exchanged nuclear attacks demarcated the global political paradigm. The duration, prevalence, social impact, and nature of the futures studies movement is complex, but it was a global movement that transcended the dichromatic political divisions of the Cold War.

Within this historical context, I will analyze the different ways in which futurists of the 1960s and 1970s criticized social values and processes of their time. Civilian and military planners advocated for the importance of long-range planning using a variety of forecasting methods such as scenario forecasting, Delphi Method, cross-impact analysis, simulation or war-games. Significantly, the goal was not simply to understand certain trends and identify potential problems, but to proactively change the future for the better. In many cases, as in Alvin Toffler's *Future Shock* where he advocated for an anticipatory democracy, criticism was overt. While Toffler aspired to change public policymaking, other futurists challenged technological, economic, or social processes, and some laid out the necessary steps to achieve such desired outcomes.

In other cases futurists' criticism of society was indirect. In discussions of better futures – and the values that make them better – historians can read in between the lines to find social commentary. For example, when discussing future transportation possibilities, Herman Kahn implied that the automobile was a harmful technology because it enabled youth to be sexually active. Similarly, some forecasts are valuable not for what they predicted – or the probability with which they predicted something – but that past futurists would have asked such questions in the first place. Thomas Edison's forecast that future factories would have no manual labor nicely illustrates this idea. More important than the forecast – or when he thought such a future might arrive – the fact that he concerned himself with such a question makes clear the emphasis on the rationalization of factories in the early twentieth century. Edward Teller's project Plowshare – plans to use hydrogen bombs for peaceful construction projects in Alaska – or Ford Motor Company's plans for the "Nucleon" – an atomic energy fueled automobile – are more important for understanding the place of nuclear power in the 1950s and 1960s, rather than how (or with what accuracy) Edward Teller or Ford engineers forecast such projects. The significance of these futurists was their belief in their forecasts, and also their belief in being capable of forecasting scientifically and objectively.

Bibliography (Work-in-progress)

Books (Primary Source)

- Drew, Elizabeth. *Senator*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979.
Helmer, Olaf. *Looking Forward*. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1983.
Hiltz, S. R. & Turoff, M. *The Network Nation*, Revised Edition, MIT Press, 1993.
Kahn, Herman & Bruce-Briggs, B. *Things to come; thinking about the seventies and eighties*. New York: Macmillan, 1972.
Sackman, H. *Delphi Critique*. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1975.
Shakhnazarov, Georgi. *Futurology Fiasco*. City: Imported Pubn, 1982.
Toffler, Alvin. *Future Shock*. New York: Random House, 1970.
_____. *The Futurists*. New York: Random House, 1972.

Books (Secondary Source)

- Abella, Alex. *Soldiers of Reason*. Boston: Mariner Books, 2009.

-
- Bell, Wendell. *Foundations of Futures Studies*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2003.
- Bright, J. R. *Practical Technology Forecasting*. Austin, TX, Technology Futures Inc., 1994.
- Collins, Martin J. *Cold War Laboratory*. Washington: Smithsonian, 2002.
- Gaddis, John. *We Now Know*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.
- Ghamari-Tabrizi, Sharon. *The Worlds of Herman Kahn*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005.
- Hargittai, Istvan. *Martians of Science*. City: Oxford University Press, USA, 2008.
- Mirowski, Philip. *Machine Dreams*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Porter, A., Roper A. T., Mason, T., Rossini, F., Banks, J. *Forecasting and Management of Technology*. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1991.
- Roland, Alex. *Military-Industrial Complex*. City: Amer Historical Assn, 2002.

Papers:

- Brockhaus L. W., & Mickelsen F. J. (1977) An Analysis of Prior Delphi Applications and Some Observations on its Future Applicability. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*. Vol. 10, pp. 103-110.
- Cyphert F. & Gant W. (1970) The Delphi Technique. *Journal of Teacher Education*, Vol 21, No3, p. 422.
- Dalkey, N.C. & Helmer, O. (1963, April). An Experimental Application of the Delphi Method to the User of Experts. *Management Science*, 9, 3, pp. 458-67.
- Dalkey, N.C. (1972). *The Delphi method: An experimental study of group opinion*. Retrieved on March 05, 2006 from: <http://www.rand.org/publications/RM/RM5888/RM5888.pdf>
- Fitch K., Bernstein S. J., Aguilar M. D., Burnand B., LaCalle J. R., Lazaro P., Loo, M., McDonnell, J., Vader, J. P., & Kahan, J. P. (2001). *The RAND/UCLA Appropriateness Method User's Manual*. Santa Monica, CA, RAND
- Fischer, Gregory W. (1981). "When oracles fail – a comparison of four procedures for aggregating subjective probability forecasts," *Organizational Behavior and Human Performance*, 28, pp. 96-110.
- Gupta, U.G., & Clarke, R.E. (1996). Theory and Applications of the Delphi Technique: A bibliography (1975-1994), *Technological Forecasting and Social Change* 53, pp. 185-211.
- Helmer, O. (1966). *The Delphi Method for Systematizing Judgments about the Future*. Los Angeles, Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of California. MR-61
- Lang, T. (1994) An Overview of Four Futures Methodologies (Delphi, Environmental Scanning, Issues Management and Emerging Issue Analysis) Retrieved on March 05, 2006 from: <http://www.soc.hawaii.edu/future/j7/LANG.html>
- Ludwig, B. (1997) Predicting the Future: Have you considered using the Delphi Methodology? Retrieved on March 05, 2006 from <http://www.joe.org/joe/1997october/tt2.html>
- Nelson, W. L. (1978). Statistical Manipulation of Delphi Statements: Its Success and Effects on Convergence and Stability. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change* 12, pp. 41-60.
- Rowe G. & Wright G. (1999) The Delphi technique as a forecasting tool: issues and analysis. *International Journal of Forecasting*, 15, pp. 353-375.

-
- Scheibe, M., Skutsch, M., & Schofer, J. (1975). Experiments in Delphi methodology. In Linstone, H. A. & Turoff, M. (Eds.). *The Delphi method: Techniques and applications* (pp. 262- 287). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Scheele, D. S. (1975). Consumerism Comes to Delphi: Comments on Delphi Assessment, Expert Opinion, Forecasting, and Group Process by H. Sackman. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change* 7, 215-219.

Journals and Newspapers:

- *The New York Times*
- *The Futurist* (1967-)
- *Futures Research Quarterly* (1985-)
- *Futures* (1968-)
- *Futures Bulletin* (1975-)
- *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* (1957-)
- *Technological Forecasting and Social Change* (1969-)
- *Journal of Futures Studies* (1996-)
- *Technology assessment and forecast* (1973-1975)
- *Journal of cold war studies* (1999-)

Other:

United States National Intelligence Council (NIC) forecasts and policy recommendations
http://www.foia.cia.gov/nic_geo.asp

PARAPSYCHOLOGY, OCCULTISM, SPIRITUALISM

Emese Lafferton

Science Studies Unit
University of Edinburgh

Experimentalizing Hypnosis in Hungarian Psychiatry in the 1880s-1890s

Much attention has been paid to the social context and rich cultural meanings of medical hypnosis in the last decades of the nineteenth century, especially - though not exclusively - in the French context. It has been shown how this greatly fashionable line of research and therapeutic practice enabled psychiatry to take part in and generate an intense cultural interchange between diverse spheres of late-nineteenth century intellectual and social life. Yet relatively little effort has been made to understand hypnosis research as a larger experimental project launched in the period when the psychiatric profession was still struggling to gain credibility and status among the medical disciplines. Hypnosis research thus reveals central professional anxieties over the 'scientific' underpinnings of psychiatry.

My paper recovers the culture of hypnotic experimentation conducted in Hungarian psychiatric and internal clinics and presented at the Royal Society of Medicine and other scholarly forums in the 1880s-1890s. By focusing on the concrete experiments and ensuing debates, the paper discusses controversies over issues of scientific objectivity, reliability of the technique of hypnosis, questions of proof, the problem of replication in

the experimental setting, as well as medico-ethical concerns around psychiatric practice. Through the analysis, I also demonstrate how social judgements and values shaped the epistemological basis of psychiatric knowledge and how the experiments ended up testing the social order itself, rather than any natural phenomenon. Finally, placing the experiments in the wider professional context, I explain the emerging opposition against hypnosis as a clash between two forms of life and psychiatric cosmologies: those of the university psychiatric clinic and the asylum. Hypnosis research may thus prove to be an important area of psychiatry where the intrusion of the manipulative techniques, objectifying strategies and 'dissecting' methods of the experimental research employed on humans ran into a dead end due to considerable professional opposition.

Selected Bibliography

- Crabtree, Adam. *From Mesmer to Freud. Magnetic Sleep and the Roots of Psychological Healing*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993.
- Darnton, Robert. *Mesmerism and the end of the Enlightenment in France*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968.
- Didi-Huberman, Georges. *Invention de l'hystérie: Charcot et l'iconographie photographique de la Salpêtrière*. Paris: Macula, 1982.
- Ellenberger, Henri. *The discovery of the unconscious: the history and evolution of dynamic psychiatry*. New York: Basic Books, 1970.
- Gauld, Alan. *A History of Hypnotism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Goetz, C.G., Bonduelle, M., & Gelfand, T. Charcot: *Constructing neurology*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Goldstein, Jan. *Console and classify: the French psychiatric profession in the nineteenth century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- Harrington, Anne. "Hysteria, Hypnosis, and the Lure of the Invisible: The Rise of Neo-Mesmerism in *Fin-de-Siècle* French Psychiatry." In *The Anatomy of Madness. Essays in the History of Psychiatry*. vol. 3., ed. W. F. Bynum, Roy Porter, and Michael Shepherd, 226-246. London: Tavistock, 1988.
- _____. "Metals and Magnets in Medicine: Hysteria, Hypnosis and Medical Culture in fin-de-siècle Paris," *Psychological medicine* 18 (1988): 21-38.
- Harris, Ruth. "Melodrama, Hysteria and Feminine Crimes of Passion in the fin-de-siècle." *History Workshop*, Iss. 25 (1988): 31-63.
- _____. *Murders and Madness: Medicine, Law and Society in the Fin de Siècle*. Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1989.
- Micale, Mark. *Approaching hysteria: disease and its interpretations*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995.
- Winter, Alison. *Mesmerized. Powers of Mind in Victorian Britain*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998.

Psychical Research and Parapsychology Interpreted: An overview of scholarly interpretations of the history of scientific investigation into 'paranormal phenomena'

Although as late as 1985 Oppenheim referred in her study to psychical research as a 'pseudoscience', nowadays it is deemed ahistorical and presentistic when psychical research and its successor, parapsychology, are not being studied in their own historical and cultural context. In this paper an overview is given of the scholarly accounts of the history of psychical research and parapsychology to argue for a new direction in the historiography of the subject: one that is centred upon the relation between parapsychology and psychology throughout the 20th century in the Netherlands.

The first accounts of the history of psychical research and parapsychology were written by insiders who either felt they needed to defend the research into 'paranormal' phenomena against allegations of fraud or were the ones making this allegations themselves.⁸ The discussion about the validity of the results of the experiments and the reality of the proof for the existence of paranormal phenomena appears to be a never-ending one and is also persistent in the first historical accounts.

Developments within the field of the social sciences and humanities made psychical research and parapsychology a respectable subject for more unbiased scholarly attention. Kuhn's ideas regarding scientific revolutions showed the relativity of the ideas of demarcation in science and thus the practical and contextual aspects of science were emphasized. This led to a whole new field of studies: the sociology of science and knowledge. Regarding the subject of parapsychology, these sociologists hoped to be able to witness a 'live' scientific revolution. But not only interest in the contemporary development of parapsychology was stimulated; the history of psychical research and parapsychology was taken to be of interest as well. The first attempts were made to put psychical research and parapsychology into their historical and cultural contexts, mostly by showing how these new fields of investigation filled the gap in between science and religion. In the paper it is shown that some of these historical studies were more successful in this enterprise than others.

Gradually, psychical research and parapsychology (and related fields) were not viewed as marginal or deviant sciences but as central to the culture in which they emerged. In the last ten years or so a growing number of historians have concentrated their scholarly activities hereon. These studies try to show for example that scientific concepts such as 'telepathy' do not emerge in a scientific vacuum but in a matrix of social and cultural influences, or that in its specific period and culture deviant sciences were very much part of the discussion what constitutes science, or that occult sciences are very much concerned with the development of the idea of self that first emerged at that specific time.

Psychical research and parapsychology appear firmly rooted in their cultural and historical context in the most recent historical accounts. However, the scientific context has received far less attention. Certainly, the intertwinement between psychical research and physics has been thoroughly researched,⁸ but the connection between parapsychology and psychology has received far less attention. In the majority of the literature the opinions of Freud, Janet and Jung regarding psychical research and their involvement in

the field is cited (briefly), but a full analysis of the stances psychology and parapsychology held towards each other is currently lacking.

The word parapsychology is used deliberately here, for the majority of the literature is more concerned with psychical research than with parapsychology. Most studies focus on the second half of the 19th century – sometimes extended towards the 1930s or 1940s – when the term parapsychology had not yet fully replaced the older term psychical research. Apart from a handful sociologists, not one recent scholar has fully researched the developments of parapsychology after the second world war. It is in the 20th century that the field of psychology is getting truly professionalized and it is worthy of investigation to see how psychology related then to the development of parapsychology as a scientific (sub)discipline.

Not only does most of the literature share an interest for the same period, the majority concentrates on the Anglo-Saxon world as well. There are certainly a few noteworthy exceptions, but in the paper it is argued that more emphasis on the developments in other countries is much needed. Especially because the situation in other countries is sometimes very unique. In the Netherlands not only were pioneering psychologists such as Gerard Heymans actively involved in experiments into telepathy, the first professor in parapsychology in the world (W.H.C. Tenhaeff) was appointed in 1953 at Utrecht University and in the 1970s and 1980s parapsychology had at Utrecht University its own research laboratory in the division of psychology. Arguably, the unique situation in the Netherlands deserves scholarly attention and would make an interesting case to investigate the much neglected connections between the fields of psychology and parapsychology in the 20th century.

Short bibliography

Beloff, John, *Parapsychology: a concise history*. (London: Athlone Press, 1993).

Collins, Harry M., and Trevor J. Pinch, *Frames of Meaning: the social construction of extraordinary science*. (London, 1982).

Dingwall, Eric John, *Very Peculiar People Portrait Studies in the Queer, the Abnormal and the Uncanny*. (New York: University Books, 1962).

Gauld, Alan, *A History of Hypnotism*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

---, *The Founders of Psychical Research*. (Michigan: Schocken Books, 1968).

Hall, Trevor H., *The Spiritualists: The Story of Florence Cook and William Crookes*. (New York: Helix Press, 1962).

---, *The Strange Case of Edmund Gurney*. (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1964).

Inglis, Brian, *Natural and Supernatural: A History of the Paranormal from Earliest Times to 1914*. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977).

---, *Science and Parascience: A History of the Paranormal, 1914-1939*. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1984).

Luckhurst, Roger, *The Invention of Telepathy, 1870-1901*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Mauskopf, Seymour H., and Michael R. McVaugh, *The Elusive Science: Origins of Experimental Psychical Research*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).

Monroe, John Warne, *Laboratories of Faith: Mesmerism, Spiritism, and Occultism in Modern France*. (Ithaca: Cornell Univ Pr, 2008).

Moore, Robert Laurence, *In Search of White Crows: Spiritualism, Parapsychology, and American Culture*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).

Noakes, Richard, "The "bridge which is between psychical and psychical research": William Fletcher Barrett, sensitive flames, and Spiritualism." *History of Science* 42, no. 4 (December 2004): 419-464.

Noakes, Richard J., "Telegraphy is an occult art: Cromwell Fleetwood Varley and the diffusion of electricity to the other world." *British Journal for the History of Science* 32, no. 115 (December 1999): 421-459.

Oppenheim, Janet, *The Other World: Spiritualism and Psychical Research in England, 1850-1914*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

Owen, Alex, *The Darkened Room: Women, Power, and Spiritualism in Late Victorian England*. (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1989).

---, *The Place of Enchantment: British Occultism and the Culture of the Modern*. (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2004).

Sawicki, Diethard, *Leben mit den Toten: Geisterglauben und die Entstehung des Spiritismus in Deutschland 1770-1900*. (Paderbron: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2002).

Wallis, Roy, ed., *On the margins of science: the social construction of rejected knowledge*. (Keele: University of Keele, 1979).

Julia Gyimesi
Institute of Psychology
Hungarian Academy of Science

Occultism and Medical Materialism in the Early History of Psychology

One of the main aims of 19th century's scientific psychology was to analyze the psyche in a rational way corresponding to the demands of medical materialism. Implicitly, this ambition determined not only the methods of the young science of psychology, but also required a radical redefinition of the psyche and psychical phenomena. As a result of this, the psyche represented by scientific psychology had to distance itself from every kind of transcendence rooted either in traditional Western religions or the modern occult movement. However, scientific psychology was not always able to fulfill this task and indirectly created conditions for a discourse in which the transcendent and medical

interpretations of the psyche were confronted. In the early history of psychology the former contradictions are quite clear (Ellenberger, 1970, Devereux, 1973), and in a broader sense they point at the question of the compatibility of religious and scientific viewpoints.

Interestingly, the opposition of transcendent and medical interpretations of the human psyche was especially determinant in the field of modern occultism⁸. It is less known that in the second part of the 19th century the young science of psychology started a fruitful cooperation with some trends of the modern occult movement. This cooperation has been a less emphasized aspect of the history of psychology until now despite the fact that many school founder psychologists played an active role in the occult movement (Cerullo, 1982, Treitel, 2004, Owen, 1989, 2004). In the cooperation and later separation of psychology and occultism a kind of secularization of the human psyche appeared which preferred rational and medical explanations instead of theories based on transcendence.

The nineteenth-century scientific and non-scientific interest in occult phenomena played a fundamental role in the history of psychology, since the examination of the occult called attention to the possible dissociation of the psyche. The theories of subconscious or subliminal tendencies were strongly connected with the latter dissociation. The occult roots of these theories are clearly identifiable in several cases (for example in the theories of Frederic Myers (1903)), though the systematical examination of the question is still missing.

The aim of my paper is to outline the influences of occultism and medical materialism in the early history of psychology. Psychoanalysis would play a central role in my presentation, since it offered a medicalized and scientific explanation of the unconscious (Freud, 1900, 1915). Although the academic reception of the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious was full of contradictions in Freud's time, his biologically based theory suited the demands of scientific materialism which determined 19th century's scientific thinking about the psyche (Freud, 1912). Therefore, the Freudian concept of the unconscious could split off the spiritualist or transcendent meaning of the unconscious, and met the demands of medical materialism with the theory of sexuality.

On the other hand, the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious remained suitable to introduce a reasoning based on a kind of speculative philosophy evading positivist science. Furthermore, several leader figures of psychoanalysis (e.g. Sigmund Freud, (1922) Carl Gustav Jung (1902), Sándor Ferenczi (1899)) were involved in popular occultism and their interest created a remarkable dynamism of medical materialism and occultism in the evolution of psychoanalytic theory.

Using a historical approach, I would focus on the tension of the occultism and medical materialism in and beyond psychoanalysis. The aim of my presentation is to outline the influences of occultism and medical materialism in the psychological thinking of the late 1800s and early 1900s. This approach of the history of psychology would pose the question of progress and demarcation in psychology in a wider, interdisciplinary context.

References

- Cerullo, J. J.** (1982): *The Secularization of the Soul: Psychological Research in Modern Britain*. Philadelphia, Institute for Studies of Modern Issues.
- George Devereux** (ed.) (1973): *Psychoanalysis and the occult*. IUP, New York.
- Ellenberger, H. F.** (1970): *The Discovery of the Unconscious. The History and the Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry*. London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press.

-
- Ferenczi S.** (1899): Spiritizmus. In: *Gyógyászat* 30:477-479.
- Freud, S** (1900): The Interpretation of Dreams. In: *The Standard Edition of Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Trans. and ed. James Strachey in collaboration with Anna Freud, London, The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-analysis. 1953-1974. Vol. 4-5.
- Freud, S.** (1912): A Note on the Unconscious in Psycho-Analysis. In: *SE* 12: 255-267.
- Freud, S.** (1915): The Unconscious. In: *SE* 14: 159-217.
- Freud, S.** (1922): Dreams and Telepathy. In: *SE* 18: 195-221.
- Jung, C. G.** (1902): On the Psychology and Pathology of So-Called Occult Phenomena. *Collected Works*, 1:3-81. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.
- Myers, F.** (1903): Introduction to "Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death. http://ISS Introduction to Human Personality Frederic W_H_Myers.htm
- Owen, A.** (1989): *The Darkened Room: women, power and spiritualism in the late nineteenth century England*. Camden Town, London: Virago.
- Owen, A.** (2004): *The Place of Enchantment. British Occultism and the Culture of the Modern*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London.
- Treitel, C.** (2004): *A Science for the Soul. Occultism and the Genesis of the German Modern*. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London.

Elisabet Vilaplana Traveria
 Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

Amalia domingo and the light of spiritualism in barcelona

During the second half of the nineteenth century, spiritualist ideas arrived to Barcelona through the secret commerce of books coming from France. Using the commercial connections of Barcelona's harbor, books like A. Kardec's *Le Livre des Esprits* entered Spain. Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, Spiritualism spread among Catalan society behind the clandestine promotion of several social actors, mainly booksellers, editors and spiritual leaders.

Among the ones who dedicated themselves to popularize spiritualist beliefs in Spain we find Amalia Domingo Soler as an outstanding figure. Her biography shows her singular life starting in difficult and poor conditions in Seville, leading finally to her role as spiritualist leader in the area near Barcelona. Domingo played a decisive role in the spreading of spiritualism within the working class of the industrialized city of Barcelona. Her strong moral convictions combined with a nearly romantic and empathetic sensibility helped her to connect with other people, spreading hope and distributing psychological comfort to the suffering.

Although Amalia, as many other spiritualist of that time tried to connect spiritualism with modern science, for Amalia spiritualism was mainly a new religion and a philosophy of life helping people to grow stronger and get better. She was not very interested in the physical phenomena produced in the spiritualist sessions. Admitting that at some sessions fraud it committed, she and her group were looking for the teachings coming from the world of spirits, in an attempt to reach spiritual perfection in their way to God, following Kardec's doctrine.

While the spiritualist ideas and practices were spreading, the conservative wing of the Catholic Church identified them as enemies and classified their members as heretics. The inquisitive acts organized represent attempts of the Catholic Church to demonstrate their political and social power and predominance. In one of these acts taking place in Barcelona in 1861 after discovering one of the huge book loads transported by ship about three hundred of forbidden spiritualist books were burned in one of the city parks (Parc de la Ciutadella). Interestingly, these kind of acts induced strong protests by part of the citizens attending the event, increasing the readership of this kind of literature between the general public.

Moreover, towards the end of the nineteenth century a vigorous public controversy took place between a leader of one of the Catalan spiritualist groups, namely Amalia Domingo, and the leader of the conservative section of the Spanish Catholic church, namely, Manterola.

In the present paper I will take a look at how this verbal conflict between Manterola and Amalia took place, how they argue and how this clash ends. It is clear from what we said that the conflict was started by part of the priest attacking spiritualism. Nevertheless her social origin and her condition as woman, Amalia turns out to be able to exhibit strength and strong convictions throughout this confrontation. A part from the analysis of arguments that were exchanges I will also take into consideration the historical context and the social issues involved like the connection between the female emancipation movement and social protest.

Bibliography

- Brandon, R. (1983). *The spiritualists. The passion for the occult in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
- Correa A. (2002). Historia de una heterodoxa. In Domingo, A. *Cuentos espiritistas*. Madrid: Clan Editorial.
- Domingo, A. (1880). *El espiritismo refutando los errores del catolicismo romano*. San Martín de Provensals: Imprenta de Juan Torrens y Compañía.
- Domingo, A. (1912). *Memorias de una mujer*. Barcelona: Editorial Ameila Boudet, 1990.
- Kardec, A. (1857). *El libro de los espíritus*. Barcelona: Edicomunicación, 1998.
- Manterola, V. (1879). *El Satanismo, o sea la Cátedra de Satanás combatida desde la Cátedra del Espíritu Santo: refutación de los errores de la escuela espiritista*. Barcelona: Tipografía de Espasa Hermanos y Salvat.

RELATED BRANCHES OF KNOWLEDGE

Christian G. Allesch

Paris-Lodron-Universität, Salzburg

Phenomenology and Aesthetics – A historical perspective

The impact of phenomenological approaches on the aesthetic theorising of the 20th century was rather weak. The reason for that does not lie in a theoretical weakness of this approach but in particular historical circumstances: Important representatives of phenomenological aesthetics – like Moritz Geiger – had been forced to emigrate or were not in the position to keep a suitable academic position.

This is deplorable because phenomenological aesthetics turned out to be a plausible solution to a burning controversy of that time, namely the debate on an ‘empirical’ or ‘critical’ (philosophical) foundation of aesthetics. It continued the empirical tradition of Fechner’s ‘aesthetics from below’, but tried to find a compromise with the aims and intentions of traditional philosophical aesthetics.

The arguments of this paper will be primarily based on the writings of Moritz Geiger (1880-1937), who at the one hand supported an empirical approach to aesthetic phenomena but, on the other hand, admitted that the ‘naturalistic’ conception of experimental psychology could not come up to the peculiarity of aesthetic experience. In his view, an aesthetic object cannot be conceived in terms of elementary perceptions, ‘stimuli’, and association. In this respect, Geiger’s concept of psychological aesthetics comes very close to the intentions of Gestalt psychology but goes beyond them by including the aspects of subjectivity and of the cultural context.

My paper will also give attention to the writings of Roman Ingarden, Rudolf Odebrecht, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and other representatives of the phenomenological movement.

Bibliography

- Allesch, Christian G. (1987). *Geschichte der psychologischen Ästhetik*. Göttingen: Hogrefe.
- Allesch, Christian G. (2006). *Einführung in die psychologische Ästhetik*. Wien: Wiener Universitätsverlag.
- Geiger, Moritz (1921). Ästhetik. In P. Hinneberg (Hrsg.), *Systematische Philosophie* (= Die Kultur der Gegenwart, Teil I, Abt. 6), 3. Aufl. (S. 311–351). Leipzig: Teubner (Nachdruck in Geiger, 1976, S. 84–124).
- Geiger, Moritz (1976). *Die Bedeutung der Kunst. Zugänge zu einer materialen Wertästhetik. Gesammelte, aus dem Nachlass ergänzte Schriften zur Ästhetik*, hrsg. v. K. Berger und W. Henckmann. München. Fink.

Irene Leopoldoff-Martin

Geneva University, Switzerland

A search of a lost science through the journal “Pedologija”

Our contribution explores the last years of paedology in USSR, a promising new science dedicated to child. We are aiming at an historical reconstruction of the discipline's short destiny from 1928, year of the first paedological Congress to 1936, when paedology, after falling suddenly on disgrace, became a forbidden science by a Resolution of the Central Party Committee. Due to this resolution, paedological literature was banished; and paedologists repressed. The word itself became a taboo, often removed from texts, sometimes replaced by the term “psychology” or “pedagogy”. The energy used to erase systematically all written traces was unusual: Fradkin (1990) speaks of a “Science murder”.

What did this science represent in the Russian context and which kind of relationship did it sustain with other sciences and politics? Who were the protagonists involved in paedology? Why did this essential discipline to study the child and its development process become a pseudo science? The emergence of a science is not a coincidence; it corresponds to some specific needs in a specific historical context. The genesis of paedology leans on the rising of the experimental research on the child at the end of the 19th century. The discipline had the same fate in the West and in USSR: a spectacular expansion and a rapid decline. But the stakes were different, as the causes to die out. The educational stakes in the 1920s in Soviet Union were of a rarely equaled large scale. After seven years of international conflicts, revolution, civil war and famine (1914-1921), one priority was the reintegration into society of hundreds thousand children and teenagers, (*bezprizorniki*) left on their own by these sequential events, in a country itself disintegrated, weakened and in search of marks. A project of fast and radical reconstruction had to be started, compatible with the ambitions of the young socialist nation. Paedology served the socio-political plan with expectations of an efficient education policy. In quest of solutions, it afforded this science a direct experiencing to the creation of a “New Man”, linking theoretical research to practice in the educational system. The main source of our study is the Moscow scientific journal “Pedologija” (1928-1932). The journal was born at the beginning of year 1928, after the First Congress of Russian paedology, on official decision, with the support of Bukharin, a prominent Party leader, Lunatcharsky, the People's Commissar for Education and Krupskaja, leader of pedagogical science. This Congress had been set up for the promotion and the institutionalization of the paedological discipline. First publications of “Pedologija” were favorably welcomed and had already 1500 subscribers in 1929. Eminent scientists like Blonsky, Zalkind, Basov, and Vygotsky, focused on child's development, were some leading partners of “Paedologija”.

The methodology in order to reconstitute the expansion and rapid decline of paedology leans mainly on the analysis of the journal “Pedologija”. It contains a considerable amount of precious empirical and statistical information for our historical but as well epistemological reconstruction.

We will present our analysis in four steps

- 1) A general description of the journal : size, publication, aimed public
- 2) The protagonists involved: the redactors, the scientific committee, the authors allow us to determine the representatives playing an active role on the paedological scene during that period.

-
- 3) The analysis of the table of contents gives an overview the themes developed in the specific socio-historical context
 - 4) A qualitative analysis of the main theoretical streams present in the journal. An illustration will be given through extracts of articles selected and translated by us revealing the opposite or complementary theoretical streams, and the criticisms against some authors. This diversified sample of texts will show in sketch what the Russian paedology could indeed look like few years before being repressed.

Our synthesis in clarifying as much as possible, the object of this “ghost” science reveals strong ideological and epistemological tensions between paedologists, subjected in early thirties to a series of virulent criticisms and self-criticism which go crescendo. A toughening and a politicization of the speeches can be noticed after the first congress on the study of the human behavior held in January 1930. But beyond these considerations, some traces of a real collaboration in practices between paedologists and pedagogists can be perceived, with a standpoint focused on child development process as starting point for a social project of human emancipation. That can explain why Vygotsky and other brilliant scientists turned towards paedology, allowing them for a short time to make research strongly linked to practical work and needs, by mobilizing knowledge outside the experimental laboratory.

Fradkin, F.A. (1990). *A search in Pedagogics*. Moscow : Progress Publishers.

Van der Veer, R. & Valsiner, J. (1991). *Understanding Vygotski. A quest for synthesis*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Anikó Nyitrai-Sükösd and Péter Bodor
University Eötvös Lóránd, Budapest

Exploring Political Psychiatry in Hungary during the State-Socialist Period

A history of a science encompasses a history of a profession, including professional practice. In the paper we present our preliminary findings on a peculiar aspect of a professional practice, on the working of political psychiatry in Hungary during the so called State-Socialist period.

First we will describe some features of psychology and psychiatry which could lie behind the special *vulnerability of these professions to political influence*.

Then we will present our finding with regard the mechanisms and effects of political psychiatry in Hungary. Following Modor (2002), we have conducted further archival research in the *Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security*. Furthermore, we have interviewed some elderly psychiatrists, and analyzed some relevant autobiographies as well. We were able to recover three cases of hospitalization and psychiatric treatment which were possibly cases of political psychiatry. One of the most salient common feature in these cases is that the involved people were not only continuously opposed and criticized the political system, but they even issued complaints toward various authorities, including foreign, especially “Western” organizations.

We found relatively few equivocal cases which attest political influence on psychiatry. In this way our data is in opposition to the accounts on the Soviet and the Chinese situation (Munro, 2000). One possible reason of this difference could lie in the fact that the political psychiatry was not properly institutionalized in Hungary. Nevertheless, the cases we recovered and the interviews we conducted both indicate that political psychiatry was present in Hungary. Further research can shed more lights on the institutional mechanism of occasional abuse of psychiatry and on the abuses the allegedly insane persons were exposed to.

In our view three major effects of political psychiatry can be differentiated with regard to Hungary. First, we can talk about a *direct effect of political psychiatry* which comprised of isolation, torturing and discrediting specific persons. Second, there certainly was an *indirect effect of political psychiatry* on the wider public functioning as a diffuse controlling device. This effect was exerted through hearsays about the possibility of taking those people to mental hospital that were openly resistant to the mainstream political ideology. Third, a *long term effect of political psychiatry* can be identified as well. When we approached some members of the relatively younger generation of psychiatrists and tried to talk with them on the issue of political psychiatry during the Socialist era, our interlocutors were generally reluctant, showed a kind of ambivalence and even open denial. Here we have a case where the past clearly influence present. Thus, it seems to us, that the political psychiatry as a sad and largely unwritten chapter of the past history of a profession has an impact on its present, on the contemporary psychiatry.

SCHOOLS OF PSYCHOLOGY ON A SOCIAL SETTING

Arthur Arruda Leal Ferreira; Fernando Machado; Felipe Hautequest
Institut of Psychology- UFRJ – Brasil

Governmental practices and radical behaviorism: from Walden II. to Los Horcones

This work aims to reflect about the governmental practices present in Los Horcones, a Mexican community inspired in the Skinnerian utopia, Walden II. For this purpose, Foucault (2007)'s concept of government - considered as a way of "human conduct of conduct"- will be resorted to. Government will be therefore understood as a way of managing each and everyone's life. Nikolas Rose (1998)'s work will also be used aiming to understand the relations between governmentality and psychology, defining this knowledge as an assemblage of inscription techniques and practices linked to devices for managing private life in democratic societies. This framework promotes the understanding of Los Horcones as a radical development of a liberal governmental technique, to a certain level standing out from and overlapping the State. In this new kind of management, government is defined as a technocracy, present in the scientific knowledge of the governed people, governing them by their own liberty, stimulating their own self-regulation. These new governmental techniques are very different from the older ones such as the sovereigns (based in juridical and legal devices) and disciplinarians (based on the constant register and control of the governed actions across time and space). The forms of liberal government manage the population through its spontaneous and natural fluctuations, thus stimulating its self-regulation. A great number of psychological practices work in this manner, but also the "experimental communities" planned by Skinner as "Walden II". Here, the sovereign forms of government are also put in question,

including democracy understood as a tyranny of the majority. In Walden II a kind of technocracy undertaken by managers and planners is proposed, intending to be aware of the general laws of behavior, stimulating a great number of self-control devices in several domains such as work, education, and marital relations. But the transition from Walden II Utopia to real communities like Los Horcones (birth in 1973) presents a history of change and an experimentation of governmental techniques: first, the ones proposed by Skinner in Walden II; second, democracy; and, third, the so-called personocracy. Here the initial system of planners and managers are reconsidered in a new fashion with decisions after community meetings where it is considered not the majority desire but the best arguments. This research of Los Horcones governmental forms is based on three sources: 1) Articles wrote by Los Horcones members (such as Los Horcones 1990); 2) Los Horcones website (<http://loshorcones.org/>); 3) E-mail contact with Los Horcones members. This experience in Los Horcones points us to some important aspects. First of all, it shows a very important link between psychological techniques and liberal forms of government, without any direct relation with sovereign govern, but duplicating it. Second, this liberal form of government is specially based on a scientific self-regulation practice, conducting to an ascetical form of "self techniques" (Foucault, 1984). Even considering the behavioristic critics to the concept of freedom (Skinner, 1971), all the control proposed in Walden II and in Los Horcones is based on the natural inclinations of the organisms, aiming at a kind of self-control. Concluding, a special feature of Los Horcones has to be remarked. If Walden was planned for 1000 habitants, in Los Horcones there are only 18 inhabitants, being 3 of them guests. Even though psychological experiments of government (for example, Lippit & White, 1977) do not work with populational mass, dealing with small groups instead, all of them seek to extract general principles to the collective and individual lives. In all of them, we have a liberal government based in self-regulation, respecting the individual inclinations and the scientific principle that manage them, aiming to govern them through their own nature.

Bibliographical references

- FOUCAULT, M. História da sexualidade 2. O uso dos prazeres. Rio de Janeiro, Graal, 1984.
- . Nacimiento de la biopolítica. Buenos Aires, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2007.
- WHITW, R. & LIPPITT, R. Conducta del líder y reacción del miembro en tres "climas sociales". In: CARTWRIGHT, D. & ZANDER, A. Dinámica de grupos. Investigación y teoría. México, Trillas, 1977.
- LOS HORCONES. Personocracia: una forma de gobierno basada en la ciencia del analisis de la conducta. Revista Latino-americana de Psicología, Bogotá, 1, v. 22, p. 111-130, 1990.
- ROSE, N. Inventing our selves. Cambridge, Cambridge University Pres, 1998
- SKINNER, B.F. Walden II: uma sociedade do futuro. 2ª ed. São Paulo, EPU, 1978.
- _____. O mito da liberdade. Rio de Janeiro, Bloch, 1972.

David Clark
Independent

**The Demise of American Behaviorism: an analysis of the influence of social factors
on psychological explanations by means of historiography**

This presentation addresses the social context in which psychological explanations are received. The theme brings historiography into focus as a tool for analysis. The theory of historical knowledge production is here considered in general terms as representative of important cultural beliefs about human nature, and beliefs of human nature are assumptions behind the mechanisms of change. Important for the thesis of this presentation is the idea that the practices of history in any one period can provide an indication of what was received as plausible explanations regarding the means of social change. Between the lines, historical narratives indicate what is believed of human nature, and thus it is argued that analysis by attending to practice of the historian can play an important supporting role in the narrative of events that comprise the history of the human sciences.

This presentation proceeds by argument based on a synthesis of books, essays, and articles from fields as diverse as psychology, sociology, economics, and the theory of history. The specific example from the history of the human sciences that occasions this thesis is an illustration from psychology. The question asked is, what were the factors that contributed to the fall of American Behaviorism. The position taken is, the demise of Behaviorism, as a strong unifying concept in American psychology, was due in part to largely as yet unexplored cultural beliefs. This presentation places Behaviorism in American history between the late 1940s and the 1970s. The thesis is that Behaviorism was challenged and rejected by segments of American society, not for scientific reasons, but because the mechanistic theory of human nature that is implicit in Behaviorism was at odds with segments of a fractured Zeitgeist that existed in America after War II.

A brief overview follows: It is basic to the argument that psychological theories, like Behaviorism, are explanations addressed to an audience, and the audience that judges the explanation is society at large. Again, the context a psychological explanation is offered, and received, within is the cultural identity. All psychological explanations are attended explicitly or implicitly with a theory of human nature. Apart from any empirical demonstrations, part and partial of accepting the psychological explanation is also agreeing with associated theories of human nature. For any period of history, society is assumed to be rife with diverse opinions regarding human nature; although context is ultimately in the eye of the beholder, the analysis of beliefs regarding human nature is a worthwhile effort towards understanding social science theories.

The question arises, how does the researcher determine which theories are acceptable, or unacceptable, during a specified period. Previously I have argued that artists represent a cultural vanguard that presages emerging social reforms and belief structures; literature and performing arts can be used as predictors of acceptable theories. To add weight to the thesis that factors external to science influence judgments, I presently argue that historians also provide an insight into the prevailing received theories of human nature.

The presentation will begin with a discussion of the basic assumptions of Behaviorism. Edwin Guthrie's theory of learning will serve as the example. After the explicit and implicit Behaviorist theory of human nature is presented, then Aptheker's 1947 analysis of the practice of history in America will be outlined. Among the theories of history that will be discussed are mechanical materialism, mysticism, the eclectic

approach, chaos, factor analysis, and Marxist history. Next, Behaviorism's theory of human nature will be compared to the various theories attending the explanations of historical change. At this point, generalizations about the more popular practice of historiography in America can be compared to the theory of human nature that attends Behaviorism, and the success for Behaviorism as a psychological explanation will be discussed.

Although often overlooked, beliefs about human nature are important. As the economist, John Kenneth Galbraith (1977, p. 7) has expressed, "... ideas are important not only for themselves but also for explaining or interpreting social behavior. The ruling ideas of the time are those by which people and governments are guided. Thus they help to shape history itself." Smith (2007) has recently addressed the reflexivity of the creation of human nature. Apart from the fact that one of the major popular historians of the post war period practiced Christian historiography, this method of analysis raises other important questions regarding the production of psychological knowledge. For example, to what degree do personal beliefs motivate and shape the direction of research. It is hoped that this presentation will stimulate a discussion that provides more insight into the social influences involved in the creation and acceptance of psychological explanations.

Partial list of References

Selected papers from the Edwin R. Guthrie Papers in the University of Washington archives.

- Aptheker, H. (1955). *History and Reality*. New York: Cameron Associates, Inc. marxist historian
- Aptheker, H. (1960). *The World of C. Wright Mills*. New York: Marzani & Munsell, Inc.
- Danziger, K. (1997). *Naming the Mind: How psychology found its language*. Thousand Oaks, Calif., Sage.
- Galbraith, J. K. (1967) *The New Industrial State*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co.
- Galbraith, J. K. (1977). *The Age of Uncertainty: a history of economic ideas and their consequences*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co.
- Guthrie, E. R. (1933). On the Nature of Psychological Explanations. *Psychological Review*, 40, 124 – 137.
- Guthrie, E. R. (1935). *The Psychology of Learning*. New York: Harper & Sons.
- Guthrie, E. R. (1959). Association by Contiguity. In Sigmund Koch (Ed.). *Psychology: A study of science*, Vol. 2 (pp. 158 – 195). New York: McGraw – Hill.
- Holton, G. (1998). *The Scientific Imagination*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Mills, C. W. (1959). *The Sociological Imagination*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Reich, C. A. (1970). *The Greening of America*. New York: Random House.
- Smith, R. (2007). *Being Human: Historical Knowledge and the Creation of Human Nature*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Miki Takasuna
Tokyo International University

The first phase in the history of comparative psychology in Japan

During the 150 years since *On the Origin of Species* (1859) was published, the field of comparative psychology that exists in Japan today has been developing differently

from its Western counterpart due to key cultural and societal differences. It is important to first identify two issues that could affect animal research. First, various kinds of wild monkeys inhabit many Asian countries. Japanese people in particular are familiar with so-called Japanese macaques (*Macaca fuscata*), an indigenous species to Japan. In one district named Jigokudani, wild macaques (also known as snow monkeys) famously bathe in hot springs.

As early as the 13th century in Japan, watching monkeys mime human behavior was popular entertainment. Interestingly, the Japanese word for any monkey is “saru,” which is a homonym of a verb that means “go away.” This relates back to samurai soldiers who were partial to watching street performances with monkeys before they headed off to battle because the monkeys were thought to force the demon they may face to “go away” from the warriors. However, the tradition of street-performing monkeys ceased after the Meiji Restoration in 1868 and was not revived until the 1970s. They remain popular by locals and tourists worldwide today.

During the 12th and 13th centuries, about the same time as the popularity of street performances with monkeys, a series of paintings was created on a scroll and kept at Kodaiji, a Buddhist temple in Kyoto. In the series, called Chojugiga in its entirety, we can easily see many species of wild animals miming human behaviors – a monkey, a fox, and a rabbit dress like a Buddhist priest; a frog poses as a Buddhist god; and so on. It is often called the oldest cartoon, or *manga*, in Japan.

This brings us to the second point that could affect animal research in Japan. Throughout history, the Japanese peoples’ relationship to Buddhism was an important influence in the general view of wildlife. Consequently, the Japanese did not delineate a rigid boundary between humans and animals. Reincarnation, one famous belief typical in Buddhism, foresees that one might be reborn in the next life as another species. This view does not mesh with that of the Christian culture. Grouping certain animals is also reflected in indigenous words. In Japanese, the words “apes” and “monkeys” are always expressed as one word (*saru*), rats and mice are collectively called *nezumi*, which corresponds to a subcategory of rodents.

The year 1877 was an important time in the history of comparative psychology in Japan due to three pivotal developments. First, the first Japanese national university was founded in Tokyo whereas only a year before it had begun as a private school. Second, Professor Masakazu Toyama, a previous student at the University of Michigan for three years, instigated a psychology lecture series using the writings of Alexander Bain, Herbert Spencer, and William B. Carpenter as the basis of his presentations. Among them, the works of Spencer especially influenced him. Although Toyama did not conduct any psychological experiments himself, he understood the significance of experimentation. When the University of Tokyo was reorganized as the Imperial University in 1887, Toyama became the president of the College of Liberal Arts. He then influenced the university to hire Yujiro Motora who had obtained a Ph.D. under G. Stanley Hall at Johns Hopkins University in 1888.

The third development at this time was the influence of evolutionary theory. Though Charles Darwin published *the Origin of Species* in 1859, the introduction of evolutionary theory in Japan did not take hold until an American zoologist, Edward S. Morse (1838–1925), arrived in 1877. At the time, Morse was studying brachiopods and visited Japan specifically to expand his collection. However, Toyama had attended Morse’s lecture on evolutionary theory while studying at University of Michigan and was so inspired by his talk that, when Morse arrived in Tokyo, he promptly offered him a zoology professorship at the University of Tokyo. Morse accepted. At that time, Darwinian evolutionary theory was only briefly introduced in a few articles in various

Japanese books and journals, so most Japanese did not yet know about the theory. Nevertheless, when Morse concluded his first lecture on the subject to biology students in September 1877, he was met with so much applause, it overwhelmed him with emotion. He was shocked that the theory was so easily accepted in Japan, with scant disapproval generated mainly from American missionaries. Morse's surprise must be attributed to, as I have pointed out, his unawareness of the cultural impacts of indigenous wild monkeys and Japan's Buddhist belief system, which made for a small step (instead of a giant leap) in accepting Darwin's theory. (!)

Selected Bibliography

- Darwin, C. (1859). *On the origin of species: By means of natural selection, or the preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life*. London: J. Murray.
- Isono, N. (1988). The introduction of evolutionary theory into Japan. In T. Moriya (Ed.), *E. S. Morse and Japan* (pp.295-327). Tokyo: Shogakkan. (In Japanese).
- Takasuna, M. (2005). Six researchers' contributions to comparative psychology in Japan: 1900-1945. *Japanese Psychological Research*, 47, 88-94.
- Takasuna, M. (2007). Proliferation of Western methodological thought in psychology in Japan: Ways of objectification. *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science*, 41, 83-92.
- Watanabe, T. (1940). *Study of Kamada Ho as first Japanese empirical psychologist*. Tokyo: Chukokan. (In Japanese).

Hroar Klempe

Department of Psychology, NTNU, Trondheim, Norway

Early Norwegian Psychology and Lutheran Protestantism

101 years 4
in Oslo

One may say that three figures constituted and formed the very early modern Norwegian psychology. These were Johan Ernst Gunnerus (1718-1773), Niels Treschow (1751-1833) and Johan Sebastian Welhaven (1807- 1873). Despite the fact that they had three quite different positions in the Norwegian society, and covered more than hundred and fifty years, they also shared some important aspects. One of them was that they were all influenced by the German idealism. The other was that they were pioneers in academic psychology, and the third was that Lutheran theology seems to have been forming a sort of premises for their psychology.

What Lutheran theology is or is not, is an open question. In a profound study on secularity, the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor presents three different definitions of changes in religious worship that came out of the reformation in western civilization (Taylor 2007). One is the emptying of the public space of religion. The other is the decline of belief, and the third is the changes of opinions in what it is to believe. It is the third definition Taylor is primarily pursuing in his investigation, and this is probably also a definition, which summarizes some of the core aspects of the entrance of the modernity. This definition does not deny religion as a part of the modernity, but it focuses on the changes of its role. According to Giddens, the doubt must be said to be a salient trait of a modern critical reasoning in general (Giddens 1991/1996, p 11), and of course, the doubt must be said to be an important aspect of the religious faith within the frame of the modernity.

In this perspective one may say that reformation in many ways grows out of the entrance of the modernity. Also Lutheranism represents a change in the opinion of what it means to have a belief. It is not sufficient just to be a part of a society, which belongs to and is more or less ruled by the church. In addition it is necessary to have an individual faith, which ends up in a certain confession revealing the faith as personal. Doubt stands in opposition to faith, thus it is the term that more or less defines faith contra factually: faith is a state in which all doubts are absent. Doubt, therefore, is a precondition for confession and faith also in Lutheran Protestantism.

In this paper I will focus on these aspects as a kind of background for the rise of the very early modern psychology in North Europe in the eighteenth century. By focusing on the three pioneers in Norwegian psychology, one may say that they are very much representing the North German Lutheran enlightenment. This is certainly true for Gunnerus, who studied in Halle when Christian Wolff was still active as a professor at the beginning of the forties. After having been abroad for several years, Gunnerus was in 1758 offered a position as bishop in Nidaros, where Trondheim represented a centre. To him this was an opportunity to establish a scientific society in Norway. This was a kind of society he knew very well from Jena, where he also studied and had been working for some years. In his Episcopal letter from 1758 he proclaimed that he would establish this society in which there were several topics he would like to focus on, not at least empirical psychology. Thus Gunnerus represents a Wolffian tradition when it comes to psychology. Treschow, on the other hand, published in 1812 a book in psychology with the very clear title: "About the human nature in general, especially its spiritual aspects". This is presented as a "psychological anthropology", which mirrors the turn of perspective on psychology launched by Kant. The book, however, demonstrates several aspects of a close relation between theology and psychology. By showing interests in spirituality it is very soon followed up by an interest in human nature. On the other hand the title reveals that there might be a conflict between some aspects of the human nature and its spirituality. This conflict, however, is something the individual has to take into account, which may end up in a certain confession. Thus this book of Treschow may be interpreted in a theological as well as a psychological perspective. Welhaven, however, represents an anti-Hegelian form of German Idealism, which runs parallel with Søren Kierkegaard. They had some contact, and even the term "existentialism" is said to be traced back to Welhaven. In this sense all the three Norwegian psychologists are closely related to three quite different continental philosophers, where all of them contributed with great impact on the development of psychology. The perspective on this paper, however, is the close relation between their psychology and current movements in theology.

References

- Giddens, A. (1991/1996): *Modernitet og selvidentitet*, Hans Reitzelz forlag København
Gunnerus, J.E. (1758/1997): *Hans opvækkelige Hyrde-Brev*. Facsimilia Bibliothecae Universitatis Nidrosiensis 1, Trondheim
Taylor, Ch. (2007): *A Secular Age*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts
Treschow, N. (1812): *Den menneskelige nature I almindelighed især dens aandelige side*. Brummers forlag, København

ut/esp
als
[Kierkegaard]

BROWSING IN THE PAST

Maria Sinatra
Department of Psychology
University of Bari (Italy)

The Italian transposition of Darwin's theory of emotion: The pioneering work of Angelo Mosso

In some notes added by Francis Darwin to the 2nd edition of his father's work, *The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals*, the Italian physiologist Angelo Mosso was mentioned as the "expert Italian physiologist" who in 1884 had published a text - entitled *Fear* - that offered physiological explanations for psychological reactions.

The current essay is designed to clarify how far Mosso reinterpreted Darwin's suggestion that facial expression of emotion was connected to adaptive selection. Although much better remembered for his research into muscular fatigue, Mosso also dealt with emotion and fear, observing the effects of these variables on subjects' cardiovascular and respiratory activity by means of such instruments as the plethysmograph (for measuring volume modifications of organs), and the hydrosphygmomanometer (for recording pulsations reflecting changes in blood circulation in the brain). Taking the view that human beings were another species of animal, he translated psychic movements into physiognomic changes. These methodological roots provided the materialistic basis for Mosso's belief that while evolution theory was valid, Darwin was hamstrung by a lack of physiological knowledge!

Lucia Monacis
Department of Psychology and History of Science
University of Bari (Italy)

Pasquale Penta: an Italian view of Darwinian heredity

The emphasis on the relationship between cranial structure and nervous disorders was the focal point for 19th century Italian psychiatrists influenced by C. Lombroso's positivist school of criminology. This approach was subsequently influenced by the Darwinian concepts of evolution and adaptation, which reduced the psychic sphere to a mere physical level. It was supposed that anatomical, behavioural, and intellectual similarities could be distinguished not in terms of quality but of intensity, which depended on the form of cranial structure. Thus, criminal anthropology classified human beings in specific categories of inferior and superior animals.

The current essay offers a portrait of Pasquale Penta, a Neapolitan psychiatrist who reinterpreted the Darwinian evolution theory in terms of atavism and degeneration. He carried out studies on sexual psychopathology, focusing on the connections between degeneration and heredity and atavism. However, the real importance of his work lies in his relationship with the most famous European psychiatrists of the second half of the 19th century (for example, P. Näcké described him as one of the leading experts on sexual science). Penta's work can be illuminating from a historiographical point of view.

Ciarán Mc Mahon

Dún Laoghaire Institute of Art, Design & Technology,
Republic of Ireland

Aquinas, prayer and *attentio*: suffusion of theology with literary practices

This paper will explore the relationship between the terminology of reflexive discourse and the context of its composition, particularly the literary practices used to compose such a work. I am endeavouring to develop an interpretative paradigm for the history of psychological language that I have begun elsewhere (Mc Mahon, 2008). The crux of this project is not merely to add the literary practices of the author as another element in the discussion of the historical context of reflexive discourse, but to argue for their fundamental importance. In this paper it will be shown that the terminology used in one of the most sophisticated and significant works of Western reflexive discourse can be shown, in certain aspects at least, to be fundamentally underpinned by the most likely literary practices of its author.

That author is Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) and the work is his monumental *Summa Theologica* and what we will be broadly concerned with is his discussion of prayer, and more specifically his use of the term *attentio* ('attention' or 'attentiveness') as it occurs therein. Prior to that particular investigation, and its relationship to Aquinas' literary practices, a thorough-going examination of his historical context will be made – detailing his education, intellectual history, religious assumptions, philosophical erudition, as well as his previous publications as well as his probable motivation for writing.

Hence, in treating of Aquinas' first major work (*Scripta super libros Sententiarum*, 'Commentary on the Sentences', 1256), Davies (1993) remarks that even though it is early, it contains all his major conclusions, from which he did not move much throughout the course of his career. That said, as it was his earliest work, it will be seen that while the content of this work is similar to that of the later *Summa Theologica* (1272); however, when a comparison is made between the use of our object term – *attentio* – in both works, subtle changes can be clearly perceived, which it is argued, can be attributed to differences in the context of their composition.

In that regard, the major part of this paper is devoted to an intensive scrutiny of the sub-sections of the *Summa Theologica* where Aquinas discusses the place of attention in prayer: the thirteenth article, of the eighty-third question of the second part of the second part. In comparison to where Aquinas discussed similar themes in his earlier work, it can be seen that his theology has become much more sophisticated. While this can be argued that this is simply due to his maturation as an author, there is a literalisation at play – ideas have become more tightly defined – and this is argued to be a consequence of several other factors. For one thing, the students which Aquinas is now lecturing are required to bring his text to class (Saenger, 1999, p. 133) and are consequently better informed and better able to criticise his failings.

However, when we examine the particular *amount* of 'attention' or 'attentiveness' that Aquinas deems necessary for a prayer to count as such, some more profound distinctions can be drawn. To put it succinctly, in the earlier 'Commentary on the Sentences', it seems that Aquinas is of the opinion that the "intellect ascends to God when it directs its prayer toward him, and the effect of this ascent lasts throughout the whole prayer" (*Super Sent.*, lib. 4 d. 15 q. 4 a. 2 qc. 4 ad. 3; trans. 1988) but later on, in the 'Summary of Theology', this appears to have changed to 'human mind is unable to remain

aloft for long' (*Summa Theologica*, II.II q. 83 a. 13 ad. 2; trans. 1947). It is consequently argued that Aquinas' pessimism stems, not merely from increasing age and declining cognitive function, but from the increasing number of works which he would have been expected to read (an experience which I am sure most academics can sympathise with!). This concurs with an observation of Jacqueline Hamesse's (1999, p. 107), that in Aquinas' times, "uninterrupted reading of an entire work" was gradually replaced with 'a more fragmented, piecemeal reading style that had the advantage of providing a quick grasp of selections but no longer encouraged any deep contact with the text."

But more fundamentally, what this paper will conclude with is an exposition that Aquinas' explanation of why 'attention is a necessary condition of prayer' and also his distinction of three kinds of attention that can be brought to prayer, both reflect the literary practices (reading, writing and researching) that he himself would have most likely engaged in. Thus there appears to be a very deep suffusion between the author's reflexive discourse intimately and his most likely literary practices, thereby augmenting previous research which illustrated this relationship (Mc Mahon, 2008). The article concludes with a discussion of the relationship of literary practices to the language of reflexive discourse and its relevance in the modern context.

References

- Aquinas, T. (1947). *Summa theologica*. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. New York: Benziger Bros.
- Aquinas, T. (1988). 'Commentary on the Sentences Book 4, distinction 15, question 4'. In S. Tugwell (ed.), *Albert & Thomas: Selected Writings*, pp. 363-418. New York: Paulist Press.
- Davies, B. (1993). *The thought of Thomas Aquinas*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hamesse, J. (1999). 'The scholastic model of reading'. In G. Cavallo and R. Chartier (eds.) *A history of reading in the West*, translated by L.G. Cochrane, pp. 103-119. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Mc Mahon, C. (2008). The origins of the psychological 'interior' – evidence from Imperial Roman literary practices. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, 44, (1), 19-37.
- Saenger, P. (1999). 'Reading in the later Middle Ages'. In G. Cavallo and R. Chartier (eds.) *A history of reading in the West*, translated by L.G. Cochrane, pp. 120-148. Cambridge: Polity Press.

PSYCHOLOGY'S IDENTITY

Sandra G.L. Schruijer
Utrecht University

Asserting a European identity for social psychology in the face of American supremacy: Ideological motives underpinning the formation of the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology (EAESP)

The 20th century has been called the American Century by Time Magazine. The United States emerged from World War II as a superpower, politically economically, technologically and culturally. The United States also became the leading nation in science. This is certainly true for psychology. This shift happened although psychology did have its own European history before the onset of World War II. A case in point may be social psychology. Modern social psychology is depicted as an American phenomenon while on both sides of the Atlantic social psychology developed its specific disciplinary tradition. Europe's tradition was more of a sociological social psychology, while that of the United States was more individualistic (e.g. Farr, 1996). The original European tradition however is often forgotten in current conceptualizations of modern social psychology's history and is largely absent from the current practice of academic social psychologists (e.g. Van Strien, 1997).

This paper focuses on the question how social psychologists in Europe underwent this decentering of Europe as a major locus of social psychological research. In particular this paper will study the motives and dynamics around the formation of a European association of social psychology: EAESP (European Association of Experimental Social Psychology). This association emerged in the early sixties and is still very active today (see www.eaesp.org) (Moscovici & Markóva, 2006). In contrast to my earlier papers that focused on a political Cold War context of the formation of EAESP (Schruijer, 1997, 1998) I will explicitly investigate the motives for developing a European social psychology as professionally or disciplinary different from an American social psychology. To this end I have studied the Archives of the EAESP, focusing on its formative years. Also, I have conducted in-depth interviews with the pioneers of the association, among which the still living members of the first committee and various consecutive presidents.

As a second aim of this paper I explore to what extent the original aims and ambitions of founding EAESP have survived the test of time. To what extent does a European social psychology still exist? Did European thinking influence American thinking in social psychology? I have studied the developments of the *European Journal of Social Psychology*, the association's journal, from its inception until now. Furthermore, I compare it with the main journals in social psychology in the United States, the *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* and the *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*.

The findings indicate that the European social psychologists clearly had a conscious, professional agenda with founding EAESP. They wanted to emancipate a European tradition in social psychological research, namely sociological social psychology. The

existence of EAESP as an institution helped in their eyes to develop and disseminate ideas and practices within that tradition. It was felt to be important to the pioneers that a European social psychology would be of equal standing and as important as the American variant of social psychology which was much more individualistic. It was imperative to the European pioneers that the American social psychologists would also validate this European variant as of equal importance as the American variant. The Western European social psychologists also wanted to extend the membership of EAESP to Eastern Europe and be united with their colleagues behind the Iron Curtain. Their ambition was thus to build a truly European association. Professional concerns may not only have been underlying this ambition, emotional concerns were relevant too (personal ties to Eastern Europe, identification with the plight of family members and colleagues).

EAESP heavily relied on American funding in its formative years. As a professed apolitical organization the EAESP was consciously or unconsciously entangled by the political transatlantic relations at the time (see Schruijer, 2007, 2008). Against this complex background of dependency, the European pioneers wanted to found an academic and science-based social psychology and distance themselves from existing applied social psychological traditions. To signal this they adopted the term experimental in the association's name. Their ambition to found a truly European association, including Eastern Europe, also meant that they had to deal with an Eastern European tradition of social psychology which was much more of an applied and interdisciplinary nature. Thus at least an interplay between professional (e.g. the nature of social psychology: applied versus experimental (or fundamental), individual versus sociological) and regional identity (American versus European) were in operation. Thus the pioneers' aims to put a European social psychology on the agenda involved a delicate balancing act.

Regarding the developments of the original ambitions over time, it seems that the notion of a European social psychology has disappeared. Although the institution of EASP (the term 'experimental' has been dropped recently) is flourishing with an increasing number of members, activities and journals, the discourse used is much more that of developing a 'truly international social psychology'. Whether that means an American social psychology that includes European social psychologists practising American social psychology, psychologists on both sides of the Atlantic regarding European and American notions of social psychology, an American social psychology that has become indistinguishable from a European social psychology or anything else, will be explored in this paper.

Bibliography

Farr, R. *The roots of modern social psychology* (Oxford 1996).

Moscovici, S. & Marková, I. (2006). *The making of modern social psychology: The hidden story of how an international social science was created* (Cambridge 2006).

Schruijer, S. (2007). *Political and intellectual considerations in founding a European association of social psychologists during the Cold War*. Paper presented at the ESHHS-Cheiron Conference, Dublin.

Schruijer, S. (2008). *Is the EAESP a Cold War baby? An investigation into the political context of its formation*. Paper presented at the conference Divided Dreamworlds - The Cultural Cold War East and West, Utrecht University, The Netherlands, 26-27 September.

Van Strien, P. 'The American 'colonization' of northwest European social psychology after World War II'. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 33 (1997) 349-363.

Annette Mülberger - Thomas Sturm
Universitat Autònoma, Barcelona, Max Planck Institute, Berlin

Debates about crisis in psychology's early history

The present paper deals with early crisis diagnosis and discussions about the historical situation and evolution of psychology towards the end of the nineteenth century in Germany. The main questions we will pursue in the following historical survey are threefold. First, how was the term "crisis" used towards the end of the nineteenth century? Secondly, what did Willy try to say by declaring a crisis in psychology and what arguments did he propose for a diagnosis of a crisis? Thirdly, how did some contemporaries react towards Willy's crisis declaration and how did other psychologists of that time evaluate the present state of the discipline?

Before the end of the 18th century, the term „crisis“ was used mainly as *terminus technicus* in medicine and military, referring to a turning point or crucial stage within a battle or a disease. With the end of the ancient regime, the concept was extended to important historical processes in politics, economics and society, and became furthermore connected to the concept of a revolution. Historians like Masur refers to these events saying: „*Their impact on many observers was that of precipitous, even calamitous, change; in a word, crisis*“ (Masur, 1968, p. 590). But it is in the descriptions of the business cycles where we first encounter a broader use of the term. The frequency of large economic crises in the 19th century (1815, 1825, 1836 and 1847) seemed to confirm the belief that crisis is only a transitory occurrence and that the only cause of depression was prosperity. In other words, crises were seen as natural phases of the business cycle which ran its course in accordance with its own laws and dynamics. Karl Marx also considered crises of enormous significance: crises destroy periodically not only the existing products but also the previously created productive forces. Crises would become more and more destructive in the course of capitalistic development, leading to the final breakdown of bourgeois society.

Soon after "crisis" had become a conceptual instrument in the description and explanation of economical, historical and social events, the term was transferred to the scientific domain as well, heading strong criticisms with regard to the psychological practice as it was pursued in the end of the nineteenth century.

The first author who declared a crisis in Psychology was Rudolf Willy who started publishing on this topic in 1897. Willy used clinical terms, diagnosing a "heavy" and "chronic" crisis in the field. From his empiriocriticist point view the crisis is a consequence of enduring metaphysical speculation in the name of "*rigorous pure empirical science*" (Willy, 1899, p. 2). Although his crisis declaration did not receive much attention, the German Priest Constantin Gutherlet reacted to Willy's crisis declaration with an extensive article on "the crisis in psychology" published the following year. This philosopher and theologian, being very interested in psychology, took the

Willy

①

?

Karl Bühler?

opposite point of view, recommending psychologists to include neo-scholastic metaphysics. If psychologists dismissed all metaphysics, then this vigorous young science would head towards a crisis. Again, according to one of the protagonists of psychology's history, William Stern, at the turn of the century psychology was already considered an autonomous discipline. Although less critical than Willy, Stern agrees with the former with regard to the coexistence of a great variety of approaches and a lack of unity in the field.

The comparison of the three contemporary witnesses shows, that at the end of the 19th century psychologists felt already overwhelmed by the expansion of their own field. Spirits were divided over several issues like Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) observed bitterly: "*Probably more than any other philosophical area psychology finds itself at the turn of the century in a very controversial situation*" (Wundt, 1904, p. 163). The discussions dealt with essential and definitional aspects of the discipline like the role of introspection and experimentation, or with epistemological and philosophical discussions concerning the kind of empirical science psychology should be and how it should relate to philosophy. Mach and Avenarius' epistemology offered a philosophical basis influencing a group of philosophers demanding psychology to become a "pure empirical science", free from any speculation and metaphysics. Willy was one of them. His diagnosis of a crisis in psychology was intended as an alarm in order to denounce the persistence of idealistic approaches like Wundt's.

Bibliography

MASUR, G. (1968). Crisis in History. In: P. Wiener, *Dictionary of the History of Ideas* (pp. 589-596). New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

→ WILLY, R. (1899). *Die Krisis der Psychologie*. Leipzig: Reisland.

WUNDT, W. (1904). *Die Psychologie im Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts*. In: W. Wundt (1917), *Reden und Aufsätze* (pp. 163-231). Leipzig: Kröner.

Sándor Soós¹, András Schubert¹, Csaba Pléh²

1 Institute for Research Organization MTA, Budapest

2 Department of Cognitive Science BME, Budapest

Magyar Pszichológiai Szemle: Tendencies in the Core Journal of Hungarian Psychology. (An Exploratory Study)

Background. Algorithmic historiography, originally proposed by Eugene Garfield, the founder of ISI, is the state-of-the art framework within which tracking the historical development of science (conceptual systems, fields, etc.) might best be accomplished. Though this term has been, in its native usage, applied specifically to the computer aided approach for the reconstruction of citation networks of publications/authors in order to reveal the spread of ideas through time (cf. Garfield-Pudovkin-Istomin, 2003), the scope of the concept can easily be extended to incorporate all the methods and techniques from information science as applied to the study of science and technology. A wide range of bibliometric and text mining methods are nowadays commonly utilized to reveal hidden patterns in scientific corpora, including historiographic or dynamic aspects of intellectual, social or institutional settings.

1911 Bihet crisis → revolution

1911 Kostyleff

La crise de

la psychologie expérimentale

The study presented below is a deployment of this methodology addressing the core journal in the field of psychology in Hungary, *Hungarian Review of Psychology* [*Magyar Pszichológiai Szemle*, hereafter: *Review* or *MPSZ*]. The goal of the analysis is at least twofold: (1) to explore the characteristics and developments of psychological research in Hungary as it is mirrored in its core scholarly journal, a dedicated platform for the Hungarian research community, and (2) to assess in what ways the activity represented in this body of literature relates to the international output of this field, comprised of publications of Hungarian authors in international, peer-reviewed journals (hereafter referred to as *HunPsy*).

Materials and methods. For the individual and comparative analysis of the *Review* and the international corpus, bibliographic collections were retrieved from the electronic databases Psychinfo™ and ISI WoS™, respectively. Psychinfo provided us with a coverage of 768 articles in the *Review* ranging from 1967 to 2007, with a much narrower subset of records containing the full set of references as a fundamental aspect for bibliometric analysis (1997–2007). The ISI WoS set comprised of 1728 articles from 1975 to date, with at least one author affiliation from Hungary, the source (journal) of which was assigned to relevant subject categories. For the comparison we randomly sampled the international corpus, and normalized the value sets of bibliographic fields in both data sets.

For the exploratory study, we combined bibliometric, social network and content analysis (with advanced information visualization characteristic of science mapping) of these data sets in a complementary manner. The hypothesis behind was that a potential convergence in the results of these approaches that measure different, still comparable dimensions of the literature, enables us to describe the main features of the subject. Three main dimensions of the literature have been subjected to analysis, with the corresponding methods (cf. Chen, 2006 and Schubert, 2001):

(1) Intellectual basis: reference sources (bibliometrics). The pool of references associated with a branch of publications are conceptualized in scientometrics as a proxy for the intellectual basis or „background knowledge” of that piece of research. W.r.t the *Review*, we examined the sources in this basis, focusing mainly on article references, i.e. the role and usage of journals in *MPSZ*. We examined the age distribution of references, and the reference patterns in both corpora to reveal their positions in the landscape of psychological research. To relate *MPSZ* to *HunPsy*, comparative analysis was conducted plotting the relative proximity/distance of their intellectual basis.

(2) Authorsip patterns and collaboration (social network analysis). The scholarly community behind *MPSZ* lent itself to analysis through the examination of authorsip patterns. Supported with some descriptive statistics, we extracted and described the co-author network from the *Review* regarding the most meaningful measures (strength of collaboration, network density, centrality parameters, subcommunities). We also characterized the main author communities resulted from the exercise in terms of keyword profiles from their set of publications.

(3) Research fronts: automated content analysis (text mining). To detect the thematic profile emerging from the *Review*, indicating the main research interests of the background community, as well as the conceptual organization conveyed by the journal, we utilized text mining tools. We ran co-word analysis and its variants on thematic descriptors, primarily on author-generated keywords for articles. The resulting conceptual network was then (a) used to identify those topics/concepts, that organize the discourse, and (b) structured by clustering techniques yielded in picture of the research strands in *MPSZ*.

Preliminary results. The analyses described above have led to a fairly consistent picture of the subject matter. Based on the analysis of references, the Review seemed to build on a quite up-to-date knowledge base (high overall Price index), which, in this quantitative respect, had a very similar profile to that of the *HunPsy* corpus ($R^2=0.96$). The qualitative side revealed that in the joint distribution of journals that contribute significantly to either sample there was a considerable asymmetry: the Review (as the entire corpus) favoured *developmental psychology* and *environmental psychology*, while the *HunPsy* corpus mainly depended on journals related to *comparative psychology* and *neurobiology*. The authorship patterns and the co-author network in the Review showed that while collaborative work was not the rule (70% of the articles was single-authored), and collaboration was not represented on a regular basis (9% of the actual collaborations included more than one article), the topology of the network from the remaining part still uncovered some valid subcommunities, usually with 1–3 key actors connecting many other authors, or author groups. Corresponding keyword profiles revealed that these subgroups can, in terms of research subjects, be described as a) *cognitive development–comparative aspects*, b) *environmental psychology*, and c) *psycholinguistics*. Prominent concepts with high discourse structuring potential (betweenness centrality), that have emerged from co-word analysis of keywords also pointed towards these research strands, as most salient in the thematic spectrum. However, partly because descriptors on a detailed level were used, a more diverse picture became visible and confirmed by clustering results (highlighting the role of personality psychology, religion psychology, or the history of psychology as well). Further analysis is planned to subsequently refine the overall picture, and to complete the comparisons in the above and similar dimensions (e.g. institutional relations), while scrutinizing the dynamic (temporal) aspects of these results.

References

- CHEN, C. (2006) CiteSpace II: Detecting and visualizing emerging trends and transient patterns in scientific literature. *Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology*, 57(3), 359-377.
- GARFIELD E, PUDOVKIN AI, ISTOMIN VS. (2003) Why do we need Algorithmic Historiography? *Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology* 54(5):400-412.
- SCHUBERT, A. (2001) Scientometrics: The Research Field and its Journal, in *Organizations and Strategies in Astronomy – Vol. 2 (OSA 2)*, Ed. A. Heck, Kluwer Acad.Publ., Dordrecht, 179-195.

Bálint Forgács

Budapest University of Technology and Economics

A neural perspective on the history of psychology: do shifts of approach reflect shifts of neural dispositions?

The scientific reduction of psychology's various schools led to various sets of key concepts: their understanding offered different metaphors. According to the cognitive

metaphor theory, abstract concepts are understood by a simple, concrete source domain, systematically mapped onto an abstract target domain.

The key metaphors of psychology can be interpreted as conceptual-metaphoric mappings of certain plausible concepts, emerging from experience and experiments (e.g. conditioning, gestalts), onto a wide variety of less easily graspable human functioning (e.g. behavior, perception). These plausible concepts, besides being source domains, also serve as target domains for metaphorical mappings, reflecting naive psychological metaphorical expressions, which ground them into source domains of sensorimotor experiences.

Based on these mappings, it is possible to create a metaphorical cortical map, where the various brain regions represent the sensorimotor source domains of metaphors, which target domains later become source domains of scientific interpretation. This way it is possible to create hypotheses on the neural dispositions of the different schools of psychology.

Following a reverse direction of the reasoning, all the neural function of the human brain can serve as source domain for theories, revealing the possible neural disposition of researchers. Some rely more on operations of the left hemisphere (logic, rational thinking, serial, sequential, and verbal processes), while others prefer the operations of the right hemisphere (holistic approach, intuitive, heuristic processes, non-verbal, visual thinking).

The history of psychology can be interpreted as shifts between neural preferences.

The early psychology of consciousness (James) focused mainly on left hemispheric functions, as consciousness itself is attributed to the verbal hemisphere. A major shift was Freud's Psychoanalysis, where the unconscious, the libido, and emotion – so the right hemisphere – broke into psychology. The dissatisfaction with subjective introspective methods led to Behaviorism, where the strictly scientific, logical reasoning of the left hemisphere was mobilized to interpret objective behavior, via subcortical functions (reflex, conditioning). Gestalt psychology offered a right hemispheric holistic approach, with important findings in perception, while it worked in an objective, experimental framework. Although Cognitive science reintroduced the mentalistic to psychology, it does not allow subjective elements enter its field. The main metaphors of computers and Chomsky's languages module talk about a strong left hemispheric start, but the recent development in connectionist networks, implicit processes might reflect a need to turn towards the right hemisphere again.

Certain conceptual dichotomies can be pervasive in psychology because of their interpretative power concerning experience created by the neural system.

/ see what you mean

NAME INDEX

Abma 20
Allesch 47
Bérdi 29
Bodor 49
Bos 10
Bryson 33
Clark 52
Curtis 15
Deutsch 21
Ferreira 50
Forgács 65
Guski-Leinwand 18
Gyimesi 43
Hautequest 50
Jovanovic 32
Kaya 36
Kiessling 25
Klempe 55
Kloosterman 41
Lafferton 39
Leary 26
Leichtman 22
Lamiell 23
Leopoldoff-Martin 48
Machado 50
MacMahon 58
Monacis 57
Mülberger 62
Nyitrai-Sükösd 49
Pazziani 11
Pietikainen 18
Plas 2
Pléh 63
Rieber 28
Rijks 15
Schruijer 60
Schubert 63
Sinatra 57
Sirotkina 6
Soós 63
Sturm 61
Takasuna 53
Vajda 9
Valentine 29
Vilaplana Traveria 45
Wan Chi Wong 3